GEIER et al. v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., et al.

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861 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
GEIER et al. v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.,
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 98–1811. Argued December 7, 1999—Decided May 22, 2000
Pursuant to its authority under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, the Department of Transportation (DOT) promul-
gated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, which re-
quired auto manufacturers to equip some but not all of their 1987 vehi-
cles with passive restraints. Petitioner Alexis Geier was injured in an
accident while driving a 1987 Honda Accord that did not have such re-
straints. She and her parents, also petitioners, sought damages under
District of Columbia tort law, claiming, inter alia, that respondents
(hereinafter American Honda) were negligent in not equipping the Ac-
cord with a driver’s side airbag. Ruling that their claims were ex-
pressly pre-empted by the Act, the District Court granted American
Honda summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that, because petitioners’ state tort claims posed an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the objectives of FMVSS 208, those claims con-
flicted with that standard and that, under ordinary pre-emption princi-
ples, the Act consequently pre-empted the lawsuit.
Held: Petitioners’ “no airbag” lawsuit conflicts with the objectives of
FMVSS 208 and is therefore pre-empted by the Act. Pp. 867–886.
(a) The Act’s pre-emption provision, 15 U. S. C. § 1392(d), does not ex-
pressly pre-empt this lawsuit. The presence of a saving clause, which
says that “[c]ompliance with” a federal safety standard “does not exempt
any person from any liability under common law,” § 1397(k), requires
that the pre-emption provision be read narrowly to pre-empt only state
statutes and regulations. The saving clause assumes that there are a
significant number of common-law liability cases to save. And reading
the express pre-emption provision to exclude common-law tort actions
gives actual meaning to the saving clause’s literal language, while leav-
ing adequate room for state tort law to operate where, for example,
federal law creates only a minimum safety standard. Pp. 867–868.
(b) However, the saving clause does not bar the ordinary working of
conflict pre-emption principles. Nothing in that clause suggests an in-
tent to save state tort actions that conflict with federal regulations.
The words “[c]ompliance” and “does not exempt” sound as if they simply

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862 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Syllabus
bar a defense that compliance with a federal standard automatically ex-
empts a defendant from state law, whether the Federal Government
meant that standard to be an absolute, or a minimum, requirement.
This interpretation does not conflict with the purpose of the saving pro-
vision, for it preserves actions that seek to establish greater safety than
the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to pro-
vide a floor. Moreover, this Court has repeatedly declined to give
broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful
regulatory scheme established by federal law, a concern applicable here.
The pre-emption provision and the saving provision, read together, re-
flect a neutral policy, not a specially favorable or unfavorable one,
toward the application of ordinary conflict pre-emption. The pre-
emption provision itself favors pre-emption of state tort suits, while the
saving clause disfavors pre-emption at least some of the time. How-
ever, there is nothing in any natural reading of the two provisions that
would favor one policy over the other where a jury-imposed safety
standard actually conflicts with a federal safety standard. Pp. 869–874.
(c) This lawsuit actually conflicts with FMVSS 208 and the Act itself.
DOT saw FMVSS 208 not as a minimum standard, but as a way to
provide a manufacturer with a range of choices among different passive
restraint systems that would be gradually introduced, thereby lowering
costs, overcoming technical safety problems, encouraging technological
development, and winning widespread consumer acceptance—all of
which would promote FMVSS 208’s safety objectives. The standard’s
history helps explain why and how DOT sought these objectives. DOT
began instituting passive restraint requirements in 1970, but it always
permitted passive restraint options. Public resistance to an ignition
interlock device that in effect forced occupants to buckle up their manual
belts influenced DOT’s subsequent initiatives. The 1984 version of
FMVSS 208 reflected several significant considerations regarding the
effectiveness of manual seatbelts and the likelihood that passengers
would leave their manual seatbelts unbuckled, the advantages and dis-
advantages of passive restraints, and the public’s resistance to the in-
stallation or use of then-available passive restraint devices. Most im-
portantly, it deliberately sought variety, rejecting an “all airbag”
standard because perceived or real safety concerns threatened a back-
lash more easily overcome with a mix of several different devices. A
mix would also help develop data on comparative effectiveness, allow
the industry time to overcome safety problems and high production
costs associated with airbags, and facilitate the development of alter-
native, cheaper, and safer passive restraint systems, thereby building
public confidence necessary to avoid an interlock-type fiasco. The
1984 standard also deliberately sought to gradually phase in passive

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863 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Syllabus
restraints, starting with a 10% requirement in 1987 vehicles. The
requirement was also conditional and would stay in effect only if two-
thirds of the States did not adopt mandatory buckle-up laws. A rule of
state tort law imposing a duty to install airbags in cars such as petition-
ers’ would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices
that the federal regulation sought and to the phase-in that the federal
regulation deliberately imposed. It would also have made adoption of
state mandatory seatbelt laws less likely. This Court’s pre-emption
cases assume compliance with the state law duty in question, and do not
turn on such compliance-related considerations as whether a private
party would ignore state legal obligations or how likely it is that state
law actually would be enforced. Finally, some weight is placed upon
DOT’s interpretation of FMVSS 208’s objectives and its conclusion that
a tort suit such as this one would stand as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of those objectives. DOT is likely to have a thor-
ough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives and is
uniquely qualified to comprehend the likely impact of state require-
ments. Because there is no reason to suspect that the Solicitor Gener-
al’s representation of these views reflects anything other than the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter, DOT’s failure in
promulgating FMVSS 208 to address pre-emption explicitly is not deter-
minative. Nor do the agency’s views, as presented here, lack coher-
ence. Pp. 874–886.
166 F. 3d 1236, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 886.
Arthur H. Bryant argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Leslie A. Brueckner and Robert M.
N. Palmer.
Malcolm E. Wheeler argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Benjamin S. Boyd, Mark A.
Brooks, and Brad J. Safon.
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Matthew D. Roberts,

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864 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Opinion of the Court
Douglas N. Letter, Kathleen Moriarty Mueller, Nancy E.
McFadden, Paul M. Geier, and Frank Seales, Jr.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case focuses on the 1984 version of a Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard promulgated by the Department of
Transportation under the authority of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U. S. C.
§ 1381 et seq. (1988 ed.). The standard, FMVSS 208, re-
quired auto manufacturers to equip some but not all of their
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Mis-
souri et al. by Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri,
James R. Layton, State Solicitor, Charles Hatfield, and Barbara McDon-
nell, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Colorado, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective States as follows: Janet Napolitano of Ari-
zona, Bill Lockyer of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thomas J.
Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana,
Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Eliot Spitzer of New York,
W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael
Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, William
H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington; for the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; for the
Attorneys Information Exchange Group by Larry E. Coben; for the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James
I. Crowley; and for Robert B Leflar et al. by Mr. Leflar, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States by Theodore B. Olson, Theodore J. Bou-
trous, Jr., Thomas G. Hungar, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers et al. by Thomas W. Merrill, Gene C. Schaerr,
Brett M. Kavanaugh, and Richard A. Cordray; for the Blue Cross Blue
Shield Association by Anthony F. Shelley and Alan I. Horowitz; for the
Defense Research Institute by Kevin M. Reynolds, Robert L. Fanter,
Richard J. Kirschman, Lloyd H. Milliken, Jr., Randall R. Riggs, and T.
Joseph Wendt; for General Motors Corp. by David M. Heilbron and Leslie
G. Landau; for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Kenneth
S. Geller, Erika Z. Jones, and John J. Sullivan; and for the Washington
Legal Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard
A. Samp.
David Overlock Stewart and Thomas M. Susman filed a brief for the
Business Roundtable as amicus curiae.

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865 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
1987 vehicles with passive restraints. We ask whether the
Act pre-empts a state common-law tort action in which the
plaintiff claims that the defendant auto manufacturer, who
was in compliance with the standard, should nonetheless
have equipped a 1987 automobile with airbags. We conclude
that the Act, taken together with FMVSS 208, pre-empts
the lawsuit.
I
In 1992, petitioner Alexis Geier, driving a 1987 Honda Ac-
cord, collided with a tree and was seriously injured. The
car was equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts which
Geier had buckled up at the time. The car was not equipped
with airbags or other passive restraint devices.
Geier and her parents, also petitioners, sued the car’s man-
ufacturer, American Honda Motor Company, Inc., and its af-
filiates (hereinafter American Honda), under District of Co-
lumbia tort law. They claimed, among other things, that
American Honda had designed its car negligently and defec-
tively because it lacked a driver’s side airbag. App. 3. The
District Court dismissed the lawsuit. The court noted that
FMVSS 208 gave car manufacturers a choice as to whether
to install airbags. And the court concluded that petitioners’
lawsuit, because it sought to establish a different safety
standard—i. e., an airbag requirement—was expressly pre-
empted by a provision of the Act which pre-empts “any
safety standard” that is not identical to a federal safety
standard applicable to the same aspect of performance, 15
U. S. C. § 1392(d) (1988 ed.); Civ. No. 95–CV–0064 (D. D. C.,
Dec. 9, 1997), App. 17. (We, like the courts below and the
parties, refer to the pre-1994 version of the statute through-
out the opinion; it has been recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 30101
et seq.)
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s con-
clusion but on somewhat different reasoning. It had doubts,
given the existence of the Act’s “saving” clause, 15 U. S. C.
§ 1397(k) (1988 ed.), that petitioners’ lawsuit involved the po-

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866 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Opinion of the Court
tential creation of the kind of “safety standard” to which the
Safety Act’s express pre-emption provision refers. But it
declined to resolve that question because it found that peti-
tioners’ state-law tort claims posed an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of FMVSS 208’s objectives. For that reason, it
found that those claims conflicted with FMVSS 208, and that,
under ordinary pre-emption principles, the Act consequently
pre-empted the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals thus af-
firmed the District Court’s dismissal. 166 F. 3d 1236, 1238–
1243 (CADC 1999).
Several state courts have held to the contrary, namely, that
neither the Act’s express pre-emption nor FMVSS 208 pre-
empts a “no airbag” tort suit. See, e. g., Drattel v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 92 N. Y. 2d 35, 43–53, 699 N. E. 2d 376, 379–386
(1998); Minton v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 80 Ohio
St. 3d 62, 70–79, 684 N. E. 2d 648, 655–661 (1997); Munroe v.
Galati, 189 Ariz. 113, 115–119, 938 P. 2d 1114, 1116–1120
(1997); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N. E. 2d 327, 330–339 (Ind.
1995); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 140 N. H. 203, 206–207,
665 A. 2d 345, 347–348 (1995). All of the Federal Circuit
Courts that have considered the question, however, have
found pre-emption. One rested its conclusion on the Act’s
express pre-emption provision. See, e. g., Harris v. Ford
Motor Co., 110 F. 3d 1410, 1413–1415 (CA9 1997). Others,
such as the Court of Appeals below, have instead found pre-
emption under ordinary pre-emption principles by virtue of
the conflict such suits pose to FMVSS 208’s objectives, and
thus to the Act itself. See, e. g., Montag v. Honda Motor
Co., 75 F. 3d 1414, 1417 (CA10 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor
Co., 902 F. 2d 1116, 1121–1125 (CA3 1990); Taylor v. General
Motors Corp., 875 F. 2d 816, 825–827 (CA11 1989); Wood v.
General Motors Corp., 865 F. 2d 395, 412–414 (CA1 1988).
We granted certiorari to resolve these differences. We now
hold that this kind of “no airbag” lawsuit conflicts with the
objectives of FMVSS 208, a standard authorized by the Act,
and is therefore pre-empted by the Act.

