Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 597 U. S. Part 2
Pages 629–696
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 29, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
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629
Syllabus
OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
certiorari
to the court of criminal appeals of
oklahoma
No. 21–429. Argued April 27, 2022—Decided June 29, 2022
In 2015, respondent Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta was charged by the
State of Oklahoma for child neglect. Castro-Huerta was convicted in
state court and sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment. While Castro-
Huerta's state-court appeal was pending, this Court decided McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 591 U. S. –––. There, the Court held that the Creek Nation's
reservation in eastern Oklahoma had never been properly disestablished
and therefore remained “Indian country.” Id., at –––. In light of Mc-
Girt, the eastern part of Oklahoma, including Tulsa, is recognized as In-
dian country. Following this development, Castro-Huerta argued that
the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute him (a
non-Indian) for a crime committed against his stepdaughter (a Cherokee
Indian) in Tulsa (Indian country), and that the State therefore lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute him. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals agreed and vacated his conviction. This Court granted certiorari
to determine the extent of a State's jurisdiction to prosecute crimes
committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
Held: The Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction
to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
country. Pp. 636–656.
(a) The jurisdictional dispute in this case arises because Oklahoma's
territory includes Indian country. In the early Republic, the Federal
Government sometimes treated Indian country as separate from state
territory. See Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515. But that view has
long since been abandoned. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369
U. S. 60, 72. And the Court has specifcally held that States have juris-
diction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against non-
Indians in Indian country. United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621;
see also Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 244–247. Accordingly,
States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian coun-
try unless preempted. Pp. 636–638.
(b) Under Court precedent, a State's jurisdiction in Indian country
may be preempted by federal law under ordinary principles of federal
preemption, or when the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully
infringe on tribal self-government. Neither serves to preempt state
jurisdiction in this case. Pp. 638–651.

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Syllabus
(1) Castro-Huerta points to two federal laws—the General Crimes
A
ct and Public Law 280—that, in his view, preempt Oklahoma's author-
ity to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in
Indian country. Neither statute, however, preempts the State's juris-
diction. Pp. 638–649.
(i) The General Crimes Act does not preempt state authority to
prosecute Castro-Huerta's crime. It provides that “the general laws of
the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed . . . within
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall extend
to the Indian country.” 18 U. S. C. § 1152. By its terms, the Act simply
“extend[s]” the federal laws that apply on federal enclaves to Indian
country. The Act does not say that Indian country is equivalent to a
federal enclave for jurisdictional purposes, that federal jurisdiction is
exclusive in Indian country, or that state jurisdiction is preempted in
Indian country.
Castro-Huerta claims that the General Crimes Act does indeed make
Indian country the jurisdictional equivalent of a federal enclave.
Castro-Huerta is wrong as a matter of text and precedent.
Pointing to the history of territorial separation and Congress's reen-
actment of the General Crimes Act after this Court suggested in dicta
in Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711, 714, that States lack jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
country, Castro-Huerta argues that Congress implicitly intended for
the Act to provide the Federal Government with exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
But the text of the Act says no such thing; the idea of territorial separa-
tion has long since been abandoned; and the reenactment canon cannot
be invoked to override clear statutory language of the kind present in
the General Crimes Act. Castro-Huerta notes that the Court has re-
peated the Williams dicta on subsequent occasions, but even repeated
dicta does not constitute precedent and does not alter the plain text of
the General Crimes Act. Pp. 639–647.
(ii) Castro-Huerta's attempt to invoke Public Law 280, 67 Stat.
588, is also unpersuasive. That law affrmatively grants certain States
(and allows other States to acquire) broad jurisdiction to prosecute
state-law offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country.
18 U. S. C. § 1162; 25 U. S. C. § 1321. Castro-Huerta contends that the
law's enactment in 1953 would have been pointless surplusage if States
already had concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-
Indians against Indians in Indian country. But Public Law 280 contains
no language preempting state jurisdiction. And Public Law 280 encom-
passes far more than just non-Indian on Indian crimes. Thus, resolu-

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Syllabus
tion of the narrow jurisdictional issue here does not negate the signif-
cance
of Public Law 280. Pp. 647–649.
(2) The test articulated in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, does not bar the State from prosecuting crimes
committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. There,
the Court held that even when federal law does not preempt state juris-
diction under ordinary preemption analysis, preemption may still occur
if the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully infringe upon tribal
self-government. Id., at 142–143. Under Bracker's balancing test, the
Court considers tribal interests, federal interests, and state interests.
Id., at 145. Here, the exercise of state jurisdiction would not infringe
on tribal self-government. And because a State's jurisdiction is concur-
rent with federal jurisdiction, a state prosecution would not preclude
an earlier or later federal prosecution. Finally, the State has a strong
sovereign interest in ensuring public safety and criminal justice within
its territory, including an interest in protecting both Indian and non-
Indian crime victims. Pp. 649–651.
(c) This Court has long held that Indian country is part of a State,
not separate from it. Under the Constitution, States have jurisdiction
to prosecute crimes within their territory except when preempted by
federal law or by principles of tribal self-government. The default is
that States have criminal jurisdiction in Indian country unless that ju-
risdiction is preempted. And that jurisdiction has not been preempted
here. Pp. 652–656.
Reversed and remanded.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., fled a
dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined,
post, p. 656.
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were William T. Marks, John M.
O'Connor, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Mithun Mansing-
hani, Solicitor General, Caroline Hunt and Jennifer Crabb,
Assistant Attorneys General, Bryan Cleveland, Assistant
Solicitor General, and Ryan Leonard.
Zachary C. Schauf argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Matthew S. Hellman, Leonard
R. Powell, Allison M. Tjemsland, David A. Strauss, and
Sarah M. Konsky.

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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Opinion of the Court
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
the
United States as amicus curiae supporting respondent.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, As-
sistant Attorney General Kim, Erica L. Ross, and James
A. Maysonett.*
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a jurisdictional question about the
prosecution of crimes committed by non-Indians against In-
dians in Indian country: Under current federal law, does the
Federal Government have exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute
those crimes? Or do the Federal Government and the State
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Texas
et al. by Judd E. Stone II, Solicitor General, Ken Paxton, Attorney Gen-
eral of Texas, Brent Webster, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip
A. Lionberger and Rance Craft, Assistant Solicitors General, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Derek Schmidt
of Kansas, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, and
Jason S. Miyares of Virginia; for the Citizens Equal Rights Foundation by
Lawrence A. Kogan; for the Environmental Federation of Oklahoma, Inc.,
et al. by Lynn H. Slade, Walter E. Stern, and Deana M. Bennett; and for the
Oklahoma District Attorneys Association et al. by Katherine C. Yarger.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Cherokee Na-
tion et al. by Robert H. Henry, Stephen H. Greetham, Frank S. Holleman
IV, Douglas B. L. Endreson, Chrissi Nimmo, Patti Palmer Ghezzi, L. Susan
Work, Riyaz A. Kanji, David A. Giampetroni, O. Joseph Williams, and Val-
erie Devol; for Federal Indian Law Scholars et al. by Z. W. Julius Chen,
Pratik A. Shah, and Amanda L. White Eagle; for Former United States At-
torneys Michael Cotter et al. by Troy A. Eid, pro se, and Jennifer H. Weddle;
for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Michael R.
