SWIERKIEWICZ v. SOREMA N. A.

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506 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
SWIERKIEWICZ v. SOREMA N. A.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 00–1853. Argued January 15, 2002—Decided February 26, 2002
Petitioner, a 53-year-old native of Hungary, filed this suit against re-
spondent, his former employer, alleging that he had been fired on
account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In affirming the District
Court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Second Circuit relied on its
settled precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint
to allege facts constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under
the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S.
792, 802. The court held that petitioner had failed to meet his burden
because his allegations were insufficient as a matter of law to raise an
inference of discrimination.
Held: An employment discrimination complaint need not contain specific
facts establishing a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, but instead must contain only “a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). The McDonnell Douglas framework—which
requires the plaintiff to show (1) membership in a protected group,
(2) qualification for the job in question, (3) an adverse employment
action, and (4) circumstances supporting an inference of discrimina-
tion—is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. See, e. g.,
411 U. S., at 800. The Court has never indicated that the requirements
for establishing a prima facie case apply to pleading. Moreover, the
McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply where, for example, a
plaintiff is able to produce direct evidence of discrimination. See Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121. Under the Second
Circuit’s heightened pleading standard, however, a plaintiff without
direct evidence at the time of his complaint must plead a prima facie
case of discrimination even though discovery might uncover such direct
evidence. It seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately
need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimi-
nation is discovered. Moreover, the precise requirements of the prima
facie case can vary with the context and were “never intended to be
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438

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Syllabus
U. S. 567, 577. It may be difficult to define the precise formulation of
the required prima facie case in a particular case before discovery has
unearthed relevant facts and evidence. Consequently, the prima facie
case should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for dis-
crimination cases. Imposing the Second Circuit’s heightened standard
conflicts with Rule 8(a)’s express language, which requires simply that
the complaint “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff ’s claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S.
41, 47. A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief
could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent
with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73.
Petitioner’s complaint easily satisfies Rule 8(a)’s requirements because
it gives respondent fair notice of the basis for his claims and the grounds
upon which they rest. In addition, it states claims upon which relief
could be granted under Title VII and the ADEA. Thus, the complaint
is sufficient to survive respondent’s motion to dismiss. Pp. 510–515.
5 Fed. Appx. 63, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Harold I. Goodman argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioner.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States
et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. On the brief were
Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Boyd,
Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Patricia A. Millett, and
Philip B. Sklover.
Lauren Reiter Brody argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief was Frances Kulka Browne.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law by John A. Payton, Gary T. John-
son, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, and
Nancy L. Perkins; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association
et al. by Paul W. Mollica and Paula A. Brantner.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Center for
Individual Freedom by Linda Van Winkle Deacon and Julie Arias Young;
and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Ann Elizabeth Rees-
man and Katherine Y. K. Cheung.

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508 SWIERKIEWICZ v. SOREMA N. A.
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a complaint in
an employment discrimination lawsuit must contain specific
facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under
the framework set forth by this Court in McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). We hold that an
employment discrimination complaint need not include such
facts and instead must contain only “a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
I
Petitioner Akos Swierkiewicz is a native of Hungary,
who at the time of his complaint was 53 years old.1 In April
1989, petitioner began working for respondent Sorema N. A.,
a reinsurance company headquartered in New York and
principally owned and controlled by a French parent corpo-
ration. Petitioner was initially employed in the position of
senior vice president and chief underwriting officer (CUO).
Nearly six years later, Franc¸ois M. Chavel, respondent’s
Chief Executive Officer, demoted petitioner to a marketing
and services position and transferred the bulk of his under-
writing responsibilities to Nicholas Papadopoulo, a 32-year-
old who, like Mr. Chavel, is a French national. About a year
later, Mr. Chavel stated that he wanted to “energize” the
underwriting department and appointed Mr. Papadopoulo
as CUO. Petitioner claims that Mr. Papadopoulo had only
one year of underwriting experience at the time he was pro-
moted, and therefore was less experienced and less qualified
to be CUO than he, since at that point he had 26 years of
experience in the insurance industry.
1 Because we review here a decision granting respondent’s motion to
dismiss, we must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained
in the complaint. See, e. g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 164 (1993).

