JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

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694 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 99–5153. Argued February 22, 2000—Decided May 15, 2000
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with
supervised release overseen by the sentencing court. If release con-
ditions are violated, that court may “revoke [the] release, and require
the person to serve in prison all or part of the [supervised release]
term . . . without credit for time previously served on postrelease
supervision . . . .” 18 U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3). In March 1994, the District
Court sentenced petitioner Johnson to imprisonment followed by a term
of supervised release. After beginning supervised release in 1995,
Johnson violated two conditions of his release. The District Court re-
voked his release and ordered him to serve an 18-month prison term to
be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The
court cited no authority for ordering additional supervised release, but,
under Circuit law, it might have relied on 18 U. S. C. § 3583(h), a subsec-
tion added to the statute in 1994, which explicitly gave district courts
that power. Johnson appealed, arguing that § 3583(e)(3) did not give
the district courts power to order a new supervised release term follow-
ing reimprisonment, and that applying § 3583(h) to him violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Although the Sixth Circuit had previously taken
the same position as Johnson with regard to § 3583(e)(3), it affirmed his
sentence, reasoning that § 3583(h)’s application was not retroactive
because revocation of supervised release was punishment for John-
son’s violation of his release conditions, which occurred after the 1994
amendments.
Held:
1. Section 3583(h) does not apply retroactively, so no ex post facto
issue arises in this case. To prevail on his ex post facto claim, Johnson
must show, inter alia, that the law operates retroactively. Contrary to
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, postrevocation penalties are attributable
to the original conviction, not to defendants’ new offenses for violating
their supervised release conditions. Thus, to sentence Johnson under
§ 3583(h) would be to apply that section retroactively. However, absent
a clear statement of congressional intent, § 3583(h) applies only to cases
in which the initial offense occurred after the amendment’s effective
date, September 13, 1994. The Government offers nothing indicating a
contrary intent. The decision to alter § 3583(e)(3)’s supervised release

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Syllabus
rule does not reveal when or how that legislative decision was intended
to take effect; and the omission of an express effective date simply indi-
cates that, absent clear congressional direction, it takes effect on its
enactment date, Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 404. Nor
did Congress expressly identify the relevant conduct in a way that
would point to retroactive intent. Thus, this case turns not on an ex
post facto question, but on whether § 3583(e)(3) permitted imposition of
supervised release following a recommitment. Pp. 699–703.
2. Section 3583(e)(3), at the time of Johnson’s conviction, gave the Dis-
trict Court the authority to reimpose supervised release. Subsection
(e)(3) does not speak directly to this question. And if the Court were
to concentrate exclusively on the verb “revoke,” it would not detect any
suggestion that reincarceration might be followed by another supervised
release term, for the conventional understanding of “revoke” is to annul
by recalling or taking back. However, there are textual reasons to
think that the option of further supervised release was intended. Sub-
section (e)(1) unequivocally “terminate[s]” a supervised release term
without the possibility of its reimposition or continuation at a later time.
Had Congress likewise meant subsection (3) to conclude any possibility
of supervised release later, it would have been natural for Congress to
write in like terms. That it chose “revoke” rather than “terminate”
left the door open to a reading of subsection (3) that would not preclude
further supervised release. The pre-1994 version of subsection (3) pro-
vided that a court could revoke a term of supervised release and require
the person to serve in prison all or part of the “term of supervised
release.” This indicates that a revoked supervised release term contin-
ues to have some effect. If it could be served in prison, then the bal-
ance of it should remain effective when the reincarceration is over.
This interpretation means that Congress used “revoke” in an unconven-
tional way. However, the unconventional sense is not unheard of, for
“revoke” can also mean to call or summon back without the implication
of annulment. There is nothing surprising about the consequences of
this reading. It also serves the congressional policy of providing for
supervised release after incarceration in order to improve the odds of a
successful transition from prison to liberty, and no prisoner would seem
to need it more than one who has tried liberty and failed. This reading
is also supported by pre-Sentencing-Guidelines parole practice. Con-
gress repeatedly used “revoke” in providing for the consequences of
parole violations, and there seems never to have been a question that a
new parole term could follow a prison sentence imposed after revocation
of an initial parole term. Since parole revocation followed by reincar-
ceration was not a mere termination of a limited liberty that a defendant
could experience only once per conviction, it is fair to suppose that,

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696 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
absent some textual bar, revocation of parole’s replacement, supervised
release, was meant to leave open the possibility of further supervised
release, as well. “Revoke” is no such bar, and the Court finds no
other. Pp. 703–713.
181 F. 3d 105, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and
in which Kennedy, J., joined in part. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in part, post, p. 713. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 715. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 715.
Rita C. LaLumia argued the cause for petitioner. With
her on the briefs were Leah J. Prewitt, David F. Ness, Jef-
frey T. Green, and Joseph S. Miller.
Paul R. Q. Wolfson argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Wax-
man, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, Deputy Solici-
tor General Dreeben, and Richard A. Friedman.*
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case grows out of an Ex Post Facto
Clause challenge to the retroactive application of 18 U. S. C.
§ 3583(h), which authorizes a district court to impose an addi-
tional term of supervised release following the reimprison-
ment of those who violate the conditions of an initial term.
The United States argues that district courts had the power
to do so under the prior law, and that this cures any ex post
facto problems. We agree with the Government as to the
interpretation of prior law, and we find that consideration of
the Ex Post Facto Clause is unnecessary.
I
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat.
1999, Congress eliminated most forms of parole in favor of
*Edward M. Chikofsky and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae
urging reversal.

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supervised release, a form of postconfinement monitoring
overseen by the sentencing court, rather than the Parole
Commission. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S.
395, 400–401 (1991). The sentencing court was authorized
to impose a term of supervised release to follow imprison-
ment, with the maximum length of the term varying accord-
ing to the severity of the initial offense. See 18 U. S. C.
§§ 3583(a), (b). While on supervised release, the offender
was required to abide by certain conditions, some speci-
fied by statute and some imposable at the court’s discretion.
See § 3583(d). Upon violation of a condition, 18 U. S. C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V) authorized the court to “re-
voke a term of supervised release, and require the person to
serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release
without credit for time previously served on post-release
supervision . . . .” 1 Such was done here.
In October 1993, petitioner Cornell Johnson violated 18
U. S. C. § 1029(b)(2), a Class D felony. In March 1994, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ten-
nessee sentenced him to 25 months’ imprisonment, to be fol-
lowed by three years of supervised release, the maximum
term available under § 3583(b) for a Class D felony. Johnson
was released from prison on August 14, 1995, having re-
ceived good-conduct credits, and began serving his 3-year
term of supervised release. Some seven months into that
term, he was arrested in Virginia and later convicted of four
state forgery-related offenses. He was thus found to have
violated one of the conditions of supervised release made
mandatory by § 3583(d), that he not commit another crime
during his term of supervised release, and one imposed by
the District Court, that he not leave the judicial district
without permission.
1 The current version of § 3583(e)(3) reads slightly differently, but
for reasons discussed below, we focus on the law in effect at the time of
Johnson’s initial crime.

