Blanche v. Lau

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BLANCHE, ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL v. LAU
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 25–429. Argued April 22, 2026—Decided June 23, 2026
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Government can
remove aliens applying for admission to the country if they are “ ‘inad-
missible,’ ” and it can remove aliens already admitted if they are “ ‘de-
portable.’ ” Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 602 U. S. 447, 451. In this
case, respondent Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen, was admitted to the
United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007. On May 7,
2012, New Jersey charged Lau with trademark counterfeiting. While
awaiting trial, Lau temporarily left the United States for China. On
June 15, 2012, Lau attempted to reenter the United States by present-
ing himself to a border officer at the airport. Lawful permanent resi-
dents generally must be regarded as already admitted to the country
and usually do not have to reapply for admission when they return
from temporary overseas travel. 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(13)(C). Under an
exception, the Government may regard a lawful permanent resident
as “seeking an admission” (and thus as not already admitted) if he “has
committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2),”
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v), including a crime involving moral turpitude,
§1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Because of Lau’s pending criminal charge, the bor-
der officer did not regard Lau as already admitted, but instead paroled
him pending the resolution of his criminal case, meaning that Lau was
allowed to physically enter the country without being formally admit-
ted. After Lau pleaded guilty to his trademark-counterfeiting charge
on June 24, 2013, the Government initiated removal proceedings
against him. At those proceedings, the Government charged Lau as
an applicant for admission who was inadmissible for having been con-
victed of a crime involving moral turpitude. Lau argued that he was a
lawful permanent resident already admitted and subject to removal

2 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
Syllabus
only on deportability grounds. 130 F. 4th 42, 44. The Immigration
Judge found Lau removable as charged, and the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirmed. Lau sought review in the Second Circuit, which va-
cated the removal order. It concluded that Lau should have been re-
garded as already admitted upon arrival unless the border officer had
“clear and convincing” evidence that Lau had committed the crime,
which it held that the officer lacked. Id., at 46. Without that evidence,
the court concluded, border officers must regard lawful permanent res-
idents as already admitted, which precludes removal on inadmissibil-
ity grounds. The court remanded to the agency without prejudice to
the Government’s ability to charge Lau with deportability. Because
the Second Circuit’s decision conflicted with those of the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, the Court granted certiorari.
Held: The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not require a bor-
der officer to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful perma-
nent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before
deeming the resident an applicant for admission. Pp. 5–9.
(a) Removing a lawful permanent resident on a charge of inadmissi-
bility involves two steps: at step one, only commission of the crime is
required to show that the alien could be regarded as seeking to be ad-
mitted; at step two, conviction or admission is required to show that
the alien seeking to be admitted is inadmissible. Lau was correctly
charged with inadmissibility. At step one, the Government regarded
him as an alien seeking admission because he had committed a crime
involving moral turpitude before attempting to reenter the country. At
step two, he was inadmissible and therefore removable because he had
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Second Circuit resisted this straightforward analysis based on
a conclusion that the Government had the burden “to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that [Lau] actually committed the crime in
question at the time of reentry.” 140 F. 4th, at 47 (emphasis added).
The statute imposes similar burdens in other situations, but nothing
in the INA says that the Government has the burden to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the alien is an applicant for admis-
sion. The Second Circuit derived its clear-and-convincing-evidence re-
quirement not from the statutory text, but from inapposite Board of
Immigration Appeals precedent. Correct or not, the Board imposes
this burden on the Government only “at the time of the removal hear-
ing,” not at the border. Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I. & N. Dec. 53,
57, 64. Here, the Government satisfied its burden at the hearing: Lau’s
guilty plea was clear and convincing evidence that, before he at-
tempted to reenter the country, he had committed the crime in ques-
tion. The Court declines to read into the INA an additional clear-and-
convincing-evidence burden on border officers entrusted with making

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
“quick judgments on the spot” when that burden is nowhere in the
statute or even Board precedent. Luz Munoz v. Holder, 755 F. 3d 366,
371. Pp. 5–7.
(b) Lau’s remaining arguments lack merit. Lau argues that the
same clear-and-convincing-evidence standard that the Board applies
during the removal proceeding should apply to the border officers de-
termining that an applicant is seeking an admission. But nothing in
the INA supports that argument.
Lau also suggests that a lawful permanent resident may be regarded
as seeking admission only after being convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, citing this Court’s footnoted dictum in Vartelas v.
Holder, 566 U. S. 257, 275, n. 11. A straightforward reading of the
statutory text contradicts Lau’s interpretation. Section
1101(a)(13)(C)(v) says that a lawful permanent resident may “be re-
garded as seeking an admission” if he “has committed” a crime identi-
fied in §1182(a)(2), which includes “a crime involving moral turpitude.”
§1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Under §1101(a)(13)(C)(v), the Government may
regard a lawful permanent resident as seeking admission as soon as
he “committed a” crime involving moral turpitude “even if (as in [Lau’s]
case) the conviction occurred” later. Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. 220, 232.
Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) incorporates by reference only the crimes
§1182(a)(2) identifies, not its requirement of conviction. Pp. 7–9.
(c) The Court does not decide whether Lau’s crime was one involving
moral turpitude, but remands the case to the Second Circuit for further
proceedings. P. 9.
130 F. 4th 42, vacated and remanded.
T
HOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.
J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.
J
ACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN,
JJ., joined.