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Opinion of the Court
In reaching our conclusion, we consider three subsidiary
questions. First, does the Act’s express pre-emption pro-
vision pre-empt this lawsuit? We think not. Second, do or-
dinary pre-emption principles nonetheless apply? We hold
that they do. Third, does this lawsuit actually conflict with
FMVSS 208, hence with the Act itself? We hold that it
does.
II
We first ask whether the Safety Act’s express pre-emption
provision pre-empts this tort action. The provision reads
as follows:
“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard es-
tablished under this subchapter is in effect, no State or
political subdivision of a State shall have any authority
either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect
to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equip-
ment[,] any safety standard applicable to the same as-
pect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment
which is not identical to the Federal standard.” 15
U. S. C. § 1392(d) (1988 ed.).
American Honda points out that a majority of this Court has
said that a somewhat similar statutory provision in a differ-
ent federal statute—a provision that uses the word “require-
ments”—may well expressly pre-empt similar tort actions.
See, e. g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 502–504
(1996) (plurality opinion); id., at 503–505 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 509–512
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Petitioners reply that this statute speaks of pre-empting a
state-law “safety standard,” not a “requirement,” and that a
tort action does not involve a safety standard. Hence, they
conclude, the express pre-emption provision does not apply.
We need not determine the precise significance of the use
of the word “standard,” rather than “requirement,” however,
for the Act contains another provision, which resolves the

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868 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Opinion of the Court
disagreement. That provision, a “saving” clause, says that
“[c]ompliance with” a federal safety standard “does not ex-
empt any person from any liability under common law.” 15
U. S. C. § 1397(k) (1988 ed.). The saving clause assumes that
there are some significant number of common-law liability
cases to save. And a reading of the express pre-emption
provision that excludes common-law tort actions gives actual
meaning to the saving clause’s literal language, while leaving
adequate room for state tort law to operate—for example,
where federal law creates only a floor, i. e., a minimum safety
standard. See, e. g., Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae 21 (explaining that common-law claim that a vehicle is
defectively designed because it lacks antilock brakes would
not be pre-empted by 49 CFR § 571.105 (1999), a safety
standard establishing minimum requirements for brake per-
formance). Without the saving clause, a broad reading of
the express pre-emption provision arguably might pre-empt
those actions, for, as we have just mentioned, it is possible
to read the pre-emption provision, standing alone, as apply-
ing to standards imposed in common-law tort actions, as well
as standards contained in state legislation or regulations.
And if so, it would pre-empt all nonidentical state standards
established in tort actions covering the same aspect of per-
formance as an applicable federal standard, even if the fed-
eral standard merely established a minimum standard. On
that broad reading of the pre-emption clause little, if any,
potential “liability at common law” would remain. And few,
if any, state tort actions would remain for the saving clause
to save. We have found no convincing indication that Con-
gress wanted to pre-empt, not only state statutes and regula-
tions, but also common-law tort actions, in such circum-
stances. Hence the broad reading cannot be correct. The
language of the pre-emption provision permits a narrow
reading that excludes common-law actions. Given the pres-
ence of the saving clause, we conclude that the pre-emption
clause must be so read.

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Opinion of the Court
III
We have just said that the saving clause at least removes
tort actions from the scope of the express pre-emption
clause. Does it do more? In particular, does it foreclose or
limit the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles insofar
as those principles instruct us to read statutes as pre-
empting state laws (including common-law rules) that “actu-
ally conflict” with the statute or federal standards promul-
gated thereunder? Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De
la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982). Petitioners concede, as
they must in light of Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S.
280 (1995), that the pre-emption provision, by itself, does not
foreclose (through negative implication) “any possibility of
implied [conflict] pre-emption,” id., at 288 (discussing Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 517–518 (1992)).
But they argue that the saving clause has that very effect.
We recognize that, when this Court previously considered
the pre-emptive effect of the statute’s language, it appeared
to leave open the question of how, or the extent to which,
the saving clause saves state-law tort actions that conflict
with federal regulations promulgated under the Act. See
Freightliner, supra, at 287, n. 3 (declining to address
whether the saving clause prevents a manufacturer from
“us[ing] a federal safety standard to immunize itself from
state common-law liability”). We now conclude that the sav-
ing clause (like the express pre-emption provision) does not
bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.
Nothing in the language of the saving clause suggests an
intent to save state-law tort actions that conflict with federal
regulations. The words “[c]ompliance” and “does not ex-
empt,” 15 U. S. C. § 1397(k) (1988 ed.), sound as if they simply
bar a special kind of defense, namely, a defense that compli-
ance with a federal standard automatically exempts a de-
fendant from state law, whether the Federal Government
meant that standard to be an absolute requirement or only a
minimum one. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

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870 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Opinion of the Court
Liability § 4(b), Comment e (1997) (distinguishing between
state-law compliance defense and a federal claim of pre-
emption). It is difficult to understand why Congress would
have insisted on a compliance-with-federal-regulation pre-
condition to the provision’s applicability had it wished the
Act to “save” all state-law tort actions, regardless of their
potential threat to the objectives of federal safety standards
promulgated under that Act. Nor does our interpretation
conflict with the purpose of the saving provision, say, by
rendering it ineffectual. As we have previously explained,
the saving provision still makes clear that the express
pre-emption provision does not of its own force pre-empt
common-law tort actions. And it thereby preserves those
actions that seek to establish greater safety than the mini-
mum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to pro-
vide a floor. See supra, at 867–868.
Moreover, this Court has repeatedly “decline[d] to give
broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset
the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law.”
United States v. Locke, ante, at 106–107; see American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524
U. S. 214, 227–228 (1998) (AT&T); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907). We find
this concern applicable in the present case. And we con-
clude that the saving clause foresees—it does not foreclose—
the possibility that a federal safety standard will pre-empt a
state common-law tort action with which it conflicts. We do
not understand the dissent to disagree, for it acknowledges
that ordinary pre-emption principles apply, at least some-
times. Post, at 899–900 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
Neither do we believe that the pre-emption provision, the
saving provision, or both together, create some kind of “spe-
cial burden” beyond that inherent in ordinary pre-emption
principles—which “special burden” would specially disfavor
pre-emption here. Cf. post, at 898–899. The two provi-
sions, read together, reflect a neutral policy, not a specially

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Opinion of the Court
favorable or unfavorable policy, toward the application of or-
dinary conflict pre-emption principles. On the one hand, the
pre-emption provision itself reflects a desire to subject the
industry to a single, uniform set of federal safety standards.
Its pre-emption of all state standards, even those that might
stand in harmony with federal law, suggests an intent to
avoid the conflict, uncertainty, cost, and occasional risk to
safety itself that too many different safety-standard cooks
might otherwise create. See H. R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1966) (“Basically, this preemption subsec-
tion is intended to result in uniformity of standards so that
the public as well as industry will be guided by one set of
criteria rather than by a multiplicity of diverse standards”);
S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1966). This policy
by itself favors pre-emption of state tort suits, for the rules
of law that judges and juries create or apply in such suits
may themselves similarly create uncertainty and even con-
flict, say, when different juries in different States reach dif-
ferent decisions on similar facts.
On the other hand, the saving clause reflects a congres-
sional determination that occasional nonuniformity is a small
price to pay for a system in which juries not only create, but
also enforce, safety standards, while simultaneously provid-
ing necessary compensation to victims. That policy by itself
disfavors pre-emption, at least some of the time. But we
can find nothing in any natural reading of the two provisions
that would favor one set of policies over the other where a
jury-imposed safety standard actually conflicts with a federal
safety standard.
Why, in any event, would Congress not have wanted ordi-
nary pre-emption principles to apply where an actual conflict
with a federal objective is at stake? Some such principle is
needed. In its absence, state law could impose legal duties
that would conflict directly with federal regulatory man-
dates, say, by premising liability upon the presence of the
very windshield retention requirements that federal law re-

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872 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Opinion of the Court
quires. See, e. g., 49 CFR § 571.212 (1999). Insofar as peti-
tioners’ argument would permit common-law actions that
“actually conflict” with federal regulations, it would take
from those who would enforce a federal law the very ability
to achieve the law’s congressionally mandated objectives that
the Constitution, through the operation of ordinary pre-
emption principles, seeks to protect. To the extent that
such an interpretation of the saving provision reads into a
particular federal law toleration of a conflict that those prin-
ciples would otherwise forbid, it permits that law to defeat
its own objectives, or potentially, as the Court has put it
before, to “ ‘destroy itself.’ ” AT&T, supra, at 228 (quoting
Abilene Cotton, supra, at 446). We do not claim that Con-
gress lacks the constitutional power to write a statute that
mandates such a complex type of state/federal relationship.
Cf. post, at 900, n. 16. But there is no reason to believe
Congress has done so here.
The dissent, as we have said, contends nonetheless that
the express pre-emption and saving provisions here, taken
together, create a “special burden,” which a court must im-
pose “on a party” who claims conflict pre-emption under
those principles. Post, at 898. But nothing in the Safety
Act’s language refers to any “special burden.” Nor can one
find the basis for a “special burden” in this Court’s prece-
dents. It is true that, in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U. S. 280 (1995), the Court said, in the context of interpreting
the Safety Act, that “[a]t best” there is an “inference that an
express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption.”
Id., at 289 (emphasis added). But the Court made this state-
ment in the course of rejecting the more absolute argument
that the presence of the express pre-emption provision en-
tirely foreclosed the possibility of conflict pre-emption. Id.,
at 288. The statement, headed with the qualifier “[a]t best,”
and made in a case where, without any need for inferences
or “special burdens,” state law obviously would survive, see
id., at 289–290, simply preserves a legal possibility. This

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Opinion of the Court
Court did not hold that the Safety Act does create a “special
burden,” or still less that such a burden necessarily arises
from the limits of an express pre-emption provision. And
considerations of language, purpose, and administrative
workability, together with the principles underlying this
Court’s pre-emption doctrine discussed above, make clear
that the express pre-emption provision imposes no unusual,
“special burden” against pre-emption. For similar reasons,
we do not see the basis for interpreting the saving clause to
impose any such burden.
A “special burden” would also promise practical difficulty
by further complicating well-established pre-emption princi-
ples that already are difficult to apply. The dissent does not
contend that this “special burden” would apply in a case in
which state law penalizes what federal law requires—i. e., a
case of impossibility. See post, at 892–893, n. 6, 900, n. 16.
But if it would not apply in such a case, then how, or when,
would it apply? This Court, when describing conflict pre-
emption, has spoken of pre-empting state law that “under
the circumstances of th[e] particular case . . . stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress”—whether that “obstacle”
goes by the name of “conflicting; contrary to; . . . repugnance;
difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtail-
ment; . . . interference,” or the like. Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U. S. 519, 526 (1977). The Court has not previously driven a
legal wedge—only a terminological one—between “conflicts”
that prevent or frustrate the accomplishment of a federal
objective and “conflicts” that make it “impossible” for pri-
vate parties to comply with both state and federal law.
Rather, it has said that both forms of conflicting state law
are “nullified” by the Supremacy Clause, De la Cuesta, 458
U. S., at 152–153; see Locke, ante, at 109; English v. General
Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 78–79 (1990), and it has assumed that
Congress would not want either kind of conflict. The Court

