BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC., et al. v. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES et al.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
598 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC., et al.
v. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN RESOURCES et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 99–1848. Argued February 27, 2001—Decided May 29, 2001
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., which operates assisted living
residences, failed an inspection by the West Virginia fire marshal’s office
because some residents were incapable of “self-preservation” as defined
by state law. After receiving orders to close its facilities, Buckhannon
and others (hereinafter petitioners) brought suit in Federal District
Court against the State and state agencies and officials (hereinafter
respondents), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the “self-
preservation” requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
Respondents agreed to stay the orders pending the case’s resolution.
The state legislature then eliminated the “self-preservation” require-
ment, and the District Court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss
the case as moot. Petitioners requested attorney’s fees as the “pre-
vailing party” under the FHAA and ADA, basing their entitlement on
the “catalyst theory,” which posits that a plaintiff is a “prevailing party”
if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a
voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct. As the Fourth Circuit
had previously rejected the “catalyst theory,” the District Court denied
the motion, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The “catalyst theory” is not a permissible basis for the award of
attorney’s fees under the FHAA and ADA. Under the “American
Rule,” parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney’s
fees, and courts follow a general practice of not awarding fees to a
prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority, Key Tronic Corp.
v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 819. Congress has employed the legal
term of art “prevailing party” in numerous statutes authorizing awards
of attorney’s fees. A “prevailing party” is one who has been awarded
some relief by a court. See, e. g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754,
758. Both judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees
create a material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship and thus
permit an award. The “catalyst theory,” however, allows an award
where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ legal re-
lationship. A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although per-

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
599 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Syllabus
haps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit,
lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. The legislative
history cited by petitioners is at best ambiguous as to the availability
of the “catalyst theory”; and, particularly in view of the “American
Rule,” such history is clearly insufficient to alter the clear meaning
of “prevailing party” in the fee-shifting statutes. Given this meaning,
this Court need not determine which way petitioners’ various policy
arguments cut. Pp. 602–610.
203 F. 3d 819, affirmed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a con-
curring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 610. Ginsburg, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 622.
Webster J. Arceneaux III argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs was Brian A. Glasser.
Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the
brief were former Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Solici-
tor General Underwood, Assistant Attorney General Lee,
Jeffrey P. Minear, Jessica Dunsay Silver, and Kevin K.
Russell.
David P. Cleek, Senior Deputy Attorney General of West
Virginia, argued the cause for respondents. With him on
the brief was Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Friends of
the Earth et al. by Bruce J. Terris, Carolyn Smith Pravlik, and Sarah
A. Adams; and for Public Citizen et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, Harvey
Grossman, Brian Wolfman, and Arthur B. Spitzer.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Maryland et al. by J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland,
and Maureen M. Dove and Andrew H. Baida, Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Col-
orado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida,
James E. Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub
of Louisiana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W. (Jay)
Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Ne-

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
600 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Numerous federal statutes allow courts to award attor-
ney’s fees and costs to the “prevailing party.” The question
presented here is whether this term includes a party that has
failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered
consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired re-
sult because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change
in the defendant’s conduct. We hold that it does not.
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., which operates
care homes that provide assisted living to their residents,
failed an inspection by the West Virginia Office of the State
Fire Marshal because some of the residents were incapable
of “self-preservation” as defined under state law. See
W. Va. Code §§ 16–5H–1, 16–5H–2 (1998) (requiring that all
residents of residential board and care homes be capable of
“self-preservation,” or capable of moving themselves “from
situations involving imminent danger, such as fire”); W. Va.
Code of State Rules, tit. 87, ser. 1, § 14.07(1) (1995) (same).
On October 28, 1997, after receiving cease-and-desist orders
requiring the closure of its residential care facilities within
30 days, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., on behalf
of itself and other similarly situated homes and residents
(hereinafter petitioners), brought suit in the United States
braska, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Michael F. Easley of
North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery
of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon,
D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island,
Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota,
Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, John Cornyn of Texas, Jan Graham of
Utah, and Mark L. Earley of Virginia; for the Alliance of Automobile Man-
ufacturers, Inc., by Charles A. Newman and Jerome H. Block; for Los
Angeles County et al. by Elwood Lui and Jeffrey S. Sutton; for the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda, James I.
Crowley, Jacqueline G. Cooper, and Paul J. Watford; and for the Pacific
Legal Foundation by M. Reed Hopper.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
601 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
against the State of West Virginia, two of its agencies, and
18 individuals (hereinafter respondents), seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief 1 that the “self-preservation” require-
ment violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
(FHAA), 102 Stat. 1619, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq., and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327,
42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq.
Respondents agreed to stay enforcement of the cease-and-
desist orders pending resolution of the case and the parties
began discovery. In 1998, the West Virginia Legislature en-
acted two bills eliminating the “self-preservation” require-
ment, see S. 627, I 1998 W. Va. Acts 983–986 (amending regu-
lations); H. R. 4200, II 1998 W. Va. Acts 1198–1199 (amending
statute), and respondents moved to dismiss the case as moot.
The District Court granted the motion, finding that the 1998
legislation had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions
and that there was no indication that the West Virginia Leg-
islature would repeal the amendments.2
Petitioners requested attorney’s fees as the “prevailing
party” under the FHAA, 42 U. S. C. § 3613(c)(2) (“[T]he
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney’s fee and costs”), and ADA, 42 U. S. C.
§ 12205 (“[T]he court . . . , in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including
litigation expenses, and costs”). Petitioners argued that
they were entitled to attorney’s fees under the “catalyst
theory,” which posits that a plaintiff is a “prevailing party”
if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought
about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct. Al-
1 The original complaint also sought money damages, but petitioners re-
linquished this claim on January 2, 1998. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A11.
2 The District Court sanctioned respondents under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 for failing to timely provide notice of the legislative amend-
ment. App. 147.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
602 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Opinion of the Court
though most Courts of Appeals recognize the “catalyst
theory,” 3 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
jected it in S–1 and S–2 v. State Bd. of Ed. of N. C., 21 F. 3d
49, 51 (1994) (en banc) (“A person may not be a ‘prevailing
party’ . . . except by virtue of having obtained an enforce-
able judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some
of the legal relief sought”). The District Court accord-
ingly denied the motion and, for the same reason, the Court
of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion.
Judgt. order reported at 203 F. 3d 819 (CA4 2000).
To resolve the disagreement amongst the Courts of Ap-
peals, we granted certiorari, 530 U. S. 1304 (2000), and now
affirm.
In the United States, parties are ordinarily required to
bear their own attorney’s fees—the prevailing party is not
entitled to collect from the loser. See Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975).
Under this “American Rule,” we follow “a general practice
of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit
statutory authority.” Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,
511 U. S. 809, 819 (1994). Congress, however, has authorized
the award of attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party” in
numerous statutes in addition to those at issue here, such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 259, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–
5(k), the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 89 Stat.
402, 42 U. S. C. § 1973l(e), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s
3 See, e. g., Stanton v. Southern Berkshire Regional School Dist., 197
F. 3d 574, 577, n. 2 (CA1 1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F. 3d 224, 234 (CA2
1995); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21 F. 3d 541, 546–
550 (CA3 1994); Payne v. Board of Ed., 88 F. 3d 392, 397 (CA6 1996); Zinn
v. Shalala, 35 F. 3d 273, 276 (CA7 1994); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pu-
laski Cty. School Dist., #1, 17 F. 3d 260, 263, n. 2 (CA8 1994); Kilgour v.
Pasadena, 53 F. 3d 1007, 1010 (CA9 1995); Beard v. Teska, 31 F. 3d 942,
951–952 (CA10 1994); Morris v. West Palm Beach, 194 F. 3d 1203, 1207
(CA11 1999).

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
603 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988.
See generally Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S. 1, 43–51 (1985) (Ap-
pendix to opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting).4
In designating those parties eligible for an award of litiga-
tion costs, Congress employed the term “prevailing party,”
a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed.
1999) defines “prevailing party” as “[a] party in whose favor
a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages
awarded <in certain cases, the court will award attorney’s
fees to the prevailing party>. — Also termed successful
party.” This view that a “prevailing party” is one who has
been awarded some relief by the court can be distilled from
our prior cases.5
In Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 758 (1980) (per
curiam), we reviewed the legislative history of § 1988 and
found that “Congress intended to permit the interim award
of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits
of at least some of his claims.” Our “[r]espect for ordinary
language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief
on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.”
4 We have interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently, see
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433, n. 7 (1983), and so approach the
nearly identical provisions at issue here.
5 We have never had occasion to decide whether the term “prevailing
party” allows an award of fees under the “catalyst theory” described
above. Dictum in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 760 (1987), alluded to
the possibility of attorney’s fees where “voluntary action by the defend-
ant . . . affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief . . . sought,” but we
expressly reserved the question, see id., at 763 (“We need not decide the
circumstances, if any, under which this ‘catalyst’ theory could justify a fee
award”). And though the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied
upon our decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103 (1992), in rejecting
the “catalyst theory,” Farrar “involved no catalytic effect.” Friends
of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S.
167, 194 (2000). Thus, there is language in our cases supporting both
petitioners and respondents, and last Term we observed that it was an
open question here. See ibid.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
604 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Opinion of the Court
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 760 (1987). We have held
that even an award of nominal damages suffices under this
test. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103 (1992).6
In addition to judgments on the merits, we have held that
settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree
may serve as the basis for an award of attorney’s fees. See
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122 (1980). Although a consent
decree does not always include an admission of liability by
the defendant, see, e. g., id., at 126, n. 8, it nonetheless is a
court-ordered “chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between
[the plaintiff] and the defendant.” Texas State Teachers
Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782,
792 (1989) (citing Hewitt, supra, at 760–761, and Rhodes v.
Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 3–4 (1988) (per curiam)).7 These deci-
sions, taken together, establish that enforceable judgments
on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the
“material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties”
necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees. 489 U. S.,
at 792–793; see also Hanrahan, supra, at 757 (“[I]t seems
clearly to have been the intent of Congress to permit . . . an
interlocutory award only to a party who has established his
entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims, either
in the trial court or on appeal” (emphasis added)).
6 However, in some circumstances such a “prevailing party” should still
not receive an award of attorney’s fees. See Farrar v. Hobby, supra, at
115–116.
7 We have subsequently characterized the Maher opinion as also allow-
ing for an award of attorney’s fees for private settlements. See Farrar
v. Hobby, supra, at 111; Hewitt v. Helms, supra, at 760. But this dictum
ignores that Maher only “held that fees may be assessed . . . after a case
has been settled by the entry of a consent decree.” Evans v. Jeff D., 475
U. S. 717, 720 (1986). Private settlements do not entail the judicial ap-
proval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal juris-
diction to enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lacking
unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into the order of
dismissal. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S.
375 (1994).

