Trump v. American Federation of Government Employees

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1174
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES,
ET AL. v. AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[July 8, 2025]
The application for stay presented to Justice Kagan and
by her referred to the Court is granted. The May 22, 2025
preliminary injunction entered by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California, case No.
3:25–cv–3698, is stayed pending the disposition of the ap-
peal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari,
if such a writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied,
this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certi-
orari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending
down of the judgment of this Court.
The District Court’s injunction was based on its view that
Executive Order No. 14210, 90 Fed. Reg. 9669 (2025), and
a joint memorandum from the Office of Management and
Budget and Office of Personnel Management implementing
that Executive Order are unlawful. Because the Govern-
ment is likely to succeed on its argument that the Executive
Order and Memorandum are lawful—and because the other
factors bearing on whether to grant a stay are satisfied—
we grant the application. We express no view on the legal-
ity of any Agency RIF and Reorganization Plan produced or
approved pursuant to the Executive Order and Memoran-
dum. The District Court enjoined further implementation
or approval of the plans based on its view about the illegal-
ity of the Executive Order and Memorandum, not on any

2 TRUMP v. AMERICAN FEDERATION
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OTOMAYOR, J., concurring
assessment of the plans themselves. Those plans are not
before this Court.
J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring in the grant of stay.
I agree with J
USTICE JACKSON that the President can-
not restructure federal agencies in a manner inconsistent
with congressional mandates. See post, at 13. Here, how-
ever, the relevant Executive Order directs agencies to plan
reorganizations and reductions in force “consistent with ap-
plicable law,” App. to Application for Stay 2a, and the re-
sulting joint memorandum from the Office of Management
and Budget and Office of Personnel Management reiterates
as much. The plans themselves are not before this Court,
at this stage, and we thus have no occasion to consider
whether they can and will be carried out consistent with the
constraints of law. I join the Court’s stay because it leaves
the District Court free to consider those questions in the
first instance.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1174
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES,
ET AL. v. AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[July 8, 2025]
JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting from the grant of applica-
tion for stay.
Under our Constitution, Congress has the power to estab-
lish administrative agencies and detail their functions.
Thus, over the past century, Presidents who have at-
tempted to reorganize the Federal Government have first
obtained authorization from Congress to do so. The Presi-
dent sharply departed from that settled practice on Febru-
ary 11, 2025, however, by allegedly arrogating this power
to himself. With no mention of congressional buy-in, the
President’s Executive Order No. 14210 mandates a “critical
transformation” of the Federal Government, to be accom-
plished by “eliminat[ing] or consolidat[ing]” existing agen-
cies and ordering agency heads to “promptly undertake
preparations to initiate large-scale reductions in force.” 90
Fed. Reg. 9669, 9670.
This unilateral decision to “transfor[m]” the Federal Gov-
ernment was quickly challenged in federal court. As rele-
vant here, the District Judge thoroughly examined the evi-
dence, considered applicable law, and made a reasoned
determination that Executive Branch officials should be en-
joined from implementing the mandated restructuring un-
til this legal challenge to the President’s authority to un-
dertake such action could be litigated. But that temporary,
practical, harm-reducing preservation of the status quo was

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ACKSON, J., dissenting
no match for this Court’s demonstrated enthusiasm for
greenlighting this President’s legally dubious actions in an
emergency posture.
The Court has now stayed the District Court’s prelimi-
nary injunction—authorizing implementation of Executive
Order No. 14210, and all the harmful upheaval that edict
entails, while the lower courts evaluate its lawfulness. In
my view, this was the wrong decision at the wrong moment,
especially given what little this Court knows about what is
actually happening on the ground.
To be specific: What is at issue here is whether Executive
Order No. 14210 effects a massive restructuring of the Fed-
eral Government (the likes of which have historically re-
quired Congress’s approval), on the one hand, or minor
workforce reductions consistent with existing law, on the
other. One needs facts to answer that critical question, and
the District Court not only issued such preliminary findings
based on actual evidence, it is also the tribunal best posi-
tioned to make that determination, at least initially. Put
differently, from its lofty perch far from the facts or the ev-
idence, this Court lacks the capacity to fully evaluate, much
less responsibly override, reasoned lower court factfinding
about what this challenged executive action actually en-
tails. I respectfully dissent because, in addition to the Gov-
ernment’s failure to show the exigency or irreparable harm
that is required for emergency relief, this Court could not
possibly know in this posture whether the Government is
likely to succeed on the merits with respect to such a fact-
dependent dispute. So it should have left well enough
alone.
I
This is not the first time that a President has wanted to
restructure the Federal Government. Even the most cur-
sory examination of history readily reveals that, over the

