Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1
Pages 1–21
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 17, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2025
CHEVRON USA INC. et al. v. PLAQUEMINES
PARISH, LOUISIANA, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 24–813. Argued January 12, 2026—Decided April 17, 2026
The federal offcer removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(1), authorizes re-
moval of state-court suits against federal offcers or persons “acting
under” them “for or relating to any act under color of such offce.” This
case concerns whether, for purposes of the statute, a state-court envi-
ronmental suit challenging Chevron's crude-oil production during the
Second World War is “for or relating to” Chevron's wartime refning of
crude oil into aviation gasoline for the U. S. military.
In 1978, Louisiana enacted the State and Local Coastal Resources
Management Act, which prohibited certain uses of Louisiana's coastal
zone, including oil production, without a permit. The Act exempted
uses legally commenced before 1980. In 2013, Plaquemines Parish and
other parishes fled 42 state-court suits against oil and gas companies
under the Act. They alleged that the companies lacked permits and
that some uses, although initiated before 1980, were illegally commenced
and therefore not covered by the exemption. An expert report fled by
the parish made clear that it intended to challenge certain defendants'
crude-oil production during the Second World War. The report alleged
that Chevron failed to use steel tanks instead of earthen pits, should
not have used vertical-drilling methods, and failed to equip felds with
suffcient roads, using canals instead.
1
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2 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Syllabus
Chevron removed the suit to federal court under the federal offcer
remova
l statute, arguing that the suit “relat[ed] to” its contractual du-
ties to refne crude oil into avgas for the military during the war. The
District Court rejected this argument and granted the parish's motion
to remand to state court. The Fifth Circuit affrmed, agreeing that
Chevron had “acted under” a federal offcer as a military contractor but
concluding that the suit was not “for or relating to” those acts because
Chevron's refning contract did not specify how to acquire crude oil.
Judge Oldham dissented, reasoning that crude oil was “indispensable”
to avgas, such that its production necessarily related to Chevron's per-
formance of its federal avgas refning duties.
Held: Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its chal-
lenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal avgas
refning duties—not a tenuous, remote, or peripheral one—and has
therefore satisfed the “relating to” requirement of the federal offcer
removal statute. Pp. 10–15.
(a) The phrase “relating to” sweeps broadly, meaning “ `to stand in
some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring
into association with or connection with.' ” Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 383. One thing can relate to another even
if the connection is “indirect,” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498
U. S. 133, 139; even if it was “not specifcally designed to affect” it, ibid.;
and even without a “strict causal relationship,” Ford Motor Co. v. Mon-
tana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 351, 362. Accordingly, a
removing defendant need not show that his federal duties specifcally
required or strictly caused the challenged conduct.
The ordinary meaning of “relating to,” however, is not “so broad that
it is meaningless.” Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management
Assn., 592 U. S. 80, 93 (Thomas, J., concurring). The ordinary meaning
requires a connection that is not “ `tenuous, remote, or peripheral.' ”
Id., at 94. Ordinary readers would not understand the federal offcer
removal statute to reach all suits with any attenuated connection to
federal duties. Pp. 11–12.
(b) Chevron's suit “relat[es] to” the performance of federal duties be-
cause Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its
challenged conduct and the performance of its federal duties. This suit
implicates Chevron's wartime efforts to produce and supply avgas' es-
sential feedstock, so it is closely connected to Chevron's wartime avgas
refning for the military. Much of the crude oil that Chevron produced
in Plaquemines Parish was ultimately used for its own avgas refning,
and the suit challenges Chevron's actions that allowed it to increase its
production of crude oil during wartime. The parish's report alleged

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as: 608 U. S. 1 (2026)
3
Syllabus
that Chevron's use of the coastal zone had been illegally commenced
because
of its reliance on vertical-drilling methods, canals, and earthen
pits—but using vertical-drilling methods maximized crude-oil produc-
tion; using canals saved time and materials resulting in more timely
oil production; and using earthen pits complied with the Government's
directive to preserve steel. The Government emphasized the impor-
tance of increasing Chevron's crude-oil production to support avgas re-
fning as part of the war effort, and it identifed the oil feld at issue as
critical to the war program because it produced a preferential kind of
crude oil for refning avgas. In this all-hands-on-deck, wartime con-
text, Chevron needed to produce more crude oil as quickly as possible
to facilitate more avgas refning, including its own. Pp. 12–14.
(c) The Court disagrees with the Fifth Circuit's two main reasons for
ruling to the contrary. First, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Chevron's
refning contract did not specify how to obtain or produce crude oil, so
Chevron's crude-oil production was unrelated to the performance of its
federal refning duties. But the ordinary meaning of “relating to” does
not require the defendant to show that his federal duties specifcally
invited his challenged conduct; Chevron's contract did not have to ex-
pressly direct or invite Chevron's crude-oil production for that conduct
to “relate to” its avgas refning. Second, the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the Government's allocation of crude oil to refneries severed any
relation between producing and refning. But an act can relate to its
consequences even when the causal chain includes actions by intermedi-
aries, see Morales, 504 U. S. 374; producing crude oil relates to refning
it into avgas, even if the Government acted as an intermediary allocat-
ing the crude oil to refneries. Pp. 14–15.
