Department of Education v. California

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 604 U. S. Part 2
Pages 650–669
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 4, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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650 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al. v.
CALIFORNIA
et al.
on application to vacate the order issued by the
united states district court for the district of
massachusetts
No. 24A910. Decided April 4, 2025
The District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Government from terminating
education-related grants and requiring the Government to make pay-
ments on those grant obligations. The District Court's conclusion
rested on a fnding that respondents were likely to succeed on their
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims. The Government applied
to this Court to vacate the order.
Held: The District Court's order is stayed pending appeal. Although ap-
pellate courts generally lack jurisdiction over appeals from TROs, the
District Court's order contains hallmarks of an appealable preliminary
injunction. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 87. Moreover, the
Government is likely to succeed in showing the District Court lacked
jurisdiction to order the payment of money. The APA's sovereign im-
munity waiver does not apply to “money damages” claims or when an-
other statute forbids the relief sought. 5 U. S. C. § 702. Instead, the
Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits
to enforce contractual payment obligations. 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1).
Finally, respondents have not refuted the Government's representation
that it would likely not recover funds once disbursed, and respondents
would not suffer irreparable harm pending appeal, as they can maintain
their programs and recover any wrongfully withheld funds if they prevail.
Application granted.
Per Curiam.
On March 10, 2025, the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts issued what it styled as a tem-
porary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Government
from terminating various education-related grants. The
order also requires the Government to pay out past-due
grant obligations and to continue paying obligations as they
accrue. The District Court's conclusion rested on a fnding

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as: 604 U. S. 650 (2025)
651
Per Curiam
that respondents are likely to succeed on the merits of their
clai
ms under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 60
Stat. 237. On March 26, the Government fled this applica-
tion to vacate the District Court's March 10 order (as ex-
tended on March 24) and requested an immediate adminis-
trative stay. The application was presented to Justice
Jackson and by her referred to the Court.
Although the Courts of Appeals generally lack appellate
jurisdiction over appeals from TROs, several factors counsel
in favor of construing the District Court's order as an appeal-
able preliminary injunction. Among other considerations,
the District Court's order carries many of the hallmarks of
a preliminary injunction. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S.
61, 87 (1974); Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 594 (2018).
Moreover, the District Court's “basis for issuing the order
[is] strongly challenged,” as the Government is likely to suc-
ceed in showing the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
order the payment of money under the APA. Sampson, 415
U. S., at 87. The APA's waiver of sovereign immunity does
not apply “if any other statute that grants consent to suit
expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” 5
U. S. C. § 702. Nor does the waiver apply to claims seeking
“money damages.” Ibid. True, a district court's jurisdic-
tion “is not barred by the possibility” that an order setting
aside an agency's action may result in the disbursement of
funds. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 910 (1988).
But, as we have recognized, the APA's limited waiver of im-
munity does not extend to orders “to enforce a contractual
obligation to pay money” along the lines of what the District
Court ordered here. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U. S. 204, 212 (2002). Instead, the Tucker Act
grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits
based on “any express or implied contract with the United
States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1).
As for the remaining stay factors, respondents have not
refuted the Government's representation that it is unlikely

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652 DEP
ARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. CALIFORNIA
Kagan, J., dissenting
to recover the grant funds once they are disbursed. No
grantee
“promised to return withdrawn funds should its
grant termination be reinstated,” and the District Court de-
clined to impose bond. App. to Application To Vacate Order
15a, 17a. By contrast, the Government compellingly argues
that respondents would not suffer irreparable harm while
the TRO is stayed. Respondents have represented in this
litigation that they have the fnancial wherewithal to keep
their programs running. So, if respondents ultimately pre-
vail, they can recover any wrongfully withheld funds through
suit in an appropriate forum. And if respondents instead
decline to keep the programs operating, then any ensuing
irreparable harm would be of their own making. “Such self-
imposed costs are not properly the subject of inquiry on a
motion for stay.” Cuomo v. NRC, 772 F. 2d 972, 977 (CADC
1985) (per curiam).
We construe the application as seeking a stay pending ap-
peal and grant the application. The March 10, 2025, order
and March 24, 2025, extension of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, No. 1:25–cv–10548,
is stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and disposition
of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely
sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall termi-
nate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the
stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment
of this Court.
It is so ordered.