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ACKSON, J., dissenting
past century, Presidents have worked with Congress—ra-
ther than around it—when seeking to significantly reorgan-
ize the agencies that comprise the Executive Branch.
Aside from prior wartime-specific grants of reorganiza-
tion authority, Congress first gave general reorganization
authority to President Hoover in the 1930s. S. Rep. No.
115–381, p. 4 (2018) (detailing history of interactions be-
tween Congress and the President concerning reorganiza-
tions). At that time, Congress delegated specific authority
to the President to transfer agencies between departments,
consolidate agencies, and change the functions of agencies.
Ibid., and n. 18 (citing Legislative Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 1933, §§401, 403, 47 Stat. 413).
Since then, Congress has considered similar requests for
reorganization authority, and it has granted such authority
(for limited time periods) to eight more Presidents, includ-
ing Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Ken-
nedy, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan. S. Rep. No. 115–381, at
4. Far from fully ceding to Presidents unfettered discretion
to reorganize the Executive Branch, Congress has, in fact,
“amended, extended, narrowed, or reactivated [its] govern-
ment reorganization authority 16 times under both Repub-
lican and Democratic administrations.” Ibid.
The many reorganization acts that Congress has passed
since 1932 vary in the degree of discretion conferred. But
all have given Congress a say before the President has im-
plemented any proposed plans to reorganize agencies’
structures. Ibid. Pursuant to that process, as of the last
time Congress expressly granted this reorganization au-
thority, “presidents [had] submitted 126 reorganization
proposals to Congress, of which 93 were implemented and
33 were affirmatively rejected by Congress.” Id., at 5.
To understand the nature of these reorganization acts,
consider the last one Congress enacted. The Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1984 allowed President Reagan to make signifi-

4 TRUMP v. AMERICAN FEDERATION
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
cant changes to the structure of agencies based upon a find-
ing that such changes were necessary to carry out specified
policies. 5 U. S. C. §901(a). Congress defined “reorganiza-
tion” to include (1) “the transfer of the whole or a part of an
agency,” (2) “the abolition of all or a part of the functions of
an agency,” (3) “the consolidation or coordination of the
whole or a part of an agency, or of the whole or a part of the
functions thereof, with the whole or a part of another
agency or the functions thereof,” (4) “the consolidation or
coordination of part of an agency or the functions thereof
with another part of the same agency or the functions
thereof,” (5) “the authorization of an officer to delegate any
of his functions,” and (6) “the abolition of the whole or a part
of an agency.” §903(a). Under the 1984 law, President
Reagan was required to submit his reorganization plans to
Congress, which could request further information about
those plans. §903(b). This latest reorganization act expired
in 1984, and Congress has not renewed it since. §905(b).
Congress has not only granted presidential requests for
reorganization authority; it has also rejected such requests
at times. For instance, in 2012, President Obama asked
Congress to reauthorize a modified version of the 1984 Re-
organization Act for two years. S. Rep. No. 115–381, at 6.
President Obama indicated that he planned to consolidate
several business and trade agencies. Ibid. But Congress
never passed the proposed legislation. Ibid. President
George W. Bush and President Trump (in his first term)
also unsuccessfully sought reorganization authority from
Congress. H. Hogue, Congressional Research Service Re-
port to Congress, Presidential Reorganization Authority
32–33 (2012); H. R. 6787, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2018); S.
3137, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2018).
To be sure, historical precedent exists for a President to
direct smaller-scale workforce reductions without first ob-
taining congressional authorization. In 1993, for example,
President Clinton issued an executive order to reduce the

