Matthew Sinnreich

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: July 7, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Matthew Sinnreich
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Serial No. 98713935
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Mark Terry of Mark Terry, P.A., for Matthew Sinnreich.
Catherine Lee, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 110,
Loksye Lee Riso, Managing Attorney.
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Before Goodman, Larkin and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Goodman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Matthew Sinnreich (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the mark for “Hats; Pants; Shirts; Shorts; Socks; Collared shirts;
Polo shirts; T-shirts; Tops as clothing” in International Class 25.1
1 Application Serial No. 98713935 was filed on August 23, 2024, based upon use in commerce
under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), alleging June 25, 2024 as the
date of first use and first use in commerce. The description of the mark in the application
states “The mark consists of the word ‘BLANCO’ in stylized font.” Color is not claimed as a
feature of the mark. The application includes a translation statement: “The English
translation of ‘BLANCO’ in the mark is ‘WHITE.’”

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The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that
Applicant’s mark is likely to cause confusion with the Principal Register mark
BLANCO LABEL (in standard characters, LABEL disclaimed) for “Clothing, Namely,
Shirts, Pants, Sweatpants, Jeans, Sweatshirts, Bandanas, Hats, Shoes, Sox, Vests,
Sweaters, Scarves, Pajamas, Sleepwear, Rain wear, Blouses, headbands, Belts for
Clothing, Hosiery, Swimwear” in International Class 25.2
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. We affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination of
likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts
in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of confusion factors set forth in In re
Page references to the application record are to the .pdf version of the USPTO’s Trademark
Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) electronic database. References to the briefs on appeal
refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system. Applicant’s appeal brief is at 6 TTABVUE; the
Examining Attorney’s brief is at 8 TTABVUE. Applicant attached evidence to his brief that
was made of record during prosecution. This was unnecessary and duplicative.
2 Registration No. 3558984, issued January 6, 2009, renewed, alleging October 1, 2006 as the
date of first use and first use in commerce. The registration includes a translation statement:
‘“The English translation of the word ‘BLANCO’ in the mark is ‘WHITE.’”

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E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See
also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
We consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See,
e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re Country Oven,
Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 381, at *2.
In every Section 2(d) case, two key factors are the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks and the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and
differences in the marks.”). These factors, and others, are discussed below.
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods
The second DuPont factor considers “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature
of the goods or services as described in an application or registration.”3 DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. See also In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2023) (“The relevant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding focuses on the goods and
services described in the application and registration.”). It is sufficient for a finding
of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any item encompassed by
the identification of goods within a particular class in the application or registration.
3 Applicant makes no argument directed to the relatedness of the goods.

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See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp. Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA
1981).
To reiterate, Applicant’s goods are hats; pants; shirts; shorts; socks; collared
shirts; polo shirts; t-shirts; tops as clothing. Registrant’s goods are clothing, namely,
shirts, pants, sweatpants, jeans, sweatshirts, bandanas, hats, shoes, sox, vests,
sweaters, scarves, pajamas, sleepwear, rain wear, blouses, headbands, belts for
clothing, hosiery, swimwear.
The goods are identical in part as to hats, pants, shirts, and socks/sox.4
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of Trade Channels
We next consider the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels” and classes of consumers.5 DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
The classes of consumers for Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are the general
public. See e.g., In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, *37 (citation
omitted) (“ubiquitous, everyday products ‘are offered to all the normal potential
4 The Examining Attorney also provided twenty third-party registrations showing that
Applicant’s hats, pants, shorts, and tops as clothing can be offered by registrants that offer,
for example, sweatpants, swimwear, pajamas, and scarves. March 10, 2025 Office Action, pp.
17-53; December 15, 2025 Reconsideration Denied pp. 6-276. See, e.g., In re Albert Trostel &
Sons Co., No. 74186695, 1993 TTAB LEXIS 36, at *7 (as a general proposition, third-party
registrations that cover goods from both the cited registration and an applicant’s application
are relevant to show that the goods are of a type that may emanate from a single source
under one mark). Since the goods are identical in part, it was not necessary for the Examining
Attorney to also provide additional evidence as to relatedness of other clothing items. Tuxedo
Monopoly, 648 F.2d at 1336; In re FabFitFun, Inc., No. 86847381, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 297, at
*5 (“In view of the identity of the recited [goods], there is no need for us to further consider
the relatedness of the goods.”).
5 Applicant makes no argument directed to the trade channels.

