Wiggins v. United States

1 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ANTOINE WIGGINS v. UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 24–6410. Decided June 30, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE
BARRETT joins, respecting the denial of certiorari.
This case implicates a split among the Courts of Appeals
over the proper definition of a “controlled substance of-
fense” under §4B1.2(b) of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
Manual §4B1.2(b) (Nov. 2024) (USSG). The Circuits have
reached different conclusions on whether such offenses
must involve a prohibited drug under state law, federal law,
or either. See Guerrant v. United States, 595 U. S. ___, ___–
___ (2022) (statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J., respecting denial
of certiorari) (slip op., at 1–2) (collecting cases).
Three years ago, I urged the Sentencing Commission to
“resume its important function in our criminal justice sys-
tem,” including by resolving that conflict. Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 3). At the time, the Commission could not do so be-
cause it lacked a quorum of voting members. Just months
later, however, the Commission regained a quorum, ena-
bling it to amend the Guidelines. See Commission Regains
a Quorum for The First Time in Three Years, Enabling it
To Amend Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Issue Sentenc-
ing Policy (Aug. 5, 2022), https://www.ussc.gov/about/
news/press-releases/august-5-2022. Yet while the Com-
mission has since acknowledged the split, see, e.g., 87 Fed.
Reg. 60439 (2022), it has not resolved it. Nor, it seems, does
it plan to do so in the 2025–2026 amendment cycle. See
Federal Register Notice of Proposed 2025–2026 Priorities

2 WIGGINS v. UNITED STATES
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
(June 9, 2025), http://www.ussc.gov/policymaking/federal-
register - notices / federal - register - notice-proposed-2025-
2026-priorities.
In the meantime, the disagreement among the Circuits
over the proper definition of a “controlled substance of-
fense” has not only persisted, but deepened. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dubois, 94 F. 4th 1284, 1294–1296 (CA11
2024) (holding that a state-law drug offense counts); United
States v. Lewis, 58 F. 4th 764 (CA3 2023) (same); United
States v. Minor, 121 F. 4th 1084, 1089–1090 (CA5 2024)
(holding that state-law offense counts only if it is a categor-
ical match for a federal offense); United States v. House, 31
F. 4th 745, 752–753 (CA9 2022) (same). This issue is an
important one: Whether the term “controlled substance of-
fense” refers to a “controlled substance” under state or fed-
eral law (or both) can determine whether certain defend-
ants will qualify as a “career offender” under the
Guidelines, see USSG §4B1.1(a), and therefore “face dra-
matically higher sentencing ranges for their crime of con-
viction,” Guerrant, 595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1). So long
as the split persists, two defendants whose criminal histo-
ries include identical drug offenses and who commit the
same federal crime will be subject to significantly different
sentencing ranges based solely on geography. Yet in our
federal system, a defendant’s location should not determine
the severity of his punishment.
It remains “the responsibility of the Sentencing Commis-
sion to address this division to ensure fair and uniform ap-
plication of the Guidelines.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (citing
Braxton v. United States, 500 U. S. 344, 348 (1991)). If the
Commission does not intend to resolve the split, it should
provide an explanation so that this Court can decide
whether to address the issue and restore uniformity.