MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION v. GARVEY

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Syllabus
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS
ASSOCIATION v. GARVEY
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 00–1210. Decided May 14, 2001
After arbitrators found that the Major League Baseball Clubs (Clubs) col-
luded in the market for free-agent services after the 1985, 1986, and
1987 baseball seasons, the Clubs and petitioner agreed that the Clubs
would establish a fund to be distributed to injured players. The
“Framework” that petitioner designed to evaluate individual claims pro-
vided, inter alia, that players could seek an arbitrator’s review of a
distribution plan, but the arbitrator could determine only whether the
Framework and its criteria were properly applied. Respondent Garvey
sought arbitration after his damages claim was rejected. At his hear-
ing, he produced a letter from San Diego Padres president and CEO
Smith, stating that Smith had offered to extend Garvey’s contract, but
the Padres refused to negotiate thereafter due to collusion. The arbi-
trator denied the claim because the letter contradicted Smith’s testi-
mony denying collusion in earlier arbitration proceedings. The Federal
District Court denied Garvey’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award.
In Garvey I, the Ninth Circuit reversed. It found that review of the
award’s merits was warranted because the arbitrator’s refusal to credit
Smith’s letter was inexplicable and bordered on irrational since arbitra-
tors had previously concluded that the owners’ testimony denying collu-
sion was false, and that there was strong support for the letter’s truth-
fulness. On remand, the District Court remanded the case for further
arbitration, and Garvey appealed. Finding that Garvey I left only one
possible result, the Ninth Circuit in Garvey II reversed and directed
the District Court to remand the case to arbitration with instructions
to enter an award for Garvey.
Held: The Ninth Circuit’s decision to resolve the dispute and bar further
proceedings is at odds with governing law. Judicial review of a labor-
arbitration decision pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement is
very limited. Courts are not authorized to review an arbitrator’s de-
cision on the merits despite allegations that the decision rests on fac-
tual errors or misinterprets the parties’ agreement. Paperworkers v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U. S. 29, 36. Only when the arbitrator effectively dis-
penses his own brand of industrial justice may his decision be unenforce-
able. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 597.

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Per Curiam
When the judiciary weighs a particular claim’s merits, it usurps a func-
tion entrusted to the arbitrator. As a rule a court must not foreclose
further proceedings by settling the merits according to its own judg-
ment of the appropriate result. It should simply vacate the award,
leaving open the possibility of further proceedings if the agreement per-
mits them. The Ninth Circuit recited these principles but erred in
applying them. In Garvey I, it overturned the arbitrator’s decision be-
cause it disagreed with his factual findings with respect to credibility,
but even serious error on the arbitrator’s part does not justify overturn-
ing his decision where, as here, he is construing a contract and acting
within the scope of his authority, Misco, supra, at 38. And in Garvey
II, the court resolved the dispute’s merits based on its assessment of
the record before the arbitrator, which it ordinarily cannot do, no matter
how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision, Misco, supra, at 40, n. 10.
Even when the arbitrator’s award may properly be vacated, the appro-
priate remedy is to remand the case for further arbitration proceedings.
Certiorari granted; 243 F. 3d 547, reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit here rejected
an arbitrator’s factual findings and then resolved the merits
of the parties’ dispute instead of remanding the case for fur-
ther arbitration proceedings. Because the court’s determi-
nation conflicts with our cases limiting review of an arbitra-
tor’s award entered pursuant to an agreement between an
employer and a labor organization and prescribing the appro-
priate remedy where vacation of the award is warranted, we
grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse. The
motions for leave to file briefs amicus curiae of the National
Academy of Arbitrators and the Office of the Commissioner
of Baseball are granted.
In the late 1980’s, petitioner Major League Baseball Play-
ers Association (Association) filed grievances against the
Major League Baseball Clubs (Clubs), claiming the Clubs had
colluded in the market for free-agent services after the 1985,
1986, and 1987 baseball seasons, in violation of the industry’s
collective-bargaining agreement. A free agent is a player
who may contract with any Club, rather than one whose
right to contract is restricted to a particular Club. In a

