Postal Service v. Konan

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P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 607 U. S. Part 2
Pages 391–420
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February 24, 2026
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reporter of decisions
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391OCTOBER
TERM,
2025
Syllabus
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al.v.KONAN
certiorari
to
the united states court of appeals for
thefth circuit
No. 24–351. Argued October 8, 2025—Decided February 24, 2026
Respondent Lebene Konan and the local post office in Euless, Texas, had
an extended dispute concerning mail delivery to two rental properties
owned by Konan. Konan alleged that, among other things, United
States Postal Service employees intentionally withheld her mail and
interfered with its delivery. After administrative complaints proved
unsuccessful, Konan sued the United States in federal court, bringing
various state-law tort claims alleging that the United States Postal
Service intentionally and wrongfully withheld her mail. The District
Court dismissed Konan's complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act's postal exception, under which the United States retains sovereign
immunity for all claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter,” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(b). The Dis-
trict Court concluded that the United States enjoys sovereign immunity
from Konan's claims because they all relate to personal or financial
harms arising from nondelivery of mail. The District Court further
held that the postal exception is not limited to merely negligent failure
to properly carry the mail. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
the terms “loss,” “miscarriage,” and “negligent transmission” do not
encompass the intentional act of not delivering the mail at all. In con-
trast, the First and Second Circuits have interpreted the postal excep-
tion to apply to suits even when they arise from harms caused by inten-
tional misconduct. The Court granted certiorari to resolve the split.
Held: The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising out
of the intentional nondelivery of mail because both “miscarriage” and
“loss” of mail under the FTCA's postal exception can occur as a result of
the Postal Service's intentional failure to deliver the mail. Pp. 398–406.
(a) The postal exception reflects Congress's judgment that redress for
“harms” of “the sort primarily identified with the Postal Service's func-
tion of transporting mail throughout the United States” should not come
from potentially burdensome tort suits.Dolanv.Postal Service, 546
U. S. 481, 489. P. 398.
(b) Both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under the postal exception
can occur as a result of the Postal Service's intentional failure to deliver
the mail. Pp. 399–404

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SERVICEv.KONAN
Syllabus
(1) The Court interprets statutory terms according to the ordinary
meani
ngs
they had when they were enacted.Wisconsin Central Ltd.
v.United States, 585 U. S. 274, 277. When Congress enacted the FTCA
in 1946, the “miscarriage” of mail ordinarily included any failure of mail
to properly arrive at its intended destination. Dictionaries published
around that time confirm that a “miscarriage” of mail happened when
mail failed to arrive at its destination. The Court declines to limit “mis-
carriage” to negligent failures, as no dictionaries cited impose this limi-
tation, and ordinary speakers used “miscarriage” to refer to problems
with mail caused by intentional misconduct, such as when mail was sto-
len or burned. The Court also declines to limit “miscarriage” to when
mail goes to the wrong address, as speakers used the term when mail
failed to reach its intended destination regardless of where the mail
ended up, including when mail was delayed, came too late, or was left
in the post office. Pp. 399–401.
(2) When Congress enacted the FTCA, the “loss” of mail ordinarily
meant a deprivation of mail, regardless of how the deprivation was
brought about. Contemporary dictionaries defined “loss” as the act or
fact of losing or suffering deprivation, and one can suffer a deprivation
of something when another intentionally keeps that thing for himself.
Konan alleged that she was entitled to possession of her mail but that
the Postal Service converted it, meaning she was “deprived of the use
and possession of the property,” Black's Law Dictionary 421, so her
claims arise out of the loss of her mail. The Court disagrees with the
attempt by Konan to limit “loss” to only inadvertent losses. A loss can
be the result of another person's intentional misconduct, and ordinary
speakers commonly described a “loss” of mail from theft, including theft
by the carrier. The Court also disagrees with the argument that the
postal exception applies only when the Postal Servicelostthe mail, be-
cause Congress applied the postal exception to all “claim[s] arising out
of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission” of mail, describing
kinds of harms, not kinds of actions by the postal workers. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the principal provision of the FTCA, which
includes losses caused by intentional misconduct and does not require
that the Government lost anything. The Court rejects Konan's pro-
posal to limit “loss” to only “destruction.” Ordinary speakers referred
to losses of mail even when the mail was not destroyed, and the diction-
ary definitions Konan pointed to were listed first because they were the
oldest, not because they were primary. Pp. 401–404.
(c) The Court rejects Konan's remaining arguments that her claims
must not be barred by the postal exception. Pp. 404–406.

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Syllabus
(1) Konan argues that the postal exception's “negligent transmis-
si
on”
category narrows the meaning of “miscarriage” and “loss,” but
Congress intentionally limited the “negligent” qualifier to “transmis-
sion” and did not use it to qualify “loss” or “miscarriage.” An adjective
before the final noun in a list cannot be transplanted to qualify the pre-
ceding nouns. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26. The Court
does not think that the “negligent” qualifier suggests that Congress was
trying to enable suits involving intentional misconduct. Instead, the
inclusion of “negligent” to qualify “transmission” forecloses claims in-
volving mail even though nothing went wrong with its transport or de-
livery, keeping the focus of the postal exception on mail-delivery prob-
lems. Pp. 404–405.
(2) Konan also argues that the Court's interpretations of “miscar-
riage” and “loss” run afoul of the presumption against surplusage, be-
cause many claims—including Konan's here—will arise from both a
“miscarriage” and a “loss” of mail. But Konan's proposal to solve the
surplusage—three nonoverlapping definitions of the statutory terms—
is inconsistent with ordinary meaning, which shows that these terms
are often used in an overlapping manner. In Dolan, the Court inter-
preted the terms in the postal exception to substantially overlap, 546
U. S., at 487, and the canon against surplusage is subordinate to the
cardinal canon that “a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there,” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Ger-
main, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254. Congress likely used broad, overlapping
terms to better keep complaints about mail delivery out of court.
Pp. 405–406.
(d) The Court does not decide whether all of Konan's claims are
barred by the postal exception, or which arguments Konan adequately
preserved. P. 406.
96 F. 4th 799, vacated and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson, JJ., joined,
post, p. 406.
Frederick Liu argued the cause for petitioners. On the
briefs were Solicitor General Sauer, Assistant Attorney
General Shumate, Deputy Solicitor General Mooppan, Urja
Mittal, Thomas J. Marshall, Stephan J. Boardman, Michael
D. Weaver, and Joshua J. Hofer.

