Wilkinson v. Garland

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 601 U. S. Part 1
Pages 209–233
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 19, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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Syllabus
WILKINSON v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 22–666. Argued November 28, 2023—Decided March 19, 2024
Congress gives immigration judges discretionary power to cancel the re-
moval of a noncitizen and instead permit the noncitizen to remain in
the country lawfully. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229b(a)–(b). An IJ faced with an
application for cancellation of removal proceeds in two steps: The IJ
must decide frst whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of
removal under the statutory criteria. If the IJ fnds the noncitizen
statutorily eligible, the IJ must then decide whether to exercise discre-
tion and grant relief. For determining eligibility, Congress has enu-
merated four statutory criteria, one of which requires the noncitizen to
“establis[h] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely un-
usual hardship to [the noncitizen's] spouse, parent, or child,” who is a
U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson was arrested and detained by Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement for remaining in the United States be-
yond the expiration of his tourist visa. Wilkinson applied for cancella-
tion of removal based in part on hardship to his 7-year-old, U. S.-born son,
M., who suffers from a serious medical condition and relies on Wilkinson
for emotional and fnancial support. To meet the hardship standard, Wil-
kinson had to show that M. “would suffer hardship that is substantially
different from or beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to re-
sult from [his] removal, but need not show that such hardship would be
`unconscionable.' ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a (quoting In re Monreal-
Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 60). Considering all of the hardship factors
presented by Wilkinson in the aggregate, the IJ held that M.'s situation
did not meet the statutory standard for “exceptional and extremely un-
usual” hardship and denied Wilkinson's application. The Board of Immi-
gration Appeals affrmed. The Third Circuit held that it lacked the juris-
diction necessary to review the IJ's discretionary hardship determination.
This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the IJ's “exceptional
and extremely unusual” hardship determination is a mixed question of law
and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D) or whether that determination
is discretionary and therefore unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Held: The Third Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to re-
view the IJ's determination in this case. Pp. 217–226.
(a) The Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction on the basis of
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which makes unreviewable any “judgment[s] regarding

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Syllabus
the granting of [discretionary] relief ” under § 1229b's cancellation of re-
mova
l provision. Section 1252(a)(2)(D), however, restores jurisdiction
to review “questions of law.” The interaction between these two provi-
sions is governed by two of this Court's previous cases: Guerrero-
Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, and Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328.
In Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that whether a non-
citizen acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for
purposes of equitable tolling was a question of fact, not a jurisdiction-
restoring “questio[n] of law.” This Court reversed, holding that “ques-
tions of law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) included mixed questions of law and fact.
589 U. S., at 225. The Court rejected the Government's argument that
“questions of law” referred only to mixed questions that are primarily
legal rather than primarily factual. Then, in Patel, this Court affrmed
an Eleventh Circuit holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an IJ's
factual credibility determinations that fell within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)'s ju-
risdictional bar. In so doing, the Court held that § 1252(a)(2)(D) did not
restore jurisdiction in the case because “questions of fact” are indisput-
ably not “questions of law.” Pp. 218–221.
(b) Wilkinson argues that § 1252(a)(2)(D) restores jurisdiction in this
case because the threshold question whether a noncitizen is statutorily
eligible for cancellation of removal requires a court to assess whether
an IJ correctly applied the statutory standard to a given set of facts.
Guerrero-Lasprilla compels the conclusion that the application of the
statutory “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to a
given set of facts presents a mixed question of law and fact. A mixed
question may require “primarily legal or factual work,” and just because
it may require a court to immerse itself in facts does not transform the
question into one of fact. U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge,
LLC, 583 U. S. 387, 396.
In this case, the application of the hardship standard—which requires
an IJ to evaluate a number of factors in determining whether any hard-
ship to a U. S. citizen or permanent-resident family member is substan-
tially different from what would normally be expected in the removal
of a close family member—concededly requires a close examination of
the facts. As in Guerrero-Lasprilla, a mixed question that requires
close engagement with the facts is still a mixed question, and therefore
a “questio[n] of law” reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as in Patel,
the IJ's underlying factual determinations that Wilkinson was credible
or that M. had a serious medical condition would be unreviewable factual
questions under § 1252(a)(2)(D). Pp. 221–222.
(c) The Government's counterarguments are unpersuasive. First,
nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla or this Court's other precedents limits
that case solely to judicially created standards like the “due diligence”
standard for equitable tolling. And this Court has frequently observed

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that the application of a “statutory standard” presents a mixed question
of
law and fact. See, e. g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273,
289, n. 19. Second, the case of Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United
States, 277 U. S. 551, on which the Government relies, has no relevance
to the question presented here on § 1252(a)(2)(D), and the Government
provides no basis for porting the interpretation of “exceptional hard-
ship” in that case to this one. Nor is the Government's argument from
the statutory history of the “hardship requirement” any more persua-
sive. Finally, the argument that a primarily factual mixed question is
a question of fact was previously rejected in Guerrero-Lasprilla, and
nothing in § 1252(a)(2)(D) supports the Government's view that the
phrase “questions of law” is so limited. Pp. 222–225.
Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kagan,
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., fled an
opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 226. Roberts, C. J., fled a
dissenting opinion, post, p. 227. Alito, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in
which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 228.
Jaime A. Santos argued the cause for petitioner. With
her on the briefs were Rohiniyurie Tashima, David J. Zim-
mer, William E. Evans, Jesse Lempel, and Rhonda F.
Gelfman.
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Prin-
cipal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy
Solicitor General Gannon, John W. Blakeley, and Claire L.
Workman.*
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
To be eligible for cancellation of removal and adjustment
to lawful permanent resident status, a noncitizen must meet
four statutory criteria. The last requires a showing that the
noncitizen's removal would result in “exceptional and ex-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Immigration Lawyers Association by Lee Turner Friedman; for Former
Executive Offce for Immigration Review Judges by Thomas G. Sprank-
ling; and for Organizations Assisting Survivors of Domestic Violence by
Zachary D. Tripp and Robert B. Niles-Weed.

