Villarreal v. Texas

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 607 U. S. Part 2
Pages 465–491
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 25, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER
TERM, 2025
465
Syllabus
VILLARREAL v. TEXAS
certiorari
to the court of criminal appeals of texas
No. 24–557. Argued October 6, 2025—Decided February 25, 2026
David Villarreal's murder trial culminated with his own testimony. That
testimony was interrupted by a 24-hour overnight recess, during which
the trial judge instructed Villarreal's attorneys not to “manage his testi-
mony.” 707 S. W. 3d 138, 142. The judge clarifed, however, that Villa-
rreal was not prohibited from talking to his attorneys and recognized
Villarreal's constitutional right to confer about certain topics, such as
possible sentencing issues. Villarreal resumed his testimony 24 hours
later and was subsequently convicted of murder. On appeal, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the order was a permissible
exercise of the trial court's discretion.
Held: A qualifed conferral order that prohibits only discussion of the de-
fendant's testimony for its own sake during a midtestimony overnight
recess permissibly balances the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel against the burden of offering unaltered trial testimony and
does not violate the Constitution. Pp. 470–480.
(a) The Sixth Amendment guarantees as “fundamental” a criminal
defendant's right to consult with counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45, 68. When a defendant takes the witness stand, however, he “[a]s-
sum[es] the position of a witness,” with its attendant “criticisms and
burdens.” Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301, 305. These include
the inability to receive advice from counsel aimed at “infuenc[ing] the
testimony in light of the testimony already given.” Geders v. United
States, 425 U. S. 80, 87. In Geders, the Court held that a judge may not
entirely prevent a testifying defendant from conferring with his lawyer
during an overnight recess, reasoning that a defendant differs from a
normal witness because he has matters “other than his own testimony”
to discuss, such as “tactical decisions,” “strategies,” and the “signif-
cance of the day's events.” Id., at 88. In Perry v. Leeke, 488 U. S. 272,
283–284, however, the Court held that a judge may prevent a testifying
defendant from conferring with his lawyer during a brief daytime recess
because “there is a virtual certainty that any conversation” during such
a recess “would relate to the ongoing testimony,” and a defendant does
not have a protected Sixth Amendment right to discuss ongoing testi-
mony with his lawyer. Pp. 470–473.
(b) The line between Geders and Perry is substantive, not merely
temporal. Perry's premises are content based: A testifying defendant
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Syllabus
has a constitutional right to consult about matters such as “the availabil-
ity
of other witnesses, trial tactics, or . . . plea bargain[ing],” 488 U. S.,
at 284, but where no nontestimony topics are involved, the Sixth Amend-
ment provides no constitutional right to consultation during breaks in
testimony, id., at 281. A defense attorney may rehearse a client's testi-
mony before the client takes the stand and debrief testimony after the
client leaves the stand for good. But while the defendant is sworn in
as a witness, consultation about the testimony itself—rather than inci-
dental discussion of testimony in service of other protected topics—
sheds its constitutional protection. This conclusion follows from the
Court's precedents as well as from the basic principles underlying con-
ferral orders. Conferral orders embody the traditional practice of wit-
ness sequestration, refashioned to accommodate the special protections
of a defendant; a rule prohibiting discussion of testimony for its own
sake mimics sequestration within constitutional bounds and advances
the central truth-seeking function of the trial, see Portuondo v. Agard,
529 U. S. 61, 73. Pp. 473–476.
(c) The trial judge's order here prohibited Villarreal's lawyers from
“managing” his “ongoing testimony.” This order permissibly balanced
the truth-seeking function of the trial against Villarreal's right to dis-
cuss protected topics with his lawyers—things like trial strategy,
whether to consider a guilty plea, and factual information crucial to
tactical decisions. A court cannot prohibit a defendant from obtaining
his attorney's advice on whether and why he should consider a guilty
plea, even if the “why” includes the impact of ongoing testimony on the
trial's prospects. But it may, like the court here did, prohibit discussion
of testimony as such. Pp. 477–478.
(d) The Court rejects Villarreal's request for a bright-line rule per-
mitting no restrictions overnight to prevent chilling of protected dis-
cussion. Courts of appeals that have prohibited uncompromising no-
testimony-discussion orders reasonably feared that directives prevent-
ing all discussion of testimony would be impermissibly overbroad. An
order prohibiting only discussion of “nothing but the testimony,” Perry,
488 U. S., at 284, does not present the same concern. Consultation
about testimony itself—practicing it, debriefng it, and the like—is a
recognized, distinct tool in every trial lawyer's preparatory arsenal, and
lawyers ordered to sheathe that tool overnight will have no diffculty
doing so. Pp. 478–480.
707 S. W. 3d 138, affrmed.
Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined.
Alito, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 481. Thomas, J., fled an

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opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post,
p
. 485.
Stuart Banner argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Daniel L. Geyser, Michael F. Qian, and
Edward F. Shaughnessy III.
Andrew N. Warthen argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was Joe D. Gonzales.
Kevin J. Barber argued the cause for the United Sates as
amicus curiae supporting respondent. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Sauer, Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Galeotti, Deputy Solicitor General Feigin, and
Ethan A. Sachs.*
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court.
A criminal defendant has many unassailable rights during
his trial, including the right not to testify and the right to
access his lawyer. But if and when a defendant takes the
witness stand in his own defense, his status shifts. He does
not shed his rights as a criminal defendant. But he does
assume some of the burdens of a testifying witness.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Constitutional
Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and
Alexis Hoag-Fordjour; for Legal Ethics Scholars by David A. Strauss,
Sarah M. Konsky, and Matthew S. Hellman; for the National Association
of Criminal Defense Attorneys by Andrea Roth and Barbara E. Bergman;
for the National College for DUI Defense by Steven W. Hernandez, Mi-
chelle Behan, and Donald J. Ramsell; and for Retired Judges by Gregg
Costa and Ryan Azad.
