MacRae v. Mattos

1 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KARI MACRAE v. MATTHEW MATTOS, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 24–355. Decided June 30, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of J
USTICE THOMAS, respecting the denial of
certiorari.
Hanover Public Schools and two of its officials (collec-
tively, respondents) fired petitioner Kari MacRae for her
pre-employment political expression on the social-media
platform TikTok. Through her personal account, MacRae
had “liked, shared, posted, or reposted” six memes—images
or other items that are “‘spread widely online’”—expressing
her views that immigration laws should be enforced, that
an individual’s sex is immutable, and that society should be
racially color-blind. 106 F. 4th 122, 126–128, and n. 1 (CA1
2024). After her firing, MacRae sued respondents for “re-
taliating against her for exercising her First Amendment
rights.” Id., at 130. But, the District Court granted sum-
mary judgment to respondents, and the First Circuit af-
firmed, finding that MacRae had not established a pro-
tected First Amendment interest under this Court’s
framework for public-employee speech. Because her peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari does not squarely challenge the
First Circuit’s application of that framework, I agree with
our decision to deny it. I write separately, however, to raise
serious concerns about the First Circuit’s approach.
Our precedents establish that “the First Amendment pro-
tects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to
speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 417 (2006). Although
“[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words

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Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
and actions,” they can regulate their employees’ private
speech about “matters of public concern” only to the extent
“necessary . . . to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id., at
418–419. Under the so-called Pickering-Garcetti frame-
work, whether such speech is protected turns on a balanc-
ing test, wherein the employee’s speech interest is weighed
against the government’s interest as an employer in avoid-
ing workplace disruption. See Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 419;
Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist.
205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968).
This case turns on the balancing component of the Pickering-
Garcetti framework. All agree that MacRae’s TikTok posts
qualify as speech on matters of public concern, but the First
Circuit concluded that the balance of interests favored re-
spondents. That court first discounted the value of
MacRae’s speech interest because her posts, which are re-
produced below, at times spoke in what the court described
as a “mocking, derogatory, and disparaging manner.” (See
Figures 1 and 2.) 106 F. 4th, at 137; see Pet. for Cert. 7
(reproducing posts).
Figure 1. Kari MacRae TikTok posts

3 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
Figure 2. Kari MacRae TikTok posts
In contrast, the First Circuit explained that respond-
ents—who fired MacRae out of “concer[n] about the poten-
tial negative impact [her] social media posts would have on
staff and students”—had a “‘strong’” interest in avoiding
disruption, and that they made a “reasonable prediction of
disruption.” 106 F. 4th, at 130, 137–138. The court pointed
to factors such as the public attention and news coverage
MacRae had received in light of her position on a neighbor-
ing town’s school board, as well as the fact that at least
some Hanover students and staff were aware of her posts.
Id., at 139–141. It also cited the fact that “some of her Tik-
Tok posts (at least arguably) conflicted with the District’s
belief of ‘[e]nsur[ing] a safe learning environment based on
respectful relationships’ and Core Value of ‘[r]espect[ing]
. . . human differences,’” “given the potential to perceive
some of her posts as transphobic, homophobic, or racist.”
Id., at 139–140. The First Circuit concluded that, on bal-
ance, the risk of disruption outweighed MacRae’s interest.
The First Circuit’s analysis strikes me as deeply flawed.
To start, I do not see how the tone of MacRae’s posts can

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ACRAE v. MATTOS
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
bear on the weight of her First Amendment interest.
“Speech on matters of public concern is at the heart of the
First Amendment’s protection.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S.
443, 451–452 (2011) (internal quotation marks and altera-
tions omitted). And, “[t]he inappropriate or controversial
character of a statement is irrelevant to the question
whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” Rankin
v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 387 (1987). “[H]umor, satire,
and even personal invective can make a point about a mat-
ter of public concern.” De Ritis v. McGarrigle, 861 F. 3d
444, 455 (CA3 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we have declined to “affor[d] less than full
First Amendment protection” even for speech that we have
deemed “particularly hurtful,” such as the picketing signs
used by the Westboro Baptist Church. Snyder, 562 U. S.,
at 454–456; see id., at 454 (listing, among other Westboro
signs, placards reading, “‘God Hates the USA/Thank God
for 9/11,’” “‘God Hates Fags,’” and “‘Thank God for Dead
Soldiers’”).
1
Against this backdrop, I do not see how the
First Circuit could discount the First Amendment value of
MacRae’s comparatively mild posts, all of which reflected
positions that represent “by no means an isolated segment
of public opinion.” Noble v. Cincinnati and Hamilton Cty.
Public Library, 112 F. 4th 373, 382 (CA6 2024).
The First Circuit’s analysis of respondents’ countervail-
ing interest in avoiding disruption is similarly questiona-
ble. Although this Court has “consistently . . . given sub-
stantial weight to government employers’ reasonable
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1
Although Snyder was not a Pickering-Garcetti case, we grounded
our analysis in caselaw from the public-employer context. See 562
U. S., at 451–455. And, our Pickering-Garcetti cases have not treated
the tone or style of an employee’s speech as bearing on its First Amend-
ment value. Cf. Rankin, 483 U. S., at 379–380, 386–387 (recognizing,
without qualification, that a “remar[k], after hearing of an attempt on
the life of the President, ‘If they go for him again, I hope they get him,’ ”
“dealt with a matter of public concern”).