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The District Court revoked Johnson’s supervised release,
imposed a prison term of 18 months, and ordered Johnson
placed on supervised release for 12 months following im-
prisonment. App. 40–41. For this last order, the District
Court did not identify the source of its authority, though
under Circuit law it might have relied on § 3583(h), a subsec-
tion added to the statute in 1994, see Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 110505(2)(B), 108 Stat.
2017. Subsection (h) explicitly gave district courts the
power to impose another term of supervised release follow-
ing imprisonment, a power not readily apparent from the
text of § 3583(e)(3) (set out infra, at 704).
Johnson appealed his sentence, arguing that § 3583(e)(3)
gave district courts no such power and that applying
§ 3583(h) to him violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution, Art. I, § 9. The Sixth Circuit, joining the ma-
jority of the Federal Courts of Appeals, had earlier taken
Johnson’s position as far as the interpretation of § 3583(e)(3)
was concerned, holding that it did not authorize a district
court to impose a new term of supervised release following
revocation and reimprisonment. See United States v.
Truss, 4 F. 3d 437 (CA6 1993).2 It nonetheless affirmed the
District Court, judgt. order reported at 181 F. 3d 105 (1999),
reasoning that the application of § 3583(h) was not retroac-
tive at all, since revocation of supervised release was punish-
ment for Johnson’s violation of the conditions of supervised
2 Of the 11 Circuits to consider the issue, 9 had reached this conclusion.
See, e. g., United States v. Koehler, 973 F. 2d 132 (CA2 1992); United States
v. Malesic, 18 F. 3d 205 (CA3 1994); United States v. Cooper, 962 F. 2d 339
(CA4 1992); United States v. Holmes, 954 F. 2d 270 (CA5 1992); United
States v. Truss, 4 F. 3d 437 (CA6 1993); United States v. McGee, 981 F. 2d
271 (CA7 1992); United States v. Behnezhad, 907 F. 2d 896 (CA9 1990);
United States v. Rockwell, 984 F. 2d 1112 (CA10 1993); United States v.
Tatum, 998 F. 2d 893 (CA11 1993). Two, the First and the Eighth, found
that § 3583(e)(3) did grant district courts such power. See United States
v. O’Neil, 11 F. 3d 292 (CA1 1993); United States v. Schrader, 973 F. 2d
623 (CA8 1992).

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release, which occurred after the 1994 amendments. With
no retroactivity, there could be no Ex Post Facto Clause vio-
lation. See App. 49 (citing United States v. Abbington, 144
F. 3d 1003, 1005 (CA6), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 933 (1998)).
Other Circuits had held to the contrary, that revocation and
reimprisonment were punishment for the original offense.
From that perspective, application of § 3583(h) was retro-
active and at odds with the Ex Post Facto Clause. 3 We
granted certiorari to resolve the conflicts, 528 U. S. 950
(1999), and now affirm.
II
The heart of the Ex Post Facto Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I,
§ 9, bars application of a law “that changes the punishment,
and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to
the crime, when committed . . . .” Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall.
386, 390 (1798) (emphasis deleted). To prevail on this sort
of ex post facto claim, Johnson must show both that the law
he challenges operates retroactively (that it applies to con-
duct completed before its enactment) and that it raises the
penalty from whatever the law provided when he acted.
See California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S.
499, 506–507, n. 3 (1995).
A
The Sixth Circuit, as mentioned earlier, disposed of the
ex post facto challenge by applying its earlier cases holding
the application of § 3583(h) not retroactive at all: revocation
3 See, e. g., United States v. Eske, 189 F. 3d 536, 539 (CA7 1999); United
States v. Lominac, 144 F. 3d 308, 312 (CA4 1998); United States v. Dozier,
119 F. 3d 239, 241 (CA3 1997); United States v. Collins, 118 F. 3d 1394,
1397 (CA9 1997); United States v. Meeks, 25 F. 3d 1117, 1124 (CA2 1994)
(addressing § 3583(g)). In contrast to these cases, the First and Eighth
Circuits, relying on their broader construction of § 3583(e)(3), concluded
that application of § 3583(h) did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See
United States v. Sandoval, 69 F. 3d 531 (CA1 1995) (unpublished), cert.
denied, 519 U. S. 821 (1996); United States v. St. John, 92 F. 3d 761 (CA8
1996).

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of supervised release “imposes punishment for defendants’
new offenses for violating the conditions of their supervised
release.” United States v. Page, 131 F. 3d 1173, 1176 (1997).
On this theory, that is, if the violation of the conditions of
supervised release occurred after the enactment of § 3583(h),
as Johnson’s did, the new law could be given effect without
applying it to events before its enactment.
While this understanding of revocation of supervised re-
lease has some intuitive appeal, the Government disavows it,
and wisely so in view of the serious constitutional questions
that would be raised by construing revocation and reimpris-
onment as punishment for the violation of the conditions of
supervised release. Although such violations often lead to
reimprisonment, the violative conduct need not be criminal
and need only be found by a judge under a preponderance of
the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. See 18 U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
Where the acts of violation are criminal in their own right,
they may be the basis for separate prosecution, which would
raise an issue of double jeopardy if the revocation of super-
vised release were also punishment for the same offense.
Treating postrevocation sanctions as part of the penalty for
the initial offense, however (as most courts have done),
avoids these difficulties. See, e. g., United States v. Wyatt,
102 F. 3d 241, 244–245 (CA7 1996) (rejecting double jeopardy
challenge on ground that sanctions for violating the condi-
tions of supervised release are part of the original sentence);
United States v. Beals, 87 F. 3d 854, 859–860 (CA7 1996) (not-
ing that punishment for noncriminal violations must be justi-
fied by reference to original crimes), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Withers, 128 F. 3d 1167 (1997);
United States v. Meeks, 25 F. 3d 1117, 1123 (CA2 1994) (not-
ing absence of constitutional procedural protections in revo-
cation proceedings). Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778,
782 (1973) (“Probation revocation . . . is not a stage of a crimi-

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nal prosecution”). For that matter, such treatment is all but
entailed by our summary affirmance of Greenfield v. Scafati,
277 F. Supp. 644 (Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), summarily
aff ’d, 390 U. S. 713 (1968), in which a three-judge panel for-
bade on ex post facto grounds the application of a Massachu-
setts statute imposing sanctions for violation of parole to
a prisoner originally sentenced before its enactment. We
therefore attribute postrevocation penalties to the original
conviction.
B
Since postrevocation penalties relate to the original of-
fense, to sentence Johnson to a further term of supervised
release under § 3583(h) would be to apply this section retro-
actively (and to raise the remaining ex post facto question,
whether that application makes him worse off). But before
any such application (and constitutional test), there is a ques-
tion that neither party addresses. The Ex Post Facto
Clause raises to the constitutional level one of the most basic
presumptions of our law: legislation, especially of the crimi-
nal sort, is not to be applied retroactively. See, e. g., Lynce
v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 439 (1997); Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265 (1994). Quite independent of
the question whether the Ex Post Facto Clause bars retro-
active application of § 3583(h), then, there is the question
whether Congress intended such application. Absent a
clear statement of that intent, we do not give retroactive
effect to statutes burdening private interests. See id., at
270.
The Government offers nothing indicating congressional
intent to apply § 3583(h) retroactively. The legislative deci-
sion to alter the rule of law established by the majority
interpretation of § 3583(e)(3) (no authority for supervised
release after revocation and reimprisonment) does not, by
itself, tell us when or how that legislative decision was
intended to take effect. See Rivers v. Roadway Express,

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Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 304–307 (1994). Neither is there any in-
dication of retroactive purpose in the omission of an express
effective date from the statute. The omission simply remits
us to the general rule that when a statute has no effective
date, “absent a clear direction by Congress to the contrary,
[it] takes effect on the date of its enactment.” Gozlon-
Peretz, 498 U. S., at 404. 4
Nor, finally, has Congress given us anything expressly
identifying the relevant conduct in a way that would point
to retroactive intent. It may well be that Congress, like the
Sixth Circuit, believed that § 3583(h) would naturally govern
sentencing proceedings for violations of supervised release
that took place after the statute’s enactment, simply because
the violation was the occasion for imposing the sanctions.5
But Congress gave us no clear indication to this effect, and
we have already rejected that theory; the relevant conduct
is the initial offense. In sum, there being no contrary intent,
our longstanding presumption directs that § 3583(h) applies
only to cases in which that initial offense occurred after the
effective date of the amendment, September 13, 1994.
Given this conclusion, the case does not turn on whether
Johnson is worse off under § 3583(h) than he previously was
under § 3583(e)(3), as subsection (h) does not apply, and the
ex post facto question does not arise. The case turns, in-
4 Indeed, the Sentencing Guidelines identify the effective date of
§ 3583(h) as September 13, 1994. United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3, comment., n. 2 (Nov. 1998) (USSG). So, too,
have the federal courts. See, e. g., United States v. Hale, 107 F. 3d 526,
529, n. 3 (CA7 1997).
5 The failure to specify an effective date evidences at least arguable
diffidence on this point. Another section of the same Act that added
§ 3583(h) amended 18 U. S. C. § 3553 to limit the applicability of some statu-
tory minimum sentences. See § 80001, 108 Stat. 1985. That amendment,
the section made explicit, “shall apply to all sentences imposed on or after
the 10th day beginning after the date of enactment of this Act.”
§ 80001(c), 108 Stat. 1986.

