Martin v. United States

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 605 U. S. Part 2
Pages 395–421
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 12, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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395
Syllabus
MARTIN, individually and as parent and next
friend
of G. W., a minor, et al. v. UNITED
STATES et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 24–362. Argued April 29, 2025—Decided June 12, 2025
On October 18, 2017, the FBI raided the wrong house in suburban Atlanta.
Offcers meant to execute search and arrest warrants at a suspected
gang hideout at 3741 Landau Lane but instead stormed 3756 Denville
Trace, a quiet family home occupied by petitioners Hilliard Toi Cliatt,
his partner Curtrina Martin, and her 7-year-old son. A six-member
SWAT team breached the front door, detonated a fash-bang grenade,
and assaulted the innocent occupants before realizing their mistake.
The cause of the error was Special Agent Guerra's reliance on a personal
GPS device, combined with the team's failure to notice the street sign
for “Denville Trace” and the house number visible on the mailbox. Left
with personal injuries and property damage, petitioners sued the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. § 2671
et seq., seeking damages resulting from the offcers' alleged negligent
and intentional actions during the raid. The district court granted
summary judgment to the government. The Eleventh Circuit affrmed,
applying a unique approach to FTCA claims.
The FTCA waives the federal government's sovereign immunity from suit
as to certain torts committed by federal employees acting within the
scope of their employment. But that waiver is subject to statutory ex-
ceptions, including two relevant to a law enforcement misconduct case
like this one. The frst is the intentional-tort exception in § 2680(h),
which bars claims against the government for 11 enumerated intentional
torts. The second is the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a),
which bars claims against the government that are based on an offcial's
exercise of discretionary functions. Section 2680(h) also contains a
“law enforcement proviso” which countermands the intentional-tort ex-
ception, allowing suits for six specifed torts (including assault, battery,
false imprisonment, and false arrest) to proceed against the United
States when the torts are committed by “investigative or law enforce-
ment offcers.” While most courts hold that the law enforcement pro-
viso applies only to the intentional-tort exception, the Eleventh Circuit's
approach is different in two key respects. First, the Eleventh Circuit
alone holds that the proviso overrides all exceptions in § 2680, including

396 MAR
TIN v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
the discretionary-function exception, meaning that intentional-tort
clai
ms covered by the proviso automatically proceed to the merits with-
out further analysis of other applicable § 2680 exceptions. Second, to
compensate for this plaintiff-friendly approach, the Eleventh Circuit
permits the government to assert a restrictive Supremacy Clause de-
fense at the liability stage, allowing the government to escape liability
when an offcer's actions have “some nexus with furthering federal pol-
icy” and reasonably “compl[y] with the full range of federal law.” Den-
son v. United States, 574 F. 3d 1318, 1348.
Applying its distinctive approach, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
law enforcement proviso protected petitioners' intentional-tort claims
from both the intentional-tort and discretionary-function exceptions.
The cour t dismissed petiti oners' neg ligence clai ms under the
discretionary-function exception, reasoning that Special Agent Guerra
enjoyed discretion in preparing for the warrant execution. On the mer-
its of the remaining intentional-tort claims, the court found the gov-
ernment had a valid Supremacy Clause defense and granted summary
judgment for the United States.
Held:
1. The law enforcement prov iso i n § 2680( h) overr ides only the
intentional-tort exception in that subsection, not the discretionary-
function exception or other exceptions throughout § 2680. Pp. 403–408.
(a) The text and structure of § 2680 demonstrate that the law en-
forcement proviso applies only to the intentional-tort exception. The
proviso appears within the same subsection and sentence as the
intentional-tort exception, refecting the established principle that stat-
utory provisos generally modify only the provisions in which they ap-
pear. Section 2680 contains 13 discrete exceptions. Coupled with the
lead-in clause, each exception forms a separate sentence and operates
as a structurally distinct provision. The proviso addresses the same
subject matter as subsection (h)—intentional torts—while other excep-
tions cover entirely different topics like lost mail, combat injuries, and
quarantine impositions. Further, the proviso's defnitional sentence ex-
pressly limits the defnition of “investigative or law enforcement offcer”
to “this subsection” (i. e., subsection (h)), even though the phrase “law
enforcement offcer” appears elsewhere in § 2680. Congress's choice to
embed the proviso within subsection (h) rather than place it at the end
of the full list of exceptions, as it sometimes does with broadly applicable
provisos, further confrms the proviso's limited application to subsection
(h) alone. Pp. 404–407.
(b) Petitioners' arguments for broader application of the proviso
are unpersuasive. While the proviso mirrors the language of § 2680's
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Syllabus
lead-in clause by stating that § 1346(b) “shall apply” rather than “shall
not
apply,” this textual similarity does not demonstrate that the proviso
applies to all exceptions, which form discrete instructions that may be
understood completely without reference to other provisions. The ab-
sence of limiting language in the proviso's frst sentence does not expand
its scope beyond subsection (h), as Congress accomplished that limita-
tion through the proviso's placement within the same sentence as the
intentional-tort exception. Legislative history suggesting Congress in-
tended to address wrong-house raids broadly cannot displace what the
law's terms clearly direct, as legislative history is not the law and Mem-
bers of Congress may have had multiple purposes in mind when crafting
the proviso. Pp. 407–408.
2. The Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a defense
in FTCA suits. The FTCA is the “supreme” federal law governing
the United States' tort liability and serves as the exclusive remedy for
damages claims arising from federal employees' offcial conduct. The
statute generally makes the government liable under state law on the
same terms as a private individual would be liable under the law of the
place where the tortious conduct occurred. Because the FTCA incor-
porates state law as the liability standard, there is typically no confict
between federal and state law for the Supremacy Clause to resolve.
