TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC. v. WILLIAMS

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Syllabus
TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY,
INC. v. WILLIAMS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 00–1089. Argued November 7, 2001—Decided January 8, 2002
Claiming to be unable to perform her automobile assembly line job be-
cause she was disabled by carpal tunnel syndrome and related impair-
ments, respondent sued petitioner, her former employer, for failing to
provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
The District Court granted petitioner summary judgment, holding that
respondent’s impairment did not qualify as a “disability” under the ADA
because it had not “substantially limit[ed]” any “major life activit[y],”
§ 12102(2)(A), and that there was no evidence that respondent had had
a record of a substantially limiting impairment or that petitioner had
regarded her as having such an impairment. The Sixth Circuit re-
versed, finding that the impairments substantially limited respondent in
the major life activity of performing manual tasks. In order to demon-
strate that she was so limited, said the court, respondent had to show
that her manual disability involved a “class” of manual activities affect-
ing the ability to perform tasks at work. Respondent satisfied this test,
according to the court, because her ailments prevented her from doing
the tasks associated with certain types of manual jobs that require the
gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended at
or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time. In reaching this
conclusion, the court found that evidence that respondent could tend to
her personal hygiene and carry out personal or household chores did not
affect a determination that her impairments substantially limited her
ability to perform the range of manual tasks associated with an assem-
bly line job. The court granted respondent partial summary judgment
on the issue of whether she was disabled under the ADA.
Held: The Sixth Circuit did not apply the proper standard in determining
that respondent was disabled under the ADA because it analyzed only
a limited class of manual tasks and failed to ask whether respondent’s
impairments prevented or restricted her from performing tasks that are
of central importance to most people’s daily lives. Pp. 193–203.
(a) The Court’s consideration of what an individual must prove to
demonstrate a substantial limitation in the major life activity of per-
forming manual tasks is guided by the ADA’s disability definition.

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“Substantially” in the phrase “substantially limits” suggests “consider-
able” or “to a large degree,” and thus clearly precludes impairments
that interfere in only a minor way with performing manual tasks.
Cf. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U. S. 555, 565. Moreover, be-
cause “major” means important, “major life activities” refers to those
activities that are of central importance to daily life. In order for per-
forming manual tasks to fit into this category, the tasks in question must
be central to daily life. To be substantially limited in the specific major
life activity of performing manual tasks, therefore, an individual must
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual
from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s
daily lives. The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long
term. See 29 CFR §§ 1630.2( j)(2)(ii)–(iii).
It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status
under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an
impairment. Instead, the ADA requires them to offer evidence that
the extent of the limitation caused by their impairment in terms of their
own experience is substantial. 527 U. S., at 567. That the ADA de-
fines “disability” “with respect to an individual,” § 12102(2), makes clear
that Congress intended the existence of a disability to be determined in
such a case-by-case manner. See, e. g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U. S. 471, 483. An individualized assessment of the effect of an
impairment is particularly necessary when the impairment is one such
as carpal tunnel syndrome, in which symptoms vary widely from person
to person. Pp. 196–199.
(b) The Sixth Circuit erred in suggesting that, in order to prove a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing manual
tasks, a plaintiff must show that her manual disability involves a “class”
of manual activities, and that those activities affect the ability to per-
form tasks at work. Nothing in the ADA’s text, this Court’s opinions,
or the regulations suggests that a class-based framework should apply
outside the context of the major life activity of working. While the
Sixth Circuit addressed the different major life activity of performing
manual tasks, its analysis erroneously circumvented Sutton, supra, at
491, by focusing on respondent’s inability to perform manual tasks asso-
ciated only with her job. Rather, the central inquiry must be whether
the claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks central to most
people’s daily lives. Also without support is the Sixth Circuit’s asser-
tion that the question of whether an impairment constitutes a disability
is to be answered only by analyzing the impairment’s effect in the work-
place. That the ADA’s “disability” definition applies not only to the
portion of the ADA dealing with employment, but also to the other
provisions dealing with public transportation and public accommoda-

