Olivier v. City of Brandon

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 607 U. S. Part 2
Pages 552–567
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 20, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
552 OCTOBER
TERM, 2025
Syllabus
OLIVIER v. CITY OF BRANDON, MISSISSIPPI
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 24–993. Argued December 3, 2025—Decided March 20, 2026
Petitioner Gabriel Olivier is a street preacher in Mississippi who believes
that sharing his religious views with fellow citizens is an important part
of exercising his faith. His vocation sometimes took him to the side-
walks near an amphitheater in the City of Brandon, where he could
fnd sizable audiences attending events. In 2019, the City adopted an
ordinance requiring all individuals or groups engaging in “protests” or
“demonstrations,” at around the time events were scheduled, to stay
within a “designated protest area.” In 2021, Olivier was arrested for
violating that ordinance. He pleaded no contest in municipal court.
The court imposed a $304 fne, one year of probation, and 10 days of
imprisonment to be served only if he violated the ordinance during his
probation. Olivier did not appeal, paid the fne, and served no prison
time. Because he still wanted to preach near the amphitheater, Olivier
fled suit against the City in federal court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleg-
ing that the city ordinance violates the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment by consigning him and other speakers to the amphithe-
ater's protest area. The complaint seeks, as a remedy, a declaration
that the ordinance infringes the First Amendment and an injunction
preventing city offcials from enforcing the ordinance in the future. In
other words, the relief requested is only prospective; Olivier seeks nei-
ther the reversal of, nor compensation for, his prior conviction.
The parties contested in the lower courts whether this Court's deci-
sion in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477—which prohibits the use of
§ 1983 to challenge the validity of a prior conviction or sentence so as to
obtain release from custody or monetary damages—bars the suit from
going forward. On the City's view of Heck, a person previously con-
victed of violating a statute cannot challenge its constitutionality under
§ 1983 because success in the suit would cast doubt on the prior convic-
tion's correctness. On Olivier's contrary view, Heck does not apply
when a plaintiff seeks wholly prospective relief, rather than relief relat-
ing to the prior conviction. The District Court agreed with the City's
understanding of Heck and found Olivier's suit barred. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affrmed on the same reasoning.
Held: Olivier's suit seeking purely prospective relief—an injunction stop-
ping offcials from enforcing an ordinance in the future—can proceed,

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 607 U. S. 552 (2026)
553
Syllabus
notwithstanding Olivier's prior conviction for violating that ordinance;
H
eck does not hold otherwise. Pp. 560–567.
(a) Before the Court's decision in Heck, the City would have had no
plausible basis for claiming Olivier's suit is barred. That type of suit
falls within § 1983's heartland: Assuming a credible threat of prosecu-
tion, a plaintiff may bring a § 1983 action to challenge a local law as
violating the Constitution and to prevent that law's future enforcement.
See, e. g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452. In Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U. S. 705, the Court held that rule to apply even when the plaintiff
was previously convicted under the challenged law. The Court ex-
plained that because the suit at issue sought “wholly prospective” re-
lief—“only to be free from prosecutions for future violations”—and was
“in no way designed to annul the results of a state trial,” § 1983 provided
an avenue for the plaintiff 's claim. Id., at 711. Were it otherwise, the
plaintiff would have been trapped “between the Scylla of intentionally
fouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be
constitutionally protected activity.” Id., at 710.
The Court's decision in Wooley, taken alone, would defeat the City's
attempt to prevent Olivier's suit from going forward, but the City ar-
gues the Court's later decision in Heck requires the opposite result. In
Heck, the Court held that a state prisoner could not use § 1983 to seek
damages attributable to his allegedly unconstitutional conviction. The
Court reasoned that such a suit in truth mounts a “collateral attack” on
the validity of the conviction, and thus intrudes on the habeas statute's
domain. 512 U. S., at 485. And such a suit could lead to “parallel liti-
gation” and “conficting ” judgments about the same conduct, with the
§ 1983 suit suggesting that the plaintiff should be released even as crimi-
nal or habeas proceedings found the opposite. Id., at 484. Hence the
so-called Heck bar on Ҥ 1983 damages actions that necessarily require
the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confnement.”
Id., at 486. “[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,”
the Court went on, “the district court must consider whether a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence.” Id., at 487.
The Court subsequently drew a line between Heck-type claims and
those seeking forward-looking relief. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S.