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Opinion of the Court
tremely unusual hardship” to a U. S.-citizen or permanent-
resident
family member. 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Peti-
tioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson argues that his removal would
cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his
U. S.-citizen son, who suffers from a serious medical condi-
tion and relies on Wilkinson for emotional and fnancial sup-
port. An Immigration Judge (IJ) held that this hardship did
not rise to the level required by statute and the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affrmed. The Third Circuit
dismissed Wilkinson's petition for review, holding that it
lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's hardship determination.
The question in this case is whether the IJ's hardship de-
termination is reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), which gives
Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to review “questions of law.”
This Court holds that it is. The application of a statutory
legal standard (like the exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship standard) to an established set of facts is a quintes-
sential mixed question of law and fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla
v. Barr held that such questions are reviewable under
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). 589 U. S. 221, 225 (2020). Accordingly, this
Court reverses.
I
A
When an IJ fnds a noncitizen removable for violating the
immigration laws, Congress provides several avenues for dis-
cretionary relief. Relevant here, an IJ may “cancel re-
moval” of a noncitizen who meets certain statutory criteria.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as added and
amended, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229b(a)–(b). Cancellation of removal
permits a noncitizen to remain in the country lawfully. An
IJ deciding a noncitizen's request for cancellation of removal
proceeds in two steps. First, the IJ must decide whether
the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation under the relevant
statutory criteria. Second, an IJ decides whether to exer-
cise his discretion favorably and grant the noncitizen relief

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in the particular case.
1
A
noncitizen bears the burden of
proving that he both “satisfes the applicable eligibility re-
quirements” and “merits a favorable exercise of discretion.”
§ 1229a(c)(4)(A).
Congress enumerated certain statutory criteria to govern
the frst step of an IJ's cancellation-of-removal determina-
tion. For a noncitizen who never received lawful permanent
residence (i.e., a green card), those criteria are stringent.
He is eligible for cancellation of removal only if he meets
four requirements: (1) he “has been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than 10
years” before he applies; (2) he “has been a person of good
moral character during such period”; (3) he has not been con-
victed of certain criminal offenses; and (4) he “establishes
that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child,” who
is a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. §§ 1229b
( b)(1)(A)–(D). Af ter deter mining whether a noncitizen
meets these criteria, an IJ proceeds to step two and decides
whether to exercise discretion to cancel the order of removal
in a particular case.
B
Wilkinson was born in Trinidad and Tobago. After police
offcers beat, robbed, and threatened to kill him in 2003, Wil-
kinson fed to the United States on a tourist visa. He has
remained in this country ever since, beyond the expiration
of his visa. In 2013, Wilkinson had a son, M., with his girl-
friend Kenyatta Watson. Both M. and Watson are U. S.
citizens.
Wilkinson lived in Pennsylvania and worked to support M.
and Watson. M. lived with Wilkinson and Watson for the
1
This second step is not perfunctory. Congress has imposed a statutory
cap of 4,000 noncitizens each fscal year who can have discretion exercised
in their favor. 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(e).

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frst two years of his life. Then, because Wilkinson could
not
take care of his son and work at the same time, he and
Watson decided M. would have a better quality of life in New
Jersey with his mother and her mother. Wilkinson took the
train to visit his son every weekend and provided almost
half his monthly wages ($1,200 per month) in informal child
support. M. suffers from severe asthma, which requires
hospital treatment multiple times a year. Wilkinson helped
M. with his inhaler and medications and knew his regimen
well. Watson suffers from depression and does not work, so
she a lso rel ies on Wi lk i nson's fi nancia l and ch i ldcare
support.
Wilkinson worked as a handyman and a laborer in con-
struction. In 2019, police found drugs in a house where he
had been hired to work on repairs. Despite Wilkinson's pro-
tests that neither the house nor the drugs were his, the po-
lice arrested him. When Wilkinson appeared in a Pennsyl-
vania courthouse to contest the charges, he was arrested and
detained by federal immigration officers. The criminal
charges were ultimately withdrawn.
M. was seven years old when Immigration and Customs
Enforcement detained his father. Afterwards, M. began to
exhibit behavioral issues. M. became sad, acted out, and
broke things. M.'s teacher texted Watson every day saying
that M. was no longer focused and needed to talk to a coun-
selor. Wilkinson called his son every other day from immi-
gration detention. When M. hung up the phone, he cried
and said he wanted his father to come home.
C
Wilkinson conceded before the IJ that he was removable
under § 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his tourist visa. He
asked for relief from that removal, claiming eligibility for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. Relevant here, he also applied
for cancellation of removal based on hardship to his U. S.-

