RAGSDALE et al. v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC.

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81 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
RAGSDALE et al. v. WOLVERINE
WORLD WIDE, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 00–6029. Argued January 7, 2002—Decided March 19, 2002
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA or Act) guarantees
qualifying employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year and encour-
ages businesses to adopt more generous policies. Respondent Wolver-
ine World Wide, Inc., granted petitioner Ragsdale 30 weeks of medical
leave under its more generous policy in 1996. It refused her request
for additional leave or permission to work part time and terminated
her when she did not return to work. She filed suit, alleging that 29
CFR § 825.700(a), a Labor Department regulation, required Wolverine
to grant her 12 additional weeks of leave because it had not informed
her that the 30-week absence would count against her FMLA entitle-
ment. The District Court granted Wolverine summary judgment, find-
ing that the regulation was in conflict with the statute and invalid be-
cause it required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than 12 weeks of
FMLA-compliant leave in one year. The Eighth Circuit agreed.
Held: Section 825.700(a) is contrary to the Act and beyond the Secretary
of Labor’s authority. Pp. 86–96.
(a) To determine whether § 825.700(a) is a valid exercise of the Secre-
tary’s authority to issue regulations necessary to carry out the FMLA,
see 29 U. S. C. § 2654, this Court must consult the Act, viewing it as a
“symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,” Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 513 U. S. 561, 569. Among other things, the Act subjects an em-
ployer that interferes with, restrains, or denies the exercise of an em-
ployee’s FMLA rights, § 2615(a)(1), to consequential damages and equi-
table relief, § 2617(a)(1); and requires the employer to post a notice
of FMLA rights on its premises, § 2619(a). The Secretary’s regula-
tions require, in addition, that an employer give employees written no-
tice that an absence will be considered FMLA leave. 29 CFR § 825.208.
Even assuming that this regulatory requirement is valid, the Secre-
tary’s categorical penalty for its breach is contrary to the Act. Section
825.700(a) punishes an employer’s failure to provide timely notice of the
FMLA designation by denying the employer any credit for leave
granted before the notice, and the penalty is unconnected to any preju-
dice the employee might have suffered from the employer’s lapse. The
employee will be entitled to 12 additional weeks of leave even if he or

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82 RAGSDALE v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC.
Syllabus
she would have acted in the same manner had notice been given and
can sue if not granted the additional leave. Pp. 86–89.
(b) This penalty is incompatible with the FMLA’s remedial mecha-
nism. To prevail under § 2617, an employee must prove that the em-
ployer violated § 2615 by interfering with, restraining, or denying the
exercise of FMLA rights. Even then, § 2617 provides no relief un-
less the employee has been prejudiced by the violation. In contrast,
§ 825.700(a) establishes an irrebuttable presumption that the employ-
ee’s exercise of FMLA rights was restrained. There is no empirical
or logical basis for this presumption, as the facts of this case demon-
strate. Ragsdale has not shown that she would have taken less, or
intermittent, leave had she received the required notice. In fact her
physician did not clear her to work until long after her 30-week leave
period had ended. Blind to the reality that she would have taken the
entire 30-week absence even had Wolverine complied with the notice
regulations, § 825.700(a) required the company to give her 12 more
weeks and rendered it liable under § 2617 when it denied her request
and terminated her. The regulation fundamentally alters the FMLA’s
cause of action by relieving employees of the burden of proving any
real impairment of their rights and resulting prejudice. The Govern-
ment claims that its categorical rule is easier to administer than a
fact-specific inquiry, but Congress chose a remedy requiring the retro-
spective, case-by-case examination the Secretary now seeks to elimi-
nate. The regulation instructs courts to ignore § 2617’s command that
employees prove impairment of their statutory rights and resulting
harm. Agencies are not authorized to contravene Congress’ will in this
manner. Cf. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S.
356. Pp. 89–92.
(c) Section 825.700(a) would be an unreasonable choice even if the
Secretary were authorized to circumvent the FMLA’s remedial pro-
visions for the sake of administrative convenience. Categorical rules
reflect broad generalizations holding true in so many cases that in-
quiry into whether they apply to the case at hand would be need-
less and wasteful. However, when the generalizations fail to hold in
the run of cases, as is true here, the justification for the categorical
rule disappears. See, e. g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 8–22.
Pp. 92–93.
(d) Inasmuch as the Secretary’s penalty will have no substantial re-
lation to the harm to the employee in the run of cases, it also amends
the FMLA’s fundamental guarantee of entitlement to a “total” of 12
weeks of leave in a 12-month period, a compromise between employers
who wanted fewer weeks and employees who wanted more. Courts

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and agencies must respect and give effect to such compromises. How-
ever, the Secretary’s penalty subverts this balance by entitling certain
employees to leave beyond the statutory mandate. Pp. 93–94.
(e) That the penalty is disproportionate and inconsistent with Con-
gress’ intent is also evident from § 2619, which assesses a $100 fine for
an employer’s willful failure to post a general notice. In contrast, the
regulation establishes a much heavier sanction for any violation of the
Secretary’s supplemental notice requirement. P. 95.
(f) Section 825.700(a) is also in considerable tension with the statute’s
admonition that nothing in the Act should discourage employers from
adopting more generous policies. Congress was well aware that the
more generous employers, discouraged by technical rules and burden-
some administrative requirements, might be pushed down to the Act’s
minimum standard, yet § 825.700(a)’s severe, across-the-board penalty is
directed at such employers. Pp. 95–96.
(g) In holding that the bounds of the Secretary’s discretion to issue
regulations were exceeded here, this Court does not decide whether the
notice and designation requirements are themselves valid or whether
other remedies for their breach might be consistent with the statute.
P. 96.
218 F. 3d 933, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 96.
L. Oneal Sutter argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs was Eric Schnapper.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on
the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Deputy Solicitor
General Kneedler, Howard M. Radzely, Allen H. Feldman,
Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Ellen L. Beard.
Richard D. Bennett argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was James Francis Barna.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by
Jonathan P. Hiatt, James B. Coppess, Judith L. Lichtman, and Laurence

