ARTUZ, SUPERINTENDENT, GREEN HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY v. BENNETT

531US1 Unit: $$U2 [03-28-01 16:53:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN
4 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
ARTUZ, SUPERINTENDENT, GREEN HAVEN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY v. BENNETT
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 99–1238. Argued October 10, 2000—Decided November 7, 2000
A New York trial court orally denied respondent’s 1995 motion to vacate
his state conviction. Subsequently, the Federal District Court dis-
missed respondent’s federal habeas petition as untimely, noting that
it was filed more than one year after the effective date of the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In revers-
ing and remanding, the Second Circuit concluded that 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(d)(2), which tolls AEDPA’s limitations period during the time that
a “properly filed” application for state postconviction relief is pending,
also tolls the 1-year grace period which the Circuit has allowed for the
filing of applications challenging pre-AEDPA convictions; that, in the
absence of a written order, respondent’s 1995 motion was still pending
under § 2244(d)(2); and that the 1995 motion was properly filed because
it complied with rules governing whether an application for state post-
conviction relief is “recognized as such” under state law. It thus re-
jected petitioner’s contention that the 1995 application was not properly
filed because the claims it contained were procedurally barred under
New York law.
Held: That respondent’s application for state postconviction relief con-
tained procedurally barred claims does not render it improperly filed
under § 2244(d)(2). An application is “filed,” as that term is commonly
understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate
court officer for placement into the official record; and it is “properly
filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the appli-
cable laws and rules governing filings, e. g., requirements concerning the
form of the document, applicable time limits upon its delivery, the court
and office in which it must be lodged, and payment of a filing fee. By
construing “properly filed application” to mean application “raising
claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred,” petitioner elides
the difference between an “application” and a “claim.” The state proce-
dural bars at issue set forth conditions to obtaining relief, rather than
conditions to filing. Pp. 8–11.
199 F. 3d 116, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

531US1 Unit: $$U2 [03-28-01 16:53:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN
5 Cite as: 531 U. S. 4 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
John M. Castellano argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Richard A. Brown and Gary S. Fidel.
Dan Schweitzer argued the cause for the State of Florida
et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of
Florida, Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy Attor-
ney General, Denise O. Simpson, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, and John M. Bailey, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecti-
cut, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Mark Pryor
of Arkansas, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of
Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, James E. Ryan of
Illinois, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Michael C. Moore
of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg
of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Heidi Heit-
kamp of North Dakota, Betty Montgomery of Ohio, W. A.
Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon,
Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of
South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, and Mark L. Earley
of Virginia.
Alan S. Futerfas argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were John H. Blume and Keir M. Weyble.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 2244(d)(2) of Title 28 U. S. C. (1994 ed., Supp. IV)
provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed appli-
cation for State post-conviction or other collateral review
with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under
this subsection.” This case presents the question whether
an application for state postconviction relief containing
claims that are procedurally barred is “properly filed” within
the meaning of this provision.
I
After a 1984 jury trial in the Supreme Court of New York,
Queens County, respondent was convicted of attempted mur-

531US1 Unit: $$U2 [03-28-01 16:53:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN
6 ARTUZ v. BENNETT
Opinion of the Court
der, criminal possession of a weapon, reckless endangerment,
criminal possession of stolen property, and unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the
New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. After
unsuccessfully pursuing state postconviction relief in 1991,
respondent in 1995 moved pro se to vacate his judgment of
conviction. On November 30, 1995, the state trial court de-
nied the motion in an oral decision on the record; no reasons
were given. Respondent claims never to have received a
copy of a written order reflecting the denial, despite several
written requests.
In February 1998, respondent filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, alleging, inter alia, that the
state trial court’s refusal to allow a defense witness to testify
deprived him of his right to a fair trial and his right to pre-
sent witnesses in his own defense, that his absence from a
pretrial hearing violated due process, and that his trial coun-
sel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to al-
legedly improper remarks made by the prosecutor in summa-
tion. The District Court summarily dismissed the petition
as untimely, noting that it had been filed more than one year
and nine months after the effective date of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110
Stat. 1214.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed and remanded. 199 F. 3d 116 (1999). The panel
first concluded that 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 ed., Supp.
IV), which tolls AEDPA’s 1-year period of limitation on ha-
beas corpus applications by state prisoners, should also toll
the 1-year grace period (commencing on AEDPA’s effective
date of April 24, 1996), which the Second Circuit has allowed
for the filing of habeas corpus applications challenging pre-
AEDPA convictions. See Ross v. Artuz, 150 F. 3d 97, 98
(CA2 1998). The panel assumed, for purposes of the appeal,

