Zhejiang Import & Export Pet Food and Product Industry Association v. Jinchun Ma

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: December 22, 2025
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Zhejiang Import & Export Pet Food and Product
Industry Association
v.
Jinchun Ma
_____
Cancellation No. 92076309
_____
David Silver of Bayramoglu Law Offices LLC,
for Zhejiang Import & Export Pet Food and Product Industry Association.
Jinchun Ma, pro se.
_____
Before English, Elgin, and Bradley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Elgin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
I. Background
On October 6, 2025, the Board issued a final decision (the “Decision”) denying the
cancellation as to Petitioner Zhejiang Import & Export Pet Food and Product
Industry Association’s claims against Respondent Jinchun Ma’s registration for the

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composite mark for various goods in in International Class 18. We held
that Petitioner did not establish that it has entitlement to a statutory cause of action.
This case now comes before the Board on Petitioner’s request for reconsideration
of the Decision pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.129(c), 37 C.F.R. § 2.129(c). The
premise underlying a request for reconsideration of a Board final decision in an inter
partes proceeding is that
based on the evidence of record and the prevailing
authorities, the Board erred in reaching the decision it
issued. The request may not be used to introduce additional
evidence, nor should it be devoted simply to a reargument
of the points presented in the requesting party’s brief on
the case. Rather, the request normally should be limited to
a demonstration that, based on the evidence properly of
record and the applicable law, the Board’s ruling is in error
and requires appropriate change.
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 543 (2025).1
II. Discussion
We find that the Board made no errors in its Decision. We address each of
Petitioner’s arguments for reconsideration in turn.
1 Petitioner’s request is at 62 TTABVUE and reply is at 64 TTABVUE. Respondent’s
opposition is at 63 TTABVUE. The applicable rules do not make provision for reply briefs in
a request for reconsideration of a final decision. Trademark Rule 2.129(c), 37 C.F.R. §
2.129(c). Nonetheless, in our discretion we have considered Petitioner’s reply brief. (64
TTABVUE). See TBMP § 543 and authorities cited therein.

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A. Misapplication of the Law
As a reminder, we determined in the Decision that the harm alleged by Petitioner
is too speculative and not corroborated by credible evidence.2 In its request for
reconsideration, Petitioner first argued that the Board “misapplied” the applicable
caselaw.3 In particular, Petitioner asserts that the decisions in Luca McDermott
Catena Gift Tr. v. Fructuoso-Hobbs SL, 102 F.4th 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2024), Curtin v.
United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 137 F.4th 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2025), and Corcamore,
LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2020), do not support the Board’s decision.
We note first that these cases were cited to set forth the framework to determine if
harm alleged by a plaintiff in a Board proceeding is too remote or derivative to
establish entitlement.
Petitioner argued that Luca McDermott is distinguishable because it concerned
the ground of likelihood of confusion, a claim not asserted by Petitioner in this case:
“Therefore, the Board’s requirement that Petitioner ‘must establish that it has a
present or prospective interest in using a similar mark or term’ … is incorrect. While
a present or prospective interest in using a similar mark or term may be one way to
establish an entitlement to a statutory cause of action, it is not a must requirement
as the Board relies.”4
2 61 TTABVUE. Citations in this opinion to the Decision, briefs and other materials in the
case docket refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. See In re Integra
Biosciences Corp., No. 87484450, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *6.
3 See 61 TTABVUE 4-7.
4 62 TTABVUE 5 (citing 61 TTABVUE 20).

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We did not, however, cite to Luca McDermott for the proposition cited by
Petitioner. The particular sentence in the opinion to which Petitioner refers above
was supported by cases decided under Sections 2(a) and 2(c) of the Trademark Act —
claims asserted by Petitioner here.5 The point of that sentence was to point out that
it is not enough for Petitioner or its members to prove only that they are in the same
business as Respondent as a basis for entitlement without also showing that they
have a present or prospective interest in using a similar mark or term. That
particular assertion of harm is too remote to establish entitlement. But that did not
foreclose Petitioner from establishing entitlement on another basis, which Petitioner
did not do here.
Nor did we, as Petitioner asserted, find that its members are “direct competitors”
of Respondent’s goods under his mark.6 Rather, we assumed only (based on vague but
unchallenged evidence) that Petitioner’s members “sell products relating to pet care
in the United States.”7 But this testimony was far too vague to establish Petitioner’s
entitlement based on its members’ conduct.
Finally, Petitioner relied on Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp.,
823 F.2d 490 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Petitioner argued that the test for associational
standing in Jewelers Vigilance was met, namely: “(a) [the association’s] members
5 See id. (citing U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Tempting Brands Netherlands B.V., No. 91233138,
2021 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *21 (Section 2(a) false suggestion claim); and R.M. Dhariwal (HUF)
100% EOU v. Zarda King Ltd., No. 91231033, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 95, at *15 (Section 2(c)
claim)).
6 62 TTABVUE 6.
7 Id. (citing 61 TTABVUE 20 n.42).

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would otherwise have [entitlement] to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks
to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit.” Id. at 494.8 Although we did not quote the test in the Decision, we found
that Petitioner’s members (none of which provided testimony in this proceeding)
would not be entitled to bring this cancellation on their own under the third element
as there was insufficient evidence to establish the members had a real interest in the
proceeding or a reasonable belief in harm from the challenged registration. For
example:
• We found that “the interests of Petitioner and its members do not fall
within the zone of interests protected by any of the asserted claims” relating
to use of President Xi’s likeness;9
• We distinguished cases such as Jeweler’s Vigilance and Dhariwal, supra,
because “[h]ere, unlike in these cases and others, Petitioner has not
demonstrated any direct connection between President Xi and Petitioner or
its members”;10
8 See 62 TTABVUE 7-9. See also 61 TTABVUE 16 n.31 (acknowledging that a trade
association, as “the watchdog for the industry,” may have a right to oppose a mark’s
registration where its individual members each have a personal interest in cancelling the
accused mark, citing Jewelers Vigilance, 823 F.2d at 494).
9 61 TTABVUE 17 (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).