(d) The Court also disagrees with Louisiana's argument that the re-
moval statute requires that the defendant was “acting under” a federal
offcer in taking the specifc actions challenged in the suit. This theory
is not consistent with the statutory text, which permits removal of suits
against offcers or their agents for acts that were not done under color
of their offces, so long as the suits “relat[e] to” such acts. Louisiana's
interpretation would leave the “relating to” requirement with little, if
any, independent function, impermissibly confating the “acting under”
and “for or relating to” elements of the federal offcer removal test.
P. 15.
103 F. 4th 324, vacated and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ.,
joined. Jackson, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, post,
p. 16. Alito, J., took no part in the decision of the case.

4 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Counsel
Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioners. With
h
im on the briefs were C. Harker Rhodes IV, Joseph J. De-
Mott, Martin A. Stern, Jeffrey E. Richardson, Robert B. Mc-
Neal, Kelly B. Becker, Jamie D. Rhymes, Kannon K. Shan-
mugam, William T. Marks, Jennifer J. Clark, Alexandra
White, Eric J. Mayer, Charles S. McCowan III, and Michael
R. Phillips.
Aaron Z. Roper argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the briefs
were Solicitor General Sauer, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Hamilton, Deputy Solicitor General Gannon, and
Michael S. Raab.
J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General of Louisiana, ar-
gued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were
Elizabeth B. Murrill, Attorney General of Louisiana, and J.
Blake Canfeld. Victor L. Marcello fled a brief for re-
spondents Plaquemines Parish et al.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of West
Virginia et al. by John B. McCuskey, Attorney General of West Virginia
and Michael R. Williams, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective States as follows: Stephen J. Cox of Alaska, Chris Carr
of Georgia, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Catherine Hanaway of Missouri, Mi-
chael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, and Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma; for
the America First Policy Institute by Nicholas J. Wanic and Gina D'An-
drea; for the American Tort Reform Association by Traci L. Lovitt; for
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Wil-
liam M. Jay, Andrew Kim, Andrew R. Varcoe, and Erica Klenicki; for
Express Scripts, Inc., by Jason R. Scherr and Douglas A. Hastings; for
Oil and Gas Associations by Jason T. Morgan, Ryan P. Steen, Constance
H. Pfeiffer, and Andrew T. Ingram; for the Pelican Institute for Public
Policy by James Baehr and Sarah Harbison; for the Washington Legal
Foundation et al. by Cory L. Andrews and Lawrence S. Ebner; for William
P. Barr et al. by Jeremy B. Rosen and John F. Querio; for Sen. Mike Lee
et al. by Christopher E. Mills and Daniel Z. Epstein; and for General
(Ret.) Richard B. Myers et al. by Tristan L. Duncan, William F. Northrip,
and Cary Silverman.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Association for Justice et al. by Robert S. Peck, Bruce Plaxen, Jeffrey R.
White, B. Scott Andrews, and Stephen J. Herman; for the Environmental
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as: 608 U. S. 1 (2026)
5
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress
has long authorized federal offcers and their
agents to remove suits brought against them in state court
to federal court. The federal offcer removal statute author-
izes an offcer or “person acting under that offcer” to remove
state suits “for or relating to any act under color of such
offce.” 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(1). In this case, Chevron USA
Inc. invoked the statute to remove to federal court an envi-
ronmental suit brought against it in Louisiana state court.
Chevron argued that the suit was removable because it im-
plicates Chevron's crude-oil production during the Second
World War, when Chevron also refned crude oil into aviation
gasoline for the U. S. military. No party disputes that Chev-
ron “act[ed] under” federal offcers when it performed its
refning duties. We thus decide only whether this suit,
which implicates Chevron's wartime production of crude oil,
“relat[es] to” Chevron's wartime aviation-gasoline refning
for the military. We hold that it does.
I
A
To protect the Federal Government from state-court “in-
terference with its operations,” Congress has given federal
courts jurisdiction over some suits against federal offcers or
those acting under them. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551
U. S. 142, 150 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The current federal offcer removal statute traces its lineage
to the Force Bill of 1833, which Congress passed to enable
federal customs offcials to remove suits to federal court
after South Carolina began prosecuting them for enforcing
Defense Fund et al. by Dana Kaersvang, Hyland Hunt, Ruthanne M.