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SERVICEv.KONAN
Opinion of the Court
Easha Anandargued the cause for respondent. With her
on
the
brief wereJeffrey L. Fisher, Pamela S. Karlan,and
Robert Clary.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot
be sued without its consent. By means of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, Congress waived that sovereign immunity for
certain tort suits based on the conduct of Government em-
ployees. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2674, 1346(b). But, in the provi-
sion at issue in this case, Congress retained sovereign immu-
nity for a wide range of claims about mail. Specifically, the
FTCA's postal exception retains sovereign immunity for all
claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter.” § 2680(b). This
case concerns whether this exception applies when postal
workers intentionally fail to deliver the mail. We hold that
it does.
I
A
The United States Postal Service is a frequent point of
contact between citizens and the Federal Government. In
2024, the Postal Service's more than 600,000 employees deliv-
ered more than 112 billion pieces of mail—over 300 million a
day—to more than 165 million delivery points. See United
States Postal Service, Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Report to
Congress 3, 29, 32, 34. Unsurprisingly, given this volume,
not all mail arrives properly and on time. The Postal Serv-
ice reports receiving approximately 335,000 customer com-
plaints per year. See Brief for Petitioners 24.
*Briefs ofamici curiaeurging affirmance were filed for APA Watch by
Lawrence J. Joseph; for the Institute for Justice by Jaba Tsitsuashvili,
Anya Bidwell, and Patrick Jaicomo; and for the Taxpayers Protection
Alliance by Erik S. Jaffe.

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Opinion of the Court
Because it is a Government agency, recourse against the
Post
a
l Service in the form of lawsuits for money damages is
limited. As part of “the executive branch of the Govern-
ment of the United States,” 39 U. S. C. § 201, “the Postal
Service enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver,”
Dolanv.Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 484 (2006). Before
1946, that sovereign immunity generally prevented those in-
jured by Government employees from receiving compensa-
tion through lawsuits. SeeMolzofv.United States, 502
U. S. 301, 304 (1992). That year, Congress enacted a “lim-
ited waiver” of immunity through the FTCA.Id., at 305.
Subject to enumerated exceptions, the FTCA allows a plain-
tiff to sue the Government for injuries or loss of property
“caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of ” a
federal employee “acting within the scope of his office or
employment.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1).
The FTCA's postal exception retains the Government's
sovereign immunity for lawsuits about failing to properly
carry or deliver mail. It forecloses “[a]ny claim arising out
of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters
or postal matter.” § 2680(b). This Court has interpreted
the postal exception to apply when the plaintiff is harmed
“because mail either fails to arrive at all or arrives late, in
damaged condition, or at the wrong address.”Dolan, 546
U. S., at 489.
B
This case arises from the dismissal of a complaint, so we
accept the complaint's allegations as true, although the Gov-
ernment disputes them. National Rifle Association of
America v. Vullo, 602 U. S. 175, 181 (2024). Respondent
Lebene Konan owns two houses a block apart in Euless,
Texas—one on Saratoga Drive and the other on Trenton
Lane. Konan leases rooms to tenants in both houses and
occasionally stays at them herself. The Postal Service de-
livers mail for all the houses in the neighborhood to a central

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AL
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Opinion of the Court
structure with a box for each house. The Postal Service
distr
ibutes
keys to the owners of the houses so that they can
retrieve their mail. As the homeowner, Konan received the
keys to the boxes for both houses. Konan kept the keys and
distributed the mail to her tenants daily, and she also re-
ceived some of her own mail at the Saratoga address.
Konan's grievances with her mail service began in May
2020. After Konan noticed that no mail had arrived at her
Saratoga house in several days, she learned that the assigned
carrier had changed the listed owner from Konan's name to
a tenant's name. The same carrier then authorized a change
of the lock to allow the tenant to have his own mail key
without Konan's consent. Konan confronted the employees
at the local post office about these changes. A supervisor
at the local post office explained to Konan that the Postal
Service would stop delivering mail to her Saratoga address
until the Postal Service Inspector General's office investi-
gated and determined the proper owner. Konan then re-
ceived no mail to the Saratoga address for a couple of months
before service resumed.
Konan then learned that the same carrier had mail ad-
dressed to her and her tenants returned to senders as “unde-
liverable.” As a result, Konan and her tenants did not re-
ceive important mail. Konan resorted to private carriers.
The disruptions in mail service resulted in the loss of tenants
and made it more difficult for Konan to attract new tenants.
The carrier also taped a red notice inside the mailbox stating
that mail addressed to some, but not all, of the Saratoga resi-
dents could be delivered to the box. In 2021, postal workers
also allegedly stopped delivering mail to the Trenton house
after discovering that Konan owned it as well.
In response, Konan signed up for the Postal Service's “In-
formed Delivery” service, which allows customers to view
scans of incoming mail. When she discovered that mail on its
way to her addresses was not being delivered, she requested
that the mail for the Saratoga residence be held at the post

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office so that she could retrieve it in person. But the postal
employees
did
not give her the mail because Konan failed to
provide identification for the addressees. In addition to these
efforts, Konan also filed administrative complaints, but with-
out success.
C
In January 2022, Konan sued the United States in federal
court. Konan alleged that the Postal Service intentionally
and wrongfully withheld her mail. As relevant here, Konan
brought claims under state law for nuisance, tortious inter-
ference with prospective business relations, conversion, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. She sought dam-
ages for loss of rental income, the deprivation of her rightful
mail, and the distress that the postal workers caused her.*
The District Court dismissed Konan's complaint based on
sovereign immunity. Relying on the postal exception, it
concluded that the United States enjoys sovereign immunity
from her claims “because they all relate to `personal or fi-
nancial harms arising from nondelivery . . . of sensitive mate-
rials or information . . .' and other mail.” 652 F. Supp. 3d
721, 731 (ND Tex. 2023) (quoting Dolan, 546 U. S., at 489).
The District Court held that the postal exception is not lim-
ited to merely negligent failure to properly carry the mail.
652 F. Supp. 3d, at 730–731.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It
held that “the terms `loss,' `miscarriage,' and `negligent
transmission' do not encompass the intentional act of not de-
livering the mail at all.” 96 F. 4th 799, 804 (2024). It
reasoned that Konan's claims did not arise out of the “loss”
*Konan also brought discrimination claims against the postal workers
under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1985, alleging that they were motivated by
racial animus. The District Court dismissed these claims. 652 F. Supp.
3d 721, 731–732 (ND Tex. 2023). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 96
F. 4th 799, 804–805 (CA5 2024). We denied Konan's cross-petition for cer-
tiorari regarding those claims, so they are not before us. 604 U. S. 1256
(2025).