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
605 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
We think, however, the “catalyst theory” falls on the other
side of the line from these examples. It allows an award
where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal
relationship of the parties. Even under a limited form of
the “catalyst theory,” a plaintiff could recover attorney’s
fees if it established that the “complaint had sufficient merit
to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27. This is not
the type of legal merit that our prior decisions, based
upon plain language and congressional intent, have found
necessary. Indeed, we held in Hewitt that an interlocutory
ruling that reverses a dismissal for failure to state a claim
“is not the stuff of which legal victories are made.” 482
U. S., at 760. See also Hanrahan, supra, at 754 (reversal
of a directed verdict for defendant does not make plaintiff
a “prevailing party”). A defendant’s voluntary change in
conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff
sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial
imprimatur on the change. Our precedents thus counsel
against holding that the term “prevailing party” authorizes
an award of attorney’s fees without a corresponding alter-
ation in the legal relationship of the parties.
The dissenters chide us for upsetting “long-prevailing
Circuit precedent.” Post, at 622 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.)
(emphasis added). But, as Justice Scalia points out in his
concurrence, several Courts of Appeals have relied upon
dicta in our prior cases in approving the “catalyst theory.”
See post, at 621–622; see also supra, at 603, n. 5. Now that
the issue is squarely presented, it behooves us to reconcile
the plain language of the statutes with our prior holdings.
We have only awarded attorney’s fees where the plaintiff has
received a judgment on the merits, see, e. g., Farrar, supra,
at 112, or obtained a court-ordered consent decree, Maher,
supra, at 129–130—we have not awarded attorney’s fees
where the plaintiff has secured the reversal of a directed

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
606 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Opinion of the Court
verdict, see Hanrahan, 446 U. S., at 759, or acquired a judi-
cial pronouncement that the defendant has violated the Con-
stitution unaccompanied by “judicial relief,” Hewitt, supra,
at 760 (emphasis added). Never have we awarded attor-
ney’s fees for a nonjudicial “alteration of actual circum-
stances.” Post, at 633 (dissenting opinion). While urging
an expansion of our precedents on this front, the dissenters
would simultaneously abrogate the “merit” requirement of
our prior cases and award attorney’s fees where the plain-
tiff ’s claim “was at least colorable” and “not . . . groundless.”
Post, at 627 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We cannot agree that the term “prevailing party” authorizes
federal courts to award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who,
by simply filing a nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially
meritless lawsuit (it will never be determined), has reached
the “sought-after destination” without obtaining any judicial
relief. Post, at 634 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).8
8 Although the dissenters seek support from Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co.
v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 (1884), that case involved costs, not attorney’s fees.
“[B]y the long established practice and universally recognized rule of the
common law . . . the prevailing party is entitled to recover a judgment for
costs,” id., at 387, but “the rule ‘has long been that attorney’s fees are
not ordinarily recoverable,’ ” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U. S. 240, 257 (1975) (quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714, 717 (1967)). Courts generally, and
this Court in particular, then and now, have a presumptive rule for costs
which the Court in its discretion may vary. See, e. g., this Court’s Rule
43.2 (“If the Court reverses or vacates a judgment, the respondent or
appellee shall pay costs unless the Court otherwise orders”). In Mans-
field, the defendants had successfully removed the case to federal court,
successfully opposed the plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state
court, lost on the merits of the case, and then reversed course and success-
fully argued in this Court that the lower federal court had no jurisdiction.
The Court awarded costs to the plaintiffs, even though they had lost and
the defendants won on the jurisdictional issue, which was the only ques-
tion this Court decided. In no ordinary sense of the word can the plain-
tiffs have been said to be the prevailing party here—they lost and their
opponents won on the only litigated issue—so the Court’s use of the term
must be regarded as a figurative rather than a literal one, justifying the

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
607 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
Petitioners nonetheless argue that the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act supports
a broad reading of “prevailing party” which includes the
“catalyst theory.” We doubt that legislative history could
overcome what we think is the rather clear meaning of
“prevailing party”—the term actually used in the statute.
Since we resorted to such history in Garland, 489 U. S., at
790, Maher, 448 U. S., at 129, and Hanrahan, supra, at 756–
757, however, we do likewise here.
The House Report to § 1988 states that “[t]he phrase ‘pre-
vailing party’ is not intended to be limited to the victor only
after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the
merits,” H. R. Rep. No. 94–1558, p. 7 (1976), while the Senate
Report explains that “parties may be considered to have pre-
vailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judg-
ment or without formally obtaining relief,” S. Rep. No. 94–
1011, p. 5 (1976). Petitioners argue that these Reports and
their reference to a 1970 decision from the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co., 433 F. 2d 421 (1970), indicate Congress’ intent to
adopt the “catalyst theory.” 9 We think the legislative his-
departure from the presumptive rule allowing costs to the prevailing
party because of the obvious equities favoring the plaintiffs. The Court
employed its discretion to recognize that the plaintiffs had been the vic-
tims of the defendants’ legally successful whipsawing tactics.
9 Although the Court of Appeals in Parham awarded attorney’s fees
to the plaintiff because his “lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted
the [defendant] to take action . . . seeking compliance with the require-
ments of Title VII,” 433 F. 2d, at 429–430, it did so only after finding
that the defendant had acted unlawfully, see id., at 426 (“We hold as a
matter of law that [plaintiff ’s evidence] established a violation of Title
VII”). Thus, consistent with our holding in Farrar, Parham stands for
the proposition that an enforceable judgment permits an award of at-
torney’s fees. And like the consent decree in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S.
122 (1980), the Court of Appeals in Parham ordered the District Court
to “retain jurisdiction over the matter for a reasonable period of time
to insure the continued implementation of the appellee’s policy of equal
employment opportunities.” 433 F. 2d, at 429. Clearly Parham does not

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
608 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Opinion of the Court
tory cited by petitioners is at best ambiguous as to the avail-
ability of the “catalyst theory” for awarding attorney’s fees.
Particularly in view of the “American Rule” that attorney’s
fees will not be awarded absent “explicit statutory author-
ity,” such legislative history is clearly insufficient to alter the
accepted meaning of the statutory term. Key Tronic, 511
U. S., at 819; see also Hanrahan, supra, at 758 (“[O]nly when
a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his
claims . . . has there been a determination of the ‘substantial
rights of the parties,’ which Congress determined was a
necessary foundation for departing from the usual rule in
this country that each party is to bear the expense of his
own attorney” (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94–1558, at 8)).
Petitioners finally assert that the “catalyst theory” is
necessary to prevent defendants from unilaterally mooting
an action before judgment in an effort to avoid an award
of attorney’s fees. They also claim that the rejection of
the “catalyst theory” will deter plaintiffs with meritorious
but expensive cases from bringing suit. We are skeptical
of these assertions, which are entirely speculative and un-
supported by any empirical evidence (e. g., whether the num-
ber of suits brought in the Fourth Circuit has declined, in
relation to other Circuits, since the decision in S–1 and S–2).
Petitioners discount the disincentive that the “catalyst
theory” may have upon a defendant’s decision to voluntarily
change its conduct, conduct that may not be illegal. “The
defendants’ potential liability for fees in this kind of liti-
gation can be as significant as, and sometimes even more
significant than, their potential liability on the merits,”
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U. S. 717, 734 (1986), and the possibility
of being assessed attorney’s fees may well deter a defendant
from altering its conduct.
And petitioners’ fear of mischievous defendants only ma-
terializes in claims for equitable relief, for so long as the
support a theory of fee shifting untethered to a material alteration in the
legal relationship of the parties as defined by our precedents.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
609 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a defendant’s
change in conduct will not moot the case.10 Even then, it is
not clear how often courts will find a case mooted: “It is well
settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to de-
termine the legality of the practice” unless it is “absolutely
clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not rea-
sonably be expected to recur.” Friends of Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167,
189 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
If a case is not found to be moot, and the plaintiff later pro-
cures an enforceable judgment, the court may of course
award attorney’s fees. Given this possibility, a defendant
has a strong incentive to enter a settlement agreement,
where it can negotiate attorney’s fees and costs. Cf. Marek
v. Chesny, 473 U. S., at 7 (“[M]any a defendant would be
unwilling to make a binding settlement offer on terms that
left it exposed to liability for attorney’s fees in whatever
amount the court might fix on motion of the plaintiff ” (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
We have also stated that “[a] request for attorney’s fees
should not result in a second major litigation,” Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 437 (1983), and have accordingly
avoided an interpretation of the fee-shifting statutes that
would have “spawn[ed] a second litigation of significant di-
mension,” Garland, supra, at 791. Among other things, a
“catalyst theory” hearing would require analysis of the
defendant’s subjective motivations in changing its conduct,
an analysis that “will likely depend on a highly factbound
inquiry and may turn on reasonable inferences from the
nature and timing of the defendant’s change in conduct.”
10 Only States and state officers acting in their official capacity are im-
mune from suits for damages in federal court. See, e. g., Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). Plaintiffs may bring suit for damages against
all others, including municipalities and other political subdivisions of a
State, see Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977).

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN
610 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Scalia, J., concurring
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Although
we do not doubt the ability of district courts to perform
the nuanced “three thresholds” test required by the “cata-
lyst theory”—whether the claim was colorable rather than
groundless; whether the lawsuit was a substantial rather
than an insubstantial cause of the defendant’s change in
conduct; whether the defendant’s change in conduct was
motivated by the plaintiff ’s threat of victory rather than
threat of expense, see post, at 627–628 (dissenting opinion)—
it is clearly not a formula for “ready administrability.” Bur-
lington v. Dague, 505 U. S. 557, 566 (1992).
Given the clear meaning of “prevailing party” in the fee-
shifting statutes, we need not determine which way these
various policy arguments cut. In Alyeska, 421 U. S., at
260, we said that Congress had not “extended any roving
authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs
or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them war-
ranted.” To disregard the clear legislative language and the
holdings of our prior cases on the basis of such policy argu-
ments would be a similar assumption of a “roving authority.”
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the “catalyst
theory” is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney’s
fees under the FHAA, 42 U. S. C. § 3613(c)(2), and ADA, 42
U. S. C. § 12205.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in its entirety, and write to
respond at greater length to the contentions of the dissent.
I
“Prevailing party” is not some newfangled legal term
invented for use in late-20th-century fee-shifting statutes.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
611 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Scalia, J., concurring
“[B]y the long established practice and universally recog-
nized rule of the common law, in actions at law, the prevail-
ing party is entitled to recover a judgment for costs . . . .”
Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 387
(1884).
“Costs have usually been allowed to the prevailing
party, as incident to the judgment, since the statute 6
Edw. I, c. 1, § 2, and the same rule was acknowledged in
the courts of the States, at the time the judicial system
of the United States was organized. . . .
“Weighed in the light of these several provisions in the
Judiciary Act [of 1789], the conclusion appears to be
clear that Congress intended to allow costs to the pre-
vailing party, as incident to the judgment . . . .” The
Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377, 388, 390 (1869).
The term has been found within the United States Statutes
at Large since at least the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which
provided that “[t]he party prevailing in the suit shall be enti-
tled to costs against the adverse party.” Act of Mar. 2, 1867,
ch. 176, § 24, 14 Stat. 528. See also Act of Mar. 3, 1887,
ch. 359, § 15, 24 Stat. 508 (“If the Government of the United
States shall put in issue the right of the plaintiff to recover
the court may, in its discretion, allow costs to the prevailing
party from the time of joining such issue”). A computer
search shows that the term “prevailing party” appears at
least 70 times in the current United States Code; it is no
stranger to the law.
At the time 42 U. S. C. § 1988 was enacted, I know of no
case, state or federal, in which—either under a statutory
invocation of “prevailing party” or under the common-law
rule—the “catalyst theory” was enunciated as the basis for
awarding costs. Indeed, the dissent cites only one case in
which (although the “catalyst theory” was not expressed)

