Libby v. Fecteau

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1 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1051
LAUREL D. LIBBY, ET AL. v. RYAN M. FECTEAU,
SPEAKER OF THE MAINE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTION
[May 20, 2025]
The application for injunction pending appeal presented
to J
USTICE JACKSON and by her referred to the Court is
granted pending disposition of the appeal in the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and disposition
of the petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely
sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be de-
nied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event
the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall
terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this
Court.
J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR would deny the application.
J
USTICE JACKSON, dissenting from the grant of the appli-
cation for injunction.
I would deny the application.
These applicants seek an injunction pending appeal.
“The All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. §1651(a), is the only source
of this Court’s authority to issue [such] an injunction.”
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 507 U. S. 1301,
1303 (1993) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers). And under our
well-established rules, relief of this sort “is not a matter of
right, but of discretion sparingly exercised.” Supreme
Court Rule 20.1. We have long recognized that this injunc-
tive relief is appropriate only when “critical and exigent cir-
cumstances” exist necessitating intervention “in aid of [our]

2 LIBBY v. FECTEAU
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
jurisdictio[n],” and the applicants’ entitlement to relief is
“indisputably clear.” Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 542 U. S. 1305, 1306 (2004) (Rehnquist,
C. J., in chambers) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
my view, these applicants have not met this high bar.
First, the applicants have failed to show that there exist
“critical and exigent circumstances” necessitating interven-
tion “in aid of [our] jurisdictio[n],” ibid.—what I have else-
where called a “line-jumping justification,” Labrador v. Poe,
601 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (opinion dissenting from grant of
stay) (slip op., at 1). The First Circuit is moving quickly to
evaluate the legal issues this case presents, with oral argu-
ment scheduled to occur in a few weeks. Meanwhile, before
us, the applicants have not asserted that there are any sig-
nificant legislative votes scheduled in the upcoming weeks;
that there are any upcoming votes in which Libby’s partici-
pation would impact the outcome; or that they will other-
wise suffer any concrete, imminent, and significant harm
while the lower court considers this matter.
Second, the applicants have not satisfied our normal cer-
tiorari factors, such as demonstrating the need to resolve a
circuit split. Supreme Court Rule 10. Instead, they request
highly fact-specific error correction concerning a question of
first impression that is unlikely to recur. We have long rec-
ognized that, to avoid end runs around the ordinary certio-
rari process, emergency relief should not be granted if the
Court would have been unlikely to grant review of the mat-
ter in any event. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183,
190 (2010) (per curiam); Does v. Mills, 595 U. S. ___, ___
(2021) (B
ARRETT, J., concurring in denial of application for
injunctive relief ) (slip op., at 1). Denying emergency relief
in a case that does not satisfy the usual certiorari factors
also avoids creating perverse incentives to seek our inter-
vention prematurely—why would any applicant who thinks
the lower courts are mistaken wait for those courts’ final

3 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
word on an issue if real-time error correction via our emer-
gency docket is readily available?
Third, these applicants have failed to demonstrate that
their right to this relief is “‘indisputably clear.’” Wisconsin
Right to Life, 542 U. S., at 1306. The Rules of the Maine
House of Representatives—adopted by the 132d Maine Leg-
islature long before the events at issue here took place—
contemplate stripping a legislative member of the ability to
vote as a sanction for certain ethical violations. See 2025
WL 1148726, *2 (D Me., Apr. 18, 2025). The House deter-
mined that Representative Libby violated those rules,
thereby triggering this sanction, when she engaged in be-
havior that a majority of the House determined “may en-
danger [a] minor.” H. Res. in No. 1:25–cv–83 (D Me., Apr.
1, 2025), ECF Doc. 29–4, p. 1.
Whether the House’s censure and resulting sanction vio-
late Libby’s constitutional rights, or those of her constitu-
ents, raises many difficult questions. What are the limits
on a state legislature’s ability to bind its members to ethics
rules? Do federal courts have the authority to determine
that those rules are improper? Does it violate a representa-
tive’s First Amendment rights to be subject to sanction un-
der such rules, and does it make a difference what the sanc-
tion is? What rights does the Federal Constitution give
constituents to override the enforcement of ethics rules of
their state legislature? Does a federal court have the power
to enjoin state representatives from enforcing a state legis-
lature’s ethics rules? And may the court enjoin legislative
employees from carrying out the will of the state legislature
with respect to that enforcement?
This Court has neither addressed nor answered most of
these questions. See, e.g., Houston Community College Sys-
tem v. Wilson, 595 U. S. 468, 482–483 (2022) (declining to
consider whether a censure accompanied by punishment
could constitute First Amendment retaliation). Others im-