_________________
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1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–429
TODD BLANCHE, ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL,
PETITIONER v. MUK CHOI LAU
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 23, 2026]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen, became a
lawful permanent resident in 2007. New Jersey charged
him with a crime in 2012. He then temporarily left the
United States. Ordinarily, a lawful permanent resident
who arrives in the United States after a temporary absence
does not have to apply for admission because he is regarded
as already admitted. 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(13)(C). If he has
committed certain crimes, however, the Government may
regard him as not yet admitted. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v). Be-
cause of Lau’s pending charge for a crime, a border officer
declined to regard Lau as admitted upon his return and did
not admit him at the border. Instead, the officer paroled
him pending the resolution of his criminal case, meaning
that he was allowed to physically enter the country without
being formally admitted. After Lau pleaded guilty to the
New Jersey charge, the Government initiated removal pro-
ceedings and secured a removal order based on his convic-
tion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit vacated the removal order. It concluded that Lau

2 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
Opinion of the Court
should have been regarded as already admitted upon arri-
val unless the border officer had “clear and convincing” ev-
idence that Lau had committed the crime, which it held that
the officer lacked. Muk Choi Lau v. Bondi, 130 F. 4th 42,
46 (2025). Because the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) does not impose that requirement, we vacate the Sec-
ond Circuit’s judgment.
I
A
The Government can remove aliens on different grounds
depending on whether they have been formally admitted to
the country. It can remove aliens applying for admission if
they are “‘inadmissible,’” and it can remove already admit-
ted aliens if they are “‘deportable.’” Campos-Chaves v. Gar-
land, 602 U. S. 447, 451 (2024). The INA specifies the re-
spective grounds of inadmissibility and deportability with
which the Government can charge an alien. §§1182(a),
1227(a). As relevant here, the Government can charge an
alien applicant for admission as inadmissible if he has been
“convicted of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude” at any
time. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). By contrast, the Government can
charge an already admitted alien as deportable if he has
been “convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude” only
if that crime was “committed within five years . . . after the
date of admission.” §1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
Because lawful permanent residents generally must be
regarded as already admitted to the country, they usually
do not have to reapply for admission when they return from
temporary overseas travel. §1101(a)(13)(C). But, under an
exception central to this case, the Government may regard
a lawful permanent resident as “seeking an admission”
(and thus as not already admitted) if he “has committed an
offense identified in section 1182(a)(2),” §1101(a)(13)(C)(v),
including a crime involving moral turpitude,
§1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

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Opinion of the Court
When the Government institutes removal proceedings
against an alien, the INA imposes various burdens of proof
on the alien and the Government. See §§1229a(c)(2), (3).
But, it does not specify whether the Government has the
burden to establish that the alien is an applicant for admis-
sion in the first place, as opposed to someone already ad-
mitted.
B
Lau is a Chinese citizen. He was admitted to the United
States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007, making him
a “noncitizen who is authorized to live permanently in the
United States.” Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. 222, 227 (2020).
On May 7, 2012, New Jersey charged Lau with trademark
counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, Lau temporarily left
the United States for China. On June 15, 2012, Lau at-
tempted to reenter the United States by presenting himself
to a border officer at John F. Kennedy International Air-
port. Because of his pending criminal charge, the officer did
not regard Lau as already admitted, but instead as an ap-
plicant seeking admission.
The border officer did not immediately decide whether
Lau was ultimately admissible. The INA allows the Gov-
ernment to parole certain aliens seeking admission instead
of formally admitting them, detaining them, or removing
them. §1182(d)(5)(A). Parole allows an alien to physically
enter the United States without being admitted. Ibid.; see
also §1101(a)(13)(B). Parole thus allows the Government to
pause the inspection at the border and defer it to a later
time without having to detain the alien pending a final ad-
missibility decision, as would otherwise be required.
§§1225(a), (b)(2)(A); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281,
300 (2018). The Government exercised that authority to
parole Lau pending the resolution of his criminal case, in-
stead of formally deeming him admitted.

4 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
Opinion of the Court
C
After Lau pleaded guilty to his trademark-counterfeiting
charge on June 24, 2013, the Government initiated removal
proceedings against him on March 13, 2014. At those pro-
ceedings, the Government charged Lau as an applicant for
admission who was inadmissible for having been convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude. See
§1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Lau sought to terminate the proceed-
ings on the ground that the Government improperly classi-
fied him as an applicant “seeking admission” when he re-
turned from his trip abroad, instead of deeming him already
admitted as a lawful permanent resident and subject to re-
moval only on deportability grounds. 130 F. 4th, at 44 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Lau also argued that his
conviction was not of a crime involving moral turpitude, but
that issue is not before the Court because the Second Cir-
cuit did not reach it. Id., at 44, 46. Thus, for purposes of
this opinion, we assume without deciding that Lau’s convic-
tion was of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Immigration Judge found Lau removable as charged,
and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the re-
moval order. It held that the Government had proved by
clear and convincing evidence that Lau fell within the ex-
ception for lawful permanent residents who had committed
a crime involving moral turpitude and that he was inadmis-
sible and removable based on his conviction.
D
Lau sought review in the Second Circuit, which vacated
the removal order. The court acknowledged that a lawful
permanent resident may be regarded as seeking admission
after he has committed a crime involving moral turpitude,
even if he has not yet been convicted. But, according to the
Second Circuit, it is not enough that the lawful permanent
resident committed a crime involving moral turpitude; the
Government needed “clear and convincing evidence,” at the

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
border, that he committed the crime. Id., at 47. Without
that evidence, the court said, border officers must regard
lawful permanent residents as already admitted, which
precludes removal on inadmissibility grounds. Because, in
its view, the criminal charge alone did not give the border
officer clear and convincing evidence that Lau committed
the crime, the court concluded that Lau was not properly
paroled, that he should instead have been deemed admit-
ted, and that he therefore could not be charged with inad-
missibility. The court remanded to the agency with instruc-
tions to terminate removal proceedings based on
inadmissibility without prejudice to the Government’s abil-
ity to charge Lau with deportability.
Because the Second Circuit’s decision conflicted with
those of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, see Luz Munoz v.
Holder, 755 F. 3d 366, 370 (CA5 2014); Vazquez Romero v.
Garland, 999 F. 3d 656, 664 (CA9 2021), we granted certio-
rari, 607 U. S. 1120 (2026).
II
The Government correctly regarded Lau as an applicant
for admission, so it properly charged him with inadmissibil-
ity. Nothing in the INA required the border officer to have
clear and convincing evidence that Lau had committed a
crime involving moral turpitude before deeming him an ap-
plicant for admission.
A
A lawful permanent resident who has “committed an of-
fense identified in section 1182(a)(2)” may “be regarded as
seeking an admission.” §1101(a)(13)(C)(v). Section
1182(a)(2), in turn, identifies any “crime involving moral
turpitude.” §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Putting the provisions to-
gether, if a lawful permanent resident has committed a
crime involving moral turpitude, he may be regarded as
seeking admission. And, because he is seeking admission,