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
612 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Scalia, J., concurring
costs were awarded for a reason that the catalyst theory
would support, but today’s holding of the Court would not:
Baldwin v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 156 Md. 552, 557,
144 A. 703, 705 (1929), where costs were awarded because
“the granting of [appellee’s] motion to dismiss the appeal has
made it unnecessary to inquire into the merits of the suit,
and the dismissal is based on an act of appellee performed
after both the institution of the suit and the entry of the
appeal.” And that case is irrelevant to the meaning of “pre-
vailing party,” because it was a case in equity. While, as
Mansfield observed, costs were awarded in actions at law to
the “prevailing party,” see 111 U. S., at 387, an equity court
could award costs “as the equities of the case might require,”
Getz v. Johnston, 145 Md. 426, 433, 125 A. 689, 691 (1924).
See also Horn v. Bohn, 96 Md. 8, 12–13, 53 A. 576, 577 (1902)
(“The question of costs in equity cases is a matter resting
in the sound discretion of the Court, from the exercise of
which no appeal will lie” (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted)).1 The other state or state-law cases the dis-
1 The jurisdiction that issued Baldwin has used the phrase “prevailing
party” frequently (including in equity cases) to mean the party acquiring
a judgment. See Getz v. Johnston, 145 Md. 426, 434, 125 A. 689, 691–692
(1924) (an equity decision noting that “on reversal, following the usual
rule, the costs will generally go to the prevailing party, that is, to the
appellant” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). See also,
e. g., Hoffman v. Glock, 20 Md. App. 284, 293, 315 A. 2d 551, 557 (1974)
(“Md. Rule 604a provides: ‘Unless otherwise provided by law, or ordered
by the court, the prevailing party shall be entitled to the allowance of
court costs, which shall be taxed by the clerk and embraced in the judg-
ment’ ”); Fritts v. Fritts, 11 Md. App. 195, 197, 273 A. 2d 648, 649 (1971)
(“We have viewed the evidence, as we must, in a light most favorable to
appellee as the prevailing party below”); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire
Dept., Inc. v. Button & Goode, Inc., 242 Md. App. 509, 516, 219 A. 2d 801,
805 (1966) (“At common law, an arbitration award became a cause of action
in favor of the prevailing party”); Burch v. Scott, 1829 WL 1006, *15 (Md.
Ct. App., Dec. 1829) (“[T]he demurrer being set down to be argued, the
court proceeds to affirm or reverse the decree, and the prevailing party
takes the deposite”).

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
613 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Scalia, J., concurring
sent cites as awarding costs despite the absence of a judg-
ment all involve a judicial finding—or its equivalent, an
acknowledgment by the defendant—of the merits of plain-
tiff ’s case.2 Moreover, the dissent cites not a single case in
2 Our decision to award costs in Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan,
111 U. S. 379 (1884), does not “tu[g] against the restrictive rule today’s
decision installs,” post, at 630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Defendants had
removed the case to federal court, and after losing on the merits, sought
to have us vacate the judgment because the basis for removal (diversity
of citizenship) was absent. We concluded that because defendants were
responsible for the improper removal in the first place, our judgment’s
“effect [was] to defeat the entire proceeding which they originated and
have prosecuted,” 111 U. S., at 388. In other words, plaintiffs “prevailed”
because defendants’ original position as to jurisdiction was defeated. In
Ficklen v. Danville, 146 Va. 426, 438–439, 132 S. E. 705, 706 (1926), appel-
lants were deemed to have “ ‘substantially prevail[ed]’ ” on their appeal
because appellees “abandoned their contention made before the lower
court,” i. e., “abandoned their intention and desire to rely upon the correct-
ness of the trial court’s decree.” In Talmage v. Monroe, 119 P. 526 (Cal.
App. 1911), costs were awarded after the defendant complied with an al-
ternative writ of mandamus; it was the writ, not the mere petition, which
led to defendant’s action.
Scatcherd v. Love, 166 F. 53 (CA6 1908), Wagner v. Wagner, 9 Pa. 214
(1848), and other cases cited by the dissent represent a rule adopted in
some States that by settling a defendant “acknowledged his liability,”
Scatcherd, supra, at 56; see also Wagner, supra, at 215. That rule was
hardly uniform among the States. Compare 15 C. J., Costs § 167, p. 89
(1918) (citing cases from 13 States which hold that a “settlement is equiva-
lent to a confession of judgment”), with id., at 89–90, § 168, and n. a (citing
cases from 11 States which hold that under a settlement “plaintiff cannot
recover costs,” because “[c]osts . . . can only follow a judgment or final
determination of the action” (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted)). I do not think these state cases (and Scatcherd, a federal case
applying state law) justify expanding the federal meaning of “prevailing
party” (based on a “confession of judgment” fiction) to include the party
accepting an out-of-court settlement—much less to expand it beyond set-
tlements, to the domain of the “catalyst theory.”
The only case cited by the dissent in which the conclusion of acknowl-
edgment of liability was rested on something other than a settlement is
Board of Ed. of Madison Cty. v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 14 S. E. 2d 478 (1941),
which, in one of the States that considered settlement an acknowledgment

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
614 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Scalia, J., concurring
which this Court—or even any other federal court applying
federal law prior to enactment of the fee-shifting statutes at
issue here—has regarded as the “prevailing party” a litigant
who left the courthouse emptyhanded. If the term means
what the dissent contends, that is a remarkable absence of
authority.
That a judicial finding of liability was an understood re-
quirement of “prevailing” is confirmed by many statutes
that use the phrase in a context that presumes the existence
of a judicial ruling. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. § 1221(g)(2) (“[i]f an
employee . . . is the prevailing party . . . and the decision
is based on a finding of a prohibited personnel practice”);
§ 1221(g)(3) (providing for an award of attorney’s fees to the
“prevailing party,” “regardless of the basis of the decision”);
§ 7701(b)(2)(A) (allowing the prevailing party to obtain an
interlocutory award of the “relief provided in the decision”);
8 U. S. C. § 1324b(h) (permitting the administrative law judge
to award an attorney’s fee to the prevailing party “if the
losing party’s argument is without reasonable foundation
in law and fact”); 18 U. S. C. § 1864(e) (1994 ed., Supp. V)
(allowing the district court to award the prevailing party
its attorney’s fee “in addition to monetary damages”).
The dissent points out, post, at 629, that the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 limits attorney’s fees to an amount
“proportionately related to the court ordered relief for
the violation.” This shows that sometimes Congress does
explicitly “tightly bind fees to judgments,” ibid., inviting
(the dissent believes) the conclusion that “prevailing party”
does not fasten fees to judgments. That conclusion does
not follow from the premise. What this statutory provision
demonstrates, at most, is that use of the phrase “prevailing
party” is not the only way to impose a requirement of court-
ordered relief. That is assuredly true. But it would be no
of liability, analogized compliance with what had been sought by a manda-
mus suit to a settlement. This is a slim reed upon which to rest the broad
conclusion of a catalyst theory.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
615 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Scalia, J., concurring
more rational to reject the normal meaning of “prevailing
party” because some statutes produce the same result with
different language, than it would be to conclude that, since
there are many synonyms for the word “jump,” the word
“jump” must mean something else.
It is undoubtedly true, as the dissent points out by quot-
ing a nonlegal dictionary, see post, at 633–634, that the word
“prevailing” can have other meanings in other contexts:
“prevailing winds” are the winds that predominate, and
the “prevailing party” in an election is the party that wins
the election. But when “prevailing party” is used by courts
or legislatures in the context of a lawsuit, it is a term of art.
It has traditionally—and to my knowledge, prior to enact-
ment of the first of the statutes at issue here, invariably—
meant the party that wins the suit or obtains a finding (or
an admission) of liability. Not the party that ultimately gets
his way because his adversary dies before the suit comes to
judgment; not the party that gets his way because circum-
stances so change that a victory on the legal point for the
other side turns out to be a practical victory for him; and not
the party that gets his way because the other side ceases
(for whatever reason) its offensive conduct. If a nuisance
suit is mooted because the defendant asphalt plant has gone
bankrupt and ceased operations, one would not normally call
the plaintiff the prevailing party. And it would make no
difference, as far as the propriety of that characterization is
concerned, if the plant did not go bankrupt but moved to a
new location to avoid the expense of litigation. In one sense
the plaintiff would have “prevailed”; but he would not be the
prevailing party in the lawsuit. Words that have acquired
a specialized meaning in the legal context must be accorded
their legal meaning.
“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries
of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster
of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
616 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Scalia, J., concurring
the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless
otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of con-
trary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely
accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.”
Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952).
The cases cited by the dissent in which we have “not
treated Black’s Law Dictionary as preclusively definitive,”
post, at 628–629, are inapposite. In both Pioneer Invest-
ment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partner-
ship, 507 U. S. 380 (1993), and United States v. Rodgers, 466
U. S. 475 (1984), we rejected Black’s definition because it con-
flicted with our precedent. See Pioneer, supra, at 395–396,
n. 14; Rodgers, supra, at 480. We did not, as the dissent
would do here, simply reject a relevant definition of a word
tailored to judicial settings in favor of a more general defini-
tion from another dictionary.
II
The dissent distorts the term “prevailing party” beyond
its normal meaning for policy reasons, but even those seem
to me misguided. They rest upon the presumption that the
catalyst theory applies when “the suit’s merit led the de-
fendant to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on,
to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the principal re-
dress sought in the complaint,” post, at 622 (emphasis added).
As the dissent would have it, by giving the term its normal
meaning the Court today approves the practice of denying
attorney’s fees to a plaintiff with a proven claim of dis-
crimination, simply because the very merit of his claim led
the defendant to capitulate before judgment. That is not
the case. To the contrary, the Court approves the result in
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F. 2d 421 (CA8
1970), where attorney’s fees were awarded “after [a] find-
ing that the defendant had acted unlawfully,” ante, at 607–