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stead, simply on whether § 3583(e)(3) permitted imposition of
supervised release following a recommitment.6
III
Section 3583(e), at the time of Johnson’s conviction, author-
ized a district court to
“(1) terminate a term of supervised release and dis-
charge the person released at any time after the expira-
tion of one year of supervised release, pursuant to the
provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
relating to the modification of probation, if it is satisfied
that such action is warranted by the conduct of the per-
son released and the interest of justice;
“(2) extend a term of supervised release if less than
the maximum authorized term was previously imposed,
and . . . modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of su-
pervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or
termination of the term of supervised release, pursuant
to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure relating to the modification of probation and the
provisions applicable to the initial setting of the terms
and conditions of post-release supervision;
6 We took a similar approach in Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508
U. S. 10 (1993). The respondents in that case were private developers
who had entered into contracts with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. When the Department sought to recalibrate pay-
ments it owed under the contracts, the developers sued, and the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the Department’s proposed method of calculating pay-
ments was prohibited by the contracts. Congress subsequently passed
legislation explicitly authorizing that method of calculation. The develop-
ers resisted application of that legislation to their contracts on the grounds
that it retroactively deprived them of vested contractual rights, in viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause. We ruled (disagreeing with the Ninth
Circuit’s earlier holding) that the Department’s methodology was accept-
able under the contracts as signed. Finding the governmental action per-
mitted by the old law, we declined to consider the constitutional conse-
quences of a legislative attempt to change the applicable law.

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“(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and require
the person to serve in prison all or part of the term of
supervised release without credit for the time pre-
viously served on postrelease supervision, if it finds by
a preponderance of the evidence that the person violated
a condition of supervised release, pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that
are applicable to probation revocation and to the provi-
sions of applicable policy statements issued by the Sen-
tencing Commission . . . .”
The text of subsection (e)(3) does not speak directly to the
question whether a district court revoking a term of super-
vised release in favor of reimprisonment may require service
of a further term of supervised release following the further
incarceration. And if we were to concentrate exclusively on
the verb “revoke,” we would not detect any suggestion that
the reincarceration might be followed by another term of
supervised release, the conventional understanding of “re-
voke” being simply “to annul by recalling or taking back.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1944 (1981).
There are reasons, nonetheless, to think that the option of
further supervised release was intended.
First, there are some textual reasons, starting with the
preceding subsection (e)(1). This is an unequivocal provi-
sion for ending the term of supervised release without the
possibility of its reimposition or continuation at a later time.
Congress wrote that when a court finds that a defendant’s
conduct and the interests of justice warrant it, the court may
“terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the
person released,” once at least a year of release time has
been served. If application of subsection (3) had likewise
been meant to conclude any possibility of supervised release
later, it would have been natural for Congress to write in
like terms. It could have provided that upon finding a de-
fendant in violation of the release conditions the court could
“terminate a term of supervised release” and order the de-

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fendant incarcerated for a term as long as the original super-
vised release term. But that is not what Congress did. In-
stead of using “terminate” with the sense of finality just
illustrated in subsection (1), Congress used the verb “re-
voke” and so at the least left the door open to a reading of
subsection (3) that would not preclude further supervised
release after the initial revocation.7 In fact, the phrasing of
subsection (3) did more than just leave the door open to the
nonpreclusive reading.
As it was written before the 1994 amendments, subsection
(3) did not provide (as it now does) that the court could re-
voke the release term and require service of a prison term
equal to the maximum authorized length of a term of super-
vised release. It provided, rather, that the court could “re-
voke a term of supervised release, and require the person
to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised
release . . . .” So far as the text is concerned, it is not a
“term of imprisonment” that is to be served, but all or part
of “the term of supervised release.” But if “the term of
supervised release” is being served, in whole or part, in
prison, then something about the term of supervised release
survives the preceding order of revocation. While this
sounds very metaphysical, the metaphysics make one thing
clear: unlike a “terminated” order of supervised release, one
7 The dissent offers an erudite explanation of the different senses of the
two words, intending to demonstrate that Congress displayed “an admira-
bly precise use of language,” by using “revoke” to mean “annul” and “ter-
minate” to indicate that “[t]he supervised release is treated as fulfilled,
and the sentence is complete.” Post, at 717 (opinion of Scalia, J.). That
is virtuoso lexicography, but it shows only that English is rich enough to
give even textualists room for creative readings. This one encounters
serious difficulties; the very same section of the statute (as in effect at the
time of Johnson’s offense) provides that if the person released is found in
possession of a controlled substance, “the court shall terminate the term
of supervised release and require the defendant to serve in prison not less
than one-third of the term of supervised release.” 18 U. S. C. § 3583(g)
(1988 ed.).

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that is “revoked” continues to have some effect. And since
it continues in some sense after revocation even when part
of it is served in prison, why can the balance of it not remain
effective as a term of supervised release when the reincar-
ceration is over? 8
Without more, we would have to admit that Congress had
used “revoke” in an unconventional way in subsection (3),
but it turns out that the unconventional sense is not unheard
of. See United States v. O’Neil, 11 F. 3d 292, 295–296 (CA1
1993). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (our
edition of which was issued three years before the 1984 Act)
reveals that “revoke” can mean “to call or summon back,”
without the implication (here) that no further supervised re-
lease is subsequently possible. It gives “recall” as a syn-
onym and comments that “RECALL in this sense indicates
a calling back, suspending, or abrogating, either finally as
erroneous or ill-advised or tentatively for deliberation . . . .”
Ibid.9 The unconventional dictionary definition is not, of
8 Justice Scalia, post, at 721, thinks the “term” survives only as a
measure of duration, but of course the statute does not read “require the
person to serve a term in prison equal to all or part of the term of super-
vised release . . . .”
9 While this sense is of course less common, the most recent editions of
the most authoritative dictionaries do not tag it as rare or obsolete. The
Oxford English Dictionary gives five examples of this usage, albeit hardly
recent ones: three are drawn from the late 16th century and the most
recent from 1784. 13 Oxford English Dictionary 838 (2d ed. 1989). But
the OED is unabashedly antiquarian; of its examples for the more common
meaning of “revoke,” the most recent dates from 1873. Ibid. Webster’s,
it should be noted, includes the less common meaning, without antiquarian
reproach, in its third edition. Webster’s Third New International Dic-
tionary 1944 (1981).
As Justice Scalia remarks, in relying on an uncommon sense of the
word, we are departing from the rule of construction that prefers ordinary
meaning, see post, at 715. But this is exactly what ought to happen when
the ordinary meaning fails to fit the text and when the realization of clear
congressional policy (here, favoring the ability to impose supervised re-
lease) is in tension with the result that customary interpretive rules would
deliver. See, e. g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 571 (1965) (rec-
ognizing “some ‘scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or

