Klein v. Martin

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 607 U. S. Part 1
Pages 213–228
OFFICIAL REPORTS
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T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
January 26, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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213
Syllabus
KLEIN, SUPERINTENDENT, DEPARTMENT OF DE-
TENTION
FACILITIES FOR ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY, et al. v. MARTIN
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 25–51. Decided January 26, 2026
Respondent Charles Brandon Martin was convicted in a Maryland court
for the attempted murder of one of his girlfriends, who was found uncon-
scious in her apartment with a gunshot wound to the head. Three
items found at the crime scene played a key part in the State's case: a
shell casing and bullet from a .380-caliber cartridge and a peculiarly
modifed Gatorade bottle resembling a homemade silencer. Federal
frearms records showed that Martin owned a .380-caliber semiautomatic
handgun that could have fred the bullet and ejected the casing. As
for the bottle, testing revealed DNA evidence that strongly implicated
Martin, and a witness testifed that, shortly before the shooting, Martin
was in a room with a Gatorade bottle and the same kind of tape that
was found on the bottle at the crime scene. In addition, Sheri Carter,
another of Martin's girlfriends, testifed that Martin had used a laptop
at her home in 2008 to research homemade gun silencers before the
shooting. The jury found Martin guilty as an accessory before the fact,
and he was sentenced to life in prison; his conviction was affrmed on
direct appeal. Martin sought postconviction relief in state court, ar-
guing that the State violated his right to due process by failing to dis-
close a forensic report analyzing computers found at his home, including
a laptop from a former employer. The report found no evidence that
the laptop had been used since 2005, and it noted that keyword searches
for terms like “silencer” and “homemade silencer” yielded no hits.
Martin argued that this computer was the one about which Carter testi-
fed and that the report tended to discredit her testimony. The postcon-
viction court agreed and ordered a new trial, but a unanimous panel of
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed on the ground that the
report was not material. Martin sought habeas relief in federal court,
and the District Court granted his petition based on the State's failure
to disclose the forensic report. A sharply divided panel of the Fourth
Circuit affrmed.
Held: Because the state appellate court's decision—that the undisclosed
forensic report was not material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S.
83—neither was “contrary to” nor “involved an unreasonable applica-

214 KLEIN
v. MARTIN
Per Curiam
tion” of “clearly established Federal law,” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1), the
Antiterror
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 required the
denial of Martin's federal habeas petition, and the Fourth Circuit erred
in affrming the grant of habeas relief. The Fourth Circuit contravened
AEDPA's deferential standards in two ways. First, it held that the
state appellate court applied the wrong legal rule despite that court's
correct citation and summary of Brady materiality precedents. Sec-
ond, it erred in holding that no fairminded jurist could fnd that the
undisclosed forensic report was immaterial when the record contains
strong support for the state court's conclusion that Martin would have
been convicted even if the report had severely impeached the witness.
Certiorari granted; reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), strict standards govern the grant of fed-
eral habeas relief to prisoners convicted in state court.
Faithful application of those standards sometimes puts fed-
eral district courts and courts of appeals in the disagreeable
position of having to deny relief in cases they would have
analyzed differently if they had been in the shoes of the rele-
vant state court. But federal courts are dutybound to com-
ply with AEDPA, and we have granted summary relief when
the lower courts have departed from the role AEDPA as-
signs. See, e. g., Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U. S. 7 (2025) (per cu-
riam); Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U. S. 731 (2021) (per curiam);
Mays v. Hines, 592 U. S. 385 (2021) (per curiam); Virginia
v. LeBlanc, 582 U. S. 91 (2017) (per curiam); White v.
Wheeler, 577 U. S. 73 (2015) (per curiam).
This is such a case. Respondent Charles Brandon Martin
was convicted in a Maryland court for the attempted murder
of one of his girlfriends, Jodi Torok. The evidence against
him was strong, his conviction was affrmed on appeal, and
an appellate court held in a state postconviction proceeding
that the State's failure to disclose certain impeachment evi-
dence that was favorable under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S.
83 (1963), did not warrant a new trial because there was no
“reasonable probability that the result of [the] trial would
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have been different” had the evidence been turned over.
App
. to Pet. for Cert. 115a (App.); see Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U. S. 419, 434 (1995) (the “touchstone of materiality is a `rea-
sonable probability' of a different result”). Because that de-
cision neither was “contrary to” nor “involved an unrea-
sonable application” of “clearly established Federal law,”
AEDPA required the denial of Martin's federal habeas peti-
tion. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). Yet the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affrmed the award of a new trial based
on reasoning that departed from what AEDPA prescribes.