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
617 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Scalia, J., concurring
608, and n. 9.3 What the dissent’s stretching of the term
produces is something more, and something far less reason-
able: an award of attorney’s fees when the merits of the
plaintiff ’s case remain unresolved—when, for all one knows,
the defendant only “abandon[ed] the fray” because the cost
of litigation—either financial or in terms of public relations—
would be too great. In such a case, the plaintiff may have
“prevailed” as Webster’s defines that term—“gain[ed] vic-
tory by virtue of strength or superiority,” see post, at 633.
But I doubt it was greater strength in financial resources, or
superiority in media manipulation, rather than superiority
in legal merit, that Congress intended to reward.
3 The dissent incorrectly characterizes Parham as involving undifferen-
tiated “findings or retention of jurisdiction,” post, at 637, n. 11. In fact,
Parham involved a finding that the defendant had discriminated, and
jurisdiction was retained so that that finding could be given effect, in the
form of injunctive relief, should the defendant ever backslide in its vol-
untary provision of relief to plaintiffs. Jurisdiction was not retained to
determine whether there had been discrimination, and I do not read the
Court’s opinion as suggesting a fee award would be appropriate in those
circumstances.
The dissent notes that two other cases were cited in Senate legisla-
tive history (Parham is cited in legislative history from both the Senate
and House) which it claims support the catalyst theory. If legislative
history in general is a risky interpretive tool, legislative history from
only one legislative chamber—and consisting of the citation of Court of
Appeals cases that surely few if any Members of Congress read—is virtu-
ally worthless. In any event, Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523 F. 2d 1005
(CA2 1975), does not support the catalyst theory because the defendant’s
voluntary compliance was not at issue. Fees were awarded on the dubi-
ous premise that discovery uncovered some documents of potential use in
other litigation, making this more a case of an award of interim fees.
Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, 428 F. 2d 981 (CA3 1970), is also inapposite.
There, the question was whether counsel for union members, whose fruit-
less efforts to sue the union had nonetheless spurred the union to sue the
employer, should be paid out of a fund established by the union’s victory.
Whether the union members were “prevailing parties” in the union suit,
or whether they were entitled to attorney’s fees as “prevailing parties”
in the earlier suit against the union, was not even at issue.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
618 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Scalia, J., concurring
It could be argued, perhaps, that insofar as abstract justice
is concerned, there is little to choose between the dissent’s
outcome and the Court’s: If the former sometimes rewards
the plaintiff with a phony claim (there is no way of knowing),
the latter sometimes denies fees to the plaintiff with a
solid case whose adversary slinks away on the eve of judg-
ment. But it seems to me the evil of the former far out-
weighs the evil of the latter. There is all the difference in
the world between a rule that denies the extraordinary boon
of attorney’s fees to some plaintiffs who are no less “deserv-
ing” of them than others who receive them, and a rule that
causes the law to be the very instrument of wrong—exacting
the payment of attorney’s fees to the extortionist.
It is true that monetary settlements and consent decrees
can be extorted as well, and we have approved the award of
attorney’s fees in cases resolved through such mechanisms.
See ante, at 604 (citing cases). Our decision that the stat-
ute makes plaintiff a “prevailing party” under such circum-
stances was based entirely on language in a House Report,
see Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129 (1980), and if this
issue were to arise for the first time today, I doubt whether
I would agree with that result. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482
U. S. 755, 760 (1987) (Scalia, J.) (opining that “[r]espect for
ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least
some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said
to prevail” (emphasis added)). But in the case of court-
approved settlements and consent decrees, even if there
has been no judicial determination of the merits, the out-
come is at least the product of, and bears the sanction of,
judicial action in the lawsuit. There is at least some basis
for saying that the party favored by the settlement or decree
prevailed in the suit. Extending the holding of Maher to
a case in which no judicial action whatever has been taken
stretches the term “prevailing party” (and the potential in-
justice that Maher produces) beyond what the normal mean-

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
619 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Scalia, J., concurring
ing of that term in the litigation context can conceivably
support.
The dissent points out that petitioners’ object in bringing
their suit was not to obtain “a judge’s approbation,” but to
“stop enforcement of a [West Virginia] rule,” post, at 634; see
also Hewitt, supra, at 761. True enough. But not even the
dissent claims that if a petitioner accumulated attorney’s fees
in preparing a threatened complaint, but never filed it prior
to the defendant’s voluntary cessation of its offending be-
havior, the wannabe-but-never-was plaintiff could recover
fees; that would be countertextual, since the fee-shifting
statutes require that there be an “action” or “proceeding,”
see 42 U. S. C. §§ 3613(d), 1988(b) (1994 ed., Supp. V)—which
in legal parlance (though not in more general usage) means
a lawsuit. See post, at 643 (concluding that a party should
be deemed prevailing as a result of a “postcomplaint pay-
ment or change in conduct” (emphasis added)). Does that
not leave achievement of the broad congressional purpose
identified by the dissent just as unsatisfactorily incomplete
as the failure to award fees when there is no decree? Just
as the dissent rhetorically asks why (never mind the lan-
guage of the statute) Congress would want to award fees
when there is a judgment, but deny fees when the defendant
capitulates on the eve of judgment; so also it is fair for us to
ask why Congress would want to award fees when suit has
been filed, but deny fees when the about-to-be defendant ca-
pitulates under the threat of filing. Surely, it cannot be be-
cause determination of whether suit was actually contem-
plated and threatened is too difficult. All the proof takes is
a threatening letter and a batch of timesheets. Surely that
obstacle would not deter the Congress that (according to the
dissent) was willing to let district judges pursue that much
more evasive will-o’-the-wisp called “catalyst.” (Is this not
why we have district courts?, asks the dissent, post, at 639–
640.) My point is not that it would take no more twisting

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
620 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Scalia, J., concurring
of language to produce prelitigation attorney’s fees than to
produce the decreeless attorney’s fees that the dissent favors
(though that may well be true). My point is that the depar-
ture from normal usage that the dissent favors cannot be
justified on the ground that it establishes a regime of logi-
cal evenhandedness. There must be a cutoff of seemingly
equivalent entitlements to fees—either the failure to file
suit in time or the failure to obtain a judgment in time.
The term “prevailing party” suggests the latter rather than
the former. One does not prevail in a suit that is never
determined.
The dissent’s ultimate worry is that today’s opinion will
“impede access to court for the less well-heeled,” post, at 623.
But, of course, the catalyst theory also harms the “less well-
heeled,” putting pressure on them to avoid the risk of mas-
sive fees by abandoning a solidly defensible case early in liti-
gation. Since the fee-shifting statutes at issue here allow
defendants as well as plaintiffs to receive a fee award, we
know that Congress did not intend to maximize the quantity
of “the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys
general,” ibid. Rather, Congress desired an appropriate
level of enforcement—which is more likely to be produced
by limiting fee awards to plaintiffs who prevail “on the mer-
its,” or at least to those who achieve an enforceable “alter-
ation of the legal relationship of the parties,” than by permit-
ting the open-ended inquiry approved by the dissent.4
4 Even the legislative history relied upon by the dissent supports the
conclusion that some merit is necessary to justify a fee award. See post,
at 636, n. 9 (citing a House Report for the proposition that fee-shifting
statutes are “ ‘designed to give [‘victims of civil rights violation’] access
to the judicial process’ ” (emphasis added)); ibid. (citing a Senate Report:
“ ‘[I]f those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed
with impunity,’ ” fee awards are necessary (emphasis added)). And for
the reasons given by the Court, see ante, at 605, the catalyst theory’s
purported “merit test”—the ability to survive a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim, or the absence of frivolousness—is scant protection
for the innocent.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
621 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Scalia, J., concurring
III
The dissent points out that the catalyst theory has been
accepted by “the clear majority of Federal Circuits,” ibid.
But our disagreeing with a “clear majority” of the Circuits
is not at all a rare phenomenon. Indeed, our opinions some-
times contradict the unanimous and longstanding interpre-
tation of lower federal courts. See, e. g., McNally v. United
States, 483 U. S. 350, 365 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(the Court’s decision contradicted “[e]very court to consider”
the question).
The dissent’s insistence that we defer to the “clear major-
ity” of Circuit opinion is particularly peculiar in the present
case, since that majority has been nurtured and preserved
by our own misleading dicta (to which I, unfortunately, con-
tributed). Most of the Court of Appeals cases cited by the
dissent, post, at 627, and n. 5, as reaffirming the catalyst
theory after our decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103
(1992), relied on our earlier opinion in Hewitt. See Marbley
v. Bane, 57 F. 3d 224, 234 (CA2 1995) (relying on Hewitt to
support catalyst theory); Payne v. Board of Ed., 88 F. 3d 392,
397 (CA6 1996) (same); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing
Auth., 21 F. 3d 541, 548 (CA3 1994) (explicitly rejecting
Farrar in favor of Hewitt); Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F. 3d 273,
274–276 (CA7 1994) (same); Beard v. Teska, 31 F. 3d 942,
950–952 (CA10 1994) (same); Morris v. West Palm Beach,
194 F. 3d 1203, 1207 (CA11 1999) (same). Deferring to our
colleagues’ own error is bad enough; but enshrining the error
that we ourselves have improvidently suggested and blam-
ing it on the near-unanimous judgment of our colleagues
would surely be unworthy.5 Informing the Courts of Ap-
5 That a few cases adopting the catalyst theory predate Hewitt v. Helms,
482 U. S. 755 (1987), see post, at 625–626, and n. 4, is irrelevant to my
point. Absent our dicta in Hewitt, and in light of everything else we have
said on this topic, see ante, at 603–604, it is unlikely that the catalyst
theory would have achieved that universality of acceptance by the Courts
of Appeals upon which the dissent relies.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
622 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
peals that our ill-considered dicta have misled them dis-
plays, it seems to me, not “disrespect,” but a most becoming
(and well-deserved) humility.
* * *
The Court today concludes that a party cannot be deemed
to have prevailed, for purposes of fee-shifting statutes such
as 42 U. S. C. §§ 1988, 3613(c)(2) (1994 ed. and Supp. V), un-
less there has been an enforceable “alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties.” That is the normal meaning of
“prevailing party” in litigation, and there is no proper basis
for departing from that normal meaning. Congress is free,
of course, to revise these provisions—but it is my guess that
if it does so it will not create the sort of inequity that the
catalyst theory invites, but will require the court to deter-
mine that there was at least a substantial likelihood that the
party requesting fees would have prevailed.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens, Jus-
tice Souter, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that a plaintiff whose suit prompts
the precise relief she seeks does not “prevail,” and hence
cannot obtain an award of attorney’s fees, unless she also
secures a court entry memorializing her victory. The entry
need not be a judgment on the merits. Nor need there be
any finding of wrongdoing. A court-approved settlement
will do.
The Court’s insistence that there be a document filed in
court—a litigated judgment or court-endorsed settlement—
upsets long-prevailing Circuit precedent applicable to scores
of federal fee-shifting statutes. The decision allows a de-
fendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay a plaintiff ’s
counsel fees, even though the suit’s merit led the defendant
to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, to accord
plaintiff sooner rather than later the principal redress sought
in the complaint. Concomitantly, the Court’s constricted