The Chief Justice would deny the application.
Justice Kagan, dissenting.
It is a mistake for the Court to grant this emergency appli-
cation. Nowhere in its papers does the Government defend
the legality of canceling the education grants at issue here.
And contra the per curiam, the respondent States have con-

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653
Jackson, J., dissenting
sistently represented that the loss of these grants will force
them—i
ndeed, has already forced them—to curtail teacher
training programs. See, e. g., Brief in Opposition to Applica-
tion 39–40; App. to Application To Vacate Order 7a–8a, 34a–
35a. The remaining issue is whether this suit, brought
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), belongs in
an ordinary district court or the Court of Federal Claims.
As the Court acknowledges, the general rule is that APA
actions go to district courts, even when a remedial order
“may result in the disbursement of funds.” Ante, at 651 (cit-
ing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 910 (1988)). To
support a different result here, the Court relies exclusively
on Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U. S.
204 (2002). But Great-West was not brought under the
APA, as the Court took care to note. See id., at 212 (distin-
guishing Bowen for that reason). So the Court's reasoning
is at the least under-developed, and very possibly wrong.
The risk of error increases when this Court decides
cases—as here—with barebones briefng, no argument, and
scarce time for refection. Sometimes, the Court must act
in that way despite the risk. And there will of course be
good-faith disagreements about when that is called for. But
in my view, nothing about this case demanded our immediate
intervention. Rather than make new law on our emergency
docket, we should have allowed the dispute to proceed in the
ordinary way. I respectfully dissent.
Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins,
dissenting.
This application concerns the Department of Education's
decision to cancel, with no meaningful explanation, more
than 100 grants the Federal Government had previously
awarded to public schools and universities across the country.
The District Court issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) fnding that the Department's decision was likely un-
lawful and pausing the grant cancellations while the court
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Jackson, J., dissenting
considers a pending motion for a preliminary injunction.
The
TRO expires in three days, and it will become moot even
ear l ier i f the D istr ic t Cour t r u les on the prel i mi nary-
injunction motion this week.
With the TRO on its last legs, a majority of this Court has
chosen to dive into this dispute today, allowing the Depart-
ment to implement immediately its new summary grant-
termination policy. It does so even though the TRO pre-
serves the pretermination status quo and causes zero
concrete harm to the Government. By contrast, reinstating
the challenged grant-termination policy will infict signifcant
harm on grantees—a fact that the Government barely con-
tests. Worse still, the Government does not even deign to
defend the lawfulness of its actions. Instead, it asks us to
superintend the lower courts' real-time decisions about ancil-
lary threshold and remedial questions, which we could easily
wait to address in the ordinary course.
It is beyond puzzling that a majority of Justices conceive
of the Government's application as an emergency. It is like-
wise baffing that anyone is persuaded that the equities favor
the Government when the Government does not even argue
that the lower courts erred in concluding that it likely behaved
unlawfully. This application should have been denied for nu-
merous obvious and independent reasons, and the Court does
itself—and the legal process—no favors in deciding to grant it.
I
A
To address a nationwide shortage of qualifed teachers,
Congress has enacted several competitive grant programs
that facilitate the recruitment, training, and support of edu-
cators. This application concerns the Department's recent
efforts to terminate grants that were awarded under two
such programs: the Teacher Quality Partnership (TQP) pro-
gram and the Supporting Effective Educator Development
(SEED) program.
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655
Jackson, J., dissenting
Congress established the TQP program in 2008, authoriz-
i
ng the Department to award grants to high-need educa-
tional agencies and schools for the purpose of training teach-
ers. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1021(6), 1022a(a), 1022a(c)(1), 1022h. In
the statute that creates this program, Congress made plain
its intent to (1) “improve student achievement,” (2) “improve
the quality of . . . teachers,” (3) “hold teacher preparation
programs at institutions of higher education accountable,”
and (4) “recruit highly qualifed individuals, including minor-
ities and individuals from other occupations, into the teach-
ing force.” § 1022.
By statute, the Department awards each TQP grant based
on a peer-review process “for a period of fve years.”
§§ 1022b(a), (b)(3). Similarly, under the SEED program,
Congress has mandated that the Department “shall award
grants” to institutions of higher education and nonproft enti-
ties that provide certain education-related services, includ-
ing “evidence-based professional development activities” for
teachers. §§ 6672(a)(2), (f ). Congress dictated that SEED
grants “shall be” awarded for up to a 3-year period, subject
to a possible 2-year extension. §§ 6672(b)(1)–(2).