A brief of amici curiae urging affrmance was fled for the State of Ohio
et al. by Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, T. Elliott Gaiser, Solicitor
General, and Jana M. Bosch, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attor-
neys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Ala-
bama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, James Uthmeier of Florida, Theodore E.
Rokita of Indiana, Russell Coleman of Kentucky, Liz Murrill of Louisi-
ana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knud-
sen of Montana, Drew H. Wrigley of North Dakota, Gentner Drummond
of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South
Dakota, and Jason Miyares of Virginia.

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This case requires us to navigate a tension between one
of
those rights and one of those burdens. The right is a
defendant's entitlement to the advice of counsel unrestricted
by judicial interference. The burden is a witness's responsi-
bility to offer sworn testimony uninfuenced by a lawyer's
midstream tinkering. Both are longstanding and fundamen-
tal, as the right forms the heart of the Sixth Amendment's
right to counsel and the burden serves the central truth-
seeking function of a trial.
We have twice addressed this tension in the context of a
trial recess that interrupts a defendant's testimony. We
held in Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976), that a
court may not prevent a testifying defendant from confer-
ring with his lawyer during an overnight recess. We held
in Perry v. Leeke, 488 U. S. 272 (1989), that a court may
prevent a testifying defendant from conferring with his law-
yer during a brief daytime recess. The trial courts in both
cases had imposed unqualifed bans that separated client
from counsel entirely.
This case presents a third scenario: an overnight recess
that interrupts a defendant's testimony—but one in which
the court allows counsel to speak with his client while limit-
ing the content of the discussion. The court here prohibited
the defendant's lawyer only from “managing ” the defendant's
testimony; it permitted all other discussion. Because we
conclude that this qualifed conferral order permissibly bal-
anced the right to counsel against the burden of offering un-
altered trial testimony, we affrm.
I
David Villarreal's murder trial culminated with his own
testimony. The only defense witness, Villarreal testifed
that he stabbed the victim in self-defense while the victim
was trying to choke him to death.
A 24-hour overnight recess interrupted Villarreal's direct
testimony. Before the recess, the trial judge gave Villarreal
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the instruction that has become the centerpiece of this ap-
pea
l. Apparently concerned that Villarreal's counsel might
coach Villarreal to adjust the remainder of his testimony, the
judge sought to narrow Villarreal's ability to confer with his
attorneys overnight.
The judge and Villarreal's counsel engaged in an extended
back-and-forth over the scope of the order. In the end, the
trial judge left Villarreal's attorneys with this directive:
“[A]sk yourselves before you talk to [Villarreal] about some-
thing, is this something that—manage[s] his testimony in
front of the jury?” 707 S. W. 3d 138, 142 (Tex. Crim. App.
2024). Addressing Villarreal, the judge clarifed: “I'm not
telling you, you can't talk to them.” Ibid. Indeed, the
judge recognized that Villarreal had “a constitutional right
to confer” with his attorneys about certain topics. Ibid.
“For instance, suppose . . . you need to start talking . . . about
possible sentencing issues, you can do that.” Ibid. But to
the extent Villarreal's lawyers wished to “manage” his testi-
mony, the judge placed that off limits. Ibid.
Villarreal's lawyers objected under the Sixth Amendment
but indicated that they understood the order's scope. Id.,
at 142–143. Villarreal resumed his testimony 24 hours later
and was subsequently convicted of murder; he received a 60-
year sentence. Id., at 140, 143. At no point did Villarreal
or his attorneys suggest that the qualifed conferral order
had inhibited any conversation they wished to have. See
id., at 143.
II
The Court of Appeals of Texas affrmed Villarreal's convic-
tion, see 596 S. W. 3d 338 (2019), as did the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (TCCA), see 707 S. W. 3d 138. The TCCA
understood the challenged conferral order as an effort to
“preserv[e] the truth-seeking function of trial” and thus con-
strued the order as prohibiting Villarreal's lawyers from
“managing” his “ongoing testimony.” Id., at 146. In the
TCCA's view, the order was a permissible exercise of the
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trial court's discretion because it “only restricted discussions
of
[Villarreal's] ongoing testimony and nothing else.” Ibid.
Although a defendant must be able to confer with counsel
about the “effects” of his testimony, the TCCA reasoned, a
trial court may prohibit more explicit discussion of the de-
fendant's testimony itself. Id., at 145. The TCCA ex-
plained that a trial court may, for example, order defense
counsel not to “coach the testimony to course-correct a disas-
trous direct examination to brace against the impact of the
upcoming cross-examination.” Ibid.
In separate writings, multiple TCCA judges expressed
hesitation with the “murky” line that emerges from Geders
and Perry. See 707 S. W. 3d, at 147–148 (Yeary, J., concur-
ring). They worried that confusion about the proper scope
of conferral orders risks trenching on a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to obtain full, unqualifed advice on mat-
ters key to the effective assistance of counsel, such as
whether to plead guilty. See id., at 148 (same); id., at 150
(Keel, J., concurring).
Those judges are among many who have struggled with
the permissibility of similar orders and who have diverged
both in their bottom-line conclusions and in their reasoning.
1
We granted certiorari to clarify the Sixth Amendment's
boundaries. 604 U. S. 1241 (2025).
III
The Sixth Amendment guarantees as “fundamental” a
criminal defendant's right to consult with his counsel. See,
1
Compare, e. g., Martin v. United States, 991 A. 2d 791, 794–795, and
n. 13 (D. C. 2010) (concluding that an order banning discussion of testimony
during an overnight recess violated the Sixth Amendment and collecting
supporting cases), with Beckham v. Commonwealth, 248 S. W. 3d 547, 553
(Ky. 2008) (allowing an order “permitting the defendant to have contact
with his attorneys during an overnight recess while limiting that contact
by telling the attorneys to not discuss their client's ongoing testimony”).
See also United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 487 F. 3d 124, 127,
133 (CA2 2007) (noting that “courts have struggled to defne the constitu-
tional line between Geders and Perry”).