Dreeben, Barbara E. Bergman, and Melissa C. Cassel; for the National Con-
gress of American Indians by Colby D. Duren; and for the National Indige-
nous Women's Resource Center et al. by Mary Kathryn Nagle.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, by
Blaine H. Evanson and Jean Ann Hudson; for the Navajo Nation et al.
by Paul Spruhan and Heather Whiteman Runs Him; for the Oklahoma
Association of Chiefs of Police by Andrew W. Lester and Anthony J. Fer-
ate; and for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma
by Klint A. Cowan.

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633
Opinion of the Court
have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute those crimes? We
conclude
that the Federal Government and the State have
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by
non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
I
In 2015, Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta lived in Tulsa, Okla-
homa, with his wife and their several children, including
Castro-Huer ta's then-5-year-old stepdaughter, who is a
Cherokee Indian. The stepdaughter has cerebral palsy and
is legally blind. One day in 2015, Castro-Huerta's sister-in-
law was in the house and noticed that the young girl was
sick. After a 911 call, the girl was rushed to a Tulsa hospi-
tal in critical condition. Dehydrated, emaciated, and cov-
ered in lice and excrement, she weighed only 19 pounds. In-
vestigators later found her bed flled with bedbugs and
cockroaches.
When questioned, Castro-Huerta admitted that he had se-
verely undernourished his stepdaughter during the preced-
ing month. The State of Oklahoma criminally charged both
Castro-Huerta and his wife for child neglect. Both were
convicted. Castro-Huerta was sentenced to 35 years of im-
prisonment, with the possibility of parole. This case con-
cerns the State's prosecution of Castro-Huerta.
After Castro-Huerta was convicted and while his appeal
was pending in state court, this Court decided McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 591 U. S. ––– (2020). In McGirt, the Court held
that Congress had never properly disestablished the Creek
Nation's reservation in eastern Oklahoma. As a result, the
Court concluded that the Creek Reservation remained “In-
dian country.” Id., at ––– – –––, –––, –––. The status of
that part of Oklahoma as Indian country meant that different
jurisdictional rules might apply for the prosecution of crimi-
nal offenses in that area. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 1151–1153.
Based on McGirt's reasoning, the Oklahoma Court of Crimi-
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634 OKLAH
OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Opinion of the Court
nal Appeals later recognized that several other Indian reser-
vati
ons in Oklahoma had likewise never been properly dises-
tablished. See, e. g., State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 2021
OK CR 21, ¶15, 497 P. 3d 686, 689 (reaffrming recognition
of the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Reservations);
Grayson v. State, 2021 OK CR 8, ¶10, 485 P. 3d 250, 254
(Seminole Reservation).
In light of McGirt and the follow-on cases, the eastern part
of Oklahoma, including Tulsa, is now recognized as Indian
country. About two million people live there, and the vast
majority are not Indians.
The classifcation of eastern Oklahoma as Indian country
has raised urgent questions about which government or gov-
ernments have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed
there. This case is an example: a crime committed in what
is now recognized as Indian country (Tulsa) by a non-Indian
(Castro-Huerta) against an Indian (his stepdaughter). All
agree that the Federal Government has jurisdiction to prose-
cute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in In-
dian country. The question is whether the Federal Govern-
ment's jurisdiction is exclusive, or whether the State also has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government.
In the wake of McGirt, Castro-Huerta argued that the
Federal Government's jurisdiction to prosecute crimes com-
mitted by a non-Indian against an Indian in Indian country
is exclusive and that the State therefore lacked jurisdiction
to prosecute him. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
agreed with Castro-Huerta. Relying on an earlier Okla-
homa decision holding that the federal General Crimes Act
grants the Federal Government exclusive jurisdiction, the
court ruled that the State did not have concurrent jurisdic-
tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against
Indians in Indian country. The court therefore vacated
Castro-Huerta's conviction. No. F–2017–1203 (Apr. 29,
2021); see also Bosse v. State, 2021 OK CR 3, 484 P. 3d 286;
Roth v. State, 2021 OK CR 27, 499 P. 3d 23.
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Opinion of the Court
While Castro-Huerta's state appellate proceedings were
ongoi
ng, a federal grand jury in Oklahoma indicted Castro-
Huerta for the same conduct. Castro-Huerta accepted a plea
agreement for a 7-year sentence followed by removal from the
United States. (Castro-Huerta is not a U. S. citizen and is un-
lawfully in the United States.) In other words, putting aside
parole possibilities, Castro-Huerta in effect received a 28-year
reduction of his sentence as a result of McGirt.
Castro-Huerta's case exemplifes a now-familiar pattern in
Oklahoma in the wake of McGirt. The Oklahoma courts
have reversed numerous state convictions on that same ju-
risdictional ground. After having their state convictions
reversed, some non-Indian criminals have received lighter
sentences in plea deals negotiated with the Federal Govern-
ment. Others have simply gone free. Going forward, the
State estimates that it will have to transfer prosecutorial
responsibility for more than 18,000 cases per year to the Fed-
eral and Tribal Governments. All of this has created a sig-
nifcant challenge for the Federal Government and for the
people of Oklahoma. At the end of fscal year 2021, the U. S.
Department of Justice was opening only 22% and 31% of all
felony referrals in the Eastern and Northern Districts of
Oklahoma. Dept. of Justice, U. S. Attorneys, Fiscal Year
2023 Congressional Justifcation 46. And the Department
recently acknowledged that “many people may not be held
accountable for their criminal conduct due to resource con-
straints.” Ibid.
In light of the sudden signifcance of this jurisdictional
question for public safety and the criminal justice system in
Oklahoma, this Court granted certiorari to decide whether a
State has concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Govern-
ment to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against
Indians in Indian country. 595 U. S. ––– (2022).