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186 TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS
Syllabus
tions, demonstrates that the definition is intended to cover individuals
with disabling impairments regardless of whether they have any connec-
tion to a workplace. Moreover, because the manual tasks unique to any
particular job are not necessarily important parts of most people’s lives,
occupation-specific tasks may have only limited relevance to the manual
task inquiry. In this case, repetitive work with hands and arms ex-
tended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods, the manual
task on which the Sixth Circuit relied, is not an important part of most
people’s daily lives. Household chores, bathing, and brushing one’s
teeth, in contrast, are among the types of manual tasks of central impor-
tance to people’s daily lives, so the Sixth Circuit should not have disre-
garded respondent’s ability to do these activities. Pp. 199–203.
224 F. 3d 840, reversed and remanded.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Jeffrey A. Savarise, John A.
West, and Katherine A. Hessenbruch.
Barbara B. McDowell argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. On the
brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Clement,
Malcolm L. Stewart, Marleigh D. Dover, and Charles W.
Scarborough.
Robert Leslie Rosenbaum argued the cause and filed a
brief for respondent.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. by Evan M. Tager and Miriam R.
Nemetz; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Ann Eliza-
beth Reesman, Katherine Y. K. Cheung, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin
Riegel; and for Levi Strauss & Co. by John C. Burgin, Jr.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jona-
than P. Hiatt, Michael H. Gottesman, and Laurence Gold; for the Associa-
tion of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; for the Judge
David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law et al. by John Townsend
Rich; for the National Council on Disability by Arlene Mayerson and
Nancy L. Perkins; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association
by Noah D. Lebowitz and Paula A. Brantner.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA
or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and
Supp. V), a physical impairment that “substantially limits
one or more . . . major life activities” is a “disability.” 42
U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994 ed.). Respondent, claiming to be
disabled because of her carpal tunnel syndrome and other
related impairments, sued petitioner, her former employer,
for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation
as required by the ADA. See § 12112(b)(5)(A). The Dis-
trict Court granted summary judgment to petitioner, finding
that respondent’s impairments did not substantially limit any
of her major life activities. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the impairments sub-
stantially limited respondent in the major life activity of per-
forming manual tasks, and therefore granting partial sum-
mary judgment to respondent on the issue of whether she
was disabled under the ADA. We conclude that the Court
of Appeals did not apply the proper standard in making this
determination because it analyzed only a limited class of
manual tasks and failed to ask whether respondent’s impair-
ments prevented or restricted her from performing tasks
that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.
I
Respondent began working at petitioner’s automobile
manufacturing plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, in August
1990. She was soon placed on an engine fabrication assem-
bly line, where her duties included work with pneumatic
tools. Use of these tools eventually caused pain in respond-
ent’s hands, wrists, and arms. She sought treatment at peti-
tioner’s in-house medical service, where she was diagnosed
with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendini-
tis. Respondent consulted a personal physician who placed
her on permanent work restrictions that precluded her from
lifting more than 20 pounds or from “frequently lifting or

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carrying . . . objects weighing up to 10 pounds,” engaging in
“constant repetitive . . . flexion or extension of [her] wrists
or elbows,” performing “overhead work,” or using “vibratory
or pneumatic tools.” Brief for Respondent 2; App. 45–46.
In light of these restrictions, for the next two years peti-
tioner assigned respondent to various modified duty jobs.
Nonetheless, respondent missed some work for medical
leave, and eventually filed a claim under the Kentucky Work-
ers’ Compensation Act. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.0011
et seq. (1997 and Supp. 2000). The parties settled this claim,
and respondent returned to work. She was unsatisfied by
petitioner’s efforts to accommodate her work restrictions,
however, and responded by bringing an action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
alleging that petitioner had violated the ADA by refusing to
accommodate her disability. That suit was also settled, and
as part of the settlement, respondent returned to work in
December 1993.
Upon her return, petitioner placed respondent on a team
in Quality Control Inspection Operations (QCIO). QCIO is
responsible for four tasks: (1) “assembly paint”; (2) “paint
second inspection”; (3) “shell body audit”; and (4) “ED sur-
face repair.” App. 19. Respondent was initially placed on
a team that performed only the first two of these tasks, and
for a couple of years, she rotated on a weekly basis between
them. In assembly paint, respondent visually inspected
painted cars moving slowly down a conveyor. She scanned
for scratches, dents, chips, or any other flaws that may have
occurred during the assembly or painting process, at a rate
of one car every 54 seconds. When respondent began work-
ing in assembly paint, inspection team members were re-
quired to open and shut the doors, trunk, and/or hood of each
passing car. Sometime during respondent’s tenure, how-
ever, the position was modified to include only visual inspec-
tion with few or no manual tasks. Paint second inspec-
tion required team members to use their hands to wipe each