5 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
size of the federal workforce by requiring agencies to elimi-
nate four percent of their full-time positions over three
years. Exec. Order No. 12839, 58 Fed. Reg. 8515 (1993).
That order did not mandate reductions in force or reorgan-
izations, however. Instead, the workforce reduction was to
be achieved “through attrition or early out programs estab-
lished at the discretion of the department and agency
heads.” Ibid. And President Clinton also later obtained
congressional authorization for his plans. See Federal
Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 111.
Historical practice thus confirms that, while Presidents
possess some discretion to reduce federal employment, they
may not fundamentally restructure the Federal Govern-
ment all on their own. Administrative agencies are created
by statute and funded by Congress; therefore, Presidents
have traditionally worked with Congress to effect signifi-
cant alterations of those statutory structures. This history
is crucial to understand, because it establishes the “status
quo” when it comes to the relative roles of Congress and the
President in reorganizing the Federal Government.
II
Given this background, one might have expected this
President, like his predecessors, to obtain congressional au-
thorization before launching the dramatic structural over-
haul that Executive Order No. 14210 directs. That order
mandates that nearly all federal agencies “promptly under-
take preparations to initiate large-scale reductions in force
(RIFs)” and agency reorganizations. 90 Fed. Reg. 9670.
And, as I previously noted, the order does not mandate pre-
implementation authorization by Congress. Instead, it re-
quires agencies to submit “RIF and Reorganization Plans”
to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Ibid.
The Directors of OMB and the Office of Personnel Man-
agement (OPM) have issued a Memorandum (Feb. 26, 2025)

6 TRUMP v. AMERICAN FEDERATION
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
pursuant to Executive Order No. 14210 instructing depart-
ment and agency heads to submit reorganization plans for
review by OMB, OPM, and the Department of Government
Efficiency. As justification for this directive, the Memoran-
dum points to the President’s promise “to sweepingly re-
form the federal government.” App. to Application for Stay
4a (App.). The Memorandum also directs agency heads to
prioritize reducing full-time employment positions, so as to
achieve “maximum elimination of functions that are not
statutorily mandated,” and to cut “components and posi-
tions that are non-critical.” Id., at 5a. And while the Mem-
orandum does require agencies to consider planning for
some degree of eventual congressional engagement, the ex-
ecutive action itself does not rest on any grant of reorgani-
zation authority by Congress. Nor could it, as Congress has
not granted such authority to the President.
1
Unions, nonprofits, and local governments filed this law-
suit challenging what they allege to be a dramatic plan to
dismantle the Federal Government without congressional
authorization. At the preliminary-relief stage, the District
Court’s task was to focus on how “to preserve the relative
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be
held, and to balance the equities as the litigation moves for-
ward.” Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op.,
——————
1
As I understand the present situation, a specific proposal to extend
reorganization authority to this President exists, see Reorganizing Gov-
ernment Act of 2025, H. R. 1295, 119th Cong., 1st Sess. (2025), but it has
yet to be enacted. Some members of Congress also proposed extending
reorganization authority to the President through the recently passed
domestic policy bill, but the final legislation did not do so. Compare Sen-
ate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Draft
Reconciliation Bill Text §90107 (June 12, 2025), https://www.paul.
senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/MDM25B50.pdf (proposing ex-
tension of explicit reorganization authority), with H. R. 1, 119th Cong.,
1st Sess. §90103 (2025) (appropriating funds for “finding budget and ac-
counting efficiencies in the executive branch” but making no reference to
reorganization authority).

7 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
at 6) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moreover, and notably, the central question the District
Court faced was primarily one of fact: Was the President
actually engaging in mere reductions in force consistent
with existing law, as the Government asserted? Or were
the plaintiffs right that the President was really attempting
to fundamentally reorganize the structure of the Govern-
ment? If the latter, historical precedent confirms that pre-
serving the status quo would mean temporarily preventing
the President from unilaterally doing what his predecessors
only did after receiving specific authorization from Con-
gress.
The District Court received extensive evidence from the
plaintiffs and scant submissions from the Government, and
it carefully reviewed everything before it, as I describe in
Part III–A, infra. In a detailed 55-page opinion that focuses
on the standard factors for preliminary injunctive relief, the
court then explained its fact-based conclusion: “[T]he role of
a district court is to examine the evidence, and at this stage
of the case the evidence discredits the executive’s position
and persuades the Court that plaintiffs are likely to succeed
on the merits of their suit.” App. 12a.
Notably, based on the evidence presented, the District
Court specifically found that several federal agencies were
in the process of rapidly implementing reorganizations and
large-scale reductions in force. Ibid. It also found that pro-
posed changes appeared to “intentionally or negligently
flout the tasks Congress has assigned” to the agencies at
issue. Ibid. And the District Court further determined that
if it did not pause this restructuring in the interim (while
the litigation is ongoing), then many “agencies will not be
able to do what Congress has directed them to do.” Ibid.
To forestall this significant harm, the court enjoined the
President’s restructuring mandate for the duration of the
lawsuit “[t]o preserve the status quo and protect the power
of the legislative branch.” Id., at 14a. The Ninth Circuit