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Opinion of the Court
Following his demotion, petitioner contends that he “was
isolated by Mr. Chavel . . . excluded from business deci-
sions and meetings and denied the opportunity to reach his
true potential at SOREMA.” App. 26. Petitioner unsuc-
cessfully attempted to meet with Mr. Chavel to discuss his
discontent. Finally, in April 1997, petitioner sent a memo
to Mr. Chavel outlining his grievances and requesting a
severance package. Two weeks later, respondent’s gen-
eral counsel presented petitioner with two options: He could
either resign without a severance package or be dismissed.
Mr. Chavel fired petitioner after he refused to resign.
Petitioner filed a lawsuit alleging that he had been ter-
minated on account of his national origin in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V),
and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602,
as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V).
App. 28. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed petitioner’s complaint be-
cause it found that he “ha[d] not adequately alleged a prima
facie case, in that he ha[d] not adequately alleged circum-
stances that support an inference of discrimination.” Id.,
at 42. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal, relying on its settled prece-
dent, which requires a plaintiff in an employment discrimi-
nation complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie
case of discrimination under the framework set forth by
this Court in McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802. See, e. g.,
Tarshis v. Riese Organization, 211 F. 3d 30, 35–36, 38 (CA2
2000); Austin v. Ford Models, Inc., 149 F. 3d 148, 152–153
(CA2 1998). The Court of Appeals held that petitioner had
failed to meet his burden because his allegations were “insuf-
ficient as a matter of law to raise an inference of discrimina-
tion.” 5 Fed. Appx. 63, 65 (CA2 2001). We granted certio-
rari, 533 U. S. 976 (2001), to resolve a split among the Courts

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510 SWIERKIEWICZ v. SOREMA N. A.
Opinion of the Court
of Appeals concerning the proper pleading standard for
employment discrimination cases,2 and now reverse.
II
Applying Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals required
petitioner to plead a prima facie case of discrimination in
order to survive respondent’s motion to dismiss. See 5 Fed.
Appx., at 64–65. In the Court of Appeals’ view, petitioner
was thus required to allege in his complaint: (1) membership
in a protected group; (2) qualification for the job in question;
(3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances that
support an inference of discrimination. Ibid.; cf. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U. S., at 802; Texas Dept. of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 253–254, n. 6 (1981).
The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, how-
ever, is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.
In McDonnell Douglas, this Court made clear that “[t]he
critical issue before us concern[ed] the order and allocation
of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employ-
ment discrimination.” 411 U. S., at 800 (emphasis added).
In subsequent cases, this Court has reiterated that the
prima facie case relates to the employee’s burden of pre-
senting evidence that raises an inference of discrimination.
See Burdine, supra, at 252–253 (“In [McDonnell Douglas,]
we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of pres-
entation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory
treatment. First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of
2 The majority of Courts of Appeals have held that a plaintiff need not
plead a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), in order to survive a motion to dismiss.
See, e. g., Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. 3d 1111, 1114 (CADC
2000); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F. 3d 516, 518 (CA7 1998); Ring v. First
Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F. 2d 924 (CA8 1993). Others, however,
maintain that a complaint must contain factual allegations that support
each element of a prima facie case. In addition to the case below, see
Jackson v. Columbus, 194 F. 3d 737, 751 (CA6 1999).

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Opinion of the Court
discrimination” (footnotes omitted)); 450 U. S., at 255, n. 8
(“This evidentiary relationship between the presumption
created by a prima facie case and the consequential burden
of production placed on the defendant is a traditional feature
of the common law”).
This Court has never indicated that the requirements for
establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas
also apply to the pleading standard that plaintiffs must sat-
isfy in order to survive a motion to dismiss. For instance,
we have rejected the argument that a Title VII complaint
requires greater “particularity,” because this would “too
narrowly constric[t] the role of the pleadings.” McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273, 283, n. 11 (1976).
Consequently, the ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency
of a complaint apply. See, e. g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S.
232, 236 (1974) (“When a federal court reviews the sufficiency
of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either
by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited
one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately pre-
vail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims”).
In addition, under a notice pleading system, it is not ap-
propriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing
a prima facie case because the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work does not apply in every employment discrimination
case. For instance, if a plaintiff is able to produce direct
evidence of discrimination, he may prevail without proving
all the elements of a prima facie case. See Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121 (1985) (“[T]he
McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plain-
tiff presents direct evidence of discrimination”). Under the
Second Circuit’s heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff
without direct evidence of discrimination at the time of his
complaint must plead a prima facie case of discrimination,
even though discovery might uncover such direct evidence.
It thus seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to