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of mail “because the mail was not destroyed or misplaced by
un
in
tentionalaction.”Id., at 802 (emphasis added). It
also reasoned that Konan's claims did not arise from the
“miscarriage” of mail “because there was no attempt at a
carriage.”Ibid. And it reasoned that Konan's claims did
not arise from the “negligent transmission” of mail because
“the postal workers' actions were intentional.”Ibid.
The Fifth Circuit's decision conflicts with those of the
First and Second Circuits, which have interpreted the postal
exception to apply to suits even when they arise from harms
caused by intentional misconduct. See Levasseur v. United
States Postal Serv., 543 F. 3d 23, 23–24 (CA1 2008) (per cu-
riam); Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 378 F. 2d 812, 813–
814 (CA2 1967). We granted certiorari to resolve the split.
604 U. S. 1256 (2025).
II
The postal exception retains the Federal Government's
sovereign immunity for “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss,
miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal
matter.” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(b). The postal exception re-
flects Congress's judgment that redress for “harms” of “the
sort primarily identified with the Postal Service's function
of transporting mail throughout the United States” should
not come from tort suits. Dolan, 546 U. S., at 489. Given
the frequency of postal workers' interactions with citizens,
those suits would arise so often that they would create a
significant burden for the Government and the courts. And
their cost to taxpayers would depend on the value and impor-
tance of the mail's contents, over which the Government typ-
ically has no control. See, e. g., Marine Ins. Co., 378 F. 2d,
at 813 (theft from mail of six emeralds valued at $152,190 in
1967 dollars).
According to Konan and the dissent, the postal exception
does not apply to Konan's claims because she alleges that
postal workers intentionally refused to deliver her mail.

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Opinion of the Court
We disagree. Both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under
the
post
al exception can occur as a result of the Postal Serv-
ice's intentional failure to deliver the mail.
A
Absent a reason to think otherwise, we interpret statutory
terms according to the ordinary meanings they had when
they were enacted. Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United
States, 585 U. S. 274, 277 (2018). When Congress enacted
the FTCA in 1946, the “miscarriage” of mail ordinarily in-
cluded any failure of mail to properly arrive at its intended
destination. Konan would limit “miscarriage” to uninten-
tional failures or failures where the mail went to the wrong
address. Neither limitation is well founded.
Dictionaries published around the time Congress enacted
the FTCA confirm that a “miscarriage” of mail happened
when mail failed to arrive properly. Two dictionaries indi-
cate that “miscarriage” of mail meant the “failure of a letter
. . . to reach its destination.” 2 New Century Dictionary of
the English Language 1069 (1927); accord, 6 Oxford English
Dictionary 497 (1933) (“The failure (of a letter, etc.) to reach
its destination”). In a third, “miscarriage” meant the “[f]ail-
ure (of something sent) to arrive.” Webster's New Interna-
tional Dictionary 1568 (2d ed. 1934) (Webster's Second).
Definitions of “miscarry” were similarly broad. Ibid. (“To
fail of reaching the destination”); 6 Oxford English Diction-
ary, at 498 (“To fail to reach its proper destination”). Some-
thing can “fail” to happen as a result of intentional miscon-
duct. See, e. g., 26 U. S. C. § 291 (1940 ed.) (imposing a
penalty for “failure to make and file [a tax] return” “unless
it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and
not due to willful neglect”). Because a “miscarriage” in-
cludes any failure of mail to arrive properly, a person experi-
ences a miscarriage of mail when his mail is delivered to his
neighbor, held at the post office, or returned to the sender—

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regardless of why it happened. Konan's claims about the
Post
a
l Service's willful failure to deliver her mail therefore
result from the miscarriage of her mail.
We disagree with Konan's attempt to limit “miscarriage”
to negligent failures of mail to arrive properly. Brief for
Respondent 19–20; accord, post, at 414 (Sotomayor, J., dis-
senting). Neither Konan nor the dissent cites any dictionar-
ies imposing this limitation. Instead, Konan cites examples
of uses of the term “miscarriage” that suggest that the mis-
carriage in question was unintentional, such as an 1868
telegraph-law decision explaining that a telegraph company
should not be liable “for every mistake, miscarriage, or acci-
dental delay that may occur.” United States Tel. Co. v. Gild-
ersleve, 29 Md. 232, 246 (1868). We agree that miscarriage
of mail can be unintentional, but “the fact that the phrase
was commonly used in a particular context does not show
that it is limited to that context.” District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 588 (2008).
In fact, ordinary speakers used “miscarriage” to refer to
problems w ith mai l caused by i ntenti ona l misconduc t.
When a mail pouch was “stolen,” a newspaper reported that
the letters “[m]iscarried.” Kansas City Star, Oct. 20, 1911,
p. 6A. When a priest failed to receive a summons because
it was “burned by an ecclesiastic,” the headline read “His
Letter Miscarried.” The Carbondale Leader, Jan. 3, 1893,
p. 1. And when litigants' documents failed to arrive, courts
classified “miscarriage” of mail as an excuse, without any
suggestion as to whether the carrier acted intentionally.
See, e. g., Lake v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 375, 402, 182 P. 2d 824, 835
(1947) (per curiam); Wagner v. Lucas, 79 Okla. 231, 232–233,
193 P. 421, 422–423 (1920). We see no reason to suppose
that these uses of “miscarriage” were extraordinary.
Konan separately contends that a “miscarriage” of mail
happens only when the mail goes to the “wrong address,” not
when it is (like her mail) held at the post office or returned
to the sender. Brief for Respondent 15. We again decline

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Opinion of the Court
to impose a limitation that has no basis in the dictionaries
or
ordi
nary usage. Speakers used the term “miscarriage”
when the mail failed to reach its intended destination, re-
gardless of where it ended up. One newspaper, for example,
explained that a letter “ `[m]iscarried' ” because it was “ `de-
layed.' ” Muskogee Times-Democrat, June 15, 1934, p. 1.
Another ran a story in which a correspondent's “letter mis-
carried and came too late.” Jersey City, N. J., The Evening
Journal, June 10, 1907, p. 10. And a court described mail
mistakenly left “in the post office” as having “miscarried.”
Heinrichv.First Nat. Bank, 219 N. Y. 1, 4, 6, 113 N. E. 531,
531–532 (1916).
We decline Konan's invitations to “artificially narrow ordi-
nary meaning.”Bartenwerferv.Buckley, 598 U. S. 69, 77
(2023). A “miscarriage of mail” includes failure of the mail
to arrive at its intended destination, regardless of the carri-
er's intent or where the mail goes instead.
B
Konan's withholding claims also arise out of the “loss” of
mail and are therefore within the postal exception. 28
U. S. C. § 2680(b). When Congress enacted the FTCA, the
“loss” of mail ordinarily meant a deprivation of mail, regard-
less of how the deprivation was brought about. So, like
“miscarriage,” intentional refusal to deliver mail could cause
the “loss” of mail.
A “loss” of mail is a deprivation of mail. “Loss is a ge-
neric and relative term; it is not a word of limited, hard and
fast meaning.” Black's Law Dictionary 1094 (rev. 4th ed.
1968). But it is commonly used to refer to any “deprivation”
or “that which is withheld,”id., at 1095, such as when some-
one suffers the loss of property in a fire or the loss of income
from being laid off. Webster's defined “loss” as the “[a]ct or
fact of losing (in various senses) or suffering deprivation.”
Webster's Second 1460. Oxford English Dictionary defined
it as “being deprived of, or the failure to keep” something.