8 TRUMP v. AMERICAN FEDERATION
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
then declined to upset that temporary injunction during the
appeal. Id., at 69a.
III
Instead of directing its attention and resources to fully
litigating the merits of the challenge to its authority in the
courts below, the Government rushed up the chain of re-
view, seeking an emergency stay of the District Court’s pre-
liminary injunction from us. We thus faced the question
whether to override the judgments of the two courts below
by allowing the President to proceed immediately with im-
plementing his restructuring plans. To answer “no” to that
question is simply to preserve the status quo while the
lower courts expeditiously decide the lawfulness of the
President’s order. To answer “yes”—as the Court now
does—is to allow an apparently unprecedented and con-
gressionally unsanctioned dismantling of the Federal Gov-
ernment to continue apace, causing irreparable harm be-
fore courts can determine whether the President has the
authority to engage in the actions he proposes.
A
As I see the choice before us, the Court’s merits-focused
approach to granting this stay is particularly problematic
because the District Court’s decision to issue an injunction
was based on findings of fact. It is not this Court’s role to
swoop in and second-guess a lower court’s factual findings,
especially when that court has made well reasoned, prelim-
inary judgments on a developing record. But that is pre-
cisely what the majority does in granting this stay.
As I previewed above, the District Court extensively ex-
amined the evidence the parties presented, which included
68 sworn declarations from plaintiffs (totaling more than
1,400 pages) and a single declaration from the Government.
Id., at 13a, 88a. The court also completed an in camera re-
view of several proposed agency reorganization plans (plans

9 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
that the Government did not submit in its application to
this Court). Based on its review of all of this evidence, the
District Court found that the plaintiffs were likely to suc-
ceed in showing that the challenged Executive Order and
Memorandum seek to effect a fundamental transformation
of the Federal Government, rather than mere reductions in
force consistent with existing statutory authority. Still, de-
spite this factbound determination and the extensive fact-
finding that supports it, the Court now cavalierly concludes
(in just one line) that “the Government is likely to succeed
on its argument that the Executive Order and Memoran-
dum are lawful.” Ante, at 1.
To be clear: Today’s merits dispute is not about the Pres-
ident’s ability to unilaterally restructure the Federal Gov-
ernment—no one argues that it is lawful for him to do so.
Instead, the President insists that his Administration’s ac-
tions in carrying out the Executive Order and Memoran-
dum are an exercise of existing executive-branch authority
to make staffing decisions, not a fundamental reorganiza-
tion of the Federal Government. Application for Stay 5–6.
So, the merits question for purposes of interim relief is
whether that is likely true.
The District Court considered that issue and found the
consistent-with-law language in the Executive Order and
Memorandum to be inconsistent with the factual record.
App. 49a–51a; see also supra, at 7–8, and n. 2, infra. For
instance, the court highlighted plans to terminate more
than half of many agencies’ staff and to “practically wipe
out” entire agencies. App. 50a. And those plans were not
outliers; rather, according to the District Court, they ap-
pear to reflect the whole point of this executive action.
2
The
——————
2
Due to the Government’s refusal to disclose nearly all agency reor-
ganization plans (except for four that the District Court reviewed in cam-
era), App. 20a, 46a, the details remain murky in this preliminary pos-
ture. But the Government concedes that—as of May 16—about 40
reductions in force were already in progress across 17 agencies. Id., at