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has thus refused to read general “saving” provisions to toler-
ate actual conflict both in cases involving impossibility, see,
e. g., AT&T, 524 U. S., at 228, and in “frustration-of-purpose”
cases, see, e. g., Locke, ante, at 103–112; International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481, 493–494 (1987); see also Chi-
cago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 U. S. 311, 328–331 (1981). We see no grounds, then,
for attempting to distinguish among types of federal-state
conflict for purposes of analyzing whether such a conflict
warrants pre-emption in a particular case. That kind of
analysis, moreover, would engender legal uncertainty with
its inevitable systemwide costs (e. g., conflicts, delay, and
expense) as courts tried sensibly to distinguish among varie-
ties of “conflict” (which often shade, one into the other)
when applying this complicated rule to the many federal
statutes that contain some form of an express pre-emption
provision, a saving provision, or as here, both. Nothing in
the statute suggests Congress wanted to complicate ordinary
experience-proved principles of conflict pre-emption with an
added “special burden.” Indeed, the dissent’s willingness to
impose a “special burden” here stems ultimately from its
view that “frustration-of-purpos[e]” conflict pre-emption is a
freewheeling, “inadequately considered” doctrine that might
well be “eliminate[d].” Post, at 907–908, and n. 22. In a
word, ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded in long-
standing precedent, Hines, supra, at 67, apply. We would
not further complicate the law with complex new doctrine.
IV
The basic question, then, is whether a common-law “no
airbag” action like the one before us actually conflicts with
FMVSS 208. We hold that it does.
In petitioners’ and the dissent’s view, FMVSS 208 sets a
minimum airbag standard. As far as FMVSS 208 is con-
cerned, the more airbags, and the sooner, the better. But
that was not the Secretary’s view. The Department of

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Transportation’s (DOT’s) comments, which accompanied the
promulgation of FMVSS 208, make clear that the standard
deliberately provided the manufacturer with a range of
choices among different passive restraint devices. Those
choices would bring about a mix of different devices intro-
duced gradually over time; and FMVSS 208 would thereby
lower costs, overcome technical safety problems, encourage
technological development, and win widespread consumer
acceptance—all of which would promote FMVSS 208’s safety
objectives. See generally 49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (1984).
A
The history of FMVSS 208 helps explain why and how
DOT sought these objectives. See generally Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto-
mobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 34–38 (1983). In 1967, DOT,
understanding that seatbelts would save many lives, re-
quired manufacturers to install manual seatbelts in all auto-
mobiles. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415. It became apparent,
however, that most occupants simply would not buckle up
their belts. See 34 Fed. Reg. 11148 (1969). DOT then
began to investigate the feasibility of requiring “passive re-
straints,” such as airbags and automatic seatbelts. Ibid.
In 1970, it amended FMVSS 208 to include some passive pro-
tection requirements, 35 Fed. Reg. 16927, while making clear
that airbags were one of several “equally acceptable” devices
and that it neither “ ‘favored’ [n]or expected the introduction
of airbag systems.” Ibid. In 1971, it added an express pro-
vision permitting compliance through the use of nondetach-
able passive belts, 36 Fed. Reg. 12858, 12859, and in 1972, it
mandated full passive protection for all front seat occupants
for vehicles manufactured after August 15, 1975, 37 Fed.
Reg. 3911. Although the agency’s focus was originally on
airbags, 34 Fed. Reg. 11148 (1969) (notice of proposed rule-
making); State Farm, 463 U. S., at 35, n. 4; see also id., at 46,
n. 11 (noting view of commentators that, as of 1970, FMVSS

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208 was “ ‘a de facto airbag mandate’ ” because of the state
of passive restraint technology), at no point did FMVSS 208
formally require the use of airbags. From the start, as in
1984, it permitted passive restraint options.
DOT gave manufacturers a further choice for new vehicles
manufactured between 1972 and August 1975. Manufactur-
ers could either install a passive restraint device such as au-
tomatic seatbelts or airbags or retain manual belts and add
an “ignition interlock” device that in effect forced occupants
to buckle up by preventing the ignition otherwise from turn-
ing on. 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972). The interlock soon be-
came popular with manufacturers. And in 1974, when the
agency approved the use of detachable automatic seatbelts,
it conditioned that approval by providing that such systems
must include an interlock system and a continuous warning
buzzer to encourage reattachment of the belt. 39 Fed. Reg.
14593. But the interlock and buzzer devices were most un-
popular with the public. And Congress, responding to pub-
lic pressure, passed a law that forbade DOT from requiring,
or permitting compliance by means of, such devices. Motor
Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, § 109, 88
Stat. 1482 (previously codified at 15 U. S. C. § 1410b(b) (1988
ed.)).
That experience influenced DOT’s subsequent passive re-
straint initiatives. In 1976, DOT Secretary William T. Cole-
man, Jr., fearing continued public resistance, suspended the
passive restraint requirements. He sought to win public ac-
ceptance for a variety of passive restraint devices through a
demonstration project that would involve about half a million
new automobiles. State Farm, supra, at 37. But his suc-
cessor, Brock Adams, canceled the project, instead amending
FMVSS 208 to require passive restraints, principally either
airbags or passive seatbelts. 42 Fed. Reg. 34289 (1977).
Andrew Lewis, a new DOT Secretary in a new administra-
tion, rescinded the Adams requirements, primarily because
DOT learned that the industry planned to satisfy those

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requirements almost exclusively through the installation
of detachable automatic seatbelts. 46 Fed. Reg. 53419–
53420 (1981). This Court held the rescission unlawful.
State Farm, supra, at 34, 46. And the stage was set for
then-DOT Secretary, Elizabeth Dole, to amend FMVSS 208
once again, promulgating the version that is now before us.
49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (1984).
B
Read in light of this history, DOT’s own contemporaneous
explanation of FMVSS 208 makes clear that the 1984 version
of FMVSS 208 reflected the following significant considera-
tions. First, buckled up seatbelts are a vital ingredient of
automobile safety. Id., at 29003; State Farm, supra, at 52
(“We start with the accepted ground that if used, seatbelts
unquestionably would save many thousands of lives and
would prevent tens of thousands of crippling injuries”).
Second, despite the enormous and unnecessary risks that a
passenger runs by not buckling up manual lap and shoulder
belts, more than 80% of front seat passengers would leave
their manual seatbelts unbuckled. 49 Fed. Reg. 28983 (1984)
(estimating that only 12.5% of front seat passengers buckled
up manual belts). Third, airbags could make up for the dan-
gers caused by unbuckled manual belts, but they could not
make up for them entirely. Id., at 28986 (concluding that,
although an airbag plus a lap and shoulder belt was the most
“effective” system, airbags alone were less effective than
buckled up manual lap and shoulder belts).
Fourth, passive restraint systems had their own disadvan-
tages, for example, the dangers associated with, intru-
siveness of, and corresponding public dislike for, nondetach-
able automatic belts. Id., at 28992–28993. Fifth, airbags
brought with them their own special risks to safety, such
as the risk of danger to out-of-position occupants (usually
children) in small cars. Id., at 28992, 29001; see also 65
Fed. Reg. 30680, 30681–30682 (2000) (finding 158 confirmed
airbag-induced fatalities as of April 2000, and amending rule

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to add new requirements, test procedures, and injury criteria
to ensure that “future air bags be designed to create less
risk of serious airbag-induced injuries than current air bags,
particularly for small women and young children”); U. S.
Dept. of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, National Accident Sampling System Crash-
worthiness Data System 1991–1993, p. viii (Aug. 1995) (find-
ing that airbags caused approximately 54,000 injuries be-
tween 1991 and 1993).
Sixth, airbags were expected to be significantly more
expensive than other passive restraint devices, raising the
average cost of a vehicle price $320 for full frontal airbags
over the cost of a car with manual lap and shoulder seatbelts
(and potentially much more if production volumes were low).
49 Fed. Reg. 28990 (1984). And the agency worried that the
high replacement cost—estimated to be $800—could lead car
owners to refuse to replace them after deployment. Id., at
28990, 29000–29001; see also id., at 28990 (estimating total
investment costs for mandatory airbag requirement at $1.3
billion compared to $500 million for automatic seatbelts).
Seventh, the public, for reasons of cost, fear, or physical in-
trusiveness, might resist installation or use of any of the
then-available passive restraint devices, id., at 28987–
28989—a particular concern with respect to airbags, id., at
29001 (noting that “[a]irbags engendered the largest quantity
of, and most vociferously worded, comments”).
FMVSS 208 reflected these considerations in several ways.
Most importantly, that standard deliberately sought vari-
ety—a mix of several different passive restraint systems.
It did so by setting a performance requirement for passive
restraint devices and allowing manufacturers to choose
among different passive restraint mechanisms, such as air-
bags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint technologies
to satisfy that requirement. Id., at 28996. And DOT ex-
plained why FMVSS 208 sought the mix of devices that
it expected its performance standard to produce. Id., at

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28997. DOT wrote that it had rejected a proposed FMVSS
208 “all airbag” standard because of safety concerns (per-
ceived or real) associated with airbags, which concerns
threatened a “backlash” more easily overcome “if airbags”
were “not the only way of complying.” Id., at 29001. It
added that a mix of devices would help develop data on
comparative effectiveness, would allow the industry time to
overcome the safety problems and the high production costs
associated with airbags, and would facilitate the develop-
ment of alternative, cheaper, and safer passive restraint sys-
tems. Id., at 29001–29002. And it would thereby build
public confidence, id., at 29001–29002, necessary to avoid
another interlock-type fiasco.
The 1984 FMVSS 208 standard also deliberately sought a
gradual phase-in of passive restraints. Id., at 28999–29000.
It required the manufacturers to equip only 10% of their car
fleet manufactured after September 1, 1986, with passive re-
straints. Id., at 28999. It then increased the percentage in
three annual stages, up to 100% of the new car fleet for cars
manufactured after September 1, 1989. Ibid. And it ex-
plained that the phased-in requirement would allow more
time for manufacturers to develop airbags or other, better,
safer passive restraint systems. It would help develop in-
formation about the comparative effectiveness of different
systems, would lead to a mix in which airbags and other non-
seatbelt passive restraint systems played a more prominent
role than would otherwise result, and would promote public
acceptance. Id., at 29000–29001.
Of course, as the dissent points out, post, at 903, FMVSS
208 did not guarantee the mix by setting a ceiling for each
different passive restraint device. In fact, it provided a
form of extra credit for airbag installation (and other nonbelt
passive restraint devices) under which each airbag-installed
vehicle counted as 1.5 vehicles for purposes of meeting
FMVSS 208’s passive restraint requirement. 49 CFR
§ 571.208, S4.1.3.4(a)(1) (1999); 49 Fed. Reg. 29000 (1984).