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painted car with a glove as it moved along a conveyor. Id.,
at 21–22. The parties agree that respondent was physically
capable of performing both of these jobs and that her per-
formance was satisfactory.
During the fall of 1996, petitioner announced that it
wanted QCIO employees to be able to rotate through all four
of the QCIO processes. Respondent therefore received
training for the shell body audit job, in which team members
apply a highlight oil to the hood, fender, doors, rear quarter
panel, and trunk of passing cars at a rate of approximately
one car per minute. The highlight oil has the viscosity of
salad oil, and employees spread it on cars with a sponge
attached to a block of wood. After they wipe each car with
the oil, the employees visually inspect it for flaws. Wiping
the cars required respondent to hold her hands and arms up
around shoulder height for several hours at a time.
A short while after the shell body audit job was added to
respondent’s rotations, she began to experience pain in her
neck and shoulders. Respondent again sought care at peti-
tioner’s in-house medical service, where she was diagnosed
with myotendinitis bilateral periscapular, an inflammation of
the muscles and tendons around both of her shoulder blades;
myotendinitis and myositis bilateral forearms with nerve
compression causing median nerve irritation; and thoracic
outlet compression, a condition that causes pain in the nerves
that lead to the upper extremities. Respondent requested
that petitioner accommodate her medical conditions by
allowing her to return to doing only her original two jobs
in QCIO, which respondent claimed she could still perform
without difficulty.
The parties disagree about what happened next. Accord-
ing to respondent, petitioner refused her request and forced
her to continue working in the shell body audit job, which
caused her even greater physical injury. According to peti-
tioner, respondent simply began missing work on a regular
basis. Regardless, it is clear that on December 6, 1996, the

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190 TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS
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last day respondent worked at petitioner’s plant, she was
placed under a no-work-of-any-kind restriction by her treat-
ing physicians. On January 27, 1997, respondent received a
letter from petitioner that terminated her employment, cit-
ing her poor attendance record.
Respondent filed a charge of disability discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
After receiving a right to sue letter, respondent filed suit
against petitioner in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky. Her complaint alleged that
petitioner had violated the ADA and the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.010 et seq. (1997 and
Supp. 2000), by failing to reasonably accommodate her dis-
ability and by terminating her employment. Respondent
later amended her complaint to also allege a violation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 107 Stat. 6,
as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 2601 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V).
Respondent based her claim that she was “disabled” under
the ADA on the ground that her physical impairments sub-
stantially limited her in (1) manual tasks; (2) housework;
(3) gardening; (4) playing with her children; (5) lifting; and
(6) working, all of which, she argued, constituted major life
activities under the Act. Respondent also argued, in the al-
ternative, that she was disabled under the ADA because she
had a record of a substantially limiting impairment and be-
cause she was regarded as having such an impairment. See
42 U. S. C. §§ 12102(2)(B)–(C) (1994 ed.).
After petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and
respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
her disability claims, the District Court granted summary
judgment to petitioner. Civ. A. No. 97–135 (Jan. 26, 1999),
App. to Pet. for Cert. A–23. The court found that respond-
ent had not been disabled, as defined by the ADA, at the
time of petitioner’s alleged refusal to accommodate her, and
that she had therefore not been covered by the Act’s protec-
tions or by the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, which is con-

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strued consistently with the ADA. Id., at A–29, A–34 to
A–47. The District Court held that respondent had suffered
from a physical impairment, but that the impairment did not
qualify as a disability because it had not “substantially lim-
it[ed]” any “major life activit[y],” 42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A).
App. to Pet. for Cert. A–34 to A–42. The court rejected
respondent’s arguments that gardening, doing housework,
and playing with children are major life activities. Id., at
A–35 to A–36. Although the court agreed that performing
manual tasks, lifting, and working are major life activities,
it found the evidence insufficient to demonstrate that re-
spondent had been substantially limited in lifting or working.
Id., at A–36 to A–42. The court found respondent’s claim
that she was substantially limited in performing manual
tasks to be “irretrievably contradicted by [respondent’s] con-
tinual insistence that she could perform the tasks in assem-
bly [paint] and paint [second] inspection without difficulty.”
Id., at A–36. The court also found no evidence that respond-
ent had had a record of a substantially limiting impairment,
id., at A–43, or that petitioner had regarded her as having
such an impairment, id., at A–46 to A–47.
The District Court also rejected respondent’s claim that
her termination violated the ADA and the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act. The court found that even if it assumed that
respondent was disabled at the time of her termination, she
was not a “qualified individual with a disability,” 42 U. S. C.
§ 12111(8) (1994 ed.), because, at that time, her physicians
had restricted her from performing work of any kind, App.
to Pet. for Cert. A–47 to A–50. Finally, the court found
that respondent’s FMLA claim failed, because she had not
presented evidence that she had suffered any damages avail-
able under the FMLA. Id., at A–50 to A–54.
Respondent appealed all but the gardening, housework,
and playing-with-children rulings. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling on
whether respondent was disabled at the time she sought an