While federal law may sometimes displace state law in FTCA suits
where a constitutional text or federal statute supplies controlling liabil-
ity rules, the Eleventh Circuit identifed no such federal statute or con-
stitutional provision displacing Georgia tort law in this case. The
court's reliance on In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, is misplaced, as that 19th-
century decision involved a federal offcer's immunity from state crimi-
nal prosecution for acts necessary and proper in discharging federal
duties, not the federal government's liability under a statute that ex-
pressly subjects it to state tort law on the same terms as private parties.
Section 2674 specifes the defenses available to the government, includ-
ing judicial or legislative immunity and other defenses to which the
United States is entitled, but these do not include the Eleventh Circuit's
novel Supremacy Clause defense. Pp. 409–413.
3. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit should consider whether subsec-
tion (a)'s discretionary-function exception bars either the plaintiffs' neg-
ligent- or intentional-tort claims—undertaking that assessment without
reference to the mistaken view that the law enforcement proviso applies
to subsection (a). The court must then ask of any surviving claims
whether, under Georgia state law, a “private individual under like cir-
cumstances” would be liable for the acts and omissions the plaintiffs
allege, subject to the defenses discussed in § 2674—not a Supremacy
Clause defense.

398 MAR
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Opinion of the Court
Remaining questions surrounding whether and under what circum-
st
ances the discretionary-function exception may ever foreclose a suit
like this one lie well beyond the two questions the Court granted certio-
rari to address, and their resolution would beneft from the Eleventh
Circuit's carefu l reexami nati on of th is case i n the first i nst ance.
Pp. 413–415.
Vacated and remanded.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Soto-
mayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Jackson, J., joined, post,
p. 415.
Patrick Jaicomo argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Anya Bidwell and Jared McClain.
Frederick Liu argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Harris, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General Roth, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral Kneedler, and Joshua M. Salzman.
Christopher Mills, by invitation of the Court, 604 U. S.
1115, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae in
support of the judgment below on Question 1.*
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
If federal offcers raid the wrong house, causing property
damage and assaulting innocent occupants, may the home-
owners sue the government for damages? The answer is
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for America's Future
et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Robert J. Olson, and
Jeffrey C. Tuomala; for the Constitutional Accountability Center by Eliz-
abeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for Members of Congress by Jona-
than C. Bond, Jeff Liu, and Lavi M. Ben Dor; for the National Police
Accountability Project et al. by Charles A. Rothfeld, Paul W. Hughes,
Eugene R. Fidell, and John W. Whitehead; for the New Civil Liberties
Alliance by Casey Norman, Jenin Younes, and Mark Chenoweth; for the
North Central Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association by Paul Koster;
for Public Accountability et al. by Athul K. Acharya, Clark M. Neily III,
Cecillia D. Wang, Brett M. Kaufman, Scott Michelman, and Cory Isaac-
son; for Public Citizen by Scott L. Nelson and Allison M. Zieve; and for
Gregory C. Sisk by Geoffrey M. Pipoly and Matthew Stan ford.
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not as obvious as it might be. All agree that the Federal
T
ort Claims Act permits some suits for wrong-house raids.
But the scope of the Act's permission is much less clear.
This case poses two questions about the Act's application:
one concerning the FTCA's sovereign-immunity waiver, and
the other touching on the defenses the United States may
assert.
I
A
In the predawn hours of October 18, 2017, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation raided the wrong house in suburban
Atlanta. Offcers meant to execute search and arrest war-
rants at a suspected gang hideout, 3741 Landau Lane. In-
stead, they stormed a quiet family home, 3756 Denville
Trace, occupied by Hilliard Toi Cliatt, his partner Curtrina
Martin, and her 7-year-old son G. W. App. to Pet. for Cert.
3a–4a.
A six-member SWAT team, led by FBI Special Agent
Lawrence Guerra, breached the front door and detonated a
fash-bang grenade. Id., at 7a–8a. Fearing a home inva-
sion, Mr. Cliatt and Ms. Martin hid in a bedroom closet. Id.,
at 8a. But the SWAT team soon found the couple's hiding
spot, dragged Mr. Cliatt from the closet, “threw [him] down
on the foor,” handcuffed him, and began “bombarding [him]
with . . . questions.” Id., at 79a. Meanwhile, another off-
cer trained his weapon on Ms. Martin, who was lying on the
foor half-naked, having fallen inside the closet. Id., at 8a,
89a. Only then did another offcer stumble across some mail
with the home's address on it and realize the team had the
wrong house. Id., at 8a.
The cause of the offcers' mistake? In preparation for the
raid, Agent Guerra visited the correct house to document its
features and identify a staging area for the SWAT team.
Id., at 5a. But, he says, when he used his personal GPS to
navigate to 3741 Landau Lane on the day of the raid, it led
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him to 3756 Denville Trace. 631 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 1287 (ND
Ga.
2022). No one could confrm as much later because
Agent Guerra “threw . . . away” his GPS device “not long
after” the raid. Id., at 1288. And it seems the agents no-
ticed neither the street sign for “Denville Trace” nor the
house number, which was visible on the mailbox at the end
of the driveway. Ibid.; Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Apparently,
too, Agent Guerra failed to appreciate that a different car
was parked in the driveway, one “not present . . . during [his]
previous visit.” 631 F. Supp. 3d, at 1288.
Left with personal injuries and property damage—but few
explanations and no compensation—Mr. Cliatt and Ms. Mar-
tin sued the United States. They did so under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2671 et seq., alleging that the
offcers had committed various negligent and intentional
torts, App. 8–14.
B
After discovery and motions practice, the district court
rejected each of the plaintiffs' claims and granted summary
judgment to the government. The Eleventh Circuit af-
frmed and, in doing so, relied on an understanding of the
FTCA that no other circuit has adopted. To appreciate
what sets the Eleventh Circuit apart and how its approach
affected its analysis of the plaintiffs' claims, it helps to begin
by outlining how this suit would have proceeded elsewhere.
