Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1
Pages 67–84
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 22, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
OCTOBER
TERM, 2025
67
Syllabus
ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP, et al. v. NESSEL, ATTOR-
NEY
GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, on behalf of the
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 24–783. Argued February 24, 2026—Decided April 22, 2026
Petitioners (collectively Enbridge) own and operate Line 5, a 645-mile pe-
troleum pipeline, 4 miles of which traverse the Straits of Mackinac pur-
suant to a 1953 easement granted to Enbridge's predecessor by the
State of Michigan. On June 27, 2019, the Michigan Attorney General
fled suit in Michigan state court seeking to halt Enbridge's operation
of Line 5 by having the 1953 easement declared void and Enbridge's
continuing operations declared unlawful. Enbridge was served with
the complaint on July 12, 2019. Rather than removing the case to fed-
eral court within the 30-day deadline required by 28 U. S. C. § 1446(b)(1),
Enbridge litigated in state court for months. In November 2020, more
than a year after Enbridge's removal deadline had lapsed, the Michigan
Governor issued a notice revoking the 1953 easement and fled a sepa-
rate lawsuit in state court against Enbridge. In that suit, unlike in the
Attorney General's suit, Enbridge timely removed to federal court, and
the parties agreed to hold the Attorney General's case in abeyance while
federal proceedings progressed. After the District Court denied the
Governor's motion to remand, fnding federal-question jurisdiction satis-
fed, the Governor voluntarily dismissed her lawsuit. On December 15,
2021—887 days after receiving the Attorney General's complaint—En-
bridge removed this action to federal court. The Attorney General
moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely under § 1446(b)'s
30-day deadline. The District Court denied the motion, holding that
equitable principles justifed excusing Enbridge's untimely removal, and
certifed its order for interlocutory appeal. The Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that although § 1446(b)(1)'s deadline is nonjurisdictional, several
features of § 1446(b)(1) and the overall removal scheme rebutted any
presumption of equitable tolling. Thus, the lawsuit had to be remanded
to the Michigan state court. This Court granted certiorari to resolve a
divide among the Courts of Appeals on whether § 1446(b)(1) is subject
to equitable tolling.
Held: Because § 1446(b)(1)'s text, structure, and context are inconsistent
with equitable tolling, Enbridge's removal was untimely. Pp. 75–84.

68 ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Syllabus
(a) The fact that the 30-day removal deadline in § 1446(b)(1) is nonju-
r
isdictional does not automatically render it subject to equitable tolling.
While jurisdictional requirements “cannot be waived or forfeited” and
“do not allow for equitable exceptions,” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596
U. S. 199, 203, “[t]he mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdictional force
. . . does not render it malleable in every respect,” Nutraceutical Corp.
v. Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 192. Some nonjurisdictional rules remain
“mandatory” and “are not susceptible” of equitable tolling. Ibid.
The Court need not decide whether § 1446(b)(1) qualifes as a statute
of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling because, even
if the presumption applies, it can be “rebutted if `there [is] good reason
to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine
to apply.' ” Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U. S. 1, 7. Here, the text,
structure, and context of § 1446(b)(1) demonstrate that Congress did not
want the 30-day deadline to be equitably tolled.
The text of § 1446(b)(1) speaks in strict, mandatory terms, requiring
that a notice of removal “shall be fled within 30 days.” Although such
mandatory language alone is not suffcient to rebut the presumption of
equitable tolling, it is consistent with treating the deadline as mandatory
and not subject to equitable tolling. Cf. Boechler, 596 U. S., at 204, 211.
More important, and decisive here, is § 1446(b)(1)'s structure. An
“explicit listing of exceptions,” set forth in a detailed manner, strongly
indicates “that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmen-
tioned, open-ended, `equitable' exceptions into the statute.” United
States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 352. That is especially so when the
“specifc exceptions” already “refect equitable considerations.” Arel-
lano, 598 U. S., at 7. There are several such exceptions here. First,
and functioning much like an equitable discovery rule, § 1446(b)(3) pro-
vides an extension when a case at frst appears unremovable but it is
later “ascertained that the case is” (or has become) removable. Con-
gress thus “has already effectively allowed for equitable tolling ” in one
respect but not others. United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48.