We therefore grant the State's petition for a writ of certio-
rari and reverse.
I
A
Torok, the victim of the attempted murder, had been dat-
ing Martin for about a year when she told him she was preg-
nant with a baby she thought was his. Angered by this
news, Martin demanded that Torok have an abortion. She
refused and informed him that she intended to go to court
to compel him to provide child support. She also threatened
to tell his “wife or baby mama” about the child. App. 254a.
A few weeks later, Martin sent Torok a text message ask-
ing: “ `What time do u work[?]' ” Martin v. State, 218 Md.
App. 1, 14, 96 A. 3d 765, 773 (2014) (alteration in original).
Torok replied, “ `I'm off [today],' ” thus verifying that she
would likely be home. Ibid. Later that day, just before 3
p.m., Torok was alone in her apartment in Crofton, Mary-
land, speaking on the phone with a close friend, Blair Wolfe,
who lived in Pittsburgh. During their call, a man purport-
ing to be a salesman knocked on Torok's front door. Torok
hung up to speak to the man but promised to call Wolfe back.
When she did not, Wolfe called her several times, but no one
answered. Growing increasingly concerned, Wolfe called
Torok's housemate, Jessica Higgs, and asked her to return
home to see if Torok was safe. Higgs found Torok uncon-

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216 KLEIN
v. MARTIN
Per Curiam
scious on the foor, bleeding from a gunshot wound to her
head.
Torok survived, but her unborn baby did not, and
Torok suffered serious permanent injuries.
When the police examined the scene of the shooting, they
found no sign of forced entry and recovered several items of
evidentiary value from the foor near where Torok lay: a shell
casing and bullet from a .380-caliber cartridge and a pecu-
liarly modifed Gatorade bottle. (Photos of this bottle ap-
pear in the appendix to this opinion.) The upper part of the
bottle was covered with two layers of tape, white medical
tape underneath and silver duct tape on top. There was a
rectangular hole in the tape over the mouth of the bottle and
a jagged hole at the bottom of the bottle.
Circumstantial evidence strongly suggested that this ob-
ject was likely brought to the apartment and left there by
Torok's assailant. Higgs testifed that the bottle was not on
the foor when she left for work that morning. Both Torok
and Higgs testifed that they did not drink Gatorade or keep
it at home, and both said that they would not have left a
bottle on the foor.
The three items found at the crime scene played a part in
the State's case. Federal frearms records showed that Mar-
tin owned a .380-caliber semiautomatic handgun that could
have fred the bullet and ejected the casing. One of Martin's
girlfriends testifed that she had seen him with a “small”
“semiautomatic” gun in the weeks before the shooting.
App. 379a. Michael Bradley, the brother of still another of
Martin's girlfriends, Maggie McFadden, added that on sev-
eral occasions he had seen Martin with a “small” “semi-auto-
matic gun.” Id., at 331a–333a, 371a.
As for the bottle, the State offered evidence suggesting
that it was a homemade silencer. A police sergeant said
that the tape on the mouth of the bottle bore a “rectangular
impression” that likely resulted from something being “stuck
in there.” Id., at 292a. The bottle was available for exami-
nation by the jury, and the State argued that the opening in

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217
Per Curiam
the tape was shaped like the muzzle of a semiautomatic hand-
g
un. The State also noted that the edges of the hole at the
bottom of the bottle were bent outward, suggesting that the
hole had been created by a force emanating from inside the
bottle. The police sergeant testifed that the bottle resem-
bled homemade silencing devices he had seen in a flm and
in online videos. A detective testifed that he found “black
soot” inside the bottle, id., at 310a–311a, but that he did not
smell burnt or burning marijuana in the bottle, id., at 314a–
315a, and another witness testifed that he found no “signs
or evidence of controlled dangerous substances” in the bottle,
id., at 309. Based on this evidence and the fact that none of
Torok's neighbors had heard a gunshot at the apartment on
the afternoon of the shooting, the State argued that the bot-
tle had been used as a silencer.
Testing of the bottle revealed DNA evidence that strongly
implicated Martin. A hair was found on the tape on the bot-
tle, and one of the State's expert witnesses, a forensic scien-
tist, determined that although the hair could not have come
from 99.94 percent of the population of North America, she
could not rule out Martin as the source of hair.