641, the Court held that while a state prisoner could not obtain damages
for an alleged past violation, a claim for “prospective injunctive relief ”—
the use of fairer procedures in the future—may “properly be brought
under § 1983,” because it does not depend on showing the “invalidity of
a previous” sentencing decision. Id., at 648. In Wilkinson v. Dotson,
544 U. S. 74, the Court allowed state prisoners to bring a § 1983 suit
requesting an injunction requiring the State to “comply with constitu-

Page Proof Pending Publication
554 OLIVIER
v. CITY OF BRANDON
Syllabus
tional” parole requirements “in the future,” determining that such a
clai
m for “future relief ” was “distant” from “the core of habeas” and so
not barred by Heck. 544 U. S., at 77, 82. Pp. 560–563.
(b) As in Balisok and Dotson, Olivier's suit falls outside habeas's
core—and likewise outside Heck's concerns. Olivier is not challenging
the “validity of [his] conviction or sentence,” for the purpose of securing
release or obtaining monetary damages. Nance v. Ward, 597 U. S. 159,
167–168. Instead, he seeks “wholly prospective” relief—“only to be free
from prosecutions for future violations” of the ordinance. Wooley, 430
U. S., at 711. Because Olivier's suit does not, as habeas suits do, “collater-
al[ ly] attack” the old conviction, it cannot give rise to “parallel litigation”
respecting his prior conduct, and does not risk “conficting ” judgments
over how that conduct was prosecuted or punished. Heck, 512 U. S., at
484, 485. Unlike in Heck, Olivier's suit merely attempts to prevent a fu-
ture prosecution, so the Heck bar does not come into play. Pp. 563–564.
(c) The City's main argument to the contrary rests on one sentence
in Heck that states: “[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983
suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed.” 512 U. S., at
487. Strictly speaking, the “necessarily imply” language fts: If Olivier
succeeds in this suit, it would mean his prior conviction was unconstitu-
tional. But “general language in judicial opinions should be read as
referring in context to circumstances similar to [those] then before the
Court,” Turkiye Halk Bankasi A. S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264,
278, and the circumstances here differ from those in Heck. The Heck
language at issue was used to identify claims that were really assaults
on a prior conviction, even though involving some indirection. By con-
trast, there is no looking back in Olivier's suit; both in the allegations
made, and in the relief sought, the suit is entirely future oriented—even
if success in it shows that something past should not have occurred.
The Heck Court did not consider such a suit, and the Heck language was
not meant to address it. Heck, properly understood, does not preclude
suits that only attempt to prevent future prosecutions. Olivier's suit to
enjoin future prosecutions under the city ordinance, so he can return to
the amphitheater, may proceed. Pp. 564–567.
Reversed and remanded.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Allyson N. Ho argued the cause for petitioner. With her
on the briefs were David W. Casazza, Aaron Smith, Giuli-
ana C. Cipollone, Aly Cox, Andrew Y. Ebrahem, John N.

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 607 U. S. 552 (2026)
555
Opinion of the Court
Reed, Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Hiram S.
Sasse
r III, David J. Hacker, Nathan W. Kellum, and Patrick
J. Fuster.
Ashley Robertson argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae supporting vacatur. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Sauer, Assistant Attorney General
Dhillon, Deputy Solicitor General Gannon, Principal Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General Osete, Andrew Braniff, and
Brant S. Levine.
G. Todd Butler argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was Mallory K. Bland.*
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Gabriel Olivier was once convicted of violating
a city ordinance restricting expressive activity near a public
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow,
Stuart J. Roth, Andrew J. Ekonomou, Walter M. Weber, and Liam R.
Harrell; for the Cato Institute by Matthew P. Cavedon; for the Christian
Legal Society et al. by Richard G. Parker and Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak;
for the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression by Joshua A.
House; for the Foundation for Moral Law by John A. Eidsmoe; for the
Human Rights Defense Center et al. by Tobias S. Loss-Eaton, Bruce
Plaxen, and Jeffrey R. White; for the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness (ISKCON) by David R. Dorey and William Wagner; for
the Liberty Justice Center by Jeffrey Schwab; for the Manhattan Institute
by Ilya Shapiro; for the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates
et al. by Catherine Short and Sheila A. Green; for the Religious Freedom
Institute by Daniel M. Sullivan and Brian T. Goldman; for the Southeast-
ern Legal Foundation by Thomas R. McCarthy, Tiffany H. Bates, Kim-
berly S. Hermann, and Celia Howard O'Leary; for the Young America's
Foundation by Madison Leigh Hahn; for Stephen Nylen et al. by Joshua
C. McDaniel; for Chike Uzuegbunam by Dominic E. Draye, John J.
Bursch, Rory T. Gray, and Travis C. Barham; and for Erma Wilson by
Jaba Tsitsuashvili and Robert McNamara.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Local Gov-
ernment Legal Center by R. Trent McCotter; and for the Texas Associa-
tion of Counties by Mike Thompson, Jr., and Scott M. Tschirhart.