1
1
Both the United States and the Cherokee Nation, along with several
other Tribes, fled amicus briefs in this case articulating their views on
the legal questions before the Court.

636 OKLAH
OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Opinion of the Court
II
The
jurisdictional dispute in this case arises because Okla-
homa's territory includes Indian country. Federal law de-
fnes “Indian country” to include, among other things, “all
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government.” 18 U. S. C.
§ 1151.
To begin with, the Constitution allows a State to exercise
jurisdiction in Indian country. Indian country is part of the
State, not separate from the State. To be sure, under this
Court's precedents, federal law may preempt that state ju-
risdiction in certain circumstances. But otherwise, as a
matter of state sovereignty, a State has jurisdiction over all
of its territory, including Indian country. See U. S. Const.,
Amdt. 10. As this Court has phrased it, a State is generally
“entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the ter-
ritory within her limits.” Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3
How. 212, 228 (1845).
In the early years of the Republic, the Federal Govern-
ment sometimes treated Indian country as separate from
state territory—in the same way that, for example, New Jer-
sey is separate from New York. Most prominently, in the
1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561, this
Court held that Georgia state law had no force in the Chero-
kee Nation because the Cherokee Nation “is a distinct com-
munity occupying its own territory.”
But the “general notion drawn from Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia” “has yielded to closer
analysis.” Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60,
72 (1962). “By 1880 the Court no longer viewed reserva-
tions as distinct nations.” Ibid. Since the latter half of the
1800s, the Court has consistently and explicitly held that In-
dian reservations are “part of the surrounding State” and
subject to the State's jurisdiction “except as forbidden by
federal law.” Ibid.
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637
Opinion of the Court
To take a few examples: In 1859, the Court stated: States
ret
ain “the power of a sovereign over their persons and
property, so far as” “necessary to preserve the peace of the
Commonwealth.” New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 21
How. 366, 370 (1859).
In 1930: “[R]eservations are part of the State within which
they lie and her laws, civil and criminal, have the same force
therein as elsewhere within her limits, save that they can
have only restricted application to the Indian wards.” Sur-
plus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 651 (1930).
In 1946: “[I]n the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or
Congressional enactment each state ha[s] a right to exercise
jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its bounda-
ries.” New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496, 499
(1946).
In 1992: “This Court's more recent cases have recognized
the rights of States, absent a congressional prohibition, to
exercise criminal (and, implicitly, civil) jurisdiction over non-
Indians located on reservation lands.” County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S.
251, 257–258 (1992).
And as recently as 2001: “State sovereignty does not end
at a reservation's border.” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U. S. 353,
361 (2001).
In accord with that overarching jurisdictional principle
dating back to the 1800s, States have jurisdiction to prose-
cute crimes committed in Indian country unless preempted.
In the leading case in the criminal context—the McBratney
case from 1882—this Court held that States have jurisdiction
to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against non-
Indians in Indian country. United States v. McBratney, 104
U. S. 621, 623–624 (1882). The Court stated that Colorado
had “criminal jurisdiction” over crimes by non-Indians
against non-Indians “throughout the whole of the territory
within its limits, including the Ute Reservation.” Id., at
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638 OKLAH
OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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624. Several years later, the Court similarly decided that
Mont
ana had criminal jurisdiction over crimes by non-
Indians against non-Indians in Indian country within that
State. Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 244–247
(1896). The McBratney principle remains good law.
In short, the Court's precedents establish that Indian
country is part of a State's territory and that, unless pre-
empted, States have jurisdiction over crimes committed in
Indian country.
III
The central question that we must decide, therefore, is
whether the State's authority to prosecute crimes committed
by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country has been
preempted. U. S. Const., Art. VI.
Under the Court's precedents, as we will explain, a State's
jurisdiction in Indian country may be preempted (i) by fed-
eral law under ordinary principles of federal preemption, or
(ii) when the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully
infringe on tribal self-government.
In Part III–A, we consider whether state authority to
prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians
in Indian country is preempted by federal law under ordi-
nary principles of preemption. In Part III–B, we consider
whether principles of tribal self-government preclude the ex-
ercise of state jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-
Indians against Indians in Indian country.
A
Castro-Huerta points to two federal laws that, in his view,
preempt Oklahoma's authority to prosecute crimes com-
mitted by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country: (i)
the General Crimes Act, which grants the Federal Govern-
ment jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in Indian country, 18
U. S. C. § 1152; and (ii) Public Law 280, which grants States,
or authorizes States to acquire, certain additional jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed in Indian country, 67 Stat. 588;
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639
Opinion of the Court
see 18 U. S. C. § 1162; 25 U. S. C. § 1321. Neither statute
preempts
preexisting or otherwise lawfully assumed state
authority to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians
against Indians in Indian country.
1
As relevant here, the General Crimes Act provides: “Ex-
cept as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the United States, except the District of Columbia,
shall extend to the Indian country.” 18 U. S. C. § 1152. By
its terms, the Act does not preempt the State's authority to
prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in
Indian country. The text of the Act simply “extend[s]” fed-
eral law to Indian country, leaving untouched the background
principle of state jurisdiction over crimes committed within
the State, including in Indian country. Ibid.
The Act also specifes the body of federal criminal law that
extends to Indian country—namely, “the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed
in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States.” Ibid. Those cross-referenced “general
laws” are the federal laws that apply in federal enclaves such
as military bases and national parks. Ibid.
Importantly, however, the General Crimes Act does not
say that Indian country is equivalent to a federal enclave for
jurisdictional purposes. Nor does the Act say that federal
jurisdiction is exclusive in Indian country, or that state juris-
diction is preempted in Indian country.
Under the General Crimes Act, therefore, both the Federal
Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to
prosecute crimes committed in Indian country.
2
The Gen-
2
To the extent that a State lacks prosecutorial authority over crimes
committed by Indians in Indian country (a question not before us), that
would not be a result of the General Crimes Act. Instead, it would be
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640 OKLAH
OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Opinion of the Court
eral Crimes Act does not preempt state authority to prose-
cute
Castro-Huerta's crime.
To overcome the text, Castro-Huerta offers several coun-
terarguments. None is persuasive.
First, Castro-Huerta advances what he describes as a
textual argument. He contends that the text of the General
Crimes Act makes Indian country the jurisdictional equiva-
lent of a federal enclave. To begin, he points out that the
Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed in federal enclaves such as military bases
and national parks. And then Castro-Huerta asserts that
the General Crimes Act in effect equates federal enclaves
and Indian country. Therefore, according to Castro-Huerta,
it follows that the Federal Government also has exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian country.
Castro-Huerta's syllogism is wrong as a textual matter.