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84 RAGSDALE v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Qualifying employees are guaranteed 12 weeks of un-
paid leave each year by the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (FMLA or Act), 107 Stat. 6, as amended, 29 U. S. C.
§ 2601 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The Act encourages
businesses to adopt more generous policies, and many em-
ployers have done so. Respondent Wolverine World Wide,
Inc., for example, granted petitioner Tracy Ragsdale 30
weeks of leave when cancer kept her out of work in 1996.
Ragsdale nevertheless brought suit under the FMLA. She
alleged that because Wolverine was in technical violation
of certain Labor Department regulations, she was entitled
to more leave.
One of these regulations, 29 CFR § 825.700(a) (2001), did
support Ragsdale’s claim. It required the company to grant
her 12 more weeks of leave because it had not informed her
that the 30-week absence would count against her FMLA
entitlement. We hold that the regulation is contrary to the
Act and beyond the Secretary of Labor’s authority. Rags-
dale was entitled to no more leave, and Wolverine was en-
titled to summary judgment.
I
Ragsdale began working at a Wolverine factory in 1995,
but in the following year she was diagnosed with Hodgkin’s
disease. Her prescribed treatment involved surgery and
months of radiation therapy. Though unable to work during
this time, she was eligible for seven months of unpaid sick
leave under Wolverine’s leave plan. Ragsdale requested
Gold; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by
Ronald B. Schwartz and Paula A. Brantner.
Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Daniel V. Yager, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S.
Conrad, and Heather L. MacDougall filed a brief for the Equal Employ-
ment Advisory Council et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Jack Whitacre filed a brief for Human Resource Management as ami-
cus curiae.

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and received a 1-month leave of absence on February 21,
1996, and asked for a 30-day extension at the end of each
of the seven months that followed. Wolverine granted the
first six requests, and Ragsdale missed 30 consecutive weeks
of work. Her position with the company was held open
throughout, and Wolverine maintained her health benefits
and paid her premiums during the first six months of her
absence. Wolverine did not notify her, however, that 12
weeks of the absence would count as her FMLA leave.
In September, Ragsdale sought a seventh 30-day exten-
sion, but Wolverine advised her that she had exhausted her
seven months under the company plan. Her condition per-
sisted, so she requested more leave or permission to work
on a part-time basis. Wolverine refused and terminated her
when she did not come back to work.
Ragsdale filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Her claim relied on
the Secretary’s regulation, which provides that if an em-
ployee takes medical leave “and the employer does not desig-
nate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not
count against an employee’s FMLA entitlement.” 29 CFR
§ 825.700(a) (2001). The required designation had not been
made, so Ragsdale argued that her 30 weeks of leave did “not
count against [her] FMLA entitlement.” Ibid. It followed
that when she was denied additional leave and terminated
after 30 weeks, the statute guaranteed her 12 more weeks.
She sought reinstatement, backpay, and other relief.
When the parties filed cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, Wolverine conceded it had not given Ragsdale spe-
cific notice that part of her absence would count as FMLA
leave. It maintained, however, that it had complied with the
statute by granting her 30 weeks of leave—more than twice
what the Act required. The District Court granted sum-
mary judgment to Wolverine. In the court’s view the regu-
lation was in conflict with the statute and invalid because,
in effect, it required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than

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12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in one year. The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed. 218 F. 3d 933
(2000).
We granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 928 (2001), and now affirm.
II
Wolverine’s challenge concentrates on the validity of a
single sentence in § 825.700(a). This provision is but a small
part of the administrative structure the Secretary devised
pursuant to Congress’ directive to issue regulations “neces-
sary to carry out” the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 2654 (1994 ed.).
The Secretary’s judgment that a particular regulation fits
within this statutory constraint must be given consider-
able weight. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U. S. 642,
673 (1997) (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424–426
(1977)). Our deference to the Secretary, however, has im-
portant limits: A regulation cannot stand if it is “ ‘arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’ ” United
States v. O’Hagan, supra, at 673 (quoting Chevron U. S. A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S.
837, 844 (1984)). To determine whether § 825.700(a) is a
valid exercise of the Secretary’s authority, we must consult
the Act, viewing it as a “symmetrical and coherent regula-
tory scheme.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 569
(1995).
The FMLA’s central provision guarantees eligible em-
ployees 12 weeks of leave in a 1-year period following cer-
tain events: a disabling health problem; a family member’s
serious illness; or the arrival of a new son or daughter. 29
U. S. C. § 2612(a)(1). During the mandatory 12 weeks, the
employer must maintain the employee’s group health cov-
erage. § 2614(c)(1). Leave must be granted, when “medi-
cally necessary,” on an intermittent or part-time basis.
§ 2612(b)(1). Upon the employee’s timely return, the em-
ployer must reinstate the employee to his or her former posi-
tion or an equivalent. § 2614(a)(1). The Act makes it un-