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series of decisions, arbitrators found collusion by the Clubs
and damage to the players. The Association and Clubs
subsequently entered into a Global Settlement Agreement
(Agreement), pursuant to which the Clubs established a $280
million fund to be distributed to injured players. The Asso-
ciation also designed a “Framework” to evaluate the individ-
ual player’s claims, and, applying that Framework, recom-
mended distribution plans for claims relating to a particular
season or seasons.
The Framework provided that players could seek an ar-
bitrator’s review of the distribution plan. The arbitrator
would determine “ ‘only whether the approved Framework
and the criteria set forth therein have been properly applied
in the proposed Distribution Plan.’ ” Garvey v. Roberts, 203
F. 3d 580, 583 (CA9 2000) (Garvey I). The Framework set
forth factors to be considered in evaluating players’ claims,
as well as specific requirements for lost contract-extension
claims. Such claims were cognizable “ ‘only in those cases
where evidence exists that a specific offer of an extension
was made by a club prior to collusion only to thereafter be
withdrawn when the collusion scheme was initiated.’ ” Id.,
at 584.
Respondent Steve Garvey, a retired, highly regarded first
baseman, submitted a claim for damages of approximately $3
million. He alleged that his contract with the San Diego
Padres was not extended to the 1988 and 1989 seasons due
to collusion. The Association rejected Garvey’s claim in
February 1996, because he presented no evidence that the
Padres actually offered to extend his contract. Garvey ob-
jected, and an arbitration hearing was held. He testified
that the Padres offered to extend his contract for the 1988
and 1989 seasons and then withdrew the offer after they
began colluding with other teams. He presented a June
1996 letter from Ballard Smith, Padres’ President and CEO
from 1979 to 1987, stating that, before the end of the 1985
season, Smith offered to extend Garvey’s contract through

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the 1989 season, but that the Padres refused to negotiate
with Garvey thereafter due to collusion.
The arbitrator denied Garvey’s claim, after seeking addi-
tional documentation from the parties. In his award, he ex-
plained that “ ‘[t]here exists . . . substantial doubt as to the
credibility of the statements in the Smith letter.’ ” Id., at
586. He noted the “stark contradictions” between the 1996
letter and Smith’s testimony in the earlier arbitration pro-
ceedings regarding collusion, where Smith, like other own-
ers, denied collusion and stated that the Padres simply were
not interested in extending Garvey’s contract. Ibid. The
arbitrator determined that, due to these contradictions, he
“ ‘must reject [Smith’s] more recent assertion that Garvey
did not receive [a contract] extension’ ” due to collusion, and
found that Garvey had not shown a specific offer of exten-
sion. Ibid. He concluded:
“ ‘The shadow cast over the credibility of the Smith tes-
timony coupled with the absence of any other corrobora-
tion of the claim submitted by Garvey compels a finding
that the Padres declined to extend his contract not be-
cause of the constraints of the collusion effort of the
clubs but rather as a baseball judgment founded upon
[Garvey’s] age and recent injury history.’ ” Ibid.
Garvey moved in Federal District Court to vacate the ar-
bitrator’s award, alleging that the arbitrator violated the
Framework by denying his claim. The District Court de-
nied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed by a divided vote. The court acknowledged that
judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision in a labor dispute
is extremely limited. But it held that review of the merits
of the arbitrator’s award was warranted in this case, because
the arbitrator “ ‘dispensed his own brand of industrial jus-
tice.’ ” Id., at 589. The court recognized that Smith’s prior
testimony with respect to collusion conflicted with the state-
ments in his 1996 letter. But in the court’s view, the arbitra-

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tor’s refusal to credit Smith’s letter was “inexplicable” and
“border[ed] on the irrational,” because a panel of arbitrators,
chaired by the arbitrator involved here, had previously con-
cluded that the owners’ prior testimony was false. Id., at
590. The court rejected the arbitrator’s reliance on the ab-
sence of other corroborating evidence, attributing that fact
to Smith and Garvey’s direct negotiations. The court also
found that the record provided “strong support” for the
truthfulness of Smith’s 1996 letter. Id., at 591–592. The
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to
vacate the award.
The District Court then remanded the case to the arbitra-
tion panel for further hearings, and Garvey appealed. The
Court of Appeals, again by a divided vote, explained that
Garvey I established that “the conclusion that Smith made
Garvey an offer and subsequently withdrew it because of
the collusion scheme was the only conclusion that the arbi-
trator could draw from the record in the proceedings.”
No. 00–56080, 2000 WL 1801383, *1 (CA9, Dec. 7, 2000) (un-
published), judgt. order reported at 243 F. 3d 547 (Garvey
II). Noting that its prior instructions might have been un-
clear, the court clarified that Garvey I “left only one possible
result—the result our holding contemplated—an award in
Garvey’s favor.” 2000 WL 1801383, at *1. The Court of
Appeals reversed the District Court and directed that it
remand the case to the arbitration panel with instructions
to enter an award for Garvey in the amount he claimed.1
1 Garvey contends that, because the Association’s petition was filed more
than 90 days after Garvey I, we cannot consider a challenge raising issues
resolved in that decision. But there is no question that the Association’s
petition was filed in sufficient time for us to review Garvey II, and we
have authority to consider questions determined in earlier stages of the
litigation where certiorari is sought from the most recent of the judgments
of the Court of Appeals. Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U. S. 152 (1964) (per
curiam); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U. S. 251,
258 (1916).