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707 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
course, dispositive (although the emphasis placed upon it by
Justice Scalia might suggest otherwise, see post, at 718–
719). What it does do, however, is to soften the strangeness
of Congress’s unconventional sense of “revoke” as allowing a
“revoked” term of supervised release to retain vitality after
revocation. It shows that saying a “revoked” term of super-
vised release survives to be served in prison following the
court’s reconsideration of it is consistent with a secondary
but recognized definition, and so is saying that any balance
not served in prison may survive to be served out as super-
vised release.
A final textually based point is that the result of recogniz-
ing Congress’s unconventional usage of “revoke” is far less
remarkable even than the unconventional usage. Let us
suppose that Congress had legislated in language that un-
usual meaning of its words where acceptance of that meaning . . . would
thwart the obvious purpose of the statute’ ”) (quoting Helvering v. Ham-
mel, 311 U. S. 504, 510–511 (1941); In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 667 (1897)
(“[N]othing is better settled, than that statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possi-
ble, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion”). When text implies
that a word is used in a secondary sense and clear legislative purpose is
at stake, Justice Scalia’s cocktail-party textualism, post, at 718, must
yield to the Congress of the United States. (Not that we consider usage
at a cocktail party a very sound general criterion of statutory meaning: a
few nips from the flask might actually explain the solecism of the dissent’s
gunner who “revoked” his bird dog, post, at 719–720, n. 4; in sober mo-
ments he would know that dogs cannot be revoked, even though sentenc-
ing orders can be. His mistake, in any case, tells us nothing about how
Congress may have used “revoke” in the statute. The gunner’s error is,
as Justice Scalia notes, one of current usage. (It is not merely that we
do not “revoke” dogs in a “literal” sense today, as Justice Scalia puts it;
we do not revoke them at all.) The question before us, however, is one
of definition as distinct from usage: when Congress employed the modern
usage in providing that a term of supervised release could be revoked,
was it employing the most modern meaning of the term “revoke”? Usage
can be a guide but not a master in answering a question of meaning like
this one. Justice Scalia’s argument from the current unacceptability of
the dog and ox examples thus jeopardizes sound statutory construction
rather more severely than his sportsman ever threatened a bird.)

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708 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
equivocally supported the dissent, by writing subsection (3)
to provide that the judge could “revoke” or “terminate” the
term of supervised release and sentence the defendant to a
further term of incarceration. There is no reason to think
that under that regime the court would lack the power to
impose a subsequent term of supervised release in accord-
ance with its general sentencing authority under 18 U. S. C.
§ 3583(a). This section provides that “[t]he court, in impos-
ing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or
a misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a
requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of su-
pervised release after imprisonment . . . .” Thus, on the
dissent’s reading, when Johnson’s supervised release was
revoked and he was committed to prison, the District Court
“impos[ed] a sentence to a term of imprisonment.” See,
e. g., App. 36, 39. And that sentence was, as already noted,
imposed for his initial offense, the Class D felony violation of
§ 1029(b)(2). See supra, at 699–701. Nor would it be mere
formalism to link the second prison sentence to the initial
offense; the gravity of the initial offense determines the max-
imum term of reimprisonment, see § 3583(e)(3), just as it con-
trols the maximum term of supervised release in the initial
sentencing, see § 3583(b). Since on the dissent’s understand-
ing the resentencing proceeding would fall literally and sen-
sibly within the terms of § 3583(a), a plain meaning approach
would find authority for reimposition of supervised release
there. Cf. United States v. Wesley, 81 F. 3d 482, 483–484
(CA4 1996) (finding that § 3583(a) grants power to impose a
term of supervised release following reimprisonment at re-
sentencing for violation of probation).
There is, then, nothing surprising about the consequences
of our reading. The reading also enjoys the virtue of serv-
ing the evident congressional purpose. The congressional
policy in providing for a term of supervised release after
incarceration is to improve the odds of a successful transition

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709 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
from the prison to liberty. See, e. g., United States v. John-
son, ante, at 59 (“Congress intended supervised release to
assist individuals in their transition to community life. Su-
pervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from
those served by incarceration”). The Senate Report was
quite explicit about this, stating that the goal of supervised
release is “to ease the defendant’s transition into the commu-
nity after the service of a long prison term for a particularly
serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant
who has spent a fairly short period in prison for punish-
ment or other purposes but still needs supervision and
training programs after release.” S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 124
(1983).
Prisoners may, of course, vary in the degree of help needed
for successful reintegration. Supervised release departed
from the parole system it replaced by giving district courts
the freedom to provide postrelease supervision for those, and
only those, who needed it. See id., at 125 (“In effect, the
term of supervised release provided by the bill takes the
place of parole supervision under current law. Unlike cur-
rent law, however, probation officers will only be supervising
those releasees from prison who actually need supervision,
and every releasee who does need supervision will receive
it”). Congress aimed, then, to use the district courts’ discre-
tionary judgment to allocate supervision to those releasees
who needed it most. But forbidding the reimposition of su-
pervised release after revocation and reimprisonment would
be fundamentally contrary to that scheme. A violation of
the terms of supervised release tends to confirm the judg-
ment that help was necessary, and if any prisoner might
profit from the decompression stage of supervised release,
no prisoner needs it more than one who has already tried
liberty and failed. He is the problem case among problem
cases, and a Congress asserting that “every releasee who
does need supervision will receive it,” ibid., seems very un-

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710 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
likely to have meant to compel the courts to wash their hands
of the worst cases at the end of reimprisonment.10
The idea that a sentencing court should have authority to
subject a reincarcerated prisoner to further supervised re-
lease has support, moreover, in the pre-Guidelines practice
with respect to nondetentive monitoring, as illuminated in
United States v. O’Neil, 11 F. 3d 292 (CA1 1993). The Sen-
tencing Guidelines, after all, “represent an approach that be-
gins with, and builds upon,” pre-Guidelines law, see USSG,
ch. 1, pt. A, intro. comment. 3, and when a new legal regime
develops out of an identifiable predecessor, it is reasonable
to look to the precursor in fathoming the new law. Cf. INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 432–434 (1987) (examining
practice under precursor statute to determine meaning of
amended statute).
Two sorts of nondetentive monitoring existed before the
introduction of supervised release: probation and parole. Of
these pre-Guidelines options, the one more closely analogous
10 Justice Scalia attributes the strong preference for supervised re-
lease at the conclusion of a prison term to this Court, post, at 724, when
that view of penal policy comes not from the Court but from Congress.
The point is crucial. Our obligation is to give effect to congressional pur-
pose so long as the congressional language does not itself bar that result.
See, e. g., Holloway v. United States, 526 U. S. 1, 9 (1999) (noting that
statutory language should be interpreted in light of congressional policy);
Caron v. United States, 524 U. S. 308, 315 (1998) (rejecting petitioner’s
reading of a statute because it “yields results contrary to a likely, and
rational, congressional policy”). One who believes that courts must not
look beyond text might well find any invocation of policy unjustified (even
willful), at least when the policy does not rise unbidden from the words of
the statute, but we have never treated the text as such a jealous guide
and have traditionally sought to construe a statute so as to reach results
consistent with what Chief Justice Taney called “its object and policy.”
See United States v. Heirs of Boisdore´, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849). And in
what Chief Justice Marshall called the attempt “to discover the design of
the legislature,” we have “seize[d] every thing from which aid can be de-
rived.” United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805).