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
623 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
definition of “prevailing party,” and consequent rejection of
the “catalyst theory,” impede access to court for the less well
heeled, and shrink the incentive Congress created for the
enforcement of federal law by private attorneys general.
In my view, the “catalyst rule,” as applied by the clear
majority of Federal Circuits, is a key component of the fee-
shifting statutes Congress adopted to advance enforcement
of civil rights. Nothing in history, precedent, or plain Eng-
lish warrants the anemic construction of the term “prevailing
party” the Court today imposes.
I
Petitioner Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. (Buck-
hannon), operates residential care homes for elderly persons
who need assisted living, but not nursing services. Among
Buckhannon’s residents in October 1996 was 102-year-old
Dorsey Pierce. Pierce had resided at Buckhannon for some
four years. Her daughter lived nearby, and the care pro-
vided at Buckhannon met Pierce’s needs. Until 1998, West
Virginia had a “self-preservation” rule prohibiting homes
like Buckhannon from accommodating persons unable to
exit the premises without assistance in the event of a fire.
Pierce and two other Buckhannon residents could not get to
a fire exit without aid. Informed of these residents’ limita-
tions, West Virginia officials proceeded against Buckhannon
for noncompliance with the self-preservation rule. On Octo-
ber 18, 1996, three orders issued, each commanding Buckhan-
non to “cease operating . . . and to effect relocation of [its]
existing population within thirty (30) days.” App. 46–53.
Ten days later, Buckhannon and Pierce, together with an
organization of residential homes and another Buckhannon
resident (hereinafter plaintiffs), commenced litigation in
Federal District Court to overturn the cease-and-desist or-
ders and the self-preservation rule on which they rested.
They sued the State, state agencies, and 18 officials (here-
inafter defendants) alleging that the rule discriminated

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
624 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
against persons with disabilities in violation of the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U. S. C. § 3601
et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiffs sought an imme-
diate order stopping defendants from closing Buckhannon’s
facilities, injunctive relief permanently barring enforcement
of the self-preservation requirement, damages, and attor-
ney’s fees.
On November 1, 1996, at a hearing on plaintiffs’ request
for a temporary restraining order, defendants agreed to the
entry of an interim order allowing Buckhannon to remain
open without changing the individual plaintiffs’ housing and
care. Discovery followed. On January 2, 1998, facing the
state defendants’ sovereign immunity pleas, plaintiffs stipu-
lated to dismissal of their demands for damages. In Febru-
ary 1998, in response to defendants’ motion to dispose of the
remainder of the case summarily, the District Court deter-
mined that plaintiffs had presented triable claims under the
FHAA and ADA.
Less than a month after the District Court found that
plaintiffs were entitled to a trial, the West Virginia Legisla-
ture repealed the self-preservation rule. Plaintiffs still al-
lege, and seek to prove, that their suit triggered the statu-
tory repeal. After the rule’s demise, defendants moved to
dismiss the case as moot, and plaintiffs sought attorney’s
fees as “prevailing parties” under the FHAA, 42 U. S. C.
§ 3613(c)(2), and the ADA, 42 U. S. C. § 12205.1
1 The FHAA provides: “In a civil action . . . , the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.”
42 U. S. C. § 3613(c)(2). Similarly, the ADA provides: “In any action . . . ,
the court . . . , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . . .”
42 U. S. C. § 12205. These ADA and FHAA provisions are modeled on
other “prevailing party” statutes, notably the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). See H. R.
Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, p. 140 (1991) (ADA); H. R. Rep. No. 100–711,
pp. 16–17, n. 20 (1988) (FHAA). Section 1988 was “patterned upon the

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
625 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Finding no likelihood that West Virginia would reenact the
self-preservation rule, the District Court agreed that the
State’s action had rendered the case moot. Turning to
plaintiffs’ application for attorney’s fees, the District Court
followed Fourth Circuit precedent requiring the denial of
fees unless termination of the action was accompanied by a
judgment, consent decree, or settlement.2 Plaintiffs did not
appeal the mootness determination, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees. In sum, plaintiffs
were denied fees not because they failed to achieve the relief
they sought. On the contrary, they gained the very change
they sought through their lawsuit when West Virginia re-
pealed the self-preservation rule that would have stopped
Buckhannon from caring for people like Dorsey Pierce.3
Prior to 1994, every Federal Court of Appeals (except the
Federal Circuit, which had not addressed the issue) con-
cluded that plaintiffs in situations like Buckhannon’s and
attorney’s fees provisions contained in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000a–3(b) and 2000e–5(k), and § 402 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U. S. C. § 1973l(e).” Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433, n. 7 (1983) (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton,
446 U. S. 754, 758, n. 4 (1980) (per curiam)). In accord with congressional
intent, we have interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently
across statutes. The Court so observes. See ante, at 603, n. 4. Notably,
the statutes do not mandate fees, but provide for their award “in [the
court’s] discretion.”
2 On plaintiffs’ motion, the District Court sanctioned defendants under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for failing timely to notify plaintiffs
“that the proposed [repeal of the self-preservation rule] was progressing
successfully at several stages . . . during the pendency of [the] litigation.”
App. 144. In their Rule 11 motion, plaintiffs requested fees and costs
totaling $62,459 to cover the expense of litigating after defendants became
aware, but did not disclose, that elimination of the rule was likely. In the
alternative, plaintiffs sought $3,252 to offset fees and expenses incurred in
litigating the Rule 11 motion. The District Court, stating that “the pri-
mary purpose of Rule 11 is to deter and not to compensate,” awarded the
smaller sum. App. 147.
3 Pierce remained a Buckhannon resident until her death on January
3, 1999.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
626 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Pierce’s could obtain a fee award if their suit acted as a “cata-
lyst” for the change they sought, even if they did not obtain
a judgment or consent decree.4 The Courts of Appeals
found it “clear that a party may be considered to have pre-
vailed even when the legal action stops short of final . . .
judgment due to . . . intervening mootness.” Grano v.
Barry, 783 F. 2d 1104, 1108 (CADC 1986). Interpreting the
term “prevailing party” in “a practical sense,” Stewart v.
Hannon, 675 F. 2d 846, 851 (CA7 1982) (citation omitted),
federal courts across the country held that a party “prevails”
for fee-shifting purposes when “its ends are accomplished as
a result of the litigation,” Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 919 F. 2d 374, 378 (CA5
1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit en banc, dividing 6-to-5, broke
ranks with its sister courts. The court declared that, in
light of Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103 (1992), a plaintiff could
4 Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F. 2d 275, 279–281 (CA1 1978); Gerena-
Valentin v. Koch, 739 F. 2d 755, 758–759 (CA2 1984); Institutionalized
Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F. 2d 897, 910–917 (CA3 1985);
Bonnes v. Long, 599 F. 2d 1316, 1319 (CA4 1979); Robinson v. Kimbrough,
652 F. 2d 458, 465–467 (CA5 1981); Citizens Against Tax Waste v. Wester-
ville City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 985 F. 2d 255, 257–258 (CA6 1993);
Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F. 2d 846, 851 (CA7 1982); Williams v. Miller, 620
F. 2d 199, 202 (CA8 1980); American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650
F. 2d 184, 187–188 (CA9 1981); J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Erie, 767 F. 2d
1469, 1474–1475 (CA10 1985); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F. 2d 1375, 1379 (CA11
1982); Grano v. Barry, 783 F. 2d 1104, 1108–1110 (CADC 1986). All twelve
of these decisions antedate Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987). But
cf. ante, at 621, and n. 5 (Scalia, J., concurring) (maintaining that this
Court’s decision in Hewitt “improvidently suggested” the catalyst rule,
and asserting that only “a few cases adopting the catalyst theory predate
Hewitt”). Hewitt said it was “settled law” that when a lawsuit prompts
a defendant’s “voluntary action . . . that redresses the plaintiff ’s griev-
ances,” the plaintiff “is deemed to have prevailed despite the absence
of a formal judgment in his favor.” 482 U. S., at 760–761. That state-
ment accurately conveyed the unanimous view then held by the Federal
Circuits.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
627 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
not become a “prevailing party” without “an enforceable
judgment, consent decree, or settlement.” S–1 and S–2 v.
State Bd. of Ed. of N. C., 21 F. 3d 49, 51 (1994). As the Court
today acknowledges, see ante, at 603, n. 5, and as we have
previously observed, the language on which the Fourth Cir-
cuit relied was dictum: Farrar “involved no catalytic effect”;
the issue plainly “was not presented for this Court’s decision
in Farrar.” Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environ-
mental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 194 (2000).
After the Fourth Circuit’s en banc ruling, nine Courts of
Appeals reaffirmed their own consistently held interpre-
tation of the term “prevail.” 5 On this predominant view,
“[s]ecuring an enforceable decree or agreement may evidence
prevailing party status, but the judgment or agreement sim-
ply embodies and enforces what is sought in bringing the
lawsuit . . . . Victory can be achieved well short of a final
judgment (or its equivalent) . . . . ” Marbley v. Bane, 57
F. 3d 224, 234 (CA2 1995) (Jacobs, J.).
The array of federal-court decisions applying the catalyst
rule suggested three conditions necessary to a party’s quali-
fication as “prevailing” short of a favorable final judgment
or consent decree. A plaintiff first had to show that the de-
fendant provided “some of the benefit sought” by the lawsuit.
Wheeler v. Towanda Area School Dist., 950 F. 2d 128, 131
(CA3 1991). Under most Circuits’ precedents, a plaintiff had
to demonstrate as well that the suit stated a genuine claim,
i. e., one that was at least “colorable,” not “frivolous, unrea-
sonable, or groundless.” Grano, 783 F. 2d, at 1110 (internal
5 Stanton v. Southern Berkshire Regional School Dist., 197 F. 3d 574,
577, n. 2 (CA1 1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F. 3d 224, 234 (CA2 1995);
Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Auth., 21 F. 3d 541, 546–550 (CA3
1994); Payne v. Board of Ed., 88 F. 3d 392, 397 (CA6 1996); Zinn v. Sha-
lala, 35 F. 3d 273, 276 (CA7 1994); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski Cty.
School Dist., #1, 17 F. 3d 260, 263, n. 2 (CA8 1994); Kilgour v. Pasadena,
53 F. 3d 1007, 1010 (CA9 1995); Beard v. Teska, 31 F. 3d 942, 951–952 (CA10
1994); Morris v. West Palm Beach, 194 F. 3d 1203, 1207 (CA11 1999).