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consumers for those goods, which would include ….’all members of the general
public.’”).
Because the goods are identical in part, we presume that the identical goods
travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers. In re Viterra
Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though there was no evidence
regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was entitled to rely
on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion).6
C. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial
impression. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar. In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4. “When
marks would appear on virtually identical goods or services, the degree of similarity
necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
6 In the December 15, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration (pp. 6-276), the Examining Attorney
submitted retailer website evidence (J. Crew, American Eagle, Vineyard Vines, Michael Kors,
and Old Navy) for the identical and related clothing items to show that those goods are offered
in overlapping trade channels; however this was unnecessary given the legal presumption
for the in part identical goods. Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362.

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The test, under the first DuPont factor, is not whether the marks can be
distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether they
are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion
as to the source of the goods or services offered under the respective marks is likely
to result. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2012). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains
a general, rather than specific, impression of trademarks. See Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v.
Akea, LLC, No. 91196527, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 166, at *17; Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott
Paper Co., No. 91055167, 1975 TTAB LEXIS 236, at *6.
“[I]n articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there
is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been
given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on
consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056,
1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Applicant’s mark is and the cited mark is BLANCO LABEL.
The dominant portion of the cited mark is BLANCO because the term LABEL has
been disclaimed and is entitled to less weight in the analysis. See In re Chatam Int’l
Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (descriptive terms are properly given less
weight); In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (generic
disclaimed term café in mark given less weight in the analysis). In addition,

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BLANCO, as the initial word in the cited mark, is most likely to be impressed on
consumers and remembered. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (“The identity of the marks’ initial two words is particularly significant
because consumers typically notice those words first.”); Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak
Prods., Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 60, at *8 (“it is often the first part of a
mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and
remembered”).
Applicant’s mark BLANCO (stylized) is subsumed within the cited mark, and
where the entirety of one mark is incorporated within another, likelihood of confusion
has frequently been found. See, e.g., In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1347-48
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (applicant’s mark ML similar to registrant’s mark ML MARK LEES);
DowntownDC Bus. Improvement Dist. v. Clarke, No. 91275100, 2024 TTAB LEXIS
412, at *67-68 (DOWNTOWNDC DISTRICT OF FASHION similar to DISTRICT OF
FASHION).
As to the shared term BLANCO, the marks are identical in appearance, sound,
connotation, and commercial impression.7
Applicant acknowledges that the marks “share the common term BLANCO” but
argues that the second element in the cited mark, LABEL, creates “visual, audio, and
connoted differences between marks,” in particular, differences in “the textual
portions, visual appearance, and pronunciations” with the connotation and
7 As indicated infra, Applicant argues that BLANCO in his mark can have a variety of
meanings. However, any of these meanings of BLANCO could be conveyed by either mark
resulting in similar commercial impressions.

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commercial impression of a “luxurious brand identity” versus a “product line or a
collection,” all of which should be given more weight.8
As to appearance, Applicant’s mark is in stylized form while the cited mark is in
standard character form without a claim to any particular display. A standard
character mark may be presented in any manner, including in the same size, font,
and uppercase and lowercase letters as Applicant’s stylized mark. Trademark Rule
2.52(a), 37 CFR § 2.52(a). See, e.g., Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637
F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“If the registrant ... obtains a standard character
mark without claim to any particular font style, size or color, the registrant is entitled
to depictions of the standard character mark regardless of font style, size, or color....”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In arguing that the marks differ in appearance, Applicant points to his mark
“consist[ing] of the word BLANCO in stylized font using cursive uppercase and
lowercase font” while the cited mark uses a “standard upper-case font.” 9
8 6 TTABVUE 4, 5, 9.
9 6 TTABVUE 6-7. Applicant’s argument also mentions a design portion as another difference
between the marks. 6 TTABVUE 6-7. However BLANCO is a stylized mark without a design
element. Moreover, it is not so stylized or abstract that it would be difficult for consumers to
discern it as the word BLANCO; as such, it appears as a literal element not as a design.
Compare, e.g., In re TSI Brands, Inc., No. 75615925, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 270, at *18 (“[T]he
degree of stylization and integration of the letters forming both of registrant’s ‘AK’ and design
marks is so high that they are more properly treated, in our view, as being akin to pure design
marks rather than simply stylized displays of word marks”; highly stylized AK marks not
confusingly similar with AK American Khakis) with In re Instruteck Corp., 1974 TTAB
LEXIS 266 , at *5 (no number in original) (although the marks containing the terms IC “were
presented in different graphic displays,” the letters were readily discernible and would
project this significance to individuals viewing them, notwithstanding additional word and
design elements in registrant’s mark).

