State v. Ahmed

#29549-a-SRJ
2022 S.D. 20

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

KADIR HUSSEIN AHMED, Defendant and Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

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THE HONORABLE CAMELA THEELER
Judge

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JASON R. ADAMS of
Tschetter & Adams Law Offices, P.C.
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and
appellant.

JASON R. RAVNSBORG
Attorney General

CHELSEA WENZEL
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and
appellee.

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CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
FEBRUARY 14, 2022
OPINION FILED 04/06/22
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JENSEN, Chief Justice

[¶1.] Kadir Hussein Ahmed was charged with multiple counts arising from

two separate incidents involving an alleged shooting and a later confrontation

between Ahmed and two men. A jury found Ahmed guilty of seven counts,

including aggravated assault by physical menace with a dangerous weapon and

grand theft by receiving stolen property. Ahmed appeals both convictions arguing

that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal

because there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] On July 25, 2020, Angela Graham was awakened around 5:00 a.m. by

“some ruckus” and pounding at her door. After the pounding stopped, Graham

claimed she walked outside and saw Ahmed. Graham alleged that Ahmed shot a

gun three times, forcing her to retreat to her apartment and call the police. During

the 911 call, Graham identified the shooter as Ahmed, who was driving a black

vehicle. Graham recognized Ahmed as a friend of her oldest daughter.

[¶3.] Law enforcement responded to the call. Upon arrival and a brief

inspection of the scene, the officers were unable to observe any evidence of a

shooting and left the scene. Shortly after law enforcement left, Graham made a

second 911 call stating that Ahmed had returned to her apartment door.

[¶4.] Officer Andrew Parrot responded to the second 911 call. Officer Parrot

inspected the apartment and discovered bullet holes in and around the apartment.

He believed the interior bullet holes were fresh, however no bullets or casings were

found.

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[¶5.] Graham identified Ahmed by his nickname, “K.D.,” and shared

Ahmed’s Facebook profile with law enforcement. Graham also directed law

enforcement to an apartment complex in Sioux Falls where Ahmed was staying.

Law enforcement also discovered that Ahmed was driving his aunt’s black Nissan

Versa. Detectives Pat Mertes and Logan Eilers were dispatched to the apartment

complex where Ahmed was believed to be staying and located the vehicle registered

to Ahmed’s aunt in the parking lot. The detectives parked along the street to

observe the vehicle. After a few minutes, Ahmed exited his apartment building and

left in the vehicle. The detectives attempted to follow Ahmed but lost sight of him.

[¶6.] The detectives returned to Ahmed’s apartment complex and observed

Ahmed come out of an apartment building and approach a woman later identified

as Racquel Jellis. Jellis was visiting her brother-in-law, Heath Range, and her

boyfriend, Mitchell Erickson. Jellis testified that she had never met Ahmed but

noticed him approaching her once she arrived at the apartment complex. Jellis

became scared of Ahmed’s presence and began to quickly walk away from him as he

followed her into the apartment building. Once inside Range’s apartment, Jellis

informed both Erickson and Range that a man had followed her into the building.

[¶7.] Range and Erickson exited the apartment building to confront Ahmed

about his interaction with Jellis. Range asked Ahmed, “What’s going on man. That

ain’t your girlfriend.” Range testified that Ahmed then pulled out a silver revolver

from the front of his waistband and responded, “don’t worry about it,” and “you

don’t want none of this smoke [N-Word]. You don’t want none of this smoke.” Upon

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seeing the gun, Range and Erickson retreated into the apartment building and

Ahmed walked away from the building.

[¶8.] The detectives observed the confrontation but due to a privacy fence

between the detectives and the three individuals, they could only see the men’s

faces and top portion of their shoulders. Detective Eilers observed Range and

Erickson show surprise or fear during the confrontation and retreat into the

apartment building. Detective Eilers did not see a gun.

[¶9.] Ahmed then ran to his vehicle and attempted to leave the apartment

complex parking lot. Officers Trent Ehler and Scott Hildebrand arrived at the

apartment complex and initiated a traffic stop in the parking lot. As Officer Ehler

exited his patrol vehicle, he heard someone yell, “he’s got a gun.” Ahmed exited his

vehicle and ran toward the apartment buildings while holding the front of his

waistband. At trial, Officer Ehler explained that based on his training and

experience, he believed Ahmed was attempting to stabilize a firearm as he ran.

Ahmed ran into an apartment building and locked himself in the apartment for

several minutes. Additional officers arrived and directed Ahmed to exit the

apartment. Another occupant came out of the apartment first. A few minutes later,

Ahmed exited, told the officers that they needed a warrant to search his apartment,

and law enforcement detained him without further incident.