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
628 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff finally had
to establish that her suit was a “substantial” or “significant”
cause of defendant’s action providing relief. Williams v.
Leatherbury, 672 F. 2d 549, 551 (CA5 1982). In some Cir-
cuits, to make this causation showing, plaintiff had to satisfy
the trial court that the suit achieved results “by threat of
victory,” not “by dint of nuisance and threat of expense.”
Marbley, 57 F. 3d, at 234–235; see also Hooper v. Demco,
Inc., 37 F. 3d 287, 293 (CA7 1994) (to render plaintiff “pre-
vailing party,” suit “must have prompted the defendant . . .
to act or cease its behavior based on the strength of the case,
not ‘wholly gratuitously’ ”). One who crossed these three
thresholds would be recognized as a “prevailing party” to
whom the district court, “in its discretion,” supra, at 624–
625, n. 1, could award attorney’s fees.
Developed over decades and in legions of federal-court de-
cisions, the catalyst rule and these implementing standards
deserve this Court’s respect and approbation.
II
A
The Court today detects a “clear meaning” of the term
prevailing party, ante, at 610, that has heretofore eluded
the large majority of courts construing those words. “Pre-
vailing party,” today’s opinion announces, means “one who
has been awarded some relief by the court,” ante, at 603.
The Court derives this “clear meaning” principally from
Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines a “prevailing party,”
in critical part, as one “in whose favor a judgment is ren-
dered,” ibid. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed.
1999)).
One can entirely agree with Black’s Law Dictionary that
a party “in whose favor a judgment is rendered” prevails,
and at the same time resist, as most Courts of Appeals have,
any implication that only such a party may prevail. In prior
cases, we have not treated Black’s Law Dictionary as preclu-

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
629 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
sively definitive; instead, we have accorded statutory terms,
including legal “term[s] of art,” ante, at 603 (opinion of the
Court); ante, at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring), a contextual
reading. See, e. g., Pioneer Investment Services Co. v.
Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380, 395–
396, n. 14 (1993) (defining “excusable neglect,” as used in
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1), more
broadly than Black’s defines that term); United States v.
Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 479–480 (1984) (adopting “natural,
nontechnical” definition of word “jurisdiction,” as that term
is used in 18 U. S. C. § 1001, and declining to confine definition
to “narrower, more technical meanings,” citing Black’s).
Notably, this Court did not refer to Black’s Law Dictionary
in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122 (1980), which held that a
consent decree could qualify a plaintiff as “prevailing.” The
Court explained:
“The fact that [plaintiff] prevailed through a settlement
rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim
to fees. Nothing in the language of [42 U. S. C.] § 1988
conditions the District Court’s power to award fees on
full litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination
that the plaintiff ’s rights have been violated.” Id., at
129.
The spare “prevailing party” language of the fee-shifting
provision applicable in Maher, and the similar wording of the
fee-shifting provisions now before the Court, contrast with
prescriptions that so tightly bind fees to judgments as to
exclude the application of a catalyst concept. The Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, for example, directs that fee
awards to prisoners under § 1988 be “proportionately related
to the court ordered relief for the violation.” 110 Stat.
1321–72, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) (1994 ed.,
Supp. V) (emphasis added). That statute, by its express
terms, forecloses an award to a prisoner on a catalyst theory.
But the FHAA and ADA fee-shifting prescriptions, modeled

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
630 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
on 42 U. S. C. § 1988 unmodified, see supra, at 624–625, n. 1,
do not similarly staple fee awards to “court ordered relief.”
Their very terms do not foreclose a catalyst theory.
B
It is altogether true, as the concurring opinion points out,
ante, at 610–611, that litigation costs other than attorney’s
fees traditionally have been allowed to the “prevailing
party,” and that a judgment winner ordinarily fits that de-
scription. It is not true, however, that precedent on costs
calls for the judgment requirement the Court ironly adopts
today for attorney’s fees. Indeed, the first decision cited in
the concurring opinion, Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan,
111 U. S. 379 (1884), see ante, at 611, tugs against the restric-
tive rule today’s decision installs.
In Mansfield, plaintiffs commenced a contract action in
state court. Over plaintiffs’ objections, defendants success-
fully removed the suit to federal court. Plaintiffs prevailed
on the merits there, and defendants obtained review here.
See 111 U. S., at 380–381. This Court determined, on its
own motion, that federal subject-matter jurisdiction was ab-
sent from the start. Based on that determination, the Court
reversed the lower court’s judgment for plaintiffs. Worse
than entering and leaving this Courthouse equally “empty-
handed,” ante, at 614 (concurring opinion), the plaintiffs in
Mansfield were stripped of the judgment they had won, in-
cluding the “judicial finding . . . of the merits” in their favor,
ante, at 613 (concurring opinion). The Mansfield plaintiffs
did, however, achieve this small consolation: The Court
awarded them costs here as well as below. Recognizing that
defendants had “prevail[ed]” in a “formal and nominal
sense,” the Mansfield Court nonetheless concluded that “[i]n
a true and proper sense” defendants were “the losing and
not the prevailing party.” 111 U. S., at 388.
While Mansfield casts doubt on the present majority’s
“formal and nominal” approach, that decision does not con-

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
631 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
sider whether costs would be in order for the plaintiff who
obtains substantial relief, but no final judgment. Nor does
“a single case” on which the concurring opinion today relies,
ante, at 613 (emphasis in original).6 There are, however,
enlightening analogies. In multiple instances, state high
courts have regarded plaintiffs as prevailing, for costs taxa-
tion purposes, when defendants’ voluntary conduct, mooting
the suit, provided the relief that plaintiffs sought.7 The con-
6 The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377 (1869), featured in the concurring opinion,
see ante, at 611, does not run the distance to which that opinion would
take it. In The Baltimore, there was a judgment in one party’s favor.
See 8 Wall., at 384. The Court did not address the question whether costs
are available absent such a judgment. The Baltimore’s “incident to the
judgment” language, which the concurrence emphasizes, ante, at 611 (cit-
ing 8 Wall., at 388, 390), likely related to the once-maintained rule that a
court without jurisdiction may not award costs. See Mayor v. Cooper, 6
Wall. 247, 250–251 (1868). That ancient rule figured some years later in
Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 (1884); the Court
noted the “universally recognized rule of the common law” that, absent
jurisdiction, a “court can render no judgment for or against either party,
[and therefore] cannot render a judgment even for costs.” Id., at 387.
Receding from that rule, the Court awarded costs, even upon dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction, because “there is a judgment or final order in the
cause dismissing it for want of jurisdiction.” Ibid.; see U. S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 21 (1994).
7 See, e. g., Board of Ed. of Madison Cty. v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 36, 14
S. E. 2d 478, 479 (1941) (mandamus action dismissed as moot, but costs
awarded to plaintiffs where “the purposes of the mandamus petition were
accomplished by the subsequent acts of the defendants, thus obviating the
necessity for further proceeding”); Baldwin v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 156 Md. 552, 557, 144 A. 703, 705 (1929) (costs awarded to plaintiff
after trial court granted defendant’s demurrer and plaintiff ’s appeal was
dismissed “based on an act of [defendant] performed after . . . entry of the
appeal”; dismissal rendered “it unnecessary to inquire into the merits of
the suit”); Ficklen v. Danville, 146 Va. 426, 438, 132 S. E. 705, 706 (1926)
(costs on appeal awarded to plaintiffs, even though trial court denied in-
junctive relief and high court dismissed appeal due to mootness, because
plaintiffs achieved the “equivalent to . . . ‘substantially prevailing’ ” in
“gain[ing] all they sought by the appeal”); cf. Scatcherd v. Love, 166 F. 53,
55, 56 (CA6 1908) (although “there was no judgment against the defendant

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
632 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
curring opinion labors unconvincingly to distinguish these
state-law cases.8 A similar federal practice has been ob-
served in cases governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d), the default rule allowing costs “to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs.” See 10 C. Wright,
A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2667,
pp. 187–188 (2d ed. 1983) (When “the defendant alters its
conduct so that plaintiff ’s claim [for injunctive relief] be-
comes moot before judgment is reached, costs may be al-
lowed [under Rule 54(d)] if the court finds that the changes
upon the merits,” defendant “acknowledged its liability . . . by paying to
the plaintiff the sum of $5,000,” rendering plaintiff the “successful party”
entitled to costs); Talmage v. Monroe, 119 P. 526 (Cal. App. 1911) (fees
awarded to petitioner after court issued “alternative writ” directing re-
spondent either to take specified action or to show cause for not doing so,
and respondent chose to take the action).
8 The concurrence urges that Baldwin is inapposite because it was an
action “in equity,” and equity courts could award costs as the equities
required. Ante, at 612 (emphasis in original). The catalyst rule becomes
relevant, however, only when a party seeks relief of a sort traditionally
typed equitable, i. e., a change of conduct, not damages. There is no such
thing as an injunction at law, and therefore one cannot expect to find
long-ago plaintiffs who quested after that mythical remedy and received
voluntary relief. By the concurrence’s reasoning, the paucity of precedent
applying the catalyst rule to “prevailing parties” is an artifact of nothing
more “remarkable,” ante, at 614, than the historic law-equity separation.
The concurrence notes that the other cited cases “all involve a judicial
finding—or its equivalent, an acknowledgment by the defendant—of the
merits of plaintiff ’s case.” Ante, at 613 (emphasis added). I agree. In
Fowler and Scatcherd, however, the “acknowledgment” consisted of noth-
ing more than the defendant’s voluntary provision to the plaintiff of the
relief that the plaintiff sought. See also, e. g., Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v.
Weinman, 39 Ind. 231 (1872) (costs awarded where defendant voluntarily
paid damages; no admission or merits judgment); Wagner v. Wagner, 9 Pa.
214 (1848) (same); Hudson v. Johnson, 1 Va. 10 (1791) (same). Common-
law courts thus regarded a defendant’s voluntary compliance, by settle-
ment or otherwise, as an “acknowledgment . . . of the merits” sufficient to
warrant treatment of a plaintiff as prevailing. But cf. ante, at 604, n. 7
(opinion of the Court). One can only wonder why the concurring opinion
would not follow the same practice today.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
633 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
were the result, at least in part, of plaintiff ’s litigation.”)
(citing, inter alia, Black Hills Alliance v. Regional Forester,
526 F. Supp. 257 (SD 1981)).
In short, there is substantial support, both old and new,
federal and state, for a costs award, “in [the court’s] discre-
tion,” supra, at 625, n. 1, to the plaintiff whose suit prompts
the defendant to provide the relief plaintiff seeks.
C
Recognizing that no practice set in stone, statute, rule, or
precedent, see infra, at 643, dictates the proper construction
of modern civil rights fee-shifting prescriptions, I would
“assume . . . that Congress intends the words in its enact-
ments to carry ‘their ordinary, contemporary, common mean-
ing.’ ” Pioneer, 507 U. S., at 388 (defining “excusable ne-
glect”) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42
(1979) (defining “bribery”)); see also, e. g., Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S. 471, 491 (1999) (defining “substan-
tially” in light of ordinary usage); Rutledge v. United States,
517 U. S. 292, 299–300, n. 10 (1996) (similarly defining “in
concert”). In everyday use, “prevail” means “gain victory
by virtue of strength or superiority: win mastery: triumph.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1797 (1976).
There are undoubtedly situations in which an individual’s
goal is to obtain approval of a judge, and in those situations,
one cannot “prevail” short of a judge’s formal declaration.
In a piano competition or a figure skating contest, for exam-
ple, the person who prevails is the person declared winner
by the judges. However, where the ultimate goal is not an
arbiter’s approval, but a favorable alteration of actual cir-
cumstances, a formal declaration is not essential. Western
democracies, for instance, “prevailed” in the Cold War even
though the Soviet Union never formally surrendered.
Among television viewers, John F. Kennedy “prevailed” in
the first debate with Richard M. Nixon during the 1960 Pres-
idential contest, even though moderator Howard K. Smith

