MacLan, Incorporated

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: July 8, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re MacLan, Inc.
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Serial No. 98126959
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Bobby W. Braxton of Braxton Perrone, PLLC,
for MacLan, Inc.
Katherine Mahoney, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 127,
Scott Kumis, Managing Attorney.
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Before Heasley, Allard, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Heasley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, MacLan, Inc. seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
standard character mark TRUGRIT for “power-operated abrasive wheels, namely,
abrasive grinding wheels for metals” in International Class 7.1
1 Application Serial No. 98126959 was filed on August 10, 2023, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claim of first use anywhere and
use in commerce since at least as early as November 3, 2012.
Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system and identify the documents by title, date, and page in the
downloadable .pdf version. Citations to the briefs and other materials in the appeal record
refer to the Board’s TTABVUE online docket system.

Serial No. 98126959
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The Examining Attorney has refused registration under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, as used in
connection with these goods, so resembles the registered mark TRUE GRIT (in
standard characters) for “abrasive lapping compounds for industrial sharpening and
grinding,” in International Class 3, as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, or to deceive.2
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration, the appeal proceeded. The matter is fully briefed. We affirm the
refusal to register.
I. Evidentiary Objection
Applicant has attached to its brief an “exhibit A” depicting Registrant’s TRUE
GRIT lapping compound.3 The Examining Attorney objects that this evidence was
already submitted in Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration.4 The objection is
sustained. In re Jimenez, No. 97551823, 2025 WL 3126703, *1, n.4 (TTAB 2025)
(“Applicant’s submission with his appeal brief of portions of the prosecution record
was superfluous and the Board strongly discourages this practice.”); In re Michalko,
No. 85584271, 2014 WL 2531202, *1 (TTAB 2014) (“Parties to Board cases
occasionally seem to be under the impression that attaching previously-filed evidence
2 Registration No. 3496744 issued on the Principal Register on September 2, 2008. Renewed.
3 Applicant’s main brief, 6 TTABVUE 10-12.
4 Examining Attorney’s brief, 9 TTABVUE 2-3 (citing Applicant’s April 9, 2025 Response to
Office Action/Request for Reconsideration at 9-11).

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to a brief and citing to the attachments, rather than to the original submission is a
courtesy or a convenience to the Board. It is neither.”). The exhibit attached to
Applicant’s main brief on appeal will be given no consideration.5
II. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act provides that a mark may be refused
registration if it:
Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used
in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when
used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive….
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion between marks under
5 Applicant’s main brief contains a perfunctory “Request for Remand” asserting, without
more, that “Applicant requests remand. Applicant respectfully submits there is good cause
to remand the mark for additional consideration.” Applicant’s main brief, 6 TTABVUE 3.
In a recent decision, the Board has counted the ways such a perfunctory request falls short:
First, the record should be complete before appeal, Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37
C.F.R. § 2.142(d)…. Second, once a final decision issues on an appeal, prosecution
will not be re-opened except to enter a disclaimer. Trademark Rule 2.142(g), 37
C.F.R. § 2.142(g). Third, we generally do not consider remand requests embedded
in briefs; rather, they should be made by separate request, preferably before any
briefs are filed. See, e.g., In re Ox Paperboard, LLC, No. 87847482, 2020 WL
4530517, at *2 (TTAB 2020). Fourth, requests for remand should be accompanied
by a showing of good cause, see generally In re NextGen Mgmt., LLC, No.
88098031, 2023 WL 111145, at *2 (TTAB 2020), and Applicant has not even
attempted to show good cause for a remand at this final stage of the appeal. See,
e.g., Ox Paperboard, 2020 WL 4530517, at *3; In re Thomas White Int’l, Ltd., No.
77080379, 2013 WL 2951787, at *6 (TTAB 2013); In re Petroglyph Games, Inc.,
No. 78806413, 2009 WL 1759327, at *2 (TTAB 2009).
In re Ralph’s Famous Italian Ices Franchise Corp., No. 9030728, 2026 WL 1920835, *9 (2026).
Applicant’s request for remand falls short for the same reasons, and is denied.