Deutsch, E. Blair Schilling, Ian L. Atkinson, Isabel A. Englehart, and
Vickie L. Patton; for Former Governor John Bel Edwards by Caroline A.
Flynn; and for General (Ret.) Russel Honoré by Daniel Woofter and Kevin
K. Russell.
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6 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Opinion of the Court
federal law. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 268–269
(1880);
Brief for U. S. Sen. Mike Lee et al. as Amici Curiae
4. Over the next 200 years, Congress expanded the scope of
federal offcer removal beyond suits against customs offcials.
Id., at 4–6. Today, defendants may remove to federal
court any
“civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced
in a State court and that is against or directed to . . .
[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any offcer
(or any person acting under that offcer) of the United
States or of any agency thereof . . . for or relating to any
act under color of such offce.” 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(1).
Under the federal offcer removal statute, a removing de-
fendant must satisfy three requirements. First, the remov-
ing defendant must be the United States, a federal agency, a
federal offcer, or a person “acting under” a federal offcer,
such as certain private parties hired to assist federal offcers.
See Watson, 551 U. S., at 148–153. Second, the suit must be
“for or relating to any act under color of such offce.”
§ 1442(a)(1). Third, the removing defendant must assert “a
colorable federal defense.” Mesa v. California, 489 U. S.
121, 129 (1989); see id., at 136–137 (grounding this require-
ment in Article III of the Constitution). This case concerns
the second requirement.
B
When the United States entered the Second World War,
aviation gasoline—or “avgas”—became critical for the mili-
tary. The war spurred “a race to gain mastery of the skies.”
A. Baime, The Arsenal of Democracy 133 (2014). Success in
the air required high-octane avgas, a “superfuel” for combat
aircraft that helped to produce “more speed, more power,
[and] quicker take-off.” J. Frey & H. Ide, A History of the
Petroleum Administration for War, 1941–1945, p. 193 (1946)
(P. A. W. History). Avgas refning therefore had to keep
pace with the “astonishing expansion of aerial activity” dur-

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7
Opinion of the Court
ing the war. Ibid. In June 1940, the U. S. military used
about
4,000 barrels of avgas per day, while American indus-
try could refne 30,000 to 40,000 barrels per day. Id., at 194.
By 1944, at the height of U. S. involvement in the war, the
U. S. military needed 636,000 barrels per day. Ibid.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Petroleum
Administration for War (P. A. W.) to ensure that the United
States would have enough fuel to win the war. See id., at
14–15, 44–45. The P. A. W. oversaw the entire oil industry,
from production to transportation to refnement. Within
two weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the P.A.W. is-
sued a directive for “the production of 100 octane aviation
gasoline [to] be greatly increased.” 7 Fed. Reg. 41 (1942).
The message was clear: “ `[F]orget economic considera-
tions—forget everything except getting out more and more
100-octane [avgas] as quickly as you can.' ” P. A. W. History
199. With the P. A. W.'s assistance, the Federal Govern-
ment, through the Defense Supplies Corporation, contracted
with dozens of avgas refneries to secure avgas for the
military.
The Government entered an avgas refning contract with
a predecessor of Chevron, the Texas Company.
1
In its con-
tract with the Government, Chevron agreed to work “day
and night” to quadruple its avgas refning capacity at its
Texas refnery. App. to Pet. for Cert. 150–151. It agreed
that the Government could request that it buy avgas compo-
nents, including crude oil, from other frms. And, it agreed
that the Government could “at any time” purchase all of
Chevron's excess avgas. Id., at 156.
The Government knew that to refne crude oil into avgas,
Chevron needed crude oil. The Government's contract with
Chevron adjusted the price of avgas based on the cost of
obtaining crude oil. The P. A. W. allocated crude oil to spe-
1
All agree that as Chevron's corporate predecessor, the Texas Com-
pany's acts were Chevron's acts for the purposes of this case. We thus
refer to it as “Chevron.”
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8 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Opinion of the Court
cifc refners to maximize output. And, the P. A. W. required
produc
tion methods that increased crude-oil production, such
as vertical drilling. 8 Fed. Reg. 3955, 3957 (1943).
At the same time, Chevron produced crude oil in Plaque-
mines Parish, Louisiana, including in two felds relevant to
this case—the Delacroix Island and Delta Duck Club felds.
Some of the crude oil produced in both felds went to the
Texas refnery at which Chevron refned crude oil into avgas
for the military during the war. In 1942, Chevron was re-
fning 4,000 barrels of crude oil per day from felds in Plaque-
mines Parish.
C
In 1978, Louisiana enacted the State and Local Coastal
Resources Management Act. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:214.21
et seq. (West 2023). The Act established a new permitting
program that took effect in 1980. It prohibits any “[u]ses
of state concern” of Louisiana's coastal zone, including
oil production, unless the user frst obtains a permit.