The FTCA allows those injured by federal employees to
sue the United States for damages. The statute achieves
that end by waiving, in 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), the federal gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity for “certain torts committed
by federal employees acting within the scope of their
employment.” Brownback v. King, 592 U. S. 209, 212
(2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the statute's
waiver is subject to 13 exceptions that claw back the govern-
ment's immunity in certain circumstances. Set out in § 2680,
most of these 13 exceptions are obviously inapplicable to
suits alleging police misconduct within the United States.
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But two in particular—the discretionary-function exception
and
the intentional-tort exception—sometimes come into
play.
In a suit like this one, most courts begin by assessing the
intentional-tort exception. Located in subsection (h) of
§ 2680, it prohibits claims alleging any of 11 enumerated
torts. But the exception is itself subject to a “law enforce-
ment proviso.” Millbrook v. United States, 569 U. S. 50, 55
(2013). That proviso countermands the exception with re-
spect to six intentional torts (including assault, battery, false
imprisonment, and false arrest) by “investigative or law en-
forcement offcers.” § 2680(h). So if a plaintiff alleges that
a federal law enforcement offcer committed one or more of
those six torts, the proviso will ensure those claims survive
an encounter with the intentional-tort exception. Id., at
55–56.
Next, most courts turn to the discretionary-function ex-
ception. Housed in subsection (a) of § 2680, this exception
bars “[a]ny claim” based on the exercise of an offcial's “dis-
cretionary function.” Faced with that instruction, most
courts ask whether the exception precludes any of the plain-
tiff 's remaining tort claims. And here, the answer is often
less clear cut. The discretionary-function exception, this
Court has said, forbids suits challenging decisions that “in-
volv[e] an element of judgment or choice” of a “kind that
the . . . exception was designed to shield.” United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U. S. 315, 322–323 (1991) (alteration in original;
internal quotation marks omitted). But several of our lower
court colleagues report that they have “struggl[ed]” to dis-
cern what this direction requires of them. See, e. g., Xi v.
Haugen, 68 F. 4th 824, 842 (CA3 2023) (Bibas, J., concurring).
So, for example, some lower courts have held that the
discretionary-function exception does not shield “careless” or
“unconstitutional” police conduct from judicial scrutiny, but
others have taken a contrary view and read the exception
much more broadly. Id., at 843; Pet. for Cert. 28–34.
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Fi na l ly, i f any of the plai nti ff 's clai ms surv ive the
discreti
onary-function exception and thus fall within the
FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity, courts turn to a third
question: Is the government liable to the plaintiff on the mer-
its? When it comes to that question, the FTCA provides that
the government will usually be liable to the plaintiff if a
“private individual under like circumstances,” § 2674, would
be liable under “the law of the place” where the government
employee's wrongful “act or omission occurred,” § 1346(b)(1).
Ordinarily, then, courts will fnd for the plaintiff if he can
demonstrate that federal offcials committed a tort under ap-
plicable state law. See Brownback, 592 U. S., at 218.
Now compare that approach to the Eleventh Circuit's.
That court begins much as others do, asking whether the
law enforcement proviso permits a plaintiff 's intentional-tort
claims to advance past subsection (h)'s intentional-tort ex-
ception. See Nguyen v. United States, 556 F. 3d 1244, 1260
(2009).
But from there, the Eleventh Circuit proceeds quite differ-
ently. Rather than ask i ng whether the discreti onary-
function exception bars either the plaintiff 's negligent-tort
claims or his intentional-tort claims, as most courts do, the
Eleventh Circuit applies that exception only to the plaintiff 's
negligence claims. The Eleventh Circuit does so because, in
its view, the law enforcement proviso does not just override
the intentional-tort exception, it also overrides all the other
exceptions in § 2680, the discretionary-function exception in-
cluded. Id., at 1257. Under that approach, any intentional-
tort claim covered by the proviso automatically proceeds to
the merits—no matter what any other exception has to say.
To compensate for its expansive and plaintiff-friendly
reading of the proviso, the Eleventh Circuit then takes a re-
strictive and defendant-friendly view at the FTCA's liability
stage. In other courts, an FTCA plaintiff will usually pre-
vail if he can show a “private individual under like circum-
stances,” § 2674, would be liable under “the law of the place”
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where the government employee's wrongful “act or omission
occurred,
” § 1346(b)(1). But in the Eleventh Circuit, the
government may assert a particular affrmative defense
under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. See Denson v.
United States, 574 F. 3d 1318, 1347 (2009). And that de-
fense, the Eleventh Circuit holds, defeats a claim whenever a
law enforcement offcer's contested actions bear “some nexus
with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be charac-
terized as complying with the full range of federal law.” Id.,
at 1348; accord, Kordash v. United States, 51 F. 4th 1289,
1293 (CA11 2022).
Applying its unique approach to this case, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the law enforcement proviso spared the
plaintiffs' intentional-tort claims from both the intentional-
tort and the discretionary-function exceptions. It dismissed
the plaintiffs' negligence claims under the discretionary-
function exception because, in its view, Agent Guerra “en-
joyed discretion in how he prepared for the warrant execu-
tion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a–18a. And on the merits
of the plaintiffs' (remaining) intentional-tort claims, the court
held that the government had a winning Supremacy Clause
defense. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, the
United States was entitled to summary judgment. Id., at
18a–19a.
We agreed to take this case to examine the distinctive
features of the Eleventh Circuit's approach—namely (1)
whether the law enforcement proviso overrides not just the
intentional-tort exception but also the discretionary-function
exception, and (2) whether the Supremacy Clause affords the
United States a defense in FTCA suits. Pet. for Cert. 16,
25. 604 U. S. 1103 (2025).
II
Begin with the law enforcement proviso. Does it counter-
mand only § 2680(h)'s intentional-tort exception, as most cir-
cuits have concluded and the government argues? Brief for
Respondents 25; Xi, 68 F. 4th, at 842 (Bibas, J., concurring)

404 MAR
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(collecting cases). Or does the proviso also override the
o
ther excepti ons in § 2680, including the discreti onary-
function exception in subsection (a), as the Eleventh Circuit
has held and the plaintiffs contend? Nguyen, 556 F. 3d, at
1257; Brief for Petitioners 40.