556 OLIVIER
v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
amphitheater. He now wishes to return to that venue to
voice
his beliefs—but this time, without the threat of crimi-
nal punishment. He therefore fled this suit, alleging that
the city ordinance infringes the First Amendment. The
suit, brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeks an order declar-
ing the ordinance unconstitutional and preventing its en-
forcement in the future. The suit, in other words, requests
only forward-looking relief—nothing to do with Olivier's
prior conviction.
The question presented here is whether this Court's deci-
sion in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), bars Olivier's
suit. The answer is no. Heck prohibits the use of § 1983 to
challenge the validity of a prior conviction or sentence so as
to obtain release from custody or monetary damages. That
decision has no bearing on Olivier's suit seeking a purely
prospective remedy.
I
Olivier was convicted some fve years ago for violating the
loca l ordi nance he now cha l lenges. Ol iv ier is a street
preacher in Mississippi—a Christian who believes that shar-
ing his religious views with fellow citizens is an important
part of exercising his faith. His vocation sometimes took
him to the sidewalks near an amphitheater in the City of
Brandon, where he could fnd sizable audiences attending
events. Olivier was apparently not the only speaker at-
tracted to that area, and the activities there caused some
disruption. In 2019, the City adopted an ordinance requir-
ing all individuals or groups engaging in “protests” or “dem-
onstrations,” at around the time events were scheduled, to
stay within a “designated protest area.” Supp. to App. 70
(capitalization deleted). On his next trip to the amphithe-
ater, in 2021, Olivier checked out that area, but found it too
remote for communicating his message. So he returned,
along with his signs and loudspeaker, to the sidewalk front-
ing the amphitheater. And there he was arrested by the
Brandon police chief for violating the city ordinance. The
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 607 U. S. 552 (2026)
557
Opinion of the Court
next month, Olivier pleaded no contest in municipal court.
The
court imposed a $304 fne; one year of probation; and
ten days of imprisonment, to be served only if, during his
probation, he again violated the ordinance. Olivier did not
appeal, paid the fne, and served no prison time.
Because he still wanted to preach near the amphitheater,
Olivier's next step was to fle this lawsuit in federal court,
naming the City and its police chief as defendants. The suit
is brought under § 1983, which authorizes claims against
state and local offcials for the “deprivation of any rights”
secured by the Constitution. Olivier's complaint alleges
that the city ordinance violates the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment by consigning him (and other speak-
ers) to the amphitheater's out-of-the-way protest area. The
complaint seeks, as a remedy, a declaration that the ordi-
nance infringes his (and other speakers') First Amendment
rights and an injunction preventing city offcials from enforc-
ing the ordinance in the future.
1
In other words, the relief
requested is only prospective; Olivier seeks neither the re-
versal of, nor compensation for, his prior conviction. And
Olivier has since made clear that he has no interest in using
a favorable judgment in this suit to later get his record ex-
punged or avoid his conviction's collateral effects. See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 7. The suit is just meant to ensure that Olivier
may return to the amphitheater to speak without fear of fur-
ther punishment.
The parties contested in the lower courts whether this
Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars the suit from
going forward. On the City's view of Heck, a person pre-
viously convicted of violating a statute cannot challenge its
constitutionality under § 1983 because success in the suit
would cast doubt on the prior conviction's correctness. On
1
Originally, Olivier also sought damages for the City's prior enforce-
ment of the ordinance against him. But he abandoned that request as the
suit progressed, leaving only the above-described pleas for declaratory and
injunctive relief.

558 OLIVIER
v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
Olivier's contrary view, that rule is subject to two limita-
ti
ons, either of which enables his suit to proceed. First,
Olivier contended, Heck does not preclude a suit seeking
wholly prospective relief, rather than relief relating to the
prior conviction. And second, Olivier argued, Heck does not
apply (regardless of the relief sought) when the person suing
was never in custody for his conviction, so never had a
chance to challenge it in federal habeas proceedings.