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
634 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
never declared a winner. See T. White, The Making of the
President 1960, pp. 293–294 (1961).
A lawsuit’s ultimate purpose is to achieve actual relief
from an opponent. Favorable judgment may be instrumen-
tal in gaining that relief. Generally, however, “the judi-
cial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the
rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessa-
tion of action) by the defendant . . . .” Hewitt v. Helms,
482 U. S. 755, 761 (1987). On this common understanding,
if a party reaches the “sought-after destination,” then the
party “prevails” regardless of the “route taken.” Henni-
gan v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 749 F. 2d 1148, 1153
(CA5 1985).
Under a fair reading of the FHAA and ADA provisions in
point, I would hold that a party “prevails” in “a true and
proper sense,” Mansfield, 111 U. S., at 388, when she
achieves, by instituting litigation, the practical relief sought
in her complaint. The Court misreads Congress, as I see it,
by insisting that, invariably, relief must be displayed in a
judgment, and correspondingly that a defendant’s voluntary
action never suffices. In this case, Buckhannon’s purpose in
suing West Virginia officials was not narrowly to obtain a
judge’s approbation. The plaintiffs’ objective was to stop
enforcement of a rule requiring Buckhannon to evict resi-
dents like centenarian Dorsey Pierce as the price of remain-
ing in business. If Buckhannon achieved that objective on
account of the strength of its case, see supra, at 628—if it
succeeded in keeping its doors open while housing and caring
for Ms. Pierce and others similarly situated—then Buckhan-
non is properly judged a party who prevailed.
III
As the Courts of Appeals have long recognized, the cata-
lyst rule suitably advances Congress’ endeavor to place pri-
vate actions, in civil rights and other legislatively defined
areas, securely within the federal law enforcement arsenal.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
635 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
The catalyst rule stemmed from modern legislation ex-
tending civil rights protections and enforcement measures.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included provisions for fee
awards to “prevailing parties” in Title II (public accommoda-
tions), 42 U. S. C. § 2000a–3(b), and Title VII (employment),
§ 2000e–5(k), but not in Title VI (federal programs). The
provisions’ central purpose was “to promote vigorous en-
forcement” of the laws by private plaintiffs; although using
the two-way term “prevailing party,” Congress did not make
fees available to plaintiffs and defendants on equal terms.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 417, 421
(1978) (under Title VII, prevailing plaintiff qualifies for fee
award absent “special circumstances,” but prevailing defend-
ant may obtain fee award only if plaintiff ’s suit is “frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation”).
Once the 1964 Act came into force, courts commenced to
award fees regularly under the statutory authorizations, and
sometimes without such authorization. See Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 262,
270–271, n. 46 (1975). In Alyeska, this Court reaffirmed the
“American Rule” that a court generally may not award attor-
ney’s fees without a legislative instruction to do so. See id.,
at 269. To provide the authorization Alyeska required for
fee awards under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as
well as under Reconstruction Era civil rights legislation, 42
U. S. C. §§ 1981–1983, 1985, 1986 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and
certain other enactments, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1994
ed. and Supp. V).
As explained in the Reports supporting § 1988, civil rights
statutes vindicate public policies “of the highest priority,”
S. Rep. No. 94–1011, p. 3 (1976) (quoting Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968) (per cu-
riam)), yet “depend heavily upon private enforcement,”
S. Rep. No. 94–1011, at 2. Persons who bring meritorious
civil rights claims, in this light, serve as “private attorneys

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
636 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
general.” Id., at 5; H. R. Rep. No. 94–1558, p. 2 (1976).
Such suitors, Congress recognized, often “cannot afford legal
counsel.” Id., at 1. They therefore experience “severe
hardshi[p]” under the “American Rule.” Id., at 2. Con-
gress enacted § 1988 to ensure that nonaffluent plaintiffs
would have “effective access” to the Nation’s courts to en-
force civil rights laws. Id., at 1.9 That objective accounts
for the fee-shifting provisions before the Court in this case,
prescriptions of the FHAA and the ADA modeled on § 1988.
See supra, at 624–625, n. 1.
Under the catalyst rule that held sway until today, plain-
tiffs who obtained the relief they sought through suit on gen-
uine claims ordinarily qualified as “prevailing parties,” so
that courts had discretion to award them their costs and fees.
Persons with limited resources were not impelled to “wage
total law” in order to assure that their counsel fees would be
paid. They could accept relief, in money or of another kind,
voluntarily proffered by a defendant who sought to avoid a
recorded decree. And they could rely on a judge then to
determine, in her equitable discretion, whether counsel fees
were warranted and, if so, in what amount.10
9 See H. R. Rep. No. 94–1558, at 1 (“Because a vast majority of the
victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are un-
able to present their cases to the courts. . . . [This statute] is designed to
give such persons effective access to the judicial process . . . .”); S. Rep.
No. 94–1011, at 2 (“If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil
rights, and if those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to
proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover
what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.”), quoted in part in
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U. S. 432, 436, n. 8 (1991). See also Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 401–402 (1968) (per curiam) (“When
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement
would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon
private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law. . . .
[Congress] enacted the provision for counsel fees . . . to encourage individ-
uals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief . . . .”).
10 Given the protection furnished by the catalyst rule, aggrieved individ-
uals were not left to worry, and wrongdoers were not led to believe, that

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
637 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Congress appears to have envisioned that very prospect.
The Senate Report on the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act states: “[F]or purposes of the award of counsel
fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they
vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without for-
mally obtaining relief.” S. Rep. No. 94–1011, at 5 (emphasis
added). In support, the Report cites cases in which parties
recovered fees in the absence of any court-conferred relief.11
strategic maneuvers by defendants might succeed in averting a fee award.
Cf. ante, at 608 (opinion of the Court). Apt here is Judge Friendly’s ob-
servation construing a fee-shifting statute kin to the provisions before us:
“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a Freedom of Information Act]
suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge
was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award
of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information.” Vermont
Low Income Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546 F. 2d 509, 513 (CA2 1976)
(interpreting 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(4)(E), allowing a complainant who “sub-
stantially prevails” to earn an attorney’s fee); accord, Cuneo v. Rumsfeld,
553 F. 2d 1360, 1364 (CADC 1977).
11 See S. Rep. No. 94–1011, at 5 (citing Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523
F. 2d 1005, 1008–1009 (CA2 1975) (partner sued his firm for release of
documents, firm released the documents, court awarded fees because of
the release, even though the partner’s claims were “dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction”), and Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428
F. 2d 981, 984, 985 (CA3 1970) (union committee twice commenced suit for
pension fund payments, suits prompted recovery, and court awarded fees
even though the first suit had been dismissed and the second had not yet
been adjudicated)).
The Court features a case cited by the House as well as the Senate in
the Reports on § 1988, Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F. 2d 421
(CA8 1970). The Court deems Parham consistent with its rejection of
the catalyst rule, alternately because the Eighth Circuit made a “finding
that the defendant had acted unlawfully,” and because that court ordered
the District Court to “ ‘retain jurisdiction over the matter . . . to insure the
continued implementation of the [defendant’s] policy of equal employment
opportunities.’ ” Ante, at 607, n. 9 (quoting 433 F. 2d, at 429). Congress
did not fix on those factors, however: Nothing in either Report suggests
that judicial findings or retention of jurisdiction is essential to an award
of fees. The courts in Kopet and Thomas awarded fees based on claims
as to which they neither made “a finding” nor “retain[ed] jurisdic-

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
638 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
The House Report corroborates: “[A]fter a complaint is filed,
a defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice.
A court should still award fees even though it might con-
clude, as a matter of equity, that no formal relief, such as an
injunction, is needed.” H. R. Rep. No. 94–1558, at 7 (empha-
ses added). These Reports, Courts of Appeals have ob-
served, are hardly ambiguous. Compare ante, at 607–608
(“legislative history . . . is at best ambiguous”), with, e. g.,
Dunn v. The Florida Bar, 889 F. 2d 1010, 1013 (CA11 1989)
(legislative history “evinces a clear Congressional intent” to
permit award “even when no formal judicial relief is ob-
tained” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Robinson v.
Kimbrough, 652 F. 2d 458, 465 (CA5 1981) (same); American
Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F. 2d 184, 187 (CA9
1981) (Senate Report “directs” fee award under catalyst
rule). Congress, I am convinced, understood that “ ‘[v]ic-
tory’ in a civil rights suit is typically a practical, rather than
a strictly legal matter.” Exeter-West Greenwich Regional
School Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F. 2d 47, 51 (CA1 1986) (cita-
tion omitted).
IV
The Court identifies several “policy arguments” that might
warrant rejection of the catalyst rule. See ante, at 608–610.
A defendant might refrain from altering its conduct, fearing
liability for fees as the price of voluntary action. See ante,
at 608. Moreover, rejection of the catalyst rule has limited
impact: Desisting from the challenged conduct will not ren-
der a case moot where damages are sought, and even when
the plaintiff seeks only equitable relief, a defendant’s volun-
tary cessation of a challenged practice does not render the
case moot “unless it is ‘absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur.’ ” Ante, at 609 (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc., 528
tion.” (It nonetheless bears attention that, in line with the Court’s de-
scription of Parham, a plaintiff could qualify as the “prevailing party”
based on a finding or retention of jurisdiction.)