A
To answer that question, we turn to the relevant statutory
text. Recall that § 1346(b) waives the federal government's
sovereign immunity, subject to a list of 13 exceptions housed
in § 2680. Those exceptions are lettered (a) through (n),
with one letter unused. Rather than setting the law en-
forcement proviso apart as a discrete provision at the end of
that list, Congress folded it into subsection (h)'s intentional-
tort exception. Here's a sense of how the proviso (under-
lined below) appears in context.
“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall not apply to—
“(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exer-
cise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.
.....
“(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false im-
prisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or in-
terference with contract rights: Provided, That, with re-
gard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforce-
ment offcers of the United States Government, the
provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title
shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of
the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery,
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false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or ma-
licious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection,
`investigative or law enforcement offcer' means any of-
fcer of the United States who is empowered by law to
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests
for violations of Federal law.
.....
“(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal
land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank
for cooperatives.”
The proviso's placement supplies an immediate clue about
the scope of its application. It appears in the same subsec-
tion (and the same sentence) as the intentional-tort excep-
tion. Given that arrangement, an ordinary reader would
naturally presume that the proviso modifes only subsection
(h). An everyday example helps illustrate the point. Sup-
pose a wife leaves her husband a shopping list: “Please buy—
Apples. Carrots. Steak: If there is a sale. Bread. Milk.”
The wife, we think, would be understandably frustrated if
her husband returned home with only steak in hand because
he could fnd nothing else discounted. Refecting that intu-
ition about ordinary meaning, our cases recognize that, ab-
sent reason to think otherwise, statutory provisos generally
modify only the provisions in which they sit. See McDon-
ald v. United States, 279 U. S. 12, 20–21 (1929); Alaska v.
United States, 545 U. S. 75, 106 (2005); A. Scalia & B. Garner,
Reading Law 154–155 (2012) (Scalia & Garner).
Nothing about § 2680(h)'s proviso gives us reason to think
it works differently. To the contrary, one textual clue after
another confrms that it follows the general rule. Start with
the statute's grammatical structure. Section 2680 contains
a lead-in clause (“The provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to—”) followed by a list
of exceptions. In conjunction with the lead-in clause, each
exception forms a stand-alone sentence ending with a period,
operating as a “distinct,” “structurally discrete” provision.
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Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S.
335,
344, and n. 4 (2005). And, given that, it is hard to see
how the law enforcement proviso might apply beyond sub-
section (h), modifying exceptions housed in separate subsec-
tions (and separate sentences) elsewhere in § 2680.
Notice, too, that subsection (h) and its proviso work to-
gether to address the same category of claims: intentional
torts. Subsection (h)'s intentional-tort exception excludes
from the FTCA's sovereign-immunity waiver claims for torts
like “assault, battery, false imprisonment, [and] false arrest.”
The proviso then undoes that assertion of sovereign immu-
nity for some of those same torts when committed by “inves-
tigative or law enforcement offcers.” By contrast, the pro-
viso does not so much as mention the issues addressed by
§ 2680's other exceptions, like claims for lost mail, combat
injuries, or the imposition of quarantines. § 2680(b), (f ), ( j).
That the proviso is “confned” to the same “subject-matter”
as subsection (h)'s “principal clause” stands as more evidence
yet that it “refers only to the provision to which it is
attached.” United States v. Morrow, 266 U. S. 531, 535
(1925).
The proviso's second sentence is telling as well. It defnes
the phrase “investigative or law enforcement offcer.” In
doing so, the sentence tells us that the defnition applies only
to “this subsection” (i. e., subsection (h)), even though the
phrase “law enforcement offcer” also appears in subsection
(c)'s exception for claims arising from tax and customs collec-
tion. § 2680(c), (h). If Congress had wished the proviso to
modify each of the exceptions in § 2680, it might have pro-
vided a section-wide defnition, rather than a limited defni-
tion just for subsection (h).
If more evidence were needed, comparing this statute with
others would supply it. Often, Congress drafts statutory
lists followed by a proviso in a separate paragraph at the
end. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§ 1383(a)(2)(F)(ii)(II), 6928(f )(2).
Sometimes, that placement can suggest that a proviso relates
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to all the preceding subparts, not just the nearest one.
Sca
lia & Garner 156. But here Congress chose a different
course, folding the proviso into a single exception, rather
than appending it to the end of the full list of exceptions.
And that choice, too, suggests this proviso applies to subsec-
tion (h) alone. See Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U. S.
685, 704 (2022).
B
Seeking to defend the Eleventh Circuit's view that the
proviso applies broadly across all of § 2680's exceptions, the
plaintiffs offer a number of thoughtful arguments. But, to
our eyes, none can overcome the textual evidence we have
just laid out.
First, the plaintiffs ask us to focus on how the proviso mir-
rors § 2680's lead-in clause. Brief for Petitioners 42. The
lead-in clause, they observe, preserves the government's sov-
ereign immunity by instructing that § 1346(b)'s waiver “shall
not apply to” claims covered by the exceptions. § 2680 (em-
phasis added). Meanwhile, the proviso countermands that
direction by instructing that § 1346(b)'s waiver “shall apply”
to certain claims. § 2680(h) (emphasis added). Because the
language of the proviso mirrors the language of the lead-in
clause, the plaintiffs submit, Congress must have meant for
the proviso to have the last word with respect to each of the
FTCA's exceptions. Id., at 42. That conclusion, however,
does not follow from its premise. Yes, the proviso and lead-
in clause contain similar language. And, yes, the proviso
surely countermands the lead-in clause for purposes of sub-
section (h). But none of that means the proviso speaks to
other exceptions that work together with the lead-in lan-
guage to form discrete instructions that “may be understood
completely without reading any further.” Jama, 543 U. S.,
at 344.