The Act simply borrows the body of federal criminal law that
applies in federal enclaves and extends it to Indian country.
The Act does not purport to equate Indian country and fed-
eral enclaves for jurisdictional purposes. Moreover, it is not
enough to speculate, as Castro-Huerta does, that Congress
might have implicitly intended a jurisdictional parallel be-
tween Indian country and federal enclaves.
Castro-Huerta's argument also directly contradicts this
Court's precedents. As far back as 1891, the Court stated
that the phrase “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” in the Gen-
eral Crimes Act is “only used in the description of the laws
which are extended” to Indian country, not “to the jurisdic-
tion extended over the Indian country.” In re Wilson, 140
U. S. 575, 578 (1891). The Court repeated that analysis in
1913, concluding that the phrase “sole and exclusive jurisdic-
the result of a separate principle of federal law that, as discussed below,
precludes state interference with tribal self-government. See Part III–
B, in fra; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142–
143, 145 (1980); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164,
171−172 (1973).

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641
Opinion of the Court
tion” is “used in order to describe the laws of the United
St
ates which by that section are extended to the Indian
country.” Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 268
(1913).
Stated otherwise, the General Crimes Act provides that
the federal criminal laws that apply to federal enclaves also
apply in Indian country. But the extension of those federal
laws to Indian country does not silently erase preexisting or
otherwise lawfully assumed state jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country.
Moreover, if Castro-Huerta's interpretation of the General
Crimes Act were correct, then the Act would preclude States
from prosecuting any crimes in Indian country—presumably
even those crimes committed by non-Indians against non-
Indians—just as States ordinarily cannot prosecute crimes
committed in federal enclaves. But this Court has long held
that States may prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians
against non-Indians in Indian country. See McBratney, 104
U. S., at 623–624; Draper, 164 U. S., at 242–246. Those hold-
ings, too, contravene Castro-Huerta's argument regarding
the General Crimes Act.
In advancing his enclave argument, Castro-Huerta also
tries to analogize the text of the General Crimes Act to the
text of the Major Crimes Act. He asserts that the Major
Crimes Act grants the Federal Government exclusive juris-
diction to prosecute certain major crimes committed by Indi-
ans in Indian country. But the Major Crimes Act contains
substantially different language than the General Crimes
Act. Unlike the General Crimes Act, the Major Crimes Act
says that defendants in Indian country “shall be subject to
the same law” as defendants in federal enclaves. See 18
U. S. C. § 1153 (“Any Indian who commits against the person
or property of another Indian or other person any of ” certain
major offenses “shall be subject to the same law and penal-
ties as all other persons committing any of the above of-
fenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
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642 OKLAH
OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Opinion of the Court
States”). So even assuming that the text of the Major
Cr
imes Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over
major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country, see,
e. g., United States v. John, 437 U. S. 634, 651, and n. 22
(1978); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U. S. 99, 103 (1993), that
conclusion does not translate to the differently worded Gen-
eral Crimes Act.
In short, the General Crimes Act does not treat Indian
country as the equivalent of a federal enclave for jurisdic-
tional purposes. Nor does the Act make federal jurisdiction
exclusive or preempt state law in Indian country.
Second, Castro-Huerta contends that, regardless of the
statutory text, Congress implicitly intended for the General
Crimes Act to provide the Federal Government with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians
against Indians in Indian country.
The fundamental problem with Castro-Huerta's implicit in-
tent argument is that the text of the General Crimes Act
says no such thing. Congress expresses its intentions
through statutory text passed by both Houses and signed by
the President (or passed over a Presidential veto). As this
Court has repeatedly stated, the text of a law controls over
purported legislative intentions unmoored from any statu-
tory text. The Court may not “replace the actual text with
speculation as to Congress' intent.” Magwood v. Patterson,
561 U. S. 320, 334 (2010). Rather, the Court “will presume
more modestly” that “the legislature says what it means and
means what it says.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA
Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted); see, e. g., McGirt, 591 U. S., at –––
(“[W]ishes are not laws”); Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. War-
ren, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (lead opinion) (The Supremacy
Clause cannot “be deployed” “to elevate abstract and un-
enacted legislative desires above state law”); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 287–288 (2001) (The Court does not
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give “dispositive weight to the expectations that the enact-
i
ng Congress had formed in light of the contemporary legal
context,” because we “begin (and fnd that we can end) our
search for Congress's intent with . . . text and structure”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Central Bank of Den-
ver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511
U. S. 164, 173 (1994) (“[T]he text of the statute controls our
decision”).
To buttress his implicit intent argument, Castro-Huerta
seizes on the history of the General Crimes Act. At the
time of the Act's earliest iterations in 1817 and 1834, Indian
country was separate from the States. Therefore, at that
time, state law did not apply in Indian country—in the same
way that New York law would not ordinarily have applied in
New Jersey. But territorial separation—not jurisdictional
preemption by the General Crimes Act—was the reason that
state authority did not extend to Indian country at that time.
Because Congress operated under a different territorial
paradigm in 1817 and 1834, it had no reason at that time to
consider whether to preempt preexisting or lawfully as-
sumed state criminal authority in Indian country. For pres-
ent purposes, the fundamental point is that the text of the
General Crimes Act does not preempt state law. And this
Court does not “rewrite a constitutionally valid statutory
text under the banner of speculation about what Congress
might have done had it faced a question that . . . it never
faced.” Henson, 582 U. S., at 89. The history of territorial
separation during the early years of the Republic is not a
license or excuse to rewrite the text of the General Crimes
Act.
As noted above, the Worcester-era understanding of Indian
country as separate from the State was abandoned later in
the 1800s. After that change, Indian country in each State
became part of that State's territory. But Congress did not
alter the General Crimes Act to make federal criminal juris-
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diction exclusive in Indian country. To this day, the text of
the
General Crimes Act still does not make federal jurisdic-
tion exclusive or preempt state jurisdiction.
In 1882, in McBratney, moreover, this Court held that
States have jurisdiction to prosecute at least some crimes
committed in Indian country. Since 1882, therefore, Con-
gress has been specifcally aware that state criminal laws
apply to some extent in Indian country. Yet since then,
Congress has never enacted new legislation that would ren-
der federal jurisdiction exclusive or preempt state jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country.
Additionally, in 1979, the Offce of Legal Counsel stated that
this Court had not resolved the specifc issue of state juris-
diction over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indi-
ans in Indian country, and that the issue was not settled. 3
Op. OLC 111, 117–119 (1979). Yet Congress still did not act
to make federal jurisdiction exclusive or to preempt state
jurisdiction.