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6 Oxford English Dictionary, at 452. One can, of course, suf-
fer
a
deprivation of something when another intentionally
keeps that thing for himself. Konan alleged that she was
“entitled to possession” of her mail but that the Postal Serv-
ice “converted” it. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a–59a. Conver-
sion means that Konan was “deprived of the use and posses-
sion of the property” in question. Black's Law Dictionary
421 (12th ed. 2024). Konan's claims therefore arise out of
the loss of her mail.
As with “miscarriage,” we disagree with Konan's attempt
to limit “loss” to only inadvertent losses. See Brief for Re-
spondent 27–28;post, at 411–413 (opinion ofSotomayor, J.).
A loss can be the result of another person's intentional mis-
conduct.One can, for example, suffer a tax “loss” that re-
sults from “embezzlement.” See,e.g.,Burnetv.Huff, 288
U. S. 156, 160 (1933). An army can suffer “loss” of soldiers
as a result of the intentional conduct of the enemy. Funk &
Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language
1465 (1942 ed.). And, in the mail context, ordinary speakers
commonly described a “loss” of mail from theft, including
theft by the carrier. Just a year before Congress enacted
the FTCA, the Army explained that “[v]irtually alllossof
mail through theft occurs at terminal transfer points outside
this country.” Pittsfield, Mass., Berkshire Evening Eagle,
Feb. 9, 1945, p. 3 (emphasis added). A few years earlier, a
reported “[l]oss of [l]ocal [m]ail” was caused by a rogue “mail
handler, who admitted the theft of considerable mail during
the past few months.” Belvidere News, Dec. 3, 1936, p. 1.
Pre-FTCA decisions also described a “loss” of mail when the
carrier stole it.E.g.,Boernerv.United States, 117 F. 2d
387, 387–388 (CA2 1941);Martinv.United States, 280 F. 513,
514 (CA4 1922).
We also disagree with Konan's, and the dissent's, rejoinder
that the postal exception applies only when the Postal Service
lostthe mail. Seepost, at 411–412. Congress could have
written the postal exception to apply only when “the Postal

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Opinion of the Court
Service lost, miscarried, or negligently transmitted” mail.
But
Congress
applied the postal exception to all “claim[s]
arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmis-
sion” of mail. It described kinds of harms, not kinds of ac-
tions by the postal workers. SeeDolan, 546 U. S., at 489;
contra,post, at 409 (opinion ofSotomayor, J.). We decline to
rescue Konan's claims by inserting the Postal Service as the
sentence's subject and then converting the three nouns into
three verbs. Cf.Terryv.United States, 593 U. S. 486, 494
(2021) (“[W]e will not convert nouns to adjectives and vice
versa”).
Our interpretation of “loss” is also consistent with the
principal provision of the FTCA. Under that provision, a
plaintiff must allege a “loss of property . . . caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal employee.
28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1). All agree that this provision in-
cludes losses caused by intentional misconduct and does not
require that the Government “lost” anything. Because Con-
gress used “loss” in this sense in the FTCA's principal provi-
sion, our interpretation adheres to the unrebutted presump-
tion that “the term bears a consistent meaning throughout”
the FTCA. See Azar v. Allina Health Services, 587 U. S.
566, 576 (2019).
Last, Konan proposes limiting “loss” to only “destruction.”
She contends that the “primary” meaning of “loss” in 1946
was “destruction,” not any other kind of deprivation. Brief
for Respondent 25–26. But, as we have explained, ordinary
speakers referred to “losses” of mail, even when the mail was
not destroyed. Judge Cardozo wrote that when an envelope
fell behind a radiator in the post office, it caused the “loss”
of the checks inside even though they were later recovered.
Heinrich, 219 N. Y., at 4, 113 N. E., at 531. And, contempo-
raneous regulations treated “loss” and “destruction” sepa-
rately, not, as Konan suggests, synonymously. See, e. g.,
Postal Laws and Regulations § 159 (1940 ed.) (delaying cer-
tain procedures until officials have “determined that such

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loss, destruction, or damage resulted from no fault or negli-
gence
on
the part of ” a postmaster). Konan asserts that
“destruction” was the “primary” meaning of loss because it
was listed as the first definition in dictionaries. Brief for
Respondent 25–26. But, “[a]lthough many people assume
that the first sense listed in a dictionary is the `main' sense,
that is often quite untrue.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 418 (2012). The
definitions Konan pointed to were listed first because they
were the oldest, not because they were primary. See 1 Ox-
ford English Dictionary, at xxxi (“[T]hat sense is placed first
which was actually the earliest in the language . . . ”); 1 New
Century Dictionary, at iii (“In general, the senses of each
word are arranged, as far as possible, in the order of their
derivation and development from the original source . . . ”);
Webster's New International Dictionary ix (1927) (following
“[t]he principle of historical arrangement followed in the ear-
lier editions”). We do not presume that Congress intended
theoldestusage, but rather the ordinary one in 1946, and
contemporaneous evidence shows that Konan's usage was not
the primary one.
III
Konan proffers two remaining arguments that her claims
must not be barred by the postal exception. We address
them in turn.
First, Konan argues that the postal exception's “negligent
transmission” category narrows the meaning of “miscar-
riage” and “loss.” She argues that the qualifier “negligent”
in the term “negligent transmission” implicitly qualifies the
other two terms. But Congress intentionally limited the
“negligent” qualifier to “transmission” and did not use it to
qualify “loss” or “miscarriage.” Konan's “argument seems
to assume that pairing a broad statutory term with a narrow
one shrinks the broad one, but there is no such general
usage.” S. D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental
Protection, 547 U. S. 370, 379 (2006). Just like “a limiting

