Doe v. Snap

1 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JOHN DOE, THROUGH NEXT FRIEND JANE ROE v. SNAP,
INC.,
DBA SNAPCHAT, L.L.C., DBA SNAP, L.L.C.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 23–961. Decided July 2, 2024
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
J
USTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
When petitioner John Doe was 15 years old, his science
teacher groomed him for a sexual relationship. The abuse
was exposed after Doe overdosed on prescription drugs pro-
vided by the teacher. The teacher initially seduced Doe by
sending him explicit content on Snapchat, a social-media
platform built around the feature of ephemeral, self-
deleting messages. Snapchat is popular among teenagers.
And, because messages sent on the platform are self-
deleting, it is popular among sexual predators as well. Doe
sued Snapchat for, among other things, negligent design
under Texas law. He alleged that the platform’s design en-
courages minors to lie about their age to access the plat-
form, and enables adults to prey upon them through the
self-deleting message feature. See Pet. for Cert. 14–15. The
courts below concluded that §230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 bars Doe’s claims. 47 U. S. C. §230.
The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc over the dis-
sent of Judge Elrod, joined by six other judges. 88 F. 4th
1069 (2023).
The Court declines to grant Doe’s petition for certiorari.
In doing so, the Court chooses not to address whether
social-media platforms—some of the largest and most pow-
erful companies in the world—can be held responsible for
their own misconduct. Section 230 of the Communications

2 DOE v. SNAP, INC.
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Decency Act states that “[n]o provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another infor-
mation content provider.” §230(c)(1). In other words, a so-
cial-media platform is not legally responsible as a publisher
or speaker for its users’ content.
Notwithstanding the statute’s narrow focus, lower courts
have interpreted §230 to “confer sweeping immunity” for a
platform’s own actions. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Soft-
ware Group USA, LLC, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (statement
of T
HOMAS, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (slip op., at
1). Courts have “extended §230 to protect companies from
a broad array of traditional product-defect claims.” Id., at
___–___ (slip op., at 8–9) (collecting examples). Even when
platforms have allegedly engaged in egregious, intentional
acts—such as “deliberately structur[ing]” a website “to fa-
cilitate illegal human trafficking”—platforms have success-
fully wielded §230 as a shield against suit. Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 8); see Doe v. Facebook, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022)
(statement of T
HOMAS, J., respecting denial of certiorari)
(slip op., at 2).
The question whether §230 immunizes platforms for
their own conduct warrants the Court’s review. In fact, just
last Term, the Court granted certiorari to consider whether
and how §230 applied to claims that Google had violated the
Antiterrorism Act by recommending ISIS videos to
YouTube users. See Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 598 U. S. 617,
621 (2023). We were unable to reach §230’s scope, however,
because the plaintiffs’ claims would have failed on the mer-
its regardless. See id., at 622 (citing Twitter, Inc. v.
Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471 (2023)). This petition presented
the Court with an opportunity to do what it could not in
Gonzalez and squarely address §230’s scope.
Although the Court denies certiorari today, there will be
other opportunities in the future. But, make no mistake
about it—there is danger in delay. Social-media platforms

3 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
have increasingly used §230 as a get-out-of-jail free card.
Many platforms claim that users’ content is their own First
Amendment speech. Because platforms organize users’
content into newsfeeds or other compilations, the argument
goes, platforms engage in constitutionally protected speech.
See Moody v. NetChoice, 603 U. S. ___, ___ (2024). When it
comes time for platforms to be held accountable for their
websites, however, they argue the opposite. Platforms
claim that since they are not speakers under §230, they can-
not be subject to any suit implicating users’ content, even if
the suit revolves around the platform’s alleged misconduct.
See Doe, 595 U. S., at ___–___ (statement of T
HOMAS, J.)
(slip op., at 1–2). In the platforms’ world, they are fully re-
sponsible for their websites when it results in constitutional
protections, but the moment that responsibility could lead
to liability, they can disclaim any obligations and enjoy
greater protections from suit than nearly any other indus-
try. The Court should consider if this state of affairs is what
§230 demands. I respectfully dissent from the denial of cer-
tiorari.