On a different tack, Castro-Huerta invokes the reenact-
ment canon. Castro-Huerta points out that, in 1948, Con-
gress recodifed the General Crimes Act. Two years before
that recodifcation, this Court suggested in dicta that States
lack jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians
against Indians in Indian country. See Williams v. United
States, 327 U. S. 711, 714 (1946). Castro-Huerta contends
that the 1948 Congress therefore intended to ratify the
Williams dicta.
Castro-Huerta's reenactment-canon argument is mis-
placed. First of all, the reenactment canon does not over-
ride clear statutory language of the kind present in the Gen-
eral Crimes Act. See BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 244 (2021). In addition, the
canon does not apply to dicta. See Jama v. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 349, 351, n. 12
(2005). The Court's statements in Williams were pure
dicta. Indeed, the Williams dicta did not even purport to
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interpret the text of the General Crimes Act. Dicta that
does
not analyze the relevant statutory provision cannot be
said to have resolved the statute's meaning. Moreover, any
inference from Congress's 1948 recodifcation is especially
weak because that recodifcation was not specifc to the
General Crimes Act, but instead was simply a general re-
codifcation of all federal criminal laws. This Court has
previously explained that “the function” of the 1948 recodif-
cation “was generally limited to that of consolidation and
codifcation.” Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454, 474 (1975)
(internal quotation marks omitted). This Court does not
infer that Congress, “in revising and consolidating the laws,
intended to change their policy, unless such an intention be
clearly expressed.” Id., at 470 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
For many reasons, then, we cannot conclude that Congress,
by recodifying the entire Federal Criminal Code in 1948, si-
lently ratifed a few sentences of dicta from Williams. The
reenactment canon does not apply in this case.
Third, Castro-Huerta contends that the Court has re-
peated the 1946 Williams dicta on several subsequent occa-
sions. But the Court's dicta, even if repeated, does not con-
stitute precedent and does not alter the plain text of the
General Crimes Act, which was the law passed by Congress
and signed by the President. See National Collegiate Ath-
letic Assn. v. Alston, 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021).
3
3
In addition to citing Williams and later cases, Castro-Huerta also cites
the earlier 1913 decision in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243. Ac-
cording to Castro-Huerta, Donnelly determined that States may not exer-
cise jurisdiction in Indian country over crimes by or against Indians.
Castro-Huerta is wrong. In Donnelly, the Court simply concluded that
although States have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-
Indians against non-Indians in Indian country, States do not have similarly
“undivided authority” over crimes committed by or against Indians in
Indian country. Id., at 271–272 (emphasis added). In other words, the
Federal Government also maintains jurisdiction under the General Crimes
Act over crimes by or against Indians in Indian country because of the
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Moreover, there is a good explanation for why the Court's
pre
vious comments on this issue came only in the form of
tangential dicta. The question of whether States have con-
current jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians
against Indians in Indian country did not previously matter
all that much and did not warrant this Court's review.
Through congressional grants of authority in Public Law 280
or state-specifc statutes, some States with substantial In-
dian populations have long possessed broad jurisdiction to
prosecute a vast array of crimes in Indian country (including
crimes by Indians). See Brief for National Congress of
American Indians as Amicus Curiae 20, and n. 2. Indeed,
Castro-Huerta notes that “21 States have jurisdiction over
crimes `by or against' Indians in some Indian country.”
Brief for Respondent 7. So the General Crimes Act ques-
tion—namely, whether that Act preempts inherent state
prosecutorial authority in Indian country—was not relevant
in those States.
In any event, this Court never considered the General
Crimes Act preemption question. As the Offce of Legal
Counsel put it, “many courts, without carefully considering
the question, have assumed that Federal jurisdictio[n] when-
ever it obtains is exclusive. We nevertheless believe that it
is a matter that should not be regarded as settled before it
Federal Government's interest in protecting and defending tribes. See
ibid. (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886)). Donnelly did
not address the distinct question we confront here: whether States have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government over non-Indians
who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country. If anything, Don-
nelly's rejection of the argument that the State had “undivided” authority,
without the Court's saying more, suggests that the Court thought that the
State had concurrent authority with the Federal Government in Indian
country, unless otherwise preempted.
The Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Ramsey, 271 U. S.
467 (1926), likewise considered whether the Federal Government's “au-
thority” to prosecute crimes committed by or against Indians “was ended
by the grant of statehood.” Id., at 469. The Court held that federal au-
thority was not “ended” by statehood. Ibid. But the Court did not say
that States lacked concurrent jurisdiction.
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has been fully explored by the courts.” 3 Op. OLC, at 117.
Th
is case is the frst time that the matter has been fully
explored by this Court.
Until the Court's decision in McGirt two years ago, this
question likewise did not matter much in Oklahoma. Most
everyone i n Oklahoma prev i ously understood that the
State included almost no Indian country. McGirt, 590 U. S.,
at ––– – ––– (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). But after McGirt,
about 43% of Oklahoma—including Tulsa—is now considered
Indian country. Therefore, the question of whether the
State of Oklahoma retains concurrent jurisdiction to prose-
cute non-Indian on Indian crimes in Indian country has
suddenly assumed immense importance. The jurisdictional
question has now been called. In light of the newfound sig-
nifcance of the question, it is necessary and appropriate for
this Court to take its frst hard look at the text and structure
of the General Crimes Act, rather than relying on scattered
dicta about a question that, until now, was relatively insig-
nifcant in the real world.
After independently examining the question, we have con-
cluded that the General Crimes Act does not preempt state
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against
Indians in Indian country.
2
Castro-Huerta next invokes Public Law 280 as a source of
preemption. That argument is similarly unpersuasive.
Public Law 280 affrmatively grants certain States broad
jurisdiction to prosecute state-law offenses committed by or
against Indians in Indian country. See 18 U. S. C. § 1162.
(Other States may opt in, with tribal consent. 25 U. S. C.
§ 1321.) But Public Law 280 does not preempt any preexist-
ing or otherwise lawfully assumed jurisdiction that States
possess to prosecute crimes in Indian country. Indeed, the
Court has already concluded as much: “Nothing in the lan-
guage or legislative history of Pub. L. 280 indicates that it
was meant to divest States of pre-existing and otherwise
lawfully assumed jurisdiction.” Three Affliated Tribes of
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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Opinion of the Court
Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C., 467
U
. S. 138, 150 (1984). The Court's defnitive statement in
Three Affliated Tribes about Public Law 280 applies to both
civil and criminal jurisdiction. And the Court's statement
follows ineluctably from the statutory text: Public Law 280
contains no language that preempts States' civil or criminal
jurisdiction.