[¶10.] Detective Eilers interviewed Ahmed, who was unable to provide a

consistent timeline of his day leading up to his arrest. Ahmed claimed that he was

having trouble recalling his day because he had been drinking. Ahmed denied any

involvement in the shooting earlier that day and denied threatening Range and

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Erickson with a gun. Ahmed also asked Detective Eilers several times if she saw

him pull a gun while motioning as if he were pulling out a gun from his waistband

from the front of his pants. However, Ahmed denied that he had a gun during the

confrontation. Ahmed stated that he ran from the officers because he had been

drinking and believed an individual named Shalice had called the police on him.

[¶11.] Law enforcement later executed a search warrant for Ahmed’s

apartment. Officers found several unspent bullet rounds in different locations

throughout the apartment, including in the pockets of a pair of pants that contained

his personal identification card. The officers also discovered a black bumper in the

apartment that matched the vehicle Ahmed was driving. In the apartment

bathroom, Detective Mertes found a silver revolver wrapped in a white cloth hidden

inside the garbage basket. Inside the revolver was one unspent bullet round,

matching the other bullets found inside the apartment. Detective Mertes ran the

serial number on the revolver, which revealed that the firearm was reported as

stolen. At trial, Cory Burrell testified that in June 2020 his Silver Taurus .38

Special Ultralight revolver was stolen from his vehicle and he identified the gun

found in Ahmed’s apartment as his gun.

[¶12.] A grand jury indicted Ahmed on multiple counts stemming from the

shooting at Graham’s apartment and the later confrontation at Ahmed’s apartment.

Count 7 of the indictment charged Ahmed with a Class 3 felony for aggravated

assault by physical menace with a deadly weapon pursuant to SDCL 22-18-1.1(5),

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stemming from the confrontation with Erickson outside the apartment. 1 Count 11

charged Ahmed with a Class 6 felony for grand theft by receiving stolen property

pursuant to SDCL 22-30A-17(2) and SDCL 22-30A-7, stemming from the firearm

recovered at his apartment. At trial, Ahmed moved for a judgment of acquittal on

all charges. The court took the motion for judgment of acquittal on Count 11 under

advisement but denied the motion as to all other counts. 2 The jury found Ahmed

guilty on seven of the fourteen counts, including Counts 7 and 11. The convictions

on seven of the charges all arose from the events at Ahmed’s apartment complex.

The jury found Ahmed not guilty on all the charges arising from the alleged

shooting earlier in the day at Graham’s apartment.

[¶13.] Ahmed appeals his convictions for aggravated assault by physical

menace against Erickson in Count 7 and for grand theft by receiving stolen property

in Count 11 arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for judgment

of acquittal.

Analysis and Decision

[¶14.] “[A] motion for judgment of acquittal attacks the sufficiency of the

evidence, which is a question of law whether the motion is considered before or after

the jury’s verdict.” State v. Wolf, 2020 S.D. 15, ¶ 12, 941 N.W.2d 216, 220. “A

question regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction is reviewed

1. Count 8 of the indictment alleged a separate charge for aggravated assault by
physical menace with a deadly weapon as to Heath Range. Ahmed was
convicted of Count 8 but does not challenge this conviction on appeal.

2. The court did not formally rule on the motion for judgment of acquittal as to
Count 11 but submitted the charge to the jury and imposed a sentence on the
conviction after the guilty verdict was entered.
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de novo.” State v. McReynolds, 2020 S.D. 65, ¶ 11, 951 N.W.2d 809, 814. When

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court considers “[w]hether there is

evidence in the record which, if believed by the fact finder, is sufficient to sustain a

finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wolf, 2020 S.D. 15, ¶ 13, 941 N.W.2d at

220 (citation omitted). On review, the Court “accept[s] the evidence and the most

favorable inferences that can be fairly drawn from it that support the verdict.” Id.

(quoting State v. Carter, 2009 S.D. 65, ¶ 44, 771 N.W.2d 329, 342). This Court does

not “resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh

the evidence on appeal. If the evidence including circumstantial evidence and

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom sustain a reasonable theory of guilt, a guilty

verdict will not be set aside.” Id. (quoting Carter, 2009 S.D. 65, ¶ 44, 771 N.W.2d at

342).

I. Count 7 – Aggravated Assault by Physical Menace
against Mitchell Erickson.

[¶15.] Any individual who “[a]ttempts by physical menace with a deadly

weapon to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm . . . is guilty of

aggravated assault.” SDCL 22-18-1.1(5). “The gravamen of the offense is the

attempt to put a person in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. Actual fear of

imminent serious bodily harm is not an essential element of the offense.” State v.

LaCroix, 423 N.W.2d 169, 170 (S.D. 1988). “Physical menace ‘requires more than

words: there must be some physical act on the part of the defendant.’” State v.