Second, the plaintiffs remind us that the proviso's second,
defnitional sentence applies to “this subsection,” but the
proviso's frst, substantive part contains no such limiting lan-
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guage. Brief for Petitioners 42–43 (quoting § 2680(h)).
And
that difference, the plaintiffs say, suggests that the frst,
substantive part applies throughout § 2680. Id., at 42–43.
Again, however, we do not see it. Congress had no need to
include similar limiting language in the frst part of the pro-
viso to confne its application to subsection (h). Congress
accomplished just that by placing the proviso's frst part in
the same sentence as the intentional-tort exception. Mean-
while, in the proviso's second sentence, Congress arguably
needed to confne the defnition of “investigative or law en-
forcement offcer” to “this subsection” to ensure that the
phrase “law enforcement offcer” carries a different meaning
when it appears in subsection (c).
Third, the plaintiffs resort to legislative history. They
poi nt to a committee repor t discussi ng how Congress
enacted the proviso in response to two wrong-house raids
much like their own. Id., at 8–10, 44; see S. Rep. No. 93–
588, p. 3 (1973). And, the plaintiffs argue, unless the proviso
is given broad effect across § 2680, it will not fulfll Con-
gress's purpose of ensuring that wrong-house-raid cases may
proceed. But this argument stumbles, too. Few pieces of
legislation pursue any single “purpos[e] at all costs.” Amer-
ican Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U. S. 228,
234 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). And Mem-
bers of Congress may well have had more than one purpose
in mind when adding the proviso to the FTCA. Perhaps
some thought amending subsection (h) alone and leaving oth-
ers untouched would strike a suitable balance between im-
munity and liability. Perhaps others concluded there was no
need to apply the proviso more broadly because no other
exception would shield the government from liability for
wrong-house raids. Whatever the reason, no amount of
guesswork about the purposes behind legislation can displace
what the law's terms clearly direct. “[L]egislative history
is not the law.” Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497,
523 (2018).

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409
Opinion of the Court
III
That
takes us to the Eleventh Circuit's second outlier posi-
tion and the second question presented. May the United
States defeat an FTCA suit by invoking the Supremacy
Clause and showing that a federal offcer's acts had “some
nexus with furthering federal policy” and “compl[ied] with
the full range of federal law”? App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because the govern-
ment now concedes that it enjoys no such defense, the Court
appointed Christopher Mills as amicus to represent the
Eleventh Circuit's views. 604 U. S. 1115 (2025). He has
ably discharged his responsibilities. But in the end, we fnd
the government's concession commendable and correct: The
FTCA does not permit the Eleventh Circuit's Supremacy
Clause defense.
The Supremacy Clause supplies a rule of decision when
federal and state laws confict. It provides that the “Consti-
tution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. So,
for example, when a regulated party cannot comply with
both federal and state directives, the Supremacy Clause tells
us the state law must yield. See, e. g., Virginia Uranium,
Inc. v. Warren, 587 U. S. 761, 767 (2019) (opinion of Gor-
such, J.).
The FTCA is the “supreme” federal law addressing the
United States' liability for torts committed by its agents. It
supplies the “exclusive remedy” for damages claims arising
out of federal employees' offcial conduct. See Hui v. Cas-
taneda, 599 U. S. 799, 806 (2010). And, as we have seen, the
government will usually be liable if a “private individual
under like circumstances,” § 2674, “would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred,” § 1346(b)(1). Accordingly, a plain-
tiff may generally prevail in an FTCA suit by demonstrating
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that “the State in which the alleged misconduct occurred
wou
ld permit a cause of action for that misconduct to go
forward.” Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 23 (1980).
Because the FTCA's liability rule incorporates state law,
in most cases there is no confict for the Supremacy Clause to
resolve. Take this case. Georgia law supplies the relevant
“law of the place” where the offcers' tortious conduct oc-
curred. § 1346(b)(1). And Georgia law would permit a
homeowner to sue a private person for damages if that per-
son intentionally or negligently raided his house and as-
saulted him. See App. 10–13 (citing Hendricks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 193 Ga. App. 264, 264–265, 387 S. E. 2d
593, 594–595 (1989), for assault and battery and Lyttle v.
United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1301 (MD Ga. 2012), for
negligence). So when the FTCA, the relevant federal law
in this feld, instructs courts to apply those same state rules
to decide whether the United States is liable to the plaintiffs,
there is no discord between the two.
To be sure, it is possible (though rare) for federal and state
law to confict in an FTCA suit. So, for example, in Hess
v. United States, this Court held that federal maritime law
supplied the “law of the place” governing an FTCA suit in-
volving an accident on the Columbia River. 361 U. S. 314,
318, and n. 7 (1960). Though the accident “occurred within
the State of Oregon,” it happened “on navigable waters . . .
within the reach of admiralty jurisdiction.” Id., at 318. As
a result, federal maritime law displaced state tort law, just
as it would in “an action between private parties.” Ibid,
n. 7. In much the same way, federal law will control other
FTCA suits where “a litigant [can] point specifcally to a con-
stitutional text or a federal statute” that supplies controlling
liability rules, displacing contrary state law. Virginia Ura-
nium, 587 U. S., at 767 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see, e. g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U. S. 604, 618 (2011).
In this case, however, the Eleventh Circuit did not identify
any federal statute or constitutional provision displacing
Georgia tort law. Instead, the court of appeals pointed to a
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411
Opinion of the Court
line of cases stemming from this Court's decision in In re
N
eagle, 135 U. S. 1, 75 (1890). App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a–
17a (citing Denson, 574 F. 3d, at 1336–1337). Those cases,
the Eleventh Circuit has observed, hold that federal offcers
may sometimes defeat state prosecutions against them by
demonstrating that their actions, though criminal under
state law, were “necessary and proper” in the discharge of
their federal responsibilities. Id., at 1346–1347 (discussing
In re Neagle). In the Eleventh Circuit's view, that same
logic works to foreclose FTCA suits like the plaintiffs'. 574
F. 3d, at 1346–1347; Kordash, 51 F. 4th, at 1293–1294.
To appreciate why that view is mistaken, a little history
helps. In re Neagle involved an affair, a homicide, and a
habeas petition. In 1883, Sarah Althea Hill claimed to be
the wife of U. S. Senator William Sharon and sought a share
of his fortune in acrimonious California divorce proceedings.