Section 1446(c)(1) also imposes a one-year cap on this rule in diversity
cases, but creates an exception if a plaintiff acted in “bad faith,” specif-
cally “account[ing] for equitable factors” in a way that would be super-
fuous if § 1446(b)(1) already provided for equitable tolling more broadly.
Arellano, 598 U. S., at 10.
Exceptions to the 30-day deadline outside of § 1446 confrm the point.
For actions against foreign states, Congress specifcally allowed “the
time limitations of § 1446(b) . . . [to] be enlarged at any time for cause
shown.” § 1441(d). Similar provisions exist for certain intellectual-
property cases, see § 1454(b)(2), and cases involving fatal accidents, see
§ 1441(e)(1). Each provision explicitly incorporates § 1446(b)(1)'s time
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 608 U. S. 67 (2026)
69
Syllabus
limit but modifes it to allow equitable, case-specifc exceptions that
wou
ld be inexplicable and unnecessary if Congress already understood
§ 1446(b)(1) to contain a cross-cutting equitable-tolling rule. Congress's
treatment of removal in criminal proceedings provides additional con-
frmation. Under § 1455(b)(1), a criminal defendant must generally re-
move within 30 days after arraignment, but “for good cause shown [a
court] may . . . gran[t] . . . leave to fle . . . at a later time.” For civil
cases, by contrast, Congress did not provide courts with a similar gen-
eral power to extend the 30-day removal deadline.
“[T]he nature of the subject matter” here further underscores the
unavailability of equitable tolling. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 14. The fed-
eral civil removal statutes have an “obvious concern with effciency,”
BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 245,
and a “general interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold
nonmerits questions,” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.,
551 U. S. 224, 237. Allowing equitable tolling would undermine Con-
gress's manifest interest in resolving threshold removal questions early
and conclusively, generating uncertainty and risking signifcant waste
of resources. Cf. Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 49. Pp. 75–80.
(b) Enbridge's counterarguments are not persuasive. Enbridge's ar-
gument that rebutting the presumption of equitable tolling requires the
“clearest command” from Congress conficts with the Court's repeated
holdings that the presumption is rebutted where “Congress's choice is
evident,” Arellano, 598 U. S., at 14; where tolling would be “inconsistent
with the text of the relevant statute,” Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48; and
where there is “good reason to believe Congress did not want equitable
tolling to apply,” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 350. None of these decisions
required the “clearest command” that Enbridge demands. Enbridge's
attempt to characterize § 1446(b)(3) as an accrual rule rather than an
exception does not account for the separate “bad faith” exception in
§ 1446(c)(1) or the many other provisions outside § 1446 that expressly
allow courts to toll § 1446(b)(1)'s deadline “for cause shown.” The fact
that these provisions are located outside of § 1446 itself does not dimin-
ish their force; courts must consider equitable tolling 's “incongruen[ce]
with the statutory scheme” overall. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 13. En-
bridge cannot identify any sensible reason why Congress would have
adopted so many express, specifc equitable exceptions to § 1446(b)(1) if
equitable tolling was already available for belated removals across the
board. Finally, Enbridge's argument based on § 1447(c)'s treatment of
defects in subject-matter jurisdiction does not support equitable tolling.
Pp. 80–84.
104 F. 4th 958, affrmed.

Page Proof Pending Publication
70 ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Syllabus
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
J
ohn J. Bursch argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Alice E. Loughran, Phillip J. De-
Rosier, and Jeffery V. Stuckey.
Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued
the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Dana
Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, pro se, Christopher
M. Allen, Assistant Solicitor General, Keith D. Underkoffer,
Assistant Attorney General, and Spencer D. Smith, Special
Assistant Attorney General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of West
Virginia et al. by John B. McCuskey, Attorney General of West Virginia,
and Michael R. Williams, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective States as follows: Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Chris Carr
of Georgia, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael
T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew Wrigley of North Dakota, Gentner Drum-
mond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, and Ken Paxton of
Texas; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
et al. by Shannon G. Denmark, Stephanie A. Maloney, Jonathan D.
Urick, and Elizabeth Milito; for North America's Building Trades Unions
et al. by Jonathan D. Newman and Jacob J. Demree; for the Washington
Legal Foundation by Cory L. Andrews and Zac Morgan; and for Arthur
R. Miller by Alexander Volokh.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Minnesota et al. by Keith Ellison, Attorney General of Minnesota, Eliza-
beth Kramer, Solicitor General, and Oliver J. Larson and Ryan V. Petty,
Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their re-
spective jurisdictions as follows: Kristin K. Mayes of Arizona, Philip J.
Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of
Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez
of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G.
Brown of Maryland, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Aaron D.
Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New
Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, and
Nicholas W. Brown of Washington; for the Center for Litigation and
Courts by Joshua P. Davis and Scott Dodson; for Federal Courts and Civil
Procedure Scholars by Dana Kaersvang and Hyland Hunt; for the Great
Lakes Business Network by Bruce T. Wallace and Andrew P. Buchsbaum;
and for Tribal Nations by Caroline A. Flynn.

Cite
as: 608 U. S. 67 (2026)
71
Opinion of the Court
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
U
nder 28 U. S. C. § 1446(b)(1), a party sued in state court
who prefers to proceed in federal court generally has 30 days
after receiving notice of the state-court action to remove the
lawsuit to federal court (if there are grounds for doing so).
In this case, petitioners (collectively Enbridge) unquestion-
ably did not meet § 1446(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline, instead wait-
ing 887 days after being served with the Michigan Attorney
General's state-court complaint before removing the case to
federal court. Enbridge argues that the District Court
nevertheless had equitable discretion to toll § 1446(b)(1)'s
deadline and excuse this late fling. This Court disagrees.
Because § 1446(b)(1)'s text, structure, and context are in-
consistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge's removal was un-
timely and remand to the Michigan state court is required.
I
A
The right to remove a lawsuit from state to federal court
“is entirely a creature of statute[,] and `a suit commenced in
a state court must remain there until cause is shown for its
transfer under some act of Congress.' ” Syngenta Crop Pro-
tection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U. S. 28, 32 (2002). Congress
provided one such basis for removal in § 1441(a), which au-
thorizes removal if a civil action “brought in a State court”
is one over “which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction.” For example, if a plaintiff sues
in state court bringing federal claims or if the plaintiff and
defendant are from different States and there is a suffcient
amount in controversy, the defendant may remove to federal
court. See §§ 1331, 1332(a).
For defendants seeking to remove under § 1441(a), the pro-
cedures for doing so are largely set forth in § 1446. Key
here as to timing, the “notice of removal of a civil action or
proceeding shall be fled within 30 days after the receipt” of
the “initial pleading ” in that action, “or within 30 days after
Page Proof Pending Publication

72 ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Opinion of the Court
the service of summons upon the defendant[,] . . . whichever
per
iod is shorter.” § 1446(b). This 30-day default rule is
subject to several exceptions in § 1446 and elsewhere. Sec-
tion 1446(b)(3), for instance, extends the 30-day deadline if
an initial pleading did not provide a basis for removal but it
is later “ascertained that the case is one which is or has be-
come removable.” As detailed below, this rule, in turn, is
subject to an exception (which itself has yet another excep-
tion). § 1446(c)(1); see infra, at 78. Outside of § 1446 itself,
Congress has also allowed later removal, for cause shown, in
specifc scenarios. See, e. g., § 1441(d) (suits against foreign
states); § 1441(e)(1) (certain suits involving mass accidents
with more than 75 fatalities); § 1454(b)(2) (certain suits in-
volving intellectual property); see also § 1455(b) (removal of
criminal actions).
After a case is removed, any motion to remand the case to
state court must be fled within 30 days of the notice of re-
moval. § 1447(c). An order remanding a case generally “is
not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” § 1447(d).
B
Enbridge
1
owns and operates the 645-mile-long Line 5
pipeline, which runs from northwestern Wisconsin through
Michigan and into Canada. Line 5 is part of a pipeline net-
work that transports petroleum products to refneries across
the Midwestern United States, Ontario, and Quebec. Be-
tween Michigan's Upper and Lower Peninsulas, a 4-mile
strip of Line 5 traverses the Straits of Mackinac pursuant
to a 1953 easement granted to Enbridge's predecessor by
the State of Michigan, which has long owned the Strait's
bottomlands.