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
639 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
U. S., at 189). Because a mootness dismissal is not easily
achieved, the defendant may be impelled to settle, negotiat-
ing fees less generous than a court might award. See ante,
at 609. Finally, a catalyst rule would “require analysis of
the defendant’s subjective motivations,” and thus protract
the litigation. Ibid.
The Court declines to look beneath the surface of these
arguments, placing its reliance, instead, on a meaning of
“prevailing party” that other jurists would scarcely recog-
nize as plain. See ante, at 603. Had the Court inspected
the “policy arguments” listed in its opinion, I doubt it would
have found them impressive.
In opposition to the argument that defendants will resist
change in order to stave off an award of fees, one could urge
that the catalyst rule may lead defendants promptly to com-
ply with the law’s requirements: the longer the litigation, the
larger the fees. Indeed, one who knows noncompliance will
be expensive might be encouraged to conform his conduct to
the legal requirements before litigation is threatened. Cf.
Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law,
46 Vand. L. Rev. 1069, 1121 (1993) (“fee shifting in favor of
prevailing plaintiffs enhances both incentives to comply with
legal rules and incentives to settle disputes”). No doubt, a
mootness dismissal is unlikely when recurrence of the con-
troversy is under the defendant’s control. But, as earlier
observed, see supra, at 636, why should this Court’s fee-
shifting rulings drive a plaintiff prepared to accept adequate
relief, though out-of-court and unrecorded, to litigate on and
on? And if the catalyst rule leads defendants to negotiate
not only settlement terms but also allied counsel fees, is that
not a consummation to applaud, not deplore?
As to the burden on the court, is it not the norm for the
judge to whom the case has been assigned to resolve fee
disputes (deciding whether an award is in order, and if it is,
the amount due), thereby clearing the case from the calen-
dar? If factfinding becomes necessary under the catalyst

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
640 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
rule, is it not the sort that “the district courts, in their fact-
finding expertise, deal with on a regular basis”? Baumgart-
ner v. Harrisburg Housing Auth., 21 F. 3d 541, 548 (CA3
1994). Might not one conclude overall, as Courts of Appeals
have suggested, that the catalyst rule “saves judicial re-
sources,” Paris v. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, 988 F. 2d 236, 240 (CA1 1993), by encouraging
“plaintiffs to discontinue litigation after receiving through
the defendant’s acquiescence the remedy initially sought”?
Morris v. West Palm Beach, 194 F. 3d 1203, 1207 (CA11
1999).
The concurring opinion adds another argument against the
catalyst rule: That opinion sees the rule as accommodating
the “extortionist” who obtains relief because of “greater
strength in financial resources, or superiority in media ma-
nipulation, rather than superiority in legal merit.” Ante,
at 617, 618 (emphasis in original). This concern overlooks
both the character of the rule and the judicial superintend-
ence Congress ordered for all fee allowances. The catalyst
rule was auxiliary to fee-shifting statutes whose primary
purpose is “to promote the vigorous enforcement” of the civil
rights laws. Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U. S., at 422.
To that end, courts deemed the conduct-altering catalyst
that counted to be the substance of the case, not merely the
plaintiff ’s atypically superior financial resources, media ties,
or political clout. See supra, at 628. And Congress as-
signed responsibility for awarding fees not to automatons un-
able to recognize extortionists, but to judges expected and
instructed to exercise “discretion.” See supra, at 624–625,
n. 1. So viewed, the catalyst rule provided no berth for nui-
sance suits, see Hooper, 37 F. 3d, at 292, or “thinly disguised
forms of extortion,” Tyler v. Corner Constr. Corp., 167 F. 3d
1202, 1206 (CA8 1999) (citation omitted).12
12 The concurring opinion notes, correctly, that “[t]here must be a cutoff
of seemingly equivalent entitlements to fees—either the failure to file suit
in time or the failure to obtain a judgment in time.” Ante, at 620 (empha-

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
641 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
V
As to our attorney’s fee precedents, the Court correctly
observes, “[w]e have never had occasion to decide whether
the term ‘prevailing party’ allows an award of fees under
the ‘catalyst theory,’ ” and “there is language in our cases
supporting both petitioners and respondents.” Ante, at 603,
n. 5. It bears emphasis, however, that in determining
whether fee shifting is in order, the Court in the past has
placed greatest weight not on any “judicial imprimatur,”
ante, at 605, but on the practical impact of the lawsuit.13 In
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122 (1980), in which the Court held
fees could be awarded on the basis of a consent decree, the
opinion nowhere relied on the presence of a formal judgment.
See supra, at 629; infra, at 642–643, n. 14. Some years
sis in original). The former cutoff, the Court has held, is impelled both
by “plain language” requiring a legal “action” or “proceeding” antecedent
to a fee award, and by “legislative history . . . replete with references to
[enforcement] ‘in suits,’ ‘through the courts’ and by ‘judicial process.’ ”
North Carolina Dept. of Transp. v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc.,
479 U. S. 6, 12 (1986) (citations omitted). The latter cutoff, requiring “a
judgment in time,” is not similarly impelled by text or legislative history.
The concurring opinion also states that a prevailing party must obtain
relief “in the lawsuit.” Ante, at 615, 618. One can demur to that elabo-
ration of the statutory text and still adhere to the catalyst rule. Under
the rule, plaintiff ’s suit raising genuine issues must trigger defendant’s
voluntary action; plaintiff will not prevail under the rule if defendant
“ceases . . . [his] offensive conduct” by dying or going bankrupt. See ante,
at 615. A behavior-altering event like dying or bankruptcy occurs out-
side the lawsuit; a change precipitated by the lawsuit’s claims and demand
for relief is an occurrence brought about “through” or “in” the suit.
13 To qualify for fees in any case, we have held, relief must be real. See
Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam) (a plaintiff who ob-
tains a formal declaratory judgment, but gains no real “relief whatsoever,”
is not a “prevailing party” eligible for fees); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S., at
761 (an interlocutory decision reversing a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, although stating that plaintiff ’s rights were violated, does not enti-
tle plaintiff to fees; to “prevail,” plaintiff must gain relief of “substance,”
i. e., more than a favorable “judicial statement that does not affect the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant”).

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
642 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
later, in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987), the Court sug-
gested that fees might be awarded the plaintiff who “ob-
tain[ed] relief without [the] benefit of a formal judgment.”
Id., at 760. The Court explained: “If the defendant, under
the pressure of the lawsuit, pays over a money claim before
the judicial judgment is pronounced,” or “if the defendant,
under pressure of [a suit for declaratory judgment], alters
his conduct (or threatened conduct) towards the plaintiff,”
i. e., conduct “that was the basis for the suit, the plaintiff will
have prevailed.” Id., at 761. I agree, and would apply that
analysis to this case.
The Court posits a “ ‘merit’ requirement of our prior
cases.” Ante, at 606. Maher, however, affirmed an award
of attorney’s fees based on a consent decree that “did not
purport to adjudicate [plaintiff ’s] statutory or constitutional
claims.” 448 U. S., at 126, n. 8. The decree in Maher “ex-
plicitly stated that ‘nothing [therein was] intended to con-
stitute an admission of fault by either party.’ ” Ibid. The
catalyst rule, in short, conflicts with none of “our prior hold-
ings,” ante, at 605. 14
14 The Court repeatedly quotes passages from Hanrahan v. Hampton,
446 U. S., at 757–758, stating that to “prevail,” plaintiffs must receive relief
“on the merits.” Ante, at 603, 604, 608. Nothing in Hanrahan, however,
declares that relief “on the merits” requires a “judicial imprimatur.”
Ante, at 605. As the Court acknowledges, Hanrahan concerned an in-
terim award of fees, after plaintiff succeeded in obtaining nothing more
than reversal of a directed verdict. See ante, at 605. At that juncture,
plaintiff had obtained no change in defendant’s behavior, and the suit’s
ultimate winner remained undetermined. There is simply no inconsist-
ency between Hanrahan, denying fees when a plaintiff might yet obtain
no real benefit, and the catalyst rule, allowing fees when a plaintiff obtains
the practical result she sought in suing. Indeed, the harmony between
the catalyst rule and Hanrahan is suggested by Hanrahan itself; like
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129 (1980), Hanrahan quoted the Senate
Report recognizing that parties may prevail “through a consent judgment
or without formally obtaining relief.” 446 U. S., at 757 (quoting S. Rep.
No. 94–1011, at 5) (emphasis added). Hanrahan also selected for citation

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
643 Cite as: 532 U. S. 598 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
* * *
The Court states that the term “prevailing party” in fee-
shifting statutes has an “accepted meaning.” Ante, at 608.
If that is so, the “accepted meaning” is not the one the Court
today announces. It is, instead, the meaning accepted by
every Court of Appeals to address the catalyst issue before
our 1987 decision in Hewitt, see supra, at 626, n. 4, and disa-
vowed since then only by the Fourth Circuit, see supra, at
627, n. 5. A plaintiff prevails, federal judges have over-
whelmingly agreed, when a litigated judgment, consent de-
cree, out-of-court settlement, or the defendant’s voluntary,
postcomplaint payment or change in conduct in fact affords
redress for the plaintiff ’s substantial grievances.
When this Court rejects the considered judgment prevail-
ing in the Circuits, respect for our colleagues demands a co-
the influential elaboration of the catalyst rule in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581
F. 2d, at 279–281. See 446 U. S., at 757.
The Court additionally cites Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland In-
dependent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782 (1989), which held, unanimously, that
a plaintiff could become a “prevailing party” without obtaining relief on
the “central issue in the suit.” Id., at 790. Texas State Teachers linked
fee awards to a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the par-
ties,” id., at 792–793, but did not say, as the Court does today, that the
change must be “court-ordered,” ante, at 604. The parties’ legal relation-
ship does change when the defendant stops engaging in the conduct that
furnishes the basis for plaintiff ’s civil action, and that action, which both
parties would otherwise have litigated, is dismissed.
The decision with language most unfavorable to the catalyst rule, Far-
rar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103 (1992), does not figure prominently in the
Court’s opinion—and for good reason, for Farrar “involved no catalytic
effect.” See ante, at 603, n. 5 (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 194 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); supra, at 627. Farrar held that a plaintiff who
sought damages of $17 million, but received damages of $1, was a “prevail-
ing party” nonetheless not entitled to fees. 506 U. S., at 113–116. In
reinforcing the link between the right to a fee award and the “degree of
success obtained,” id., at 114 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S., at
436), Farrar’s holding is consistent with the catalyst rule.

532US2 Unit: $U55 [09-19-02 20:51:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN
644 BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, INC. v. WEST
VIRGINIA DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
gent explanation. Today’s decision does not provide one.
The Court’s narrow construction of the words “prevailing
party” is unsupported by precedent and unaided by history
or logic. Congress prescribed fee-shifting provisions like
those included in the FHAA and ADA to encourage private
enforcement of laws designed to advance civil rights. Fidel-
ity to that purpose calls for court-awarded fees when a pri-
vate party’s lawsuit, whether or not its settlement is regis-
tered in court, vindicates rights Congress sought to secure.
I would so hold and therefore dissent from the judgment and
opinion of the Court.