10 TRUMP v. AMERICAN FEDERATION
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District Court’s preliminary factfinding was vital to its con-
clusion that plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that
the challenged executive action amounts to a wholesale gov-
ernment reorganization. Thus, the majority’s rejection of
that determination—i.e., its passing reference to the law-
fulness of the Executive Order and Memorandum—must
rest on a conclusion that the District Court was wrong
about the facts of what is really happening to agencies and
their employees pursuant to this executive action.
That approach is plainly inconsistent with this Court’s
traditional role. District courts are far better suited than
appellate courts (this one especially) to evaluate facts on
the ground. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564,
574–575 (1985) (explaining that trial judges’ expertise in
making factual determinations warrants deference on ap-
peal). Accordingly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6)
establishes that a trial court’s factual findings “must not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous.” And this Court has, his-
torically, acknowledged its own limitations, citing the “well-
settled rule” that “factual findings are reviewable only for
clear error,” “with a serious thumb on the scale” supporting
the district court’s evaluation of evidence. U. S. Bank N. A.
v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. 387, 394 (2018).
What is more, deference toward lower court factfinding
should be at its peak at this extremely early stage of the
——————
18a. Moreover, the extensive (and unrebutted) record demonstrates that
those planned personnel changes are massive. The District Court cited
multiple examples to illustrate this point, including proposed reductions
in force of approximately 93 percent of employees at the National Insti-
tute for Occupational Safety and Health, nearly half the workforce at the
Department of Energy, and more than half the workforce of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association. Id., at 18a, 50a. Also in evidence
were proposed cuts of 70 percent of the staff at the Department of Labor’s
headquarters and 83,000 workers at the Department of Veterans Affairs,
just to name a few. Id., at 18a; see also id., at 82a (Ninth Circuit recita-
tion of agencies proposing to eliminate more than 85 percent of their
workforces).

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ACKSON, J., dissenting
litigation process—when what we are considering is an ap-
plication for an emergency stay of a preliminary injunction.
Even when deciding the actual appeal of a preliminary in-
junction (still down the road), “this Court may only consider
whether issuance of the injunction constituted an abuse of
discretion.” Brown v. Chote, 411 U. S. 452, 457 (1973).
The clear-error review that governs factual findings, (see
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 52(a)(2), (6)), and the deference owed
to a district court’s issuance of preliminary relief weigh
heavily against intervening to override the reasoned, fact-
based judgments of the lower courts. Add to that the re-
quirement that an applicant for emergency relief make not
just a showing, but a “‘strong’ ” one, “‘that he is likely to
succeed on the merits,’” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434
(2009) (emphasis added), and it is no wonder that this Court
has long considered stays to be “extraordinary” relief. Cf.
Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. S. 1201, 1203 (1972) (Powell, J., in
chambers) (explaining that this Court grants stays pending
appeal “only in extraordinary circumstances” because a
“lower court judgment, entered by a tribunal that was
closer to the facts . . . is entitled to a presumption of valid-
ity”). Together, these deferential standards should make it
the truly rare occasion that this Court uses its emergency
docket to overrule district courts’ fact-based, preliminary
determinations on the merits. That also makes perfect
sense in light of quickly developing records and lower courts
that are far better acquainted with those facts.
But, today, this Court once again ignores all of this while
casually discarding 55 pages of evidence-based lower court
reasoning. On what grounds does the majority deviate from
the District Court’s fact-based findings here? Has it found
that the court below clearly erred with respect to its assess-
ment of the evidence? Has it opted to simply ignore the
well-settled deferential standards of review? Has it made
its own factual findings about the nature, scope, and extent
of the Government’s reorganization activities? All of these