On June 27, 2019, the Michigan Attorney General fled this
lawsuit in Michigan state court, seeking to halt Enbridge's
1
Petitioners are Enbridge Energy, LP, Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., and
Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. For simplicity, the Court refers to them
together as Enbridge.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 608 U. S. 67 (2026)
73
Opinion of the Court
operation of Line 5. She alleged that the 1953 easement is
void
and that Enbridge's operations violate Michigan law,
given the risk of an oil spill from the pipeline. On July 12,
2019, the Attorney General served Enbridge with a com-
plaint. Over the following months, Enbridge did not re-
move the case to federal court and instead briefed cross-
motions for summary disposition and participated in oral ar-
gument on those motions, all in state court. Enbridge ar-
gued, among other things, that the state-law claims against
it were preempted by federal law.
On November 13, 2020, more than a year after Enbridge's
30-day deadline to remove had lapsed, Michigan Governor
Gretchen Whitmer issued a notice of revocation of the 1953
easement, calling for Line 5 to be shut down. At the same
time, the Governor fled a separate lawsuit in Michigan state
court against Enbridge to enforce the notice, bringing state-
law claims very similar to those in the Attorney General's
lawsuit. Instead of litigating the Governor's suit in state
court, Enbridge timely removed that action to federal court,
arguing that the Federal District Court had jurisdiction
under § 1331 because the case involved a substantial federal
question. See Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue
Engineering & Mfg., 545 U. S. 308, 314 (2005) (recognizing
a limited category of state-law claims that support federal-
question jurisdiction because they necessarily raise substan-
tial questions of federal law). Enbridge did not remove the
Attorney General's suit at that time; instead, the parties
agreed to hold the Attorney General's case (that is, this case)
in abeyance while federal proceedings progressed in the Gov-
ernor's suit.
The Governor moved to remand her case to state court,
arguing that the case did not raise a signifcant federal issue.
Soon after, the Government of Canada submitted amicus fl-
ings arguing that shutting down Line 5 would implicate a
1977 treaty between Canada and the United States and im-
pair foreign relations between the two countries. On No-
Page Proof Pending Publication

74 ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Opinion of the Court
vember 16, 2021, the District Court denied the Governor's
moti
on to remand, concluding that federal-question jurisdic-
tion was satisfed because the claims necessarily implicated
substantial federal questions under two federal statutes and
the 1977 treaty. The Governor voluntarily dismissed her
lawsuit not long after that ruling.
2
On December 15, 2021, following the District Court's fa-
vorable remand ruling in the Governor's suit, Enbridge re-
moved this action to federal court. At that point, 887 days
had elapsed from when Enbridge received the Attorney Gen-
eral's complaint. The Attorney General moved to remand,
arguing, as relevant here, that removal was untimely under
§ 1446(b)'s 30-day deadline. The District Court denied the
motion, holding that equitable principles justifed excusing
Enbridge's untimely removal. It then certifed its order de-
nying remand for interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b).
After accepting the interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit
reversed. 104 F. 4th 958 (2024). Enbridge, the Circuit
held, unquestionably missed the 30-day removal deadline.
As for the District Court's conclusion that § 1446(b)(1)'s dead-
line should be equitably tolled, the Circuit held that although
statutes of limitations are presumptively subject to such toll-
ing, several features of § 1446(b)(1) and the overall removal
scheme rebutted that presumption. Section 1446(b)(1) thus
could not be equitably tolled, and the lawsuit had to be re-
manded to the Michigan state court.
Enbridge fled a timely petition for a writ of certiorari,
seeking review of the Sixth Circuit's holding that § 1446(b) is
not subject to equitable tolling. Other Courts of Appeals
2
Similar issues remain pending in another federal action. In November
2020, Enbridge sued the Governor seeking affrmative relief, and in De-
cember 2025, the District Court granted summary judgment to Enbridge,
concluding that the Governor's efforts to shut down Line 5 were pre-
empted. See Enbridge Energy, LP v. Whitmer, 813 F. Supp. 3d 777, 792–
793 (WD Mich. 2025).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 608 U. S. 67 (2026)
75
Opinion of the Court
have held that equitable tolling is available under § 1446(b)(1)
i
n at least some circumstances. See Gillis v. Louisiana, 294
F. 3d 755, 759 (CA5 2002); Loftin v. Rush, 767 F. 2d 800, 805
(CA11 1985). This Court granted certiorari to resolve the
divide among the Courts of Appeals. 606 U. S. 930 (2025).