Besides the DNA taken from the hair, trace DNA from at
least three persons, including at least one male, was found
on the mouth of the bottle. A forensic chemist testifed that
she could rule out 96 percent of the black population as po-
tential sources of this DNA but could not rule out Martin
(who is black).*
This DNA evidence linking Martin to the bottle was bol-
stered by the testimony of Michael Bradley. Bradley testi-
fed that on the afternoon of the shooting, he, his brother
Frank, Martin, and an acquaintance named Jerry Burks
smoked marijuana at McFadden's home. At one point, ac-
cording to Michael, Frank went upstairs and came back with
white “medical tape.” Id., at 337a. Martin and Frank then
*Nor could she rule out Torok.

218 KLEIN
v. MARTIN
Per Curiam
went upstairs together. Frank came downstairs, grabbed a
Gatorade
bottle, and headed back up the stairs with it.
Based on this testimony, the State suggested that Martin
helped to make the bottle into the silencing device that the
shooter used. This theory was supported by the discovery
in the McFadden home of the same kind of white medical
tape that was affxed to the bottle.
Michael Bradley further testifed that Martin acted suspi-
ciously at the time of and shortly after the shooting. Ac-
cording to his testimony, Martin and Burks left the house
together before 2 p.m. and were still out when he returned
from picking up his niece at around 3 p.m. Martin and
Burks eventually reappeared together some time before 6:30
p.m. Martin then handed Frank Bradley a “brown paper
bag ” and told him to “get rid of this.” Id., at 353a. The
State suggested that this bag contained the hit weapon,
which was never found. Neither did police ever fnd the
.380-caliber pistol that, according to federal frearms records
and witness testimony, Martin owned.
In addition to all this evidence, Sheri Carter, another of
Martin's girlfriends, testifed for the State. Carter said that
Martin had kept at her home a laptop that he said he had
obtained from a former employer. She testifed that she had
seen Martin “looking up gun silencers” on this laptop not
long before the shooting. Id., at 377a. Martin, she as-
serted, took the laptop from her apartment after the shoot-
ing and “got rid of it” “in case [the] apartment got searched,”
because he “didn't want it found there.” Id., at 378a–379a.
The trial judge instructed the jury that Martin could be
found guilty if he had “ `aided' ” or “ `encouraged' ” the at-
tempted murder and assault with the intent that the crime
succeed. Id., at 79a. The jury found him guilty as an ac-
cessory before the fact. The court sentenced him to life in
prison, and his conviction and sentence were affrmed on di-
rect appeal. Martin, 218 Md. App. 1, 96 A. 3d 765.
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219
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B
Mar
tin then sought postconviction relief in state court.
He argued that the State had violated his right to due proc-
ess by failing to disclose a forensic report that had analyzed
fve computers found at his home. One of these machines, a
laptop, had been issued to Martin by a former employer.
The report found no evidence that this laptop had been used
since 2005, and it noted that a keyword search for words such
as “ `Handgun,' ” “ `Gatorade,' ” “ `silencer,' ” and “ `Home-
made silencer' ” had yielded no hits. App. 103a–104a.
Martin argued that this computer was the one to which
Carter had referred in her testimony and that the report
tended to discredit her claim that he had used the laptop at
her home to research silencers. The postconviction court
agreed and ordered a new trial, but a unanimous panel of the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed on the ground
that the report was not material. Based on its review of the
whole record, the court concluded that even if the report
had “totally discredit[ed]” Carter, the other evidence linking
Martin to the crime was so “strong ” that there was no “rea-
sonable probability that the result of his trial would have
been different.” Id., at 112a, 115a. The State's high court
denied review, Martin v. State, 466 Md. 554, 222 A. 3d 1075
(2020) (table), as did this Court, see Martin v. Maryland,
590 U. S. 973 (2020).
C
Martin sought habeas relief in federal court, and the Dis-
trict Court granted his petition based on the State's failure
to disclose the forensic report. A sharply divided panel of
the Fourth Circuit affrmed. The majority acknowledged
that the state appellate court had correctly stated the rule
on materiality set out in our decisions and had claimed to
apply that rule. Yet the majority concluded that the state
court had not actually done what it said it did—had not held
that there was no “reasonable probability” that the disclo-

220 KLEIN
v. MARTIN
Per Curiam
sure of the forensic report would have changed the verdict—
but
instead had applied the suffciency-of-the-evidence rule
that we condemned in Kyles. App. 21a–22a; see 514 U. S.,
at 434–435 (a Brady claimant need not show that, “after dis-
counting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed
evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict”).
According to the majority, the state court “never engaged”
with some evidence, “disregarded or misconstrued” other ev-
idence, and failed to assess in a “nuanced” way the evidence
it did discuss. App. 24a–26a. The majority then ruled that
no fairminded jurist could agree with the state court's deci-
sion. Id., at 27a.