5 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
predictions of disruption,” the key word here is “reasona-
ble.” United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454,
492 (1995) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). The First Circuit
accordingly should have discarded factors whose disruptive
potential was purely speculative, such as the fact that
“ ‘some students and staff . . . were aware of ’ [MacRae’s]
posts” or that “students [were overheard] discussing her so-
cial media activity.” 106 F. 4th, at 139–140.
Even worse, the First Circuit compounded its reliance on
speculative factors with consideration of illicit ones. We
have made clear that the core First Amendment principle
of viewpoint neutrality applies in the Pickering-Garcetti
context as elsewhere. See Rankin, 483 U. S., at 384 (“Vigi-
lance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not
use authority over employees to silence discourse . . . simply
because superiors disagree with the content of employees’
speech”). Yet, the First Circuit cited an arguable conflict
between MacRae’s posts and institutional expressions of
viewpoint such as Hanover’s “Core Value of ‘[r]espect[ing]
. . . human differences’” as evidence of potential disruption.
106 F. 4th, at 139. It undermines core First Amendment
values to allow a government employer to adopt an institu-
tional viewpoint on the issues of the day and then, when
faced with a dissenting employee, portray this disagree-
ment as evidence of disruption. And, the problem is exac-
erbated in the case of an employee such as MacRae, who
expressed her views only outside the workplace and before
her employment.
Whatever the proper weight of respondents’ interest in
minimizing disruption, the First Circuit failed to conduct a
proper balancing inquiry because it improperly discounted
MacRae’s First Amendment interest. To its credit, that
court recognized that “[t]he government employer’s interest
must be proportional to the value of the employee’s speech.”
Id., at 136; see Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 152 (1983)
(“[A] stronger showing may be necessary if the employee’s

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ACRAE v. MATTOS
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
speech more substantially involved matters of public con-
cern”). But, because the court viewed MacRae’s interest as
“weigh[ing] less than it normally would,” it did not hold re-
spondents to their full burden. 106 F. 4th, at 137.
This case is the latest in a trend of lower court decisions
that have misapplied our First Amendment precedents in
cases involving controversial political speech. See, e.g.,
L. M. v. Middleborough, 605 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2025)
(A
LITO, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (slip op., at 6–13). And, a concerning number of
these cases have arisen in the context of the Pickering-Gar-
cetti framework. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton School
Dist., 586 U. S. 1130, 1132–1133 (2019) (statement of
A
LITO, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (explaining how
“the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of the free speech rights
of public school teachers is troubling”); Porter v. Board of
Trustees of N. C. State Univ., 72 F. 4th 573, 586, 595 (CA4
2023) (Richardson, J., dissenting). If left unchecked, this
number will likely increase: In many cases, government
employers may find it convenient to attempt to “restric[t]
. . . disfavored or unpopular speech in the name of prevent-
ing disruption.” Dodge v. Evergreen School Dist. #114, 56
F. 4th 767, 786 (CA9 2022). But, the Pickering-Garcetti
framework plainly forbids using “the guise of protecting ad-
ministrative interests” to “disfavor any particular view.” 56
F. 4th, at 785–787; cf. Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U. S. ___,
___ (2025) (T
HOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 11) (recog-
nizing, in the free-exercise context, that school claims of dis-
ruption must be scrutinized to avoid “giv[ing] schools a
playbook for evading the First Amendment”).
Lower courts are bound to apply the Pickering-Garcetti
framework as we have articulated it.
2
I have serious con-
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2
This obligation does not mean that the Pickering-Garcetti framework
is necessarily correct as a matter of original meaning. Given that the

7 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
cerns about how the First Circuit applied it here. But, ra-
ther than raise these broader issues, MacRae’s petition fo-
cuses on the discrete question whether the framework’s bal-
ancing test applies at all in the context of a public
employee’s “unrelated, preemployment speech.” Pet. for
Cert. i. Because I agree with the Court that this question
does not independently warrant review, I concur in the de-
nial of certiorari. In an appropriate case, I would make
clear that public employers cannot use Pickering-Garcetti
balancing generally or unsupported claims of disruption in
particular to target employees who express disfavored po-
litical views.
——————
historical rule was that “a public employee had no right to object to [em-
ployer-imposed] restrict[ions on] the exercise of constitutional rights,”
there is good reason to think it may not be. Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S.
138, 143 (1983). But, “unless and until this Court revisits it, [the Pick-
ering-Garcetti framework] is binding precedent that lower courts must
faithfully apply.” L. M. v. Middleborough, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025)
(T
HOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 1).