2
The District Court agreed with the City's understanding
of Heck, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
frmed on the same reasoning. If Olivier's § 1983 suit suc-
ceeded, the District Court reasoned, the judgment would
“undermine his Municipal Court conviction.” 2022 WL
15047414, *11 (SD Miss., Sept. 23, 2022). And so the suit
was categorically barred under Heck. Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit viewed Heck as precluding any § 1983 claim that, if
successful, would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the
plaintiff 's criminal conviction.” 2023 WL 5500223, *1 (Aug.
25, 2023); see Heck, 512 U. S., at 487 (using near-identical
language). Olivier's claim, the court maintained, was of that
sort: If he showed that the city ordinance violated the First
Amendment, he also would show that his prior conviction
should not have happened. And that fact, the court con-
cluded, was dispositive. It did not matter whether Olivier's
conviction had landed him in custody. See 2023 WL
2
The premise of Olivier's second argument is, of course, that he had not
been in custody following his conviction. That premise appears to be
wrong. Under his sentence, Olivier served a year of probation—indeed,
was still serving that time when he fled this suit. And a person on proba-
tion is generally “ `in custody' for purposes of federal habeas corpus.”
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420, 430 (1984); see Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U. S. 236, 241–243 (1963). For whatever reason, though, the City
failed to raise that objection below, and both lower courts accepted that
Olivier was not put in custody for his conviction. See 2022 WL 15047414,
*10 (SD Miss., Sept. 23, 2022); 2023 WL 5500223, *4 (CA5, Aug. 25, 2023).
Given that the case has proceeded so far on that basis, we treat any con-
trary argument as forfeited and proceed in the same way.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 607 U. S. 552 (2026)
559
Opinion of the Court
5500223, *4. Nor did it matter whether Olivier's suit sought
only
prospective relief. See ibid.
The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, but eight (of
seventeen) judges dissented. Those judges understood
Heck to bar only the “retrospective use of [§ 1983] to collater-
ally attack criminal convictions.” 121 F. 4th 511, 514 (2024)
(Oldham, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). A suit like
Olivier's for “prospective injunctive relief,” the dissenters
argued, is not precluded because granting a “forward-looking
injunction” neither “invalidate[s]” nor “impose[s] tort liabil-
ity” for a prior conviction. Id., at 514–515; see id., at 513
(Ho, J., dissenting) (similar). The dissenters noted that the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had adopted their
view, which meant there was now a Circuit split about Heck's
proper reach. 121 F. 4th, at 515 (Oldham, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Martin v. Boise, 920 F. 3d 584, 614 (2019)).
We granted certiorari, 606 U. S. 959 (2025), to consider the
two independent reasons Olivier offered below for why his
suit escapes the so-called Heck bar: that he was never in
custody for his prior conviction, and that he now seeks
purely prospective relief. See Pet. for Cert. i. We need not
address the former reason today because we agree with Oliv-
ier (and the Fifth Circuit's dissenting judges) on the latter.
Given that Olivier asked for only a forward-looking rem-
edy—an injunction stopping offcials from enforcing the city
ordinance in the future—his suit can proceed, notwithstand-
ing his prior conviction.
3
Heck, properly understood, does
not say otherwise.
3
In reaching that holding, we do not say that every person can challenge
his statute of conviction through a § 1983 suit for wholly prospective relief.
The Government, appearing here as amicus curiae, urges us to reserve
the issue whether a person may bring such a suit while he is in custody
for violating the statute challenged. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41–42, 46–47;
see also Brief for United States 27 (positing why that circumstance might
matter). We think it appropriate to do so because, as we have explained,
our assumption here is that Olivier was never in custody. See supra, at
558, n. 2.

560 OLIVIER
v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
II
Before
our decision in Heck, the City would have had no
plausible basis for claiming Olivier's suit is barred. That
type of suit, as no one here disputes, falls within § 1983's
heartland: Assuming a credible threat of prosecution, a plain-
tiff may bring a § 1983 action to challenge a local law as vio-
lating the Constitution and to prevent that law's future en-
forcement. See, e. g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452
(1974). And a half-century ago, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U. S. 705 (1977), this Court held that rule to apply even when
the plaintiff (like Olivier) was previously convicted under the
challenged law.