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But why should DOT have bothered to impose an airbag ceil-
ing when the practical threat to the mix it desired arose from
the likelihood that manufacturers would install, not too many
airbags too quickly, but too few or none at all? After all,
only a few years earlier, Secretary Dole’s predecessor had
discovered that manufacturers intended to meet the then-
current passive restraint requirement almost entirely (more
than 99%) through the installation of more affordable auto-
matic belt systems. 46 Fed. Reg. 53421 (1981); State Farm,
463 U. S., at 38. The extra credit, as DOT explained, was
designed to “encourage manufacturers to equip at least some
of their cars with airbags.” 49 Fed. Reg. 29001 (1984) (em-
phasis added) (responding to comment that failure to man-
date airbags might mean the “end of . . . airbag technology”);
see also id., at 29000 (explaining that the extra credit for
airbags “should promote the development of what may be
better alternatives to automatic belts than would otherwise
be developed” (emphasis added)). The credit provision rein-
forces the point that FMVSS 208 sought a gradually develop-
ing mix of passive restraint devices; it does not show the
contrary.
Finally, FMVSS 208’s passive restraint requirement was
conditional. DOT believed that ordinary manual lap and
shoulder belts would produce about the same amount of
safety as passive restraints, and at significantly lower
costs—if only auto occupants would buckle up. See id., at
28997–28998. Thus, FMVSS 208 provided for rescission of
its passive restraint requirement if, by September 1, 1989,
two-thirds of the States had laws in place that, like those of
many other nations, required auto occupants to buckle up
(and which met other requirements specified in the stand-
ard). Id., at 28963, 28993–28994, 28997–28999. The Secre-
tary wrote that “coverage of a large percentage of the Amer-
ican people by seatbelt laws that are enforced would largely
negate the incremental increase in safety to be expected
from an automatic protection requirement.” Id., at 28997.

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In the end, two-thirds of the States did not enact mandatory
buckle-up laws, and the passive restraint requirement re-
mained in effect.
In sum, as DOT now tells us through the Solicitor General,
the 1984 version of FMVSS 208 “embodies the Secretary’s
policy judgment that safety would best be promoted if manu-
facturers installed alternative protection systems in their
fleets rather than one particular system in every car.” Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 25; see 49 Fed. Reg.
28997 (1984). Petitioners’ tort suit claims that the manufac-
turers of the 1987 Honda Accord “had a duty to design, man-
ufacture, distribute and sell a motor vehicle with an effective
and safe passive restraint system, including, but not limited
to, airbags.” App. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 11).
In effect, petitioners’ tort action depends upon its claim
that manufacturers had a duty to install an airbag when they
manufactured the 1987 Honda Accord. Such a state law—
i. e., a rule of state tort law imposing such a duty—by its
terms would have required manufacturers of all similar cars
to install airbags rather than other passive restraint sys-
tems, such as automatic belts or passive interiors. It
thereby would have presented an obstacle to the variety and
mix of devices that the federal regulation sought. It would
have required all manufacturers to have installed airbags in
respect to the entire District-of-Columbia-related portion of
their 1987 new car fleet, even though FMVSS 208 at that
time required only that 10% of a manufacturer’s nationwide
fleet be equipped with any passive restraint device at all. It
thereby also would have stood as an obstacle to the gradual
passive restraint phase-in that the federal regulation delib-
erately imposed. In addition, it could have made less likely
the adoption of a state mandatory buckle-up law. Because
the rule of law for which petitioners contend would have
stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of ” the important means-related federal objectives that we
have just discussed, it is pre-empted. Hines, 312 U. S., at

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67; see also Ouellette, 479 U. S., at 493; De la Cuesta, 458
U. S., at 156 (finding conflict and pre-emption where state
law limited the availability of an option that the fed-
eral agency considered essential to ensure its ultimate
objectives).
Petitioners ask this Court to calculate the precise size of
the “obstacle,” with the aim of minimizing it, by considering
the risk of tort liability and a successful tort action’s
incentive-related or timing-related compliance effects. See
Brief for Petitioners 45–50. The dissent agrees. Post, at
900–905. But this Court’s pre-emption cases do not ordi-
narily turn on such compliance-related considerations as
whether a private party in practice would ignore state legal
obligations—paying, say, a fine instead—or how likely it
is that state law actually would be enforced. Rather, this
Court’s pre-emption cases ordinarily assume compliance
with the state-law duty in question. The Court has on occa-
sion suggested that tort law may be somewhat different, and
that related considerations—for example, the ability to pay
damages instead of modifying one’s behavior—may be rele-
vant for pre-emption purposes. See Goodyear Atomic Corp.
v. Miller, 486 U. S. 174, 185 (1988); Cipollone, 505 U. S., at
536–539 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part, and dissenting in part); see also English,
496 U. S., at 86; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238,
256 (1984). In other cases, the Court has found tort law to
conflict with federal law without engaging in that kind of
an analysis. See, e. g., Ouellette, supra, at 494–497; Kalo
Brick, 450 U. S., at 324–332. We need not try to resolve
these differences here, however, for the incentive or compli-
ance considerations upon which the dissent relies cannot, by
themselves, change the legal result. Some of those consid-
erations rest on speculation, see, e. g., post, at 901 (predicting
risk of “no airbag” liability and manufacturers’ likely re-
sponse to such liability); some rest in critical part upon the
dissenters’ own view of FMVSS 208’s basic purposes—a view

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which we reject, see, e. g., post, at 901–904 (suggesting that
pre-existing risk of “no airbag” liability would have made
FMVSS 208 unnecessary); and others, if we understand them
correctly, seem less than persuasive, see, e. g., post, at 902
(suggesting that manufacturers could have complied with a
mandatory state airbag duty by installing a different kind of
passive restraint device). And in so concluding, we do not
“put the burden” of proving pre-emption on petitioners.
Post, at 907. We simply find unpersuasive their arguments
attempting to undermine the Government’s demonstration of
actual conflict.
One final point: We place some weight upon DOT’s inter-
pretation of FMVSS 208’s objectives and its conclusion, as
set forth in the Government’s brief, that a tort suit such as
this one would “ ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution’ ” of those objectives. Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 25–26 (quoting Hines, supra, at 67).
Congress has delegated to DOT authority to implement the
statute; the subject matter is technical; and the relevant
history and background are complex and extensive. The
agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own
regulation and its objectives and is “uniquely qualified” to
comprehend the likely impact of state requirements. Med-
tronic, 518 U. S., at 496; see id., at 506 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment). And DOT has
explained FMVSS 208’s objectives, and the interference that
“no airbag” suits pose thereto, consistently over time. Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae in Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, O. T. 1994, No. 94–286, pp. 28–29; Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae in Wood v. General Motors Corp.,
O. T. 1989, No. 89–46, pp. 7, 11–16. In these circumstances,
the agency’s own views should make a difference. See City
of New York v. FCC, 486 U. S. 57, 64 (1988); Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S.
707, 714, 721 (1985); De la Cuesta, supra, at 158; Blum v.
Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 141 (1982); Kalo Brick, supra, at 321.

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We have no reason to suspect that the Solicitor General’s
representation of DOT’s views reflects anything other than
“the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter.”
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461–462 (1997); cf. Hillsbor-
ough County, supra, at 721 (expressing reluctance, in the
absence of strong evidence, to find an actual conflict between
state law and federal regulation where agency that promul-
gated the regulation had not, at the time the regulation was
promulgated or subsequently, concluded that such a conflict
existed). The failure of the Federal Register to address
pre-emption explicitly is thus not determinative.
The dissent would require a formal agency statement of
pre-emptive intent as a prerequisite to concluding that a con-
flict exists. It relies on cases, or portions thereof, that did
not involve conflict pre-emption. See post, at 908–909; Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U. S. 572,
583 (1987); Hillsborough, supra, at 718. And conflict pre-
emption is different in that it turns on the identification of
“actual conflict,” and not on an express statement of pre-
emptive intent. English, supra, at 78–79; see Hillsbor-
ough, supra, at 720–721; Jones, 430 U. S., at 540–543. While
“[p]re-emption fundamentally is a question of congressional
intent,” English, supra, at 78, this Court traditionally distin-
guishes between “express” and “implied” pre-emptive intent,
and treats “conflict” pre-emption as an instance of the latter.
See, e. g., Freightliner, 514 U. S., at 287; English, supra, at
78–79; see also Cipollone, supra, at 545, 547–548 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). And
though the Court has looked for a specific statement of pre-
emptive intent where it is claimed that the mere “volume
and complexity” of agency regulations demonstrate an im-
plicit intent to displace all state law in a particular area,
Hillsborough, supra, at 717; see post, at 908–909, n. 23—
so-called “field pre-emption”—the Court has never before re-
quired a specific, formal agency statement identifying con-
flict in order to conclude that such a conflict in fact exists.

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Indeed, one can assume that Congress or an agency ordi-
narily would not intend to permit a significant conflict.
While we certainly accept the dissent’s basic position that a
court should not find pre-emption too readily in the absence
of clear evidence of a conflict, English, supra, at 90, for the
reasons set out above we find such evidence here. To insist
on a specific expression of agency intent to pre-empt, made
after notice-and-comment rulemaking, would be in certain
cases to tolerate conflicts that an agency, and therefore Con-
gress, is most unlikely to have intended. The dissent, as we
have said, apparently welcomes that result, at least where
“frustration-of-purpos[e]” pre-emption by agency regulation
is at issue. Post, at 907–908, and n. 22. We do not.
Nor do we agree with the dissent that the agency’s views,
as presented here, lack coherence. Post, at 904–905. The
dissent points, ibid., to language in the Government’s brief
stating that
“a claim that a manufacturer should have chosen to in-
stall airbags rather than another type of passive re-
straint in a certain model of car because of other design
features particular to that car . . . would not necessarily
frustrate Standard 208’s purposes.” Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 26, n. 23 (emphasis added).
And the dissent says that these words amount to a conces-
sion that there is no conflict in this very case. Post, at 905.
But that is not what the words say. Rather, as the italicized
phrase emphasizes, they simply leave open the question
whether FMVSS 208 would pre-empt a different kind of tort
case—one not at issue here. It is possible that some special
design-related circumstance concerning a particular kind of
car might require airbags, rather than automatic belts, and
that a suit seeking to impose that requirement could escape
pre-emption—say, because it would affect so few cars that
its rule of law would not create a legal “obstacle” to 208’s
mixed-fleet, gradual objective. But that is not what peti-