Scott, 2019 S.D. 25, ¶ 19, 927 N.W.2d 120, 127 (quoting In re R.L.G., 2005 S.D. 119,

¶ 10, 707 N.W.2d 258, 261).

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[¶16.] Ahmed argues his conviction for aggravated assault against Erickson

is not supported by sufficient evidence because he never pointed the gun at Erickson

and his singular use of the N-Word indicates the threatening act was solely directed

towards Range. Ahmed also argues that because Erickson did not testify at trial

and the detectives’ view was obstructed, the evidence was insufficient to show that

Erickson had an actual fear of imminent serious bodily harm. The State responds

that Ahmed’s act of brandishing a firearm in Erickson’s proximity and his

threatening statements are sufficient to sustain the conviction.

[¶17.] This Court has previously affirmed a circuit court’s denial of a motion

for judgment of acquittal on a charge for aggravated assault by physical menace

despite the absence of any evidence that the defendant directly pointed a gun at the

victim. State v. Schmiedt, 525 N.W.2d 253, 255 (S.D. 1994). In Schmiedt, this

Court found a defendant’s command to a law enforcement officer not to come any

closer, combined with the defendant suddenly grabbing a loaded firearm and

keeping the firearm at his side, supported a conviction for aggravated assault by

physical menace. Id. Furthermore, in discussing the factual basis for a charge

under SDCL 22-18-1.1(5), we have stated that whether the defendant “pointed [a

gun] at the victims and [whether] it was loaded or unloaded makes no difference.”

See State v. Waters, 529 N.W.2d 586, 588 (S.D. 1995) (affirming the circuit court’s

decision to reject a lesser included instruction for simple assault because the

defendant used “a deadly weapon for the purpose of this offense, during this

incident”); see also State v. Schumacher, 2021 S.D. 16, ¶ 31, 956 N.W.2d 427, 435

(finding sufficient evidence to support a conviction under SDCL 22-18-1.1(5) when

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the defendant held a gun on her shoulder, pointed it in the air, and later pointed the

barrel in the general direction of two law enforcement officers as she was setting it

down).

[¶18.] The evidence shows Erickson and Range approached Ahmed and

confronted him about his interaction with Jellis. Range testified that, in response,

Ahmed pulled the firearm from his waistband and pointed it directly at Range’s

head. Ahmed was in close proximity to both Erickson and Range, in sole control of

the firearm, and used threatening language during the interaction. Given Ahmed’s

close proximity to Erickson and Range, and his ability to instantly utilize the

firearm against Erickson or Range, a jury could have reasonably concluded that

Ahmed attempted to put both Erickson and Range in fear of imminent serious

bodily harm.

[¶19.] Ahmed’s claim that Erickson was required to testify to show that

Erickson feared imminent harm from Ahmed also fails. “[T]he State need not prove

‘actual fear of imminent serious bodily harm.’” Scott, 2019 S.D. 25, ¶ 19, 927

N.W.2d at 127 (quoting LaCroix, 423 N.W.2d at 170). We have recognized that “an

attempt to put another in fear” is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. An attempt

includes “any act toward the commission of the crime but fails or is prevented or

intercepted in the perpetration thereof.” Id. (citation omitted). Range’s testimony

was sufficient for the jury to find that Ahmed, through his words and actions,

attempted to place both Range and Erickson in fear of imminent serious bodily

harm. Further, although it was unnecessary to prove the alleged victims were

actually afraid, Detective Eilers testified that Range and Erickson looked “surprised

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or afraid” moments before they retreated into the apartment building. Detective

Eilers also testified that Range and Erickson were shaking, anxious, and appeared

very upset when she spoke with them immediately after their encounter with

Ahmed.

[¶20.] This Court examines the evidence in its totality and does not reweigh

evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. Carter, 2009 S.D. 65, ¶¶ 44–45, 771

N.W.2d at 342. The evidence presented to the jury, including the testimony from

Range and law enforcement, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,

support a reasonable theory of guilt. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in

denying Ahmed’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated assault by

physical menace conviction.

II. Count 11 – Grand Theft by Receiving Stolen
Property.

[¶21.] SDCL 22-30A-7 provides that “[a]ny person who receives, retains, or

disposes of property of another knowing that the property has been stolen, or

believing that the property has probably been stolen, unless the property is

received, retained, or disposed of with the intent to restore the property to the

owner, is guilty of theft.” Grand theft by receiving stolen property is a Class 6

felony if the stolen property “[i]s a firearm with a value of less than or equal to two

thousand five hundred dollars[.]” SDCL 22-30A-17(2).