On February 5, 2025, the Acting Secretary of Education
issued an internal directive requiring Department personnel
to review “ `issued grants' ” to “ `ensur[e] that Department
grants do not fund discriminatory practices' ” that are “ `con-
trary to law or to the Department's policy objectives' ” and
that “ `all grants are free from fraud, abuse, and duplica-
tion.' ” App. to Application To Vacate Order 12a (App.).
The directive expressly extends to “ `practices . . . in the form
of [diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”)].' ” Ibid. (alter-
ation in original).
Two days later, TQP and SEED grant recipients began to
receive letters from the Department announcing the termi-
nation of their grant awards. The letters were identical,
save for differences in the addressees, grant-award numbers,
and termination dates. Each letter included a single para-
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Jackson, J., dissenting
graph regarding the Department's justifcation for the grant
ter
mination, which stated, in full, as follows:
“ `The grant specifed above provides funding for pro-
grams that promote or take part in DEI initiatives or
other initiatives that unlawfully discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or an-
other protected characteristic; that violate either the
letter or purpose of Federal civil rights law; that confict
with the Department's policy of prioritizing merit, fair-
ness, and excellence in education; that are not free from
fraud, abuse, or duplication; or that otherwise fail to
serve the best interests of the United States. The
grant is therefore inconsistent with, and no longer ef-
fec tuates, Depar tment pr i or ities. See 2 C.F.R.
§ 200.340(a)(4); see also 34 C.F.R. § 75.253. Therefore,
pursuant to, among other authorities, 2 C.F.R. § 200.339–
43, 34 C.F.R. § 75.253, and the termination provisions in
your grant award, the Department hereby terminates
grant No. [grant award number] in its entirety effective
[date of letter].' ” Complaint in No. 25–cv–10548 (D
Mass.), ECF Doc. 1, p. 35 (alterations in original).
Most grantees also received revised grant-award notifcation
letters stating solely that their grants had been “deemed to
be inconsistent with, and no longer effectuat[e], Department
priorities. See 2 C.F.R. 200.340(a)(4); see also 34 C.F.R.
75.253.” Id., at 36–37.
B
On March 6, 2025, eight States sued the Department in the
District of Massachusetts, claiming that this mass, summary
termination of TQP and SEED grants was arbitrary and ca-
pricious, and not in accordance with law, in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A).
The Plaintiff States alleged that, as a result of the grant
terminations, their public universities, schools, and other in-
stitutions “now face abrupt shortfalls to their current year
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657
Jackson, J., dissenting
budgets collectively exceeding ten million dollars.” ECF
Doc.
1, at 41. As relevant, the Plaintiff States sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief to set aside the termination of
the previously awarded grants. They also sought a TRO to
immediately block termination of the grants.
After holding a 2-hour hearing, the District Court issued
a TRO on March 10. The order “restore[d] Plaintiff States
to the pre-existing status quo prior to the termination under
all previously awarded TQP or SEED grants for recipients
in Plaintiff States,” and “temporarily enjoined” the Depart-
ment from terminating any previously awarded or individual
TQP or SEED grants for recipients in Plaintiff States.
769 F. Supp. 3d 72, 80 (Mass. 2025). The order also con-
tained an exception permitting the Department to make indi-
vidual grant terminations consistent with applicable law
and regulations.
By its terms, the TRO was “effective immediately” and
would “remain in effect for 14 days,” until March 24. Ibid.
The District Court then separately construed the Plain-
tiff States' TRO motion as a motion for a preliminary in-
junction and set that motion for a hearing on March 28.
The District Court subsequently extended the TRO for
an additional 14 days, until April 7, while also expressing
its “intent that the TRO be temporary and short.” ECF
Doc. 79.
Seeking to enforce its termination decisions during the pe-
riod in which the TRO remained in effect, the Government
requested a stay pending appeal. The District Court denied
the request, as did a unanimous panel of the First Circuit.
