Mira International Foods, Inc.

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: January 12, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Mira International Foods, Inc.
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Serial No. 98465558
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Daniel S. Kirshner, of Daniel S. Kirshner, Attorney at Law, LLC,
for Mira International Foods, Inc.
Amanda Miller, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 133,
Laurie Kaufman, Managing Attorney.
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Before Goodman, Pologeorgis, and Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Mira International Foods, Inc. (Applicant) applied to register the mark YOGUT,
in standard-character format, on the Principal Register for goods ultimately
identified as “Freeze-dried yogurt-based snack” in International Class 29.1 The
Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d), due to likelihood of confusion with the standard-character mark
1 The application was filed under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b),
based on Applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.

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YOURGUT, which is registered on the Principal Register for “yogurt” in International
Class 29.2
After final refusal,3 Applicant appealed.4 Both Applicant and the Examining
Attorney filed appeal briefs.5 The appeal is now ready for decision. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm.
ANALYSIS
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). We determine whether confusion
is likely by analyzing all probative facts in evidence relevant to the likelihood-of-
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
1361 (CCPA 1973). See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2023). Though du Pont lists thirteen numbered factors, we generally address only
those that are relevant and material to the case before us. See, e.g., Shen Mfg. Co. v.
Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston
2 Reg. No. 7145295 issued on August 22, 2023.
3 See Dec. 10, 2024 Final Office Action. Citations to specific pages of prosecution filings will
be to .pdf-format versions of the documents as downloaded from the USPTO’s TSDR
electronic trademark docketing system.
4 See 1 TTABVUE. References to the briefs and other Board docket entries cite to the
Board’s TTABVUE electronic docket system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” represents
the docket number assigned to the cited filing in TTABVUE and any number immediately
following “TTABVUE” identifies the specifically-cited page(s), if any.
5 See 4 TTABVUE (Applicant’s brief); 6 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney’s brief).

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Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Typically, those are the
factors that the parties address and on which there is relevant evidence in the record.
See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.
2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). After
making findings on the relevant factors, we then weigh them together to determine
if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64
F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In this case, Applicant and the Examining Attorney engage only on the first two
factors listed in du Pont:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or
services as described in an application or registration ….
476 F.2d at 1371.6 These two factors usually play important roles in whether
confusion is likely and sometimes are dispositive. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc,
866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The likelihood of confusion analysis considers
all DuPont factors for which there is record evidence but may focus ... on dispositive
factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods.”) (cleaned up;
citations omitted); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098,
1103 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry … goes to the cumulative effect of
6 As discussed below, the Examining Attorney also argues that the third factor—trade
channels—supports the refusal, but Applicant does not address this factor.

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differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”).
A. Comparison of the marks
We start with “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as
to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at
1371. Similarity in all four aspects is not required, however, for this factor to support
a refusal. See, e.g., Beacon-Morris Corp. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 463 F.2d 1097, 1098,
(CCPA 1972) (confusion likely as between DUO-FLO and TWIN FLO because of
similar meaning notwithstanding differences in appearance and sound); Krim-Ko
Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the
similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”)
(citation omitted); Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 740 (CCPA 1953)
(“it is proper to consider [the marks’] appearance, sound and meaning … but a
combination of all three factors need not necessarily exist”) (cleaned up; citations
omitted). We compare marks in their entireties, see, e.g., Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. v.
Georgallis Holdings, LLC, 826 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016), but not side-by-side,
as though in a laboratory. Rather, we keep in mind both that consumers depend on
their recollection of marks to which they’ve previously been exposed and that their
memories are fallible. See, e.g., In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981).
We also keep in mind that “[s]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of
degree.” St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 752 (citation omitted). “The proper test is …

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whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted); see also
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Knox Indus. Corp., 277 F.2d 945, 947 (CCPA 1960) (“This
issue is whether the marks are confusingly similar, not whether they are identical.”)
(citation omitted).
We “analyze[ ] likelihood of confusion based on the mark as applied to the goods
recited” in the application and registration. i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1324-25. The
registered mark is YOURGUT for yogurt and Applicant’s mark is YOGUT for freeze-
dried yogurt-based snacks. The marks, while not identical in appearance or sound,
are similar-sounding and similar-looking. As to connotation and meaning, both
marks, in this yogurty context, would likely be seen as intentional misspellings of
“yogurt” that, by omitting the letter “r,” point to the digestive benefits of yogurt.
Indeed, Applicant admits as much, noting that “eating yogurt on a regular basis is
good for gut health” and that, accordingly, the term “gut in the marks is arguably
suggestive of the goods.”7
Applicant, however, hypothesizes that the “YO” portion of its mark will be seen as
the Spanish word for “I” or “me,” and thus contends that consumers will read its mark
as “I am stomach.”8 The Examining Attorney does not deny that “YO” means “I” or
“me” in Spanish, but, pointing to English dictionary evidence, contends that
7 See 4 TTABVUE 11-12.
8 See id. at 11.