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accommodation, but affirmed the District Court’s rulings on
respondent’s FMLA and wrongful termination claims. 224
F. 3d 840 (2000). The Court of Appeals held that in order
for respondent to demonstrate that she was disabled due to
a substantial limitation in the ability to perform manual
tasks at the time of her accommodation request, she had to
“show that her manual disability involve[d] a ‘class’ of man-
ual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.”
Id., at 843. Respondent satisfied this test, according to the
Court of Appeals, because her ailments “prevent[ed] her
from doing the tasks associated with certain types of manual
assembly line jobs, manual product handling jobs and manual
building trade jobs (painting, plumbing, roofing, etc.) that re-
quire the gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands
and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended
periods of time.” Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the
court disregarded evidence that respondent could “ten[d] to
her personal hygiene [and] carr[y] out personal or household
chores,” finding that such evidence “does not affect a deter-
mination that her impairment substantially limit[ed] her abil-
ity to perform the range of manual tasks associated with
an assembly line job,” ibid. Because the Court of Appeals
concluded that respondent had been substantially limited in
performing manual tasks and, for that reason, was entitled
to partial summary judgment on the issue of whether she
was disabled under the Act, it found that it did not need to
determine whether respondent had been substantially lim-
ited in the major life activities of lifting or working, ibid., or
whether she had had a “record of ” a disability or had been
“regarded as” disabled, id., at 844.
We granted certiorari, 532 U. S. 970 (2001), to consider the
proper standard for assessing whether an individual is sub-
stantially limited in performing manual tasks. We now re-
verse the Court of Appeals’ decision to grant partial sum-
mary judgment to respondent on the issue of whether she
was substantially limited in performing manual tasks at the

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time she sought an accommodation. We express no opinion
on the working, lifting, or other arguments for disability sta-
tus that were preserved below but which were not ruled
upon by the Court of Appeals.
II
The ADA requires covered entities, including private em-
ployers, to provide “reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise quali-
fied individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” 42
U. S. C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994 ed.); see also § 12111(2) (“The
term ‘covered entity’ means an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management com-
mittee”). The Act defines a “qualified individual with a dis-
ability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or with-
out reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.” § 12111(8). In turn, a “disability” is:
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual;
“(B) a record of such an impairment; or
“(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”
§ 12102(2).
There are two potential sources of guidance for interpret-
ing the terms of this definition—the regulations interpreting
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 361, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 706(8)(B) (1988 ed.), and the EEOC regulations in-
terpreting the ADA. Congress drew the ADA’s definition
of disability almost verbatim from the definition of “handi-
capped individual” in the Rehabilitation Act, § 706(8)(B), and
Congress’ repetition of a well-established term generally
implies that Congress intended the term to be construed

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in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 631 (1998); FDIC v. Phila-
delphia Gear Corp., 476 U. S. 426, 437–438 (1986); ICC v. Par-
ker, 326 U. S. 60, 65 (1945). As we explained in Bragdon v.
Abbott, supra, at 631, Congress did more in the ADA than
suggest this construction; it adopted a specific statutory pro-
vision directing as follows:
“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, noth-
ing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser
standard than the standards applied under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U. S. C. 790 et seq.) or the
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such
title.” 42 U. S. C. § 12201(a) (1994 ed.).
The persuasive authority of the EEOC regulations is less
clear. As we have previously noted, see Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S. 471, 479 (1999), no agency has been
given authority to issue regulations interpreting the term
“disability” in the ADA. Nonetheless, the EEOC has done
so. See 29 CFR §§ 1630.2(g)–( j) (2001). Because both par-
ties accept the EEOC regulations as reasonable, we assume
without deciding that they are, and we have no occasion to
decide what level of deference, if any, they are due. See
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 480; Albertson’s,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U. S. 555, 563, n. 10 (1999).
To qualify as disabled under subsection (A) of the ADA’s
definition of disability, a claimant must initially prove that he
or she has a physical or mental impairment. See 42 U. S. C.
§ 12102(2)(A). The Rehabilitation Act regulations issued by
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in
1977, which appear without change in the current regula-
tions issued by the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices, define “physical impairment,” the type of impairment
relevant to this case, to mean “any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affect-
ing one or more of the following body systems: neurological;