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lawful for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or deny
the exercise of ” these rights, § 2615(a)(1), and violators are
subject to consequential damages and appropriate equitable
relief, § 2617(a)(1).
A number of employers have adopted policies with terms
far more generous than the statute requires. Congress en-
couraged as much, mandating in the Act’s penultimate pro-
vision that “[n]othing in this Act . . . shall be construed
to discourage employers from adopting or retaining leave
policies more generous than any policies that comply with
the requirements under this Act.” § 2653. Some employ-
ers, like Wolverine, allow more than the 12-week annual
minimum; others offer paid leave. U. S. Dept. of Labor,
D. Cantor et al., Balancing the Needs of Families and Em-
ployers: Family and Medical Leave Surveys 5–10, 5–12 (2001)
(22.9% of FMLA-covered establishments allow more than 12
weeks of leave per year; 62.7% provide paid disability leave).
As long as these policies meet the Act’s minimum require-
ments, leave taken may be counted toward the 12 weeks
guaranteed by the FMLA. See 60 Fed. Reg. 2230 (1995)
(“[E]mployers may designate paid leave as FMLA leave and
offset the maximum entitlements under the employer’s more
generous policies”).
With this statutory structure in place, the Secretary is-
sued regulations requiring employers to inform their work-
ers about the relationship between the FMLA and leave
granted under company plans. The regulations make it the
employer’s responsibility to tell the employee that an ab-
sence will be considered FMLA leave. 29 CFR § 825.208(a)
(2001). Employers must give written notice of the desig-
nation, along with detailed information concerning the em-
ployee’s rights and responsibilities under the Act, “within a
reasonable time after notice of the need for leave is given by
the employee—within one or two business days if feasible.”
§ 825.301(c).

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The regulations are in addition to a notice provision ex-
plicitly set out in the statute. Section 2619(a) requires em-
ployers to “keep posted, in conspicuous places . . . , a no-
tice . . . setting forth excerpts from, or summaries of, the
pertinent provisions of this subchapter and information
pertaining to the filing of a charge.” According to the Sec-
retary, the more comprehensive and individualized notice
required by the regulations is necessary to ensure that em-
ployees are aware of their rights when they take leave.
See 60 Fed. Reg. 2220 (1995). We need not decide today
whether this conclusion accords with the text and structure
of the FMLA, or whether Congress has instead “spoken to
the precise question” of notice, Chevron, supra, at 842, and
so foreclosed the notice regulations. Even assuming the ad-
ditional notice requirement is valid, the categorical penalty
the Secretary imposes for its breach is contrary to the Act’s
remedial design.
The penalty is set out in a separate regulation, § 825.700,
which is entitled “What if an employer provides more gen-
erous benefits than required by the FMLA?” This is the
sentence on which Ragsdale relies:
“If an employee takes paid or unpaid leave and the em-
ployer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the
leave taken does not count against an employee’s FMLA
entitlement.” 29 CFR § 825.700(a) (2001).
This provision punishes an employer’s failure to provide
timely notice of the FMLA designation by denying it any
credit for leave granted before the notice. The penalty is
unconnected to any prejudice the employee might have suf-
fered from the employer’s lapse. If the employee takes an
undesignated absence of 12 weeks or more, the regulation
always gives him or her the right to 12 more weeks of leave
that year. The fact that the employee would have acted in
the same manner if notice had been given is, in the Secre-
tary’s view, irrelevant. Indeed, as we understand the Sec-

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retary’s position, the employer would be required to grant
the added 12 weeks even if the employee had full knowl-
edge of the FMLA and expected the absence to count against
the 12-week entitlement. An employer who denies the em-
ployee this additional leave will be deemed to have violated
the employee’s rights under § 2615 and so will be liable for
damages and equitable relief under § 2617.
The categorical penalty is incompatible with the FMLA’s
comprehensive remedial mechanism. To prevail under the
cause of action set out in § 2617, an employee must prove,
as a threshold matter, that the employer violated § 2615 by
interfering with, restraining, or denying his or her exercise
of FMLA rights. Even then, § 2617 provides no relief un-
less the employee has been prejudiced by the violation: The
employer is liable only for compensation and benefits lost
“by reason of the violation,” § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I), for other
monetary losses sustained “as a direct result of the viola-
tion,” § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II), and for “appropriate” equitable
relief, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion,
§ 2617(a)(1)(B). The remedy is tailored to the harm suffered.
Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U. S. 279, 292–293 (2002)
(provisions in Title VII stating that plaintiffs “may recover”
damages and “appropriate” equitable relief “refer to the trial
judge’s discretion in a particular case to order reinstatement
and award damages in an amount warranted by the facts of
that case”).
Section 825.700(a), Ragsdale contends, reflects the Secre-
tary’s understanding that an employer’s failure to comply
with the designation requirement might sometimes burden
an employee’s exercise of basic FMLA rights in violation
of § 2615. Consider, for instance, the right under § 2612(b)(1)
to take intermittent leave when medically necessary. An
employee who undergoes cancer treatments every other
week over the course of 12 weeks might want to work dur-
ing the off weeks, earning a paycheck and saving six weeks
for later. If she is not informed that her absence qualifies