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e. g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 68 (1932). When a
defendant
opts to take the witness stand, however, he “[a]s-
sum[es] the position of a witness,” with its attendant “criti-
cisms and burdens.” Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301,
305 (1895). One such burden: Courts may limit advice from
counsel aimed at “infuenc[ing] the testimony in light of the
testimony already given.” Geders, 425 U. S., at 87.
During a normal trial recess—one that does not interrupt
the defendant's testimony—no such infuence is threatened
and the Constitution plainly protects a defendant's right to
access his counsel without judicial interference. But during
a midtestimony recess (when the defendant not only enjoys
the Sixth Amendment's protection but also bears a witness's
burdens), it is less clear whether and to what extent the
Sixth Amendment permits judge-imposed restrictions on the
defendant's access to counsel.
This Court frst encountered that question in Geders. An
overnight recess divided Geders's direct testimony from his
cross-examination. Before the recess, the judge ordered
Geders not to discuss the case overnight with anyone. 425
U. S., at 82–83, and n. 1. Geders's attorney objected to this
absolute conferral ban, explaining that he believed his client
had a right to confer with him “about matters other than the
imminent cross-examination.” Id., at 82.
This Court agreed. The trial judge's order, we explained,
was a species of the traditional practice of witness sequestra-
tion. “Applied to nonparty witnesses,” the practice is unob-
jectionable and “within sound judicial discretion.” Id., at
88. But Geders “was not simply a witness; he was also the
defendant.” Ibid. And whereas “[a] nonparty witness or-
dinarily has little, other than his own testimony, to discuss
with trial counsel” during an overnight recess, the same is
not true of a defendant: “It is common practice during such
recesses for an accused and counsel to discuss the events of
the day's trial.” Ibid. Indeed, we explained,
“[s]uch recesses are often times of intensive work, with
tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be re-
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viewed. The lawyer may need to obtain from his client
i
nformation made relevant by the day's testimony, or he
may need to pursue inquiry along lines not fully ex-
plored earlier. At the very least, the overnight recess
during trial gives the defendant a chance to discuss with
counsel the signifcance of the day's events.” Ibid.
For those reasons, we held in Geders that the Sixth
Amendment precludes the judge from keeping a defendant
and his lawyer apart during that crucial interlude in the de-
fendant's testimony. We observed that concerns about “the
problem of possible improper infuence on testimony or
`coaching ' of a witness” can be addressed without so blunt
an instrument as a complete overnight barrier. Id., at 89.
And, “[t]o the extent that confict remains” between the Con-
stitution and the interest in untutored cross-examination, we
concluded that “the confict must, under the Sixth Amend-
ment, be resolved in favor of the right to the assistance and
guidance of counsel.” Id., at 91.
Geders explicitly reserved judgment regarding the consti-
tutionality of a shorter conferral restriction, like one govern-
ing “a brief routine recess during the trial day.” Id., at 89,
n. 2. But when that question arose 13 years later in Perry,
we upheld the restriction, emphasizing a defendant's shift in
status when he takes the stand. “[B]efore he begins to tes-
tify,” we reasoned, a defendant “has an absolute right” to
consult with his lawyer. 488 U. S., at 281. When he be-
comes a witness, however, a competing duty arises: the duty
to advance “the truth-seeking function of the trial.” Id., at
282. That function, we explained, is best served when testi-
mony is unaided by “an opportunity to consult with third
parties,” such as lawyers, about the course of one's testimony
once it has begun. Ibid.
Then, Perry made a key observation: As a practical mat-
ter, a truth-undermining consultation is exactly the kind of
communication likely to happen during a brief daytime re-
cess. That is, during a brief recess, “there is a virtual cer-
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tainty that any conversation between the witness and the
lawyer
would relate to the ongoing testimony.” Id., at 283–
284. Notably, this fact differentiated the Perry recess from
the Geders one. When (as in Geders) the recess stretches
overnight, the discussion will likely “encompass matters that
go beyond the content of the defendant's own testimony—
matters that the defendant does have a constitutional right
to discuss with his lawyer, such as the availability of other
witnesses, trial tactics, or even the possibility of negotiating
a plea bargain.” Perry, 488 U. S., at 284.
Perry therefore held that what the Sixth Amendment for-
bids overnight (a total conferral ban), it permits during a
brief daytime recess. Perry also suggested that, during
such a brief recess, trial courts might opt for a lesser in-
cluded restriction—one that would permit consultation on
protected topics “but forbid discussion of ongoing testi-
mony.” Ibid., n. 8.
We acknowledged in Perry that “the line between the
facts of Geders and” Perry “is a thin one.” Id., at 280. It
is nonetheless “a line of constitutional dimension.” Ibid.
IV
A
Before us, Villarreal and Texas place that line along differ-
ent axes. For Villarreal, the line is temporal. Villarreal
concedes that, during a brief daytime recess, a defendant has
no right to confer. But during an overnight recess, Villar-
real insists, the conferral right is absolute and unqualifed;
that is, an overnight recess is different in kind such that the
Sixth Amendment admits no restriction.
For Texas, the line is substantive. The reason Perry held
a total nonconferral order permissible during a brief daytime
recess, Texas argues, is because of the unprotected content
of discussion that presumably occupies such a recess, not
simply because of the amount of time the recess lasts. And
if that is so, then a court order prohibiting only unprotected
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content (like, Texas posits, the one here) comports with the
Sixth
Amendment.
2
We conclude that Texas is correct. Underlying Perry are
two premises. One is factual and the other legal, but both
are content based. First, while Perry recognizes that a tes-
tifying defendant has a constitutional right during a midtes-
timony recess to consult with his lawyer about a wide range
of topics—“the availability of other witnesses, trial tactics,
or even the possibility of negotiating a plea bargain,” id., at
284—it posits that a short break in a defendant's appearance
on the witness stand is unlikely to feature such topics. In-
stead, such a pause will likely contain discussion of “nothing
but the testimony.” Ibid. So, then, Perry's second (correl-
ative) premise emerges: A midtestimony defendant does not
have a protected Sixth Amendment right to discuss his ongo-
ing testimony with his lawyer. Put differently, where no
nontestimony topics are involved, the Sixth Amendment pro-
vides no constitutional right to consultation during breaks in
the defendant's testimony. Id., at 281.