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citizen son, M. The U. S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)
stipulated that Wilkinson met the frst three statu-
tory criteria for eligibility (namely, continuous physical pres-
ence, good moral character, and lack of specifc criminal bars)
but contested the last: exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to M. Wilkinson, Watson, and M.'s grandmother
all testifed in support of Wilkinson's applications for relief.
In evaluating Wilkinson's applications, the IJ found Wil-
kinson credible (despite DHS's attempts to impeach him),
and credited the testimonies of each witness in full. The IJ
then turned to cancellation of removal and recited the stand-
ard for exceptional and extremely unusual hardship adopted
by the BIA. To meet this standard, a noncitizen “must dem-
onstrate that a qualifying relative would suffer hardship that
is substantially different from or beyond that which would
ordinarily be expected to result from their removal, but need
not show that such hardship would be `unconscionable.' ”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga,
23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 60 (BIA 2001)). In evaluating whether
a noncitizen meets this standard, IJs must consider a range
of factors, including the age and health of the qualifying
family member. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a–27a (citing In re
Andaloza-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323–324 (BIA 2002);
Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 63). “[A]ll hardship
factors should be considered in the aggregate to determine
whether the qualifying relative will suffer hardship that
rises to the level of `exceptional and extremely unusual.' ”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a (quoting Monreal-Aguinaga, 23
I. & N. Dec., at 64).
The IJ then applied this standard to the established facts.
He found that M.'s asthma was a serious medical condition
and that Wilkinson provided emotional and fnancial care to
his son. He found that M. had been struggling since Wilkin-
son's detention. Nevertheless, the IJ held that M. did not
meet the statutory standard for exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship. The IJ reasoned that M. received medi-

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cal insurance from the government and that he and his fam-
i
ly might qualify for other public assistance if necessary.
Although Wilkinson provided emotional support, the I J
noted that M. had lived without Wilkinson's “daily presence”
for most of M.'s life. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. The IJ
recognized that M. and his mother would suffer some fnan-
cial hardship from Wilkinson's removal. Yet the IJ rea-
soned that Wilkinson had not provided evidence that he
would be unable to work and support his family from Trini-
dad and Tobago. The IJ also noted that M.'s mother was
able to work even though she had primarily been caring
for M. He reasoned that M.'s grandmother, who had helped
care for M. before, could continue to do so.
Based on “the aggregate of the factors” that he “weighed,”
the IJ found that any fnancial or emotional hardship was
not “beyond that which would normally be expected from
the removal of a parent and provider.” Id., at 29a (citing
Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 65). Ultimately, the
IJ held that “the evidence of hardship” in the case did not
rise to the level of “exceptional and extremely unusual hard-
ship.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. Because he held that
Wilkinson was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of re-
moval, the IJ did “not reach determining whether or not to
exercise [his] discretion to grant the application for cancella-
tion of removal.” Ibid. The IJ denied Wilkinson's applica-
tion. Wilkinson appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA. The
BIA affrmed without issuing an opinion.
Wilkinson petitioned the Third Circuit for review, arguing
that the court had jurisdiction to review the BIA's hardship
determination as a mixed question of law and fact. The Third
Circuit held that because the hardship determination was “dis-
cretionary,” it lacked jurisdiction to review it. Id., at 3a (cit-
ing § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328 (2022)).
It therefore dismissed that part of Wilkinson's petition.
Wilkinson asked this Court to grant certiorari to resolve
whether the IJ's “determination that a given set of estab-

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lished facts does not rise to the statutory standard of `excep-
ti
onal and extremely unusual hardship' is a mixed question
of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D) . . . or
whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call
unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” Pet. for Cert. i.
This Court granted certiorari. 600 U. S. ––– (2023). The
Courts of Appeals are split on this question.
2
This Court
now holds that the application of the exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts is
reviewable as a question of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
II
Section 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that a court of appeals may
consider fnal orders of removal via petitions raising “consti-
tutional claims or questions of law.” In Guerrero-Lasprilla,
this Court held that “the statutory phrase `questions of law'
includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or
established facts,” also referred to as mixed questions of law
and fact. 589 U. S., at 227. The statutory criterion of “ex-
ceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a legal stand-
ard that an IJ must, at the frst step, apply to a set of es-
tablished facts. This Court therefore holds that it is a
“questio[n] of law” over which § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides judi-
cial review.
2
Three Circuits have held that courts of appeals have jurisdiction over
hardship determinations because they are mixed questions of law and fact.
See Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland, 34 F. 4th 603, 610 (CA7 2022); Singh v.
Rosen, 984 F. 3d 1142, 1150 (CA6 2021); Gonzalez Galvan v. Garland, 6 F.
4th 552, 555 (CA4 2021). Six Circuits have indicated that courts of ap-
peals have no jurisdiction over the BIA's hardship determinations. See
Gonzalez-Rivas v. Garland, 53 F. 4th 1129, 1132 (CA8 2022); Flores-
Alonso v. United States Atty. Gen., 36 F. 4th 1095, 1100 (CA11 2022)
(per curiam); Castillo-Gutierrez v. Garland, 43 F. 4th 477, 481 (CA5 2022)
(per curiam); Aguilar-Osorio v. Garland, 991 F. 3d 997, 999 (CA9 2021)
(per curiam); Hernandez-Morales v. Attorney Gen. U. S., 977 F. 3d 247,
249 (CA3 2020); Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F. 3d 1176, 1183–1184
(CA10 2020).