6 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
Opinion of the Court
he “may be charged with any applicable ground of inadmis-
sibility under section 1182(a),” §1229a(a)(2), including be-
ing convicted of or admitting to “a crime involving moral
turpitude,” §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
Removing a lawful permanent resident on a charge of in-
admissibility thus involves two steps: “[W]hile only commis-
sion [of the crime] is required at step one” (to show that the
alien could be regarded as seeking to be admitted), “convic-
tion (or admission) is required at step two” (to show that the
alien seeking to be admitted is inadmissible). Barton, 590
U. S., at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under these rules, Lau was correctly charged with inad-
missibility. At step one, the Government properly regarded
him as an alien seeking admission because he had commit-
ted a crime involving moral turpitude before attempting to
reenter the country. See Luz Munoz, 755 F. 3d, at 370. So,
at step two, he was inadmissible and therefore removable if
he satisfied any statutory ground for inadmissibility, in-
cluding that he had been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. See §1229a(e)(2)(A).
B
The Second Circuit resisted that straightforward analy-
sis. In its view, at step one, the Government had the burden
“to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Lau] actu-
ally committed the crime in question at the time of reentry.”
130 F. 4th, at 47 (emphasis added). We disagree.
Nothing in the INA imposes the burden that the Second
Circuit recognized. The statute imposes similar burdens in
other situations, but not in this one. It imposes the burden
on the applicant for admission to prove that he is admissi-
ble. §1229a(c)(2)(A). It imposes the burden on an alien
seeking to prove that he was previously admitted.
§1229a(c)(2)(B). It imposes the burden on the Government
to prove that an already-admitted alien is deportable.
§1229a(c)(3)(A). But, it nowhere says that the Government

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the alien is an applicant for admission.
1
The Second Circuit derived its clear-and-convincing-evi-
dence requirement not from the statutory text, but from in-
apposite Board of Immigration Appeals precedent. The
Board says that the Government must establish that a law-
ful permanent resident is an applicant for admission by
clear and convincing evidence. App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a.
But, the Board imposes this burden on the Government,
correctly or not, only “at the time of the removal hearing,”
not at the border. Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 53, 57, 64 (BIA 2012).
2
And, here, the Government
satisfied its burden at the hearing based “on the evidence
produced at the hearing,” §1229a(c)(1)(A): Lau’s guilty plea
was clear and convincing evidence that, before he at-
tempted to reenter the country, he had committed the crime
in question. We decline to read into the INA an additional
clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on border officers en-
trusted with making “quick judgments on the spot” when
that burden is nowhere in the statute or even Board prece-
dent. Luz Munoz, 755 F. 3d, at 371.
——————
1
The dissent does not dispute that the INA nowhere imposes the Sec-
ond Circuit’s clear-and-convincing-evidence border requirement. Post, at
11–12 (opinion of J
ACKSON, J.). It asserts that there is a “requisite cer-
tainty” that the Government must have at the border, but even after
looking to “the text of the statute” it fails to tell us where the dissent’s
requirement is to be found. Post, at 3.
2
The Board’s holding that the Government bears the burden to estab-
lish that the alien is an applicant for admission is not before the Court,
so we do not decide whether it is correct. See Brief for Petitioner 16. The
Government suggests that, if there were any burden at the border, it
would be for “the arriving individual to establish facts ‘to the satisfaction
of the inspecting officer’ ” “relevant to determining the person’s status.”
Reply Brief 11–12; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. Because we reject the
Second Circuit’s conclusion that border officers had to have clear and
convincing evidence of Lau’s crime, we need not decide that issue.

8 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
Opinion of the Court
C
We also disagree with Lau’s remaining arguments.
Lau argues that border officers had to determine that he
was “seeking an admission” based on some standard,
§1101(a)(13)(C); accord, 130 F. 4th, at 49; post, at 2, 4–5
(J
ACKSON, J., dissenting), and that the same clear-and-con-
vincing-evidence standard that the Board applies at the re-
moval proceeding should apply for both purposes. Brief for
Respondent 14–15, 31. But, as the Government points out,
border “officers did determine that he was seeking an ad-
mission” when they paroled him. Reply Brief 2. And, as we
have already explained, there is nothing in the INA that
suggests that those officers had to have clear and convinc-
ing evidence to do so at that time. Lau argues that the Gov-
ernment “expressly” conceded that it had that burden.
Brief for Respondent 15, 18. But, the Government conceded
that it had the burden only “in removal proceedings,” not at
the border. Brief for Petitioner 16 (emphasis added); Reply
Brief 3.
Lau also suggests that the Second Circuit did not go far
enough: A lawful permanent resident may be regarded as
seeking admission, he argues, only after being convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude. Brief for Respondent 31,
45–46; see also Brief for Immigration Law Professors as
Amici Curiae 9; but see 130 F. 4th, at 47 (rejecting this ar-
gument). He cites this Court’s footnoted dictum that the
phrase “committed an offense identified in section
1182(a)(2),” §1101(a)(13)(C)(v), “appears to advert to a law-
ful permanent resident who has been convicted of an of-
fense under §1182(a)(2) (or admits to one),” Vartelas v.
Holder, 566 U. S. 257, 275, n. 11 (2012). Brief for Respond-
ent 31, 45.
A straightforward reading of the text contradicts Lau’s
interpretation. Accord, post, at 12–13 (J
ACKSON, J., dis-
senting). Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) says that a lawful per-