§§ 49:214.25(A)(1)(f ), 49:214.30(A)(1). But, it exempts from
its permitting requirement “[i]ndividual specifc uses legally
commenced or established prior to the effective date of the
coastal use permit program.” § 49:214.34(C)(2).
In 2013, Plaquemines Parish, along with other parishes,
fled 42 state-court suits against oil and gas companies under
the Act. The parishes alleged that the companies lacked
permits for their uses of the coastal zone, and that some of
these uses, although initiated before 1980, were illegally
commenced and not covered by the Act's exemption for uses
that commenced before 1980. The State of Louisiana and its
Department of Energy and Natural Resources intervened in
support of the parishes.
Plaquemines Parish fled an expert report in one of these
suits that made clear that it intended to challenge certain
defendants' crude-oil production during the Second World
War. The report alleged that several uses had been illegally
commenced during the war, making them “violations which
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9
Opinion of the Court
provide the basis for defendant liability.” Preliminary Ex-
per
t Report on Violations, No. 2:18–cv–5256 (ED La.), ECF
Doc. 1–3, p. 4. As to Chevron, the report identifed produc-
tion activities in the Delacroix Island feld, where Chevron
began drilling in 1941. Specifcally, the report alleged that
Chevron failed to use steel tanks instead of earthen pits. It
alleged that Chevron should not have used vertical-drilling
methods, which allegedly harmed the environment more
than alternative methods. And, it alleged that Chevron
failed to equip Delacroix Island with suffcient roads for
transportation and instead primarily used canals. The re-
port alleged that these production activities showed “bad
faith” and failed to protect the “marshland from contamina-
tion and excessive land losses,” making Chevron subject to
liability under the Act. ECF Doc. 1–5, p. 35. All agree at
this stage that this report refects the parishes' general theo-
ries of liability across the 42 suits.
Several defendants removed the suits against them under
the federal offcer removal statute. 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(1).
The removal effort focused on the connection between these
1940s allegations and the defendants' 1940s federal contracts.
Because the allegations concerned their 1940s crude-oil pro-
duction, the defendants argued that the suits “relat[ed] to”
their contractual duties to refne crude oil into avgas for the
military at the same time.
In this case, the parish's suit challenged Chevron's conduct
at the Delta Duck Club feld, where Chevron drilled during
the war. Chevron removed on the theory that the suit al-
leged that Chevron illegally produced crude oil in the Delta
Duck Club feld, while it simultaneously served as an avgas
refner for the military. The parish's state-court complaint,
like its expert report in the parallel case, alleged that Chev-
ron's use of the coastal zone had been illegally commenced
prior to the effective date of the Act, citing its crude-oil pro-
duction processes, use of earthen pits, and dredging of ca-
nals. Chevron's notice of removal thus argued that the com-
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10 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Opinion of the Court
plaint, alongside the parishes' report, showed that the parish
wou
ld target acts related to its performance of federal duties
during the war. The District Court rejected this argument
and granted the parish's motion to remand to state court.
The Fifth Circuit affrmed. The court agreed with Chev-
ron that it had “acted under” a federal offcer because it re-
fned crude oil into avgas as a military contractor. Plaque-
mines Parish v. BP America Production Co., 103 F. 4th 324,
334–335 (2024). But, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
suit was not “for or relating to” those acts. It agreed that
the complaint, when “read in conjunction with the [expert]
report,” targeted crude-oil production activities during the
war. Id., at 337. Nonetheless, it concluded that this suit,
despite challenging Chevron's crude-oil production, did not
relate to the performance of Chevron's avgas refning con-
tract because the contract did not specify how to acquire
crude oil. Id., at 340–341.
Judge Oldham dissented. He reasoned that crude oil was
“indispensable” to avgas, such that its production necessarily
related to Chevron's performance of its federal avgas refn-
ing duties. Id., at 348.
We granted Chevron's petition for a writ of certiorari.
605 U. S. 1009 (2025).
II
We address whether this suit, which implicates Chevron's
wartime production of crude oil, is “for or relating to” Chev-
ron's wartime refning of crude oil into avgas for the mili-
tary.
2
28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(1). Chevron's wartime crude-oil
production was closely connected to its wartime avgas refn-
ing, so the parish's suit challenging that crude-oil production
relates to that refning.
2
The Fifth Circuit held that Chevron satisfed the frst requirement of
the removal statute because it “act[ed] under” a federal offcer when it
refned crude oil into avgas for the military pursuant to a federal contract.
No party disputes that Chevron acted under a federal offcer in that capac-
ity. We assume, without deciding, that it did.
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Opinion of the Court
A
The
phrase “relating to” sweeps broadly. It means “ `to
stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to per-
tain; refer; to bring into association with or connection
with.' ” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S.
374, 383 (1992) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed.