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The hardship determination in this case was not discre-
ti
onary. Because the IJ held that M.'s hardship did not sat-
isfy the statutory eligibility criteria, he never reached the
second step and exercised his unreviewable discretion to can-
cel or decline to cancel Wilkinson's removal. The Third Cir-
cuit therefore erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to
review the IJ's determination in this case.
A
Section 1252 generally grants federal courts the power to
review fnal orders of removal. § 1252(a)(1). It then strips
courts of jurisdiction for certain categories of removal order.
§ 1252(a)(2). Finally, it restores jurisdiction to review “con-
stitutional claims or questions of law.” § 1252(a)(2)(D).
3
Relevant here, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdic-
tion over “judgment[s] regarding the granting of [discretion-
ary] relief under section . . . 1229b.” Section 1229b governs
cancellation of removal. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) therefore
strips courts of jurisdiction over a “judgment” on cancella-
tion of removal. The Third Circuit held that it had no juris-
diction over the part of Wilkinson's petition related to the
hardship determination on this basis.
That holding ignores § 1252(a)(2)(D), which restores juris-
diction to review “questions of law.” Two clear rules govern
the interaction between § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (which strips juris-
diction over judgments regarding discretionary relief ) and
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) (which restores it for legal questions), laid out
in two of this Court's previous cases: Guerrero-Lasprilla
and Patel. Guerrero-Lasprilla held that petitions raising
3
This scheme is the result of this Court's decision in INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U. S. 289 (2001), which construed earlier versions of the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions as permitting review in habeas corpus proceedings
“to avoid the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by a
contrary interpretation.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 232
(2020) (citi ng St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 299 – 305). Congress enac ted
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) to ensure the constitutionality of its jurisdiction-stripping
provisions. See 589 U. S., at 232–234.

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mixed questions of law and fact are always reviewable as
questi
ons of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D). 589 U. S., at 225.
Patel held that questions of fact underlying denials of discre-
tionary relief are unreviewable under both § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
and § 1252(a)(2)(D). 596 U. S., at 343, 347. Those two rules
resolve this case.
In Guerrero-Lasprilla, § 1252(a)(2)(C) stripped courts of
jurisdiction over two noncitizens' orders of removal via a
different provision targeting certain criminal convictions.
Those noncitizens had sought to reopen their immigration
cases after being removed because a change in the law re-
garding their criminal convictions rendered them newly eli-
gible for discretionary relief. Although the 90-day time
limit to reopen their cases had expired, they argued that the
limit should be “equitably tolled.” 589 U. S., at 225–226.
The BIA denied their request, concluding that each had
failed to demonstrate the requisite due diligence. When the
noncitizens petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review of that
decision, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide
the question. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that whether a
noncitizen acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal
proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling was a question
of fact, not a “questio[n] of law” that would restore jurisdic-
tion under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
This Court reversed. The Court held that “questions of
law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) included mixed questions of law and
fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 225. The “applica-
tion of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts”
is a mixed question. Ibid. Whether the BIA had correctly
applied the equitable tolling due diligence standard to the
facts was therefore a question of law reviewable by a court
of appeals.
In so doing, this Court rejected the Government's primary
argument that “questions of law” referred only to mixed
questions that are primarily legal rather than primarily fac-
tual. Such an interpretation, the Court reasoned, would

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“forbid review of any [BIA] decision applying a properly
st
ated legal standard, irrespective of how mistaken that ap-
plication might be.” Id., at 236. This Court also rejected
the Government's alternative argument that “questions of
law” should be limited to “ `pure' ” questions of law based on
the statutory context, history, and relevant precedent. Id.,
at 230–234. Finally, the Court rejected the Government's
argument that interpreting “questions of law” to cover all
mixed questions would “undercut Congress' efforts to se-
verely limit and streamline judicial review.” Id., at 235.
Section 1252(a)(2)(D) had no effect on the unreviewability of
factual determinations which, as the Court noted, are “an
important category in the removal context.” Ibid.
The issue of questions of fact came before this Court in
Patel. There, the noncitizen checked a box in his application
for a state driver's license indicating that he was a U. S. citi-
zen when he was not. 596 U. S., at 333. Because of that
misrepresentation, he became statutorily inadmissible to ad-
just his status to permanent resident. Later, in removal
proceedings, the noncitizen conceded he was removable but
argued that he mistakenly checked the box and lacked the
statutory mens rea. The IJ found him not credible, based
partly on the fact that he had a strong incentive to deceive
state offcials about his citizenship status to obtain a state
driver's license. The noncitizen appealed, arguing that the
basis for the credibility determination was clearly wrong:
Under state law, he was entitled to a driver's license without
being a citizen. The BIA determined that the IJ's factual
fndings were not clearly erroneous and dismissed the appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the petition for review,
holding that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),
which strips courts of jurisdiction to review “ `any judgment
regarding the granting of relief ' ” under the adjustment-
of-status provision. Id., at 335. The court concluded that
both whether petitioner had testifed credibly and whether
he had subjectively intended to misrepresent himself as