Castro-Huerta separately contends that the enactment of
Public Law 280 in 1953 would have been pointless surplusage
if States already had concurrent jurisdiction over crimes
committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
So he says that, as of 1953, Congress must have assumed
that States did not already have concurrent jurisdiction over
those crimes. To begin with, assumptions are not laws, and
the fact remains that Public Law 280 contains no language
preempting state jurisdiction, as the Court already held in
Three Affliated Tribes. Apart from that, Public Law 280
encompasses far more than just non-Indian on Indian crimes
(the issue here). Public Law 280 also grants States jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed by Indians. See Conference of
Western Attorneys General, American Indian Law Deskbook
§ 4.6, p. 250–251 (2021 ed.); cf. Negonsott, 507 U. S., at 105–
107. Absent Public Law 280, state jurisdiction over those
Indian-defendant crimes could implicate principles of tribal
self-government. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142–143 (1980); Part III–B, infra. So
our resolution of the narrow jurisdictional issue in this case
does not negate the signifcance of Public Law 280 in afford-
ing States broad criminal jurisdiction over other crimes com-
mitted in Indian country, such as crimes committed by
Indians.
4
4
Castro-Huerta also points to several state-specifc grants of jurisdic-
tion from 1940 through 1948. See Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat.
1224 (New York); Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa); Act
of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229 (North Dakota); Act of June 8, 1940,
ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (Kansas). Those statutes operate similarly to Public
Law 280.

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In any event, to the extent that there is any overlap (or
e
ven complete overlap) between Public Law 280's jurisdic-
tional grant and some of the States' preexisting jurisdiction
with respect to crimes committed in Indian country, it made
good sense for Congress in 1953 to explicitly grant such au-
thority in Public Law 280. The scope of the States' author-
ity had not previously been resolved by this Court, except
in cases such as McBratney and Draper with respect to non-
Indian on non-Indian crimes. Congressional action in the
face of such legal uncertainty cannot reasonably be charac-
terized as unnecessary surplusage. See Nielsen v. Preap,
586 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019). And fnally, even if there is
some surplusage, the Court has stated that “[r]edundancy is
not a silver bullet” when interpreting statutes. Rimini
Stree t, Inc. v. O racl e USA, Inc., 586 U. S. –––, –––
(2019).
In sum, Public Law 280 does not preempt state authority
to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indi-
ans in Indian country.
B
Applying what has been referred to as the Bracker balanc-
ing test, this Court has recognized that even when federal
law does not preempt state jurisdiction under ordinary pre-
emption analysis, preemption may still occur if the exercise
of state jurisdiction would unlawfully infringe upon tribal
self-government. See Bracker, 448 U. S., at 142–143; see
also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S. 324,
333–335 (1983). Under the Bracker balancing test, the
Court considers tribal interests, federal interests, and state
interests. 448 U. S., at 145.
5
5
The dissent suggests that we should not reach Bracker because Con-
gress has already spoken to the issue and preempted state jurisdiction.
Post, at 685−686 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). As already discussed, Congress
did not preempt the State's jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-
Indians against Indians in Indian country. Therefore, we proceed to
Bracker balancing to determine whether the exercise of state jurisdiction
would unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government.
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Here, Bracker does not bar the State from prosecuting
cr
imes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
country.
First, the exercise of state jurisdiction here would not in-
fringe on tribal self-government. In particular, a state
prosecution of a crime committed by a non-Indian against an
Indian would not deprive the tribe of any of its prosecutorial
authority. That is because, with exceptions not invoked
here, Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed by non-Indians such as Castro-Huerta,
even when non-Indians commit crimes against Indians in In-
dian country. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U. S.
191, 195 (1978).
Moreover, a state prosecution of a non-Indian does not in-
volve the exercise of state power over any Indian or over
any tribe. The only parties to the criminal case are the
State and the non-Indian defendant. Therefore, as has been
recognized, any tribal self-government “justifcation for
preemption of state jurisdiction” would be “problematic.”
American Indian Law Deskbook § 4.8, at 260; see Three Af-
fliated Tribes, 467 U. S., at 148; see also Hicks, 533 U. S., at
364; McBratney, 104 U. S., at 623–624; Draper, 164 U. S., at
242–243.
6
Second, a state prosecution of a non-Indian likewise would
not harm the federal interest in protecting Indian victims.
State prosecution would supplement federal authority, not
supplant federal authority. As the United States has ex-
plained in the past, “recognition of concurrent state jurisdic-
6
To the extent that some tribes might have a policy preference for fed-
eral jurisdiction or tribal jurisdiction, but not state jurisdiction, over
crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country, that policy preference
does not factor into the Bracker analysis.
Furthermore, this case does not involve the converse situation of a
State's prosecution of crimes committed by an Indian against a non-Indian
in Indian country. We express no view on state jurisdiction over a crimi-
nal case of that kind.
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Opinion of the Court
tion” could “facilitate effective law enforcement on the Res-
ervati
on, and thereby further the federal and tribal interests
in protecting Indians and their property against the actions
of non-Indians.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
in Arizona v. Flint, O. T. 1988, No. 603, p. 6. The situation
might be different if state jurisdiction ousted federal juris-
diction. But because the State's jurisdiction would be con-
current with federal jurisdiction, a state prosecution would
not preclude an earlier or later federal prosecution and
would not harm the federal interest in protecting Indian
victims.
Third, the State has a strong sovereign interest in ensur-
ing public safety and criminal justice within its territory, and
in protecting all crime victims. See Dibble, 21 How., at 370.
The State also has a strong interest in ensuring that criminal
offenders—especially violent offenders—are appropriately
punished and do not harm others in the State.
The State's interest in protecting crime victims includes
both Indian and non-Indian victims. If his victim were a
non-Indian, Castro-Huerta could be prosecuted by the State,
as he acknowledges. But because his victim is an Indian,
Castro-Huerta says that he is free from state prosecution.
Castro-Huerta's argument would require this Court to treat
Indian victims as second-class citizens. We decline to do so.
7
7
Castro-Huerta notes that many tribes were enemies of States in the
1700s and 1800s. The theory appears to be that States (unlike the Federal
Government) cannot be trusted to fairly and aggressively prosecute
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in 2022. That theory is
misplaced for at least two reasons. First, the State's jurisdiction would
simply be concurrent with, not exclusive of, the Federal Government's.