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The parties do not dispute that this case arises under § 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156,
29 U. S. C. § 185(a), as the controversy involves an assertion
of rights under an agreement between an employer and a
labor organization. Although Garvey’s specific allegation is
that the arbitrator violated the Framework for resolving
players’ claims for damages, that Framework was designed
to facilitate payments to remedy the Clubs’ breach of the
collective-bargaining agreement. Garvey’s right to be made
whole is founded on that agreement.
Judicial review of a labor-arbitration decision pursuant to
such an agreement is very limited. Courts are not author-
ized to review the arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite
allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misin-
terprets the parties’ agreement. Paperworkers v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U. S. 29, 36 (1987). We recently reiterated that if
an “ ‘arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the
contract and acting within the scope of his authority,’ the
fact that ‘a court is convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision.’ ” Eastern Associ-
ated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U. S. 57, 62 (2000)
(quoting Misco, supra, at 38). It is only when the arbitrator
strays from interpretation and application of the agreement
and effectively “dispense[s] his own brand of industrial jus-
tice” that his decision may be unenforceable. Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 597 (1960).
When an arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the applica-
tion of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitra-
tor’s “improvident, even silly, factfinding” does not provide
a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.
Misco, 484 U. S., at 39.
In discussing the courts’ limited role in reviewing the mer-
its of arbitration awards, we have stated that “ ‘courts . . .
have no business weighing the merits of the grievance [or]
considering whether there is equity in a particular claim.’ ”

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Id., at 37 (quoting Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U. S. 564, 568 (1960)). When the judiciary does so, “it usurps
a function which . . . is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal.”
Id., at 569; see also Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra, at
599 (“It is the arbitrator’s construction [of the agreement]
which was bargained for . . .”). Consistent with this limited
role, we said in Misco that “[e]ven in the very rare instances
when an arbitrator’s procedural aberrations rise to the level
of affirmative misconduct, as a rule the court must not fore-
close further proceedings by settling the merits according to
its own judgment of the appropriate result.” 484 U. S., at
40–41, n. 10. That step, we explained, “would improperly
substitute a judicial determination for the arbitrator’s de-
cision that the parties bargained for” in their agreement.
Ibid. Instead, the court should “simply vacate the award,
thus leaving open the possibility of further proceedings
if they are permitted under the terms of the agreement.”
Ibid.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals here recited these princi-
ples, but its application of them is nothing short of baffling.
The substance of the court’s discussion reveals that it over-
turned the arbitrator’s decision because it disagreed with the
arbitrator’s factual findings, particularly those with respect
to credibility. The Court of Appeals, it appears, would have
credited Smith’s 1996 letter, and found the arbitrator’s re-
fusal to do so at worst “irrational” and at best “bizarre.”
Garvey I, 203 F. 3d, at 590–591. But even “serious error”
on the arbitrator’s part does not justify overturning his deci-
sion, where, as here, he is construing a contract and acting
within the scope of his authority. Misco, supra, at 38.
In Garvey II, the court clarified that Garvey I both re-
jected the arbitrator’s findings and went further, resolving
the merits of the parties’ dispute based on the court’s assess-
ment of the record before the arbitrator. For that reason,
the court found further arbitration proceedings inappropri-