9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
manent resident may “be regarded as seeking an admis-
sion” if he “has committed” a crime identified in §1182(a)(2).
Section 1182(a)(2), in turn, identifies certain types of
crimes. One is “a crime involving moral turpitude.”
§1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). So, under §1101(a)(13)(C)(v), the Gov-
ernment may regard a lawful permanent resident as seek-
ing admission as soon as he “committed a” crime involving
moral turpitude “even if (as in [Lau’s] case) the conviction
occurred” later. Barton, 590 U. S., at 232.
To be sure, an alien’s ultimate inadmissibility under
§1182(a)(2) turns on whether the alien is convicted of an
identified crime. But, §1101(a)(13)(C)(v), by its express
terms, incorporates by reference only the crimes §1182(a)(2)
identifies, not its requirement of conviction. Read together
in that way, the provisions make good sense: “An alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence in the United States
shall not be regarded as seeking an admission . . . unless
the alien . . . has committed,” §1101(a)(13)(C)(v), “a crime
involving moral turpitude,” §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Read to-
gether in the way that Lau suggests, the provisions make
little sense: “An alien lawfully admitted for permanent res-
idence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking
an admission . . . unless the alien . . . has committed,”
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v), a “convict[ion]” of “a crime involving
moral turpitude,” §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). One does not commit
a conviction.
III
We conclude that the Government properly charged Lau
with inadmissibility. Border officers did not have the bur-
den to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Lau
had committed a crime involving moral turpitude. Because
Lau still argues that his crime was not one involving moral
turpitude and we do not decide that issue, we vacate the
judgment of the Second Circuit and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

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1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–429
TODD BLANCHE, ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL,
PETITIONER v. MUK CHOI LAU
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 23, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and
J
USTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
Lawful permanent residents (LPRs)—also known as
green card holders—have special status in the U. S. immi-
gration system. They are authorized to live and work per-
manently in the United States (as the name suggests), are
eligible for certain federal benefits, and can contribute
money to political campaigns. As relevant here, LPRs can
also travel in and out of the United States more easily than
other noncitizens. This is because, when an LPR returns to
the United States after an international trip, border officers
are required by statute to treat an LPR as already admitted
unless one of six exceptions applies. See 8 U. S. C.
§1101(a)(13)(C).
One of those exceptions—the focus of today’s case—ap-
plies when the returning LPR “has committed an offense”
involving moral turpitude. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v); see
§1182(a)(2). If that statutory provision or any of the other
listed exceptions is applicable to an LPR returning from
abroad, the LPR can be divested of his already-admitted
status and treated as if he is “seeking an admission” in-
stead. §1101(a)(13)(C). An LPR who is deemed to be “seek-
ing an admission” rather than already admitted can be
turned away, detained, or conditionally let back into the
country on parole. §1182(d)(5)(A). And being paroled often

2 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
goes hand in hand with confiscation of the LPR’s physical
green card (the official document designating the individual
as an LPR), thrusting the LPR into a state of uncertainty
about his immigration status, his future, and his access to
the protections the immigration system affords him.
This case is about whether the Government must deter-
mine that one of the six statutory exceptions applies before
divesting a returning LPR of his already-admitted status.
Given the statutory scheme I have just outlined, to ask this
question is to answer it: The Government must, of course,
make some determination about the applicability of one of
the statutory exceptions before an LPR can be deemed
“seeking an admission” and paroled back into the country.
But today the Court allows the Government to deem an
LPR to be “seeking an admission” first and justify the ap-
plicability of an exception later—undermining the statu-
tory scheme as well as the benefits and security that come
with having a green card. I respectfully dissent because the
governing law’s text, structure, and context show that the
majority’s view cannot possibly be what Congress intended.
I
Though this isn’t clear from the majority’s opinion, the
only question this case presents is one of sequencing: Must
the Government determine whether an LPR “has commit-
ted” a crime involving moral turpitude, §1101(a)(13)(C)(v),
before refusing to deem him already admitted at the border?
The majority responds in the negative. The Court now re-
lieves the Government of its statutory burden to determine
the applicability of an exception at the border if the Govern-
ment “satisfie[s] its burden at the [removal] hearing based
on the evidence” it accrues by the time of the hearing. Ante,
at 7 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
1
——————
1
In a footnote, the majority hedges that it “do[es] not decide whether”
the Government must satisfy “any burden at the border,” and gestures

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
But under the plain terms of the statute, the removal hear-
ing—which can come months, or even years, after the LPR
is demoted to “seeking an admission” status and paroled
in—is too late for the Government to carry its burden. The
Government needs to have the requisite certainty about the
applicability of the crime-involving-moral-turpitude excep-
tion at the border, before it decides that the statute’s default
requirement for admission of LPRs does not apply.
A
Start with the text of the statute. The Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) plainly provides a default rule re-
garding the Government’s admission of an LPR returning
home from travels abroad. Unlike other noncitizens, an
LPR “shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into
the United States.” §1101(a)(13)(C) (emphasis added).
This is a clear directive. In practical terms, it means that a
border officer “shall not” require an LPR to (re)prove that
he satisfies the standard admission criteria upon his return
to the United States.
2
The default rule requiring LPRs to be deemed already ad-
mitted gives way in only six circumstances specified in the
statute. The border officer may regard an LPR as “seeking
an admission” if the LPR “has abandoned or relinquished”
his LPR status; “has been absent from the United States for
a continuous period in excess of 180 days”; “has engaged in
illegal activity after having departed the United States”;
“has departed from the United States while” removal
——————
at the Government’s alternative position that, if it bears any such bur-
den, the correct standard would be “to the satisfaction of the inspecting
officer.” Ante, at 7, n. 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is hard to
square this purported disclaimer with the Court’s holding, which is that
all is fine here because the Government “satisfied its burden at the [re-
moval] hearing based on the evidence produced at the hearing.” Ante,
at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2
This is why, for example, LPRs are often processed alongside U. S.
citizens at ports of entry.