In less prominent form, the same content-based premises
undergird Geders. The Court there explained that a de-
fendant differs from a normal witness because the defendant
has matters “other than his own testimony” to discuss. 425
U. S., at 88 (emphasis added). And Geders's lawyer appar-
ently shared that same assumption, because he insisted that
he and his client must be permitted to confer “about matters
other than the imminent cross-examination.” Id., at 82 (em-
phasis added).
Villarreal's hardline position—that the Sixth Amendment
permits no restriction of a defendant's consultation right
during an overnight recess—thus fails to account for the
content-related premises underlying Geders and Perry. It
is inconsistent too with another such premise: Perry's expla-
2
The lower courts have likewise diverged with respect to this subsidiary
time-versus-content question. See Serrano v. Fischer, 412 F. 3d 292, 299–
300 (CA2 2005) (Sotomayor, J.) (collecting cases).
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nation that something shifts “when a defendant becomes a
w
itness.” 488 U. S., at 281; see also id., at 282 (“[W]hen he
assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply
to other witnesses—rules that serve the truthseeking func-
tion of the trial—are generally applicable to him as well”).
Villarreal says the shift merely allows a judge to prohibit
“impermissible coaching,” which Villarreal defnes as solicit-
ing perjury. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. But, of course, soliciting
perjury is always improper; a judge's instruction to avoid it
would raise no more eyebrows at the outset of trial than
leading into a midtestimony recess. See Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U. S. 157, 166 (1986). On Villarreal's view, the defend-
ant's taking the witness stand works no change in the judge's
discretion to preserve “the truth-seeking function of the
trial.” Perry, 488 U. S., at 282.
By contrast, Texas's reading—and now ours—gives con-
tent to Perry's framework: What shifts is the protection af-
forded to a certain subset of consultation. That subset, we
hold, is discussion of testimony for its own sake—what Perry
called “nothing but the testimony.” Id., at 284. A defense
attorney may rehearse her client's testimony before her cli-
ent takes the witness stand. See ABA Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion
508: The Ethics of Witness Preparation 1–4 (Aug. 5, 2023)
(Formal Opinion 508). And a defense attorney may debrief
her client's testimony after her client leaves the witness
stand for good. Such discussion of testimony qua testimony
is entirely proper and the consultation that enables it is con-
stitutionally protected before the defendant's testimony be-
gins and after it concludes. But for the duration of the de-
fendant's time on the stand, consultation about the testimony
itself—rather than incidental discussion of testimony in serv-
ice of protected topics—sheds its constitutional protection.
This means that, as even Texas acknowledges, a court can-
not prohibit a lawyer from asking his client about a new po-
tential witness or a piece of evidence mentioned for the frst
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time during the defendant's testimony, or a defendant from
ask
ing his lawyer about compliance with the court's eviden-
tiary rulings. See Brief for Respondent 27–28. What it
may prohibit is discussion of testimony for its own sake.
Such discussion threatens to shape the defendant's testimony
and undermine the trial's search for the truth.
This rule follows naturally from our precedents and the
principles underlying them; in particular, the recognition
that conferral orders are “a corollary” of the traditional prac-
tice of witness sequestration, refashioned to accommodate
the special protections of a defendant. Perry, 488 U. S., at
281–282. Witness sequestration (the exclusion of a witness
from the courtroom prior to his testimony) prevents the wit-
ness from “adapt[ing] his testimony . . . to victory rather
than to veracity, so as to meet the necessities as laid open by
prior” testimony. 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1869, p. 502 (3d
ed. 1940); accord, Perry, 488 U. S., at 281–282. Pure seques-
tration is, of course, incompatible with a defendant's right to
attend his trial and to consult his attorney. See Geders, 425
U. S., at 88; Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 607 (1972).
But a rule prohibiting the discussion of testimony for its own
sake mimics sequestration within constitutional bounds. It
restrains real-time feedback aimed at chameleonic adjust-
ments in the defendant's testimony and thus (like true se-
questration) advances “the central function of the trial,
which is to discover the truth.” Portuondo v. Agard, 529
U. S. 61, 73 (2000).
In short, we agree that “[t]he difference between Perry
and Geders is not the quantity of communication restrained
but its constitutional quality.” United States v. Padilla, 203
F. 3d 156, 160 (CA2 2000). And while many topics retain
constitutional protection during extended breaks in a de-
fendant's testimony (see Part IV–B, infra), testimony qua
testimony does not.
3
3
To be clear, we address here only the constitutional protection for—
and not the ethical propriety of—discussion of testimony during an over-
night recess. In other words, this opinion solely considers the extent of

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B
W
hile not a model of clarity, the trial judge's order here
did enough to tailor the “quality” of forbidden consultation,
Padilla, 203 F. 3d, at 160, to the rule we discern from Geders
and Perry. As the TCCA explained, the order prohibited
Villarreal's lawyers from “managing” his “ongoing testi-
mony.” 707 S. W. 3d, at 146. Forbidding that mode of dis-
cussion permissibly balanced the truth-seeking function of
the trial against Villarreal's right to discuss protected topics
with his lawyers.
Those protected topics are not insignifcant. Indeed,
under the rule we announce, many topics a testifying defend-
ant and his lawyer might discuss during a midtestimony
overnight recess remain protected. No less than before or
after his testimony, a defendant's access to advice about trial
strategy remains essential to the collaborative enterprise
that is criminal defense. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U. S.
414, 421–424 (2018). We have long held that “ `[a]n accused
is entitled to be assisted' ”—not merely directed—“ `by an
attorney.' ” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U. S. 365, 377
(1986) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 685
(1984)).