1979)). One thing can relate to another even if the connec-
tion is “indirect.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498
U. S. 133, 139 (1990). One thing can relate to another even
if it was “not specifcally designed to affect” it. Ibid. And,
one thing can relate to another even without a “strict causal
relationship.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 351, 362 (2021); see also Altria Group,
Inc. v. Good, 555 U. S. 70, 85–86 (2008). Accordingly, a re-
moving defendant need not show that his federal duties spe-
cifcally required or strictly caused the challenged conduct.
3
See District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 89 F. 4th
144, 155 (CADC 2023) (collecting cases).
The ordinary meaning of “relating to,” however, is not “so
broad that it is meaningless.” Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical
Care Management Assn., 592 U. S. 80, 93 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). To be sure, in a literalist sense, “everything is
related to everything else.” California Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc.,
519 U. S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). But, gener-
ally in statutory interpretation, “it is the ordinary, not liter-
alist, meaning that is the better one.” Rutledge, 592 U. S.,
at 93 (Thomas, J., concurring); see A. Scalia, A Matter of
3
Congress only recently adopted the “relating to” statutory language.
Before 2011, the statute required that the suit be “for” an act under color
of offce. 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006 ed.). This Court had interpreted
that language to require the removing defendant to “show a nexus, a
` “causal connection” between the charged conduct and asserted offcial
authority.' ” Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U. S. 423, 431 (1999). In
2011, Congress broadened the statute by authorizing removal of suits “for
or relating to” an act under color of offce. § 2(b), 125 Stat. 545.
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12 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Opinion of the Court
Interpretation 24 (1997) (“the good textualist is not a
l
iteralist”).
The ordinary understanding of “relating to” requires a
connection that is not “tenuous, remote, or peripheral.”
Rutledge, 592 U. S., at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Ordinary readers would not un-
derstand the statement that someone is “ `related to Joe' ” to
refer to “a mutual tie to Adam and Eve.” Ibid. Nor would
they understand the futtering of a butterfy's wings to “re-
late to” the next week's weather.
4
And, in this context, they
would not understand the federal offcer removal statute to
reach all suits with any attenuated connection to federal du-
ties. For instance, the D. C. Circuit has held that a false-
advertising suit targeting an oil company's statements to
consumers about the future effects of fossil fuels on climate
change did not relate to its decades-earlier production for
the Government. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 89 F. 4th, at 156;
see also Minnesota v. American Petroleum Inst., 63 F. 4th
703, 715 (CA8 2023).
B
Chevron's case fts comfortably within the ordinary mean-
ing of a suit “relating to” the performance of federal duties.
Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between
its challenged conduct and the performance of its federal du-
ties—not a tenuous, remote, or peripheral one. Cf. Dart
Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U. S. 81, 89
(2014) (explaining that, when reviewing a remand to state
court, we credit plausible factual allegations by the remov-
ing party).
This suit implicates Chevron's wartime efforts to produce
and supply avgas' essential feedstock, so it is closely con-
nected to Chevron's wartime avgas refning for the military.
4
Cf. E. Lorenz, Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfy's Wings in
Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?, at the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (Dec. 29, 1972) (describing what is now known as
the butterfy effect).
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13
Opinion of the Court
Much of the crude oil that Chevron produced in the Delta
Duck
Club feld was ultimately used for its own avgas refn-
ing. And, as the Fifth Circuit assumed and no party dis-
putes, this suit will challenge Chevron's actions that allowed
it to increase its production of crude oil in the Delta Duck
Club feld during wartime. See 103 F. 4th, at 337. The par-
ish's report alleged that Chevron's use of the coastal zone had
been illegally commenced because of its reliance on vertical-
drilling methods, canals, and earthen pits. See ibid. But,
using vertical-drilling methods “maximize[d] production” of
crude oil. App. 19. Using canals instead of building roads
saved “time, materials and manpower,” resulting in more
“timely oil production.” Id., at 18. And, using earthen pits
complied with the P. A. W.'s directive to preserve steel. See
id., at 22; 6 Fed. Reg. 5880 (1941). If Chevron had refrained
from these actions and produced less crude oil as a result,
its avgas refning for the military may have suffered.
Moreover, the Government emphasized the importance of
increasing Chevron's crude-oil production to support avgas
refning as part of the war effort. The P. A. W. identifed
Delta Duck Club as a “ `Critical Fiel[d] Essential to the War
Program' ” because it produced a “ `preferential' ” kind of
crude oil for refning avgas. App. 112–113. Under Chev-
ron's refning contract, the Government paid more for avgas
when the price of obtaining crude oil increased. Meanwhile,
the P. A. W. required the development of plans “to increase
to a maximum the production of all grades of aviation gaso-
line . . . in the shortest possible time,” including by address-
ing the need for components such as crude oil. 6 Fed. Reg.