4 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
proceedings are pending; “has committed” a crime involving
moral turpitude or a qualifying drug offense; or “is attempt-
ing to enter at a time or place other than as designated by
immigration officers.” §§1101(a)(13)(C)(i)–(vi).
3
1
Knowing just what I have already explained about the
statutory scheme is enough to answer the question pre-
sented in this case. Congress’s use of the phrase “shall not”
leaves the Government no discretion to divest an LPR of his
already-admitted status and treat him as “seeking an ad-
mission” if he does not fit into one of the six exceptions. See
§1101(a)(13)(C); Maine Community Health Options v.
United States, 590 U. S. 296, 310 (2020) (“Unlike the word
‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually con-
notes a requirement” (some internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
In other words, as the Second Circuit correctly observed,
§1101(a)(13)(C) is “unmistakably clear that the default pre-
sumption is that LPRs will not be treated as seeking admis-
sion unless certain threshold determinations have been
made.” Muk Choi Lau v. Bondi, 130 F. 4th 42, 49 (2025)
(case below). So, as a matter of logic, the statute is “defini-
tive on the question of sequence: [The border officer] must
determine whether an LPR is an applicant for admission as
a threshold matter before [he] is authorized” not to admit
that LPR. Ibid. (emphasis deleted). It really is that simple.
——————
3
In the case before us, a border officer deemed Lau to be “seeking an
admission” based on the penultimate exception—i.e., on the ground that
he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude. But at the time of
entry, Lau had not yet been convicted of the then-pending charge for sell-
ing counterfeit clothes in New Jersey, and instead testified at a border
interview that he “did not know exactly what was contained in the boxes
that [he] stored in the” warehouse. App. 16. At a removal hearing years
later, an Immigration Judge nevertheless held that the Government had
properly deemed Lau to be “seeking an admission” on the basis of a con-
viction entered after he had been so deemed.

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
Critical here (and elided in the majority’s reasoning) is
the distinction between the border officer’s initial decision
whether an LPR should be classified as “seeking an admis-
sion” and an immigration judge’s later decision, at the re-
moval hearing, whether the LPR is ultimately admissible.
The admissibility determination comes after the LPR is
deemed to be “seeking an admission.” But the Court’s anal-
ysis conflates these two distinct determinations. It thereby
allows the Government to “satisf[y] its burden” for the ini-
tial decision (which, logically, must happen at the border)
with later-accrued evidence, i.e., backfill its justification.
Ante, at 7. For the reasons I have just laid out, that conclu-
sion cannot be squared with §1101(a)(13)(C)’s core mandate
directing the Government not to “regar[d an LPR] as seek-
ing an admission into the United States.”
4
2
For additional confirmation of the Government’s burden
at the border, one need only look to the rest of
§1101(a)(13)(C). Congress’s use of the present-perfect tense
in five of the six exceptions (including the one at issue here)
shows that the statute was written for use by border offic-
ers. It is the border officer, not the immigration judge, who
is tasked with making the determination whether to
——————
4
In Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I. & N. Dec. 53 (BIA 2012), the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) likewise held that the Government’s bur-
den to prove that an LPR is “seeking an admission” applies at the re-
moval hearing (when admissibility is determined), rather than at the
border. The BIA reasoned that the “Immigration Judge’s attempt to de-
cide the admissibility issue at the time [the LPR] was initially stopped
at the border is at odds with the well-established immigration practice
that treats an application for admission as a continuing one.” Id., at 59.
The problem with this analysis is that, at the border, the inquiry cannot
(yet) be about “inadmissibility” since there is not yet any “application for
admission.” The inquiry at the border goes instead to whether the LPR
must be deemed already admitted or is “seeking an admission” in the
first place. This Court should have abrogated, rather than endorsed, this
fundamentally flawed decision. See ante, at 7.

6 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
classify a returning LPR as already admitted or as “seeking
an admission.” The relevant statutory questions are di-
rected to the border officer: whether the LPR before him
“has abandoned or relinquished” his LPR status, “has been
absent from the United States for a continuous period in
excess of 180 days,” “has engaged in illegal activity after
having departed the United States,” “has departed from the
United States” pending removal proceedings, or, as rele-
vant here, “has committed” a crime of moral turpitude.
§§1101(a)(13)(C)(i)–(v) (emphases added). By contrast, the
immigration judge, looking retrospectively from a later
post-entry point in the timeline, would consider whether
the LPR had so relinquished, been absent, engaged in ille-
gal activity, departed, or committed a qualifying crime by
the time of entry. See ante, at 6 (noting Lau “had commit-
ted a crime involving moral turpitude before attempting to
reenter the country” (emphasis added)).
“[T]he present-perfect tense conveys to a listener that the
event in question continues to be true or valid.” Hewitt v.
United States, 606 U. S. 419, 429 (2025). It makes sense
that the border officer would ask what “has” transpired
with respect to a returning LPR when deciding whether
that individual should be treated as already admitted or
“seeking an admission.” By contrast, it would not make
sense for the immigration judge to consider, for example,
whether the LPR “has departed” the United States,
§1101(a)(13)(C)(iv); by the time of the removal hearing, the
LPR is back inside the country. Similarly, why would an
immigration judge consider whether the LPR “has been
absent . . . in excess of 180 days” by the time of the removal
hearing when, by then, the LPR will already have returned
to the United States? What matters under
§1101(a)(13)(C)(ii) is how long the LPR has been outside the
United States before arriving at the border, not before his