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a citi zen were fac tua l deter mi nati ons that fel l w ith i n
§
1252(a)(2)(B)(i)'s jurisdictional bar.
This Court affrmed. The Court held that these factual
fndings, which formed the basis for the denial of relief, fell
within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)'s jurisdiction-stripping provision.
Further, § 1252(a)(2)(D) did not restore jurisdiction, because
“questions of fact” are indisputably not “questions of law.”
Id., at 339. Relying on Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Court noted
that questions of fact were the “major remaining category”
for which Congress could still strip courts of jurisdiction.
596 U. S., at 339–340.
B
Wilkinson does not dispute that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) generally
strips courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal
decisions. He argues, instead, that § 1252(a)(2)(D) restores
jurisdiction in this case because the threshold question
whether a noncitizen is statutorily eligible for cancellation of
removal requires a court to assess whether an IJ correctly
applied the statutory standard to a given set of facts. This
Court agrees that the application of the statutory “excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to a
given set of facts presents a mixed question of law and fact.
Guerrero-Lasprilla compels this conclusion.
Guerrero-Lasprilla held that “the statutory term `ques-
tions of law' ” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) “includes the application of a
legal standard to established facts.” 589 U. S., at 234. That
term included the application of the due diligence standard
for equitable tolling to a given set of facts. Similarly, the
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard in
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D) is a legal standard that an IJ applies to facts.
The standard may require an IJ to closely examine and
weigh a set of established facts, but it is not a factual inquiry.
It is, inescapably, a mixed question of law and fact.
Mixed questions “are not all alike.” U. S. Bank N. A. v.
Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. 387, 395–396 (2018). A
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work.” Id., at 396. It may “require courts to expound on
the
law . . . by amplifying or elaborating on a broad legal
standard.” Ibid. Or it may “immerse courts in case-
specifc factual issues—compelling them to marshal and
weigh evidence.” Ibid. That a mixed question requires a
court to immerse itself in facts does not transform the ques-
tion into one of fact. It simply suggests a more deferential
standard of review.
As interpreted by the BIA, the application of the “excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship” standard requires an
IJ to evaluate a number of factors in determining whether
any hardship to a U. S.-citizen or permanent-resident family
member is “substantially different from, or beyond, that
which would normally be expected from the deportation” of
a “close family membe[r].” Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N.
Dec., at 65. That application concededly requires a close ex-
amination of the facts. Yet that was also true of the due
diligence standard in Guerrero-Lasprilla, which required a
court to evaluate whether a noncitizen was adequately con-
scientious in his pursuit of a fling deadline. A mixed ques-
tion that requires close engagement with the facts is still a
mixed question, and it is therefore a “questio[n] of law” that
is reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Under Patel, of course, a court is still without jurisdiction
to review a factual question raised in an application for dis-
cretionary relief. As in Patel, that would include the IJ's
underlying factual determination that Wilkinson was credi-
ble, or the fnding that M. had a serious medical condition.
When an IJ weighs those found facts and applies the “excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, however,
the result is a mixed question of law and fact that is review-
able under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
C
The Government's counterarguments largely seek to re-
litigate Guerrero-Lasprilla. This Court is unpersuaded.
First, the Government argues that the statutory standard
is not a legal standard at all. It asks this Court to limit

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Guerrero-Lasprilla solely to judicially created standards
l
ike the “due diligence” standard for equitable tolling.
Nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla or this Court's other prece-
dents supports such a distinction. This Court has fre-
quently observed that the application of a “statutory stand-
ard” presents a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g.,
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 289, n. 19 (1982)
(defning a mixed question as asking whether “the historical
facts . . . satisfy the statutory standard”); Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U. S. 690, 696–697 (1996) (same); U. S. Bank, 583
U. S., at 394 (same). Guerrero-Lasprilla itself refected this
understanding. See 589 U. S., at 232 (reasoning that § 1252
(a)(2)(D) was intended to preserve the kind of review tradi-
tionally available in a habeas proceeding, including review
of the “erroneous application or interpretation of statutes”
(emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted)). This
Court sees no reason to treat the statutory hardship stand-
ard here any differently from a judicially created “due dili-
gence” standard.
Second, the Government argues that a 1928 case, Wil-
liamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, and
the statutory history of the hardship requirement preclude
review. In Williamsport, the Court evaluated a wartime
tax-relief provision that was in effect from 1919 to 1921.
That provision allowed the Internal Revenue Service Com-
missioner to use a “ `special method' ” for determining a com-
pany's tax burden if computation under the regular scheme
would work “ `an exceptional hardship.' ” Id., at 558. The
statute granted the Commissioner power to act, for the most
part, without any justifcation. The Commissioner did not
have to make fndings of fact, and had to create a “meagre
record” only if he ordered a special assessment. Id., at 559.
This Court therefore concluded that the IRS's “exceptional
hardship” determination was a question of administrative
discretion not subject to judicial review. Ibid.
Williamsport has no relevance to the question presented
here. The Government provides no basis for why this Court