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Section 2(d), we analyze the evidence and arguments under the factors set forth in In
re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (the “DuPont
factors”), cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 135 (2015).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities
of the marks and the similarities of the goods. Bullshine Distillery LLC v. Sazerac
Brands, LLC, 130 F.4th 1025, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2025). “While the Board is required to
consider each DuPont factor for which it has evidence, the Board ‘may focus its
analysis on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the
goods.’ Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
see also Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. v. Georgallis Holdings, LLC, 826 F.3d 1376, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2016); In re Dixie Restaurants, 105 F.3d [1405,] 1407 [(Fed. Cir. 1997)] (‘We
see no error in the [B]oard’s decision to focus on the DuPont factors it deemed
dispositive.’).” Stratus Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Commc’ns. Inc., 955 F.3d 994,
999 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
A. Similarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we determine the similarity or dissimilarity of
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties, taking into account their
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361. “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893,
*5 (TTAB 2018) aff’d 777 Fed. Appx. 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing In re Davia, No.
85497617, 2014 WL 2531200, *2 (TTAB 2014)); Cecile Gagnon Co. v. Bourjois, Inc.,

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223 F.2d 731, 733 (CCPA 1955) (“And with respect to sound, meaning, and
appearance, substantial identity between the marks in any one or more of such
attributes is, in of itself, fatal to the registration of his mark by an applicant.”). “[T]he
‘similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties’ is a predominant inquiry.”
Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 WL 4925901, *29 (TTAB 2024).
Again, Registrant’s mark is TRUE GRIT, and Applicant’s mark is TRUGRIT, both
in standard characters. As the Examining Attorney notes, “[t]he marks only differ by
one letter, ‘E’, and a space.”6
The slight difference in the marks’ spelling is not enough to distinguish them. See
Glenwood Labs., Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 455 F.2d 1384, 1386 (CCPA 1972)
(“In considering the marks ‘MYOCHOLINE’ and ‘MYSOLINE’, we find substantial
similarities therebetween. These similarities are apparent in appearance and
especially in sound.”); Alfacell v. Anticancer Inc., No. 92032202, 2004 WL 1631116,
*4 (TTAB 2004) (finding ONCASE similar to ONCONASE; “Although petitioner’s
mark includes an additional syllable, it is the middle portion of the mark. As seen
and spoken, this middle portion may be missed by many of the relevant
purchasers.”). Simply put, a finding of similarity is usually not avoided by use of a
variant spelling.
So too with the absence of a space in Applicant’s mark. Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt
Benckiser LLC, No. 91173963, 2016 WL 3915987, *5 (TTAB 2016) (TTAB 2016) (“The
absence of a space in Applicant’s mark MINIMELTS does not meaningfully
6 Examining Attorney’s brief, 9 TTABVUE 5.

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distinguish it from Opposer’s mark [MINI MELTS].”). The marks, differing by a
single “e”, are likely to be pronounced the same, and are thus phonetic equivalents.
Contour Chair-Lounge Co. v. Englander Co., 324 F.2d 186, 189 (CCPA 1963)
(“…‘Contur’ [is] but a slight misspelling of ‘Contour,’ with identical pronunciation and
meaning.”).
The marks convey the same or similar connotation. Both convey a play on the
phrase “true grit.” “Grit” is defined in this context as:
1. Minute rough granules, as of sand or stone.
2. The texture or fineness of sand or stone used in grinding.
3. A coarse hard sandstone used for making grindstones and millstones.7
Here, both marks are used on abrasives, appearing either on a grinding wheel or
in a compound, used to shape the contours of the object being ground. There is nothing
in the record to suggest that the marks have one meaning when used with Applicant’s
goods and a second and different meaning when used with the goods identified in the
cited registration. In re Dare Foods Inc., No. 88758625, 2022 WL 970319, *6 (TTAB
2022). “To the extent [the term] has a meaning in connection with [the goods], it would
have the same connotation in Applicant’s mark as in Registrant’s mark.” In re
Aquitaine Wine USA, No. 86928469, 2018 WL 1620989, *2 (TTAB 2018).
7 AHDictionary.com, 7/6/26. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions,
including online dictionaries that exist in printed format or regular fixed editions. In
re Leathernecks Motorcycle Club Int’l, Inc., No. 90498154, 2024 WL 2863442, *6 n.6
(TTAB 2024).