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consumers would more naturally read “YO” as a colloquial English abbreviation for
“your,” with the result that consumers would likely see YOGUT as a misspelled
version of “your gut.”9 We agree with the Examining Attorney. We see nothing in the
record, nor is there anything about Applicant’s identified goods (freeze-dried yogurt
based snacks), that would prompt consumers to read the first portion of Applicant’s
single-term mark as a Spanish word and the second half as an English word. Cf.
Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F. 3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(assessing the connotation of the parties’ marks in the context of the parties’
respective goods and services, affirming a finding that consumers would take away
different connotations from the word “COACH” in connection with luxury leather
handbags, suitcases, and travel items than they would in the context of the other
party’s educational materials). In the context of the respective goods at issue here,
we find that the marks have the same meaning and connotation.
Because the marks have identical suggestive meanings and connotations and are
similar in visual appearance and sound, we find that, overall, they create very similar
commercial impressions. Thus, in our final weighing we will count the first du Pont
factor as favoring a conclusion that confusion is likely.
B. Comparison of the goods
The second likelihood-of-confusion factor looks at “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity
and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration.” du
9 See 6 TTABVUE 5-7 (citing October 2, 2024, Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 9
(Abbreviations.com definition of “YO” as “shortened form of your”; id. at 10
(Yourdictionary.com definition of “YO” as a colloquial “shortened form of your”)).

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Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. This is a factor of “considerable importance” when weighing
whether confusion is likely or not. See, e.g., Pink Lady Corp. v. L.N. Renault & Sons,
Inc., 265 F.2d 951, 953 (CCPA 1959); Pep Boys-Manny, Moe and Jack v. Edwin F.
Guth Co., 197 F.2d 527, 528-29 (CCPA 1952). This is not “an all-or-nothing factor,”
however, but “should be analyzed along a sliding scale.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards,
LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017). That is
because, “[e]ven if the goods and services in question are not identical, the consuming
public may perceive them as related enough to cause confusion about the source or
origin of the goods … .” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261,
1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also In re Rsch. & Trading Corp., 793
F.2d 1276, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“It is … not necessary that the goods of the parties
be identical in order to sustain a finding of likelihood of confusion.”) (citations
omitted).
There are several ways to show that consumers view non-identical (i.e., “non-
competing”) goods as related. One way is to show that the goods are “intrinsically
related.” See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc. v. K2 Corp., 555 F.2d 815, 816 (CCPA 1977)
(noting this as one way consumers may see products or services to be related). Here,
the goods recited in the cited registration is yogurt, and Applicant’s goods are “yogurt-
based.” Thus, there is an intrinsic relationship between the two goods.
Another way to show that consumers perceive two types of goods to be related is
to show that one or more other companies offer both under the same mark. See, e.g.,
Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2024); In re Detroit

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Athl. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267.
The more consumers see companies selling certain non-identical goods under one
mark, the more they tend to see those goods as related in the sense that matters for
potential source confusion. Here, the Examining Attorney placed evidence in the
record that several other companies do exactly that.10
Applicant concedes “there is some relationship between the goods” but contends
they “are not related enough to arise to likelihood of confusion.”11 Applicant, however,
cites no evidence in rebuttal to the evidence of relatedness we noted above. Rather, it
pins this argument on its characterization of the respective marks as being “simply
not very similar.”12 As we found above, however, the marks are very similar.
Based on the descriptions of the respective goods in the application and
registration and on the evidence of third-parties selling both types of goods under one
brand, we find the goods to be related. This important factor will also count in favor
of a conclusion that confusion is likely when we conduct our final factor-weighing.
C. Comparison of the channels of trade
Another factor that may bear on whether confusion is likely is “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at
10 See HAPPY BABY brand freeze-dried yogurt-based snack (Dec. 10, 2024 Final Office
Action, at TSDR 7) and yogurt (id. at 12); GOOD & GATHER brand freeze-dried yogurt-based
bites (id. at 15) and yogurt (id. at 18); GERBER brand freeze-dried yogurt-based snack (id.
at 26) and yogurt (id. at 33); PARENTS’ CHOICE brand freeze-dried yogurt-based snack (id.
at 42) and yogurt (id. at 50); BEECH-NUT brand yogurt-based snack (id. at 57) and yogurt
(id. at 66-70); MEIJER brand freeze-dried yogurt bites (id. at 76) and yogurt (id. at 80).
11 See 4 TTABVUE 12.
12 See id.

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1361. The Examining Attorney contends that the evidence shows that the goods are
likely to travel in the same trade channels.13 Applicant does not address this factor.
We agree that the evidence we listed above of third-party websites that offer both
yogurt and yogurt-based snacks for purchase online shows that the trade channels
overlap. Based on that, we find at least some overlap in the trade channels used for
these types of goods. This factor lends some support to a conclusion that confusion is
likely. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., No. 77029776, 2009 WL 2420527, at *6
(TTAB 2009) (“This overlap in trade channels supports a finding, under the third du
Pont factor, that a likelihood of confusion exists.”).
D. Weighing the findings on the relevant factors together
Having made findings on each of the relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors, our
final step is to assess together the findings we have made on the relevant factors to
determine if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely as to the marks before
us. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384.
Here, the marks are very similar and the goods are related. As we mentioned
earlier, these both are important factors. The trade channels overlap, too, though this
is not as weighty a consideration in this case. With all three factors addressed on
appeal pointing towards a conclusion that confusion is likely, we have no difficulty on
this record so concluding.
Decision: We affirm the refusal.
13 See 6 TTABVUE 8-9.