Saldaño v. Texas

1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
VICTOR SALDAÑO v. TEXAS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
No. 25–5749. Decided June 22, 2026
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
J
USTICE JACKSON join, dissenting from the denial of certio-
rari.
Under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002), the
Eighth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution forbids the ex-
ecution of intellectually disabled individuals. Here, every
expert to have evaluated petitioner Victor Saldaño has con-
cluded that he is intellectually disabled. As a result, both
Saldaño and the State of Texas asked the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (TCCA) to remand for a trial court to re-
view the relevant evidence and decide whether Saldaño can
be executed consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Yet
the TCCA refused that modest step. I would have granted
certiorari and summarily vacated that decision to ensure
that Saldaño, the State, and the Texas courts have the op-
portunity to determine Saldaño’s Atkins claim on the merits
and assess whether executing him would, in fact, violate the
Eighth Amendment.
In 1996, Saldaño was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death. He initially sought postconviction relief
in both state and federal courts, and a federal habeas court
granted resentencing after finding that Saldaño’s penalty
phase had been tainted by testimony from the State’s ex-
pert that Saldaño posed a risk of future dangerousness in
part due to his race. Saldaño was resentenced to death in
2004 and filed an initial state habeas application in 2007
and a subsequent application in 2008, both of which were

2 SALDAÑO v. TEXAS
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
denied. Saldaño did not raise a claim of intellectual disa-
bility under Atkins in any of these proceedings.
In 2021, after the State sought an execution date for Sal-
daño, Saldaño filed a motion arguing that he was incompe-
tent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399
(1986), because of his serious mental health issues, includ-
ing schizophrenia. In support, Saldaño also submitted evi-
dence that he had recently received a full-scale IQ score of
73 on the WAIS-IV IQ test, which is a widely used test for
assessing intellectual disability. In response, the State had
its own expert administer another WAIS-IV IQ test, which
produced a full-scale IQ score of 74. Given these low scores
(with standard-error ranges below 70), the parties agreed
to pause the competency proceedings and address the pos-
sibility that, separate and apart from his competency to be
executed, Saldaño may be intellectually disabled under At-
kins.
After a thorough investigation, experts for both Saldaño
and the State analyzed Saldaño’s IQ scores and other evi-
dence of intellectual disability, including declarations from
over a dozen individuals who have known Saldaño through-
out his life. Assessing this evidence, all three experts (two
for Saldaño and one for the State) concluded that Saldaño
meets the standard for intellectual disability established by
Atkins. In addition to his IQ scores, which all three experts
agreed reflected significantly subaverage intellectual func-
tioning, the evidence showed severe deficits in adaptive
functioning. For instance, from childhood, Saldaño was
perceived as “‘slow,’” and he had to repeat sixth grade.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 97–98 (Pet. App.). He had difficulty
bathing, feeding, and clothing himself. He once “‘spent two
days without food, a bathroom, or anything else’ ” inexplica-
bly waiting outside his uncle’s house even though other
family members lived nearby. Id., at 96. He was also twice
struck by cars because he could not grasp his family’s ex-
planations of how to avoid cars in the street.

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
In 2024, with both the State’s expert and his own experts
concluding that he was intellectually disabled for purposes
of the Eighth Amendment, Saldaño filed a second subse-
quent habeas application with the TCCA. Under Texas
Code of Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 11.071, §5(a) (Vernon 2015),
a subsequent application is generally impermissible unless
one of several exceptions applies. Saldaño argued that his
subsequent application could go forward under an excep-
tion to that general rule, and that a trial court should hold
a hearing and address the merits of his claim considering
all the evidence he had compiled.
Specifically, Saldaño argued that, under §5(a)(3), he
could establish by “clear and convincing evidence” that “no
rational juror would have” imposed the death penalty, given
that “no rational juror could” have done so consistent with
the Eighth Amendment. Ex parte Blue, 230 S. W. 3d 151,
161–162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (emphasis deleted). To pro-
ceed to a merits determination under §5(a)(3), the TCCA
has previously held, an applicant need not prove the merits
of an Atkins claim; he need only make a “threshold presen-
tation of evidence that, if true,” would support an Atkins
claim by clear and convincing evidence. Id., at 163. Nota-
bly, the State supported Saldaño’s application, arguing that
he satisfied §5(a)(3) and asking the TCCA to remand the
case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and merits
determination of Saldaño’s Atkins claim.*
——————
*Saldaño also sought to proceed under §5(a)(1), which he argued inde-
pendently provided a gateway to a merits determination. Relying on
§5(a)(1), he contended that the “factual or legal basis for the claim” was
unavailable when he filed his earlier habeas applications. That was be-
cause his Atkins claim, if filed before 2017, would have failed under
Texas’s framework for assessing intellectual disability, which this Court
later held unconstitutional in Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1 (2017) (Moore
I). In several previous cases, the TCCA had held that Moore I had cre-
ated a new, previously unavailable “legal basis” for an Atkins claim for
purposes of §5(a)(1). See, e.g., Ex parte Segundo, 663 S. W. 3d 705, 705–

4 SALDAÑO v. TEXAS
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
The TCCA, however, held in a single paragraph that Sal-
daño did not satisfy §5(a)(3). See Pet. App. 4 (holding with-
out further explanation that Saldaño did not “plea[d] ‘suffi-
cient specific facts that, if true,’” would prove his Atkins
claim). Now in this Court, Saldaño and the State both ar-
gue that this holding was error given the significant evi-
dence of Saldaño’s intellectual disability and that the evi-
dence “warrants litigation of his Atkins claim on the
merits.” Brief in Opposition 9.
This Court should grant the parties’ mutual request to
“vacate the TCCA’s dismissal” and “remand” so that the
Texas courts can resolve Saldaño’s claim on the merits. Id.,
at 10. To start, the TCCA’s §5(a)(3) holding on whether the
alleged facts, if true, clearly and convincingly establish in-
tellectual disability under Atkins presents a federal ques-
tion reviewable by this Court. See Glossip v. Oklahoma,
604 U. S. 226, 242–243 (2025). Further, assuming that all
Saldaño’s factual allegations are true, he has plainly made
the “threshold” Atkins showing that Texas law requires.
Blue, 230 S. W. 3d, at 163; see Pet. App. 4 (citing Blue).
Every expert in the case agrees that Saldaño’s IQ scores
satisfy the criteria for intellectual disability, that his severe
conceptual, social, and practical deficits show serious im-
pairment of adaptive functioning, and that all these deficits
have been present since his childhood. Those findings are
consistent with this Court’s precedents. See, e.g., Brum-
field v. Cain, 576 U. S. 305, 315 (2015) (describing an IQ
score of 75 as “squarely in the range of potential intellectual
disability”); Moore v. Texas, 586 U. S. 133, 134–135, 142
(2019) (per curiam) (holding that an applicant was intellec-
tually disabled given IQ scores of 74 and 78 and significant
evidence of adaptive deficits); cf. Moore I, 581 U. S., at 10,
——————
706 (2022); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 105–107, and n. 6 (collecting
cases). Although the State supported relief under §5(a)(1) below, too, the
TCCA also denied Saldaño’s application on this basis.

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
14–15 (requiring consideration of adaptive functioning for
individual with IQ score of 74 and standard-error range of
69 to 79). Assuming the truth of this uncontradicted evi-
dence, as is required at this stage, it is difficult to see any
way in which Saldaño could have failed to make at least the
threshold showing of intellectual disability that is sufficient
to proceed to a merits determination.
The Court’s refusal to allow that merits determination to
proceed not only does a profound disservice to Saldaño, who
now might be executed without any court ever determining
whether he is, in fact, intellectually disabled. It also se-
verely undermines the State’s interest in ensuring the le-
gitimacy of its criminal system. In that system, the prose-
cutor serves as “the representative . . . of a sovereignty . . .
whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v.
United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935). Much as the State
has a “strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments,”
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 584 (2006), it has an
equally strong interest in maintaining, and demonstrating,
the integrity of those judgments. That is why this Court
generally requires that “great weight” be afforded to prose-
cutorial confessions of error. Young v. United States, 315
U. S. 257, 258 (1942). It is also partially why, when the
State does confess error, a reviewing court must explain
why such a confession is inadequate to support relief. Cf.
Escobar v. Texas, 598 U. S. ___ (2023). A court is not bound
by the prosecutor’s views, but such explanation is necessary
to safeguard, among other things, the public perception of
fairness in the courts.
Here, the State admirably sought to fulfill its responsibil-
ities by ensuring that, if it is going to take Saldaño’s life,
that grave act will comport with the Constitution’s guaran-
tee against cruel and unusual punishment. The TCCA did
not satisfy its reciprocal obligations. Because the Court’s
refusal to intervene both creates a significant risk that

6 SALDAÑO v. TEXAS
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Saldaño’s fundamental rights will be violated in contraven-
tion of the Eighth Amendment and disserves the State’s im-
portant interests in preventing that result, I respectfully
dissent from the denial of certiorari.