6433–6434. And, the P. A. W.'s regulations required the
vertical-drilling methods challenged by the parish as part of
its effort to “provide adequate supplies of petroleum for mili-
tary and other essential purposes.” 8 Fed. Reg. 3955; see
id., at 3957. In this all-hands-on-deck, wartime context,
Chevron needed to produce more crude oil as quickly as pos-
sible to facilitate more avgas refning, including its own.
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14 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Opinion of the Court
Chevron has therefore satisfed the “relating to” require-
ment.
This suit implicates acts by Chevron that are closely
connected to the performance of its federal duties.
5
C
We disagree with the Fifth Circuit's two main reasons for
ruling to the contrary.
First, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Chevron's refning
contract did not specify how to obtain or produce crude oil,
so Chevron's crude-oil production was unrelated to the per-
formance of its federal refning duties. 103 F. 4th, at 341.
But, the ordinary meaning of “relating to” does not require
the defendant to show that his federal duties specifcally in-
vited his challenged conduct. See, supra, at 11–12. For ex-
ample, we have held in the preemption context that a state
law can “relate to” beneft plans even when the law was
“not specifcally designed to affect such plans.” Ingersoll-
Rand, 498 U. S., at 139. Likewise, Chevron's contract did
not have to expressly direct or invite Chevron's crude-oil
production for that conduct to “relate to” its avgas refning.
Second, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the P. A. W.'s allo-
cation of crude oil to refneries severed any relation between
producing and refning. 103 F. 4th, at 344. But, as this
Court's decision in Morales illustrates, an act can relate to
its consequences even when the causal chain includes actions
by intermediaries. Morales concerned whether state rules
for advertising “ `relat[ed]' ” to airline “ `rates' ” and were
therefore preempted by a federal statute. 504 U. S., at 378–
379. This Court explained that if States restrict advertis-
ing, the market puts less pressure on airlines to “price com-
petitively.” Id., at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, advertising rules related to rates, even though adver-
tising affects rates only through the acts of an intermediary,
5
We do not resolve whether the defendants in the related cases can
satisfy the “for or relating to” requirement. We also do not address the
other requirements of federal offcer removal.
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15
Opinion of the Court
the consumer. Id., at 389. Likewise, producing crude oil
relates
to refning it into avgas, even if the P. A. W. acted as
an intermediary allocating the crude oil to refneries.
D
Finally, we disagree with Louisiana's argument that it
should prevail on an alternative theory. On Louisiana's
view, this case should not turn on the meaning of “relating
to” at all. Instead, Louisiana argues, the removal statute
requires that the defendant was “acting under” a federal of-
fcer in taking the specifc actions challenged in the suit.
Brief for Respondent State of Louisiana et al. 18, 21. Loui-
siana does not dispute that Chevron acted under a federal
offcer while engaged in avgas refning. But, because Chev-
ron did not produce crude oil pursuant to a federal contract,
Louisiana reasons that the suit is not against a defendant
“acting under” an offcer.
Louisiana's theory is not consistent with the statutory
text. The statute permits the removal of state-court suits
against “any offcer (or any person acting under that offcer)”
that are “for or relating to any act under color of such offce.”
28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(1). It contemplates removal of suits
against offcers or their agents for acts that were not done
under color of their offces, so long as the suits “relat[e] to”
such acts. Louisiana's interpretation would leave the “relat-
ing to” requirement with little, if any, independent function.
As the Fifth Circuit explained, Louisiana's interpretation
“impermissibly confates the `distinct' `acting under' and
`connected or associated with' elements of the federal offcer
removal test.” 103 F. 4th, at 335. We generally do not read
a statute “in a way that makes part of it redundant.” Na-
tional Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551
U. S. 644, 669 (2007).
III
The Fifth Circuit erred in concluding at this stage that the
suit against Chevron was not “for or relating to” its perform-
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16 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Jackson, J., concurring in judgment
ance of federal duties. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment
of
the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.
Justice Jackson, concurring in the judgment.
The Court correctly holds that the underlying lawsuit is
“for or relating to” Chevron's acts done “under color of [fed-
eral] offce.” 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(1); see ante, at 15–16.
But I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the federal
offcer removal statute's “for or relating to” language re-
quires only an indirect relationship between the conduct tar-
geted by the lawsuit and the asserted federal duties. See
ante, at 11. In my view, the statute demands more.
Understood in the context of its statutory and legislative
history, § 1442(a)(1) requires a causal nexus between the tar-
geted conduct and the federal duties, as I explain below.
Chevron satisfes the causal-nexus requirement on the facts
presented here, so I agree that the Fifth Circuit's ruling
must be vacated. I therefore respectfully concur only in the
majority's judgment.