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clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying
only
the
noun or phrase that it immediately follows,” an ad-
jective before the final noun in a list cannot be transplanted
to qualify the preceding nouns.Barnhartv.Thomas, 540
U. S. 20, 26 (2003). We also do not think that the “negli-
gent” qualifier suggests that Congress was trying to enable
suits involving intentional misconduct. Contra,post, at 410–
411 (opinion ofSotomayor, J.). If Congress had written the
postal exception to refer to all “transmission” of mail, the
category—unlike “miscarriage” and “loss”—would have en-
compassed claims that involved mail even though nothing
went wrong with its transport or delivery. SeeDolan, 546
U. S., at 486 (acknowledging the broad meaning of “transmis-
sion” in isolation). The inclusion of “negligent” to qualify
“transmission” forecloses that result and thereby keeps the
focus of the postal exception on mail-delivery problems, but,
in doing so, it does not limit the other two categories.
Second, Konan argues that our interpretations of “miscar-
riage” and “loss” run afoul of the presumption against sur-
plusage. On our interpretation, she argues, many claims—
including Konan's here—will arise from both a “miscarriage”
and a “loss” of mail, making one or the other redundant. To
solve the surplusage, Konan proposes three nonoverlapping
definitions: “Loss” covers “damage” to mail; “miscarriage”
covers “what happens” to mail “when it leaves the USPS's
custody and ends up in the wrong place”; and “negligent
transmission” covers “detention or delays of the mail while
still in the USPS's possession.” Brief for Respondent 9.
Konan's proposal is inconsistent with ordinary meaning,
which shows that these terms were often used in an overlap-
ping manner. See,e.g.,Heinrich, 219 N. Y., at 4–6, 113
N. E., at 531–532 (describing “[t]he loss of the checks” that
“miscarried in the mails”);Brevardv.Wimberly, 89 Mo. App.
331, 338–339 (1901) (“miscarriage of . . . packages” could lead
to “the loss of a registered package”). And, inDolan, the
Court interpreted the terms in the postal exception to sub-

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stantially overlap. See 546 U. S., at 487. The canon against
sur
plusage
is subordinate to the “cardinal canon” that “a leg-
islature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v.
Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254 (1992). We think that Con-
gress likely used broad, overlapping terms to better keep
complaints about mail delivery out of court.
IV
We hold that the postal exception covers suits against the
United States for the intentional nondelivery of mail. We
do not decide whether all of Konan's claims are barred by
the postal exception, or which arguments Konan adequately
preserved. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan, Jus-
tice Gorsuch, and Justice Jackson join, dissenting.
For two years, respondent Lebene Konan and her tenants
did not receive mail addressed to the rental properties that
Konan owned. According to Konan, negligence was not to
blame. Quite the opposite: She alleges that United States
Postal Service employees intentionally withheld delivery be-
cause they did not like “ `that a black person own[ed]' ” the
properties and “ `lease[d] rooms . . . to white people.' ” 652
F. Supp. 3d 721, 725 (ND Tex. 2023).
Konan brought this action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) against the United States to recover damages
she sustained as a result of this alleged years-long harass-
ment campaign. The United States is generally protected
by sovereign immunity, but Congress, through the FTCA,
has enacted a capacious waiver of that immunity for tort
suits when an individual is harmed by a federal employee
acting within the scope of her employment. That waiver,

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however, is subject to several exceptions. Today, the Court
holds
that
one exception—the postal exception—prevents in-
dividuals from recovering for injuries based on a postal em-
ployee's intentional misconduct, including when an employee
maliciously withholds their mail. Because this reading of
the postal exception transforms, rather than honors, the ex-
ception Congress enacted, I respectfully dissent.
I
The FTCA serves a simple purpose: “ `to remove the sov-
ereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort.' ”
Levin v. United States, 568 U. S. 503, 506 (2013). This
“broad waiver” of immunity, Millbrook v. United States, 569
U. S. 50, 52 (2013), allows an individual harmed by a federal
employee “acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment” to recover for “injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the” employee's “negligent or
wrongful act or omission,” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1); see United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 547 (1951) (describing
the waiver as “sweeping ”).
Congress has also enacted several exceptions preserving
the United States' immunity in some circumstances. See
§ 2680 (listing 13 such exceptions). The exceptions “are de-
signed to protect certain important governmental functions
and prerogatives from disr upti on. ”M o lzo f v. Un i ted
States, 502 U. S. 301, 311 (1992). They thus “mark the
`boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort lia-
bility upon the United States and its desire to protect certain
governmental activities from exposure to suit by private in-
dividuals.' ” Ibid.
At the same time, courts must be careful not to interpret
these exceptions too broadly. “ `[U]nduly generous inter-
pretations,' ” this Court has warned, “ `run the risk of defeat-
ing the central purpose of the statute' ”—to “ `waiv[e] the
Government's immunity from suit in sweeping language.' ”
Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 492 (2006) (quoting

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Kosakv.United States, 465 U. S. 848, 853, n. 9 (1984);Yellow
C
ab,
340 U. S., at 547). To harmonize these considerations,
“ `the proper objective of a court attempting to construe one
of the' ” exceptions “ `is to identify those circumstances which
are within the words and reason of the exception—no less
and no more.' ”Dolan, 546 U. S., at 492 (quotingKosak, 465
U. S., at 853–854, n. 9 (some internal quotation marks
omitted)).
This case calls on the Court to interpret the postal excep-
tion, which covers “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscar-
riage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.”
§ 2680(b). The wording of this exception is noticeably nar-
rower than some of its neighbors. For example, all claims
for “damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury
or by the regulation of the monetary system” are barred.
§ 2680(i). So too are all “claim[s] arising from the activities
of the Tennessee Valley Authority,” the “Panama Canal
Company,” and “a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate
credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives,” §§ 2680(l), (m), (n).
By comparison, Congress did not paint with as broad of a
brush in designing the postal exception. Like it had for
these other agencies and activities, Congress could have
granted immunity for all “claims arising from the mail activi-
ties of the Postal Service.” Instead, Congress identified
certain “misconduct for which the Government was not as-
suming financial responsibility—namely, `the loss, miscar-
riage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.' ”
Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855. By using “specificity” over “gener-
ality,” it follows that Congress intended for this exception
“to belessencompassing ” than the coverage provided by
the broader exceptions, and for the Government to “assum[e]
financial responsibility” for certain classes of “misconduct”
related to postal activities.Ibid.
This Court has already identified some of those classes.
InKosak, the Court explained that claims arising from car
accidents caused by postal employees delivering mail fall

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outside the exception.Ibid. InDolan, the Court recog-
ni
zed
a second class of claims for slip and falls caused by an
employee negligently placing a package on a porch step. 546
U. S., at 483. Today, I would have affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's well-reasoned decision that acknowledged a third class:
claims concerning intentional misconduct committed by
postal employees, which would necessarily include withhold-
ing a person's mail for malicious reasons.
II
A
The postal exception's text shows that Congress did not
intend to immunize intentional misconduct. Recall that the
exception covers the “loss,” “miscarriage,” and “negligent
transmission” of mail. § 2680(b). As Kosak observed, the
terms describe three categories of “misconduct” that postal
employees can commit without incurring liability for the
United States. 465 U. S., at 855. The majority, however,
contends that these terms focus on “harms” rather than Gov-
ernment wrongdoing, citing Dolan. Ante, at 395, 398, 403.
To be sure, Dolan described these terms as “harm[s],” but
in the same breath, it also emphasized that the three terms
protect “only a subset of postal wrongdoing.” 546 U. S.,
at 490.
A focus on misconduct is consistent with most other FTCA
exceptions, which generally are triggered by certain types
of Government conduct, rather than the type of harm the
plaintiff experiences. For instance, some exceptions di-
rectly cover different “act[s] or omission[s]” of Government
employees, §§ 2680(a) (discretionary acts), (e) (administering
§§ 1–31 of Title 50). Another addresses intentional actions
by employees, capturing, for example, assault, battery, false
imprisonment, and other intentional torts like them.
§ 2680(h). A different group immunizes the “activities” of a
given Government instrumentality. §§ 2680( j), (l), (m), (n).
Yet a different subset describes a specific type of Govern-