Sharon admitted an affair but insisted that Hill had forged
the pair's handwritten marriage contract. Hill hired David
Terry to represent her. A former Chief Justice of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, Terry had resigned that post after
killing (another) U. S. Senator in a duel. As the litigation
wore on, lawyer and client married.
Eventually, the dispute between Hill and Sharon wound
up before U. S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field while
he was riding circuit. Terry and Justice Field were no
strangers, having served together on the California Supreme
Court. Even so, Justice Field issued a devastating ruling
against Hill. As he announced his decision, Hill leapt from
her seat, denounced the Justice as “bought,” and had to be
carr ied from the cour troom. Joining the fracas, Terry
punched a marshal and brandished a bowie knife. Even
after the couple spent time in jail for contempt, they contin-
ued to issue threats against Justice Field.
1
1
For a full account of the saga, see In re Neagle, 135 U. S., at 42–55;
W. Lewis, The Supreme Court and a Six-Gun: The Extraordinary Story of
In re Neagle, 43 A. B. A. J. 415 (1957) (Lewis).
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Those events found their way into the U. S. Reports this
way
. Aware of the threat Hill and Terry posed, the U. S.
Attorney General ordered Deputy Marshal David Neagle, a
former chief of police in Tombstone, Arizona, to accompany
Justice Field when he next rode circuit in California. Lewis
478; In re Neagle, 135 U. S., at 51–52. That decision proved
prescient, for Terry soon cornered the Justice on a train and
attacked him. Id., at 52–54. Intervening to protect the
Justice, Neagle shot and killed Terry. Ibid. After the
shooting, California authorities arrested Neagle and began
prosecuting him for murder. Neagle countered by fling a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court seeking
his release. Ibid.
When Neagle's petition reached this Court, it agreed the
writ should issue, reasoning that the Supremacy Clause
shielded him from state criminal charges. Without some
such protection, the Court concluded, California could frus-
trate federal law by prosecuting a federal marshal “for an
act which he was authorized to do by the law of the United
States,” an act “which it was his duty to do,” and in circum-
stances where he “did no more than what was necessary and
proper.” Id., at 75–76.
Memorable as In re Neagle may be, we do not see how it
informs the prosaic task of applying the FTCA. The Court's
decision may stand for the proposition that federal law will
sometimes preempt a state criminal law when it conficts
with a federal offcer's duties—and do so even in the absence
of express federal legislation overriding the state law in
question. But In re Neagle does not speak to a situation
where, as here, Congress has entered the feld and expressly
bound the federal government to accept liability under state
tort law on the same terms as a “private individual.” § 2674.
After all, no private individual could deploy In re Neagle to
his advantage. It has only ever worked to shield “[f]ederal
offcers who are discharging their duties.” Ohio v. Thomas,
173 U. S. 276, 283 (1899); see also In re Neagle, 135 U. S., at
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413
Opinion of the Court
62 (“offcers and agents . . . acting . . . within the scope of
their
authority”); Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S. 399, 402 (1900)
(“an offcer of the United States [who] has been arrested
under state process for acts done under the authority of the
Federal government”).
2
To be sure, the government may raise other defenses
against tort liability, and some may be uniquely federal in
nature. After setting forth the general rule that the gov-
ernment can be held liable under state tort law on the same
terms as a “private individual,” § 2674 adds that the govern-
ment may “assert any defense based upon judicial or legisla-
tive immunity which otherwise would have been available to
the employee of the United States whose act or omission
gave rise to the claim, as well as any other defenses to which
the United States is entitled.” But none of these defenses
include In re Neagle. That decision did not recognize a “ju-
dicial or legislative immunity.” Nor has it been understood
as a “defens[e] to which the United States is entitled,” but
instead (and again) as a shield “[f]ederal offcers” may assert.
Thomas, 173 U. S., at 283. Had Congress wanted to refash-
ion In re Neagle into a new defense the government itself
can assert under the FTCA, it might have said so. Yet it
did not.
IV
Where does all that leave the case before us? We can say
this much: The plaintiffs' intentional-tort claims survive
2
To date at least, this Court has also generally understood In re Neagle
as providing federal offcers a shield against only state criminal prosecu-
tion, not (as here) state tort liability. See, e. g., Thomas, 173 U. S., at 283–
285 (favorably citing In re Waite, a case holding that the defense would
permit “a civil action for damages,” even where it barred “a criminal
prosecution,” because a damages action, unlike a prosecution, would not
bring the “federal and state governments into confict,” 81 F. 359, 363–364
(ND Iowa 1897)); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 56 (1920) (suggesting
that the defense would not foreclose “liability under the common law of a
State” for “negligence”).
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Opinion of the Court
their encounter with subsection (h) thanks to the law en-
forcement
proviso, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized. But
it remains for that court on remand to consider whether sub-
section (a)'s discretionary-function exception bars either the
plaintiffs' negligent- or intentional-tort claims. As we have
explained, the Eleventh Circuit must undertake that assess-
ment without reference to its mistaken view that the law
enforcement proviso applies to subsection (a). Should some
or all of the plaintiffs' claims survive the discretionary-
function exception, the Eleventh Circuit must then ask
whether, under Georgia state law, a “private individual
under like circumstances” would be liable for the acts and
omissions the plaintiffs allege, subject to the defenses dis-
cussed in § 2674—not a Supremacy Clause defense nowhere
mentioned there.