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musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, includ-
ing speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.”
45 CFR § 84.3( j)(2)(i) (2001). The HEW regulations are of
particular significance because at the time they were issued,
HEW was the agency responsible for coordinating the imple-
mentation and enforcement of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U. S. C. § 794 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), which prohibits dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities by recipients
of federal financial assistance. Bragdon v. Abbott, supra, at
632 (citing Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 465
U. S. 624, 634 (1984)).
Merely having an impairment does not make one disabled
for purposes of the ADA. Claimants also need to demon-
strate that the impairment limits a major life activity. See
42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994 ed.). The HEW Rehabili-
tation Act regulations provide a list of examples of “major
life activities” that includes “walking, seeing, hearing,” and,
as relevant here, “performing manual tasks.” 45 CFR
§ 84.3( j)(2)(ii) (2001).
To qualify as disabled, a claimant must further show that
the limitation on the major life activity is “substantia[l].”
42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A). Unlike “physical impairment” and
“major life activities,” the HEW regulations do not define
the term “substantially limits.” See Nondiscrimination on
the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving
or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 42 Fed.
Reg. 22676, 22685 (1977) (stating HEW’s position that a
definition of “substantially limits” was not possible at that
time). The EEOC, therefore, has created its own definition
for purposes of the ADA. According to the EEOC regula-
tions, “substantially limit[ed]” means “[u]nable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform”; or “[s]ignificantly restricted as to
the condition, manner or duration under which an individual
can perform a particular major life activity as compared to

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196 TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS
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the condition, manner, or duration under which the average
person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity.” 29 CFR § 1630.2( j) (2001). In deter-
mining whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity, the regulations instruct that the following
factors should be considered: “[t]he nature and severity of
the impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and [t]he permanent or long-term impact, or the
expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from
the impairment.” §§ 1630.2( j)(2)(i)–(iii).
III
The question presented by this case is whether the Sixth
Circuit properly determined that respondent was disabled
under subsection (A) of the ADA’s disability definition at the
time that she sought an accommodation from petitioner. 42
U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A). The parties do not dispute that re-
spondent’s medical conditions, which include carpal tunnel
syndrome, myotendinitis, and thoracic outlet compression,
amount to physical impairments. The relevant question,
therefore, is whether the Sixth Circuit correctly analyzed
whether these impairments substantially limited respondent
in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. An-
swering this requires us to address an issue about which the
EEOC regulations are silent: what a plaintiff must demon-
strate to establish a substantial limitation in the specific
major life activity of performing manual tasks.
Our consideration of this issue is guided first and foremost
by the words of the disability definition itself. “[S]ubstan-
tially” in the phrase “substantially limits” suggests “consid-
erable” or “to a large degree.” See Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining “substantially”
as “in a substantial manner” and “substantial” as “consider-
able in amount, value, or worth” and “being that specified to
a large degree or in the main”); see also 17 Oxford English
Dictionary 66–67 (2d ed. 1989) (“substantial”: “[r]elating to

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or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential”; “[o]f
ample or considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions”).
The word “substantial” thus clearly precludes impairments
that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of
manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities. Cf. Albert-
son’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U. S., at 565 (explaining that
a “mere difference” does not amount to a “significant restric-
[tion]” and therefore does not satisfy the EEOC’s interpre-
tation of “substantially limits”).
“Major” in the phrase “major life activities” means impor-
tant. See Webster’s, supra, at 1363 (defining “major” as
“greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest”). “Major
life activities” thus refers to those activities that are of cen-
tral importance to daily life. In order for performing man-
ual tasks to fit into this category—a category that includes
such basic abilities as walking, seeing, and hearing—the
manual tasks in question must be central to daily life. If
each of the tasks included in the major life activity of per-
forming manual tasks does not independently qualify as a
major life activity, then together they must do so.
That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create
a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed
by the first section of the ADA, which lays out the legislative
findings and purposes that motivate the Act. See 42 U. S. C.
§ 12101. When it enacted the ADA in 1990, Congress found
that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities.” § 12101(a)(1). If Congress intended
everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the
performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly
difficult manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of
disabled Americans would surely have been much higher.
Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S., at 487 (finding
that because more than 100 million people need corrective
lenses to see properly, “[h]ad Congress intended to include
all persons with corrected physical limitations among those
covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much