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ment action, such as the “assessment or collection of any tax
or
customs
duty,” § 2680(c), the “imposition or establishment
of a quarantine,” § 2680(f ), and the “fiscal operations of the
Treasury,” § 2680(i). The focus of each is on the Govern-
ment conduct. The same is necessarily true of the postal
exception.
The key question is thus as follows: What kind of miscon-
duct falls within the “ `words and reason' ” of the postal ex-
ception?Dolan, 546 U. S., at 492 (quotingKosak, 465 U. S.,
at 854, n. 9). All signs point to Congress leaving intentional
misconduct outside of the exception's scope.
1
Begin with “negligent transmission.” This term covers
“negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in dam-
aged condition, or at the wrong address.”Dolan, 546 U. S.,
at 486. It goes without saying that this term therefore does
not immunize intentional misconduct.
Beyond that basic insight, however, Congress's express in-
clusion of “negligent transmission” provides other important
clues for deciphering statutory meaning about the scope of
the postal exception. As the majority recognizes, if Con-
gress had included all claims arising out of the “transmis-
sion” of mail in the postal exception, the term “would have
encompassed claims that involved mail even though nothing
went wrong with its transport or delivery.”Ante,at 405.
To avoid that outcome, Congress needed to add a narrowing
modifier to focus on when things go wrong.
1
Critically, Congress did not have to choose “negligent” as
that modifier (or the only modifier). Congress could have,
for example, modified “transmission” with both “negligent”
and “wrongful.” Doing so would have avoided the problem
1
Congress did not need to add “negligent” before “miscarriage” or “loss”
because the ordinary meaning of those terms, plus statutory context, con-
vey inadvertence on their own. See in fra, at 411–418.

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the majority identifies while also clarifying that both classes
of
conduc
t fall within the exception's scope. Yet Congress
elected to immunize negligent conduct alone. Its choice to
do so carries significance. It raises the natural inference
that Congress intended for at least some intentional wrong-
doing related to transmitting mail to fall outside the scope of
the exception.
Indeed, before this Court, the Government emphasizes re-
peatedly that “negligent transmission” is “significant” be-
cause the term “shows that Congress knew how to exclude
intentional misconduct when it wanted to.” Brief for Peti-
tioners 3, 17, 35. Yet, according to the Government and the
majority, this was a hollow choice. In their view, Congress
excluded some set of intentional conduct through the “negli-
gent transmission” modifier only to sweep that conduct back
into the exception through “miscarriage” and “loss.” The
majority adopts the Government's definition of “miscarriage”
as capturing situations where “mail fail[s] to arrive prop-
erly,” regardless of the actor's intent.Ante,at 399. It also
adopts the Government's definition of “loss” as capturing the
“deprivation of mail,” regardless, again, of the depriver's in-
tent.Ante,at 401. It is difficult to see how a postal em-
ployee could intentionally transmit mail wrongfully—such as
by refusing to deliver the mail, lighting it on fire, or shred-
ding it into pieces—without falling within these definitions
of “miscarriage” or “loss.” In this world, Congress did not
even need to bother with the modifier to transmission that
it adopted.
Congress did not make this odd choice. As explained
below, “loss” and “miscarriage,” as used in the postal excep-
tion, do not capture intentional misconduct either.
2
Turn, then, to “loss.” As the Government acknowledged
in its petition for certiorari, “loss” is ordinarily understood

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to capture unintentional conduct. Pet. for Cert. 14; see also
W
ebster
's New International Dictionary 1460 (2d ed. 1934)
(defining “loss” as an “[a]ct or fact of losing . . . esp[ecially],
unintentional parting with something of value”). For good
reason: As the Fifth Circuit observed below, “no one inten-
tionally loses something.” 96 F. 4th 799, 802 (2024). People
lose their keys when they misplace them, not when they give
them to their children. People lose their mail when it gets
stuck behind a drawer, not when they intentionally throw it
away. If someone said that they “lost” their car, no one
would think it was stolen, only that the person forgot where
they had parked it. The same is true when the Postal Serv-
ice loses someone's mail. The reason is an error, not deliber-
ate wrongdoing.
To reach its contrary result, the majority defines “loss”
as any “deprivation of mail,” which it concludes captures all
situations where the individual does not receive mail, no mat-
ter the cause. Ante, at 401. To do so, however, the majority
must shift away from a focus on harms that befall the mail
to harms that befall Konan. The majority says that the
post a l excepti on encompasses three “ k i nds of har ms,
not kinds of actions by the postal workers.” Ante, at 403.
The majority defines the first two terms, “miscarriage” and
“negligent transmission,” to encompass “harms” to the mail.
Yet, under the majority's interpretation, “loss” is an entirely
distinct kind of “harm.” That is because the mail does not
“suffer a deprivation” in the same way that mail fails to ar-
rive (miscarriage) or mail is damaged due to negligence (neg-
ligent transmission). The only way “loss” could mean a
“deprivation” is if it were a harm experienced by Konan, not
by the mail. No such inconsistency, however, arises if (as
explained above) all three terms are read to refer to the
Government's misconduct: the Postal Service's loss, miscar-
riage, or negligent transmission of mail. See supra, at 409–
410. When used in this sense, “loss” plainly and sensibly

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denotes unintentional conduct, consistent with its ordinary
meani
ng
.
2
The majority also invokes the presumption of consistent
usage. It points to the use of “loss” in the FTCA's sovereign
immunity waiver as meaning “deprivation,” and argues that
“loss” as used in the postal exception must take on the same
meaning.Ante,at 403. The consistent-usage canon, how-
ever, “ `readily yields' to context,” Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 320 (2014), and here, comparing
the context of the FTCA's waiver to the context of the postal
exception shows that “loss” is being used in two different
ways.
The waiver uses “loss” to describe the form of damages an
individual harmed by a federal employee can seek to recover.
It states that plaintiffs can bring claims against the United
States for “loss of property” “caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment” while acting within the scope of their employment.
§ 1346(b)(1). The plaintiff 's “loss” could be due to “negligent
or wrongful” conduct, as the waiver states explicitly. Ibid.
In contrast, the postal exception uses “loss” to describe the
form of the employee's misconduct that is protected from lia-
bility. If an employee lost the mail, the plaintiff suffered a
“loss” under the waiver and the claim arose “out of the loss”
of the mail, meaning the postal exception applies. If an em-
ployee intentionally destroyed the mail, the waiver would
still be implicated because the plaintiff suffered a relevant
“loss” for purposes of the waiver. The postal exception
2
The Government also contends that “loss” in the postal exception in-
corporates intentional misconduct because it asks “whether the alleged
victims `lost' mail.” Brief for Petitioners 41 (emphasis deleted); Tr. of
Oral Arg. 21 (same). That again requires the same shift in perspective:
asking, on one hand, whether mail was “miscarr[ied]” or “negligently
transmitted” by the Postal Service, and, on the other hand, whether Konan
“los[t]” (and so was deprived of ) her mail.