If concurrent state jurisdiction somehow poses a problem, Congress can
seek to alter it. Second, many tribes were also opposed to the Federal
Government at least as late as the Civil War. Indeed, some of those
tribes, including the Cherokees, held black slaves and entered into treaties
with the Confederate government. A. Gibson, Native Americans and the
Civil War, 9 Am. Indian Q. 4, 385, 388 (1985); 1 F. Cohen, Handbook of
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IV
The
dissent emphasizes the history of mistreatment of
American Indians. But that history does not resolve the
legal questions presented in this case. Those questions are:
(i) whether Indian country is part of a State or instead is
separate and independent from a State; and (ii) if Indian
country is part of a State, whether the State has concurrent
jur isdiction w ith the Federa l Gover nment to prosecute
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
country.
The answers to those questions are straightforward. On
the frst question, as explained above, this Court has repeat-
edly ruled that Indian country is part of a State, not separate
from a State. By contrast, the dissent lifts up the 1832 deci-
sion in Worcester v. Georgia as a proper exposition of Indian
law. But this Court long ago made clear that Worcester
rested on a mistaken understanding of the relationship be-
tween Indian country and the States. The Court has stated
that the “general notion drawn from Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Worcester v. Georgia” “has yielded to closer analy-
sis”: “By 1880 the Court no longer viewed reservations as
distinct nations. On the contrary, it was said that a reserva-
tion was in many cases a part of the surrounding State or
Territory, and subject to its jurisdiction except as forbidden
by federal law.” Organized Village of Kake, 369 U. S., at 72.
Because Indian country is part of a State, not separate
from a State, the second question here—the question regard-
ing the State's jurisdiction to prosecute Castro-Huerta—is
also straightforward. Under the Constitution, States have
Federal Indian Law § 4.07(1)(a), p. 289 (2012); see McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591
U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting); Cherokee Nation
v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86, 89−90 (DC 2017). In any event, it is not
evident why the pre-Civil War history of tribal discord with States—un-
connected from any statutory text—should disable States from exercising
jurisdiction in 2022 to ensure that crime victims in state territory are
protected under the State's laws.

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Opinion of the Court
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within their territory except
when
preempted (in a manner consistent with the Consti-
tuti on) by federa l law or by pr i nciples of tr iba l self-
government. As we have explained, no federal law pre-
empts the St ate's exercise of jur isdic ti on over cr i mes
committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
And principles of tribal self-government likewise do not
preempt state jurisdiction here.
As a corollary to its argument that Indian country is inher-
ently separate from States, the dissent contends that Con-
gress must affrmatively authorize States to exercise juris-
diction in Indian country, even jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed by non-Indians. But under the Constitu-
tion and this Court's precedents, the default is that States
may exercise criminal jurisdiction within their territory.
See Amdt. 10. States do not need a permission slip from
Congress to exercise their sovereign authority. In other
words, the default is that States have criminal jurisdiction
in Indian country unless that jurisdiction is preempted. In
the dissent's view, by contrast, the default is that States do
not have criminal jurisdiction in Indian country unless Con-
gress specifcally provides it. The dissent's view is incon-
sistent with the Constitution's structure, the States' inherent
sovereignty, and the Court's precedents.
Straying further afeld, the dissent seizes on treaties from
the 1800s. Post, at 673−675, and n. 4 (opinion of Gorsuch,
J.).
8
But those treaties do not preclude state jurisdiction
here. The dissent relies heavily on the 1835 Treaty of New
Echota, which stated that Indian country was separate from
States, and which the dissent says was preserved in relevant
part by the 1866 Treaty. See Treaty with the Cherokee (New
Echota), Art. 5, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 481; Treaty with the
8
Congress “abolished treatymaking with the Indian nations in 1871 and
has itself subjected the tribes to substantial bodies of state and federal
law.” County of Yakima v. Con federated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Nation, 502 U. S. 251, 257 (1992) (citation omitted).
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Cherokee, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799. But history and legal
de
velopment did not end in 1866. Some early treaties may
have been consistent with the Worcester-era theory of sepa-
rateness. But as relevant here, those treaties have been
supplanted: Specifc to Oklahoma, those treaties, in relevant
part, were formally supplanted no later than the 1906 Act
enabling Oklahoma's statehood. See Oklahoma Enabling
Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267. As this Court has previously
concluded, “admission of a State into the Union” “necessarily
repeals the provisions of any prior statute, or of any existing
treaty” that is inconsistent with the State's exercise of crimi-
nal jurisdiction “throughout the whole of the territory within
its limits,” including Indian country, unless the enabling act
says otherwise “by express words.” McBratney, 104 U. S.,
at 623−624; see Draper, 164 U. S., at 242–246. The Okla-
homa Enabling Act contains no such express exception.
Therefore, at least since Oklahoma's statehood in the early
1900s, Indian country has been part of the territory of
Oklahoma.
The dissent responds that the language of the 1906 statute
enabling Oklahoma's statehood itself established a jurisdic-
tional division between the State and Indian country. See
post, at 675– 676 (discussing the Oklahoma Enabling Act).
That argument is mistaken. This Court long ago explained
that interpreting a statehood act to divest a State of jurisdic-
tion over Indian country “wholly situated within [its] geo-
graphical boundaries” would undermine “the very nature of
the equality conferred on the State by virtue of its admission
into the Union.” Draper, 164 U. S., at 242–243. So the
Court requires clear statutory language “to create an excep-
tion” to that “rule.” Id., at 244. To reiterate, the Okla-
homa Enabling Act contains no such clear language. In-
deed, the Court has interpreted similar statutory language
in other state enabling acts not to displace state jurisdiction.
See id., at 243–247; Organized Village of Kake, 369 U. S., at
67–71. In Organized Village of Kake, the Court specifcally
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Opinion of the Court
addressed several state enabling acts, including the Okla-
homa
Enabling Act, and stated that statutory language re-
serving jurisdiction and control to the United States was
meant to preserve federal jurisdiction to the extent that it
existed before statehood, not to make federal jurisdiction ex-
clusive. Id., at 67–70. Consistent with that precedent, to-
day's decision recognizes that the Federal Government and
the State have concurrent jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
9
The dissent incorrectly seeks to characterize various as-
pects of the Court's decision as dicta. To be clear, the Court
today holds that Indian country within a State's territory is
part of a State, not separate from a State. Therefore, a
State has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in In-
dian country unless state jurisdiction is preempted. With
respect to crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians
in Indian country, the Court today further holds that the
General Crimes Act does not preempt the State's authority
to prosecute; that Public Law 280 does not preempt the
State's authority to prosecute; that no principle of tribal self-
government preempts the State's authority to prosecute;
that the cited treaties do not preempt Oklahoma's authority
to prosecute; and that the Oklahoma Enabling Act does not
9
The dissent characterizes the Court's opinion in several ways that are
not accurate. Post, at 692−695. For example, the dissent suggests that
States may not exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians
against non-Indians in Indian country—the reverse of the scenario in this
case. To reiterate, we do not take a position on that question. See
supra, at 650, n. 6.