The First Circuit panel assumed without deciding that it had
jurisdiction to review the TRO and made several determina-
tions, including: that the States were likely to succeed on the
merits of their claim that the Department's termination of
the grants was arbitrary and capricious; that the Govern-
ment's assertions of irreparable harm consisted of “specula-
tion and hyperbole”; and that the equitable stay factors cut

658 DEP
ARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. CALIFORNIA
Jackson, J., dissenting
against the Government. 132 F. 4th 92, 96, 100 (2025). The
Gover
nment then turned to us for an emergency stay.
II
First and foremost, the Government's application should
have been swiftly denied because this Court lacks jurisdic-
tion over this interlocutory order. It is clear beyond cavil
that, ordinarily, “orders granting . . . temporary restraining
orders are not appealable.” 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3922.1, p. 90 (3d
ed. 2012). This Court has recognized an exception for TROs
and other interlocutory orders that are “potentially unlim-
ited” in duration, Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 87 (1974),
and risk imposing a “ `serious, perhaps irreparable, conse-
quence,' ” Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 84
(1981). But this time-limited TRO presents no such threat.
To start, the District Court has merely ordered restora-
tion of the “pre-existing status quo prior to the termination”
of the grants in the Plaintiff States. 769 F. Supp. 3d, at 80.
Its order comes in the form of an injunction only insofar as
it has prohibited the Government from implementing the
abruptly announced terminations—the District Court has
not ordered that the Government do anything other than
what was required by law before the termination letters
issued.
Notably, the TRO also includes an exception that permits
the Government to make individual grant terminations while
the order is in effect “to the extent the fnal agency action
is consistent with the Congressional authorization and appro-
priations, relevant federal statute[s], including the require-
ments of the APA, the requirements of the relevant imple-
menting regulations, [and] the grant terms and conditions.”
Ibid. Thus, the Government is only precluded from imple-
menting what the Plaintiff States challenge as a “mass ter-
mination” of previously issued grants; the Government can
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659
Jackson, J., dissenting
still proceed with reasoned, individualized grant termina-
ti
ons under its usual review process.
1
This TRO is also expressly time limited and is set to expire
just three days from now. All agree that the order falls
squarely within the time limitations prescribed by the Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure governing TROs. See Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 65(b)(2) (providing that a TRO is “not to ex-
ceed 14 days” unless “the court, for good cause, extends it
for a like period”). That is true even though the District
Court has granted a one-time extension of the TRO while it
considers and rules upon the Plaintiff States' motion for a
preliminary injunction. See ibid. The Government pro-
vides no reason to believe that the District Court intends to
extend the order again. Quite to the contrary, the fact that
the District Court construed the Plaintiff States' TRO mo-
tion as a motion for a preliminary injunction, and has already
held a hearing, indicates that the court is moving with dis-
patch and is in no way attempting to shield its interim order
from appellate review.
This TRO thus falls squarely within the “general congres-
sional policy against piecemeal review.” Carson, 450 U. S.,
at 84.
III
Even assuming that the TRO is reviewable on appeal, the
Government's application does not demonstrate the sort of
exigency that warrants emergency relief—what I have else-
where called a “line-jumping justifcation,” Labrador v. Poe,
601 U. S. –––, ––– (2024) (opinion dissenting from grant of
1
The Department now rejects the “mass termination” characterization
on the grounds that it allowed 5 TQP and SEED grants (out of 109) to
remain in place. App. 14a. But Department employees previously in-
formed grantees that “ `[a]ll the grants have been terminated.' ” ECF
Doc. 8–13, pp. 6, 60 (emphasis added). These inconsistent statements un-
derscore the need for additional factual development below before this
Court gets involved.
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stay). As explained above, TQP and SEED are statutorily
author
ized grant programs that have been implemented by
the Department for more than a decade—since 2008 and
2015, respectively. What is new here is the Department's
insistence that it need not go through the notice and review
procedures the agency has traditionally used to terminate
grants it has awarded. Instead, the Department now seeks
to terminate the pending grants en masse, through the use
of boilerplate language that is not particularized to any
grant recipient.
The Government has not provided any persuasive reason
for why it urgently needs to be relieved of the lower court's
requirement that it wait 14 days (and now 28) to execute its
preferred grant-termination policy. Even if the Govern-
ment is right about the merits of the arguments it raises in
this application (which is doubtful), there is no reason why
the Government cannot proceed through the usual litigation
and appeals process to receive its vindication, as other liti-
gants must. To reiterate, the TRO expires in three days,
and the District Court held a hearing on the Plaintiff States'
preliminary-injunction motion a week ago. The only hint of
urgency that the Government offers to justify its unusual
request for our intervention is that, during the waning days
of the TRO period, some grant recipients might seek to draw
down grant funds that the Government wants to terminate.