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886 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
tioners claimed. They have argued generally that, to be
safe, a car must have an airbag. See App. 4.
Regardless, the language of FMVSS 208 and the contem-
poraneous 1984 DOT explanation is clear enough—even
without giving DOT’s own view special weight. FMVSS
208 sought a gradually developing mix of alternative passive
restraint devices for safety-related reasons. The rule of
state tort law for which petitioners argue would stand as
an “obstacle” to the accomplishment of that objective. And
the statute foresees the application of ordinary principles
of pre-emption in cases of actual conflict. Hence, the tort
action is pre-empted.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
Airbag technology has been available to automobile manu-
facturers for over 30 years. There is now general agree-
ment on the proposition “that, to be safe, a car must have an
airbag.” Ante this page. Indeed, current federal law im-
poses that requirement on all automobile manufacturers.
See 49 U. S. C. § 30127; 49 CFR § 571.208, S4.1.5.3 (1998).
The question raised by petitioners’ common-law tort action
is whether that proposition was sufficiently obvious when
Honda’s 1987 Accord was manufactured to make the failure
to install such a safety feature actionable under theories of
negligence or defective design. The Court holds that an in-
terim regulation motivated by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion’s desire to foster gradual development of a variety of
passive restraint devices deprives state courts of jurisdiction
to answer that question. I respectfully dissent from that
holding, and especially from the Court’s unprecedented ex-
tension of the doctrine of pre-emption. As a preface to an
explanation of my understanding of the statute and the regu-
lation, these preliminary observations seem appropriate.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
“This is a case about federalism,” Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U. S. 722, 726 (1991), that is, about respect for “the con-
stitutional role of the States as sovereign entities.” Alden
v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 713 (1999). It raises important ques-
tions concerning the way in which the Federal Government
may exercise its undoubted power to oust state courts of
their traditional jurisdiction over common-law tort actions.
The rule the Court enforces today was not enacted by Con-
gress and is not to be found in the text of any Executive
Order or regulation. It has a unique origin: It is the prod-
uct of the Court’s interpretation of the final commentary ac-
companying an interim administrative regulation and the
history of airbag regulation generally. Like many other
judge-made rules, its contours are not precisely defined. I
believe, however, that it is fair to state that if it had been
expressly adopted by the Secretary of Transportation, it
would have read as follows:
“No state court shall entertain a common-law tort action
based on a claim that an automobile was negligently or
defectively designed because it was not equipped with
an airbag;
“Provided, however, that this rule shall not apply to cars
manufactured before September 1, 1986, or after such
time as the Secretary may require the installation of
airbags in all new cars; and
“Provided further, that this rule shall not preclude a
claim by a driver who was not wearing her seatbelt that
an automobile was negligently or defectively designed
because it was not equipped with any passive restraint
whatsoever, or a claim that an automobile with particu-
lar design features was negligently or defectively de-
signed because it was equipped with one type of passive
restraint instead of another.”
Perhaps such a rule would be a wise component of a legisla-
tive reform of our tort system. I express no opinion about

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888 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
that possibility. It is, however, quite clear to me that Con-
gress neither enacted any such rule itself nor authorized the
Secretary of Transportation to do so. It is equally clear to
me that the objectives that the Secretary intended to achieve
through the adoption of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stand-
ard 208 would not be frustrated one whit by allowing state
courts to determine whether in 1987 the lifesaving advan-
tages of airbags had become sufficiently obvious that their
omission might constitute a design defect in some new cars.
Finally, I submit that the Court is quite wrong to charac-
terize its rejection of the presumption against pre-emption,
and its reliance on history and regulatory commentary
rather than either statutory or regulatory text, as “ordi-
nary experience-proved principles of conflict pre-emption.”
Ante, at 874.
I
The question presented is whether either the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act or
Act), 80 Stat. 718, 15 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1988 ed.),1 or
the version of Standard 208 promulgated by the Secretary
of Transportation in 1984, 49 CFR § 571.208, S4.1.3–S4.1.4
(1998), pre-empts common-law tort claims that an automobile
manufactured in 1987 was negligently and defectively de-
signed because it lacked “an effective and safe passive re-
straint system, including, but not limited to, airbags.”
App. 3. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 34–38
(1983), we reviewed the first chapters of the “complex and
convoluted history” of Standard 208. It was the “unaccept-
ably high” rate of deaths and injuries caused by automobile
accidents that led to the enactment of the Safety Act in 1966.
Id., at 33. The purpose of the Act, as stated by Congress,
1 In 1994, the Safety Act was recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 30101 et seq.
Because the changes made to the Act as part of the recodification process
were not intended to be substantive, throughout this opinion I shall refer
to the pre-1994 version of the statute, as did the Court of Appeals.

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889 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
was “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to
persons resulting from traffic accidents.” 15 U. S. C. § 1381.
The Act directed the Secretary of Transportation or his dele-
gate to issue motor vehicle safety standards that “shall be
practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and
shall be stated in objective terms.” § 1392(a). The Act de-
fines the term “safety standard” as a “minimum standard
for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment
performance.” § 1391(2).
Standard 208 covers “[o]ccupant crash protection.” Its
purpose “is to reduce the number of deaths of vehicle occu-
pants, and the severity of injuries, by specifying vehicle
crashworthiness requirements . . . [and] equipment require-
ments for active and passive restraint systems.” 49 CFR
§ 571.208, S2 (1998). The first version of that standard, is-
sued in 1967, simply required the installation of manual seat-
belts in all automobiles. Two years later the Secretary for-
mally proposed a revision that would require the installation
of “passive occupant restraint systems,” that is to say, de-
vices that do not depend for their effectiveness on any action
by the vehicle occupant. The airbag is one such system.2
The Secretary’s proposal led to a series of amendments to
Standard 208 that imposed various passive restraint require-
ments, culminating in a 1977 regulation that mandated such
restraints in all cars by the model year 1984. The two com-
mercially available restraints that could satisfy this mandate
2 “The airbag is an inflatable device concealed in the dashboard and
steering column. It automatically inflates when a sensor indicates that
deceleration forces from an accident have exceeded a preset minimum,
then rapidly deflates to dissipate those forces. The lifesaving potential of
these devices was immediately recognized, and in 1977, after substantial
on-the-road experience with both devices, it was estimated by [the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)] that passive re-
straints could prevent approximately 12,000 deaths and over 100,000 seri-
ous injuries annually. 42 Fed. Reg. 34298.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn.
of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S.
29, 35 (1983).

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890 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
were airbags and automatic seatbelts; the regulation allowed
each vehicle manufacturer to choose which restraint to in-
stall. In 1981, however, following a change of administra-
tion, the new Secretary first extended the deadline for com-
pliance and then rescinded the passive restraint requirement
altogether. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn., we affirmed a de-
cision by the Court of Appeals holding that this rescission
was arbitrary. On remand, Secretary Elizabeth Dole pro-
mulgated the version of Standard 208 that is at issue in
this case.
The 1984 standard provided for a phase-in of passive re-
straint requirements beginning with the 1987 model year.
In that year, vehicle manufacturers were required to equip
a minimum of 10% of their new passenger cars with such
restraints. While the 1987 Honda Accord driven by Ms.
Geier was not so equipped, it is undisputed that Honda com-
plied with the 10% minimum by installing passive restraints
in certain other 1987 models. This minimum passive re-
straint requirement increased to 25% of 1988 models and 40%
of 1989 models; the standard also mandated that “after Sep-
tember 1, 1989, all new cars must have automatic occupant
crash protection.” 49 Fed. Reg. 28999 (1984); see 49 CFR
§ 571.208, S4.1.3–S4.1.4 (1998). In response to a 1991 amend-
ment to the Safety Act, the Secretary amended the standard
to require that, beginning in the 1998 model year, all new
cars have an airbag at both the driver’s and right front pas-
senger’s positions.3
Given that Secretary Dole promulgated the 1984 standard
in response to our opinion invalidating her predecessor’s re-
scission of the 1977 passive restraint requirement, she pro-
vided a full explanation for her decision not to require air-
3 See 49 U. S. C. § 30127; 49 CFR § 571.208, S4.1.5.3 (1998). Congress
stated that it did not intend its amendment or the Secretary’s consequent
alteration of Standard 208 to affect the potential liability of vehicle manu-
facturers under applicable law related to vehicles with or without airbags.
49 U. S. C. § 30127(f)(2).

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891 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
bags in all cars and to phase in the new requirements. The
initial 3-year delay was designed to give vehicle manufactur-
ers adequate time for compliance. The decision to give man-
ufacturers a choice between airbags and a different form of
passive restraint, such as an automatic seatbelt, was moti-
vated in part by safety concerns and in part by a desire not
to retard the development of more effective systems. 49
Fed. Reg. 29000–29001 (1984). An important safety concern
was the fear of a “public backlash” to an airbag mandate
that consumers might not fully understand. The Secretary
believed, however, that the use of airbags would avoid possi-
ble public objections to automatic seatbelts and that many of
the public concerns regarding airbags were unfounded. Id.,
at 28991.
Although the standard did not require airbags in all cars,
it is clear that the Secretary did intend to encourage wider
use of airbags. One of her basic conclusions was that “[a]u-
tomatic occupant protection systems that do not totally rely
upon belts, such as airbags . . . , offer significant additional
potential for preventing fatalities and injuries, at least in
part because the American public is likely to find them less
intrusive; their development and availability should be en-
couraged through appropriate incentives.” Id., at 28963; see
also id., at 28966, 28986 (noting conclusion of both Secretary
and manufacturers that airbags used in conjunction with
manual lap and shoulder belts would be “the most effective
system of all” for preventing fatalities and injuries). The
Secretary therefore included a phase-in period in order to
encourage manufacturers to comply with the standard by in-
stalling airbags and other (perhaps more effective) nonbelt
technologies that they might develop, rather than by install-
ing less expensive automatic seatbelts.4 As a further incen-
4 “If the Department had required full compliance by September 1, 1987,
it is very likely all of the manufacturers would have had to comply through
the use of automatic belts. Thus, by phasing-in the requirement, the De-
partment makes it easier for manufacturers to use other, perhaps better,

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892 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
tive for the use of such technologies, the standard provided
that a vehicle equipped with an airbag or other nonbelt sys-
tem would count as 1.5 vehicles for the purpose of determin-
ing compliance with the required 10, 25, or 40% minimum
passive restraint requirement during the phase-in period.
49 CFR § 571.208, S4.1.3.4(a)(1) (1998). With one oblique ex-
ception,5 there is no mention, either in the text of the final
standard or in the accompanying comments, of the possibility
that the risk of potential tort liability would provide an in-
centive for manufacturers to install airbags. Nor is there
any other specific evidence of an intent to preclude common-
law tort actions.
II
Before discussing the pre-emption issue, it is appropriate
to note that there is a vast difference between a rejection of
Honda’s threshold arguments in favor of federal pre-emption
and a conclusion that petitioners ultimately would prevail
on their common-law tort claims. I express no opinion on
the possible merit, or lack of merit, of those claims. I do
observe, however, that even though good-faith compliance
with the minimum requirements of Standard 208 would not
provide Honda with a complete defense on the merits,6 I as-
systems such as airbags and passive interiors.” 49 Fed. Reg. 29000
(1984).
5 In response to a comment that the manufacturers were likely to use
the cheapest system to comply with the new standard, the Secretary
stated that she believed “that competition, potential liability for any defi-
cient systems[,] and pride in one’s product would prevent this.” Ibid.
6 Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F. 2d 395, 417 (CA1 1988) (collect-
ing cases). The result would be different, of course, if petitioners had
brought common-law tort claims challenging Honda’s compliance with a
mandatory minimum federal standard—e. g., claims that a 1999 Honda was
negligently and defectively designed because it was equipped with airbags
as required by the current version of Standard 208. Restatement (Third)
of Torts: General Principles § 14(b), and Comment g (Discussion Draft,
Apr. 5, 1999) (“If the actor’s adoption [or rejection] of a precaution would
require the actor to violate a statute, the actor cannot be found negligent
for failing to adopt [or reject] that precaution”); cf. ante, at 871–872 (dis-