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711 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
to supervised release following imprisonment was parole,
which by definition was a release under supervision of a pa-
role officer following service of some term of incarceration.
Courts have commented on the similarity. See, e. g., Meeks,
25 F. 3d, at 1121 (“[S]upervised release is essentially similar
to parole”); United States v. Paskow, 11 F. 3d 873, 881 (CA9
1993) (“Supervised release and parole are virtually identical
systems”).
In thinking about this case, it is striking that the provi-
sions of the former parole scheme dealing with the conse-
quences of violating parole conditions repeatedly used the
verb “revoke.” See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 4214(d)(5) (1982 ed.)
(repealed 1984, Pub. L. 98–473, §§ 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat.
2027, 2031) (revocation of parole); 21 U. S. C. § 841(c) (1982
ed.) (repealed 1984) (revocation of special parole). And yet
there seems never to have been a question that a new term
of parole could follow a prison sentence imposed after revo-
cation of an initial parole term.11 See, e. g., 28 CFR § 2.52(b)
11 The same is true of special parole, part of the required sentence for
certain drug offenses. Though the special parole statute did not explicitly
authorize reimposition of special parole after revocation of the initial term
and reimprisonment, the Parole Commission required it. See 28 CFR
§ 2.57(c) (1999). Some courts have recently decided that this regulation is
inconsistent with 21 U. S. C. § 841(c) (1982 ed.), see, e. g., Evans v. United
States Parole Comm’n, 78 F. 3d 262 (CA7 1996), but this does not affect
the backdrop against which Congress legislated in 1984.
As for probation, the sentencing court’s power to order a new term
following revocation was the subject of some disagreement. The pre-
Guidelines statute authorized the court to “revoke the probation and . . .
impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.” 18
U. S. C. § 3653 (1982 ed.) (repealed). The statute thus clearly specified
that the options for postrevocation sentencing were those available at the
original sentencing; courts disputed only whether probation was a “sen-
tence” that could be imposed. See O’Neil, 11 F. 3d, at 298–299 (collecting
cases). The dispute over what counted as a sentence does not affect the
broader point that a court’s powers at the original sentencing are the
baseline from which powers at resentencing are determined. Nor is our

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712 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
(1999) (following revocation of parole, Sentencing Commis-
sion will determine whether reparole is warranted); O’Neil,
supra, at 299; United States Parole Comm’n v. Williams, 54
F. 3d 820, 824 (CADC 1995) (noting “the established pre-
Guidelines sentencing principle that parole is available un-
less expressly precluded” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).12 Thus, “revocation” of parole followed by
further imprisonment was not a mere termination of a lim-
ited liberty that a defendant could experience only once per
conviction, and it is fair to suppose that in the absence of any
textual bar “revocation” of parole’s replacement, supervised
release, was meant to leave open the possibility of further
supervised release, as well.
As seen already, “revoke” is no such bar, and we find no
other. The proceeding that follows a violation of the condi-
tions of supervised release is not, to be sure, a precise reen-
actment of the initial sentencing. Section 3583(e)(3) limits
the possible prison term to the duration of the term of super-
vised release originally imposed. (If less than the maximum
has been imposed, a court presumably may, before revoking
the term, extend it pursuant to § 3583(e)(2); this would allow
the term of imprisonment to equal the term of supervised
release authorized for the initial offense.) The new prison
term is limited further according to the gravity of the origi-
nal offense. See § 3583(e)(3). But nothing in these specific
analysis of supervised release drawn into question by the fact that courts
could not, for violations of probation, impose imprisonment followed by
probation. Probation, unlike supervised release, was an alternative to im-
prisonment. Courts did not have the power to impose both at the original
sentencing, so their inability to do so at subsequent sentencings is no
surprise.
12 The dissent seems to misconstrue our discussion of pre-Guidelines
practice, see post, at 724–726, claiming that the practice is unilluminating
because the possibility of parole inhered in any prison sentence. But our
point simply is that, metaphysics aside, Congress gave no indication that
it thought supervised release after reincarceration would be less valuable
than reparole after reincarceration had been.

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713 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Kennedy, J., concurring in part
provisions suggests that the possibility of supervised release
following imprisonment was meant to be eliminated.13
In sum, from a purely textual perspective, the more plau-
sible reading of § 3583(e)(3) before its amendment and the
addition of subsection (h) leaves open the possibility of su-
pervised release after reincarceration. Pre-Guidelines prac-
tice, linguistic continuity from the old scheme to the current
one, and the obvious thrust of congressional sentencing pol-
icy confirm that, in applying the law as before the enactment
of subsection (h), district courts have the authority to order
terms of supervised release following reimprisonment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit is
Affirmed.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in part.
The Court holds that 18 U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3), as it stood
before the amendment adding what is now subsection (h),
permits a trial court to impose further incarceration followed
by a period of supervised release after revoking an earlier
supervised release because the conditions were violated. In
my view this is the correct result. The subsection permits
a court to “require [a] person to serve in prison all or part
of the term of supervised release” originally imposed. 18
U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V). This indicates that
after the right to be on supervised release has been revoked
there is yet an unexpired term of supervised release that can
be allocated, in the court’s discretion, in whole or in part
to confinement and to release on such terms and conditions
13 Nor does our traditional rule of lenity in interpreting criminal statutes
demand a contrary result. Lenity applies only when the equipoise of com-
peting reasons cannot otherwise be resolved (not the case here), and in
any event the rule of lenity would be Delphic in this case. There is simply
no way to tell whether sentencing courts given the option of supervised
release will generally be more or less lenient in fixing the second prison
sentence.

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714 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Kennedy, J., concurring in part
as the court specifies. This was the convincing analysis
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
reaching the same conclusion, and it suffices to resolve the
case. See United States v. O’Neil, 11 F. 3d 292 (1993). The
analysis, moreover, is no less fair than Justice Scalia’s,
post, at 722, n. 5 (dissenting opinion), which, after explaining
at length that the only possible meaning of “revoke a term”
is “ ‘to annul’ ” it, post, at 715, to “ ‘cancel’ ” it, post, at 716,
and to treat it “as though it had never existed,” post, at 717,
explains away the statute’s later inconvenient reference to
“the term of supervised release” as “describ[ing] the length
of the permitted imprisonment by reference to that now-
defunct term of supervised release,” post, at 721. This, of
course, is not what the text says. Indeed, for support
Justice Scalia turns to Congress’ use of “terminate” in
§ 3583(g)—which Justice Scalia elsewhere concedes “was
a mistake.” Post, at 718, n. 2. Faced with a choice between
two difficult readings of what all must admit is not optimal
statutory text, the Court is correct to adopt the interpreta-
tion that makes the most sense.
I would not go on to suggest, as the Court does, that a
court could extend a term of supervised release pursuant
to § 3583(e)(2) prior to revoking the term under § 3583(e)(3).
Ante, at 712. The subparts of § 3583(e) are phrased in the
disjunctive; and § 3583(e)(3) must stand on its own. This
suggests the term of imprisonment plus any further term of
supervised release imposed under § 3583(e)(3) may not ex-
ceed the original term of supervised release that had been
imposed and then violated.
Nor would I invoke 18 U. S. C. § 3583(a), ante, at 708, which
raises more issues than it resolves, not the least of which is
the description of the District Court’s action as “imposing a
sentence.” Petitioner’s sentence was imposed upon convic-
tion. What is at issue in this case is the appropriate adjust-
ment to make to that sentence when the prisoner has vio-
lated the conditions of supervised release.

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715 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Scalia, J., dissenting
With these observations I join the opinion of the Court,
save for its parenthetical discussion of § 3583(e)(2), ante, at
712, and its dictum regarding § 3583(a), ante, at 708.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court’s textual analysis of 18 U. S. C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V), and think that analysis suffi-
cient to resolve this case. I agree with Justice Kennedy
that the Court’s discussions of § 3583(a), ante, at 707–708, and
§ 3583(e)(2), ante, at 712, are unnecessary to the result. I
would not rely, as the Court (ante, at 708–710) and Justice
Kennedy (ante this page (opinion concurring in part)) do, on
any apparent congressional purpose supporting the Court’s
reading of § 3583(e)(3). With these observations, I concur in
the judgment.
Justice Scalia, dissenting.
I agree with Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion, and
thus, like the Court, believe that the case ultimately turns
on the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
I do not agree, however, with the Court’s interpretation of
that provision. The section provides that when the condi-
tions of supervised release are violated, the court may “re-
voke a term of supervised release, and require the person to
serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release
without credit for time previously served on postrelease su-
pervision.” Finding in this an authorization for imposition
of additional supervised release is an act of willpower rather
than of judgment.
The term “revoke” is not defined by the statute, and thus
should be construed “in accordance with its ordinary or natu-
ral meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). As
the Court recognizes, the ordinary meaning of “revoke” is
“ ‘to annul by recalling or taking back.’ ” Ante, at 704 (quot-
ing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1944
(1981)); see also American Heritage Dictionary 1545 (3d ed.