4
And just as lawyer advises client, so too does cli-
ent advise lawyer: “More than merely allowing the defendant
to participate in tactical decisions, consultation enables the
a court's discretion to ban such consultation. See Perry v. Leeke, 488
U. S. 272, 284–285 (1989). We do not disturb what a lawyer may discuss
with her client in the absence of a court order. Nor do we touch upon
what a lawyer must discuss with her client to render effective assistance.
4
See also, e. g., Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 820 (1975) (explain-
ing that the Sixth Amendment “speaks of the `assistance' of counsel, and
an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant”); Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U. S. 368, 382, n. 10 (1979) (observing that the Sixth Amendment
“contemplat[es] a norm in which the accused, and not a lawyer, is master
of his own defense”); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U. S. 175, 178 (2004) (“Defense
counsel undoubtedly has a duty to discuss potential strategies with the
defendant” (citing Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688)); Morris v. Slappy, 461
U. S. 1, 21 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result) (“[T]he attorney must
work closely with the defendant in formulating defense strategy”).
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lawyer to obtain factual information crucial to making
them.
” United States v. McLaughlin, 164 F. 3d 1, 17
(CADC 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
As we explained in Perry, a court may not stem this collab-
oration merely because it involves incidental discussion of
testimony. 488 U. S., at 284; accord, Geders, 425 U. S., at 91
(explaining that any confict between the Sixth Amendment
and the desire for untutored testimony must “be resolved in
favor of the right to the assistance and guidance of counsel”).
For example, a court cannot prohibit a defendant from ob-
taining his attorney's advice on whether and why he should
consider a guilty plea—even if the “why” includes the impact
of his ongoing testimony on the trial's prospects. The Sixth
Amendment does not abide a take-my-word-for-it vision of
the attorney-client relationship. It does, however, tolerate
a midtestimony conferral order prohibiting discussion of tes-
timony as such, lest that discussion shape future testimony
“in light of the testimony already given.” Id., at 87. The
no-testimony-management order entered here falls on the
constitutional side of that line.
5
C
Having rejected Villarreal's frontline argument (that the
Sixth Amendment affrmatively protects access to testimony
management during an overnight recess), we also reject his
backup. Even if the Sixth Amendment's protection does not
itself span the full range of topics that might come up during
5
The line between discussion of testimony for its own sake and discus-
sion of testimony incidental to other topics may not always be razor sharp.
We trust that defense counsel will not evade the spirit of qualifed confer-
ral orders by couching discussion of testimony qua testimony in strategic
terms. For instance, unprotected discussion does not become protected
simply by way of a preface explaining that a defendant's “chances of ac-
quittal will improve” if he adjusts his testimony. Although such advice
involves strategic considerations, at its core it seeks to shape future testi-
mony in light of past testimony and thus is unprotected. Accord, post, at
484 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Opinion of the Court
a midtestimony recess, Villarreal asks for a prophylactic rule
bubble-wrappi
ng what the Sixth Amendment does protect.
In Villarreal's view, a line dividing discussion of testimony
from discussion of other topics is “no line at all.” Brief for
Petitioner 25. And so Villarreal fears that conferral orders
like the one at issue here will operate to chill protected dis-
cussion in effect even if they do not do so formally. Villar-
real thus demands a bright-line rule permitting no restric-
tions overnight.
This argument, which is not without force, has persuaded
a number of lower courts. See, e. g., United States v. San-
tos, 201 F. 3d 953, 965 (CA7 2000) (“Perry makes clear” that
a no-discussion-of-testimony order violates the Sixth Amend-
ment because it “would as a practical matter preclude the
assistance of counsel across a range of legitimate legal and
tactical questions”); United States v. Triumph Capital
Group, Inc., 487 F. 3d 124, 132–133 (CA2 2007) (similar);
United States v. Cobb, 905 F. 2d 784, 792 (CA4 1990) (similar).
But, importantly, those courts addressed conferral orders
banning any and all discussion of the defendant's testimony,
even if incidental to protected topics.
Uncompromising no-testimony-discussion orders like those
are easy to articulate and hard to apply. That is because, as
we have explained, protected discussion—e. g., deliberation
over whether to accept a guilty plea—often must involve
some discussion of testimony. The courts of appeals that
have prohibited blanket no-discussion orders have reason-
ably feared that directives preventing all discussion of testi-
mony, full stop, would be impermissibly overbroad and thus
dilute the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.
The same concern is not present with an order prohibiting
only discussion of “nothing but the testimony.” Perry, 488
U. S., at 284. Consultation about testimony itself—practic-
ing it, debriefng it, and the like—is a recognized, distinct
tool in every trial lawyer's preparatory arsenal. See, e. g.,
Brief for Legal Ethics Scholars as Amici Curiae 10–11; For-
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Opinion of the Court
mal Opinion 508, at 1–2. We trust that lawyers ordered to
sheathe
that tool overnight will have no diffculty doing so.
V
We do not share Justice Thomas's view that today's deci-
sion “needlessly expands our precedents.” Post, at 485
(opinion concurring in judgment). It is true that “Perry
never stated” the rule we draw from it and Geders. Post,
at 491. If it did, there would have been no need to take this
case. But for the reasons explained above, today's result
follows neatly from our precedents.
“[B]efore he begins to testify,” a defendant “has an abso-
lute right” to confer with his lawyer. Perry, 488 U. S., at
281; accord, Geders, 425 U. S., at 88. Once he begins to tes-
tify, what was absolute becomes qualifed, as “the testifying
defendant does not have a constitutional right to advice”
about his “ongoing testimony.” Perry, 488 U. S., at 284.
But the testifying defendant “does have a constitutional
right to discuss” “matters that go beyond the content of [his]
own testimony,” even though “such discussions will inevita-
bly include some consideration of the defendant's ongoing
testimony.” Ibid.; accord, Geders, 425 U. S., at 88, 91. We
say no more than that today.