If true, that would be unfortunate, but worse things have
happened. And that possibility does not come anywhere
close to explaining why this Court must take the “ `extraordi-
nary' ” step of intervening now. Williams v. Zbaraz, 442
U. S. 1309, 1311 (1979) (Stevens, J., in chambers); cf. Nken v.
Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 433 (2009) (“ `A stay is not a matter of
right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result' ”).
In my view, the patent lack of exigency alone warrants deny-
ing the Government's bid for emergency relief. See Labra-
dor, 601 U. S., at ––– (Jackson, J., dissenting from grant of
stay). But, wait, there's more.
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661
Jackson, J., dissenting
The Government's assertions of harm are speculative, at
best,
and appear to be far from irreparable. Importantly,
there is no evidence that grantees have rushed to draw down
the remaining $65 million in grant funds since the District
Court entered the TRO 25 days ago. If the past is the best
predictor of the future, then there is no factual basis for con-
cluding that any terminated-recipient grant runs are likely
to occur in the three days remaining in the TRO.
The Government's speculation is also contrary to the way
that the TQP and SEED programs operate. As the Plaintiff
States explain, TQP and SEED grantees typically “receive
funds spread over the multi-year period of their grants” and
“generally submit periodic draw-down requests for expenses
they have already incurred.” Brief in Opposition to Appli-
cation 7. Grant recipients are also closely supervised with
respect to such withdrawals: “The Department is authorized
to monitor draw-down activity for all grants,” and certain
recipients are even “subject to an annual audit.” Id., at 8–9.
Finally, even if the feared food of recipient withdrawals
occurs, the Government has various legal mechanisms to re-
coup these kinds of funds. See, e. g., 20 U. S. C. §§ 1234a,
1234b; 2 CFR § 200.346 (2024); see also J. Shaffer & D. Ram-
ish, Federal Grant Practice § 36:29 (2024 ed.) (“In the end,
the Government usually gets its money”). It is likely that,
given the Department's new policy position with respect to
terminations, it will be extra vigilant about recording any
withdrawals made while the TRO is in effect, so that the
money can be clawed back if appropriate. Thus, the alleged
funding drain at which the Government gestures does not
even appear to be irreparable. The Government has cer-
tainly not met its burden to show otherwise. See Hollings-
worth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (stay
applicants bear the burden to show, among other things, “a
likelihood [of] irreparable harm”).
The Court nonetheless swoops in to stay a TRO that will
be mooted imminently by either the District Court's ruling
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on the preliminary-injunction motion or the natural expira-
ti
on of the TRO period. Instead of playing remedy police
in this nascent case, I would permit the litigation to proceed
in the lower courts as usual, as we would expect in any other
case in which the Government was not the applicant.
IV
To review, the Court has now granted the Government's
request for “emergency” relief, staying a TRO that will ex-
pire in just three days in a case where appellate jurisdiction
is wanting and the Government's assertions of harm are illu-
sory. One might reasonably assume that, for the Supreme
Court of the United States to step in and grant relief in this
posture, the applicant would have at least presented a rock-
solid argument in support of its underlying merits position.
Thus, here, one would expect the Government to vigorously
maintain that the Department was legally entitled to all but
eliminate two grant programs that Congress established a
decade ago. But in this Court, the Government offers no
defense against the Plaintiff States' claim that the Depart-
ment's erasure of the grants at issue was arbitrary and capri-
cious. Instead, the Government raises several threshold
and remedial questions about the scope of the District
Court's power to review the Government's allegedly unlaw-
ful conduct.
2
The Government's request for emergency relief from this
Court—without presenting any defense as to the merits of
the Plaintiff States' arbitrary-and-capricious challenge—is
striking. And the Court now blesses this strategic decision
to sidestep the underlying merits by reinstating grant termi-
2
To be specifc, the Government argues that the lawfulness of the termi-
nations is irrelevant for present purposes because (1) the Court of Federal
Claims, not the District Court, has original jurisdiction over this dispute;
(2) the Department's grant-termi nati on decisi ons are “committed to
agency discretion by law” and thus not reviewable under the APA, 5
U. S. C. § 701(a)(2); and (3) the TRO at issue is too broad.
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Jackson, J., dissenting
nations that both lower courts have said are likely unlawful.