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Opinion of the Court
as FMLA leave—and if she does not know of her right under
the statute to take intermittent leave—she might take all
12 of her FMLA-guaranteed weeks consecutively and have
no leave remaining for some future emergency. In circum-
stances like these, Ragsdale argues, the employer’s failure
to give the notice required by the regulation could be said
to “deny,” “restrain,” or “interfere with” the employee’s
exercise of her right to take intermittent leave.
This position may be reasonable, but the more extreme
one embodied in § 825.700(a) is not. The penalty provision
does not say that in certain situations an employer’s failure
to make the designation will violate § 2615 and entitle the
employee to additional leave. Rather, the regulation estab-
lishes an irrebuttable presumption that the employee’s ex-
ercise of FMLA rights was impaired—and that the employee
deserves 12 more weeks. There is no empirical or logical
basis for this presumption, as the facts of this case well
demonstrate. Ragsdale has not shown that she would have
taken less leave or intermittent leave if she had received
the required notice. As the Court of Appeals noted—and
Ragsdale did not dispute in her petition for certiorari—
“Ragsdale’s medical condition rendered her unable to work
for substantially longer than the FMLA twelve-week pe-
riod.” 218 F. 3d, at 940. In fact her physician did not clear
her to work until December, long after her 30-week leave
period had ended. Even if Wolverine had complied with the
notice regulations, Ragsdale still would have taken the en-
tire 30-week absence. Blind to this reality, the Secretary’s
provision required the company to grant Ragsdale 12 more
weeks of leave—and rendered it liable under § 2617 when it
denied her request and terminated her.
The challenged regulation is invalid because it alters the
FMLA’s cause of action in a fundamental way: It relieves
employees of the burden of proving any real impairment of
their rights and resulting prejudice. In the case at hand,
the regulation permitted Ragsdale to bring suit under § 2617,

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despite her inability to show that Wolverine’s actions re-
strained her exercise of FMLA rights. Section 825.700(a)
transformed the company’s failure to give notice—along with
its refusal to grant her more than 30 weeks of leave—into
an actionable violation of § 2615. This regulatory sleight
of hand also entitled Ragsdale to reinstatement and back-
pay, even though reinstatement could not be said to be
“appropriate” in these circumstances and Ragsdale lost no
compensation “by reason of ” Wolverine’s failure to desig-
nate her absence as FMLA leave. By mandating these re-
sults absent a showing of consequential harm, the regulation
worked an end run around important limitations of the stat-
ute’s remedial scheme.
In defense of the regulation, the Government notes that
a categorical penalty requiring the employer to grant more
leave is easier to administer than one involving a fact-specific
inquiry into what steps the employee would have taken had
the employer given the required notice. “Regardless of how
serious the problem an administrative agency seeks to ad-
dress, however, it may not exercise its authority ‘in a manner
that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that
Congress enacted into law.’ ” FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 125 (2000) (quoting ETSI Pipe-
line Project v. Missouri, 484 U. S. 495, 517 (1988)). By its
nature, the remedy created by Congress requires the retro-
spective, case-by-case examination the Secretary now seeks
to eliminate. The purpose of the cause of action is to permit
a court to inquire into matters such as whether the employee
would have exercised his or her FMLA rights in the absence
of the employer’s actions. To determine whether damages
and equitable relief are appropriate under the FMLA, the
judge or jury must ask what steps the employee would
have taken had circumstances been different—considering,
for example, when the employee would have returned to
work after taking leave. Though the Secretary could not

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enact rules purporting to make these kinds of determi-
nations for the courts, § 825.700(a) has this precise effect.
For this reason, the Government’s reliance upon Mourning
v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973),
is misplaced. Just as the FMLA does not itself require em-
ployers to give individualized notice, see supra, at 88, the
Truth in Lending Act did not itself require lenders to make
certain disclosures mandated by the regulation at issue in
Mourning. In sustaining the regulation, we observed that
the disclosure requirement was not contrary to the statute
and that the Federal Reserve Board’s rulemaking authority
was much broader than the Secretary’s is here. See 411
U. S., at 361–362 (quoting 15 U. S. C. § 1604 (1970 ed.) (em-
powering the Board to issue regulations not only necessary
“to carry out the purposes of [the statute],” but also “neces-
sary or proper . . . to prevent circumvention or evasion [of
the statute], or to facilitate compliance therewith”)). The
crucial distinction, however, is that although we referred to
the Board’s regulation as a “remedial measure,” 411 U. S., at
371, the disclosure requirement was in fact enforced through
the statute’s pre-existing remedial scheme and in a manner
consistent with it. The Board simply assessed violators the
$100 minimum statutory fine applicable to lenders who failed
to make required disclosures. See id., at 376. In contrast,
§ 825.700(a) enforces the individualized notice requirement
in a way that contradicts and undermines the FMLA’s pre-
existing remedial scheme. While § 2617 says that employ-
ees must prove impairment of their statutory rights and re-
sulting harm, the Secretary’s regulation instructs the courts
to ignore this command. Our previous decisions, Mourning
included, do not authorize agencies to contravene Congress’
will in this manner.
Furthermore, even if the Secretary were authorized to
reconfigure the FMLA’s cause of action for her administra-
tive convenience, this particular rule would be an unreason-
able choice. As we have noted in other contexts, categorical