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716 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Scalia, J., dissenting
1992) (defining “revoke” as “[t]o void or annul by recalling,
withdrawing, or reversing; cancel; rescind”). Under this
reading, the “revoked” term of supervised release is simply
canceled; and since there is no authorization for a new term
of supervised release to replace the one that has been re-
voked, additional supervised release is unavailable.
The Court is not content with this natural reading, how-
ever, and proceeds to adopt what it calls an “unconventional”
reading of “revoke,” ante, at 706, as meaning “to call or sum-
mon back” without annulling, ibid.1 It thereby concludes
that the revoked term of supervised release retains some
effect, and thus that additional supervised release may be
required after reimprisonment. The Court suggests that its
abandonment of ordinary meaning is justified by the text,
by congressional purpose, and by analogy to pre-Guidelines
practice regarding nondetentive monitoring. None of the
proffered reasons is convincing.
The Court claims textual support for its “unconventional”
reading in the fact that subsection (e)(3), at issue here, uses
the term “revoke,” while subsection (e)(1) uses the term
“terminate.” Since, the Court reasons, the two terms
should not be interpreted to have exactly the same meaning,
(1) the statute must intend a “less common” meaning of “re-
voke,” namely, “call back,” see ante, at 706, and n. 9; and (2)
this “less common” meaning authorizes the later imposition
of supervised release. Each part of this two-step analysis is
patently false.
1 Describing the Court’s reading as “unconventional” makes it sound per-
fectly O. K. There are, after all, unconventional houses, unconventional
hairdos, even unconventional batting stances, all of which are fine.
Houses, hairdos, and batting stances, however, have an independent exist-
ence apart from convention, whereas words are nothing but a convention—
particular sounds which by agreement represent particular concepts, and
(in the case of most written languages) particular symbols which by agree-
ment represent particular sounds. Thus, when the Court admits that it
is giving the word “revoke” an “unconventional” meaning, it says that it
is choosing to ignore the word “revoke.”

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717 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Scalia, J., dissenting
As to the first: The usual, ordinary-English definition of
“revoke” is already amply distinguishable from “terminate,”
and does not have to be tortured into Old English (or actu-
ally, transliteration from Old Latin) in order to explain the
choice of words. “Terminate” connotes completion rather
than cancellation. See American Heritage Dictionary 1852
(3d ed. 1992) (defining “terminate” as “[t]o bring to an end
or a halt” or “[t]o occur at or form the end of; conclude or
finish”); Webster’s New International Dictionary 2605 (2d ed.
1942) (defining “terminate” as “[t]o put an end to; to make to
cease; to end . . . to form the conclusion of . . .”). Using
“terminate” in subsection (e)(1) and “revoke” (in its ordinary
sense) in subsection (e)(3) is not only not inexplicable; it re-
flects an admirably precise use of language. In subsection
(e)(1), the term of supervised release is “terminated”
(“brought to an end”) because termination is warranted “by
the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of jus-
tice.” The supervised release is treated as fulfilled, and the
sentence is complete. In subsection (e)(3), by contrast, the
supervised release term is not merely brought to an end; it
is annulled and treated as though it had never existed, the
defendant receiving no credit for any supervised release
served. It would be hard to pick two words more clearly
connoting these distinct consequences than “terminate” and
“revoke.” 2
2 The Court is correct, ante, at 705, n. 7, that my suggested explanation
of the difference between “terminate” and “revoke” does not comport with
the use of “terminate” in § 3583(g). But the use of the term in that sub-
section also contradicts the Court’s explanation of the difference between
the two terms—viz., that “terminate,” unlike in its view “revoke,” “con-
clude[s] any possibility of supervised release later,” ante, at 704. For the
Court evidently believes (contrary to the use of “terminate” in § 3583(g))
that further supervised release is available when a supervisee is reimpris-
oned for possession of a controlled substance. It would be “fundamentally
contrary” to the congressional scheme, the Court asserts, if supervised
release following reimprisonment were not available for “one who has al-
ready tried liberty and failed,” ante, at 709. But the use of “terminate” in

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718 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Scalia, J., dissenting
The first step of the Court’s analysis—its inference that
the use of “terminate” in subsection (e)(1) requires its alter-
native meaning of “revoke” in subsection (e)(3)—is also
wrong because the alternative meaning that the Court posits
(“to call or summon back,” without the implication of annul-
ment, ante, at 706) is not merely (as the Court says) “less
common,” ante, at 706, n. 9; in the context that is relevant
here, it is utterly unheard of. One can “call or summon
back” a person or thing without implication of annulment,
but it is quite impossible to “call or summon back” an order
or decree without that implication—which is precisely why
the primary meaning of revoke has shifted from its root
meaning (“call or summon back”) to the meaning that it
bears in its most common context, i. e., when applied to or-
ders or decrees (“cancel or annul”). Of course the acid test
of whether a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning
is whether you could use the word in that sense at a cocktail
party without having people look at you funny. The Court’s
assigned meaning would surely fail that test, even late in the
evening. Try telling someone, “Though I do not cancel or
annul my earlier action, I revoke it.” The notion that Con-
§ 3583(g) prescribes just that. Further, § 3583(g) undermines the Court’s
argument that because § 3583(e)(3) authorizes the court to “revoke a term
of supervised release” and then to require “all or part of the term” to be
served in prison, the revoked term must retain some metaphysical vitality.
See ante, at 705–706. This is so because § 3583(g) provides that the court
shall “terminate the term of supervised release” (hence extinguishing it
even in the Court’s view), and yet goes on to provide that the court shall
require the defendant to serve at least one-third of “the term of super-
vised release” in prison. See infra, at 721. So on either the Court’s inter-
pretation of the difference between “terminate” and “revoke” or on mine,
the use of “terminate” in § 3583(g) was a mistake—which is why Congress
has since amended it to read “revoke.” See § 110505, 108 Stat. 2017. See
also Brief for United States 25, n. 20 (“Congress apprehended that the
term ‘terminate’ was inappropriate [in § 3583(g)]”). If we both concede
it was a mistake, that leaves my explanation of the difference between
“terminate” in § 3583(e)(1) and “revoke” in § 3583(e)(3) uncontradicted.