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
removal hearing.
5
Section 1101(a)(13)(C) thus governs the
border officer’s analysis at the time of the LPR’s entry,
rather than the immigration judge’s analysis at the removal
hearing.
One may still wonder, what is the big deal if the applica-
ble exception is established later based on evidence the
Government gathers after the fact? Sure, Lau was deemed
to be “seeking an admission” at the border, but ultimately,
that did not prevent him from physically entering the coun-
try. To so reason reflects a basic misunderstanding of the
nature of the determination that a border officer makes un-
der §1101(a)(13)(C).
When the INA says that an LPR “shall not be regarded
as seeking an admission into the United States . . . unless”
one of the six exceptions applies, ibid., it refers to the border
officer’s determination of status, first and foremost. The de-
fault status of an LPR is that he is already admitted; but
under the specified circumstances, a border officer could de-
mote him to the status of “seeking an admission,” rendering
him vulnerable to removal proceedings and the insecurity
and indeterminacy that come with having to face such pro-
ceedings in the future. It is only after the border officer
makes the status determination that he then separately de-
cides whether to turn back, detain, or parole (i.e., let in) the
demoted LPR. Put differently, at the border, the officer
must first classify a returning LPR as already admitted or
“seeking an admission,” and that determination, in turn,
——————
5
The same logic applies to the sixth exception, though it departs from
the present-perfect formulation. That exception allows the border officer
to treat a returning LPR as applying for admission if he “is attempting to
enter at a time or place other than as designated by immigration offic-
ers.” §1101(a)(13)(C)(vi) (emphasis added). The present participle in
that provision refers to an event “in progress,” B. Garner, The Chicago
Guide to Grammar, Usage, and Punctuation 86 (2016), that, in this case,
begins and ends at the border. As Lau explains, “[a] person cannot [still]
be ‘attempting’ to enter the country if he has already entered,” as would
be the case by the time of the removal hearing. Brief for Respondent 24.

8 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
governs the process by which the LPR may (or may not) be
let back into the country.
Understanding how this scheme works helps illuminate
a critical fact: The decision whether an exception applies
under §1101(a)(13)(C)—which establishes the LPR’s status
as already admitted or “seeking an admission”—must hap-
pen at the border, before an LPR is even given permission
to cross the threshold and enter the United States.
B
So far, I have shown that the majority’s view makes no
sense under the plain terms and mechanics of this statutory
scheme. In the worst-case scenario under today’s holding,
the Government could merely assume at the border that
any one of the six exceptions applies to an LPR (without any
evidence) and prove the applicability of the statutory down-
grade at a later removal hearing, using evidence accrued in
the meantime. The majority’s view also cannot be how Con-
gress—the same one that took care to protect an LPR’s al-
ready-admitted status at the border—meant for this to
work. A demotion to the status of “seeking an admission”
is not costless. Quite to the contrary, it comes with signifi-
cant deprivations.
First of all, an LPR who is classified as “seeking an ad-
mission” may be immediately detained or paroled. See
§1226(a) (providing that “an alien may be arrested and de-
tained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be re-
moved from the United States”); §1182(d)(5)(A) (authoriz-
ing the Government to parole “alien[s] applying for
admission to the United States”). The downsides of deten-
tion are obvious. But even when an LPR is paroled—and
thus allowed to enter the United States without being ad-
mitted, see §1182(d)(5)(A); ante, at 3—serious negative re-
percussions flow from an LPR’s being deemed to be “seeking
an admission.”

9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
The facts of this case exemplify this. When Lau was pa-
roled as an LPR “seeking an admission,” border officers con-
fiscated his I–551, his permanent green card. In its stead,
they issued him an I–94 Arrival/Departure Card bearing
only handwritten information and a stapled photograph,
and offering no indication of his LPR status other than a
barely legible stamp and the form code “I–551” scribbled on
the empty side of the card. See App. 6. That piece of paper
has been Lau’s only proof of his LPR status for the past 14
years, while Lau remained in immigration limbo following
the Government’s decision to classify him as “seeking an
admission” at the border.
6
As several amici explain, having only a temporary green
card makes it harder to work, open bank accounts, secure
housing, obtain health insurance, and enroll in school.
Brief for Asian American Legal Defense and Education
Fund et al. as Amici Curiae 14. For example, the Govern-
ment instructs employers to treat I–94s with I–551 stamps
(like the card Lau received) as short-term “receipts” of au-
thorization to work rather than proof of permanent status.
That receipt is valid for only “1 year after the issuance date
if the stamp does not contain an expiration date.”
7
After
that, the LPR is required to “provide their permanent resi-
dent card.”
8
So an LPR in Lau’s position could lose his abil-
ity to work within a year of being paroled, and without the
security of a permanent green card, could then face the
downstream consequences of being unemployed and unem-
ployable for however long the legal limbo continues.
——————
6
Paroled LPRs can be kept in legal limbo for as long as the Government
chooses. In Lau’s case, the Government did not issue a notice to appear—
the document that kicks off removal proceedings—until around two
years after Lau was paroled into the United States. See App. 25–27.
7
U. S. Citizenship & Immigration Service, Form I–9 Acceptable Docu-
ments–Receipts (Oct. 16, 2024), https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/form-i-
9-acceptable-documents/receipts (archived at https://perma.cc/94CT-
WR8Q).
8
Ibid.

10 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
Second, being regarded as “seeking an admission” ex-
poses an LPR to inadmissibility proceedings, which are less
favorable to LPRs than deportation proceedings. Once an
LPR is deemed already admitted—pursuant to the default
rule that applies when he returns home after a trip
abroad—if the Government wishes to expel the LPR, its
only option is to initiate deportation proceedings. See
§1227. In such proceedings, it is the Government, not the
LPR, that bears the burden of proving deportability. See 8
CFR §1240.8(a) (2025). But if an LPR is deemed to be “seek-
ing an admission,” and is therefore detained or paroled, the
Government may initiate removal proceedings on the
ground that the LPR is inadmissible. And in those proceed-
ings, the LPR carries the burden of defeating the inadmis-
sibility charge. See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(2)(A). Thus, even
affording the Government the presumption of good faith,
see INS v. Miranda, 459 U. S. 14, 18 (1982) (per curiam), it
is in the Government’s interest to parole LPRs, rather than
deem them admitted, when in doubt. And that self-interest
cannot go unchecked, lest it “nullif[y Congress’s] clear com-
mand” to deem LPRs already admitted unless the specified
exceptions are met. 130 F. 4th, at 49.
The majority’s contrary view rests on a misguided view of
§1101(a)(13)(C). According to the majority, Congress pro-
vided LPRs with a default claim to already-admitted status
at the border with one hand, while snatching away that en-
titlement with the other by enabling the Government to
override it with impunity. Such an interpretation mistak-
enly allows the statutory exceptions to swallow the default
rule. And it devalues an LPR’s “weighty” rights “to stay and
live and work in this land of freedom” and to rejoin her fam-
ily in the United States. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U. S. 21,
32–34 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).