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rules—such as the rule of per se antitrust illegality—reflect
broad generalizations holding true in so many cases that
inquiry into whether they apply to the case at hand would
be needless and wasteful. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 50, n. 16 (1977); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U. S. 451, 486–487
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). When the generalizations
fail to hold in the run of cases—when, for example, a particu-
lar restraint of trade does not usually present a pronounced
risk of injury to competition—the justification for the cate-
gorical rule disappears. See, e. g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U. S. 3, 8–22 (1997) (rejecting per se ban on vertical maxi-
mum price fixing). That said, the generalization made by
the Secretary’s categorical penalty—that the proper re-
dress for an employer’s violation of the notice regulations is
a full 12 more weeks of leave—holds true in but few cases.
The employee who would have taken the absence anyway,
of course, would need no more leave; but the regulation pro-
vides 12 additional weeks. Even the employee who would
have chosen to work on an intermittent basis—say, every
other week, see supra, at 89–90—could claim an entitlement
not to 12 weeks of leave but instead to the 6 weeks he or she
would not have taken. To be sure, 12 more weeks might
be an appropriate make-whole remedy for an employee who
would not have taken any leave at all if the notice had
been given. It is not a “fair assumption,” United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U. S., at 676, however, that this fact pattern
will occur in any but the most exceptional of cases.
To the extent the Secretary’s penalty will have no sub-
stantial relation to the harm suffered by the employee in
the run of cases, it also amends the FMLA’s most funda-
mental substantive guarantee—the employee’s entitlement
to “a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month
period.” § 2612(a)(1). Like any key term in an important
piece of legislation, the 12-week figure was the result of com-
promise between groups with marked but divergent inter-

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94 RAGSDALE v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
ests in the contested provision. Employers wanted fewer
weeks; employees wanted more. See H. R. Rep. No. 102–
135, pt. 1, p. 37 (1991). Congress resolved the conflict by
choosing a middle ground, a period considered long enough
to serve “the needs of families” but not so long that it would
upset “the legitimate interests of employers.” § 2601(b).
Courts and agencies must respect and give effect to these
sorts of compromises. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S.
807, 818–819 (1980). The Secretary’s chosen penalty sub-
verts the careful balance, for it gives certain employees a
right to more than 12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in
a given 1-year period. This is so in part because the em-
ployee will often enjoy every right guaranteed by the FMLA
during part or all of an undesignated absence. Under the
Secretary’s regulations, moreover, employers must comply
with the FMLA’s minimum requirements during these un-
designated periods. See, e. g., 29 CFR § 825.208(c) (2001)
(an employee on paid leave “is subject to the full protections
of the Act” during “the absence preceding the notice to the
employee of the [FMLA] designation”). Here, the Secre-
tary required Wolverine to maintain Ragsdale’s health bene-
fits for at least 12 weeks of her 30-week absence; if it had
not, Ragsdale could have sued. The penalty provision, in
turn, required the company to grant Ragsdale 12 more weeks
after the 30 weeks had passed. Section 2654 merely author-
izes the Secretary to issue rules “necessary to carry out” the
Act, but these regulations extended Wolverine’s liability far
beyond the 12-week total guaranteed by the statute. It is
no answer to say, as the Government does, that the Secre-
tary’s provision is consistent with the Act because employers
must provide more than 12 weeks of leave only when they
do not comply with the individualized notice requirement.
If this argument carried the day, a penalty of 24 weeks—
or 36, or 48—would also be permissible. Just as those pro-
visions would be contrary to the FMLA’s 12-week mandate,
so is § 825.700(a).

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95 Cite as: 535 U. S. 81 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
That the Secretary’s penalty is disproportionate and in-
consistent with Congress’ intent is evident as well from the
sole notice provision in the Act itself. As noted above,
§ 2619 directs employers to post a general notice informing
employees of their FMLA rights. See supra, at 88. This
provision sets out its own penalty for noncompliance: “Any
employer that willfully violates this section may be assessed
a civil monetary penalty not to exceed $100 for each separate
offense.” § 2619(b). Congress believed that a $100 fine, en-
forced by the Secretary, was the appropriate penalty for
willful violations of the only notice requirement specified
in the statute. The regulation, in contrast, establishes a
much heavier sanction, enforced not by the Secretary but
by employees, for both willful and inadvertent violations
of a supplemental notice requirement.
Section 825.700(a) is also in considerable tension with the
statute’s admonition that “[n]othing in this Act . . . shall be
construed to discourage employers from adopting or re-
taining leave policies more generous than any policies that
comply with the requirements under this Act.” § 2653.
The FMLA was intended to pull certain employers up to the
minimum standard, but Congress was well aware of the dan-
ger that it might push more generous employers down to the
minimum at the same time. Technical rules and burden-
some administrative requirements, Congress knew, might
impose unforeseen liabilities and discourage employers from
adopting policies that varied much from the basic federal
requirements.
Although § 825.700(a) itself is directed toward employers
“provid[ing] more generous benefits than required by the
FMLA,” its severe and across-the-board penalty could cause
employers to discontinue these voluntary programs. Com-
pliance with the designation requirement is easy enough for
companies meeting only the minimum federal requirements:
All leave is given the FMLA designation. Matters are quite
different for companies like Wolverine, which offer more