Having resolved that much, the plaintiffs ask us to decide
more still. See Brief for Petitioners 19–40. In particular,
they call on us to determine whether and under what circum-
stances the discretionary-function exception bars suits for
wrong-house raids and similar misconduct. Unless we take
up that further question, they worry, the Eleventh Circuit
on remand may take too broad a view of the exception and
dismiss their claims again. After all, the plaintiffs observe,
in the past that court has suggested that the discretionary-
function exception bars any claim “unless a source of federal
law `specifcally prescribes' a course of conduct” and thus de-
prives an offcial of all discretion. Id., at 36 (quoting Shivers
v. United States, 1 F. 4th 924, 931 (CA11 2021)). And that
approach, the plaintiffs insist, is both seriously mistaken and
at odds with how other circuits understand the exception.
Brief for Petitioners 36. Some courts, for instance, have
held that the discretionary-function exception does not pro-
tect conduct “marked by individual carelessness or laziness,”
rather than “policy considerations.” Rich v. United States,
811 F. 3d 140, 147 (CA4 2015). Some courts do not apply the
exception when law enforcement offcers violate the plain-
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415
Sotomayor, J., concurring
tiffs' constitutional rights. Xi, 68 F. 4th, at 839 (“govern-
ment
offcials never have discretion to violate the Constitu-
tion”). And some have indicated that the exception does not
protect “ministerial” tasks. See id., at 843 (Bibas, J., con-
curring). The plaintiffs ask us to endorse decisions like
these, apply their reasoning to this case, and hold it survives
the discretionary-function exception. Brief for Petitioners
39–40.
We readily acknowledge that different lower courts have
taken different views of the discretionary-function exception.
We acknowledge, too, that important questions surround
whether and under what circumstances that exception may
ever foreclose a suit like this one. But those questions lie
well beyond the two we granted certiorari to address. And
before addressing them, we would beneft from the Eleventh
Circuit's careful reexamination of this case in the frst in-
stance. It is work enough for the day to answer the ques-
tions we took this case to resolve, clear away the two faulty
assumptions on which that court has relied in the past, and
redirect it to the proper inquiry.
The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Jackson joins,
concurring.
I join in full the Court's opinion, which holds that the Elev-
enth Circuit's distinctive approach to suits under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is wrong in two respects. See ante,
at 403–404, 413–414. The law enforcement proviso modifes
only the subsection in which it is located: Section 2680(h)'s
intentional-tort exception. Ante, at 403–408. The United
States, moreover, may not defeat an FTCA suit simply by
“showing that a federal offcer's acts had `some nexus with
furthering federal policy' and `compl[ied] with the full range

416 MAR
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Sotomayor, J., concurring
of federal law.' ” Ante, at 409 (alteration in original). With
those
two principles clarifed, I also agree that the Eleventh
Circuit must now consider on remand whether the
FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars plaintiffs'
negligent- and intentional-tort claims. Ante, at 414–415. I
write separately to underscore that there is reason to think
the discretionary-function exception may not apply to these
claims.
I
The FTCA shields the United States from liability for
claims “based upon” a federal employee's “exercise or per-
formance” (or failure to exercise or perform) “a discretionary
function or duty,” “whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a). This Court has set forth a
two-part test that governs the application of § 2680(a), known
as the discretionary-function exception. First, courts must
consider the nature of the offcial's conduct and decide
whether it “ `involv[es] an element of judgment or choice.' ”
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U. S. 315, 322 (1991) (quoting
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U. S. 531, 536 (1988)). “The
requirement of judgment or choice,” this Court has ex-
plained, “is not satisfed if a `federal statute, regulation, or
policy specifcally prescribes a course of action for an em-
ployee to follow.' ” 499 U. S., at 322. In such circum-
stances, “ `the employee has no rightful option but to adhere
to the directive.' ” Ibid.
Even where a federal employee retains an element of
choice, however, the exception does not apply refexively.
After all, it is rare for statutes or regulations to prescribe
an offcial's required course of conduct down to the very last
detail, so some degree of choice will almost invariably re-
main. Thus, this Court has required lower courts to deter-
mine, at the second step, whether “th[e] judgment is of the
kind that the discretionary function exception was designed
to shield.” Berkovitz, 486 U. S., at 536. Because “[t]he
basis for the discretionary function exception was Congress'
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417
Sotomayor, J., concurring
desire to `prevent judicial “second-guessing ” of legislative
and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic,
and political policy through the medium of an action in tort,' ”
this Court has clarifed that the exception protects only those
governmental actions and decisions that are themselves
“based on considerations of public policy.” Id., at 536–537
(quoting United States v. S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea
Rio Grandense, 467 U. S. 797, 814 (1984)); see Gaubert, 499
U. S., at 323.
To that end, this Court has said, it is “obviou[s]” that some
discretionary acts performed by Government agents “are
within the scope of [their] employment but not within the
discretionary function exception.” Id., at 325, n. 7. If a
federal banking regulator “drove an automobile on a mission
connected with his offcial duties and negligently collided
with another car,” for example, the Court has made clear
that “the exception would not apply.” Ibid. That is be-
cause, while “driving requires the constant exercise of dis-
cretion, the offcial's decisions in exercising that discretion
can hardly be said to be grounded in regulatory policy.”
Ibid.
It has been 34 years since this Court last weighed in on
the discretionary-function exception, see Gaubert, 499 U. S.
315, and despite substantial percolation in the courts of ap-
peals, the “exact boundaries of the exception remain un-
clear,” 14 C. Wright, A. Miller, & H. Hershkoff, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 3658.1 (4th ed. Supp. 2025). The Court
today resolves one of the Circuit splits regarding the excep-
tion's application: whether claims that fall within the FTCA's
law enforcement proviso must necessarily fall outside of the
discretionary-function exception. Yet, as the Court recog-
nizes, ante, at 414–415, several additional points of disagree-
ment remain, including whether allegedly “unconstitutional
conduct necessarily falls outside the exception” because off-
cials lack discretion to violate the Constitution, and “whether
the exception applies when the challenged act was careless
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Sotomayor, J., concurring
rather than a considered exercise of discretion.” Xi v.