II
Enbridge's argument proceeds in three steps, each critical
to prevailing here. First, it contends that § 1446(b)(1)'s 30-
day removal deadline is not jurisdictional. Second, because
the deadline is nonjurisdictional, Enbridge argues that it is
presumptively subject to equitable tolling. Third, according
to Enbridge, nothing rebuts the presumption that this dead-
line can be equitably tolled.
At the frst step, there is rightly no dispute. “No one con-
tends that [§ 1446(b)(1)] is jurisdictional,” given that “it `does
not expressly refer to subject-matter jurisdiction or speak in
jurisdictional terms.' ” McIntosh v. United States, 601 U. S.
330, 337 (2024); see 104 F. 4th, at 969 (explaining why
§ 1446(b)(1) is not jurisdictional). That much is crucial for
Enbridge's case, as “[ j]urisdictional requirements cannot be
waived or forfeited, must be raised by courts sua sponte,
and, as relevant to this case, do not allow for equitable excep-
tions.” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203 (2022).
“The mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdictional force,
however, does not render it malleable in every respect.”
Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 192 (2019).
Some nonjurisdictional rules remain “mandatory” and “are
not susceptible of the equitable approach” that Enbridge
urges. Ibid.
That brings us to steps two and three in Enbridge's argu-
ment. The Attorney General argues that, at each step, En-
bridge confronts an independent reason why § 1446(b)(1),
though nonjurisdictional, is not subject to equitable tolling.
First, she disagrees that any presumption of equitable tolling
Page Proof Pending Publication

76 ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Opinion of the Court
applies to § 1446(b)(1). This Court “ha[s] only applied [the
presumpti
on of equitable tolling] to statutes of limitations.”
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 13–14 (2014); see
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 27 (1989). Ac-
cording to the Attorney General, § 1446(b)(1) is not a statute
of limitations because it does not “extinguis[h] a tardy claim
(the function of a statute of limitations),” Arellano v. Mc-
Donough, 598 U. S. 1, 7 (2023), and instead addresses “a
forum issue that arises only after a claim for relief has been
brought.” Brief for Respondent 28; see Young v. United
States, 535 U. S. 43, 47 (2002) (explaining that a limitations
period “prescribes a period within which certain rights . . .
may be enforced”). Second, the Attorney General argues
that even if § 1446(b)(1) is a statute of limitations to which
the presumption of equitable tolling applies, the presumption
is rebutted here because such tol l i ng confl ic ts w ith
§ 1446(b)(1)'s text, structure, and context.
As in prior cases, the Court need not parse whether
§ 1446(b)(1) qualifes as a statute of limitations subject to a
presumption of equitable tolling because the result, even if
the presumption applies, “is straightforward.” Arellano,
598 U. S., at 7; see United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347,
350 (1997). “The presumption is rebutted if `there [is] good
reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable
tolling doctrine to apply.' ” Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7 (alter-
ation in original). Here, the kinds of evidence the Court
generally considers on this question show that Congress did
not want § 1446(b)(1) to be equitably tolled.
Starting with the text of § 1446(b)(1), this provision speaks
in strict, mandatory terms. It requires that a notice of re-
moval “shall be fled within 30 days” of the defendant receiv-
ing either a complaint or summons, “whichever period is
shorter.” To be sure, this kind of mandatory language is
not suffcient, on its own, to rebut the presumption of equita-
ble tolling. See, e. g., United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 608 U. S. 67 (2026)
77
Opinion of the Court
U. S. 402, 410–411, 420 (2015) (deadline stating that claim
“
`shall be forever barred' ” was subject to equitable tolling).
The strict phrasing of § 1446(b)(1), however, is at least con-
sistent with treating its deadline as mandatory and not sub-
ject to equitable tolling. Cf. Boechler, 596 U. S., at 204, 211
(concluding that equitable tolling applied to a provision that
merely set the deadline by which a person “ `may' ” fle a
petition with the Tax Court).
More important, and decisive here, is § 1446(b)(1)'s struc-
ture. This Court has repeatedly held that an “explicit list-
ing of exceptions,” set forth in a detailed manner, strongly
indicates “that Congress did not intend courts to read other
unmentioned, open-ended, `equitable' exceptions into the
statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352; see,
e. g., Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7. That is because “[i]t would
be inconsistent with [a] comprehensive scheme” that includes
a default deadline and several exceptions “to extend [the
deadline] still further through the doctrine of equitable toll-
ing,” outside of those specifed exceptions. Arellano, 598
U. S., at 7. This “structural inference” is “heighten[ed],”
moreover, if the “specifc exceptions” at issue already “refect
equitable considerations.” Id., at 9.