11 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
II
So how did the majority reach today’s counterintuitive
and consequential result? By ignoring the “shall not” lan-
guage in §1101(a)(13)(C). (Indeed, those words do not ap-
pear in the majority opinion until the very last page. See
ante, at 9.) But the words of a statute convey intended
meaning. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S.
63, 68 (1982). And nothing about the text or purpose of
§1101(a)(13)(C) supports the majority’s or the Govern-
ment’s reading.
A
Consider the textual points. First, the majority insists
that the INA “nowhere” places the “burden” on the Govern-
ment to establish “that the alien is an applicant for admis-
sion.” Ante, at 6–7. This assertion is truly puzzling—what
about §1101(a)(13)(C) itself? Under that section, which is
the linchpin of this case, a returning LPR “shall not be re-
garded as seeking an admission into the United States” un-
less an exception applies. As I have explained, this means
that the Government’s default obligation is to deem the
LPR already admitted; it must prove against that default
in order to be able to do otherwise. If that’s not a burden,
nothing is.
Perhaps the majority’s view is that, even assuming the
Government carries a burden at the border, the burden
might be something other than “clear and convincing evi-
dence.” See ante, at 7, n. 2. Indeed, the courts of appeals
have varied on the proper standard. The Third Circuit, for
example, has embraced a lower, “probable cause” standard.
Doe v. Attorney General, 659 F. 3d 266, 272 (2011).
But doubt about the burden’s substance is no reason to
jettison the duty altogether. As the Government itself
stressed at the certiorari stage, it “is not challenging” here
(and did not challenge below) “the clear and convincing
standard.” Pet. for Cert. Reply Brief 11. Instead, “[t]his

12 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
case is about when the [G]overnment must carry that bur-
den.” Ibid.
9
So if the Court’s decision today is driven by
any uncertainty regarding the level of burden that applies,
see ante, 7, n. 1, it could have (properly) concluded that the
Government has a burden at the border and remanded the
matter for consideration of the contours of that burden.
The majority also maintains that the fact that
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v) says “committed” (rather than “con-
victed,” for instance) means that the Government “may re-
gard [an LPR] as seeking admission as soon as he ‘commit-
ted a’ crime involving moral turpitude ‘even if (as in [Lau’s]
case) the conviction occurred’ later.” Ante, at 9 (quoting
Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. 222, 232 (2020)). Fair enough. I
acknowledge that a conviction is not the only basis upon
which a border officer could determine that an LPR has
committed a qualifying crime. But that does not solve the
majority’s sequencing problem. The border officer still
must determine that an LPR “has committed” a crime in-
volving moral turpitude. And that determination must be
——————
9
At the Second Circuit below, the Government urged adoption only of
the BIA’s view in Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, which was that the Govern-
ment need not prove that an LPR qualifies as “seeking an admission”
until the removal hearing. See n. 4, supra. The Government mentioned
the Third Circuit’s position but did not advocate that view even in the
alternative. If anything, the Government suggested that the Third Cir-
cuit was wrong. See Brief for United States in Muk Choi Lau v. Garland,
No. 21–6623 (CA2), pp. 51–52.
Before us, the Government again picks its battles. It disputes only the
sequence, urging us to hold that the Government must satisfy the “clear
and convincing evidence” standard at the removal hearing, rather than
at the border. See Brief for Petitioner 14–23. The Government’s passing
invocation in its reply of a brand-new “to the satisfaction of the inspect-
ing officer” standard as well as the Third Circuit’s “probable cause”
standard is too little, too late. Reply Brief 11–12 (internal quotation
marks omitted); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349, 371, n. 12
(2005) (declining to consider an argument that “was not pressed or
passed upon below and was raised only as an afterthought in petitioners’
reply brief ”).

13 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
based on something—be it a confession, a credibility deter-
mination based on the border interview, a conviction, or
otherwise. Moreover, as I have now said repeatedly, that
determination must be made before the border officer can
demote an LPR to “seeking an admission” status and parole
him back into the country.
Barton (see ante, at 9) is not to the contrary. There, the
Court considered a provision of the INA that established
“strict eligibility requirements” for cancellation of removal.
590 U. S., at 225. Under that provision, §1229b(a), a noncit-
izen “who is inadmissible or deportable” may receive can-
cellation of removal and adjustment of status if he “has re-
sided in the United States continuously for 7 years after
having been admitted in any status” and “has not been con-
victed of ” a qualifying offense. We held that a noncitizen
who committed a qualifying crime during the 7-year period
was ineligible for cancellation of removal even though he
was convicted “after the seven years elapsed.” Id., at 232.
Right or wrong, that holding has no bearing here. The
question whether a noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of
removal follows a finding of removability or deportability.
See ibid. (“Under the cancellation-of-removal statute, im-
migration judges must . . . determine whether, after a pre-
viously admitted noncitizen has been determined to be de-
portable, the noncitizen should nonetheless be allowed to
remain in the United States” (emphasis added)). So, by the
time §1229b(a) kicks in, the propriety of the removability or
deportability finding must be taken for granted. By con-
trast, a border officer performing his duties under
§1101(a)(13)(C) is deciding whether a returning LPR will be
treated as “seeking an admission”—a necessary step before
a removal hearing is set to decide that individual’s remova-
bility. That an LPR subsequently commits a crime or is
later convicted for criminal behavior (after he comes back
into the country) does not and cannot logically bear on the
correctness of the border officer’s classification.