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198 TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS
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higher number [than 43 million] disabled persons in the
findings”).
We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in per-
forming manual tasks, an individual must have an impair-
ment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most peo-
ple’s daily lives. The impairment’s impact must also be per-
manent or long term. See 29 CFR §§ 1630.2( j)(2)(ii)–(iii)
(2001).
It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove dis-
ability status under this test to merely submit evidence of
a medical diagnosis of an impairment. Instead, the ADA
requires those “claiming the Act’s protection . . . to prove a
disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limita-
tion [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own
experience . . . is substantial.” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirking-
burg, supra, at 567 (holding that monocular vision is not in-
variably a disability, but must be analyzed on an individual
basis, taking into account the individual’s ability to compen-
sate for the impairment). That the Act defines “disability”
“with respect to an individual,” 42 U. S. C. § 12102(2), makes
clear that Congress intended the existence of a disability to
be determined in such a case-by-case manner. See Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 483; Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, supra, at 566; cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S.,
at 641–642 (relying on unchallenged testimony that the re-
spondent’s HIV infection controlled her decision not to have
a child, and declining to consider whether HIV infection is a
per se disability under the ADA); 29 CFR pt. 1630, App.
§ 1630.2( j) (2001) (“The determination of whether an individ-
ual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or
diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on
the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual”);
ibid. (“The determination of whether an individual is sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a
case-by-case basis”).

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An individualized assessment of the effect of an impair-
ment is particularly necessary when the impairment is one
whose symptoms vary widely from person to person. Car-
pal tunnel syndrome, one of respondent’s impairments, is
just such a condition. While cases of severe carpal tunnel
syndrome are characterized by muscle atrophy and extreme
sensory deficits, mild cases generally do not have either of
these effects and create only intermittent symptoms of
numbness and tingling. Carniero, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome:
The Cause Dictates the Treatment, 66 Cleveland Clinic J.
Medicine 159, 161–162 (1999). Studies have further shown
that, even without surgical treatment, one quarter of carpal
tunnel cases resolve in one month, but that in 22 percent of
cases, symptoms last for eight years or longer. See DeSte-
fano, Nordstrom, & Uierkant, Long-term Symptom Out-
comes of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and its Treatment, 22A J.
Hand Surgery 200, 204–205 (1997). When pregnancy is the
cause of carpal tunnel syndrome, in contrast, the symptoms
normally resolve within two weeks of delivery. See Ouel-
lette, Nerve Compression Syndromes of the Upper Extrem-
ity in Women, 17 J. of Musculoskeletal Medicine 536 (2000).
Given these large potential differences in the severity and
duration of the effects of carpal tunnel syndrome, an individ-
ual’s carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosis, on its own, does not
indicate whether the individual has a disability within the
meaning of the ADA.
IV
The Court of Appeals’ analysis of respondent’s claimed dis-
ability suggested that in order to prove a substantial limita-
tion in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, a
“plaintiff must show that her manual disability involves a
‘class’ of manual activities,” and that those activities “affec[t]
the ability to perform tasks at work.” See 224 F. 3d, at 843.
Both of these ideas lack support.
The Court of Appeals relied on our opinion in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., for the idea that a “class” of manual