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• We found that “[t]he alleged harm to Petitioner and its members as a
result of Respondent’s mark incorporating the purported image of President
Xi and Chinese characters also is speculative and highly attenuated”;11
• We noted that “The witness has not explained why the Chinese government
would mistakenly associate Respondent’s mark with Petitioner or its
members and the other evidence of record does not fill this gap”;12
• We were not convinced by Leilei Jiang’s testimony that Petitioner and its
members would be associated with Respondent’s “low quality products”
with Chinese lettering because “[t]hese statements are not specifically
about U.S. consumers nor is there any evidence of record that U.S.
consumers know of Petitioner or its members. Furthermore, the
testimony is far too speculative to demonstrate a real interest in the
proceeding or a reasonable belief in harm from the challenged
registration.”13
In short, Petitioner did not establish that its members would be entitled to bring
this cancellation on their own under the Jeweler’s Vigilance test.
B. Weight of Leilei Jiang Testimony Declaration
Petitioner next argued that we did not give sufficient weight to the testimony
declaration of its secretary general, Leilei Jiang, disregarding it as our unilateral
11 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).

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“personal belief without evidentiary support.”14 Petitioner contended that the
witness’s testimony regarding alleged harm was reasonable and uncontradicted.15
We found the testimony to be unsupported by documentary evidence and vague in
certain respects, including the lack of information about the types of and amounts of
products sold by its members in the United States,16 alleged mis-association by U.S.
consumers between Petitioner or its members with the Chinese government,17 and
Petitioner’s intent to use a similar mark.18 Moreover, the evidence and history
regarding the filing of the intent-to-use application raised serious questions about
Petitioner’s motives and the witness’s credibility.19 The credibility of witnesses is
always a question to be considered in evaluating their testimonies. See, e.g., Tiger
Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap. Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
(“Decisions about credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence are committed to the
14 62 TTABVUE 12.
15 Id. at 10-12.
16 See, e.g., 61 TTABVUE 20 n.42 (“Petitioner’s evidence to show that it and its members are
competitors of Applicant’s pet waste bags in the United States is vague, confusing, and
unsupported by documentary evidence.”).
17 Id. at 19 (“The witness has not explained why the Chinese government would mistakenly
associate Respondent’s mark with Petitioner or its members and the other evidence of record
does not fill this gap”).
18 Id. at 21 (“In this case, the only proof we have been supplied as to Petitioner’s bona fide
intent to use a ‘similar’ mark is Leilei Jiang’s vague testimony and the partial TSDR printout
of the ’102 Application”).
19 Id. (“Given the timing of the filing of the ’102 Application and the unexplained structural
similarities of the parties’ marks (which we believe are highly unlikely to be merely
coincidental), we are not convinced that Petitioner’s so-called intent to use this mark was
formed separate and apart from its prior knowledge of Respondent’s mark. If anything, the
evidence strongly suggests that Petitioner’s intent to use this mark was formed after the
Board denied Petitioner’s summary judgment motion in a pretextual attempt to manufacture
entitlement. Leilei Jiang’s testimony on this point is not credible, and we give it very little
probative value.”).

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sound discretion of the Board as the trier of fact.”), quoted in In re Uman Diagnostics
AB, No. 88960633, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 77, at *43. The Board was within its discretion
as the trier of fact in this proceeding not to give full credit to the testimony in view of
the limited, vague, and questionable evidence
C. Petitioner’s Trademark Application
Petitioner argued that our conclusion that “Petitioner’s assertion that the
challenged registration poses a ‘potential obstacle’ to its application or use of the
mark is not reasonable under the circumstances” is itself unreasonable.20 Petitioner
contended that we should not have compared the marks as we did, and instead the
fact that we acknowledged certain “structural similarities” between the marks was
“evidence enough that there can be a debate as to whether such similarities are
sufficient under a likelihood of confusion analysis that would take into account many
other factors, including but not limited to trade channels and consumer
sophistication,” in light of the low threshold for entitlement.21 We disagree.
The issue is whether Petitioner proved that continued registration of the contested
mark could impact Petitioner’s ability to register or use an arguably similar mark as
a basis for entitlement. See, e.g., U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Tempting Brands
Netherlands B.V., No. 91233138, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *21; Dhariwal, 2019 TTAB
LEXIS 95, at *15. A plaintiff’s ownership of an application to register an arguably
similar mark for arguably similar goods and services may be sufficient to establish
20 62 TTABVUE 13 (citing 61 TTABVUE 23).
21 Id. at 14.

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entitlement. Here, even if Petitioner’s mark is “arguably similar” to
Respondent’s mark (and we disagree that it is), there is no evidence as to
the nature of goods or services identified in the application inasmuch as the TSDR
record made of record by Petitioner is truncated.22 Nor was there other evidence of
record that would support arguable similarity such as a refusal based on
Respondent’s registration or detailed witness testimony.
III. Conclusion
Petitioner has failed prove that “based on the evidence of record and the prevailing
authorities, the Board erred in reaching the decision it issued.” Petitioner cites to
Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1303, for the proposition that “the zone-of-interests test is
‘not especially demanding,’ and that ‘the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.’”23
Here, we do not harbor any doubt about Petitioner’s failure to meet its burden.
Petitioner’s request for reconsideration is denied, and the Board’s Decision stands.
22 See 61 TTABVUE 21.
23 62 TTABVUE 6; see also id. at 7, 12, and 13.