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should port the interpretation of “exceptional hardship”
from
a 1919 tax-relief provision to a 1996 immigration-relief
provision. An IJ applying the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” standard must create an extensive record
of his decisionmaking, including detailed factfnding and the
application of BIA precedent. Additionally, Williamsport
did not evaluate the term “exceptional hardship” against the
background of a jurisdiction-restoring provision like § 1252
(a)(2)(D), enacted in 2005.
The Government's argument from the statutory history of
the “hardship requirement” is no more persuasive. Brief for
Respondent 26. The precursor to cancellation of removal
was suspension of deportation. That relief was available
only to a “person whose deportation would, in the opinion
of the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” to the noncitizen himself or a qualifying
relative. §§ 244(a)(1)–(5), 66 Stat. 214–216 (emphasis added).
The Government argues that this Court should read that dis-
cretion back into the current version of the statute.
The Government's request to reinstate statutory language
removed by Congress is particularly unavailing because
Congress chose to retain similar language in provisions
governing other forms of discretionary relief subject to
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)'s bar on judicial review. See, e.g., § 1182
(h)(1)(B) (allowing relief “if it is established to the satisfac-
tion of the Attorney General that the [noncitizen's] denial of
admission would result in extreme hardship to the United
States citizen”); § 1182(i)(1) (allowing relief “if it is estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the
refusal of admission . . . of such [noncitizen] would result in
extreme hardship to the citizen . . . spouse or parent”);
§ 1255(l)(1) (allowing relief if “in the opinion of the Secretary
of [DHS], in consultation with the Attorney General, as ap-
propriate . . . the [noncitizen] would suffer extreme hardship
involving unusual and severe harm upon removal”). Con-
gress could have, but did not, do the same with the hardship
requirement in § 1229b(b)(1).

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The Government's fnal argument is one this Court already
re
jected in Guerrero-Lasprilla: that a primarily factual
mixed question is a question of fact. Such a rule would re-
quire a court of appeals evaluating its jurisdiction to deter-
mine in every instance whether a particular legal standard
presented a primarily factual or primarily legal inquiry.
Nothing in § 1252(a)(2)(D) or its statutory context suggests
that “questions of law” is so limited. See 589 U. S., at 227–
228. This Court declined to require the courts of appeals to
engage in that complex line-drawing exercise in Guerrero-
Lasprilla, and it declines to do so here.
***
Today's decision announces nothing more remarkable than
the fact that this Court meant what it said in Guerrero-
Lasprilla: Mixed questions of law and fact, even when they
are primarily factual, fall within the statutory defnition
of “questions of law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) and are therefore
reviewable. That holding does not render § 1252(a)(2)'s
jurisdicti on-str ipping provisions meaningless. As th is
Court said in Guerrero-Lasprilla and reiterated in Patel,
those provisions still operate to exclude “agency fact-fnding
from review.” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 234–235;
Patel, 596 U. S., at 339 (“[J]udicial review of factfnding is
unavailable”). The facts underlying any determination on
cancellation of removal therefore remain unreviewable. For
instance, an IJ's factfnding on credibility, the seriousness of
a family member's medical condition, or the level of fnancial
support a noncitizen currently provides remain unreview-
able. Only the question whether those established facts sat-
isfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to judicial
review.
4
Because this mixed question is primarily factual,
that review is deferential.
4
Similarly, if the IJ decides a noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of
removal at step one, his step-two discretionary determination on whether
or not to grant cancellation of removal in the particular case is not review-
able as a question of law.

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Jackson, J., concurring in judgment
For these reasons, the Court reverses the Third Circuit's
“
jurisdictional” decision, vacates its judgment, and remands
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Jackson, concurring in the judgment.
The Immigration and Nationality Act plainly constrains
judicial review of discretionary-relief determinations. It
frst strips courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment
regarding the granting of relief ” under provisions including
8 U. S. C. § 1229b, which governs cancellation of removal.
See § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Then, the Act restores judicial review
for only a subset of claims—“constitutional claims or ques-
tions of law” raised in a petition for review in the courts of
appeals. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Through these provisions, Con-
gress made clear that courts should play a minimal role in
the discretionary-relief process.
In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020), the
Court interpreted the phrase “questions of law” in § 1252(a)
(2)(D) to include mixed questions of law and fact, i.e., “the
application of a legal standard to undisputed or established
facts.” Id., at 225. Today, the Court removes any doubt
that the phrase “questions of law” encompasses all mixed
questions, even those that are “primarily factual.” Ante, at
225. Thus, an immigration judge's determination that a
“noncitizen's removal would result in `exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship' ” presents a judicially reviewable
mixed question. Ante, at 211–212 (quoting § 1229b(b)(1)(D)).
Pointing to our precedent, the Court holds that “Guerrero-
Lasprilla compels this conclusion.” Ante, at 221.
I am skeptical that Congress intended “questions of law”
as used in § 1252(a)(2)(D) to sweep so broadly, given the stat-
utory scheme. The legislative history of the provision,
though not conclusive, provides additional evidence to the
contrary. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 109–72, p. 175 (2005)