531US1 Unit: $$U2 [03-28-01 16:53:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN
7 Cite as: 531 U. S. 4 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
that respondent had not yet received a written order deny-
ing his 1995 motion to vacate the conviction. Since respond-
ent could not appeal the denial absent such written order;
and since, in the panel’s view, “a state-court petition is ‘pend-
ing’ from the time it is first filed until finally disposed of and
further appellate review is unavailable under the particular
state’s procedures,” 199 F. 3d, at 120; the panel concluded
that respondent’s 1995 motion was still “pending” for pur-
poses of § 2244(d)(2). Finally (and this is the sole point on
which we granted certiorari), the panel held that respond-
ent’s 1995 motion was “properly filed” within the meaning of
§ 2244(d)(2) because it complied with those rules “governing”
whether “an application for state post-conviction relief [is]
recognized as such” under state law. Id., at 123. It re-
jected petitioner’s contention that the application was not
properly filed because the claims it contained were subject
to two procedural bars under New York law: a bar against
raising an issue that had been “previously determined on
the merits upon an appeal from the judgment,” N. Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 440.10(2)(a) (McKinney 1994), and a bar against
raising a claim that was available on direct appeal but was
not raised because of the defendant’s “unjustifiable failure,”
§ 440.10(2)(c).1 199 F. 3d, at 123. We granted certiorari.
529 U. S. 1065 (2000).
1 The cited provisions read in full as follows:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one [which sets forth vari-
ous grounds upon which a court may vacate its earlier judgment], the
court must deny a motion to vacate a judgment when:
“(a) The ground or issue raised upon the motion was previously deter-
mined on the merits upon an appeal from the judgment, unless since the
time of such appellate determination there has been a retroactively effec-
tive change in the law controlling such issue; or
. . . . .
“(c) Although sufficient facts appear on the record of the proceedings
underlying the judgment to have permitted, upon appeal from such judg-
ment, adequate review of the ground or issue raised upon the motion, no

531US1 Unit: $$U2 [03-28-01 16:53:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN
8 ARTUZ v. BENNETT
Opinion of the Court
II
Petitioner contends here, as he did below, that an applica-
tion for state postconviction or other collateral review is not
“properly filed” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) unless it complies
with all mandatory state-law procedural requirements that
would bar review of the merits of the application. We
disagree.
An application is “filed,” as that term is commonly under-
stood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appro-
priate court officer for placement into the official record.
See, e. g., United States v. Lombardo, 241 U. S. 73, 76 (1916)
(“A paper is filed when it is delivered to the proper official
and by him received and filed”); Black’s Law Dictionary 642
(7th ed. 1999) (defining “file” as “[t]o deliver a legal document
to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the
official record”). And an application is “properly filed” when
its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the appli-
cable laws and rules governing filings. These usually pre-
scribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits
upon its delivery,2 the court and office in which it must be
lodged, and the requisite filing fee. See, e. g., Habteselassie
v. Novak, 209 F. 3d 1208, 1210–1211 (CA10 2000); 199 F. 3d,
at 121 (case below); Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F. 3d 467, 469–
470 (CA5 1999); Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F. 3d 146, 148 (CA3
1998). In some jurisdictions the filing requirements also
include, for example, preconditions imposed on particular
abusive filers, cf. Martin v. District of Columbia Court of
such appellate review or determination occurred owing to the defendant’s
unjustifiable failure to take or perfect an appeal during the prescribed
period or to his unjustifiable failure to raise such ground or issue upon
an appeal actually perfected by him; . . . .” N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§§ 440.10(2)(a) and (c) (McKinney 1994).
2 We express no view on the question whether the existence of certain
exceptions to a timely filing requirement can prevent a late application
from being considered improperly filed. See, e. g., Smith v. Ward, 209
F. 3d 383, 385 (CA5 2000).