14 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
Finally, the Government and the majority maintain that
the INA restricts the immigration judge’s review of the bor-
der officer’s classification to only “the evidence produced at
the hearing,” which they interpret to include evidence ac-
crued after the border officer’s parole decision. Ante, at 7
(citing §1229a(c)(1)(A)). It is puzzling to think that this lan-
guage—which appears in a section that has nothing to do
with the Government’s obligations regarding LPRs at the
border—would allow the Government to rely on postparole
evidence to prove that it had authority to parole. Section
1229a(c)(1)(A) is about what the immigration judge can con-
sider in determining inadmissibility, not whether an LPR
should be at a removal proceeding in the first place. And in
any case, that provision is clearly meant to prohibit immi-
gration judges from considering material extraneous to the
hearing (e.g., broader world events, stereotypes, and cul-
tural assumptions), not to expand the range of permissible
evidence to post hoc justifications of the border officer’s pa-
role decision.
B
That leaves the Government’s policy argument. The Gov-
ernment asserts that holding it to a burden of proof at the
time of an LPR’s reentry would force border officers to con-
duct minitrials and clog up immigration processing at the
border. See Brief for Petitioner 36–38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27–
28. This argument, too, is without merit.
My view of §1101(a)(13)(C) would not require the border
officer and the LPR to litigate the merits of any pending
criminal charges at the border. Often, as here, an LPR will
not challenge a border officer’s decision to deem him to be
“seeking an admission” until the removal hearing. In such
circumstances, the dispute regarding whether the LPR sat-
isfied the exception at the time he was paroled will unfold
in front of the immigration judge, whose task will be to de-
termine, in retrospect, whether the border officer’s decision

15 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
was lawful. The practical delta between my view and the
majority’s is that I do not agree that the Government can
proffer post hoc evidence—such as the LPR’s subsequent
conviction—to support the determination the border officer
made when the LPR returned from his travels. Keeping to
the most natural reading of §1101(a)(13)(C) would not cause
a breakdown in border processing; rather, it would incen-
tivize border officers to take care to remain within the
bounds of their statutory authority.
Indeed, the Government nowhere disputes that border of-
ficers have already been conducting these kinds of inquiries
during the customs process, with none of the problems the
Government imagines. As the record in this case reflects,
see App. 13–19, immigration officers “have power to admin-
ister oaths and to take and consider evidence of or from any
person touching the privilege of any alien . . . to . . . reenter
. . . the United States”—including, presumably, about any
pending criminal charges. §1225(d)(3).
10
And the officers
are well equipped to do so: They have access to databases
from international, federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment agencies. Those resources would easily allow a border
officer to discover that an LPR was “convicted of an offense”
or, in the absence of a conviction, observe an LPR “admi[t]
to one.” Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U. S. 257, 275, n. 11
(2012).
11
——————
10
See also U. S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration Inspec-
tion Program (May 1, 2026), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-
entry/immigration-inspection-program (archived at
https://perma.cc/Z86N-Z2X6).
11
The Government’s suggestion that the border officer must go fur-
ther—i.e., that the officer would need to conduct a minitrial of the LPR
based on the pending criminal charges—is mistaken. Whatever the
proper standard, the border officer is answering the same basic question:
Does the evidence before him show that the LPR “has committed” a crime
of moral turpitude? Nothing in the statute requires the border officer to
go scavenging for evidence beyond what is available to him at the border.

16 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
The Congress that crafted §1101(a)(13)(C) did not share
the Government’s anxieties about the detrimental impact
that making this determination would have on processing
immigrants at the border. Quite to the contrary, it antici-
pated that border officers would be “able to determine from
the information supplied by the alien whether he falls
within the ‘criminal’ category of excludables, notwithstand-
ing the fact that there may be no record of conviction or ad-
mission of the commission of a specific offense.” H. R. Rep.
No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 48 (1952) (emphasis added).
If the Government feels this assessment is outdated, “its . . .
recourse lies in Congress, not in the courts where litigants
are generally entitled to expect that statutes will ‘be en-
forced as written.’” Feliciano v. Department of Transp., 605
U. S. 38, 54 (2025) (citing Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584
U. S. 497, 525 (2018)).
III
Applying the proper sequencing under §1101(a)(13)(C) to
the facts at hand—and assuming (without taking a view)
that the applicable standard is “clear and convincing evi-
dence,” see n. 9, supra—I agree with the Second Circuit
that the Government failed to carry its burden to establish,
at the time the border officer made the parole decision, that
Lau had committed a crime involving moral turpitude.
Lau took a short trip to China after he was charged
with—but not yet convicted of—selling counterfeit Coogi
shorts in New Jersey. The parties agree that, upon his re-
turn home, Lau was divested of his already-admitted sta-
tus, deemed an applicant for admission, and paroled solely
on the basis of the indictment. The border officers had nei-
ther a conviction nor a confession, and they did not have
any evidence to rebut Lau’s sworn statements that he “did
not know exactly what was contained in the boxes that [he]
——————
Congress did not shift criminal adjudication to the border when it en-
acted §1101(a)(13)(C)(v).

17 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
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ACKSON, J., dissenting
stored in the” warehouse. App. 16. It is a fundamental
maxim in our country that all are innocent until proven
guilty. Lau’s indictment alone was insufficient to establish
by “clear and convincing evidence” that he had already
“committed” a crime involving moral turpitude.
***
I worry that the Court has now handed the Government
a massive blank check. With today’s decision, the Court al-
lows the Government to return an LPR to the status of
“seeking an admission” upon his entry at the border, so long
as the Government is able to show later that he was even-
tually convicted. That sequencing undermines the plain
terms and basic operation of the relevant statutory scheme,
which guarantees that LPRs will not be “regarded as seek-
ing an admission” at the border unless certain exceptions
apply. §1101(a)(13)(C).
To be sure, if the paroled LPR ends up being acquitted,
the Government’s eventual effort to remove him on this ba-
sis will fail (insofar as the charge of removability was based
only on the qualifying offense). But that is likely cold com-
fort to the LPR, who by then might have spent years in legal
limbo (with only the protection of a temporary green card)
or worse, in detention.
Having enshrined a returning LPR’s already-admitted
status, Congress could not have meant for the guarantees
it was affording to be so cavalierly swept aside. By law,
LPRs are as close to citizenship as one can get absent nat-
uralization. Cf. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U. S.
306, 309–310 (1970) (“We extend to [LPRs] the same consti-
tutional protections of due process that we accord citizens”
(citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596
(1953)). Today, the majority ignores that crucial fact and
empowers Government officials to act accordingly.