That is exactly the case here. Within § 1446(b) itself, Con-
gress provided that the ordinary 30-day deadline does not
apply when a case at frst appears unremovable, but a later
“pleading, motion, order or other paper” reveals that it is
(or has become) removable. § 1446(b)(3). In that case, the
defendant has another 30 days to remove from “receipt” of
the paper “from which it may frst be ascertained that the case
is . . . removable.” Ibid. This extension is limited, however,
if the basis for removal is diversity of citizenship. Such “[a]
case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) . . . more than
1 year after commencement of the action, unless the district
court fnds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to
prevent a defendant from removing the action.” § 1446(c)(1).
Page Proof Pending Publication

78 ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Opinion of the Court
This highly detailed scheme matters for at least two rea-
sons.
First, the “ascertain[ment]” provision in § 1446(b)(3)
functions much like a discovery rule, giving defendants extra
time to remove after the date on which they learned or
should have learned that a case was removable. In doing
so, Congress “has already effectively allowed for equitable
tolling ” in this one respect but not others, which cuts against
the availability of broader tolling. United States v. Beg-
gerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48 (1998). Second, in creating the “bad
faith” exception to § 1446(c)(1)'s 1-year bar in diversity cases,
Congress specifcally “accounted for equitable factors,” by
providing additional time for removal, in a way that would
be superfuous if § 1446(b)(1) already broadly provided for
equitable tolling in all cases. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 10.
Exceptions to § 1446(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline outside of
§ 1446 drive home the point. For actions against foreign
states, Congress specifcally allowed “the time limitations of
section 1446(b) . . . [to] be enlarged at any time for cause
shown.” § 1441(d). So too for actions involving certain
intellectual-property rights. See § 1454(b)(2). For certain
cases involving fatal accidents, removal generally “shall be
made in accordance with section 1446 . . . except that,” as to
timing, an action may be removed “at a later time with leave
of the district court.” § 1441(e)(1). Each of these provi-
sions explicitly incorporates § 1446(b)(1)'s time limit but mod-
ifes it to allow equitable, case-specifc exceptions. Each
provision would be inexplicable and unnecessary, however, if
Congress already understood § 1446(b)(1) to contain a cross-
cutting rule allowing equitable tolling.
Stepping beyond the removal of civil cases, Congress's
treatment of removal in criminal proceedings provides addi-
tional confrmation that Congress did not want equitable toll-
ing under § 1446(b)(1). Under § 1455(b)(1), a criminal de-
fendant with a removable case must generally remove within
“30 days after the arraignment in the State court,” but “for
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 608 U. S. 67 (2026)
79
Opinion of the Court
good cause shown [a court] may . . . gran[t] the defendant or
defendants
leave to fle the notice at a later time.” In crimi-
nal cases, Congress thus did grant federal courts a broad,
generally applicable power to allow late removals. For civil
cases, by contrast, Congress did not provide courts with a
similar general power to extend the 30-day removal deadline.
Instead, through the limited exceptions discussed above,
Congress specifed the cases in which it wanted to authorize
equitable tolling. Enbridge's position would eliminate the
variation between these two removal contexts, but “[w]hen
Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it from a neighbor, we normally understand
that difference in language to convey a difference in mean-
ing.” Bittner v. United States, 598 U. S. 85, 94 (2023).
Finally, and to “garnish an already solid argument,” “the
nature of the subject matter” here underscores the unavail-
ability of equitable tolling. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 14; see
Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. The federal civil removal stat-
utes have an “obvious concern with effciency,” BP p.l.c. v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 245
(2021), and a “general interest in avoiding prolonged litiga-
tion on threshold nonmerits questions,” Powerex Corp. v. Re-
liant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 237 (2007). That
is refected not only in the short deadline for removal itself,
but also in the strict 30-day deadline for seeking remand of
a removed action, § 1447(c), and the default rule that remand
orders are not appealable, § 1447(d); see Kircher v. Putnam
Funds Trust, 547 U. S. 633, 640–642 (2006) (explaining that
this interest in effciency and fnality necessarily sacrifces
some measure of accuracy).