531US1 Unit: $$U2 [03-28-01 16:53:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN
9 Cite as: 531 U. S. 4 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam), or on all filers
generally, cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2253(c) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) (condi-
tioning the taking of an appeal on the issuance of a “certifi-
cate of appealability”). But in common usage, the question
whether an application has been “properly filed” is quite sep-
arate from the question whether the claims contained in the
application are meritorious and free of procedural bar.
Petitioner contends that such an interpretation of the stat-
utory phrase renders the word “properly,” and possibly both
words (“properly filed”), surplusage, since if the provision
omitted those words, and tolled simply for “[t]he time during
which a[n] . . . application for State post-conviction [relief] is
pending,” it would necessarily condition tolling on compli-
ance with filing requirements of the sort described above.
That is not so. If, for example, an application is erroneously
accepted by the clerk of a court lacking jurisdiction, or is
erroneously accepted without the requisite filing fee, it will
be pending, but not properly filed.
Petitioner’s interpretation is flawed for a more fundamen-
tal reason. By construing “properly filed application” to
mean “application raising claims that are not mandatorily
procedurally barred,” petitioner elides the difference be-
tween an “application” and a “claim.” Only individual
claims, and not the application containing those claims, can
be procedurally defaulted under state law pursuant to our
holdings in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722 (1991), and
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), which establish the
sort of procedural bar on which petitioner relies. Compare
§ 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was pre-
sented in a prior application shall be dismissed”) with
§ 2244(b)(3)(A) (“Before a second or successive application
permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the
applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for
an order authorizing the district court to consider the appli-
cation” (emphases added)). See also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,

531US1 Unit: $$U2 [03-28-01 16:53:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN
10 ARTUZ v. BENNETT
Opinion of the Court
526 U. S. 838, 839–840 (1999) (“In this case, we are asked to
decide whether a state prisoner must present his claims to
a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review
in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement” (emphases
added)). Ignoring this distinction would require judges to
engage in verbal gymnastics when an application contains
some claims that are procedurally barred and some that are
not. Presumably a court would have to say that the applica-
tion is “properly filed” as to the nonbarred claims, and not
“properly filed” as to the rest. The statute, however, refers
only to “properly filed” applications and does not contain the
peculiar suggestion that a single application can be both
“properly filed” and not “properly filed.” Ordinary English
would refer to certain claims as having been properly pre-
sented or raised, irrespective of whether the application con-
taining those claims was properly filed.
Petitioner’s remaining arguments are beside the point.
He argues, for example, that tolling for applications that
raise procedurally barred claims does nothing to enable the
exhaustion of available state remedies—which is the object
of § 2244(d)(2). Respondent counters that petitioner’s view
would trigger a flood of protective filings in federal courts,
absorbing their resources in threshold interpretations of
state procedural rules. Whatever merits these and other
policy arguments may have, it is not the province of this
Court to rewrite the statute to accommodate them. We
hold as we do because respondent’s view seems to us the
only permissible interpretation of the text—which may, for
all we know, have slighted policy concerns on one or the
other side of the issue as part of the legislative compromise
that enabled the law to be enacted.
III
The state procedural bars at issue in this case—N. Y.
Crim. Proc. Law §§ 440.10(2)(a) and (c) (McKinney 1994)—
simply prescribe a rule of decision for a court confronted

531US1 Unit: $$U2 [03-28-01 16:53:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN
11 Cite as: 531 U. S. 4 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
with claims that were “previously determined on the merits
upon an appeal from the judgment” of conviction or that
could have been raised on direct appeal but were not: “[T]he
court must deny” such claims for relief. Neither provision
purports to set forth a condition to filing, as opposed to a
condition to obtaining relief. Motions to vacate that violate
these provisions will not be successful, but they have been
properly delivered and accepted so long as the filing condi-
tions have been met. Consequently, the alleged failure of
respondent’s application to comply with §§ 440.10(2)(a) and
(c) does not render it “[im]properly filed” for purposes of
§ 2244(d)(2). The judgment of the Court of Appeals must
therefore be affirmed.
It is so ordered.