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
(noting that “[t]he purpose” of the provision was “to permit
judicia
l review over . . . constitutional and statutory-
construction questions, not discretionary or factual ques-
tions” (emphasis added)). As the dissent observes, under a
maximalist reading of “questions of law,” the exception to
limited judicial review is poised to swallow the rule. See post,
at 228–230 (opinion of Alito, J.). If that reading is correct,
Congress went through an awful lot to achieve relatively little.
I had not yet joined the Court when it decided Guerrero-
Lasprilla. But I agree that Guerrero-Lasprilla controls
this case. The fundamental principle of stare decisis—“that
today's Court should stand by yesterday's decisions”—has
“enhanced force” when a decision interprets a statute.
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455–
456 (2015). Congress remains free to revise the statute, and
it should do so if we have strayed from its intent concerning
the scope of judicial review set forth in § 1252(a)(2)(D).
I concur in today's judgment with the understanding that
the jurisdiction-stripping provision is not “meaningless.”
Ante, at 225. When reviewing denials of discretionary re-
lief, courts should respect the choice of Congress, refecting
the will of the People, to limit judicial interference. Courts
cannot review the facts underlying a hardship determination
in the cancellation-of-removal context, and they should care-
fully distinguish between application of the “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” legal standard, such as it is, and
those unreviewable facts.
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting.
I joined the opinion of the Court in Guerrero-Lasprilla v.
Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020), and continue to believe that it was
correctly decided. I agree with Justice Alito's dissent in
this case, however, that the Court errs in reading the lan-
guage in Guerrero-Lasprilla “as broadly as possible,” indeed
“to the outer limits of its possible reach.” Post, at 232, 231.

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Alito, J., dissenting
Nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla requires such a reading, and
I
accordingly join Justice Alito's dissent.
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice and
Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
In the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546, Congress
sought to control illegal immigration and streamline the pro-
cedures for removing illegal aliens who had been convicted
of criminal offenses. A key provision of the Act is 8 U. S. C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides that “no court shall have
jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the
granting ” of certain forms of discretionary relief. After
IIRIRA's enactment, this Court fagged a “substantial con-
stitutional questio[n]” that would arise if federal habeas
courts were stripped of jurisdiction to review “pure ques-
tion[s] of law.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 300 (2001).
Congress responded by enacting an amendment clarifying
that § 1252(a)(2)(B) did not “preclud[e] review of constitu-
tional claims or questions of law.” § 1252(a)(2)(D).
I
In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020), this
Court addressed the meaning of this amendment. The case
concerned two criminal aliens who were ordered removed
and then failed to ask to have their removal proceedings re-
opened by the 90-day statutory deadline. They argued,
however, that the deadline should be equitably tolled. The-
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected that argu-
ment, and the issue before us was whether the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to review such a decision under
§ 1252(a)(2)(B) and § 1252(a)(2)(D).
The answer to that question depended on whether the cor-
rectness of the BIA's decisions was a “questio[n] of law”
within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D). The aliens urged us
to decide the case on “narrow grounds.” Brief for Petition-

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ers in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, O. T. 2019, No. 18–776
etc.,
p. 15. They did not dispute the relevant facts, see 589
U. S., at 226, but argued that the BIA had applied the wrong
legal test in holding that they had not acted with suffcient
diligence to justify equitable tolling—specifcally, that the
BIA had demanded a demonstration of “ `maximum feasible
diligence' ” rather than “ `reasonable diligence, ' ” which
they claimed was the right test. Brief for Petitioners in
Guerrero-Lasprilla, at 15.
The Court ruled for the aliens and in doing so stated
broadly that “questions of law” include all questions that in-
volve the application of the law to a particular set of facts.
589 U. S., at 228. Under this statement, the phrase “ques-
tions of law” has a stunning sweep. It encompasses all sorts
of discretionary rulings that depend almost entirely on the
relevant facts, as a few examples of mundane trial court rul-
ings illustrate. For one, take a trial court's denial of a re-
quest for a continuance or a decision about the length of a
trial day or the days of the week during which a jury is
required to sit. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U. S. 1, 11 (1983).
Such decisions are governed by a legal standard, albeit a
very permissive one: the decisions cannot be “unreasoning
and arbitrary.” Ibid. But in the rare case in which such a
decision is reversed on appeal, the appellate court is unlikely
to say that the trial court made an error of law because it
mistakenly thought a continuance would be unreasonable and
arbitrary. Instead, the question on appeal would almost
certainly be based on an assessment of the facts.
Here is another example. Under the broad language of
Guerrero-Lasprilla, juries decide questions of law whenever
they return a verdict in a criminal or civil case. If, for ex-
ample, a jury in a criminal case fnds that a defendant vio-
lated a statute that requires “knowing ” conduct, the jury
decides a question of law because it applies the law (as set
out in the court's instructions on the meaning of “knowing ”
conduct, see, e. g., 2B K. O'Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Fed-