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However, the mere stylization of the word BLANCO in Applicant’s mark is
insufficient to distinguish the respective marks. Squirtco v. Tomy Corp, 697 F.2d
1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he argument concerning a difference in type style is
not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display. By presenting its
mark merely in a typed drawing, a difference cannot legally be asserted by that
party”). We must assume that the Registrant could display its standard character
BLANCO LABEL mark in the same letter style in which BLANCO appears in
Applicant’s mark.
As to differences in appearance and sound, Applicant also argues that BLANCO
is a two syllable, one word “stand-alone term,” consisting of six letters while BLANCO
LABEL is a two word “compound expression,” having four syllables and 11 letters
with “elongated” pronunciation.10 Applicant submits that “[t]he difference in
phonetics is particularly important in the … apparel industry, where brand names
are frequently spoken in advertisements, word-of-mouth recommendations, and
product discussions.”11
Although there are differences in appearance and pronunciation between the
marks due to the additional term LABEL in the cited mark, consumers do not focus
on the number of syllables, letters, or words in each mark. See Fuji Jyukogyo K.K. v.
Toyota Jidosha K.K., No. 91063523, 1985 TTAB LEXIS 31, at *8 (“Purchasers do not
count letters when reacting to trademarks in the marketplace.”); In re John Scarne
10 6 TTABVUE 4, 5.
11 6 TTABVUE 5.

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Games, Inc., 1959 TTAB LEXIS 31, at *1 (no number in original) (“Purchasers . . . do
not engage in trademark syllable counting – they are governed by general
impressions made by appearance or sound, or both.”). Instead, the overall general
impression of a mark is more important. Fuji Jyukogyo K.K., 1985 TTAB LEXIS 31,
at *8.
Applicant argues that the marks have “divergent meanings” where his mark
“conveys a singular concept - whether as a surname, a geographic reference, or the
Spanish word for ‘white’” while the cited mark conveys “a compound idea in which
the term LABEL modifies the meaning of BLANCO” conveying the idea of “a sub-
brand or a labeled series of goods.”12 Applicant argues that BLANCO (stylized) evokes
a luxurious brand identity and “thoughts of penmanship, craftsmanship and high
quality” while BLANCO LABEL evokes the impression of “a product line, a collection;
or a branded tag.”13
However, BLANCO in both marks could evoke the same meaning (surname,
geographic name, or Spanish word for white) and give the impression of the name of
a clothing label or luxurious brand identity with Applicant’s BLANCO (stylized) mark
being viewed merely as a variant of Registrant’s BLANCO LABEL mark. We find
that the marks create similar commercial impressions.
12 6 TTABVUE 8-9.
13 6 TTABVUE 9.

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When we consider the marks and BLANCO LABEL in their
entireties, we consider the less significant disclaimed descriptive wording LABEL in
the cited mark. See In re Code Consultants Inc., No. 75645560, 2001 TTAB LEXIS
685 at *12 (disclaimed matter is often “less significant in creating the mark’s
commercial impression”). But we find that this difference is not sufficient to overcome
the overall similarities of appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial
impression resulting from the initial shared term BLANCO, particularly in view of
the fallible memories of consumers, who retain general impressions of trademarks.
See In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (marks “must be
considered . . . in light of the fallibility of memory” and “not on the basis of side-by-
side comparison”) (quoting San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs. Components
Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 685 (CCPA 1977)). See also Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1382
(“an additional … component may technically differentiate a mark but do little to
alleviate confusion.”).
Moreover, consumers have a “penchant” for shortening marks. See, e.g., In re
Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 815 (CCPA 1978) (Rich, J., concurring) (“users of
language have a universal habit of shortening full names—from haste or laziness or
just economy of words”)). We find it likely that consumers would shorten BLANCO
LABEL simply to BLANCO in verbalizing and recalling the cited mark.

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We find Applicant’s mark and the cited BLANCO LABEL
mark are highly similar in appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression.
II. Conclusion
The similarity of the marks, the goods, and the trade channels all weigh in favor
of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal to register Applicant’s mark
is affirmed.