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96 RAGSDALE v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC.
O’Connor, J., dissenting
diverse and expansive options to their employees. In addi-
tion to allowing more than 12 weeks of leave per year, these
employers might also provide leave for non-FMLA reasons,
or to employees who are not yet FMLA eligible—leave the
Secretary may not permit to be designated as FMLA leave.
See, e. g., 60 Fed. Reg. 2230 (1995) (“Leave granted under
circumstances that do not meet . . . specified reasons for
FMLA-qualifying leave may not be counted against [the]
FMLA’s 12-week entitlement”). Those employers must de-
cide, almost as soon as leave is requested, whether to desig-
nate the absence as FMLA leave. The answer might not
always be obvious, and this decision may require substan-
tial investigation. The regulation imposes a high price for
a good-faith but erroneous characterization of an absence
as non-FMLA leave, and employers like Wolverine might
well conclude that the simpler, less generous route is the
preferable one.
These considerations persuade us that § 825.700(a) effects
an impermissible alteration of the statutory framework and
cannot be within the Secretary’s power to issue regulations
“necessary to carry out” the Act under § 2654. In so hold-
ing we do not decide whether the notice and designation re-
quirements are themselves valid or whether other means
of enforcing them might be consistent with the statute.
Whatever the bounds of the Secretary’s discretion on this
matter, they were exceeded here. The FMLA guaranteed
Ragsdale 12—not 42—weeks of leave in 1996.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993 (FMLA or Act), 29 U. S. C. § 2601 et seq. (1994
ed. and Supp. V), clearly precludes the Secretary of Labor
from adopting a rule requiring an employer to give an em-

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97 Cite as: 535 U. S. 81 (2002)
O’Connor, J., dissenting
ployee notice that leave is FMLA qualifying before the leave
may be counted against the employer’s 12-week obligation.
Because I believe the Secretary is justified in requiring such
individualized notice and because I think that nothing in the
Act constrains the Secretary’s ability to secure compliance
with that requirement by refusing to count the leave against
the employer’s statutory obligation, I respectfully dissent.
I
I begin with the question the Court set aside, see ante, at
88, whether the Secretary was justified in requiring in-
dividualized notice at all. The FMLA gives the Secretary
the notice and comment rulemaking authority to “prescribe
such regulations as are necessary to carry out” the Act.
29 U. S. C. § 2654 (1994 ed.). In light of this explicit con-
gressional delegation of rulemaking authority, we must up-
hold the Secretary’s regulations unless they are “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U. S. 837, 844 (1984).
The Secretary has reasonably determined that individ-
ualized notice is necessary to implement the FMLA’s pro-
visions. According to the Secretary, to fulfill the FMLA’s
purposes, employees need to be aware of their rights and
responsibilities under the Act. See 60 Fed. Reg. 2220 (1995)
(“The intent of this notice requirement is to insure em-
ployees receive the information necessary to enable them
to take FMLA leave”). Although the Act requires that each
employer post a general notice of FMLA rights, 29 U. S. C.
§ 2619(a), the provision of individualized notice provides addi-
tional assurance that employees taking leave are aware of
their rights under the Act. Individualized notice reminds
employees of the existence of the Act and its protections at
the very moment they become relevant. See also 29 CFR
§ 825.301(b)(1) (2001) (notice must also include information
about various FMLA rights and obligations).

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98 RAGSDALE v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC.
O’Connor, J., dissenting
Perhaps more importantly, individualized notice indi-
cates to employees that the Act applies to them specifically.
To trigger employers’ FMLA obligations, employees need
not explicitly assert their rights under the Act; they must
only inform their employers of their reasons for seeking
leave. See § 825.208(a)(2). They may not be aware that
their leave is protected under the FMLA. For many em-
ployees, the individualized notice required by the Secre-
tary may therefore be their first opportunity to learn that
their leave is in fact protected by the FMLA. This not
only assists employees in enforcing their entitlement to
12 weeks of leave, but also helps them take advantage of
their other rights under the Act (such as their right to take
intermittent leave, 29 U. S. C. § 2612(b)(1), or to substitute
accrued paid leave, § 2612(b)(2)), and facilitates their enforce-
ment of the employer’s other obligations (such as the obliga-
tion to continue health insurance coverage during FMLA
leave, § 2614(c)(1), and the obligation to restore the employee
to a position upon return from leave, § 2614(a)).
Individualized notice also informs employees whether the
employer plans to provide FMLA and employer-sponsored
leave consecutively or concurrently. This can facilitate
leave planning, allowing employees to organize their health
treatments or family obligations around the total amount of
leave they will ultimately be provided.
Given these reasons, the Secretary’s decision to require
individualized notice is not arbitrary and capricious. Re-
spondent does not disagree, instead arguing that, whether or
not these reasons are valid, requiring individualized notice
is contrary to the Act. Because the Act explicitly requires
other sorts of notice, such as the requirement that the em-
ployer post a general notice, § 2619(a), and requirements that
an employee notify the employer of the need for or reasons
for FMLA leave, §§ 2612(e)(1), 2613, respondent argues that
Congress intended that the Secretary not enact any other
notice requirements.