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893 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
sume that such compliance would be admissible evidence
tending to negate charges of negligent and defective design.7
In addition, if Honda were ultimately found liable, such com-
pliance would presumably weigh against an award of puni-
tive damages. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp.
566, 583–584 (WD Okla. 1979) (concluding that substantial
compliance with regulatory scheme did not bar award of pu-
nitive damages, but noting that “[g]ood faith belief in, and
efforts to comply with, all government regulations would be
evidence of conduct inconsistent with the mental state requi-
site for punitive damages” under state law).8
The parties have not called our attention to any appellate
court opinions discussing the merits of similar no-airbag
claims despite the fact that airbag technology was available
for many years before the promulgation of the 1984 stand-
ard—a standard that is not applicable to any automobiles
manufactured before September 1, 1986. Given that an ar-
guable basis for a pre-emption defense did not exist until
that standard was promulgated, it is reasonable to infer that
the manufacturers’ assessment of their potential liability for
compensatory and punitive damages on such claims—even
cussing problem of basing state tort liability upon compliance with manda-
tory federal regulatory requirement as question of pre-emption rather
than of liability on the merits); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142–143 (1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state
law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where
compliance with both federal [regulations and state tort law] is a physi-
cal impossibility . . .”).
7 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b), and Comment e
(1997); Contini v. Hyundai Motor Co., 840 F. Supp. 22, 23–24 (SDNY 1993).
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C, and Comment a (1964)
(negligence); McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins, 686 A. 2d 567, 577–579
(D. C. 1996) (strict liability).
8 The subsequent history of Silkwood does not cast doubt on this prem-
ise. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F. 2d 908, 921–923 (CA10
1981) (reversing on ground that federal law pre-empts award of punitive
damages), rev’d and remanded, 464 U. S. 238 (1984), on remand, 769 F. 2d
1451, 1457–1458 (CA10 1985).

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894 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
without any pre-emption defense—did not provide them
with a sufficient incentive to engage in widespread installa-
tion of airbags.
Turning to the subject of pre-emption, Honda contends
that the Safety Act’s pre-emption provision, 15 U. S. C.
§ 1392(d), expressly pre-empts petitioners’ common-law no-
airbag claims. It also argues that the claims are in any
event impliedly pre-empted because the imposition of liabil-
ity in cases such as this would frustrate the purposes
of Standard 208. I discuss these alternative arguments in
turn.
III
When a state statute, administrative rule, or common-law
cause of action conflicts with a federal statute, it is axiomatic
that the state law is without effect. U. S. Const., Art. VI,
cl. 2; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 516
(1992). On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Su-
premacy Clause does not give unelected federal judges carte
blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing their own
ideas of tort reform on the States.9 Because of the role of
States as separate sovereigns in our federal system, we have
long presumed that state laws—particularly those, such as
the provision of tort remedies to compensate for personal
injuries, that are within the scope of the States’ historic po-
lice powers—are not to be pre-empted by a federal statute
unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do
so. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996); Gade
v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88,
116–117 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“If the [federal] stat-
ute’s terms can be read sensibly not to have a pre-emptive
effect, the presumption controls and no pre-emption may be
inferred”).
9 Regrettably, the Court has not always honored the latter proposition
as scrupulously as the former. See, e. g., Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp., 487 U. S. 500 (1988).

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895 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
When a federal statute contains an express pre-emption
provision, “the task of statutory construction must in the
first instance focus on the plain wording of [that provision],
which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’
pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
U. S. 658, 664 (1993). The Safety Act contains both an ex-
press pre-emption provision, 15 U. S. C. § 1392(d), and a
saving clause that expressly preserves common-law claims,
§ 1397(k). The relevant part of the former provides:
“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard es-
tablished under this subchapter is in effect, no State or
political subdivision of a State shall have any authority
either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect
to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equip-
ment[,] any safety standard applicable to the same as-
pect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment
which is not identical to the Federal standard.” 10
The latter states:
“Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety
standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt
any person from any liability under common law.” 11
10 This provision is now codified at 49 U. S. C. § 30103(b)(1). Because
both federal and state opinions construing this provision have consistently
referred to it as “§ 1392(d),” I shall follow that practice. Section 1392(d)
contains these additional sentences: “Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued as preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which
is identical to a Federal safety standard. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any
State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety require-
ment applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured
for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of perform-
ance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal
standard.”
11 This provision is now codified at 49 U. S. C. § 30103(e). See nn. 1 and
10, supra.

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896 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
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Relying on § 1392(d) and legislative history discussing Con-
gress’ desire for uniform national safety standards,12 Honda
argues that petitioners’ common-law no-airbag claims are ex-
pressly pre-empted because success on those claims would
necessarily establish a state “safety standard” not identical
to Standard 208. It is perfectly clear, however, that the
term “safety standard” as used in these two sections refers
to an objective rule prescribed by a legislature or an admin-
istrative agency and does not encompass case-specific deci-
sions by judges and juries that resolve common-law claims.
That term is used three times in these sections; presumably
it is used consistently. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S.
561, 570 (1995). The two references to a federal safety
standard are necessarily describing an objective administra-
tive rule. 15 U. S. C. § 1392(a). When the pre-emption pro-
vision refers to a safety standard established by a “State or
political subdivision of a State,” therefore, it is most natu-
rally read to convey a similar meaning. In addition, when
the two sections are read together, they provide compelling
evidence of an intent to distinguish between legislative and
administrative rulemaking, on the one hand, and common-
law liability, on the other. This distinction was certainly a
rational one for Congress to draw in the Safety Act given
that common-law liability—unlike most legislative or admin-
istrative rulemaking—necessarily performs an important re-
medial role in compensating accident victims. Cf. Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 251, 256 (1984).
It is true that in three recent cases we concluded that
broadly phrased pre-emptive commands encompassed
common-law claims. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
while we thought it clear that the pre-emption provision in
the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
applied only to “rulemaking bodies,” 505 U. S., at 518, we
concluded that the broad command in the subsequent 1969
12 S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966); H. R. Rep. No. 1776,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1966).

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Stevens, J., dissenting
amendment that “[n]o requirement or prohibition . . . shall
be imposed under State law” did include certain common-law
claims. Id., at 548–549 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part).13 In CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Easterwood, where the pre-emption clause of the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970 expressly provided that federal
railroad safety regulations would pre-empt any incompatible
state “ ‘law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to
railroad safety,’ ” 14 we held that a federal regulation govern-
ing maximum train speed pre-empted a negligence claim that
a speed under the federal maximum was excessive. And in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, we recognized that the statutory
reference to “any requirement” imposed by a State or its
political subdivisions may include common-law duties. 518
U. S., at 502–503 (plurality opinion); id., at 503–505 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at
509–512 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
The statutes construed in those cases differed from the
Safety Act in two significant respects. First, the language
in each of those pre-emption provisions was significantly
broader than the text of § 1392(d). Unlike the broader lan-
guage of those provisions, the ordinary meaning of the term
“safety standard” includes positive enactments, but does not
include judicial decisions in common-law tort cases.
Second, the statutes at issue in Cipollone, CSX, and Med-
tronic did not contain a saving clause expressly preserving
common-law remedies. The saving clause in the Safety Act
13 The full text of the 1969 provision read: “ ‘No requirement or prohibi-
tion based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.’ ” 505
U. S., at 515 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 84
Stat. 88).
14 507 U. S., at 664 (quoting § 205, 84 Stat. 972, as amended, 45 U. S. C.
§ 434 (1988 ed. and Supp. II)).

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898 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
unambiguously expresses a decision by Congress that com-
pliance with a federal safety standard does not exempt a
manufacturer from any common-law liability. In light of
this reference to common-law liability in the saving clause,
Congress surely would have included a similar reference in
§ 1392(d) if it had intended to pre-empt such liability. Chi-
cago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U. S. 328, 338
(1994) (noting presumption that Congress acts intentionally
when it includes particular language in one section of a stat-
ute but omits it in another).
The Court does not disagree with this interpretation of the
term “safety standard” in § 1392(d). Because the meaning of
that term as used by Congress in this statute is clear, the
text of § 1392(d) is itself sufficient to establish that the Safety
Act does not expressly pre-empt common-law claims. In
order to avoid the conclusion that the saving clause is super-
fluous, therefore, it must follow that it has a different pur-
pose: to limit, or possibly to foreclose entirely, the possible
pre-emptive effect of safety standards promulgated by the
Secretary. The Court’s approach to the case has the practi-
cal effect of reading the saving clause out of the statute
altogether.15
Given the cumulative force of the fact that § 1392(d) does
not expressly pre-empt common-law claims and the fact that
§ 1397(k) was obviously intended to limit the pre-emptive ef-
fect of the Secretary’s safety standards, it is quite wrong for
the Court to assume that a possible implicit conflict with the
purposes to be achieved by such a standard should have the
same pre-emptive effect “ ‘as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’ ” Ante, at 873. Properly construed, the Safety
Act imposes a special burden on a party relying on an argu-
able, implicit conflict with a temporary regulatory policy—
15 The Court surely cannot believe that Congress included that clause in
the statute just to avoid the danger that we would otherwise fail to give
the term “safety standard” its ordinary meaning.

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899 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
rather than a conflict with congressional policy or with the
text of any regulation—to demonstrate that a common-law
claim has been pre-empted.
IV
Even though the Safety Act does not expressly pre-empt
common-law claims, Honda contends that Standard 208—of
its own force—implicitly pre-empts the claims in this case.
“We have recognized that a federal statute implicitly
overrides state law either when the scope of a statute
indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy
a field exclusively, English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S.
72, 78–79 (1990), or when state law is in actual conflict
with federal law. We have found implied conflict pre-
emption where it is ‘impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements,’ id.,
at 79, or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52, 67 (1941).” Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S.
280, 287 (1995).
In addition, we have concluded that regulations “intended to
pre-empt state law” that are promulgated by an agency act-
ing nonarbitrarily and within its congressionally delegated
authority may also have pre-emptive force. Fidelity Fed.
Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153–154
(1982). In this case, Honda relies on the last of the implied
pre-emption principles stated in Freightliner, arguing that
the imposition of common-law liability for failure to install
an airbag would frustrate the purposes and objectives of
Standard 208.
Both the text of the statute and the text of the standard
provide persuasive reasons for rejecting this argument.
The saving clause of the Safety Act arguably denies the Sec-
retary the authority to promulgate standards that would

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900 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
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pre-empt common-law remedies.16 Moreover, the text of
Standard 208 says nothing about pre-emption, and I am not
persuaded that Honda has overcome our traditional pre-
sumption that it lacks any implicit pre-emptive effect.
Honda argues, and the Court now agrees, that the risk of
liability presented by common-law claims that vehicles with-
out airbags are negligently and defectively designed would
frustrate the policy decision that the Secretary made in
promulgating Standard 208. This decision, in their view,
was that safety—including a desire to encourage “public ac-
ceptance of the airbag technology and experimentation with
better passive restraint systems” 17
—would best be promoted
16 The Court contends, in essence, that a saving clause cannot foreclose
implied conflict pre-emption. Ante, at 873–874. The cases it cites to
support that point, however, merely interpreted the language of the par-
ticular saving clauses at issue and concluded that those clauses did not
foreclose implied pre-emption; they do not establish that a saving clause
in a given statute cannot foreclose implied pre-emption based on frustra-
tion of that statute’s purposes, or even (more importantly for our present
purposes) that a saving clause in a given statute cannot deprive a regula-
tion issued pursuant to that statute of any implicit pre-emptive effect.
See United States v. Locke, ante, at 104–107; International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481, 493 (1987) (“Given that the Act itself does not
speak directly to the issue, the Court must be guided by the goals and
policies of the Act in determining whether it in fact pre-empts an action”);
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S.
311, 328, 331 (1981). As stated in the text, I believe the language of this
particular saving clause unquestionably limits, and possibly forecloses en-
tirely, the pre-emptive effect that safety standards promulgated by the
Secretary have on common-law remedies. See Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 374 (1986). Under that interpretation,
there is by definition no frustration of federal purposes—that is, no “toler-
at[ion of] actual conflict,” ante, at 874—when tort suits are allowed to go
forward. Thus, because there is a textual basis for concluding that Con-
gress intended to preserve the state law at issue, I think it entirely appro-
priate for the party favoring pre-emption to bear a special burden in at-
tempting to show that valid federal purposes would be frustrated if that
state law were not pre-empted.
17 166 F. 3d 1236, 1243 (CADC 1999).