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512 SWIERKIEWICZ v. SOREMA N. A.
Opinion of the Court
survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may
ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct
evidence of discrimination is discovered.
Moreover, the precise requirements of a prima facie case
can vary depending on the context and were “never intended
to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978); see also McDonnell
Douglas, supra, at 802, n. 13 (“[T]he specification . . . of
the prima facie proof required from respondent is not neces-
sarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situa-
tions”); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 (1977)
(noting that this Court “did not purport to create an in-
flexible formulation” for a prima facie case); Ring v. First
Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F. 2d 924, 927 (CA8 1993)
(“[T]o measure a plaintiff ’s complaint against a particular
formulation of the prima facie case at the pleading stage is
inappropriate”). Before discovery has unearthed relevant
facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise
formulation of the required prima facie case in a particular
case. Given that the prima facie case operates as a flexible
evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid
pleading standard for discrimination cases.
Furthermore, imposing the Court of Appeals’ heightened
pleading standard in employment discrimination cases con-
flicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which pro-
vides that a complaint must include only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Such a statement must simply “give the de-
fendant fair notice of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S.
41, 47 (1957). This simplified notice pleading standard re-
lies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment mo-
tions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims. See id., at 47–48; Leatherman v. Tar-
rant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U. S. 163, 168–169 (1993). “The provisions for discov-

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ery are so flexible and the provisions for pretrial procedure
and summary judgment so effective, that attempted surprise
in federal practice is aborted very easily, synthetic issues
detected, and the gravamen of the dispute brought frankly
into the open for the inspection of the court.” 5 C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1202, p. 76
(2d ed. 1990).
Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil
actions, with limited exceptions. Rule 9(b), for example,
provides for greater particularity in all averments of fraud
or mistake.3 This Court, however, has declined to extend
such exceptions to other contexts. In Leatherman we
stated: “[T]he Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the
question of the need for greater particularity in pleading
certain actions, but do not include among the enumerated
actions any reference to complaints alleging municipal lia-
bility under § 1983. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”
507 U. S., at 168. Just as Rule 9(b) makes no mention of
municipal liability under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983
(1994 ed., Supp. V), neither does it refer to employment dis-
crimination. Thus, complaints in these cases, as in most oth-
ers, must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a).4
Other provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are inextricably linked to Rule 8(a)’s simplified notice plead-
ing standard. Rule 8(e)(1) states that “[n]o technical forms
of pleading or motions are required,” and Rule 8(f) provides
3 “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowl-
edge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.”
4 These requirements are exemplified by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Forms, which “are sufficient under the rules and are intended
to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules con-
template.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 84. For example, Form 9 sets forth a
complaint for negligence in which plaintiff simply states in relevant part:
“On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston,
Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plain-
tiff who was then crossing said highway.”

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514 SWIERKIEWICZ v. SOREMA N. A.
Opinion of the Court
that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice.” Given the Federal Rules’ simplified standard for
pleading, “[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear
that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that
could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73 (1984). If a pleading fails
to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient
notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement
under Rule 12(e) before responding. Moreover, claims lack-
ing merit may be dealt with through summary judgment
under Rule 56. The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is
the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which
was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim. See
Conley, supra, at 48 (“The Federal Rules reject the approach
that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by coun-
sel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle
that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision
on the merits”).
Applying the relevant standard, petitioner’s complaint
easily satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a) because it gives
respondent fair notice of the basis for petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner alleged that he had been terminated on account of
his national origin in violation of Title VII and on account of
his age in violation of the ADEA. App. 28. His complaint
detailed the events leading to his termination, provided rele-
vant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least
some of the relevant persons involved with his termination.
Id., at 24–28. These allegations give respondent fair notice
of what petitioner’s claims are and the grounds upon which
they rest. See Conley, supra, at 47. In addition, they state
claims upon which relief could be granted under Title VII
and the ADEA.
Respondent argues that allowing lawsuits based on conclu-
sory allegations of discrimination to go forward will burden
the courts and encourage disgruntled employees to bring
unsubstantiated suits. Brief for Respondent 34–40. What-

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Opinion of the Court
ever the practical merits of this argument, the Federal Rules
do not contain a heightened pleading standard for employ-
ment discrimination suits. A requirement of greater speci-
ficity for particular claims is a result that “must be obtained
by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
judicial interpretation.” Leatherman, supra, at 168. Fur-
thermore, Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard with-
out regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits.
“Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the
test.” Scheuer, 416 U. S., at 236.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that an employment
discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case
of discrimination and that petitioner’s complaint is suffi-
cient to survive respondent’s motion to dismiss. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.