For anyone who has followed along this far, a description
of Wooley should strike a chord. George Maynard viewed
the “Live Free or Die” motto on his New Hampshire license
plate as “repugnant to [his] moral and religious beliefs.”
Id., at 707. So he covered those words with refective tape,
in violation of a state statute. Maynard was convicted for
that conduct three times over in state court, receiving
(mostly suspended) sentences involving small fnes and short
jail terms. After the last proceeding had concluded—and
presumably anxious that there not be a fourth—Maynard
brought a § 1983 suit in federal court, seeking a declaration
that the state statute violated the First Amendment and an
injunction to prevent its future enforcement. New Hamp-
shire argued, as its front line of defense, that the suit was
precluded “because [Maynard] has already been subjected to
prosecution” under the challenged law. Id., at 712, n. 9.
Our decision in Heck had not yet issued. Instead, New
Hampshire relied on “Younger principles,” which caution
against federal interference with state-court proceedings.
430 U. S., at 712, n. 9; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37
(1971). Those principles would be offended, New Hamp-
shire claimed, if a federal court were to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a state law at the behest of someone earlier con-
victed under it in state court.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 552 (2026)
561
Opinion of the Court
This Court rejected New Hampshire's argument on the
ground
that Maynard's suit sought only to prevent “further
prosecution” under the New Hampshire statute. Wooley,
430 U. S., at 711. The suit, the Court explained, was “in no
way designed to annul the results of a state trial” (as indeed
would have been troubling under Younger doctrine). 430
U. S., at 711. Maynard had “already sustained [his] convic-
tions” and “served [his] sentence[s].” Ibid. And he did
“not seek to have his record expunged, or to annul any collat-
eral effects” his convictions might have—for example, “upon
his driving privileges.” Ibid. Rather, Maynard sought
“wholly prospective” relief: He wanted “only to be free from
prosecutions for future violations of the same” (allegedly un-
constitutional) statute. Ibid. Because that was so, the
Court held, § 1983 provided an avenue to bring his claim.
See id., at 710. Were it otherwise, the Court reasoned,
Maynard would have no good way to vindicate his First
Amendment rights: He would be trapped “between the
Scylla of intentionally fouting state law and the Charybdis
of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected
activity” so as to avoid yet another criminal prosecution.
Ibid.
All of that could as easily be said of Olivier's suit. Like
Maynard, Olivier was convicted under the statute he now
alleges to violate the First Amendment. But also like May-
nard, Olivier did not seek in his § 1983 suit to upset that
conviction, or even to avert its collateral effects. Rather,
Olivier sought “wholly prospective” relief—an injunction to
preclude “further prosecution” under the law he had earlier
broken. Id., at 711. If not able to bring such a suit, Olivier
would face the same untenable choice as Maynard: violate
the law and suffer the consequences (the Scylla), or else give
up what he takes to be his First Amendment rights (the
Charybdis). See id., at 710. Our decision in Wooley, taken
alone, would thus defeat the City's attempt to prevent Olivi-
er's suit from going forward.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
562 OLIVIER
v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
Some two decades later, though, the Court encountered
H
eck v. Humphrey, which the City now argues requires the
opposite result. Roy Heck had been convicted in state court
of manslaughter, and was serving a ffteen-year prison sen-
tence. While his appeal was pending, he fled a § 1983 suit
in federal court naming two prosecutors and a police investi-
gator as defendants. Heck alleged that they had committed
misconduct, such as destroying exculpatory evidence, to gain
his conviction. He sought as a remedy monetary “damages
attributable to [his] unconstitutional conviction.” 512 U. S.,
at 489–490. The question raised was whether § 1983 al-
lowed the suit.
The Court held it did not. The Court took as settled that
Heck could not have used § 1983 to “challenge[ ] the fact or
duration of his confnement and seek[ ] immediate or speedier
release” from custody. Id., at 481 (citing Preiser v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U. S. 475, 488–490 (1973)). A claim of that sort,
the Court noted, “must be brought in habeas corpus proceed-
ings.” Heck, 512 U. S., at 481. And so too, the Court held,
Heck could not use § 1983 to seek damages deriving from a
conviction, unless it had already been overturned. See id.,
at 486–487. To be sure, Heck could not get damages by way
of a habeas action. See id., at 481. But in suing for them
under § 1983, Heck was in truth mounting a “collateral at-
tack” on the validity of his conviction, and thus intruding on
the habeas statute's domain. Id., at 485. Such a suit could
lead to “parallel litigation” respecting “the issues of probable
cause and guilt.” Id., at 484. And it could give rise to
“conficting ” judgments about the same conduct, with the
§ 1983 suit suggesting that Heck should be released even as
criminal or habeas proceedings found the opposite. Ibid.