H
augen, 68 F. 4th 824, 843 (CA3 2023) (Bibas, J., concurring)
(describing these Circuit splits). Given the enduring ques-
tions about how to apply the discretionary-function excep-
tion, and the divergent approaches taken by the Circuits, it
is long past time for this Court to weigh in on the excep-
tion's scope.
Even without further intervention by this Court, however,
there is reason to question the Eleventh Circuit's suggestion
in the decision below that the discretionary-function excep-
tion might apply “ `unless a source of federal law “specifcally
prescribes” a [federal employee's] course of conduct.' ” 2024
WL 1716235, *6 (2024) (quoting Shivers v. United States, 1
F. 4th 924, 931 (CA11 2021); emphasis in original). That ap-
proach, which even the Government does not defend before
this Court, would run headlong into this Court's precedents.
Gaubert, after all, applies the discretionary-function excep-
tion only where an offcial's actions both involve an element
of judgment and rely on public policy considerations. See
499 U. S., at 322–323; see also Berkovitz, 486 U. S., at 536–
537. Whether federal law prescribes a particular course of
action resolves only the frst of Gaubert's two questions.
The second question (whether an offcer's decisions were
“ `based on considerations of public policy,' ” 499 U. S., at 323)
remains live. Were it otherwise, a federal offcial's negli-
gent driving decisions would fall beyond the reach of the
discretionary-function exception only if federal law or policy
specifcally prescribed an offcer's permissible maneuvers on
the road. Cf. id., at 325, n. 7.
II
Agent Guerra's preparation to execute search and arrest
warrants at 3741 Landau Lane, and his subsequent decision
to raid Martin and Cliatt's home at 3756 Denville Trace, bear
some resemblance to Gaubert's negligent driving hypotheti-
cal. Like driving, executing a warrant always involves
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419
Sotomayor, J., concurring
some measure of discretion. Yet it is hard to see how Guer-
ra'
s conduct in this case, including his allegedly negligent
choice to use his personal GPS and his failure to check the
street sign or house number on the mailbox before breaking
down Martin's door and terrorizing the home's occupants, in-
volved the kind of policy judgments that the discretionary-
function exception was designed to protect.
The FTCA's history, too, confrms Congress's intention to
subject the United States to liability for intentional torts
committed by law enforcement offcers like Agent Guerra.
The relevant context is as follows: For several decades after
the FTCA's enactment, Congress retained the United States'
sovereign immunity for myriad intentional torts committed
by federal employees, including assault, battery, and false
arrest. See 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h). That changed, however,
in response to an episode that will sound familiar to readers
of the majority opinion. See ante, at 399–400.
In April 1973, Herbert and Evelyn Giglotto awoke in their
Collinsville, Illinois, townhouse “to the sound of someone
smashing down their door and bursting into their home.” J.
Boger, M. Gitenstein, & P. Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims
Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpretative Analy-
sis, 54 N. C. L. Rev. 497, 500 (1976). After 15 state and
federal offcers ransacked the Giglottos' home, tied them up
at gunpoint, and threatened to shoot Mr. Giglotto if he
moved, the offcers realized they “ `ha[d] the wrong people.' ”
Ibid. The offcers eventually moved on to the home of Don-
ald Askew, where they terrorized yet another innocent cou-
ple before confessing they had acted on a “ `bad tip.' ” Id.,
at 501.
The Collinsville raids garnered national attention, includ-
ing from the United States Senate. See S. Rep. No. 93–588,
pp. 2–3 (1973); see also Brief for Members of Congress as
Amici Curiae 8–12. Noting that “[t]here [was] no effective
legal remedy against the Federal Government for the actual
physical damage, much less the pain, suffering and humilia-
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tion to which the Collinsville families ha[d] been subjected,”
the
Senate Committee on Government Operations proposed
an amendment to the FTCA. See S. Rep. No. 93–588, at 2.
The solution was to add a proviso to the end of the
intentional-tort exception that “deprive[s] the Federal Gov-
ernment of the defense of sovereign immunity” for FTCA
suits arising out of the state-law torts of “assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, or
abuse of process” by federal law enforcement offcers. Id.,
at 3; see § 2680(h). The Committee designed the proviso to
ensure “innocent individuals who are subjected to raids of
the type conducted in Collinsville, Illinois, will have a cause
of action against the individual Federal agents [via suits
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388 (1971)] and the Federal Government [through the
FTCA].” Id., at 3 (emphasis added).
Of course, the majority correctly holds that the proviso
does not altogether trump the discretionary-function excep-
tion: Even if an intentional-tort claim “survive[s its] en-
counter with subsection (h) thanks to the law enforcement
proviso,” courts must nevertheless consider whether “sub-
section (a)'s discretionary-function exception bars . . . the
plaintiffs' negligent- or intentional-tort claims.” Ante, at
413–414. Courts, however, should not ignore the existence
of the law enforcement proviso, or the factual context that
inspired its passage, when construing the discretionary-func-
tion exception. Whatever else is true of that exception, any
interpretation should allow for liability in the very cases
Congress amended the FTCA to remedy. See Van Buren v.
United States, 593 U. S. 374, 393 (2021) (“ `When Congress
amends legislation, courts must presume it intends the
change to have real and substantial effect' ”); see also Hun-
gary v. Simon, 604 U. S. 115, 132 (2025) (relying on a statute's
“ `historical backdrop' ” to “ `permit adjudication of claims' ”
that an earlier decision of this Court had avoided).
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***
On
remand, the court should approach the discretionary-
function exception with an eye to both steps of the Gaubert
analysis and to the existence and context of the intentional-
tort exception's law enforcement proviso.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 401, line 11: “against” is changed to “by”
p. 419, line 20: “house” is changed to “home”