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eral Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal § 70:07 (6th ed.
2010)),
to the facts as they see them. Likewise, in a routine
negligence case, the jury applies the law (as explained in the
court's instructions on the meaning of “negligence,” see, e. g.,
3A id., Civil § 155:30 (2012)), to the facts shown at trial.
W hen Congress responded to St. Cyr by enac ti ng
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), did it mean to adopt this maximalist under-
standing of “questions of law”? St. Cyr never suggested
that Congress was obligated to go that far, and if Congress
had wanted to achieve the end that results from the Court's
broad statements in Guerrero-Lasprilla, Congress might
as well have repealed § 1252(a)(2)(B) outright. Under the
Guerrero-Lasprilla formulation, the net effect of § 1252
(a)(2)(B) and § 1252(a)(2)(D) is as follows. Before the enact-
ment of those provisions, pure fndings of fact were subject
to review, but under a very deferential standard—namely,
they could be overturned only if “ `any reasonable adjudica-
tor would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.' ” Nas-
rallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 584 (2020). Afterwards, pure
fndings of fact were not reviewable at all. Is it plausible
that this pipsqueak of a change was Congress's cure for what
it saw as undue delay in the conclusion of removal proceed-
ings for criminal aliens? I hardly think so.
II
I dissented in Guerrero-Lasprilla because I feared that
the Court's sweeping language would lead to “absurd results
in light of the statute's structure” and would “transform
§ 1252(a)(2)(D)'s narrow exception into a broad provision per-
mitting judicial review of all criminal aliens' challenges to
their removal proceedings except the precious few that raise
only pure questions of fact.” 589 U. S., at 238, 240 (Thomas,
J., joined by Alito, J., dissenting). Under this reading, “the
exception” for “questions of law” “all but swallows the rule.”
Id., at 241.

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We are permitted to exercise at least a modicum of “ `com-
mon
sense' ” when we interpret a statute, see West Virginia
v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 722 (2022), and Guerrero-Lasprilla's
broad language defes common sense. If the Congress that
enacted § 1252(a)(2)(D) had wanted to bring about the result
that the broad statements in Guerrero-Lasprilla suggest, it
could have simply repealed § 1252(a)(2)(B) and stated in
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) that courts cannot review pure questions of
fact. Qualifying the broad prohibition in § 1252(a)(2)(D) by
adding an exception that all but eliminates the prohibition
would have been a very odd way of achieving that result.
What the Court says that Congress did—combining the
broad prohibition in § 1252(a)(2)(B) with the nearly congru-
ent exception in § 1252(a)(2)(D)—would be the equivalent of
a city council adopting an ordinance banning all dogs from a
park with an exception for all dogs that weigh under 125
pounds. Or the council passes an ordinance prohibiting all
persons from riding a bicycle without a helmet but then
adopts an exception for all persons under the age of 90.
When Congress enacted § 1252(a)(2)(D), it was not engaging
in such silliness.
III
Accepting of the judgment in Guerrero-Lasprilla—that
the BIA's understanding of the scope of equitable tolling is
a question of law—does not require that we take the lan-
guage in the Court's opinion to the outer limits of its possible
reach. But that is what the Court has now done. As Jus-
tice Breyer, the author of the opinion in Guerrero-Lasprilla,
recognized in an earlier opinion for the Court, the concept of
a question of law does not always encompass all applications
of the law to a set of facts. In Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.
v. Albrecht, 587 U. S. 299 (2019), the decision hung on the
question whether the Food and Drug Administration would
have approved a change in a drug 's label. The Court recog-
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ments, but the Court did not hold that the question was one
of
law simply because it involved the application of law to a
set of facts. Id., at 316–318. Rather, the Court considered
which element was most likely to be contested and asked
whether the answer to the question whether the FDA would
have approved the change would generally turn on a judg-
ment about the law or the facts. Ibid.
If that same mode of analysis is applied here, the answer
is clear—and it is the opposite of the one given by the Court.
Whether “removal would result in exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship” to the “spouse, parent, or child”
of the alien subject to removal is overwhelmingly a question
of fact. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The only legal component con-
sists of the meaning of the everyday terms “hardship,” “ex-
ceptional,” and “unusual.”
The facts of this case illustrate the degree to which the
factual element involved in the question at hand overwhelms
the slim legal component. Below, petitioner argued that the
Immigration Judge misunderstood “the depth of the emo-
tional relationship between Petitioner and his Child,” the
amount of “care and support that Petitioner's Child would
receive if Petitioner is removed,” and “the Child's uncommon
and diffcult situation, in light of his family's unwillingness
to provide him access to care for his mental health needs.”
Brief for Petitioner in No. 21–3166 (CA3), pp. 21–22. All
those issues are entirely factual, and there is no legal princi-
ple that can help an immigration judge, the BIA, or a court
assess whether any “hardship” resulting from petitioner's re-
moval would be “exceptional and extremely unusual.” That
question must be decided by the application of what the
decision-maker knows from experience about human nature
and family relationships. Consequently, the question should
not be classifed as a “question of law” under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
The Court, however, reads Guerrero-Lasprilla as broadly
as possible. As it sees things, all “[m]ixed questions” are
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Ante, at 225. And since the question here is overwhelm-
i
ngly factual, what the Court seems to mean by “primarily”
is anything that falls short of 100%.
That is not what Congress meant when it enacted
§ 1252(a)(2)(B) and § 1252(a)(2)(D), and I therefore respect-
fully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 209, line 21: “, but need not show that such hardship would be `uncon-
scionable.' ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a (quoting ” is inserted after
“removal”
p. 209, line 22: “62” is replaced with “60)”
p. 215, line 19: “62” is replaced with “60”
p. 215, line 19: “2021” is replaced with “2001”
p. 231, line 12 from bottom: “estoppel” is replaced with “tolling ”
p. 232, line 12 from bottom: “16–17” is replaced with “21–22”