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activities must be implicated for an impairment to substan-
tially limit the major life activity of performing manual
tasks. 224 F. 3d, at 843. But Sutton said only that “[w]hen
the major life activity under consideration is that of work-
ing, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’ requires . . .
that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class
of jobs.” 527 U. S., at 491 (emphasis added). Because of
the conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that
working could be a major life activity, we have been hesitant
to hold as much, and we need not decide this difficult ques-
tion today. In Sutton, we noted that even assuming that
working is a major life activity, a claimant would be required
to show an inability to work in a “broad range of jobs,”
rather than a specific job. Id., at 492. But Sutton did not
suggest that a class-based analysis should be applied to any
major life activity other than working. Nor do the EEOC
regulations. In defining “substantially limits,” the EEOC
regulations only mention the “class” concept in the context
of the major life activity of working. 29 CFR § 1630.2( j)(3)
(2001) (“With respect to the major life activity of working[,]
[t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted
in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average
person having comparable training, skills and abilities”).
Nothing in the text of the Act, our previous opinions, or the
regulations suggests that a class-based framework should
apply outside the context of the major life activity of
working.
While the Court of Appeals in this case addressed the dif-
ferent major life activity of performing manual tasks, its
analysis circumvented Sutton by focusing on respondent’s
inability to perform manual tasks associated only with her
job. This was error. When addressing the major life activ-
ity of performing manual tasks, the central inquiry must be
whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety of
tasks central to most people’s daily lives, not whether the

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claimant is unable to perform the tasks associated with her
specific job. Otherwise, Sutton’s restriction on claims of
disability based on a substantial limitation in working will
be rendered meaningless because an inability to perform a
specific job always can be recast as an inability to perform a
“class” of tasks associated with that specific job.
There is also no support in the Act, our previous opinions,
or the regulations for the Court of Appeals’ idea that the
question of whether an impairment constitutes a disability is
to be answered only by analyzing the effect of the impair-
ment in the workplace. Indeed, the fact that the Act’s defi-
nition of “disability” applies not only to Title I of the Act, 42
U. S. C. §§ 12111–12117 (1994 ed.), which deals with employ-
ment, but also to the other portions of the Act, which deal
with subjects such as public transportation, §§ 12141–12150,
42 U. S. C. §§ 12161–12165 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and pri-
vately provided public accommodations, §§ 12181–12189,
demonstrates that the definition is intended to cover individ-
uals with disabling impairments regardless of whether the
individuals have any connection to a workplace.
Even more critically, the manual tasks unique to any par-
ticular job are not necessarily important parts of most peo-
ple’s lives. As a result, occupation-specific tasks may have
only limited relevance to the manual task inquiry. In this
case, “repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or
above shoulder levels for extended periods of time,” 224
F. 3d, at 843, the manual task on which the Court of Appeals
relied, is not an important part of most people’s daily lives.
The court, therefore, should not have considered respond-
ent’s inability to do such manual work in her specialized as-
sembly line job as sufficient proof that she was substantially
limited in performing manual tasks.
At the same time, the Court of Appeals appears to have
disregarded the very type of evidence that it should have
focused upon. It treated as irrelevant “[t]he fact that [re-
spondent] can . . . ten[d] to her personal hygiene [and] carr[y]

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out personal or household chores.” Ibid. Yet household
chores, bathing, and brushing one’s teeth are among the
types of manual tasks of central importance to people’s daily
lives, and should have been part of the assessment of
whether respondent was substantially limited in performing
manual tasks.
The District Court noted that at the time respondent
sought an accommodation from petitioner, she admitted that
she was able to do the manual tasks required by her original
two jobs in QCIO. App. to Pet. for Cert. A–36. In addi-
tion, according to respondent’s deposition testimony, even
after her condition worsened, she could still brush her teeth,
wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast,
do laundry, and pick up around the house. App. 32–34. The
record also indicates that her medical conditions caused her
to avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to occasionally seek help
dressing, and to reduce how often she plays with her chil-
dren, gardens, and drives long distances. Id., at 32, 38–39.
But these changes in her life did not amount to such severe
restrictions in the activities that are of central importance
to most people’s daily lives that they establish a manual task
disability as a matter of law. On this record, it was there-
fore inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to grant partial
summary judgment to respondent on the issue of whether
she was substantially limited in performing manual tasks,
and its decision to do so must be reversed.
In its brief on the merits, petitioner asks us to reinstate
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to peti-
tioner on the manual task issue. In its petition for certio-
rari, however, petitioner did not seek summary judgment; it
argued only that the Court of Appeals’ reasons for granting
partial summary judgment to respondent were unsound.
This Court’s Rule 14.1(a) provides: “Only the questions set
out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be consid-
ered by the Court.” The question of whether petitioner was
entitled to summary judgment on the manual task issue is

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therefore not properly before us. See Irvine v. California,
347 U. S. 128, 129–130 (1954).
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment
granting partial summary judgment to respondent and re-
mand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.