Hence the Heck bar on Ҥ 1983 damages actions that neces-
sarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his
conviction or confnement.” Id., at 486. “[W]hen a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,” the Court went on,
“the district court must consider whether a judgment in

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 607 U. S. 552 (2026)
563
Opinion of the Court
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of
his conviction or sentence.” Id., at 487. A judgment for
Heck would have done so, for his success rested on proof
discrediting his conviction. His § 1983 suit therefore could
not go forward.
In two later decisions, though, the Court drew a line be-
tween Heck-type claims and those seeking forward-looking
relief. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997), a state
prisoner alleged that procedures used in a disciplinary hear-
ing—which had deprived him of good-time credits and thus
lengthened his sentence—violated his Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process rights. He sought money damages for the
alleged past violation; he also sought an injunction requiring
prison offcials to adopt new procedures, so as to “prevent
future violations.” Id., at 643. The Court made short work
of the claim for damages. As in Heck, the Court reasoned,
the prisoner could not obtain damages without demonstrat-
ing “the invalidity of the punishment imposed” on him (i. e.,
the loss of his good-time credits), and thus impinging on ha-
beas. 520 U. S., at 648. But the claim for “prospective in-
junctive relief ”—the use of fairer procedures in the future—
was a different thing. Said the Court: “Ordinarily, a prayer
for such prospective relief ” may “properly be brought under
§ 1983,” because it does not depend on showing the “invalid-
ity of a previous” sentencing decision. Ibid. Likewise, in
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 77 (2005), the Court al-
lowed state prisoners to bring a § 1983 suit alleging that ex-
isting parole procedures violated the Due Process Clause and
requesting an injunction that the State “comply with consti-
tutional” requirements “in the future.” That claim for “fu-
ture relief,” the Court determined, was “distant” from “the
core of habeas” and so not barred by Heck. 544 U. S., at 82
(emphasis in original).
The same is true of Olivier's suit. Olivier is not challeng-
ing the “validity of [his] conviction or sentence,” for the pur-
pose either of securing (or speeding) release or of obtaining

Page Proof Pending Publication
564 OLIVIER
v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
monetary damages. Nance v. Ward, 597 U. S. 159, 167–168
(2022).
Instead, Olivier is seeking (in Wooley's words)
“wholly prospective” relief—“only to be free from prosecu-
tions for future violations” of the city ordinance. 430 U. S.,
at 711. And that request, as Balisok and Dotson recog-
nized, falls outside habeas's core—and likewise outside
Heck's concerns. See 520 U. S., at 648; 544 U. S., at 82.
Olivier's suit does not, as habeas suits do, “collateral[ly] at-
tack” the old conviction. Heck, 512 U. S., at 485. It thus
cannot give rise, as Heck feared, to “parallel litigation” re-
specting his prior conduct. Id., at 484. Nor does it risk
“conficting ” judgments over how that conduct was prose-
cuted or punished. Ibid. The suit, after all, is not about
what Olivier did in the past, and depends on no proof ad-
dressed to his prior conviction. Unlike in Heck, the suit
merely attempts to prevent a future prosecution. So the
Heck bar does not come into play.
The City's main argument to the contrary (echoing the de-
cisions below) rests on one sentence of our Heck opinion.
That supposedly dispositive line states: “[W]hen a state pris-
oner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence;
if it would, the complaint must be dismissed” (unless the con-
viction has already been invalidated). Id., at 487; see supra,
at 562–563. Of course, Olivier does not “seek[ ] damages” in
his § 1983 suit, but the City points out that several post-Heck
decisions dropped the sentence's prefatory phrase while re-
peating the rest. See, e. g., Dotson, 544 U. S., at 81–82;
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 533–534 (2011). And in
the City's view, that modifed inquiry suggests that the Heck
bar should apply to Olivier's suit. That is because, the City
says, a judgment in Olivier's favor would “necessarily imply
the invalidity of [his] prior conviction[ ].” Brief for Re-
spondent 33. To declare the city ordinance unconstitutional,

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 607 U. S. 552 (2026)
565
Opinion of the Court
as Olivier seeks, would be to imply that no one—including
Ol
ivier—should have been convicted under that law.