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ate. But again, established law ordinarily precludes a court
from resolving the merits of the parties’ dispute on the basis
of its own factual determinations, no matter how erroneous
the arbitrator’s decision. Misco, supra, at 40, n. 10; see also
American Mfg. Co., supra, at 568. Even when the arbitra-
tor’s award may properly be vacated, the appropriate rem-
edy is to remand the case for further arbitration proceedings.
Misco, supra, at 40, n. 10. The dissent suggests that the
remedy described in Misco is limited to cases where the
arbitrator’s errors are procedural. Post, at 512 (opinion of
Stevens, J.). Misco did involve procedural issues, but our
discussion regarding the appropriate remedy was not so
limited. If a remand is appropriate even when the arbitra-
tor’s award has been set aside for “procedural aberrations”
that constitute “affirmative misconduct,” it follows that a re-
mand ordinarily will be appropriate when the arbitrator sim-
ply made factual findings that the reviewing court perceives
as “irrational.” The Court of Appeals usurped the arbitra-
tor’s role by resolving the dispute and barring further pro-
ceedings, a result at odds with this governing law.2
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the order of the District Court denying the motion
to vacate the arbitrator’s award, and it erred further in di-
recting that judgment be entered in Garvey’s favor. The
petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of
2 In any event, no serious error on the arbitrator’s part is apparent in
this case. The fact that an earlier panel of arbitrators rejected the own-
ers’ testimony as a whole does not compel the conclusion that the panel
found Smith’s specific statements with respect to Garvey to be false. The
arbitrator’s explanation for his decision indicates that he simply found
Smith an unreliable witness and that, in the absence of corroborating evi-
dence, he could only conclude that Garvey failed to show that the Padres
had offered to extend his contract. The arbitrator’s analysis may have
been unpersuasive to the Court of Appeals, but his decision hardly quali-
fies as serious error, let alone irrational or inexplicable error. And, as we
have said, any such error would not justify the actions taken by the court.

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512 MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSN. v. GARVEY
Stevens, J., dissenting
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I agree with the Court that in Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F. 3d
580 (CA9 2000), the Ninth Circuit should not have disturbed
the arbitrator’s award. Correction of that error sets this
case straight. I see no need to say more.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
It is well settled that an arbitrator “does not sit to dis-
pense his own brand of industrial justice.” Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 597 (1960).
We have also said fairly definitively, albeit in dicta, that a
court should remedy an arbitrator’s “procedural aberrations”
by vacating the award and remanding for further proceed-
ings. Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U. S. 29, 40–41, n. 10
(1987). Our cases, however, do not provide significant guid-
ance as to what standards a federal court should use in as-
sessing whether an arbitrator’s behavior is so untethered to
either the agreement of the parties or the factual record so
as to constitute an attempt to “dispense his own brand of
industrial justice.” Nor, more importantly, do they tell us
how, having made such a finding, courts should deal with
“the extraordinary circumstance in which the arbitrator’s
own rulings make clear that, more than being simply errone-
ous, his finding is completely inexplicable and borders on the
irrational.” Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F. 3d 580, 590 (CA9
2000) (case below). Because our case law is not sufficiently
clear to allow me to conclude that the case below was
wrongly decided—let alone to conclude that the decision was
so wrong as to require the extraordinary remedy of a sum-

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Stevens, J., dissenting
mary reversal—I dissent from the Court’s disposition of
this petition.
Without the benefit of briefing or argument, today the
Court resolves two difficult questions. First, it decides that
even if the Court of Appeals’ appraisal of the merits is cor-
rect—that is to say, even if the arbitrator did dispense his
own brand of justice untethered to the agreement of the par-
ties, and even if the correct disposition of the matter is per-
fectly clear—the only course open to a reviewing court is to
remand the matter for another arbitration. That conclusion
is not compelled by any of our cases, nor by any analysis
offered by the Court. As the issue is subject to serious ar-
guments on both sides, the Court should have set this case
for argument if it wanted to answer this remedial question.
Second, without reviewing the record or soliciting briefing,
the Court concludes that, in any event, “no serious error on
the arbitrator’s part is apparent in this case.” Ante, at 511,
n. 2. At this stage in the proceedings, I simply cannot en-
dorse that conclusion. After examining the record, obtain-
ing briefing, and hearing oral argument, the Court of Ap-
peals offered a reasoned explanation of its conclusion. See
203 F. 3d, at 589–592; see also id., at 593–594 (Hawkins, J.,
concurring). Whether or not I would ultimately agree with
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, I find the Court’s willingness to
reverse a factbound determination of the Court of Appeals
without engaging that court’s reasoning a troubling depar-
ture from our normal practice.*
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*The Court’s opinion is somewhat ambiguous as to its reasons for over-
turning the portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision setting aside the
arbitration. It is unclear whether the majority is saying that a court may
never set aside an arbitration because of a factual error, no matter how
perverse, or whether the Court merely holds that the error in this case
was not sufficiently severe to allow a court to take that step. If it is the
latter, the Court offers no explanation of what standards it is using or of
its reasons for reaching that conclusion.