Th
is seems like a development in our practices related to
emergency applications that, at a minimum, requires further
exploration. If the emergency docket has now become a ve-
hicle for certain defendants to obtain this Court's real-time
opinion about lower court rulings on various auxiliary mat-
ters, we should announce that new policy and be prepared to
shift how we think about, and address, these kinds of
applications.
I, for one, think it would be a grave mistake to permit
parties seeking equitable emergency relief not only to make
an inadequate showing of interim harm but also to seek relief
on the basis of their concerns about issues that can be ad-
dressed later, in the ordinary course. In an appeals system
that is supposed to provide prompt resolution of all legal
challenges, this new avenue for piecemeal interlocutory re-
view enables strategic delay and facilitates obfuscation of the
weaknesses of the defendant's merits positions.
A
Take this case, for example. In my preliminary evalua-
tion, the lower courts' early assessment that the Depart-
ment's mass grant terminations were probably unlawful is
not unreasonable, for the reasons I explain in this section.
If the lower courts were left alone, they would be able to
provide prompt rulings on the core legal question that we
could then review, together with the Department's other ar-
guments, in the ordinary course.
The APA requires, among other things, that an agency
must not act arbitrarily or capriciously, and that it must
explain its actions. See, e. g., FCC v. Prometheus Radio
Project, 592 U. S. 414, 423 (2021) (“The APA's arbitrary-and-
capricious standard requires that agency action be reason-
able and reasonably explained”). But a mere two days after
the Acting Secretary instructed agency offcials to review
the TQP and SEED grants, the Department started issuing
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summary grant-termination letters that provide a general
and
disjunctive list of potential grounds for cancellation,
without specifying which ground led to the termination of
any particular grant. Nor did the letters detail the Depart-
ment's decisionmaking with respect to any individual termi-
nation decision. It also appears that the grant recipients
did not receive any pretermination notice or any opportunity
to be heard, much less a chance to cure, which the regula-
tions seem to require. See, e. g., 2 CFR §§ 200.339, 200.208(c)
(permitting grant termination only after an agency “deter-
mines that noncompliance cannot be remedied by imposing
additional conditions,” such as by “[r]equiring additional
project monitoring,” by requiring that the recipient obtain
technical or management assistance, or by “[e]stablishing ad-
ditional prior approvals”).
The Department's robotic rollout of its new mass grant-
termination policy means that grant recipients and review-
ing courts are “compelled to guess at the theory underlying
the agency's action.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194,
196–197 (1947). Moreover, the agency's abruptness leaves
one wondering whether any reasoned decisionmaking has oc-
curred with respect to these terminations at all.
3
These are
precisely the kinds of concerns that the APA's bar on
arbitrary-and-capricious agency decisionmaking was meant
to address. See Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U. S., at 423
(explaining that the APA requires a reviewing court to en-
sure that “the agency . . . has reasonably considered the rele-
vant issues and reasonably explained the decision”).
3
The Government suggested before the First Circuit that its retention
of 5 of the 109 previously awarded grants proves that it engaged in rea-
soned decisionmaking. But the Government has not yet supplied an ad-
ministrative record to facilitate judicial review. App. 30a; accord, ECF
Doc. 69, p. 13. Without documentation of the Department's reasoning, its
failure to terminate every single grant could just as easily refect neglect
or even additional arbitrariness. Cf. ECF Doc. 76, p. 7, n. 1 (noting that
one remai ni ng grant “proposed to `focus on cu ltura l ly responsive
practices' ”).
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665
Jackson, J., dissenting
It also seems clear that at least one of the items included
on
the Department's undifferentiated laundry list of possible
reasons for terminating these grants—that the entity may
have participated in unspecifed DEI practices—would not
suffce as a basis for termination under the law as it currently
exists. That is because termination is only permissible for
recipient conduct that is inconsistent with the terms of the
grants and the statutes that authorize them. But the TQP
and SEED statutes expressly contemplate that grant recipi-
ents will train educators on teaching “diverse populations”
in “traditionally underserved” schools, and on improving stu-
dents' “social, emotional, and physical development.” 20
U. S. C. §§ 1022e(b)(4), 6672(a)(1), 1022a(d)(1)(A)(ii).
4
It
would be manifestly arbitrary and capricious for the Depart-
ment to terminate grants for funding diversity-related pro-
grams that the law expressly requires. Cf. Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto-
mobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983) (explaining that an
agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it relies “on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider”).