***
The conferral order here prevented only one thing during
the overnight recess that bifurcated Villarreal's testimony:
Villarreal's lawyers could not manage his ongoing testimony
in light of the testimony he had already given. Such man-
agement amounts to discussion of testimony qua testimony
and therefore falls on the unprotected side of the line we
discern from our precedents. Accordingly, the conferral
order did not ban or impermissibly chill constitutionally pro-
tected consultation. The judgment of the TCCA is affrmed.
It is so ordered.
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481
Alito, J., concurring
Justice Alito, concurring.
I
agree that the trial court did not violate petitioner's
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel by re-
stricting consultation with his attorney during an overnight
midtestimonial recess. I write to set out the framework
under which courts should analyze limitations on communica-
tions between a criminal defendant and his attorney during
a break in the defendant's testimony.
I
I begin with a word about the origin and nature of the
constitutional right that petitioner invokes, that is, the right
to confer with his attorney during an overnight break in his
testimony. Petitioner claims that the Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel includes this right. When
the Sixth Amendment was adopted, however, criminal de-
fendants could not testify in their own defense because they
were not considered competent witnesses. See Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 49–50 (1987). It follows that a
defendant could not consult with an attorney about such
testimony. Most States did not allow defendants to take
the stand until well into the 19th century, see Ferguson
v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 576–577, and nn. 5–6 (1961), and
this Court did not squarely recognize a defendant's constitu-
tional right to testify in his own defense until its 1987 deci-
sion in Rock, 483 U. S., at 49. Even then, the Court did not
hold that the Sixth Amendment alone conferred this right.
The Court pointed to several possible sources of the right
but appeared to rely primarily on the Due Process Clause.
See id., at 51. And the Court made clear that the constitu-
tional right to testify was subject to limitations designed to
protect the truth-seeking function of trial. Id., at 55–56,
and n. 11. Limitations on midtestimonial attorney-client
communications must therefore be analyzed against this
backdrop.
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II
In
considering the permissible scope of a defendant's mid-
testimonial consultation, it is helpful to begin with the base-
line situation in which a defendant completes both direct and
cross-examination without any break in the proceedings. In
that situation, the governing rules allow the jury to hear the
defendant's story in his own words from his own mouth, not
a version of that story scripted or choreographed by counsel.
A defendant may not, for instance, sign and present to the
jury a carefully crafted affdavit of events written by counsel.
Nor may the defense show the jury a video in which the
defendant recites a prepared statement. And when the de-
fendant is on the stand, defense counsel cannot pass him
notes or speak to him via an earpiece.
Instead, the defendant must take the stand and speak di-
rectly to the jury in his own words. During direct examina-
tion, defense counsel generally may not lead the witness.
Fed. Rule Evid. 611(c). That is, counsel may not ask ques-
tions in a form that suggests the answer that the defendant
should give. And during cross-examination, counsel's par-
ticipation is limited to objecting to any improper questions.
Otherwise, the defendant is on his own.
A break in the proceeding—either a short break during
the trial day or an overnight recess—should not fundamen-
tally alter the rule that the defendant must testify without
coaching by counsel. That is why we have held that during
a brief break a trial judge may prohibit all communications
between the defendant and counsel. Perry v. Leeke, 488
U. S. 272, 281 (1989). In that situation, we observed, there
was a “virtual certainty” that any communication between
the defendant and his attorney would “relate to the ongoing
testimony.” Id., at 283–284. When a defendant decides to
take the stand, his testimony is a critical stage of the trial.
If the jury comes away with a low opinion of his character
or simply disbelieves his testimony, the chances of conviction
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483
Alito, J., concurring
increase, and if the jury forms a favorable opinion of the
defendant
and believes his testimony, he has a greater chance
of acquittal. Thus, during this critical phase, counsel will
almost certainly prioritize bolstering the defendant's testi-
mony over all other matters. And since a short break gives
the defendant and counsel little time to converse, they will
likely discuss only the most urgent topic at hand. With
much at stake and limited time for consultation, it is almost
certain that any discussion will concern the remainder of the
client's make-or-break testimony, not other matters that can
be discussed after the testimony ends.
A trial judge could deal with this situation by allowing
the defendant and counsel to confer but instructing them not
to talk about the defendant's testimony. But the judge
would have little ability to determine whether the defendant
and counsel obeyed this instruction. The judge could not sit
in on their conversation or later ask them what they said.
Instead, the judge would have to rely heavily on the attor-
ney's good faith. Although we may presume that most de-
fense attorneys would try to follow the judge's instructions,
our decision in Perry—holding that consultation during a
short midtestimonial break may be completely barred—elim-
inates the danger of noncompliance.
III
When a defendant's testimony cannot be completed by the
end of a trial day, the situation is somewhat different. Some
things remain the same: Because of its centrality, the defend-
ant's testimony is very likely still the top priority. Accord-
ingly, counsel's incentive to improve that testimony will re-
main strong. But because they will have more time, the
likelihood that the attorney and client will also seek to dis-
cuss matters unrelated to the defendant's testimony will be
greater. And particularly if the defendant's testimony is an-
ticipated to fnish before the end of the next trial day, the

484 VIL
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Alito, J., concurring
attorney and client might need to discuss other defense wit-
nesses
who will follow the defendant on the stand, as well as
any rebuttal witnesses the prosecution might call.
In light of these different circumstances, the Court struck
a different balance in Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80
(1976), and held that a trial judge may not prohibit all
attorney-client consultation during an overnight break.
But that decision did not alter the baseline rule that, if a
defendant elects to take the stand, the jury is entitled to
hear the defendant's own story in his own words, not a ver-
sion crafted or edited by counsel. Thus, during an over-
night break, a defendant may consult his attorney about mat-
ters other than the defendant's testimony, but any efforts to
shape what the defendant will say when he resumes testify-
ing are improper. And attempts to achieve that end indi-
rectly are just as improper as attempts to do so directly.