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901 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
through gradual implementation of a passive restraint re-
quirement making airbags only one of a variety of systems
that a manufacturer could install in order to comply, rather
than through a requirement mandating the use of one partic-
ular system in every vehicle. In its brief supporting Honda,
the United States agreed with this submission. It argued
that if the manufacturers had known in 1984 that they might
later be held liable for failure to install airbags, that risk
“would likely have led them to install airbags in all cars,”
thereby frustrating the Secretary’s safety goals and interfer-
ing with the methods designed to achieve them. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 25.
There are at least three flaws in this argument that pro-
vide sufficient grounds for rejecting it. First, the entire ar-
gument is based on an unrealistic factual predicate. What-
ever the risk of liability on a no-airbag claim may have been
prior to the promulgation of the 1984 version of Standard
208, that risk did not lead any manufacturer to install airbags
in even a substantial portion of its cars. If there had been
a realistic likelihood that the risk of tort liability would have
that consequence, there would have been no need for Stand-
ard 208. The promulgation of that standard certainly did
not increase the pre-existing risk of liability. Even if the
standard did not create a previously unavailable pre-emption
defense, it likely reduced the manufacturers’ risk of liability
by enabling them to point to the regulation and their compli-
ance therewith as evidence tending to negate charges of neg-
ligent and defective design. See Part II, supra. Given
that the pre-1984 risk of liability did not lead to widespread
airbag installation, this reduced risk of liability was hardly
likely to compel manufacturers to install airbags in all cars—
or even to compel them to comply with Standard 208 during
the phase-in period by installing airbags exclusively.
Second, even if the manufacturers’ assessment of their risk
of liability ultimately proved to be wrong, the purposes of
Standard 208 would not be frustrated. In light of the inevi-

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902 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
table time interval between the eventual filing of a tort ac-
tion alleging that the failure to install an airbag is a design
defect and the possible resolution of such a claim against a
manufacturer, as well as the additional interval between
such a resolution (if any) and manufacturers’ “compliance
with the state-law duty in question,” ante, at 882, by modify-
ing their designs to avoid such liability in the future, it is
obvious that the phase-in period would have ended long be-
fore its purposes could have been frustrated by the specter
of tort liability. Thus, even without pre-emption, the public
would have been given the time that the Secretary deemed
necessary to gradually adjust to the increasing use of airbag
technology and allay their unfounded concerns about it.
Moreover, even if any no-airbag suits were ultimately re-
solved against manufacturers, the resulting incentive to
modify their designs would have been quite different from a
decision by the Secretary to mandate the use of airbags in
every vehicle. For example, if the extra credit provided for
the use of nonbelt passive restraint technologies during the
phase-in period had (as the Secretary hoped) ultimately en-
couraged manufacturers to develop a nonbelt system more
effective than the airbag, manufacturers held liable for fail-
ing to install passive restraints would have been free to re-
spond by modifying their designs to include such a system
instead of an airbag.18 It seems clear, therefore, that any
18 The Court’s failure to “understand [this point] correctly,” ante, at 883,
is directly attributable to its fundamental misconception of the nature of
duties imposed by tort law. A general verdict of liability in a case seeking
damages for negligent and defective design of a vehicle that (like Ms.
Geier’s) lacked any passive restraints does not amount to an immutable,
mandatory “rule of state tort law imposing . . . a duty [to install an air-
bag].” Ante, at 881; see also ante, at 871 (referring to verdict in common-
law tort suit as a “jury-imposed safety standard”). Rather, that verdict
merely reflects the jury’s judgment that the manufacturer of a vehicle
without any passive restraint system breached its duty of due care by
designing a product that was not reasonably safe because a reasonable
alternative design—“including, but not limited to, airbags,” App. 3—could

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903 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
potential tort liability would not frustrate the Secretary’s
desire to encourage both experimentation with better pas-
sive restraint systems and public acceptance of airbags.
Third, despite its acknowledgment that the saving clause
“preserves those actions that seek to establish greater safety
than the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation
intended to provide a floor,” ante, at 870, the Court com-
pletely ignores the important fact that by definition all of the
standards established under the Safety Act—like the British
regulations that governed the number and capacity of life-
boats aboard the Titanic 19 —impose minimum, rather than
fixed or maximum, requirements. 15 U. S. C. § 1391(2); see
Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Shanklin, ante, at 359 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (“[F]ederal minimum safety standards should
not pre-empt a state tort action”); Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 721
(1985). The phase-in program authorized by Standard 208
thus set minimum percentage requirements for the installa-
tion of passive restraints, increasing in annual stages of 10,
25, 40, and 100%. Those requirements were not ceilings,
and it is obvious that the Secretary favored a more rapid
increase. The possibility that exposure to potential tort lia-
have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product. See
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b), and Comment d
(1997); id., § 1, Comment a (noting that § 2(b) is rooted in concepts of both
negligence and strict liability). Such a verdict obviously does not fore-
close the possibility that more than one alternative design exists the use
of which would render the vehicle reasonably safe and satisfy the manufac-
turer’s duty of due care. Thus, the Court is quite wrong to suggest that,
as a consequence of such a verdict, only the installation of airbags would
enable manufacturers to avoid liability in the future.
19 Statutory Rules and Orders 1018–1021, 1033 (1908). See Nader &
Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with Federal Stand-
ards, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 415, 459 (1996) (noting that the Titanic “com-
plied with British governmental regulations setting minimum require-
ments for lifeboats when it left port on its final, fateful voyage with boats
capable of carrying only about [half] of the people on board”); W. Wade,
The Titanic: End of a Dream 68 (1986).

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904 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
bility might accelerate the rate of increase would actually
further the only goal explicitly mentioned in the standard
itself: reducing the number of deaths and severity of injuries
of vehicle occupants. Had gradualism been independently
important as a method of achieving the Secretary’s safety
goals, presumably the Secretary would have put a ceiling as
well as a floor on each annual increase in the required per-
centage of new passive restraint installations. For similar
reasons, it is evident that variety was not a matter of inde-
pendent importance to the Secretary. Although the stand-
ard allowed manufacturers to comply with the minimum per-
centage requirements by installing passive restraint systems
other than airbags (such as automatic seatbelts), it encour-
aged them to install airbags and other nonbelt systems that
might be developed in the future. The Secretary did not act
to ensure the use of a variety of passive restraints by placing
ceilings on the number of airbags that could be used in com-
plying with the minimum requirements.20 Moreover, even
if variety and gradualism had been independently important
to the Secretary, there is nothing in the standard, the accom-
panying commentary, or the history of airbag regulation to
support the notion that the Secretary intended to advance
those purposes at all costs, without regard to the detrimen-
tal consequences that pre-emption of tort liability could have
for the achievement of her avowed purpose of reducing ve-
hicular injuries. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U. S., at 257.
My disagreement with Honda and the Government runs
deeper than these flaws, however. In its brief, the Govern-
ment concedes that “[a] claim that a manufacturer should
have chosen to install airbags rather than another type of
20 Of course, allowing a suit like petitioners’ to proceed against a manu-
facturer that had installed no passive restraint system in a particular vehi-
cle would not even arguably pose an “obstacle” to the auto manufacturers’
freedom to choose among several different passive restraint device op-
tions. Cf. ante, at 878, 881.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
passive restraint in a certain model of car because of other
design features particular to that car . . . would not necessar-
ily frustrate Standard 208’s purposes.” Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 26, n. 23. 21 Petitioners’ claims
here are quite similar to the claim described by the Govern-
ment: their complaint discusses other design features partic-
ular to the 1987 Accord (such as the driver’s seat) that alleg-
edly rendered it unreasonably dangerous to operate without
an airbag. App. 4–5. The only distinction is that in this
case, the particular 1987 Accord driven by Ms. Geier included
no passive restraint of any kind because Honda chose to com-
ply with Standard 208’s 10% minimum requirement by in-
stalling passive restraints in other 1987 models. I fail to see
how this distinction makes a difference to the purposes of
Standard 208, however. If anything, the type of claim fa-
vored by the Government—e. g., that a particular model of
car should have contained an airbag instead of an automatic
seatbelt—would seem to trench even more severely upon the
purposes that the Government and Honda contend were be-
hind the promulgation of Standard 208: that having a variety
of passive restraints, rather than only airbags, was necessary
to promote safety. Thus, I conclude that the Government,
on the Secretary’s behalf, has failed to articulate a coherent
view of the policies behind Standard 208 that would be frus-
trated by petitioners’ claims.
V
For these reasons, it is evident that Honda has not crossed
the high threshold established by our decisions regarding
21 Compare ante, at 881 (disagreeing with Government’s view by con-
cluding that tort-law duty “requir[ing] manufacturers of all similar cars to
install airbags rather than other passive restraint systems . . . would [pre-
sent] an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regula-
tion sought”), with ante, at 883, 885 (noting that “the agency’s own views
should make a difference,” but contending that the above-quoted Govern-
ment view is “not at issue here”).