[¶22.] Ahmed initially argues the State failed to provide sufficient evidence

that he was ever in possession of the firearm, or that he knew or should have known

the firearm was stolen as required by SDCL 22-30A-7. Ahmed highlights that there

was no evidence that he was actually in possession of the stolen firearm, how the

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firearm ended up in the garbage basket, or any evidence of fingerprints or DNA

found on the firearm. The State points to Range’s testimony and Officer Ehler’s

dash cam footage and testimony to show that Ahmed was in possession of the

firearm just before it was found in his apartment. The State also asserts there was

sufficient evidence to support that Ahmed knew the firearm was stolen based upon

the circumstances presented at trial.

[¶23.] This Court does not “resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the

credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence on appeal.” Wolf, 2020 S.D. 15,

¶ 13, 941 N.W.2d at 220 (citation omitted). Further, “[a]ll elements of a crime . . .

may be established circumstantially.” State v. Falkenberg, 2021 S.D. 59, ¶ 39, 965

N.W.2d 580, 591 (quoting State v. Shaw, 2005 S.D. 105, ¶ 45, 705 N.W.2d 620, 633).

“Direct and circumstantial evidence have equal weight. In fact, in some instances

circumstantial evidence may be more reliable than direct evidence.” Id. (quoting

State v. Riley, 2013 S.D. 95, ¶ 18, 841 N.W.2d 431, 437).

[¶24.] From our review of the record, there was sufficient evidence supporting

the jury’s determination that Ahmed had possession of the firearm and the requisite

knowledge that the firearm was stolen. Range testified that Ahmed pulled a silver

revolver from his waistband. Additionally, Officer Ehler’s dash cam showed Ahmed

running to his apartment building while holding onto the front of his waistband,

which Officer Ehler testified is a common running position used to secure a firearm.

Inside Ahmed’s apartment, law enforcement found a firearm matching the one

described by Range at the bottom of a garbage basket wrapped in a cloth. Law

enforcement also found a pair of pants that contained Ahmed’s personal

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identification card and bullets for the firearm. The owner of the firearm testified

that the firearm found in Ahmed’s apartment was stolen from his vehicle

approximately a month earlier. Accepting this evidence and the most favorable

inferences drawn therefrom, the evidence supports the jury’s determination that

Ahmed was in possession of the firearm and knew or believed that it was stolen.

[¶25.] Ahmed also argues that the State was required to present evidence of

the value of the firearm to prove that he was guilty of a Class 6 felony under SDCL

22-30A-17(2). He claims that the value of the firearm was an essential element of

the offense. Grand theft is a Class 6 felony if the stolen property “[i]s a firearm with

a value of less than or equal to two thousand five hundred dollars[.]” SDCL 22-30A-

17(2). Under SDCL 22-30A-17, the State is required to prove the value of the stolen

property beyond a reasonable doubt, but the exact value of the property is not

important unless the value of the item stolen is close to the relevant statutory

amount or level. State v. Iron Necklace, 430 N.W.2d 66, 81 (S.D. 1988).

[¶26.] SDCL 22-30A-17(2) provides that the theft of a “firearm with a value of

less than or equal to two thousand five hundred dollars” is a Class 6 felony.

(Emphasis added.); see State ex rel. Dep’t. of Transp. v. Clark, 2011 S.D. 20, ¶ 10,

798 N.W.2d 160, 164 (“In matters of statutory interpretation, [this Court begins]

with the plain language and structure of the statute.” (citation omitted)). Under the

plain language of the statute, a theft of any firearm, regardless of value, is at least a

Class 6 felony. Therefore, the State did not have to present evidence of the

firearm’s exact value in order for the jury to find Ahmed guilty of a Class 6 felony

for receiving stolen property.

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[¶27.] Another jurisdiction applying similar statutory language reached a

similar conclusion. See generally Blair v. State, 562 S.W.3d 261 (Ark. Ct. App.

2018). In Blair, the defendant was charged with theft by receiving stolen property,

a Class D felony, under a statute with nearly identical language to SDCL 22-30A-

17(2), which states that “theft by receiving is a class D felony if the property is a

firearm valued at less than $2500.” Id. at 264 (emphasis added); see also Ark. Code.

Ann. § 5-36-1-6(e)(3)(B)(iii). The prosecution did not present any evidence of the

value of the firearm. Id. The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction finding that

“[t]heft by receiving of a firearm is at least a Class D felony regardless of the

weapon’s value, and the State is not required to establish the value of the firearm in

order to obtain a conviction.” Id.

[¶28.] At trial, the jury was shown pictures of the firearm, and heard

testimony from the owner that he purchased the firearm from Gary’s Gun Shop and

that the firearm had been stolen. Therefore, the jury was reasonably able to

conclude that the firearm had been stolen and had some value less than $2,500.

Based on the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,

there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict of grand theft by

receiving a stolen firearm.

[¶29.] We affirm the circuit court’s denial of the motion for judgment of

acquittal on both counts.

[¶30.] KERN, SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN, Justices, concur.

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