Allowing equitable tolling of § 1446(b)(1)'s deadline would
undermine Congress's manifest interest in resolving thresh-
old removal questions early and conclusively. Under the
rule the Court adopts today, plaintiffs that sue in state court
usually can be confdent that, after § 1446(b)(1)'s deadline has
Page Proof Pending Publication

80 ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Opinion of the Court
elapsed, the forum question has been put to rest and the case
w
ill proceed in the chosen court. Under the rule Enbridge
favors, to the contrary, the possibility of a late removal would
hang over a case, generating uncertainty and risking signif-
cant waste of resources in one forum before a possible be-
lated removal to another. Cf. Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 49
(holding equitable tolling unavailable based in part on the
“cloud of uncertainty” such tolling would produce, in a con-
text where “certainty” was of “special importance”). Be-
cause Enbridge's approach would upset the “balance struck
by Congress” in the removal statutes, Hallstrom, 493 U. S.,
at 30, these underlying concerns provide yet another reason
to conclude that equitable tolling is not available under
§ 1446(b)(1).
III
Enbridge's counterarguments are not persuasive. It
starts by attempting to raise the bar for rebutting the pre-
sumption of equitable tolling. In its view, it is not enough
to show that tolling is inconsistent with the overall statutory
scheme; the question is instead whether Congress has pro-
vided the “ `clearest command' ” that equitable tolling should
not apply. Brief for Petitioners 32 (quoting Holland v. Flor-
ida, 560 U. S. 631, 646 (2010)). This Court, however, has
never applied such a requirement in this context, and doing
so would confict with the Court's repeated holdings that the
presumption has been rebutted where “Congress's choice is
evident,” Arellano, 598 U. S., at 14, where tolling would be
“inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute,” Beggerly,
524 U. S., at 48, and where there is “good reason to believe
that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to
apply,” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 350. None of these decisions
required the “clearest command” that Enbridge demands.
They simply looked to text, structure, and context and asked
if there were “good reasons” to conclude that tolling should
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 608 U. S. 67 (2026)
81
Opinion of the Court
not be available.
3
As
discussed above, such reasons are
present here.
On the text of § 1446(b)(1), Enbridge argues that the 30-
day deadline is short and focused on litigants' conduct, not
courts' authority, which (according to Enbridge) makes it
akin to other provisions the Court has held subject to equita-
ble tolling. See, e. g., Boechler, 596 U. S., at 209. This
Court, however, has found other deadlines that speak at least
in part to a litigant's conduct, and with even shorter dead-
lines, not to be subject to equitable tolling when surrounding
context led to that conclusion. See, e. g., Brockamp, 519
U. S., at 351, 354 (claim had to “ `be fled by the taxpayer' ”
within certain periods); cf. Nutraceutical, 586 U. S., at 191,
194 (similar, with 14-day window).
4
Seeking to discount the many exceptions to § 1446(b)(1)'s
deadline, Enbridge disputes whether they are really “excep-
tions” at all. As to § 1446(b)(3), which applies to later-
“ascertained” removability, Enbridge argues it is more akin
to an accrual rule for a limitations period, which this Court
3
Enbridge relies heavily on this Court's use of the “clearest command”
language in Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631 (2010), but Holland used
that language to explain why the presumption was “reinforced” in that
case: The Court will not read a statute to “ `displace' ” the “ `equitable
principles' [that] have traditionally `governed' the substantive law of ha-
beas corpus . . . absent the `clearest command.' ” Id., at 646. That is a
different issue than displacing the presumption of equitable tolling.
4
Enbridge tries to distinguish Brockamp on the ground that it set forth
its deadline in a “highly detailed technical manner.” United States v.
Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350 (1997). It is unclear, however, that 28
U. S. C. § 1446(b)(1), with its two alternative deadlines, choice of whichever
period is “shorter,” and many exceptions, is meaningfully less “detailed”
than the statute in Brockamp. 519 U. S., at 351 (discussing statute pro-
hibiting claims for tax refunds “ `within 3 years from the time the return
was fled or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such
periods expires the later, or if no return was fled . . . within 2 years from
the time the tax was paid' ”).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
82 ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Opinion of the Court
has distinguished from a true “ `exception[n].' ” Holland,
560
U. S., at 647. Even if so, however, that would not ac-
count for the separate “bad faith” exception to the 1-year
deadline for diversity cases in § 1446(c)(1).