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719 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Scalia, J., dissenting
gress, by the phrase “revoke a term of supervised release,”
meant “recall but not cancel a term of supervised release” is
both linguistically and conceptually absurd.
The dictionary support that the Court seeks to enlist for
its definition is fictitious. It is indeed the case that both the
Oxford English Dictionary and Webster’s Third New Inter-
national Dictionary give as a meaning of “revoke” “to call or
summon back”; but neither of them adds the fillip that is
essential to the Court’s point—that the thing called back “re-
tain vitality.” Ante, at 707. They say nothing at all about
the implication of calling or summoning back—which, in the
case of calling or summoning back an order or decree, is nec-
essarily annulment.3 Further, while the dictionaries the
Court mentions do not give its chosen meaning “antiquarian
reproach,” ante, at 706, n. 9, many dictionaries do. The New
Shorter Oxford shows this usage as obsolete, see New
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 2583 (1993), and the pre-
vious edition of Webster’s New International shows it as
rare, see Webster’s New International Dictionary 2134 (2d
ed. 1942). Other dictionaries also show the Court’s chosen
meaning as rare, e. g., Chambers English Dictionary 1257
(1988), as obsolete or archaic, e. g., Cassell Concise English
Dictionary 1149 (1992); Funk and Wagnalls New Standard
Dictionary 2104 (1957), or do not give it as a meaning at all,
e. g., American Heritage Dictionary 1545 (3d ed. 1992).4
3 As the Court suggests in its quotation of Webster’s Third’s definition
of “RECALL,” see ante, at 706, the annulment may be only temporary (a
“suspension”); but that is so only if there is some authority for repromulga-
tion after the revocation—which leaves the Court no further along than it
was before it dipped into the more obscure meanings of “revoke”: it must
identify some authority to reimpose supervised release. This blends into
the next point made in text.
4 Whether one attributes any currency to “revoke” in the sense of “call
back” depends, I think, on whether one counts as current usage figurative
usage. The OED, while not showing the meaning “to call back” as obso-
lete, does indicate that its current usage is “chiefly fig[urative].” 13 Ox-

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720 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Scalia, J., dissenting
As for the second step of the Court’s analysis: Even if
there were justification for giving “revoke” something other
than its normal meaning, and even if the meaning the Court
adopts were not unheard of, the latter meaning still does not
provide the needed authorization for reimposition of super-
vised release. The statute does not say that the court may
“revoke” (“call back,” as the Court would have it) only part
of the term of supervised release, so there is no argument
that some portion remains in place for later use. Thus, even
if “revoke” means “call back,” a court would need statutory
authorization to reimpose this “called back” term of super-
vised release. But § 3583(e)(3) provides no such authoriza-
tion. The court is empowered to “revoke” the term; it is
empowered to require that “all or part” of the term be
served in prison; it is not empowered to reimpose “all or
part” of the term as a later term of supervised release.
ford English Dictionary 838 (2d ed. 1989) (OED). Just as current usage
would allow one to say that “the emperor called back his decree,” so also
it would allow one to say that the emperor “revoked” his decree in that
figurative sense of “calling it back”—i. e., in the sense of canceling it. It
is assuredly not current usage, however—I think not even rare current
usage—to use “revoke” to connote a literal calling back. (“Since my bird
dog was ranging too far afield, I revoked him.”)
The Court chastises this example, suggesting that only a tippling hunter
would “revoke” his bird dog, as “dogs cannot be revoked, even though
sentencing orders can be.” Ante, at 707, n. 9. I could not agree more.
However, the definition the Court employs (“call back” without the impli-
cation of cancellation) envisions that dogs can be revoked—thus illustrat-
ing its obscurity. The OED definition on which the Court relies, see ante,
at 706, n. 9, defines “revoke” as “to recall; to call or summon back . . . an
animal or thing.” 13 OED 838 (2d ed. 1989). The first example it gives
of this usage is as follows: “These hounds . . . being acquainted with their
masters watchwordes, eyther in revoking or imboldening them to serve
the game.” Ibid. Of course the Court’s “not unheard of ” usage, ante, at
706, is not limited to recalling dogs—oxen can be revoked as well, as the
OED’s third example illustrates: “Ye must revoke The patient Oxe unto
the Yoke.” 13 OED 838.

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721 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Scalia, J., dissenting
The Court opines that no authorization for further super-
vised release is needed, because the fact that the district
court may require “all or part of the term of supervised re-
lease” to be served in prison demonstrates that the revoked
term continues to have some metaphysical effect, ante, at
705–706, so that “the balance of it [can] remain effective as a
term of supervised release when the reincarceration is over,”
ante, at 706. It demonstrates no such thing. In allowing
the district court to require that “all or part of the term of
supervised release” be spent in prison, the statute simply
describes the length of the permitted imprisonment by refer-
ence to that now-defunct term of supervised release. It is
quite beyond me how the Court can believe that the statute
“does not read” this way, ante, at 706, n. 8, and the concur-
rence that “[t]his . . . is not what the text says,” ante, at 714.
A “term of supervised release” in what might be called the
substantive rather than the temporal sense—i. e., the sen-
tence to a period of supervised release—cannot possibly be
served in prison. To be in prison is not to be released. The
only sense in which “all or part of the term of supervised
release” can be served in prison is the temporal sense. Cf.
United States v. Johnson, ante, at 57 (“To say respondent
was released while still imprisoned diminishes the concept
the word intends to convey”). The Court’s unrealistic read-
ing is also undermined by the fact that § 3583(g) provides for
serving in prison part of “the term of supervised release,”
in spite of the fact that the term there has been “termi-
nated,” so that even the Court would not claim it has ongoing
vitality. See n. 2, supra. And finally, in concluding that the
term of supervised release remains in place, the Court essen-
tially reads the phrase “revoke a term of supervised release”
out of the statute, treating the subsection as if it did no more
than authorize the court to “require the person to serve in
prison all or part of the term of supervised release” origi-
nally imposed, § 3583(e)(3). Of course the statute could have
been drafted to say just that—allowing the court to require

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722 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Scalia, J., dissenting
part of the term of supervised release to be served in prison,
with the rest of the term remaining in place to be served on
supervised release. In the text actually adopted, however,
the supervised-release term is not left in place, but is explic-
itly “revoked.” 5
Further, if one assumes, as the Court does, that a revoked
term somehow “survives the . . . order of revocation,” ante,
at 705, and retains effect (even without any statutory au-
thorization for reimposition or reactivation), then it would
follow that whatever part of it is not required to be served
in prison is necessarily still in effect. Thus the district
court would have no discretion not to require the remainder
of the term to be served on supervised release. Yet the
Court seems to view further supervised release as only an
“option.” Ante, at 704, 713, n. 13; accord, ante, at 713–714
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
The Court’s confusing discussion of how § 3583(a) would
produce consequences similar to those its opinion achieves—
and consequences that are entirely reasonable—i f
§ 3583(e)(3) read differently from the way it does read, ante,
at 707–708, is entirely irrelevant. I do not contend that the
result the Court reaches is any way remarkable, only that it
is not the result called for by the statute. The Court care-
fully does not maintain—and it could not, for reasons I need
not describe—that subsection (a) justifies imposition of post-
5 The concurrence adjusts for that inconvenient fact by simply changing
the object of the verb, concluding that “after the right to be on supervised
release has been revoked there is yet an unexpired term of supervised
release that can be allocated . . . in whole or in part to confinement and to
release . . . .” Ante, at 713 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (emphasis
added). The statute, however, does not revoke “the right to be on super-
vised release”; it revokes the “term of supervised release” itself, see
§ 3583(e)(3), which is utterly incompatible with the notion that the term
remains in place. Switching the object of “revoke” is no fair in itself, and
it leaves the provision entirely redundant, since revoking “the right to be
on supervised release” adds nothing to “requir[ing] the person to serve in
prison all or part of the term,” § 3583(e)(3).