B
It is thus small wonder that the Government has chosen
not to press its merits arguments in this emergency applica-
tion. See n. 2, supra. What better way to avoid prompt
consideration of the Plaintiff States' serious claims about the
unlawful arbitrariness of the Government's conduct than to
4
See also, e. g., § 1022a(d)(5) (encouraging TQP grantees to “recrui[t] into
the teaching profession . . . individuals from under[-]represented popula-
tions,” “former military personnel,” and “individuals to teach in rural com-
munities”); § 1022a(e)(2)(A)(vi)(II) (permitting TQP teacher-residency pro-
grams to consider choosing “applicants who refect the communities in
which they will teach as well as consideration of individuals from under-
represented populations”); § 6672(b)(3) (requiring the Department to en-
sure that SEED grants are, to the extent practicable, “distributed among
eligible entities that will serve geographically diverse areas, including
urban, suburban, and rural areas”).
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Jackson, J., dissenting
demand that jurists turn away from those core questions and
enter
tain a host of side issues about the power of the District
Court on an “emergency” basis? Courts that are properly
mulling interim injunctive relief (to prevent imminent harms
and thereby facilitate fair adjudication of potentially merito-
rious claims) should be wary of allowing defendants with
weak underlying arguments to divert all attention to ancillary
threshold and remedial questions. Children, pets, and magi-
cians might fnd pleasure in the clever use of such shiny-object
tactics. But a court of law should not be so easily distracted.
Yet, here we are. Instead of leaving the lower court
judges alone to do the important work of effciently adjudi-
cating all of the parties' legal claims, the Supreme Court has
decided to enter the fray. We have intervened to stay an
almost-expired TRO that is plainly preventing the Plaintiff
States from suffering imminent harm—not because the
harms will not occur (no one seriously disputes this), and
not because the Government has shown that any harm will
actually befall it if the TRO remains in place for another
three days, but because the Government has technical ques-
tions about which court is the proper forum to hear this case
and what relief that court can order. Albeit interesting, and
perhaps even ultimately dispositive, surely those nonurgent
issues can get sorted out in the ordinary course as part of
the lower court's expedited consideration of the legal claims
both sides have made. There is no reason they have to be
addressed by this Court at this moment. And it is truly
bizarre that a Court that purports to be “a court of review,
not of frst view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718,
n. 7 (2005), has seen ft to rouse itself to respond to the Gov-
ernment's queries by addressing these tangential legal issues
and disturbing a well-justifed, harm-based TRO in the
process.
5
5
Indeed, other than paving the way for the Plaintiff States' immediate
suffering, it appears that the primary effect of today's emergency stay is
to hand the Government an early “win”—a notch in its belt at the start of

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as: 604 U. S. 650 (2025)
667
Jackson, J., dissenting
V
Fi
nally, even if this were a “close cas[e],” Hollingsworth,
558 U. S., at 190, the balance of the equities clearly counsel
against staying the TRO and reinstating the grant termina-
tions. On one side of the balance, the Government's asser-
tions of harm if the TRO remains in place amount to “specu-
lation and hyperbole,” as the First Circuit put it. 132 F. 4th,
at 100. On the other, there is ample evidence that the loss
of grants during the remaining days of the TRO period will
infict signifcant harm on the Plaintiff States and their
instrumentalities.
6
Those harms are concrete. In Massachusetts, Boston
Public Schools has already had to fre multiple full-time em-
ployees due to this loss of grant funding. ECF Doc. 8–2,
pp. 11–12. In New Jersey, the College of New Jersey has
canceled the remainder of its teacher-residency program
for the same reason. ECF Doc. 8–9, pp. 8–9. In Illinois,
a legal battle in which the long-term prospects for its eventual success
seem doubtful. And I don't blame the Government for trying. If you're
likely to lose on the merits, why not use the Court's procedures to fght
on new and creative fronts? The Government has now gotten this Court
to nullify clearly warranted interim injunctive relief, defecting attention
away from the Government's own highly questionable behavior, all with-
out any showing of urgency or need. I worry that permitting the emer-
gency docket to be hijacked in this way, by parties with tangential legal
questi ons unrelated to i mmi nent har m, damages our i nstituti ona l
credibility.