I
A
Since 1948, Congress has authorized federal offcers, and
people acting under federal offcers, to remove lawsuits
brought “for any act under color of [federal] offce.” Act of
June 25, 1948, § 1442(a)(1), 62 Stat. 938. We interpreted this
statutory language to require “a causal connection between
the charged conduct and asserted offcial authority.” Will-
ingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 409 (1969) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). In other words, we held that the fed-
eral directive giving rise to the authority to act must be a
but-for cause of the conduct challenged by the lawsuit. See
Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9, 33 (1926) (explaining that,
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17
Jackson, J., concurring in judgment
under a similar statute, a federal offcial could remove a
prosecuti
on to federal court if the case was “based on or
arises out of the acts he did under authority of federal law
in the discharge of his duty and only by reason thereof ”);
accord, Willingham, 395 U. S., at 409.
Congress amended the federal offcer removal statute in
2011, adding the “or relating to” language. See Removal
Clarifcation Act of 2011, § 2(b), 125 Stat. 545. The question
the Court answers today is what this addition means.
B
In responding to this inquiry, the majority considers in
isolation the “ordinary meaning ” of the phrase “relating to.”
Ante, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on
our case law interpreting that phrase in other contexts, the
majority concludes that this language requires only an indi-
rect relationship between the conduct alleged in the lawsuit
and the asserted federal duties. Ante, at 10–12. Accord-
ingly, in the majority's view, Congress's addition of “or relat-
ing to” jettisoned the causal-nexus test in favor of a looser
standard. Ante, at 11, and n. 3.
I think the Court should interpret the “relating to” addi-
tion primarily by determining what Congress intended to
accomplish with this amendment. Learning Resources, Inc.
v. Trump, 607 U. S. 229, 310–311 (2026) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment). Indeed, the
Court's “fundamental task” in interpreting federal statutes
is to give effect to Congress's intent. R. Katzmann, Judging
Statutes 31 (2014) (Katzmann); see Pennington v. Coxe, 2
Cranch 33, 59 (1804) (opinion for the Court by Marshall, C. J.)
(“It is the duty of the court to discover the intention of the
legislature, and to respect that intention”). And the Court
faithfully discharges this duty when it considers all reliable
evidence of Congress's intent—including statutory and legis-
lative history. See United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762,
775 (2023) (“Statutory history is an important part of [the]
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18 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Jackson, J., concurring in judgment
context” in which we interpret text); Katzmann 38 (“Legisla-
tive
history . . . can help [ judges] understand what the law
means”).
Here, the statutory and legislative history is clear: Con-
gress did not set out to change the causal-nexus requirement
with its 2011 amendment. Rather, the “relating to” addition
was motivated by a problem entirely separate from the
causal-nexus requirement.
At the time of the amendment, 40 States had laws author-
izing private parties to compel document production or
depositions before they commenced a lawsuit. See Removal
Clarifcation Act of 2010: Hearing on H. R. 5281 before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., 1
(2010) (House Hearings).* Federal offcers were sometimes
the target of such presuit discovery proceedings. H. R. Rep.
No. 112–17, pt. 1, pp. 3–4 (2011) (H. R. Rep.). Courts were
split, however, on whether federal offcers could remove
presuit discovery proceedi ngs to federa l cour t under
§ 1442(a)(1). House Hearings, at 1–2; compare Price v. John-
son, 600 F. 3d 460, 462 (CA5 2010) (reviewing District Court
order determining such a proceeding was not removable),
with In re Subpoena In Collins, 524 F. 3d 249, 251 (CADC
2008) (determining such a proceeding was removable).
Congress amended the federal offcer removal statute to
clarify that presuit discovery proceedings targeting federal
offcers were removable. H. R. Rep., at 4. Congress made
substantive changes to that end; for example, it specifcally
stated that “any proceeding ” in which “a judicial order, in-
cluding a subpoena for testimony or documents, is sought or
issued” was removable. § 2(a)(1), 125 Stat. 545 (codifed at
28 U. S. C. § 1442(d)(1)); see H. R. Rep., at 4.
*The House Hearings were for a predecessor bill proposed the year
before the Removal Clarifcation Act was passed. That predecessor bill
included the “or relating to” language that was ultimately enacted. See
H. R. 5281, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(b)(2) (2010).
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19
Jackson, J., concurring in judgment
Congress also made several “conforming amendments.”
§
2(b), 125 Stat. 545. The addition of the “or relating to”
language to § 1442(a)(1) was one of them. 125 Stat. 545 (re-
ferring to this change as a “conforming amendment”); accord,
House Hearings, at 44 (describing this as a “minor chang[e]
to existing § 1442(a) [to] make it consistent” with the substan-
tive changes). The addition of “or relating to” was not a
substantive change.
C
That the addition of “or relating to” was a “conforming
amendment” is meaningful. Congress rarely changes the
substance of a statute through “mere conforming amend-
ment[s].” INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S. 407, 428 (1984). Such
amendments are typically “minor tweak[s],” intended to har-
monize or clarify amended statutory provisions. Cyan, Inc.
v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, 583 U. S.
