Goldey v. Fields

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 606 U. S. Part 2
Pages 942–945
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 30, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
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942 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Per Curiam
GOLDEY, ASSOCIATE WARDEN, et al. v. FIELDS
et
al.
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 24–809. Decided June 30, 2025
Prison offcials at the U. S. Penitentiary in Lee County, Virginia, placed
respondent Fields in solitary confnement. Fields alleges that during
periodic checks, offcials physically abused him. Fields sued the Bureau
of Prisons and prison offcials for damages, claiming excessive force in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The District Court dismissed
Fields's complaint, determining he lacked a cause of action under Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388. The Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed, concluding that Fields could proceed with his Eighth
Amendment excessive-force claim for damages.
Held: Bivens does not extend to allow an Eighth Amendment excessive-
force claim for damages against federal prison offcials. For 45 years,
this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts.
This case arises in a new context, and special factors counsel against
recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action for Eighth Amendment
excessive-force violations. Congress has actively legislated in prisoner
litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for money
damages. Extending Bivens to excessive-force claims could have nega-
tive consequences for prison operations, and alternative remedial proce-
dures already exist for federal prisoners.
Certiorari granted; 109 F. 4th 264, reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of
action for damages against federal offcers for certain alleged
violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subse-
quently recognized two additional contexts where implied
Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was
an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. After 1980,
we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to
cover other constitutional violations. Those many post-1980
Bivens “cases have made clear that, in all but the most un-

Cite
as: 606 U. S. 942 (2025)
943
Per Curiam
usual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for
Congress,
not the courts.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482,
486 (2022). Despite those precedents, the U. S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit permitted the plaintiff here
to maintain an Eighth Amendment excessive-force Bivens
claim for damages against federal prison offcials.
This case began when prison offcials at the U. S. Peniten-
tiary in Lee County, Virginia, ordered that plaintiff Andrew
Fields be placed in solitary confnement. Prison offcials
monitored Fields while he was isolated. Fields alleges that
during their periodic checks, offcials would “physically
abuse” him. Fields v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 109 F. 4th
264, 268 (CA4 2024).
Fields sued the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the prison war-
den, and several prison offcials in federal court for damages,
claiming that certain prison offcials used excessive force
against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
U. S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia dis-
missed Fields's complaint. As relevant here, the court de-
termined that Fields lacked a cause of action under Bivens.
Because “the Supreme Court has never ruled that a damages
remedy exists for claims of excessive force by BOP offcers
against an inmate,” the District Court had “no diffculty in
concluding that these claims arise in a new context” and that
a Bivens remedy was unavailable. App. to Pet. for Cert.
49a; see id., at 45a–54a.
Fields appealed. In a divided decision, the Fourth Circuit
reversed in relevant part, concluding that Fields could pro-
ceed with his Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim for
damages. The Court of Appeals determined that no “special
factors counseled against extending Biv en s” here. 109
F. 4th, at 270.
Judge Richardson dissented and stated: “A faithful applica-
tion of our precedent and the Supreme Court's leads squarely
to the conclusion that we cannot create a new Bivens action
here.” Id., at 283.
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944 GOLDEY
v. FIELDS
Per Curiam
After the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, prison
offcia
ls sought review in this Court, with the support of the
United States as amicus curiae. We now grant the petition
for certiorari and reverse.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “recognizing a
cause of action under Bivens is `a disfavored judicial activ-
ity.' ” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491. To determine whether a
Bivens claim may proceed, the Court has applied a two-step
test. First, the Court asks whether the case presents “a
new Bivens context”—that is, whether the case “is different
in a meaningful way” from the cases in which this Court has
recognized a Bivens remedy. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S.
120, 139 (2017); see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980);
Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979); Bivens, 403 U. S. 388.
Second, if so, we then ask whether there are “special fac-
tors” indicating that “the Judiciary is at least arguably less
equipped than Congress to `weigh the costs and benefts of
allowing a damages action to proceed.' ” Egbert, 596 U. S.,
at 492. That analysis is anchored in “separation-of-powers
principles.” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 135.
This case arises in a new context, and “special factors”
counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action
for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations. To begin
with, Congress has actively legislated in the area of prisoner
litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for
money damages. See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 148–149. In ad-
dition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment
claim for excessive force could have negative systemic con-
sequences for prison offcials and the “inordinately diffcult
undertaking ” of running a prison. Turner v. Safey, 482
U. S. 78, 84–85 (1987). Moreover, “an alternative remedial
structure” already exists for aggrieved federal prisoners.
Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137; see Correctional Services Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74 (2001). The existence of such al-
ternative remedial procedures counsels against allowing
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Cite
as: 606 U. S. 942 (2025)
945
Per Curiam
Bivens suits even if such “procedures are `not as effective as
an
individual damages remedy.' ” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 498.
For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined
to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596 U. S., at
490–491. We do the same here. The petition for certiorari
is granted, the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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