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99 Cite as: 535 U. S. 81 (2002)
O’Connor, J., dissenting
The Act, however, provides no indication that its notice
provisions are intended to be exclusive. Nor does it make
sense for them to be so. Different notice requirements
serve different functions. The requirement that employees
notify their employers of their reasons for leave, for instance,
informs employers that their obligations have been triggered
and allows them to use the certification mechanisms pro-
vided in the Act. § 2613. The requirement that employees
give advance notice when leave is foreseeable, § 2612(e)(1),
facilitates employer planning. That the Act provides for
notice to further these objectives indicates nothing about
whether the Secretary may permissibly use the same tool to
further different ends.
Even the provision that may seem most similar, the gen-
eral notice requirement, § 2619(a), serves a significantly dif-
ferent purpose than the Secretary’s requirement. Although
both inform employees of their rights under the Act, the
general notice requirement is particularly useful to em-
ployees who might otherwise never approach their employer
with a leave request, while the individualized notice require-
ment is targeted at employees after they have informed the
employer of their request for leave. Moreover, even if the
purposes of both sorts of notice were identical, it is not at
all clear that, by providing for one sort of notice to fur-
ther these objectives, Congress intended to preclude the
Secretary from bolstering this purpose with an additional
notice requirement. I therefore conclude that nothing in the
Act precludes the Secretary from accomplishing her goals
through a requirement of individualized notice.
II
Also at issue before the Court is whether the Secretary
may secure compliance with the individualized notice re-
quirement by providing that leave will not count against
the employer’s 12-week obligation unless the employer ful-
fills this requirement. The Court concludes that this means

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100 RAGSDALE v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC.
O’Connor, J., dissenting
of securing compliance is inconsistent with the cause of ac-
tion the Act provides when employers “interfere with, re-
strain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise,
any right provided under this subchapter.” 29 U. S. C.
§ 2615. The Court appears to see two different kinds of con-
flict. At times, the Court seems to suggest that, insofar as
the purpose of the individualized notice requirement is to
enable the employee to enforce the Act’s specific protections
(such as the right to be reinstated at the end of the leave
period), the Act restricts employees to bringing § 2615 ac-
tions to redress violations of these protections and not the
notice requirement itself. See ante, at 91 (The Secretary’s
penalty provision “transformed the company’s failure to
give notice . . . into an actionable violation of § 2615”).
Under that section, employees bear the burden of proving
the violation, and their recovery is limited to whatever
damages they can show they have suffered because of the
employer’s violation. § 2617 (1994 ed. and Supp. V).
If this is in fact the Court’s view, it would effectively evis-
cerate the individualized notice requirement. Under such
a scheme, an employer could feel no obligation to provide
individualized notice, only an obligation to refrain from
otherwise violating the Act’s other provisions. This would
seriously impede the Secretary’s goals. While the fear of
litigation under § 2615 might go some way toward deterring
employers from, for instance, failing to reinstate employees
who have taken leave or discontinuing their health insurance
while they are on leave, it would do so less effectively than
if employees were explicitly informed that their leave was
FMLA qualifying at the moment it was taken. More im-
portantly, the potential for § 2615 liability would do noth-
ing to further some of the Secretary’s other goals, such as
making employees aware that the range of options pro-
vided by the FMLA is available to them. Without indi-
vidualized notice, for instance, employees may not be made
aware that they have the option of requesting intermittent

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101 Cite as: 535 U. S. 81 (2002)
O’Connor, J., dissenting
leave, § 2612(b)(1), or the option of asking the employer to
substitute accrued paid vacation or sick leave for unpaid
FMLA leave, § 2612(b)(2). An employer may only be liable
under § 2615 for denying these options if the employee knows
enough to request them. A rule that would restrict FMLA
remedies to violations of § 2615 based on denials of other
statutorily protected rights would thus be equivalent to
denying the Secretary the power to enforce an individual-
ized notice requirement at all. Because I believe the indi-
vidualized notice requirement is justified, and because the
Secretary’s power to create such a requirement must also
include a power to enforce it in some way, this extreme view
of the Act’s remedial scheme should be rejected.
At other times, however, the Court suggests a less ex-
treme view—that the Secretary may be allowed to require
individualized notice, but that the remedy for failing to
give such notice must also lie under § 2615, requiring the
employee to prove harm from the employer’s failure to no-
tify. See ante, at 91 (suggesting that the appropriate rule
is one “involving a fact-specific inquiry into what steps the
employee would have taken had the employer given the re-
quired notice”). This was the approach adopted by the
Court of Appeals, allowing recovery when an “employer’s
failure to give notice . . . interfere[s] with or [denies] an em-
ployee’s substantive FMLA rights.” 218 F. 3d 933, 939
(CA8 2000).
But there is no reason to restrict the Secretary’s rem-
edy to § 2615 actions. The Secretary is charged with adopt-
ing regulations that are “necessary to carry out” the Act.
§ 2654. This includes the power to craft appropriate rem-
edies for regulatory violations. In Mourning v. Family
Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973), where the
Federal Reserve Board was empowered to “prescribe regu-
lations to carry out the purposes of ” the Truth in Lend-
ing Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1604, this Court deferred to its choice
of remedies, asserting that “[w]e have consistently held