416, 430 (2018); accord, Stevic, 467 U. S., at 428. Thus, it
would be passing strange to conclude that “Congress made a
radical—but entirely implicit—change” to the standard for
federal offcer removal through a conforming amendment.
Director of Revenue of Mo. v. CoBank ACB, 531 U. S. 316,
324 (2001).
And indeed, the legislative history here confrms that Con-
gress did no such thing. It makes crystal clear that the Re-
moval Clarifcation Act was “not changing the underlying
removal law,” but was instead simply clarifying that § 1442
would apply “anytime a legal demand is made on a Federal
offcer for any act done under their offcial capacity.” House
Hearings, at 2; see id., at 13 (testimony of the House General
Counsel that the bill “does not alter the standard for general
removal for Federal offcer removal under [§ ]1442”); id., at
17 (“[U]nder the terms of the bill . . . , each of the currently
existing requirements of the federal offcer removal statute
still must be met for removal to be permitted”); 157 Cong.
Rec. 2792 (2011) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee that the bill
“does not make any changes to the underlying removal law”).
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20 CHE
VRON USA INC. v. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
Jackson, J., concurring in judgment
Moreover, the history establishes that Congress knew the
remova
l law it was amending required a causal nexus. See
H. R. Rep., at 3 (“Federal offcers . . . must demonstrate a
causal connection between the charged conduct and asserted
offcial authority”). So, with full knowledge of the causal-
nexus test, Congress made only a “conforming ” change—it
did not alter the substantive requirements for removal.
This is not to say that the “or relating to” language served
no purpose. By adding it, Congress confrmed that sub-
poena enforcement and presuit discovery proceedings “fall
within the scope of Section 1442.” House Hearings, at 20
(testimony of the House General Counsel).
The nature of presuit discovery proceedings necessitated
such confrmation. Presuit discovery proceedings seek to
get information, not to accuse the target of engaging in un-
lawful conduct. Thus, to describe a subpoena or a deposi-
tion as being “for” unlawful conduct is factually inaccurate.
If the statute permitted removal of only those proceedings
that are “for” federally directed conduct, then arguably that
statutory provision would not authorize removal of presuit
discovery proceedings. But presuit discovery proceedings
are “related to” a defendant's federally directed conduct.
See Brief for Former Governor John Bel Edwards as Amicus
Curiae 12–13. So, “[b]ecause the amended § 1442 would
now include proceedings that do not seek to impose civil lia-
bility or a criminal penalty on the federal offcer, [the statute]
allows removal not only in proceedings `for' acts under color
of the federal offce but also in proceedings `relating to' such
acts.” House Hearings, at 68 (statement of Arthur D. Hell-
man, University of Pittsburgh School of Law).
In short, by adding “or relating to,” Congress confrmed
that the substantive changes “broaden[ed] the universe of
acts that enable Federal offcers to remove to Federal court.”
H. R. Rep., at 6. The amendment clarifed that presuit dis-
covery proceedings were squarely within “the universe of
acts” that a federal offcer could remove. But Congress did
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21
Jackson, J., concurring in judgment
not intend to change any of the underlying removal require-
ments—i
ncluding the causal-nexus test.
II
Although the majority and I interpret the “for or relating
to” requirement differently, we agree that the state lawsuit
here satisfes this requirement. The lawsuit targets Chev-
ron's crude-oil production activities. And as the majority
explains, Chevron's predecessor contracted with the Federal
Government during the Second World War to produce avia-
tion gasoline (“avgas”), a product refned from crude oil.
Ante, at 6–8.
Chevron used much of the crude oil it pumped from its
Louisiana oil felds to refne into avgas during the war. This
was no accident. The crude oil from Chevron's Louisiana
felds was particularly well-suited for refning into avgas, and
the Federal Government pushed its refners, including Chev-
ron, to produce more and more avgas. Ante, at 13. This in
turn demanded an ever-increasing supply of crude oil. Ibid.
Chevron therefore produced crude oil, at least in part, to
meet the demands of its federal contracts—satisfying the
causal-nexus requirement.
The Fifth Circuit erred in concluding that the removal
statute's “for or relating to” requirement was not met under
the circumstances presented here. It faulted Chevron for
failing to identify a specifc contractual directive “pertaining
to oil production.” Plaquemines Parish v. BP America
Production Co., 103 F. 4th 324, 341 (2024). But Chevron's
federal contracts can be a but-for cause of the challenged
crude-oil production without specifcally directing that pro-
duction. Because the Fifth Circuit's contractual-directive
demand goes a step further than even the causal-nexus test,
I agree with the majority that the Fifth Circuit's judgment
must be vacated.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None