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723 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Scalia, J., dissenting
revocation supervisory release given the actual text of sub-
section (e)(3), and nothing more is pertinent here. Hypo-
thetical discussion of what role § 3583(a) might play had
Congress legislated differently is beside the point.
The Court next turns to questions of policy—framed as an
inquiry into “congressional purpose.” Ante, at 708. Citing
legislative history (although not legislative history discuss-
ing the particular subsection at issue), ante, at 709–710, the
Court explains what it views as the policies Congress seeks
to serve with supervised release generally, and then explains
how these general policies would be undermined by reading
§ 3583(e)(3) as written. “Our obligation,” the Court says, “is
to give effect to congressional purpose so long as the con-
gressional language does not itself bar that result.” Ante,
at 710, n. 10. I think not. Our obligation is to go as far
in achieving the general congressional purpose as the text
of the statute fairly prescribes—and no further. We stop
where the statutory language does, and do not require ex-
plicit prohibition of our carrying the ball a few yards beyond.
In any event, as read by any English speaker except one who
talks of revoking a dog, the statute does “bar” the result the
Court reaches here. The proper canon to govern the pres-
ent case is quite simple: “[W]here, as here, the statute’s lan-
guage is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce
it according to its terms,’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enter-
prises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917)).
Perhaps there is a scrivener’s error exception to that
canon, see, e. g., Holloway v. United States, 526 U. S. 1, 19,
n. 2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 527–528 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in judgment), but the words of today’s author in an-
other case well describe why that is inapplicable here: “This
case is a far cry from the rare one where the effect of imple-
menting the ordinary meaning of the statutory text would
be patent absurdity or demonstrably at odds with the inten-

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724 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Scalia, J., dissenting
tions of its drafters.” BFP v. Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion, 511 U. S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted). It would have
been entirely reasonable for Congress to conclude that a pris-
oner who had broken the terms of supervised release seri-
ously enough to be reincarcerated should not be trusted in
that status again; and that a judge should not be tempted to
impose an inappropriately short period of reimprisonment
by the availability of further supervised release. Congress
might also have wished to eliminate the unattractive pros-
pect that a prisoner would go through one or even more rep-
etitions of the violation-reimprisonment-supervised-release
sequence—which is avoided by requiring the district court
confronted with a violation either to leave the prisoner on
supervised release (perhaps with tightened conditions and
lengthened term, as § 3583(e)(2) permits) or to impose im-
prisonment, but not to combine the two. Because the inter-
pretation demanded by the text is an entirely plausible one,
this Court’s views of what is prudent policy are beside the
point. And that is so whether those policy views are forth-
rightly stated as such (“[I]f any prisoner might profit from
the decompression stage of supervised release, no prisoner
needs it more than one who has already tried liberty and
failed,” ante, at 709), or whether, to give an interpretive odor
to the opinion, they are recast as policies that it “seems very
unlikely” for Congress to have intended (“Congress . . .
seems very unlikely to have meant to compel the courts to
wash their hands of the worst cases at the end of reimprison-
ment,” ante, at 709–710).
Finally, the Court appeals to pre-Guidelines practice with
regard to nondetentive monitoring. But this cannot cure
the lack of statutory authorization for additional supervised
release. Even if the language of § 3583(e)(3) were ambigu-
ous (which it is not), that history would be of little relevance,
since the Sentencing Reform Act’s adoption of supervised
release was meant to make a significant break with prior

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725 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Scalia, J., dissenting
practice, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 366
(1989) (describing the Act’s “sweeping reforms”); Gozlon-
Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 407 (1991) (“Super-
vised release is a unique method of postconfinement super-
vision invented by the Congress for a series of sentencing
reforms”).6 The Court’s effort to equate parole and super-
vised release, ante, at 710–712, is unpersuasive. Unlike pa-
role, which replaced a portion of a defendant’s prison sen-
tence, supervised release is a separate term imposed at the
time of initial sentencing. Compare 18 U. S. C. § 3583(a)
with 18 U. S. C. §§ 4205(a), 4206 (1982 ed.) (repealed); see also
USSG ch. 7, pt. A, intro. comment. 2(b). This distinction has
important consequences for the present question, since when
parole was “revoked” (unlike when supervised release is
revoked), there was no need to impose a new term of
imprisonment; the term currently being served (on parole)
was still in place. Similarly, there was no occasion to impose
a new term of parole, since the possibility of parole was in-
herent in the remaining sentence. See 18 U. S. C. § 4205(a)
(1982 ed.) (“Whenever confined and serving a definite term
6 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A,
intro. comment. 3 (Nov. 1998) (USSG), is not to the contrary. The Court
quotes the comment for the broad proposition that “[t]he Sentencing
Guidelines, after all, ‘represent an approach that begins with, and builds
upon,’ pre-Guidelines law.” Ante, at 710. The comment itself, however,
makes the much more narrow point that data on sentences imposed pre-
Guidelines were used as a “starting point” in devising sentencing ranges
under the Guidelines. The sentence from which the Court quotes states:
“Despite . . . policy-oriented departures from pre-guidelines practice, the
guidelines represent an approach that begins with, and builds upon, empir-
ical data.” USSG ch. 1, pt. A, intro. comment. 3. This sheds no light on
the extent to which prior practice in matters other than length of sentence
underlay the Guidelines, much less on the extent to which such prior prac-
tice is a meaningful guide to statutory interpretation in general—and even
less to statutory interpretation pertaining to supervised release, which
the Guidelines elsewhere refer to as “a new form of post-imprisonment
supervision created by the Sentencing Reform Act,” id., ch. 7, pt. A, intro.
comment. 2(b).

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726 JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
Scalia, J., dissenting
or terms of more than one year, a prisoner shall be eligible
for release on parole after serving one-third of such
term . . .”). The question whether further supervised re-
lease may be required after revocation of supervised release
is so entirely different from the question whether further
parole may be accorded after revocation of parole, that the
Court’s appeal to the parole practice demonstrates nothing
except the dire scarcity of arguments available to support
its conclusion.7
7 The Court also appeals to pre-Guidelines practice regarding probation
and special parole. Ante, at 711–712, n. 11. The pre-Guidelines proba-
tion practice is altogether inapt, since the governing statute explicitly pro-
vided for resentencing after violation, and specifically allowed the court
to “impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.” 18
U. S. C. § 3653 (1982 ed.) (repealed). This makes it quite impossible for
probation practice to support the Court’s “broader point that a court’s
powers at the original sentencing are the baseline from which powers at
resentencing are determined,” ante, at 711, n. 11; all it proves is that they
are the baseline where the statute says so. Indeed, the fact that the stat-
ute found it necessary to say so tends to contradict the Court’s position.
Special parole, while more akin to supervised release than either parole
or probation, hardly provides clear support for the Court’s reading of
§ 3583(e)(3). In fact, the majority of Courts of Appeals have read the
relevant statute regarding special parole, 21 U. S. C. § 841(c) (1982 ed.) (re-
pealed), as not allowing reimposition of special parole in circumstances
analogous to those at issue here. See Manso v. Federal Detention Center,
182 F. 3d 814, 817 (CA11 1999) (citing cases). The Court’s reliance on the
Parole Commission’s 1977 interpretation of the special parole statute, see
28 CFR § 2.57(c) (1999), is misplaced. The principle that Congress is pre-
sumed to legislate in light of existing administrative interpretations does
not stretch to cover an administrative interpretation of a statute dealing
with a different subject, of recent vintage, and unsupported by judi-
cial opinion. Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 645 (1998) (repetition
of existing statutory language assumed to incorporate “uniform body of
administrative and judicial precedent” that had “settled the meaning” of
existing provision); Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 297 (1981) (assuming
congressional awareness of “longstanding administrative construction”).
Further, some courts have found it unclear whether the Parole Commis-
sion’s regulation itself envisions reimposition of special parole. See, e. g.,
Fowler v. United States Parole Commission, 94 F. 3d 835, 841 (CA3 1996).

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727 Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Scalia, J., dissenting
* * *
This is not an important case, since it deals with the inter-
pretation of a statute that has been amended to eliminate,
for the future, the issue we today resolve. But an institu-
tion that is careless in small things is more likely to be care-
less in large ones; and an institution that is willful in small
things is almost certain to be willful in large ones. The fact
that nothing but the Court’s views of policy and “congres-
sional purpose” supports today’s judgment is a matter of
great concern, if only because of what it tells district and
circuit judges. The overwhelming majority of the Courts of
Appeals—9 out of 11—notwithstanding what they might
have viewed as the more desirable policy arrangement,
reached the result unambiguously demanded by the statu-
tory text. See ante, at 698, n. 2. Today’s decision invites
them to return to headier days of not-too-yore, when laws
meant what judges knew they ought to mean. I dissent.