Judge Niemeyer dissented, contending that the majority
had defed AEDPA's standard of review.
II
A
As we have noted many times, AEDPA sharply limits fed-
eral review of habeas claims raised by state prisoners. A
federal court may grant habeas relief on a claim that a state
court resolved on the merits only when the state court's “de-
cision” was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law,” or “was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented” in state court. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
These standards require federal courts to give the “beneft
of the doubt” to merits decisions issued by the courts of the
sovereign States. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24
(2002) (per curiam). AEDPA review provides an important
but limited safeguard: It protects against “ `extreme mal-
functions' ” in the state courts' adjudication of constitutional
claims. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102 (2011). So
in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must
“show far more” than “ `clear error.' ” Shinn v. Kayer, 592
U. S. 111, 118 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting LeBlanc, 582
U. S., at 94). The habeas claimant must instead establish
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that the state court “blunder[ed] so badly that every fair-
mi
nded jurist would disagree” with the decision. Mays, 592
U. S., at 392. Only then is a decision “so lacking in justifca-
tion” that its error precludes even the “possibility for fair-
minded” dispute. Richter, 562 U. S., at 103.
“If this rule means anything,” we have said, it means that
a federal court must “carefully consider all the reasons and
evidence supporting the state court's decision.” Mays, 592
U. S., at 391. That requirement is pivotal because federal
courts have “no authority to impose mandatory opinion-
writing standards on state courts.” Johnson v. Williams,
568 U. S. 289, 300 (2013). And a state court “need not make
detailed fndings addressing all the evidence before it.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 347 (2003). Indeed,
AEDPA requires deference even if the state court does not
discuss the evidence at all. Richter, 562 U. S., at 99. What
matters under § 2254(d)(1)—the standard relevant here—is
whether a decision is contrary to, or involves an unreason-
able application of, this Court's holdings, not whether the
state court's opinion satisfes the federal court's opinion-
writing standards.
B
The panel majority contravened these well-settled princi-
ples in two ways. First, it grounded its holding that the
state appellate court applied the wrong legal rule on its con-
clusion that the state court had not actually applied the ma-
teriality test that it clearly invoked. Second, it erred in
holding that no fairminded jurist could fnd the forensic re-
port on the computer to be immaterial.
1
The panel majority frst erred in holding that the state
appellate court failed to apply the right rule for Brady mate-
riality. Undisclosed evidence is material if it could reason-
ably have “ `put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confdence in the verdict.' ” Strickler v. Greene,
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222 KLEIN
v. MARTIN
Per Curiam
527 U. S. 263, 290 (1999). But when the evidence could not
have
reasonably had such an effect, it is not material, and its
erroneous nondisclosure does not justify relief. Under this
rule, even if undisclosed evidence “entirely discredit[s]” a
prosecution witness, the failure to turn over the evidence
is not material if “considerable” other evidence “link[s]” the
defendant to the crime and the record provides “strong sup-
port” that the defendant would have been convicted anyway.
Id., at 292–294.
The state appellate court applied these rules instead of a
suffciency-of-the-evidence test. The state court accurately
summarized our Brady precedents, correctly stated the gov-
erning rule on materiality, and stated unequivocally that its
decision was based on that rule. It recounted salient trial
evidence, acknowledged where the State's theory of the case
was “attenuated,” and said that the disclosure of the forensic
report would likely have eliminated any adverse inference
based on the concealment of evidence. App. 114a–115a, and
n. 14. It also assumed that the jury would have “totally
discredit[ed]” Carter's testimony had the State disclosed the
report. Id., at 112a. Yet based on its review of the “ `entire
record,' ” the court found that the evidence “linking ” Martin
to the crime was so “strong ” that there was no “reasonable
probability that the result of his trial would have been differ-
ent.” Id., at 109a–110a, 112a, 115a. That standard was le-
gally correct. And except when it was quoting our prece-
dent, the state court did not use words like “suffcient,”
“insuffcient,” “adequate,” or “inadequate” in analyzing the
Brady claim.
The panel majority nonetheless held that the state appel-
late court applied the wrong rule because that court failed
to discuss certain evidence that tended to undermine the
State's case and because its analysis was not suffciently “nu-
anced.” App. 24a–26a. That holding was a basic misappli-
cation of AEDPA, which bars federal courts from imposing
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opinion-writing standards on state courts and demands that
the
relevant state-court decision be given the “beneft of the
doubt.” Woodford, 537 U. S., at 24. The majority's “readi-
ness to attribute error” to the state appellate court despite
that court's correct citation and synthesis of our precedent
was both “inconsistent with the presumption that state
courts know and follow the law” and “incompatible with
§ 2254(d)'s `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-
court rulings.' ” Ibid. (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S.