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906 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
pre-emption of state laws that allegedly frustrate federal
purposes: it has not demonstrated that allowing a common-
law no-airbag claim to go forward would impose an obligation
on manufacturers that directly and irreconcilably contradicts
any primary objective that the Secretary set forth with clar-
ity in Standard 208. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Man-
agement Assn., 505 U. S., at 110 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); id., at 111 (“A freewheel-
ing judicial inquiry into whether [state law] is in tension with
federal objectives would undercut the principle that it is
Congress [and federal agencies,] rather than the courts[,]
that pre-emp[t] state law”). Furthermore, it is important to
note that the text of Standard 208 (which the Court does not
even bother to quote in its opinion), unlike the regulation we
reviewed in Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta,
458 U. S., at 158, does not contain any expression of an intent
to displace state law. Given our repeated emphasis on the
importance of the presumption against pre-emption, see,
e. g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S., at 663–664;
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947),
this silence lends additional support to the conclusion that
the continuation of whatever common-law liability may exist
in a case like this poses no danger of frustrating any of the
Secretary’s primary purposes in promulgating Standard 208.
See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labora-
tories, Inc., 471 U. S., at 721; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U. S., at 251 (“It is difficult to believe that [the Secretary]
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial re-
course for those injured by illegal conduct”).
The Court apparently views the question of pre-emption
in this case as a close one. Ante, at 883 (relying on Secre-
tary’s interpretation of Standard 208’s objectives to bolster
its finding of pre-emption). Under “ordinary experience-
proved principles of conflict pre-emption,” ante, at 874,
therefore, the presumption against pre-emption should con-
trol. Instead, the Court simply ignores the presumption,

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907 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
preferring instead to put the burden on petitioners to show
that their tort claim would not frustrate the Secretary’s pur-
poses. Ante, at 882 (noting that petitioners’ arguments
“cannot, by themselves, change the legal result”). In view
of the important principles upon which the presumption is
founded, however, rejecting it in this manner is profoundly
unwise.
Our presumption against pre-emption is rooted in the
concept of federalism. It recognizes that when Congress
legislates “in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied . . . [,] we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S.,
at 230; see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525
(1977). The signal virtues of this presumption are its place-
ment of the power of pre-emption squarely in the hands of
Congress, which is far more suited than the Judiciary to
strike the appropriate state/federal balance (particularly in
areas of traditional state regulation), and its requirement
that Congress speak clearly when exercising that power. In
this way, the structural safeguards inherent in the normal
operation of the legislative process operate to defend state
interests from undue infringement. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 552 (1985);
see United States v. Morrison, ante, at 660–663 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62,
93–94 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce Termi-
nix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 292–293 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460–464
(1991). In addition, the presumption serves as a limiting
principle that prevents federal judges from running amok
with our potentially boundless (and perhaps inadequately
considered) doctrine of implied conflict pre-emption based on
frustration of purposes—i. e., that state law is pre-empted if
it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-

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908 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).22
While the presumption is important in assessing the pre-
emptive reach of federal statutes, it becomes crucial when
the pre-emptive effect of an administrative regulation is at
issue. Unlike Congress, administrative agencies are clearly
not designed to represent the interests of States, yet with
relative ease they can promulgate comprehensive and de-
tailed regulations that have broad pre-emption ramifications
for state law. We have addressed the heightened federalism
and nondelegation concerns that agency pre-emption raises
by using the presumption to build a procedural bridge across
the political accountability gap between States and adminis-
trative agencies. Thus, even in cases where implied regula-
tory pre-emption is at issue, we generally “expect an admin-
istrative regulation to declare any intention to pre-empt
state law with some specificity. ” 23 California Coastal
22 Recently, one commentator has argued that our doctrine of
frustration-of-purposes (or “obstacle”) pre-emption is not supported by the
text or history of the Supremacy Clause, and has suggested that we at-
tempt to bring a measure of rationality to our pre-emption jurisprudence
by eliminating it. Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 231–232 (2000)
(“Under the Supremacy Clause, preemption occurs if and only if state law
contradicts a valid rule established by federal law, and the mere fact that
the federal law serves certain purposes does not automatically mean that
it contradicts everything that might get in the way of those purposes”).
Obviously, if we were to do so, there would be much less need for the
presumption against pre-emption (which the commentator also criticizes).
As matters now stand, however, the presumption reduces the risk that
federal judges will draw too deeply on malleable and politically unaccount-
able sources such as regulatory history in finding pre-emption based on
frustration of purposes.
23 The Court brushes aside our specificity requirement on the ground
that the cases in which we relied upon it were not cases of implied conflict
pre-emption. Ante, at 884. The Court is quite correct that Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707 (1985),
and California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U. S. 572 (1987),
are cases in which field pre-emption, rather than conflict pre-emption, was
at issue. This distinction, however, does not take the Court as far as it

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909 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U. S. 572, 583 (1987); see
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., 471 U. S., at 717–718 (noting that too easily implying
pre-emption “would be inconsistent with the federal-state
balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence,”
and stating that “because agencies normally address prob-
lems in a detailed manner and can speak through a variety
of means, including regulations, preambles, interpretive
statements, and responses to comments, we can expect that
they will make their intentions clear if they intend for their
regulations to be exclusive”); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 154 (noting that pre-
emption inquiry is initiated “[w]hen the administrator pro-
mulgates regulations intended to pre-empt state law”).
This expectation, which is shared by the Executive Branch,24
serves to ensure that States will be able to have a dialog
would like. Our cases firmly establish that conflict and field pre-emption
are alike in that both are instances of implied pre-emption that by defini-
tion do “not [turn] on an express statement of pre-emptive intent.” Ante,
at 884; see, e. g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S. 280, 287 (1995)
(quoted supra, at 899); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79–80,
and n. 5 (1990) (noting that field pre-emption rests on an inference of
congressional intent to exclude state regulation and that it “may be un-
derstood as a species of conflict pre-emption”); Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982). Given that our
specificity requirement was adopted in cases involving implied pre-
emption, the Court cannot persuasively claim that the requirement is in-
compatible with our implied pre-emption jurisprudence in the federal reg-
ulatory context.
24 See Exec. Order No. 12612, § 4(e), 3 CFR 252, 255 (1988) (“When an
Executive department or agency proposes to act through adjudication or
rule-making to preempt State law, the department or agency shall provide
all affected States notice and an opportunity for appropriate participation
in the proceedings”); Exec. Order No. 13132, § 4(e), 64 Fed. Reg. 43255,
43257 (1999) (same); cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 496 (1996)
(discussing 21 CFR § 808.5 (1995), an FDA regulation allowing a State
to request an advisory opinion regarding whether a particular state-law
requirement is pre-empted, or exempt from pre-emption, under the Medi-
cal Device Amendments of 1976).

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910 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
with agencies regarding pre-emption decisions ex ante
through the normal notice-and-comment procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 553.
When the presumption and its underpinnings are properly
understood, it is plain that Honda has not overcome the pre-
sumption in this case. Neither Standard 208 nor its accom-
panying commentary includes the slightest specific indication
of an intent to pre-empt common-law no-airbag suits. In-
deed, the only mention of such suits in the commentary tends
to suggest that they would not be pre-empted. See n. 5,
supra. In the Court’s view, however, “[t]he failure of the
Federal Register to address pre-emption explicitly is . . . not
determinative,” ante, at 884, because the Secretary’s consist-
ent litigating position since 1989, the history of airbag regu-
lation, and the commentary accompanying the final version
of Standard 208 reveal purposes and objectives of the Secre-
tary that would be frustrated by no-airbag suits. Pre-
empting on these three bases blatantly contradicts the pre-
sumption against pre-emption. When the 1984 version of
Standard 208 was under consideration, the States obviously
were not afforded any notice that purposes might someday
be discerned in the history of airbag regulation that would
support pre-emption. Nor does the Court claim that the no-
tice of proposed rulemaking that led to Standard 208 pro-
vided the States with notice either that the final version of
the standard might contain an express pre-emption provision
or that the commentary accompanying it might contain a
statement of purposes with arguable pre-emptive effect.
Finally, the States plainly had no opportunity to comment
upon either the commentary accompanying the final version
of the standard or the Secretary’s ex post litigating position
that the standard had implicit pre-emptive effect.
Furthermore, the Court identifies no case in which we
have upheld a regulatory claim of frustration-of-purposes im-
plied conflict pre-emption based on nothing more than an
ex post administrative litigating position and inferences from

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911 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
regulatory history and final commentary. The latter two
sources are even more malleable than legislative history.
Thus, when snippets from them are combined with the
Court’s broad conception of a doctrine of frustration-of-
purposes pre-emption untempered by the presumption, a
vast, undefined area of state law becomes vulnerable to pre-
emption by any related federal law or regulation. In my
view, however, “preemption analysis is, or at least should
be, a matter of precise statutory [or regulatory] construction
rather than an exercise in free-form judicial policymaking.”
1 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6–28, p. 1177 (3d
ed. 2000).
As to the Secretary’s litigating position, it is clear that “an
interpretation contained in a [legal brief], not one arrived
at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking[,] . . . do[es] not warrant Chevron-style
deference.” Christensen v. Harris County, ante, at 587.
Moreover, our pre-emption precedents and the APA estab-
lish that even if the Secretary’s litigating position were co-
herent, the lesser deference paid to it by the Court today
would be inappropriate. Given the Secretary’s contention
that he has the authority to promulgate safety standards
that pre-empt state law and the fact that he could promul-
gate a standard such as the one quoted supra, at 887, with
relative ease, we should be quite reluctant to find pre-
emption based only on the Secretary’s informal effort to re-
cast the 1984 version of Standard 208 into a pre-emptive
mold.25 See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
25 The cases cited by the Court, ante, at 883, are not to the contrary. In
City of New York v. FCC, 486 U. S. 57 (1988), for example, we were faced
with Federal Communications Commission regulations that explicitly “re-
affirmed the Commission’s established policy of pre-empting local regula-
tion of technical signal quality standards for cable television.” Id., at 62,
65. It was only in determining whether the issuance of such regulations
was a proper exercise of the authority delegated to the agency by Con-
gress that we afforded a measure of deference to the agency’s interpreta-
tion of that authority, as formally expressed through its explicitly pre-

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912 GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Stevens, J., dissenting
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S., at 721; cf. Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U. S., at 512 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“It is not certain that an agency reg-
ulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any federal
statute is entitled to deference”); Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 743–744 (1996). Requiring
the Secretary to put his pre-emptive position through for-
mal notice-and-comment rulemaking—whether contempora-
neously with the promulgation of the allegedly pre-emptive
regulation or at any later time that the need for pre-emption
becomes apparent 26 —respects both the federalism and non-
delegation principles that underlie the presumption against
pre-emption in the regulatory context and the APA’s
requirement of new rulemaking when an agency substan-
tially modifies its interpretation of a regulation. 5 U. S. C.
§ 551(5); Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D. C. Arena
L. P., 117 F. 3d 579, 586 (CADC 1997); National Family
Planning & Reproductive Health Assn. v. Sullivan, 979
F. 2d 227, 240 (CADC 1992).
* * *
Because neither the text of the statute nor the text of the
regulation contains any indication of an intent to pre-empt
emptive regulations. Id., at 64; see also Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 700–705 (1984) (regulation); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 158–159 (regulation); Blum v. Bacon,
457 U. S. 132, 141–142 (1982) (Action Transmittal by Social Security Ad-
ministration); Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile
Co., 450 U. S., at 327 (order of Interstate Commerce Commission); United
States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 377 (1961) (regulation). I express no opin-
ion on whether any deference would be appropriate in any of these situa-
tions, but merely observe that such situations are not presented here.
26 Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471
U. S., at 721 (noting that agency “can be expected to monitor, on a continu-
ing basis, the effects on the federal program of local requirements” and to
promulgate regulations pre-empting local law that imperils the goals of
that program).

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913 Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
petitioners’ cause of action, and because I cannot agree with
the Court’s unprecedented use of inferences from regulatory
history and commentary as a basis for implied pre-emption,
I am convinced that Honda has not overcome the presump-
tion against pre-emption in this case. I therefore respect-
fully dissent.

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The next page is purposely numbered 1001. The numbers between 913
and 1001 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita-
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.