For example, consider what defense counsel could and
could not properly say during an overnight break concerning
the tactical decision whether to seek a plea deal. Counsel
could say, “Let's discuss what plea terms you would be will-
ing to agree to,” or, “We should seek a deal because there is
a strong chance the jury will fnd you guilty.” But counsel
could not say: “We will really need to secure a deal unless
you clean up mistakes A, B, and C that you made today on
the stand.” Nor could counsel say: “We will really need to
secure some sort of deal unless, when you return to the stand
tomorrow, you stop scowling, looking down, and making ner-
vous gestures with your fngers.” Such efforts would con-
stitute the sort of improper “coaching ” that Geders does not
allow. They would not be “incidental.” Ante, at 475, 478,
and n. 5, 479.
At bottom, a defendant and his counsel may not engage
in midtestimonial discussions that affect the truth-seeking
function of trial by improving or shaping the defendant's on-
going testimony. I join the majority opinion with the under-
standing that it draws this line.
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485
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins,
concurr
ing in the judgment.
David Villarreal testifed in his own defense at his murder
trial. Partway through Villarreal's testimony, trial recessed
for the day. The trial judge gave Villarreal and his counsel
an order limiting what they could discuss during the break
in his testimony. The judge told them that they could confer
with each other overnight, but not about Villarreal's ongoing
testimony. Villarreal was convicted. He now challenges
the trial judge's order as violating his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
The trial judge's order did not violate Villarreal's right to
counsel under our precedents. In Geders v. United States,
425 U. S. 80 (1976), this Court held that a trial judge cannot
bar a testifying defendant from conferring with counsel over-
night because of his interest in discussing matters “other
than his own testimony.” Id., at 88. In Perry v. Leeke, 488
U. S. 272 (1989), this Court held that a trial judge can bar a
testifying defendant from conferring with counsel during a
15-minute recess. Id., at 274, 283–284. Whatever right a
defendant has to discuss other matters, the Court held, he
has no “right to discuss [his] testimony while it is in process.”
Id., at 284. The trial judge's order prohibiting discussion of
Villarreal's ongoing testimony plainly complied with both
precedents.
I cannot join the Court's opinion because it opines on hypo-
thetical situations not before the Court and needlessly ex-
pands our precedents. I therefore respectfully concur only
in the judgment.
I
Petitioner David Villarreal was charged with murder and
tried in Texas state court. Villarreal took the stand to tes-
tify in his own defense. While Villarreal was still on direct
examination, the judge had to recess trial for the day due to
a scheduling confict. Ordinarily, a witness cannot consult
with counsel during his testimony. See Perry, 488 U. S., at

486 VIL
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
281–282, and nn. 4–5; Geders, 425 U. S., at 87. The trial
judge
therefore instructed Villarreal's counsel not to discuss
Villarreal's testimony overnight. But his order allowed Vil-
larreal to confer with counsel about matters other than his
ongoing testimony:
“THE COURT: Normally your lawyer couldn't come up
and confer with you about your testimony in the middle
of the trial and in the middle of having the jury hear
your testimony. And so I'd like to tell you that you
can't confer with your attorney but [at] the same time
you have a Sixth Amendment right to talk to your
attorney.
“So I'm really going to put the burden on [counsel] to
tell you the truth. . . . I'm going to ask that [counsel]
pretend that Mr. Vi l larrea l is on the st and. You
couldn't confer with him during that time.
.....
“But I believe if you need to talk to your attorneys, I'm
not telling you, you can't talk to them. But I'm going
to rely on [counsel] to use your best judgment in talk-
ing to [Villarreal] because you can't—you couldn't
confer with him while he was on the stand about his
testimony. . . .
“DEFENSE COUNSEL #1: All right. So just so I am
clear and don't violate any court orders, that—because
he is still on direct and still testifying, that it is your
ruling that we cannot confer with our client?
“THE COURT: Let me help you with that. For in-
stance, suppose we go into a sentencing hearing and you
need to start talking to him about possible sentencing
issues, you can do that. Does that make sense? I don't
want you discussing what you couldn't discuss with him
if he was on the stand in front of the [ j]ury.
“DEFENSE COUNSEL #1: Okay.
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
“THE COURT: His testimony. I'm not sure whatever
else
you'd like to talk with him about while he's on the
stand. But ask yourselves before you talk to him about
something, is this something that—manage[s] his testi-
mony in front of the jury? Does that make sense to
you?
“DEFENSE COUNSEL #1: Sure, it does.
“DEFENSE COUNSEL #2: We aren't going to talk to
him about the facts that he testifed about.
“THE COURT: All right. Fair enough. But at the
same time—I'm going to put the burden on the lawyers,
not on him, because he has a constitutional right to con-
fer with you. At the same time, all lawyers are under—
they're under different rules than the defendants are.
.....
“And you're going to have to decide, if he asks you any
questions and such, is this something that is going to be
considered to be conferring with him on the witness
stand while the jury is there or not.” 707 S. W. 3d 138,
141–142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (some alterations and
boldface omitted).
Villarreal's counsel objected to the judge's order, but the
judge overruled that objection. Id., at 142–143.
Villarreal resumed testifying the next day. Neither he
nor his counsel reported that the trial judge's order impeded
any discussions. The record does not refect that they
planned to discuss any matter even arguably covered by the
judge's order. The jury later found Villarreal guilty of
murder.
On appeal, Villarreal argued that the trial judge's order,
by preventing him from discussing his ongoing testimony
with his counsel, violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The Texas Court of Appeals affrmed because a
trial court may “limit [a defendant's] right to confer with his
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
attorneys during an overnight recess to topics other than his
ongoi
ng testimony.” 596 S. W. 3d 338, 343 (2019). The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also affrmed on the ground
that a defendant has no right to discuss “ongoing testimony.”
707 S. W. 3d, at 144–146.
This Court granted certiorari. 604 U. S. 1241 (2025).