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would not apply, however, because the employee destroyed
the
mai
l and did not lose it. “Loss” is thus being clearly
used in two different ways and carries two different
meanings.
3
That brings us to “miscarriage.” The majority is correct
that “miscarriage” covers misconduct by the Postal Service
that causes mail to “fai[l] to arrive properly,” ante, at 399,
but the majority is wrong to extend this meaning to cover
situations that involve intentional misconduct.
As the majority recognizes, “miscarriage” commonly cov-
ers negligence or inadvertence. Ante, at 400. Indeed,
there are many examples of “miscarriage” being used when
mail “fails to arrive” due to negligence, including as illus-
trated by the Government's own cases. See, e. g., Heinrich
v. First Nat. Bank, 219 N. Y. 1, 113 N. E. 531, 531–532 (1916);
Elam v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 117 Mo. App. 453, 93 S. W.
851 (1906); see n. 3, infra. From here, as the majority sees
it, mail that is intentionally not delivered, even for malicious
reasons, also “failed to arrive properly,” so Congress must
have intended to include intentional misconduct within the
exception by using “miscarriage.” Ante, at 399–400. The
majority, however, offers no persuasive evidence suggesting
that “miscarriage” is commonly used in this way.
To start, the majority relies on several dictionary defini-
tions. Ante, at 399. None of those definitions addresses an
individual's mens rea. The phrase “failure to arrive,” more-
over, does not immediately suggest intentional wrongdoing.
“A diplomat might `fail to arrive' at a treaty negotiation if
her flight were cancelled, but no one would describe her as
`failing to arrive' if she deliberately skipped the talks to un-
dermine the treaty (`refused to attend' would be more accu-
rate).” Brief for Respondent 23.
Next, the majority turns to real-life examples. Here, the
majority does not rely on any cases cited by the Government.
That is not a surprise, as the Government failed to identify

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a single example of “miscarriage” being used to describe mail
“fai
l
ing to arrive properly” due to intentional misconduct.
3
The majority thus searches elsewhere, citing examples of its
own: two cherry-picked newspaper references almost 20
years apart, and at least 30 years before the enactment of
the FTCA, that used “miscarried,” not “miscarriage.” Ante,
at 400. If “miscarriage” were in fact ordinarily used to de-
scribe intentional misconduct, one might expect that actual
examples of the usage would be easier to come by.
The majority also cites cases in which the reason behind a
“miscarriage” was not identified, but those cases do not sup-
port its position. Ibid. How a word is used when the cause
is unknown hardly informs whether an ordinary speaker
would use the same word when the cause is known. Those
cases, moreover, simply reflect the general presumption that
issues with mail are typically not a result of intentional
misconduct by postal workers. For example, in Lake v.
Lake, 63 Wyo. 375, 182 P. 2d 824 (1947) (per curiam), the
court explained that when a motion arrived in court “a day
3
See Reply Brief 8–10 (citing Bowen v. Wilson, 15 F. 2d 733, 734 (DC
1926) (“miscarriage” when delivery was attempted but returned because
the recipient could not be found); Heinrich v. First Nat. Bank, 219 N. Y.
1, 113 N. E. 531, 531–532 (1916) (mail was “miscarried” when it was mis-
placed behind a radiator due to “the negligence of employees of the post-
office”); Southern Express Co. v. Hill, 81 Ark. 1, 98 S. W. 371, 372–373
(1906) (“miscarriage” due to the sender mistakenly writing the wrong ad-
dress); Elam v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 117 Mo. App. 453, 93 S. W. 851
(1906) (“miscarriage” due to the “negligence” of the postal carrier); West-
ern Home Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 40 Neb. 1, 58 N. W. 597, 598 (1894) (cause
unknown); Fosters v. McKibben, 14 Pa. 168, 170 (1850) (describing a letter
that “miscarrie[s] for want of publication”); People ex rel. Holdsworth v.
Superior Ct., 18 Wend. 675, 678 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (cause unknown)).
See also Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ellis, 53 Okla. 264, 156 P. 226, 228
(1916) (although the cause of the mail arriving late was unknown, the court
referred to the “miscarriage of the mail” as an “accident”); Kellogg v.
Smith, 171 Okla. 355, 42 P. 2d 493, 495 (1935) (per curiam) (similar); Hogan
v. Bailey, 27 Okla. 15, 110 P. 890, 891 (1910) (similar); Chichester v. Cande,
3 Cow. 39, 48 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (similar).

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too late” due to a “miscarriage of the mails,” with no further
cause
explai
ned, that “ `mere accident' ” should not be held
against the party.Id., at 402, 182 P. 2d, at 835. Similarly,
inWagnerv.Lucas, 79 Okla. 231, 193 P. 421 (1920), the court
described “miscarriage of the mails” as a situation that
“human prudence, foresight, and sagacity . . . could not pre-
vent,” like a “mistake in the wording of a telegram.” Id., at
232–233, 193 P., at 423. Accordingly, the use of the term
“miscarriage” in these cases does not prove that the term
covers intentional misconduct; in context, had the courts sus-
pected that the late delivery, for instance, was a result of
such misconduct, they likely would have used a different
word.
The contemporaneous Postal Laws and Regulations from
before the FTCA was enacted—the “backdrop” against
which “Congress enacted the postal exception,” Brief for
Petitioners 35—further undermine the majority's interpreta-
tion. For example, those regulations directed the Division
of Stamps to make adjustments in “cases of loss, miscarriage,
or detention of stamped supplies in transit.” Post Office
Dept., Postal Law & Regs. § 12.6 (1940 ed.). This suggests
that when the stamped supplies were intentionally held back
and not delivered (i. e., failed to arrive), “detention” was used
instead of “miscarriage,” even though, on the majority's
reading, “miscarriage” would have sufficed. The regula-
tions also directed postal employees to “hold” packages
dropped off for “forwarding ” if they contained “destructive
mail matter,” to “notify the sender” of the “detention of the
package,” and to let them know it cannot be “transported
by mail.” § 728. This is another use of “detention” in the
context where, under the majority's view, “miscarriage”
would have been appropriate because the mail “failed to ar-
rive” at its destination. Yet, in each, the cause of the nonde-
livery was known, it was not inadvertence, and a different
term was used.