6
The majority asserts that the Plaintiff States' harms may not be irrepa-
rable because they “have represented in this litigation that they have the
fnancial wherewithal to keep their programs running.” Ante, at 652. At
most, the Plaintiff States represented below that the Department's deci-
sion to terminate grants would require their institutions to either “expend
public funds . . . or suffer the obvious public harms resulting from a scar-
city of qualifed teachers.” Appellees' Opposition to Appellants' Motion
for Stay in No. 25–1244 (CA1), p. 20. In any event, the majority ignores
the District Court's fnding that the abrupt grant terminations have
caused the Plaintiff States numerous harms that money cannot remedy.
769 F. Supp. 3d 72, 79 (Mass. 2025).
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Jackson, J., dissenting
Chicago Public Schools—which already faces a multimillion-
dol
lar budget defcit—may have to shut down its successful
teacher-pipeline program. ECF Doc. 8–13, p. 7. In Cali-
fornia, California State University has ended support for 26
students currently enrolled in its teacher-residency program
and has eliminated fnancial assistance for about 50 incoming
students. ECF Doc. 8–3, p. 7.
On the current record, I perceive no clear error in the Dis-
trict Court's conclusion that, absent immediate relief, “doz-
ens of programs upon which public schools, public universi-
ties, students, teachers, and faculty rely will be gutted.”
769 F. Supp. 3d, at 79. The harms that will result from per-
mitting the Department to reinstate these terminations are
directly contrary to Congress's goals in enacting the TQP
and SEED programs and in entrusting the Department with
their implementation. It boggles the mind to equate the
devastation wrought from such abrupt funding withdrawals
with the mere risk that some grantees might seek to draw
down previously promised funds that the Department wants
to yank away from them.
***
This Court's eagerness to insert itself into this early stage
of ongoing litigation over the lawfulness of the Department's
actions—even when doing so facilitates the infiction of sig-
nifcant harms on the Plaintiff States, and even though the
Government has not bothered to press any argument that
the Department's harm-causing conduct is lawful—is equal
parts unprincipled and unfortunate. It is also entirely un-
warranted. We do not ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over
TROs, and this one is no different. The Government has
not articulated any concrete harm it will suffer if the grant
terminations are not implemented in the next three days.
And this Court will have every opportunity to address all of
the legal issues the Government has hastily shoved up the

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669
Jackson, J., dissenting
chain of review, and more, in due course. Because we could
have
and should have easily denied this application, I re-
spectfully dissent.
7
7
Apparently not content to insert itself into this action for no reason,
the majority goes further, seizing on this opportunity. Without oral argu-
ment and with less than one week's worth of deliberation, the Court now
has determined that, at least in this context, restoring the grants at issue
might qualify as an order to “ `enforce a contractual obligation to pay
money' ” such that it is the Court of Federal Claims, rather than the Dis-
trict Court, that has jurisdiction over the Plaintiff States' challenge.
Ante, at 651 (quoting Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534
U. S. 204, 212 (2002)). Even assuming that Great-West has any bearing
on this issue, the majority's characterization of the relief granted by the
District Court is dubious given what the Plaintiff States actually say in
their complaint about the legal problem and the relief they are requesting.
See ECF Doc. 1, pp. 46–47, 51–52; see also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
U. S. 879, 893 (1988) (“The fact that a judicial remedy may require one
party to pay money to another is not a suffcient reason to characterize
the relief as `money damages' ”). And the majority does not dispute the
“basic reality” that some APA challenges to grant-related administrative
action may proceed in district court, even if they have as their “natural
consequence . . . the release of funds to the plaintiff down the road.”
Department of State v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition, 604 U. S.
–––, ––– (2025) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of application).
In any event, the District Court in this case is now hard at work evaluat-
ing this and other arguments in the context of the pending preliminary-
injunction motion. The majority's attempt to inject itself into the ongoing
litigation by suggesting new, substantive principles for the District Court
to consider in this case is unorthodox and, in my view, inappropriate.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
p. 658, line 7 from bottom: “the” is inserted before “Congressional”