II
The Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees to a criminal de-
fendant the right to have “the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.” It was enacted in response to English laws that
sometimes forced defendants to represent themselves at
trial. See Garza v. Idaho, 586 U. S. 232, 259 (2019) (Thomas,
J., dissenting). This Court has interpreted it to guarantee
a defendant a right to discuss with counsel matters other
than his ongoing testimony. The trial judge's order here al-
lowed Villarreal and his counsel to discuss matters other
than Villarreal's ongoing testimony overnight, so it did not
violate his Sixth Amendment rights.
A
Under our precedents, a defendant “has no constitutional
right to consult with his lawyer while he is testifying.”
Perry, 488 U. S., at 281. Rather, “when he assumes the role
of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other wit-
nesses—rules that serve the truth-seeking function of the
trial—are generally applicable to him as well.” Id., at 282.
Criminal defendants originally did not testify in their own
defense at trial. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570,
573–575 (1961). When they began doing so, this Court ex-
plained that they would do so “subject to all [the] criticisms
and burdens” of other witnesses. Reagan v. United States,
157 U. S. 301, 305 (1895). It is common practice for trial
judges to prohibit other witnesses from discussing their on-

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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
going testimony with counsel. See Perry, 488 U. S., at 281–
282,
and nn. 4–5; Geders, 425 U. S., at 87.
This Court has recognized only one exception to the gen-
eral rule that a defendant has no constitutional right to con-
sult with his lawyer while he is testifying. In Geders, this
Court held that a trial judge could not bar a defendant from
talking “ `about anything ' ” with counsel during an overnight
recess. Id., at 91. As this Court would explain, the judge's
order in Geders was unconstitutional only because it would
impede discussion of matters “beyond the content of the de-
fendant's own testimony.” Perry, 488 U. S., at 284. In
Perry, this Court held that a trial judge therefore could bar
all conferral with counsel during a 15-minute recess because
the Sixth Amendment does not protect discussion of “th[e]
testimony while it is in process.” Ibid.
Allowing any witness to discuss his ongoing testimony
with counsel, Perry explained, would undermine the truth-
seeking function of the trial. “Once the defendant places
himself at the very heart of the trial process,” the trial court
can ensure that “the story presented on direct is measured
for its accuracy and completeness by uninfuenced testimony
on cross-examination.” Id., at 282–283 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
B
The trial judge's order here complied with our precedents.
The trial judge instructed defense counsel not to “discus[s]
what you couldn't discuss with [Villarreal] if he was on the
stand in front of the [ j]ury,” and explained that “you couldn't
confer with him while he was on the stand about his testi-
mony.” 707 S. W. 3d, at 142 (boldface omitted). The trial
judge otherwise allowed Villarreal and his counsel to meet
and discuss anything that they wanted. Ibid. Under Ged-
ers and Perry, the trial judge's order was constitutional be-
cause Villarreal could discuss matters other than his testi-
mony. See Geders, 425 U. S., at 88; Perry, 488 U. S., at 284.
Perry, in fact, specifcally endorsed orders that “permit con-

490 VIL
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
sultation between counsel and defendant during such a re-
cess,
but forbid discussion of ongoing testimony.” Id.,
at 284, n. 8. The order therefore did not deny Villarreal
“the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U. S. Const.,
Amdt. 6.
Perry also rejected Villarreal's main counterargument.
Villarreal argues that because it is diffcult to distinguish
discussion of testimony from discussion of other matters, he
should have been able to discuss his testimony in order to
ensure that he could discuss other topics, too. Brief for
Petitioner 24–38. But in Perry, three Justices dissented
partly because they, like Villarreal, did not believe that it
was “possible to distinguish discussions regarding trial strat-
egy from discussions regarding testimony.” 488 U. S., at
295, n. 8 (opinion of Marshall, J.). The Perry majority made
that distinction nonetheless and endorsed orders that turn
on that distinction. Id., at 284, n. 8.
III
I am unable to join the majority opinion because it unnec-
essarily expands these precedents. It purports to “an-
nounce” a “rule” under which a defendant has a constitu-
tional right to “discussion of testimony” so long as that
discussion is “incidental to other topics.” Ante, at 477, 478,
n. 5. It identifes new circumstances, not presented here, in
which a defendant supposedly has a right to discuss matters
related to his ongoing testimony. Ante, at 477–479. And it
endorses a methodology under which “any confict between
the Sixth Amendment and the desire for untutored testi-
mony must `be resolved in favor of the right to the assistance
and guidance of counsel.' ” Ante, at 478.
The majority opinion fnds no support in Perry. As for a
general right to discuss testimony, this Court in Perry ex-
plained in straightforward terms that “we do not believe the
defendant has a constitutional right to discuss [his] testimony
while it is in process.” 488 U. S., at 284; cf. ante, at 477–479.
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
Perry therefore endorsed orders that categorically “forbid
discussi
on of ongoing testimony.” 488 U. S., at 284, n. 8.
That endorsement came in the context of a brief recess. Id.,
at 284. But, unlike the majority opinion in this case, see
ante at 477, 479, Perry never stated that those sorts of cate-
gorical orders are forbidden overnight. As for the potential
confict between the possibility for conferral and uncompro-
mised testimony, see ante, at 478, Perry clarifed that the
Court would not read Geders to demand resolving them in
favor of conferral in all cases. “[W]hen [a defendant] as-
sumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply
to other witnesses—rules that serve the truth-seeking func-
tion of the trial—are generally applicable to him as well.”
Perry, 488 U. S., at 282. Defendants, in other words, are
generally “subject to” the same “criticisms and burdens” as
other witnesses. Reagan, 157 U. S., at 305.
The majority opinion does not claim that its approach fnds
any support in the original meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment. The majority also does not claim that opining on mat-
ters not presented by the facts was necessary to decide this
case, wh ich i nvolved an order that a l l agree was
constitutional.
I respectfully concur in the judgment.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None