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At most, the majority shows that certain dictionary defi-
niti
ons
of “miscarriage” could conceivably capture intention-
ally withholding mail, or tearing up a letter into pieces, or
lighting a package on fire—in all those situations, the mail
“failed to arrive properly.”Ante,at 399. “That a definition
is broad enough to encompass one sense of a word,” however,
“does not establish that the word isordinarilyunderstood
in that sense.”Taniguchiv.Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566
U. S. 560, 568 (2012). Here, neither the majority nor the
Government has offered any meaningful evidence supporting
the view that “miscarriage” was commonly used in situations
when the mail failed to arrive properly due to intentional
wrongdoing, and that, by including “miscarriage” within
the postal exception, Congress intended to capture such
wrongdoing.
If there were any doubt, the words surrounding “miscar-
riage” resolve it. As the Court inDolanexplained, when
construed in context, “[a] word in a statute may or may not
extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.”
546 U. S., at 486. For example, “ `[a] word is known by the
company it keeps,' ” and “ `[w]ords grouped in a list should
be given related meaning.' ”Id., at 486–487. Without this
rule, courts risk “ `ascribing to one word a meaning so broad
that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giv-
ing unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.' ”Yatesv.
United States, 574 U. S. 528, 543 (2015) (plurality opinion).
Here, reading “miscarriage” to capture intentional miscon-
duct does precisely that. As noted above, the word “loss”
typically connotes negligence, seesupra, at 411–412, and the
majority's reading makes Congress's specific inclusion of the
“negligent” modifier for “transmission” entirely ineffective
at serving its purpose—excluding intentional misconduct.
Seesupra, at 410–411. There also does not appear to be
any good reason why Congress would have wanted one term
(“miscarriage,” alone) to cover intentional misconduct and

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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
not the other two terms. Indeed, under the majority's
broad
defi
nition of “miscarriage,” the words “loss” and “neg-
ligent transmission” become no more than “misleading sur-
plusage.”Yates, 574 U. S., at 546.
B
For all these reasons, a faithful interpretation of the postal
exception leads to the conclusion that intentional misconduct
is excluded from its reach. Congress used “overlapping ”
terms in the exception, ante, at 406, but Congress intended
for that overlap to keep claims alleging negligence, not inten-
tional wrongdoing, out of court. This reading gives mean-
ing to Congress's choice to put “negligent” before “transmis-
sion” and to use the words “miscarriage” and “loss” in their
common understanding, and it respects the “specificity” Con-
gress used in the postal exception as compared to the
broadly worded exceptions Congress used for other agencies.
Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855.
Undeterred by this evidence, the majority gives the Postal
Service the blanket exception Congress withheld. In its
view, the exception immunizes the agency for all intentional
and nonintentional actions in the delivery of mail (apart from
auto accidents and slip and falls, as Dolan and Kosak re-
quire). Relying on “loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans-
mission” is an odd way to cover this waterfront. If Con-
gress had intended this outcome, why not follow the same
approach that it used for other broad exceptions in the
FTCA? See supra, at 408. The answer is that Congress
intended no such thing. By expanding the “words and rea-
son” of the postal exception beyond their “specifi[c]” scope,
Kosak, 565 U. S., at 855, the majority undermines the
“ `sweeping ' ” waiver of immunity Congress adopted, Dolan,
546 U. S., at 492.
Contrary to the majority's suggestion otherwise, adhering
to the text Congress enacted would not flood the Govern-

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419Cite
as:
607 U. S. 391 (2026)
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
ment or courts with frivolous lawsuits.
4
That
is
because the
FTCA has additional safeguards that bar many claims prem-
ised on intentional misconduct. Liability for the United
States will arise only in the rare situation in which the em-
ployee's intentional conduct is tortious, falls within the scope
of her employment, and falls outside of the due-care and
discretionary-function exceptions. See 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a).
For example, the majority cites one case of an insurance com-
pany suing after a federal employee stole an expensive pack-
age it had insured, see ante, at 398, but most States likely
do not consider intentional torts like theft to fall within an
individual's scope of employment, see Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 228 (1957) (torts fall outside the scope of employ-
ment when they are “too little actuated by a purpose to
serve” the employer); Brief for Respondent 43, n. 21 (collect-
ing cases where theft fell outside the scope of employment).
The United States, accordingly, would not incur liability in
those circumstances or others involving claims of similar
misconduct.
In addition, there are ordinary litigation tools to prevent
any threat of abuses, from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to the plausibility standards in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U. S. 662 (2009). These tools suffice in many other cir-
4
The majority points to the 335,000 complaints filed with the Postal
Service each year to suggest that those claims arise out of mail failing to
“arriv[e] properly and on time.” Ante, at 394. This is misleading. As
Konan explains, those complaints include “everything from `[r]ude or un-
professional . . . employee behavior' to `[c]omplaints about . . . vehicle
parking.' ” Brief for Respondent 43. Submitting a “ `customer com-
plaint,' ” moreover, requires “typing a few sentences into an online form,”
whereas “[f]iling an FTCA claim requires first exhausting administrative
remedies and then filing suit in court.” Ibid. The raw number of com-
plaints therefore does not provide an accurate gauge of the consequences
for recognizing that intentional misconduct does not fall within the
postal exception.

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cumstances where the threats of disruption posed by large
volumes
of
litigation are also high. Other exceptions, like
the intentional-tort exception, § 2680(h), and the due-care ex-
ception, § 2680(a), turn on Government officials' mens rea,
and courts are well equipped to assess the plausibility of any
given case based on the facts before them.
Finally, even if ruling for Konan today would mean more
suits against the Government for mail-related intentional
torts tomorrow, that would not provide this Court with au-
thority to change the text Congress enacted. Ultimately,
this regime is the consequence of Congress's choice to have
the exception turn on certain types of misconduct, rather
than providing the Postal Service with a blanket exception.
It is not the role of the Judiciary to supplant the choice Con-
gress made because it would have chosen differently.
***
Today, the majority concludes that the postal exception
captures, and therefore protects, the intentional nondelivery
of mail, even when that nondelivery was driven by malicious
reasons. Because this interpretation expands the scope of
the exception beyond what it can reasonably support, and
undermines the FTCA's sweeping waiver in the process, I
respectfully dissent.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to reflect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the official United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or filed briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 397, line 3 from bottom: “no” is deleted
p. 399, line 15 from bottom: “ed.” is deleted
p. 408, line 18: “land” is inserted between “Federal” and “bank”
p. 411, line 11: “conduct” is changed to “misconduct”
p. 418, line 12 from bottom: “and” is changed to “or”