320, 333, n. 7 (1997)).
2
a
The panel majority also went astray in holding that every
fairminded jurist would fnd that the undisclosed forensic re-
port about Martin's laptop was material. On the contrary,
the record contains “strong support” for the state court's
conclusion that Martin “would have been convicted” even if
the forensic report “severely impeached” Carter. Strickler,
527 U. S., at 294.
DNA evidence tied Martin tightly to the modifed Gator-
ade bottled that resembled a homemade silencer and that
had apparently been used in the shooting. Evidence also
suggested that Martin was present when the bottle was mod-
ifed. Michael Bradley testifed that shortly before the
shooting Martin was in the room to which Frank Bradley
brought both a Gatorade bottle and tape that matched the
white medical tape on the mouth of the bottle found at the
crime scene.
Martin had a strong motive for aiding the attempted mur-
der of Torok: She had refused to get an abortion, had ex-
pressed her intent to take him to court to obtain child sup-
port, and had threatened to tell his wife about the baby. On
the day of the shooting, Martin had texted Torok in what a
reasonable jury could think was an effort to fnd a time when
she would be home.
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224 KLEIN
v. MARTIN
Per Curiam
Martin owned the kind of gun that seemed to have been
used
to shoot Torok, and multiple witnesses testifed that
they had seen him with such a weapon. Michael Bradley
also testifed that Martin left McFadden's house not long be-
fore the hit and that, upon returning, Martin told Frank
Bradley to get rid of a brown paper bag that Martin had
been holding. Because the police never found Martin's
handgun or the weapon used in the shooting, a reasonable
jury might well have concluded that Martin allowed his gun
to be used and then ensured its disposal.
In light of all this evidence, a fairminded jurist could easily
conclude that the disclosure of the forensic report on the
computer would not have “undercut” the relevance or force
of these “item[s] of the State's case,” Kyles, 514 U. S., at 451,
or “ `put the whole case in such a different light as to under-
mine confdence in the verdict,' ” Strickler, 527 U. S., at 290.
b
The panel majority's reasons for concluding otherwise
were not consistent with the deference that AEDPA re-
quires. First, the majority argued that the disclosure of the
report would have bolstered the defense's primary theory of
the case: that the bottle was a device used to smoke mari-
juana, not a silencer. But a fairminded jurist could fnd that
theory farfetched. Among other things, the mouth of the
bottle was covered in tape that looked like it had nestled the
muzzle of a semiautomatic frearm. The bottle did not smell
like burnt marijuana and bore no trace of controlled sub-
stances. The outward-punched puncture at the bottom of
the bottle also looked like a bullet hole, and the defense
never explained why anyone wanting to construct a bong
would have poked a hole in the bottom of the bottle.
The panel majority ventured that Carter's testimony was
the “only evidence connecting Martin to his potential con-
struction of the Gatorade bottle for use as a silencer.” App.
21a. A fairminded jurist could easily disagree based on both
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the bottle itself and Michael Bradley's eyewitness testimony
about
what had occurred upstairs in the McFadden house
shortly before the shooting.
The panel majority discounted the strength of the evidence
against Martin because it thought that strong evidence
linked McFadden to the commission of the crime. Yet that
theory was inconsistent with the undisputed testimony that
Torok ended her phone call with Wolfe to speak with a man
who was at the door. Nor did any evidence tie McFadden
to the Gatorade bottle or the disposal of the frearm. And
even if McFadden were somehow involved in the crime, Mar-
tin could have been an accessory anyway. After all, a fair-
minded jurist could decide that no evidence suggests that
McFadden knew about Torok, or had any reason to want her
killed, except through and because of Martin. See id., at
439a.
Last, the panel majority voiced serious doubt about Mi-
chael Bradley's credibility, and the defense certainly had ma-
terial to use in its effort to convince the jury that he should
not be believed. But his testimony about Martin's role in
the creation of the makeshift silencer was supported by the
DNA evidence, and the jury was able to assess his credibil-
ity frsthand.
Based on all the evidence, a fairminded jurist could easily
conclude that disclosure of the forensic report on the laptop
would not have made a difference.
***
We grant the State's petition for a writ of certiorari, re-
verse the judgment of the Fourth Circuit, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Jackson would deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari.

226 KLEIN
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App. 445a

228 KLEIN
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None