4 LIBBY v. FECTEAU
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
plicate tensions in our precedent that lack an obvious reso-
lution. Compare Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 504–
506 (1969) (legislative immunity does not bar suit against
nonrepresentative employees), with Gravel v. United
States, 408 U. S. 606, 618 (1972) (legislative immunity ex-
tends to acts of nonlegislators “insofar as the conduct of the
[employee] would be a protected legislative act if performed
by the Member himself ”).
It is certainly possible that the applicants have the better
of the arguments on the merits of their claims. But in the
absence of binding precedent on any of these issues, their
right to relief is not clear, let alone indisputably so.
* * *
Not very long ago, this Court treaded carefully with re-
spect to exercising its equitable power to issue injunctive
relief at the request of a party claiming an emergency. The
opinions are legion in which individual Justices, reviewing
such requests in chambers, declined to intervene—reiterat-
ing that “such power should be used sparingly and only in
the most critical and exigent circumstances.” Williams v.
Rhodes, 89 S. Ct. 1, 2, 21 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
in chambers); see also Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy,
Inc. v. NRC, 479 U. S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (Scalia, J., in
chambers); South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. New-
som, 590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (R
OBERTS, C. J., concur-
ring in denial of application for injunctive relief ) (slip op.,
at 1–2).
Those days are no more. Today’s Court barely pauses to
acknowledge these important threshold limitations on the
exercise of its own authority. It opts instead to dole out er-
ror correction as it sees fit, regardless of the lack of any ex-
igency and even when the applicants’ claims raise signifi-
cant legal issues that warrant thorough evaluation by the
lower courts that are dutifully considering them.

5 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
I think this clear departure from past practice is both in-
equitable and unwise. For one thing, the Court’s failure to
articulate clear standards for when emergency relief is ap-
propriate makes it difficult to confidently conclude that any
such standards are actually being referenced and applied
evenhandedly. Cf. Merrill v. Milligan, 595 U. S. ___, ___–
___ (2022) (K
AGAN, J., dissenting from grant of applications
for stays) (slip op., at 11–12) (observing that our ordinary
appellate processes “serve both to constrain and to legiti-
mate the Court’s authority”). Also, as a practical matter, it
is plainly prudent to reserve our emergency docket for ap-
plicants who demonstrate that they truly need our help
now. In the absence of that showing, we can, and should,
allow even applicants with credible merits claims to litigate
their arguments in the lower courts before we get involved.
Cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005)
(demonstrating that, at least sometimes, we opt to proceed
as if “we are a court of review, not of first view”).
The watering down of our Court’s standards for granting
emergency relief is, to me, an unfortunate development. Af-
ter all, the manner in which we handle emergency applica-
tions—“on a short fuse without benefit of full briefing and
oral argument,” Does, 595 U. S., at ___ (opinion of B
ARRETT,
J.) (slip op., at 1)—is hardly a model for sound decisionmak-
ing. At the very least, by lowering the bar for granting
emergency relief, the Court itself will bear responsibility for
the resulting systemic disruption, as a surge in requests for
our “extraordinary” intervention—at earlier and earlier
stages of ongoing lower court proceedings, and with greater
and greater frequency—will undoubtedly follow.