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102 RAGSDALE v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC.
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that where reasonable minds may differ as to which of
several remedial measures should be chosen, courts should
defer to the informed experience and judgment of the agency
to whom Congress delegated appropriate authority.” 411
U. S., at 371–372.
Just as the fact that the Act provides for certain sorts
of notice does not preclude the Secretary from providing for
other sorts, the fact that the Act provides for certain reme-
dies does not tie the hands of the Secretary to provide for
others. The Court’s argument to the contrary seems to be
based on something like the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius—that Congress’ decision to provide for one
remedy indicates that it did not intend for the Secretary
to have authority to create any others. Because of the
deference given to agencies on matters about which the stat-
utes they administer are silent, Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843,
however, expressio unius ought to have somewhat reduced
force in this context. See Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v.
Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F. 2d 685, 694 (CADC 1991). For
example, in Mourning, this Court deferred to the agency’s
decision to impose a set fine on lenders who violated a regu-
lation, rejecting the argument that, because the Truth in
Lending Act provided for one sort of remedy, the agency
lacked authority to impose any other sort of penalty. Al-
though the penalty was set in an amount equal to the mini-
mum fine set forth in the statute, it clearly went beyond
the statute’s remedial scheme, which required that damages
be set in an amount related to the lender’s finance charge.
Cf. ante, at 92. In so holding, we stated:
“[T]he objective sought in delegating rulemaking au-
thority to an agency is to relieve Congress of the impos-
sible burden of drafting a code explicitly covering every
conceivable future problem. Congress cannot then be
required to tailor civil penalty provisions so as to deal
precisely with each step which the agency thereafter
finds necessary.” 411 U. S., at 376.

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103 Cite as: 535 U. S. 81 (2002)
O’Connor, J., dissenting
Moreover, the Act itself provides some remedies that fall
outside the framework of 29 U. S. C. § 2615—for instance,
the fine for failure to post a general notice of FMLA rights,
§ 2619(b). This confirms that § 2615 is not intended to be
the exclusive remedy for violations of the Act or its imple-
menting regulations. Respondent conceded at oral argu-
ment that the Secretary could secure compliance with the
individual notice requirement through establishment of a
fine, a remedy that goes beyond § 2615. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28.
If the Secretary may enforce her regulations with a fine,
what in the Act precludes her from enforcing them as appro-
priate through a range of remedies, such as treble damages,
cease and desist orders punishable by contempt, or, in this
case, additional leave?
The Court further claims that, even if the Secretary has
the power to craft her own remedy for violation of the regu-
lation, the particular remedy she has chosen is unreasonable.
See ante, at 92–93. The Court does not take issue with the
reasonableness of a categorical remedy, one that is not neces-
sarily tailored to the individual loss of each litigant. See
Mourning, supra, at 377 (approving of such “prophylactic”
rules). The Court’s argument is instead based on its asser-
tion that the categorical remedy the Secretary has chosen is
too harsh. In the Court’s judgment, 12 weeks of additional
leave is too great a punishment because few employees will
have actually suffered this much harm from the employer’s
failure to give individualized notice. See ante, at 93.
We are bound, however, to defer to the Secretary’s judg-
ment of the likely harms of lack of notice so long as it is
reasonable. I believe that it is. The Secretary has de-
termined that a variety of purposes will be served through
individualized notice, including facilitating employee plan-
ning, and enabling enforcement of the Act’s protections and
use of its various options by making employees aware that
their leave is FMLA qualifying at the moment they take
it. For those employees who ultimately bring suit for denial

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104 RAGSDALE v. WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC.
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of notice, it is difficult to quantify their damages retrospec-
tively—it requires knowing not only what options an em-
ployee would have been likely to take had notice been given,
but also the extent to which that employee’s ability to plan
leave was compromised. Moreover, an employer’s failure to
give individualized notice may itself cause some employees
(unaware that their leave is FMLA qualifying) not to bring
suit at all. I therefore see no reason to doubt the Secre-
tary’s judgment that 12 additional weeks of leave is an ap-
propriate penalty for failing to provide individualized notice.
The Court further suggests that the Secretary’s remedy
is contrary to the statute in two other ways. First, it claims
that the penalty would exceed the FMLA’s guarantee of
12 weeks of leave under §§ 2612(a)(1) and (d)(1). See ante,
at 93–94. But nothing requires an employer to provide
more than 12 weeks of leave—an employer may avoid this
penalty by following the regulation. The penalty the Sec-
retary has chosen no more extends an employer’s obliga-
tions under the Act than would any fine or other remedy for
a violation of those obligations. Nor, as the Court notes,
would a longer penalty violate this aspect of the Act. See
ante, at 94. To the extent that an even lengthier penalty
would be inappropriate, it would be because it is unrea-
sonable, not because it is contrary to the Act’s 12-week
allotment.
Moreover, providing this notice is not at all onerous.
In most situations, notice will require nothing more than in-
forming the employee of what the employer already knows:
that the leave is FMLA qualifying. The employer will
eventually have to make this designation to comply with
the Act’s recordkeeping requirements. 29 U. S. C. § 2616(b).
At most, the regulation moves up the time of this designa-
tion. When an employer is unsure at the time the leave
begins whether it qualifies, the regulations allow an in-
terim designation followed by later confirmation. 29 CFR

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105 Cite as: 535 U. S. 81 (2002)
O’Connor, J., dissenting
§ 825.208(e)(2) (2001). This is hardly the “high price” of
which the Court complains. See ante, at 96.
Second, the Court claims that the penalty would discour-
age employers from voluntarily providing more leave than
the FMLA requires, contrary to the Act’s assertion that
“[n]othing in this Act . . . shall be construed to discourage
employers from adopting or retaining [more generous] leave
policies,” § 2653. See ante, at 95. This section sets out a
general interpretive principle, however, and should not be
construed as removing from the Secretary the power to
craft any regulation that might have even a small discourag-
ing effect, no matter how otherwise important. Moreover,
because of the ease with which an employer may meet its
obligation to provide individualized notice, this effect will
be minimal.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand the case for appropriate
proceedings.