Serial No. 98126959
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And the marks convey the same or similar commercial impression—that of
making productive use of “GRIT,” or abrasives. As our primary reviewing Court
explains:
The commercial impression of a trademark is “the meaning or idea it
conveys or the mental reaction it evokes,” including the information it
conveys with respect to source. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d
1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013) … see also Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea &
Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293, 1296 (CCPA 1974) (finding two marks create the
same commercial impression because they “convey to prospective
purchasers the same idea, same mental reaction, and same meaning”).
Bertini v. Apple, Inc., 63 F.4th 1373, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
For these reasons, the marks are similar in sight, sound, connotation and
commercial impression, and the first DuPont factor weighs strongly in favor of finding
a likelihood of confusion.
B. Relatedness of the Goods
The second DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration….” DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. Consistent with this factor, “[t]he relevant inquiry in an ex parte
proceeding focuses on the goods and services described in the application and
registration.” In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Here, Applicant’s identified goods are “power-operated abrasive wheels, namely,
abrasive grinding wheels for metals.” Applicant’s goods, as depicted in its specimen,
appear as follows:

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8
Registrant’s identified goods are “abrasive lapping compounds for industrial
sharpening and grinding.” “Lapping,” as used here, means “[t]o polish (a surface)
until smooth.”9 Registrant’s goods appear as follows:
8 Aug. 10, 2024 specimen.
9 AHDictionary.com, 7/6/26.

Serial No. 98126959
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10
Applicant premises its claim that the goods are distinctive on a single point:
“Applicant’s goods are for power-operated abrasive wheels, as shown above. Applicant
respectfully submits that an abrasive wheel, as shown above, is vastly different from
a compound which is retrieved from a pail. Applicant respectfully submits that there
will be no customer confusion.”11
Applicant is mistaken; that is not enough to avert consumer confusion. “The issue
is not whether purchasers would confuse the goods, but rather whether there is a
likelihood of confusion as to the source of these goods.” In re Samsung Display Co.,
Ltd., No. 90502617, 2024 WL 3451873, *3 (TTAB 2024). The goods need not be
identical, but need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances
surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief
that they emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning
10 April 9, 2025 Response to Office Action/Request for Reconsideration at 9.
11 Applicant’s main brief at 7-8; Applicant’s reply brief, 10 TTABVUE 4.

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LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012), quoted in Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v.
Barclays Cap. Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
In this case, the Application and Registration both identify “abrasive” materials
used for “grinding.” According to the identifications, Applicant’s wheels are used to
grind “metals,” whereas Registrant’s goods are used for “industrial sharpening and
grinding” – a description that includes but is not limited to metals. Registrant’s use
of “lapping,” meaning “[t]o polish (a surface) until smooth,”12 suggests that its
products could be used to polish and smooth rough edges left by grinding wheels.
Inasmuch as these goods could be used sequentially for a common purpose, we
find that they are complementary, or at least related, as they are likely to be
perceived by purchasers as deriving from the same source. See In re Iolo Techs., No.
77399654, 2010 WL 2513865, *3 (TTAB 2010) (finding likelihood of confusion where
“based on the identifications themselves” the goods are “complementary in function
and purpose”); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., No. 79046106, 2009 WL 1896059, *5
(TTAB 2009) (“When we consider that applicant’s and registrant’s goods are medical
diagnostic equipment that can originate from the same source (applicant itself is a
source of both types of equipment), that can be purchased by the same facilities, and
that are used on the same patients to treat the same disease by the same physician,
we conclude that these goods are related.”).
12 AHDictionary.com, 7/6/26.

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To further demonstrate the relatedness of the goods, the Examining Attorney has
placed in the record examples of eight companies that offer both sorts of goods.13 For
instance:
• SL Munson—premium grinding wheels and lapping compounds;14
• Dianamic—Diamond grinding wheels and diamond lapping paste;15
• Lapmaster Wolters—Lapping abrasives and fine grinding wheels;16 and
• Foley—Lapping compounds and grinding wheels.17
Evidence of this sort, showing that other companies offer both goods under the
same mark, tends to show that customers will perceive the goods as related. See, e.g.,
Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2024); In re Detroit
Athl. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 13036 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Applicant does not address the
Examining Attorney’s third-party evidence in its briefs. In re Morinaga Nyugyo
K.K., No. 86338392, 2016 WL 5219811, *2 (TTAB 2016) (“[a]pparently conceding the
issue....”).
In summary, we find that the respective goods are indeed related under the second
DuPont factor.
III. Conclusion
On careful consideration of the arguments and evidence under the applicable law,
13 May 6, 2024 Office Action at 8-16; Oct. 16, 2024 Office Action at 7-67; Oct. 28, 2025 Office
Action/Request for Reconsideration denied at 7-31.
14 Oct. 28, 2025 Office Action/Request for Reconsideration denied at 7.
15 Id., at 16-17.
16 Oct. 16, 2024 Office Action at 7, 11.
17 Id., at 60-63.

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we find that the first and second DuPont factors weigh in favor of finding a likelihood
of confusion. Applicant has identified no countervailing factors. We find, therefore, a
likelihood of confusion within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed.