Malliotakis v. Williams

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

A
LITO, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 25A914
_________________
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, ET AL. v. MICHAEL
WILLIAMS,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
_________________
No. 25A915
_________________
PETER KOSINSKI, ET AL. v. MICHAEL
WILLIAMS,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[March 2, 2026]
The applications for stay presented to JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR and by her referred to the Court are granted.
The January 21, 2026 order entered by the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, New York County, Index No.
164002/2025, is stayed pending the disposition of the ap-
peal in the New York state courts and disposition of a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari in this Court, if such a writ is
timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall
terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted,
the stay shall terminate upon the issuance of the mandate
of this Court.
J
USTICE ALITO, concurring in grant of stay.
These cases concern a state-court order that blatantly
discriminates on the basis of race. The New York Supreme
Court (that State’s trial-level court) ordered the New York
Independent Redistricting Commission to draw a new con-
gressional district for the express purpose of ensuring that
“minority voters” are able to elect the candidate of their
choice. 1 App. to Emergency Application for Stay 15a.

2 MALLIOTAKIS v. WILLIAMS
A
LITO, J., concurring
That is unadorned racial discrimination, an inherently
“ ‘odious’” activity that violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause except in the “most extraor-
dinary case.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Presi-
dent and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U. S. 181, 208
(2023). Extraordinary circumstances exist only when the
challenged state conduct is narrowly tailored to achieve a
“compelling” interest, and our precedents have identified
only two compelling interests that can justify race-based
government action: (1) mitigating prison-specific risks and
(2) “remediating specific, identified instances of past dis-
crimination that violated the Constitution or a statute.”
Id., at 206–207. Neither of those interests is present here.
Instead, the court based its injunction on an interpretation
of state law. But under the Supremacy Clause, a state law
cannot authorize the violation of federal rights. It is there-
fore an understatement to say that applicants are likely to
succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim.
Despite this, the New York courts refused to stay the trial
court’s order. After that highly questionable injunction was
issued, the applicants filed appeals in both the Appellate
Division (the State’s intermediate appellate court) and the
Court of Appeals (its highest court) challenging the trial
court’s order on federal constitutional grounds. At the same
time, applicants asked both courts to stay the trial court’s
order. The Appellate Division refused to issue a stay, and
by order issued on February 11, the Court of Appeals sent
the appeal filed in that court to the Appellate Division and
dismissed applicants’ motions for a stay.
With nowhere else to turn, the applicants asked us to is-
sue a stay, and we have jurisdiction to entertain their ap-
plication. Title 28 U. S. C. §1257(a) gives us jurisdiction to
review “[f]inal judgments or decrees” that are rendered by
a State’s highest court and adjudicate federal constitutional
claims, and the Court of Appeals’ February 11 order falls
within that category. Our decision in National Socialist

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)
A
LITO, J., concurring
Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U. S. 43, 44 (1977) (per cu-
riam), makes that clear. In that case, a trial court issued
an injunction that prohibited petitioner’s members from en-
gaging in various forms of expression. Without providing
any reasoning, both the State’s intermediate appellate
court and supreme court denied applications for a stay
pending appeal, and the latter court also refused to hear the
stay applicants’ appeal prior to the time when their consti-
tutional rights would be violated. See App. to Application
for Stay in National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie,
O. T. 1976, No. 76-1786, pp. 5a–7a (unreasoned orders by
the State’s intermediate and supreme courts). We held that
by “den[ying] both the stay and leave for an expedited ap-
peal,” the State Supreme Court was necessarily rendering
a final judgment or decree on “the merits of petitioners’
claim that the outstanding injunction will deprive them of
rights protected by the” Constitution “during the period of
appellate review.” Skokie, 432 U. S., at 43–44. The same
is true here: The New York Court of Appeals’ decision not
to grant a stay or hear a direct appeal was effectively a final
determination on the merits of the applicants’ claim that
the outstanding injunction is depriving them of their con-
stitutional rights pending appeal. Because the situation
here is not materially different from that in Skokie, we have
jurisdiction.
We are likewise authorized to grant a stay because it is
“necessary or appropriate in aid of [our] jurisdiction.” 28
U. S. C. §1651(a). That requirement is met when a stay is
“necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with
a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to
seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority
to decide that case.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomo-
tive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 295 (1970).
That is the situation here because there is an unaccepta-
bly strong possibility that the applicants’ appeal in the state
court system will not conclude until it is too late for us to

4 MALLIOTAKIS v. WILLIAMS
A
LITO, J., concurring
review the ultimate decision by means of a writ of certio-
rari, even if it appears that the decision is based on a seri-
ously mistaken understanding of the Constitution. By
then, the principle of restraint we recognized in Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam), may counsel
against the issuance of an injunction. An injunction is an
equitable remedy, and such relief may be inequitable if it is
issued shortly before an election, when candidates, election
officials, and voters have relied on the rules in place at that
time. Ibid.
At this point, however, the Purcell principle does not
counsel against a stay. That principle concerns “[l]ate judi-
cial tinkering” that “can lead to disruption and to unantici-
pated and unfair consequences for candidates, political par-
ties, and voters, among others.” Merrill v. Milligan, 595
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring in grant
of application for stay) (slip op., at 4). Here, our stay, far
from causing disruption or upsetting legitimate expecta-
tions, eliminates much of the uncertainty and confusion
that would exist if the Independent Redistricting Commis-
sion proceeded to draw a new district that this Court would
likely strike down if the cases reached us in time.
For these reasons, the stay issued by the Court rests on
sound and well-established legal grounds. J
USTICE
SOTOMAYOR’s accusation of two-faced practice, post, at 1, is
baseless, and her 13-page dissent is most notable for what
it conspicuously omits: even the most tepid imaginable de-
fense of the constitutionality of the trial court’s order. In-
stead, her disquisition ducks that issue and demands that
we wait until the completion of a series of events that would
likely run out the clock before we could review the order.
That would provide a way of achieving what full review
would not permit: the use of an unconstitutional district in
the November election and the election of a Member of the
House of Representatives whose entitlement to the office
would be tainted. That is a prospect this Court should not
countenance.

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 25A914
_________________
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, ET AL. v. MICHAEL
WILLIAMS,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
_________________
No. 25A915
_________________
PETER KOSINSKI, ET AL. v. MICHAEL
WILLIAMS,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[March 2, 2026]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting from grant of stay.
The Court’s 101-word unexplained order can be summa-
rized in just 7: “Rules for thee, but not for me.” Time and
again, this Court has said that federal courts have limited
jurisdiction. Time and again, this Court has said that fed-
eral courts should not interfere with state-court litigation.
Time and again, this Court has said that federal courts
should not meddle with state election laws ahead of an elec-
tion. Today, the Court says: except for this one, except for
this one, and except for this one. Ignoring every limit on
federal courts’ authority, the Court takes the unprece-
dented step of staying a state trial court’s decision in a re-
districting dispute on matters of state law without giving
the State’s highest court a chance to act. Because that or-
der violates basic principles of jurisdiction, federalism, and
equity, I respectfully dissent.

2 MALLIOTAKIS v. WILLIAMS

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
I
New York’s Eleventh Congressional District is located in
New York City and covers all of Staten Island and part of
southwestern Brooklyn. Representative Nicole Malliotakis
currently represents the district.
In October 2025, New York voters sued state election of-
ficials in the Supreme Court of New York, the State’s trial
court, to challenge the district’s lines. They claimed that
the district as drawn violates the New York Constitution
because it dilutes Black and Latino votes. Representative
Malliotakis intervened to defend the current map.
Following a 4-day trial in early January, the trial court
sided with the voters. It first observed that this action pre-
sented “an issue of first impression” because “New York
courts have yet to determine the appropriate legal standard
to evaluate a vote dilution claim” under the New York Con-
stitution. Williams v. Board of Elections, ___ N. Y. S. 3d
___, ___, 2026 N. Y. Slip Op. 26015, *2 (Jan. 21, 2026). Ap-
plying a new legal standard, the trial court held that, based
on the totality of the circumstances, the district as drawn
denied Black and Latino voters the equal “opportunity to
participate in the political process . . . and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice” guaranteed to them by Article III,
§4, of the New York Constitution.
The trial court then enjoined New York’s current congres-
sional map and ordered New York’s Independent Redis-
tricting Commission to redraw the district as a “crossover”
district that met three criteria.
1
First, under the remedial
——————
1
A crossover district is one in which minority voters do not constitute
a majority in a district but are able to elect their preferred candidates
through “crossover” support from White voters. The trial court’s discus-
sion of crossover districts relied heavily on Justice Souter’s separate
writings, which have been especially influential in this area. See Wil-
liams v. Board of Elections, ___ N. Y. S. 3d ___, ___, 2026 N. Y. Slip Op.
26015, *6 (Jan. 21, 2026); see also League of United Latin American Cit-
izens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 484–491 (2006) (Souter, J., concurring in

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
district’s lines, minority voters must be able to elect their
preferred candidates in primary elections. Second, minor-
ity-favored candidates must typically win general elections.
Third, the district must ensure that minority voters’ sup-
port is decisive in primary elections. The court’s order also
made clear that the case would not be “resolved until the
successful implementation of a new Congressional Map
complying with [its] order.” ___ N. Y. S. 3d, at ___, 2026
N. Y. Slip Op. 26015, *8. As of today, the Commission has
not yet drawn a new district.
Defendants appealed to both the Appellate Division (New
York’s intermediate court) and the Court of Appeals (New
York’s highest court) on January 26 and simultaneously
sought a stay pending appeal from both courts. Together,
they argued that the trial court’s order requiring a new dis-
trict to be drawn violates the Federal Due Process Clause,
Elections Clause, and Equal Protection Clause even before
any new district had been drawn. On February 11, the
Court of Appeals transferred its appeal to the Appellate Di-
vision on the grounds that defendants could not first appeal
directly to the Court of Appeals. See 1 App. to Emergency
Application 20a–21a (App.); see also N.Y. Const., Art. VI,
§3b(2); N. Y. C. P. L. R. §5601(b)(2).
The next day, without a response from the Appellate Di-
vision, defendants applied to this Court for an emergency
stay pending appeal. While the applications were pending,
the Appellate Division denied a stay pending appeal. Supp.
App. 102–103. Since that denial, defendants have neither
sought leave to appeal the denial nor asked for a stay from
the New York Court of Appeals, an obvious place “to turn”
to for relief, see ante, at 2; see also N. Y. C. P. L. R. §§5519,
5602.
——————
part and dissenting in part); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 31–35
(2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing crossover claims under §2 of
the Voting Rights Act); see also id., at 22 (plurality opinion) (discussing
Justice Souter’s proposed definition).

4 MALLIOTAKIS v. WILLIAMS

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
II
Today, the Court takes the astonishing, unexplained step
of staying a state trial court’s order before the state high
court has had a chance to weigh in. To do so, the majority
had to conclude that it has jurisdiction to act, that acting
now is consistent with the bedrock federalism values under-
lying its jurisdictional limits, and that the equities favor
granting this relief despite the Court’s repeated admoni-
tions to proceed cautiously when intervening in state elec-
tions or court proceedings. The Court goes badly wrong at
every turn.
A
To begin, this Court has repeatedly held that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hain Ce-
lestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist, 607 U. S. ___, ___ (2026)
(slip op., at 1); Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch 173,
185 (1809) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court). If a lower federal
court lacks jurisdiction, then it cannot act. Hain, 607 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 5).
This Court’s jurisdiction is supposed to be limited too, es-
pecially as to state-court proceedings. Title 28 U. S. C.
§1257(a) allows this Court to review “[f]inal judgments or
decrees rendered by the highest court of a State” that im-
plicate federal law. As this Court has explained, §1257(a)
“establishes a firm final judgment rule,” requiring a state-
court judgment to be final “
‘in two senses: it must be subject
to no further review or correction in any other state tribu-
nal; it must also be final as an effective determination of the
litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate
steps therein.’
” Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U. S. 75,
81 (1997). Put simply, the decision on review “
‘must be the
final word of a final court.’
” Ibid.
Here, there is no final decision from any state court, let
alone New York’s highest court, on any federal question.
After the New York trial court entered its interim order,

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
defendants ran to this Court and sought a stay of that order
before either the Appellate Division or the Court of Appeals
had weighed in on the merits. Needless to say, an order by
a state trial court is not a decision by “the highest court of
a State.” §1257(a). While these applications were pending
before this Court, the Appellate Division denied a stay. The
Appellate Division’s order cannot satisfy §1257(a), however,
because that denial is reviewable by the New York Court of
Appeals. See N. Y. C. P. L. R. §5602. Yet defendants have
not even asked the Court of Appeals to act following the Ap-
pellate Division’s denial.
This procedural defect should be fatal. In every other
case in which this Court has granted emergency relief from
a state-court decision, the State’s highest court either de-
nied it first or failed to act promptly on a request for it. See,
e.g., National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U. S.
43, 43–44 (1977) (per curiam); CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U. S.
1315, 1316 (1994) (Blackmun, J., in chambers);
Volkswagenwerk A. G. v. Falzon, 461 U. S. 1303, 1303–1305
(1983) (O’Connor, J., in chambers); M. I. C., Ltd. v. Bedford
Township, 463 U. S. 1341, 1342–1343 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
in chambers); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 423 U. S.
1327, 1328–1329 (1975) (Blackmun, J., in chambers). That
is true even of cases that came to this Court through New
York courts. In Yeshiva Univ. v. YU Pride Alliance, 597
U. S. ___ (2022), for instance, this Court denied an emer-
gency application to stay a permanent injunction entered
by a New York trial court because “applicants h[ad] at least
two further avenues for expedited or interim state court re-
lief,” including by seeking a stay from the New York Court
of Appeals. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 1); see also New Jersey
Transit Corp. v. Colt, 606 U. S. 1051 (2025) (staying state-
court trial only after applicants were denied relief by the
Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals, see Applica-
tion for Stay, O. T. 2024, No. 25A287, p. 2).

6 MALLIOTAKIS v. WILLIAMS

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Defendants contend that they cannot ask the Court of Ap-
peals for relief. Not so. Although the Court of Appeals pre-
viously transferred their appeal to the Appellate Division,
it did so because it lacked jurisdiction over the initial direct
appeal of the trial court’s order that had bypassed the Ap-
pellate Division. See App. 20a–21a (citing N.Y. Const.,
Art. VI, §§3b(2), 5(b); N. Y. C. P. L. R. §5601(b)(2)). In
denying a procedurally improper appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals did not close its doors to a procedurally proper one
later. J
USTICE ALITO claims that National Socialist Party
of America v. Skokie, 432 U. S. 43, “makes . . . clear” that
this transfer order is a final judgment under §1257(a).
Ante, at 2–3 (concurring opinion). That is wrong. In Skokie,
petitioners sought, and were denied, interim relief from the
state intermediate and high courts before seeking relief
from this Court. 432 U. S., at 43–44. Based on those deni-
als of relief, the Court concluded that the state high court
had “finally determined the merits of petitioners’ claim.”
Id., at 44. No such determination has occurred here. The
New York Court of Appeals did not resolve anything on the
merits, much less finally, when it told defendants to seek
relief from the Appellate Division first.
2

As for the Appellate Division, defendants claim that that
court denied them leave to appeal the denial of stay. It did
no such thing: All it did was deny their request for leave to
appeal the trial court’s order directly to the Court of
——————
2
Skokie is also distinguishable because it involved a prior restraint on
speech. This Court has long held that a prior restraint carries “a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity” and can be “tolerated”
only where a litigant may seek “an almost immediate judicial determi-
nation of the validity of the restraint.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963). This Court has not expanded this exception be-
yond that uniquely unconstitutional type of law. 16B C. Wright, A. Mil-
ler, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4010 (3d ed., 2025
Supp.) (Skokie “may signify little for general doctrine” because it “rested
finality on such special reasons” and “has not yet had a sweeping impact
on general finality doctrine”).

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Appeals. Supp. App. 102–103. Besides, even if the Appel-
late Division denied defendants leave to appeal the denial
of stay, defendants still may seek that same relief from the
Court of Appeals directly. N. Y. C. P. L. R. §5519(c);
§5602(a)(2) (permitting a litigant to seek leave to appeal
from the Court of Appeals “upon refusal by the appellate
division” as to “an order of the appellate division which does
not finally determine [the] proceeding”).
Until defendants try to obtain relief from New York’s
highest court, this Court cannot and should not act. That
defendants have not taken that modest step should have
resulted in the denial of the stay they seek.
3

B
The limits on this Court’s authority to review state
courts’ judgments exist for a reason: They reinforce basic
federalism values. This Court has long held that, con-
sistent with States’ sovereignty, state courts can resolve
both federal- and state-law issues. See Claflin v. House-
man, 93 U. S. 130, 136–137 (1876). This Court has also rec-
ognized that, as early as 1793, “Congress adopted a general
policy under which state proceedings ‘should normally be
allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower
federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the
state appellate courts and ultimately this Court.’
” Chick
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U. S. 140, 146 (1988); see 28
U. S. C. §2283. This policy of allowing state courts to adju-
dicate cases free of federal interference, even when those
cases involve federal issues, “is a necessary concomitant of
the Framers’ decision to authorize, and Congress’ decision
——————
3
JUSTICE ALITO faults me for “duck[ing]” the merits. Ante, at 4. Juris-
dictional rules, however, do not depend on the underlying merits. Lance
v. Coffman, 549 U. S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam) (Federal courts “must
determine that they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits”);
but see ante, at 1–2 (discussing merits before jurisdiction).

8 MALLIOTAKIS v. WILLIAMS

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts.”
Chick Kam Choo, 486 U. S., at 146.
To persuade this Court to violate these principles and in-
terfere with the New York courts, defendants assert that
this Court must act now because doing so is “necessary or
appropriate in aid of [this Court’s] jurisdictio[n]” under the
All Writs Act. §1651(a). That assertion is perplexing. This
Court lacks jurisdiction over the trial court’s interlocutory
order, see supra, at 4–7, and “[w]e have long held [that t]he
authority to issue a writ under the All Writs Act is not a
font of jurisdiction,” United States v. Denedo, 556 U. S. 904,
914 (2009).
Even assuming that that Act permits this Court to go be-
yond its jurisdictional limits, it requires that the Court’s ac-
tions today aid its ability to hear and decide a federal ques-
tion later.
4
See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive
Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 295 (1970). The majority’s unrea-
soned order, however, gives no reasons at all for why its in-
tervention meets that requirement. Defendants, for their
part, argue that this Court’s intervention is needed because
the primary election is right around the corner. If this
Court does not act now, they say, then it will not be able to
act before the election.
That argument starts from a flawed premise. It assumes,
for no apparent reason, that this Court will need to act at
all, never mind by any deadline. If the trial court’s federal
constitutional errors are as obvious as defendants claim
they are, then the Court of Appeals could very well give
them the relief they seek. The Court of Appeals also could
decide that the trial court decided a novel question of state
constitutional law incorrectly or that the novelty of the
——————
4
Title 28 U. S. C. §2101(f ) also does not authorize the relief defendants
seek. That statute permits this Court to stay a “final judgment or decree
of any court [that] is subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of
certiorari.” For all the reasons explained in the text, there is no final
judgment reviewable by this Court.

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
state-law question warrants a stay pending appeal. It also
could decide that the trial court erred on any one of several
independent state-law grounds that defendants have raised
in the courts below. See Brief for Respondent Kathy Hochul
et al. 16–20. Yet neither defendants nor the majority afford
the Court of Appeals a chance to do any of those things.
Next, defendants’ supposed time constraints are illusory.
The general election is eight months away and the primary
is about four months away. That is more than enough time
for defendants to, at the very least, seek a stay from the
Court of Appeals. It is also enough time for the New York
courts to decide this case finally on the merits. The New
York courts are surely aware that their State is without a
congressional districting plan in the middle of an election
year and that they must act swiftly in the weeks ahead.
The New York Constitution directs state courts to do just
that: They must prioritize apportionment disputes above all
other matters. See Art. VI, §5. New York courts take that
command seriously. In 2022, for example, the Appellate Di-
vision decided an appeal in a partisan gerrymandering
challenge in just 21 days. As for the Court of Appeals, it
needed only 6.
5

Even if 6 days is still somehow not fast enough for the
majority, New York courts can move the primary election
date. They did just that in 2022 to leave enough time to
resolve state-court litigation, ensure that state law was be-
ing followed, and give the State enough time to implement
new maps before the election. See United States v. New
York, 2022 WL 1473259, *1 (NDNY, May 10, 2022); see also
Harkenrider v. Hochul, 38 N. Y. 3d 494, 522, 197 N. E. 3d
437, 454–455 (2022).
——————
5
The trial court issued its decision on March 31, 2022. Harkenrider v.
Hochul, 173 N. Y. S. 3d 109. The Appellate Division decided the appeal
on April 21, 2022. Harkenrider v. Hochul, 204 App. Div. 3d 1366, 167
N. Y. S. 3d 659. The Court of Appeals issued its decision on April 27,
2022. Harkenrider v. Hochul, 38 N. Y. 3d 494, 197 N. E. 3d 437.

10 MALLIOTAKIS v. WILLIAMS

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
In short, there is every reason to think that the New York
courts will fully, swiftly, and prudently resolve this case be-
fore the primary election. Basic federalism principles,
which have bound federal courts since the founding, require
giving the New York courts a fair opportunity to do so. The
majority, however, denies them that chance.
C
The majority’s decision to grant relief here is also irrec-
oncilable with its repeated admonishing of lower federal
courts not to interfere with state election laws on the “eve
of an election.” Republican National Committee v. Demo-
cratic National Committee, 589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020) (per
curiam). Known as the “Purcell principle,” this doctrine
generally holds that, because late-breaking changes to elec-
tion procedures can cause chaos, federal courts should hes-
itate before exercising their equitable discretion to alter
state election laws close to an election. Merrill v. Milligan,
595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring in
grant of application for stays) (slip op., at 4); see also Purcell
v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam). Importantly,
this Court has never applied Purcell to prevent state courts
from adjudicating state-law election disputes, even when
state-court action might cause “confusion,” ante, at 4. “It is
one thing for a State on its own to toy with its election laws
close to a State’s elections. But it is quite another thing for
a federal court to swoop in and re-do a State’s election laws
in the period close to an election.” See Milligan, 595 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 4) (opinion of K
AVANAUGH, J.).
The Court has deployed Purcell at least three times in the
last five years to stay federal-court injunctions of state re-
districting plans months ahead of an upcoming election.
Just this past December, the Court relied on Purcell to stay
a Federal District Court’s injunction against Texas’s con-
gressional districting plan ahead of the primary election in
March. Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citizens,

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
607 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (LULAC) (slip op., at 2); see id., at
___ (K
AGAN, J., dissenting from grant of application for
stay) (slip op., at 15). That District Court, this Court
chided, “improperly inserted itself into an active primary
campaign, causing much confusion and upsetting the deli-
cate federal-state balance in elections.” Id., at ___ (majority
opinion) (slip op., at 2). Similarly, this Court stayed a Fed-
eral District Court’s injunction of Alabama’s congressional
districts issued four months ahead of the next primary elec-
tion, even though this Court later held that map unlawful.
Milligan, 595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1); see id., at ___
(K
AGAN, J., dissenting from grant of application for stays)
(slip op., at 10); Allen v. Milligan, 599 U. S. 1, 23 (2023). It
even stayed a federal injunction of Louisiana’s congres-
sional districts more than six months before the next elec-
tion. Robinson v. Callais, 601 U. S. ___ (2024) (slip op., at
1); see id., at ___ (J
ACKSON, J., dissenting from grant of ap-
plications for stay) (slip op., at 2).
I disagreed with the majority’s position in those cases
that the “eve” of an election is four (never mind six) months
long. Apparently, the majority now thinks so too, but only
for this case. Four months before an election may be too
late for a lower federal court to act, but it is not too late for
this Court to upend a State’s administration of its own elec-
tion laws. What was “imprope[r]” just this past December,
LULAC, 607 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2), is now “necessary
or appropriate,” 28 U. S. C. §1651(a). Both state courts and
lower federal courts deserve more than the majority’s unex-
plained about-face.
6

Some Members of this Court have expressed the view
that Purcell does not bar federal-court action when “the un-
derlying merits are entirely clearcut in favor of the
——————
6
JUSTICE ALITO suggests that this Court must act today because Pur-
cell might prevent it from acting later. Ante, at 4. In so doing, he turns
what is supposed to be a “principle of restraint,” ibid., into an excuse for
intemperance.

12 MALLIOTAKIS v. WILLIAMS

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
plaintiff.” Milligan, 595 U. S., at ___ (opinion of
K
AVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 5). Whatever clarity the ma-
jority may have found in this case is hard to discern. The
trial court’s order, to be sure, calls for creating a crossover
district, and Members of this Court have previously noted
that intentionally creating such a district raises “serious
constitutional questions.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U. S.
1, 18 (2009) (plurality opinion) (addressing crossover dis-
tricts). Even so, no remedial district has been drawn yet,
and it is not remotely clear that one would have been drawn
after the New York appellate courts reviewed the trial
court’s decision. The majority, however, seems to have no
doubts that whatever district may or may not be drawn nec-
essarily will violate the Federal Constitution, regardless of
how it might be configured, regardless of how the New York
Independent Redistricting Commission might go about
drawing it, and regardless of what state law might actually
require. All this, even though this Court has purposefully
left open the constitutionality of crossover districts. See
Bartlett, 556 U. S., at 21 (plurality opinion); see also Be-
thune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 580 U. S. 178,
192 (2017) (holding that “the use of an express racial target”
in redistricting must be evaluated in context based on the
district as a whole). The Court should not so prematurely
and dismissively decide so serious a question.
7

——————
7
Far from “baseless,” ante, at 4, my opinion is based entirely on what
JUSTICE ALITO and the majority have done in the recent past. JUSTICE
ALITO frets that if the Court does not act today, then New York may be
able to hold an election using an illegal map. Ibid. Yet he himself relied
on Purcell just four years ago to permit Alabama to hold an election using
a map that this Court later held was unlawful under a “faithfu[l] ap-
pli[cation of] our precedents” and “the law as it exists.” Allen v. Milligan,
599 U. S. 1, 23 (2023); Merrill v. Milligan, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022)
(K
AVANAUGH, J., joined by ALITO, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2). In any
event, JUSTICE ALITO’s fears are unwarranted. Again, the general elec-
tion is eight months away. During that time, defendants could seek a
stay of the trial court’s order before the Court of Appeals, or reversal on

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13

S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
* * *
If this Court’s grasping reach extends even to a nonfinal
decision of a state trial court, then every decision from any
court is now fair game. By granting these applications, the
Court thrusts itself into the middle of every election-law
dispute around the country, even as many States redraw
their congressional maps ahead of the 2026 election. It also
invites parties searching for a sympathetic ear to file emer-
gency applications directly with this Court, without even
bothering to ask the state courts first. There is much rea-
son to question whether the majority will exercise its new-
found authority wisely, but there is no reason to question
this: If you build it, they will come.
I respectfully dissent.
——————
the merits before both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.
If neither of those courts grants them relief, then a new map will have to
be devised and implemented to replace the enjoined one so that a general
election can occur in November. Thus, there will be some juncture in the
months ahead at which defendants could return to this Court with an
order that actually falls within its jurisdiction.