The argument is a fair one, but hardly dispositive. We
have to agree that if Olivier succeeds in this suit, it would
mean his prior conviction was unconstitutional. So, strictly
speaking, the Heck language fts. But that could just show
that the phrasing was not quite as tailored as it should have
been. This Court has often cautioned that “general lan-
guage in judicial opinions should be read as referring in con-
text to circumstances similar to the circumstances then
before the Court and not referring to quite different circum-
stances that the Court was not then considering.” Turkiye
Halk Bankasi A. S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 278 (2023)
(quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U. S. 419, 424 (2004)). The
City's argument raises the question whether that is true
here.
We think, with the beneft of hindsight, that it is—that the
sentence relied on swept a bit too broad. That language was
used in Heck to identify claims that were really assaults on
a prior conviction, even though involving some indirection.
One example was found in Heck itself: a claim seeking not
straightforward reversal of a conviction (and release from
custody), but damages attributable to that conviction, requir-
ing proof that police misconduct made it invalid. Another
example Heck offered was yet further attenuated. See 512
U. S., at 486–487, n. 6. A person convicted of resisting ar-
rest—defned as preventing an offcer from effecting a lawful
arrest—brings a § 1983 action for damages against the ar-
resting offcer for violation of his Fourth Amendment right
not to be unreasonably seized. The damages sought, unlike
in Heck, are not attributable to his conviction (for resisting
arrest); they are damages deriving only from the underlying
arrest. Still, a “§ 1983 action will not lie” because the plain-
tiff, to prevail, “would have to negate an element of the of-
fense of which he has been convicted”—i. e., that the

Page Proof Pending Publication
566 OLIVIER
v. CITY OF BRANDON
Opinion of the Court
underlying arrest was “lawful.” Ibid. Once again, the suit
requires
looking back to conduct involved in a prior convic-
tion, and offering contradictory proof. By contrast, there
is no looking back in Olivier's suit. Both in the allega-
tions made, and in the relief sought, the suit is all future-
oriented—even if, as a kind of byproduct, success in it shows
that something past should not have occurred. The Heck
Court did not consider such a suit, and the Heck language
was not meant to address it.
Proof positive comes from the logical—but wholly untena-
ble—consequences of the City's position. Suppose that
after Olivier's conviction, another citizen brings a § 1983 suit
to enjoin the city ordinance so that he can speak outside the
amphitheater. Let's name this citizen Laurence and say
that he boasts a clean police record. Would Heck allow Lau-
rence's suit to proceed? See 121 F. 4th, at 514 (Oldham, J.,
dissenting) (offering a similar hypothetical). The very ques-
tion seems ludicrous: No one would say Heck poses a bar.
But under the City's logic, it should—because here, too,
Heck's language fts. The hypothetical suit—no less than
Olivier's own—would, if successful, “necessarily imply the
invalidity” of Olivier's conviction (as well as all other convic-
tions under the statute). 512 U. S., at 487. A judgment in
that suit too would demonstrate, and in just the same way,
that Olivier's conviction was unconstitutional. The hypo-
thetical thus shows that the “necessarily imply” language
cannot extend as far as the City wants. Contra the City's
logic, the Heck language does not preclude Laurence's § 1983
suit because, rather than challenging a prior conviction, that
suit only attempts to prevent future ones. And contra the
City's actual position, the language does not preclude Olivi-
er's § 1983 suit for the identical reason—because, as ex-
plained above, it looks forward only. See supra, at 563–564.
With Heck thus out of the way, Wooley returns to center
stage. Recall the Court held in that case that Maynard
could sue under § 1983 to prevent future enforcement of an

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 552 (2026)
567
Opinion of the Court
allegedly unconstitutional statute, despite a prior conviction
under
that law. See supra, at 561. The same rule allows
Olivier to sue under § 1983 to enjoin future prosecutions
under the city ordinance, despite his prior conviction. Were
that not so, Olivier would face the same dilemma as Maynard:
fout the law and risk another prosecution, or else forgo
speech he bel ieves is constituti ona l ly protec ted. See
Wooley, 430 U. S., at 710; supra, at 561. We declined to put
Maynard to that choice, and we will not put Olivier to it
either. His suit to enjoin the ordinance, so he can return to
the amphitheater, may proceed.
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None