Nor does Enbridge's rejoinder account for the many other
provisions, outside of § 1446, expressly allowing courts to toll
§ 1446(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline “for cause shown” and the like.
See supra, at 79. Enbridge labels these as “comprehensive
legislation targeting a particular area for reform,” not “ex-
ception[s] to Section 1446(b).” Reply Brief 16–17; see id., at
16–20. The problem is that, in the most important respect,
these statutes are not “comprehensive”: They do not set
their own deadlines, but rely on § 1446(b)(1) and modify it.
Critically, they often do so precisely to allow consideration
of the very same equitable factors that, on Enbridge's theory,
are already built into § 1446(b)(1). Enbridge also suggests
that because these exceptions are located outside of § 1446
itself, they should carry less force. The Court, however, has
already disapproved of such “[l]aser focu[s]” on a single pro-
vision in isolation. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 12. Instead,
courts must consider equitable tolling 's “incongruen[ce] with
the statutory scheme” overall. Id., at 13. The fact that the
timing “scheme” here is set forth in provisions that extend
beyond § 1446 is not a meaningful difference from Arellano.
Enbridge also attempts to distinguish this case from Arel-
lano on the ground that the timing rule at issue in Arellano
had 16 distinct exceptions while § 1446(b)(1) has fewer, and
points out that this Court has found equitable tolling to apply
even when a deadline has an explicit exception. See, e. g.,
Holland, 560 U. S., at 647–648. Enbridge is correct on the
numbers, but this inquiry is not a mere counting exercise.
In Holland, the key point was not that there was only one
exception. It was that the exception at issue (tolling the
time for seeking federal habeas relief while an application
for state postconviction relief is pending) was “easily ex-
plained” by a “special need for an express provision” ac-

Cite
as: 608 U. S. 67 (2026)
83
Opinion of the Court
counting for state-court litigation, which “undermine[d]” any
i
nference that Congress did not intend for equitable tolling
more broadly to apply. Id., at 648; see Young, 535 U. S., at
53 (similar). Here, to the contrary, Enbridge cannot identify
any sensible reason why Congress would have adopted so
many express, specifc equitable exceptions to § 1446(b)(1) if
equitable tolling was already available for belated removals
across the board.
Finally, Enbridge points to § 1447(c)'s 30-day deadline for
motions to remand, which does not apply if a court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction. As Enbridge sees it, Con-
gress's requirement of remand even outside of the 30-day
deadline for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but not for
other defects like untimeliness, suggests that Congress in-
tended to treat untimeliness less harshly than the lack of
jurisdiction, including by allowing equitable tolling. En-
bridge's conclusion does not follow from its premises. Sec-
tion 1447(c) refects the unique stringency that applies to ju-
risdictional rules, which “cannot be waived or forfeited.”
Boechler, 596 U. S., at 203; cf. Nutraceutical, 586 U. S., at
192 (explaining that even “mandatory” rules not subject to
equitable tolling may be “subject to waiver and forfeiture”).
As explained above, however, not all nonjurisdictional rules
can be equitably tolled. See supra, at 76. The fact that
§ 1447(c) requires remand at any time for jurisdictional de-
fects, but not for nonjurisdictional defects like untimeliness,
therefore in no way implies the availability of equitable
tolling.
5
IV
Assuming § 1446(b)(1) is a statute of limitations and is
therefore subject to the presumption of equitable tolling, the
statute's text, structure, and surrounding context provide
5
The Court resolves only the applicability of equitable tolling to
§ 1446(b)(1), and does not resolve the applicability of other equitable doc-
trines like waiver, forfeiture, and estoppel.
Page Proof Pending Publication

84 ENBRIDGE
ENERGY, LP v. NESSEL
Opinion of the Court
good reason to fnd the presumption rebutted. Accordingly,
§
1446(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline cannot be equitably tolled.
The Court of Appeals therefore correctly held that Enbrid-
ge's notice of removal was untimely and that this action must
be remanded to the Michigan state court. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
p. 76, line 9 from bottom: “shows” is changed to “show”