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possibilities are problematic. And because the Court pro-
vides no explanation for its likelihood-of-success conclusion,
the answers to these crucial questions are also anyone’s
guess.
3
B
The Court’s disregard for the District Court’s factfinding
(and also, apparently, for the applicable standards of re-
view) would be troubling enough when viewed through a
mere procedural lens. But it is all the more puzzling, and
ultimately disheartening, given the extraordinary risk of
harm that today’s ruling immediately unleashes.
No one seriously disputes that, if implemented, Executive
Order No. 14210 will lead to enormous real-world conse-
quences. This executive action promises mass employee
terminations, widespread cancellation of federal programs
and services, and the dismantling of much of the Federal
Government as Congress has created it. As the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded, the statutory shortfalls likely to result from
implementation of this Executive Order will be immensely
painful to the general public, and the plaintiffs, in the in-
terim, causing harm that includes “proliferat[ing] food-
borne disease,” perpetuating “hazardous environmental
conditions,” “eviscerat[ing] disaster loan services for local
businesses,” and “drastically reduc[ing] the provision of
——————
3
The Court does observe that the specific reorganization plans are not
yet before it. Ante, at 1–2. But that suggests that the Court is in a posi-
tion to assess the lawfulness of this executive action (for now) by ignoring
what the Government is actually doing. The District Court’s careful,
sensible, and detailed consideration of what is happening in the real
world belies that assumption; indeed, it ably demonstrates that the like-
lihood of success on the merits of the legal claims at issue here can only
be determined relative to facts, no matter how much the majority ma-
neuvers to get around them. If every (or nearly every) reorganization
plan seeks to gut federal agencies—as the evidence indicates so far—
then the whole executive action is unlawful, not just each individual
plan.

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ACKSON, J., dissenting
healthcare and other services to our nation’s veterans.”
App. 94a. Preventing those kinds of calamities is just a
small slice of the work that federal employees do to carry
out Congress’s statutory mandates—work that the Execu-
tive Order immediately imperils if implemented.
Consider the harms to democracy, too, if it turns out that
the plaintiffs and the lower courts are right that the Presi-
dent is unilaterally changing the structure of the Federal
Government. What one person (or President) might call bu-
reaucratic bloat is a farmer’s prospect for a healthy crop, a
coal miner’s chance to breathe free from black lung, or a
preschooler’s opportunity to learn in a safe environment.
The details of the programs that this executive action tar-
gets are the product of policy choices that Congress has
made—a representative democracy at work. While the
President no doubt has the authority to manage the Execu-
tive Branch, our system does not allow the President to re-
write laws on his own under the guise of that authority.
“The President’s power, if any, to issue [an executive] or-
der must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U. S. 579, 585 (1952). This constraint on the Pres-
ident is protective of democracy, not an impediment to it.
That is, although the President is an elected representative
with a claim on the popular will, so too are the People’s rep-
resentatives in Congress—and our Constitution gives them
the power to make laws. If a President runs roughshod over
the carefully crafted statutes that authorize and animate
the Federal Government (as the District Court’s prelimi-
nary findings show to be likely happening here), he discards
and disables the democratic system that created those laws.
It is the duty of judges to safeguard that system. Partic-
ularly when a President “takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress,” his claim to
power “must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional

14 TRUMP v. AMERICAN FEDERATION
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system.” Id., at 637–638 (R. Jackson, J., concurring). But,
today, the Court exercises neither caution nor scrutiny, es-
pecially compared to the reasoned decisions issued by the
courts below. With scant justification, the majority permits
the immediate and potentially devastating aggrandizement
of one branch (the Executive) at the expense of another
(Congress), and once again leaves the People paying the
price for its reckless emergency-docket determinations.
* * *
Given the fact-based nature of the issue in this case and
the many serious harms that result from allowing the Pres-
ident to dramatically reconfigure the Federal Government,
it was eminently reasonable for the District Court to main-
tain the status quo while the courts evaluate the lawfulness
of the President’s executive action. At bottom, this case is
about whether that action amounts to a structural overhaul
that usurps Congress’s policymaking prerogatives—and it
is hard to imagine deciding that question in any meaningful
way after those changes have happened. Yet, for some rea-
son, this Court sees fit to step in now and release the Pres-
ident’s wrecking ball at the outset of this litigation.
In my view, this decision is not only truly unfortunate but
also hubristic and senseless. Lower court judges have their
fingers on the pulse of what is happening on the ground and
are indisputably best positioned to determine the relevant
facts—including those that underlie fair assessments of the
merits, harms, and equities. I see no basis to conclude that
the District Court erred—let alone clearly so—in finding
that the President is attempting to fundamentally restruc-
ture the Federal Government. Therefore, I would not dis-
rupt the lower courts’ preservation of the status quo. In-
stead, I would leave intact their protection of the historical
relationship between Congress and the President, prevent-
ing irreparable harm to the plaintiffs and the public while

15 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
JACKSON, J., dissenting
the Judiciary does the critical work of evaluating this exer-
cise of power.