The dissent also hints that the jurisdictional holding of the Court in this
case may apply only in Oklahoma. That is incorrect. The Court's hold-
ing is an interpretation of federal law, which applies throughout the United
States: Unless preempted, States may exercise jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
Finally, the statutory defnition of Indian country includes “all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished.” See
18 U. S. C. § 1151. Therefore, States may prosecute crimes committed by
non-Indians against Indians in those allotments.

656 OKLAH
OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
preempt Oklahoma's authority to prosecute (indeed, it solidi-
fes
the State's presumptive sovereign authority to prose-
cute). Comments in the dissenting opinion suggesting any-
thing otherwise “are just that: comments in a dissenting
opinion.” Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,
177, n. 10 (1980).
From start to fnish, the dissent employs extraordinary
rhetoric in articulating its deeply held policy views about
what Indian law should be. The dissent goes so far as to
draft a proposed statute for Congress. But this Court's
proper role under Article III of the Constitution is to declare
what the law is, not what we think the law should be. The
dissent's views about the jurisdictional question presented in
this case are contrary to this Court's precedents and to the
laws enacted by Congress.
***
We conclude that the Federal Government and the State
have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed
by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. We there-
fore reverse the judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Breyer, Justice
Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
In 1831, Georgia arrested Samuel Worcester, a white mis-
sionary, for preaching to the Cherokee on tribal lands with-
out a license. Really, the prosecution was a show of force—
an attempt by the State to demonstrate its authority over
tribal lands. Speaking for this Court, Chief Justice Mar-
shall refused to endorse Georgia's ploy because the State en-
joyed no lawful right to govern the territory of a separate
sovereign. See Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561 (1832).
The Court's decision was deeply unpopular, and both Georgia
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and President Jackson fouted it. But in time, Worcester
came
to be recognized as one of this Court's fner hours.
The decision established a foundational rule that would per-
sist for over 200 years: Native American Tribes retain their
sovereignty unless and until Congress ordains otherwise.
Worcester proved that, even in the “[c]ourts of the con-
queror,” the rule of law meant something. Johnson's Lessee
v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 588 (1823).
Where this Court once stood frm, today it wilts. After
the Cherokee's exile to what became Oklahoma, the federal
government promised the Tribe that it would remain forever
free from interference by state authorities. Only the Tribe
or the federal government could punish crimes by or against
tribal members on tribal lands. At various points in its his-
tory, Oklahoma has chafed at this limitation. Now, the State
seeks to claim for itself the power to try crimes by non-
Indians against tribal members within the Cherokee Reser-
vation. Where our predecessors refused to participate in
one State's unlawful power grab at the expense of the Chero-
kee, today's Court accedes to another's. Respectfully, I
dissent.
I
A
Long before our Republic, the Cherokee controlled much
of what is now Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Tennessee. See 1 G. Litton, History of Oklahoma at the
Golden Anniversary of Statehood 91 (1957) (Litton). The
Cherokee were a “distinct, independent political commu-
nit[y],” who “retain[ed] their original” sovereign right to
“regulat[e] their internal and social relations.” Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 55 (1978) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
As colonists settled coastal areas near Cherokee territory,
the Tribe proved a valuable trading partner—and a military
threat. See W. Echo-Hawk, In the Court of the Conqueror
89 (2010). Recognizing this, Great Britain signed a treaty
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with the Cherokee in 1730. See 1 Litton 92. As was true
of
“tributary” and “feudatory” states in Europe, the Chero-
kee did not cease to be “sovereign and independent” under
this arrangement, but retained the right to govern their in-
ternal affairs. E. de Vattel, Law of Nations 60–61 (1805);
see Worcester, 6 Pet., at 561. Meanwhile, under British law
the crown possessed “centraliz[ed]” authority over diplomacy
with Tribes to the exclusion of colonial governments. See
C. Berkey, United States–Indian Relations: The Constitu-
tional Basis, in Exiled in the Land of the Free 192 (O. Lyons
& J. Mohawk eds. 1992).
Ultimately, the American Revolution replaced that legal
framework with a similar one. When the delegates drafted
the Articles of Confederation, they debated whether the na-
tional or state authorities should manage Indian affairs.
See 6 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789,
pp. 1077–1079 (W. Ford ed. 1906). The resulting compromise
proved unworkable. The Articles granted Congress the
“sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the
trade and managing all affairs with the Indians.” Art. IX.
But the Articles undermined that assignment by further pro-
viding that “the legislative right of any state[,] within its
own limits,” could not be “infringed or violated.” Ibid. To-
gether, these provisions led to battles between national and
state governments over who could oversee relations with
various Tribes. See G. Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Com-
merce Clause, 124 Yale L. J. 1012, 1033–1035 (2015) (Ablav-
sky). James Madison later complained that the Articles' di-
vision of authority over Indian affairs had “endeavored to
accomplish [an] impossibilit[y]; to reconcile a partial sover-
eignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the
States.” The Federalist No. 42, p. 269 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
When the framers convened to draft a new Constitution,
this problem was among those they sought to resolve. To
that end, they gave the federal government “broad general
powers” over Indian affairs. United States v. Lara, 541
U. S. 193, 200 (2004). The Constitution afforded Congress
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authority to make war and negotiate treaties with the
Tr
ibes. See Art. I, § 8; Art. VI, cl. 2. It barred States from
doing either of these things. See Art. I, § 10. And the Con-
stitution granted Congress the power to “regulate Com-
merce . . . with the Indian Tribes.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Nor
did the Constitution replicate the Articles' carveout for state
power over Tribes within their borders. Madison praised
this change, contending that the new federal government
would be “very properly unfettered” from this prior “limita-
tio[n].” The Federalist No. 42, at 268. Antifederalist Abra-
ham Yates agreed (but bemoaned) that the Constitution
“totally surrender[ed] into the hands of Congress the man-
agement and regulation of the Indian affairs.” Letter to the
Citizens of the State of New York (June 13–14, 1788), in 20
Documentary History of the Ratifcation of the Constitution
1153, 1158 (J. Kaminski et al. eds. 2004).
Consistent with that view, “[t]he Washington Administra-
tion insisted that the federal government enjoyed exclusive
constitutional authority” over tribal relations. Ablavsky
1019. The new Administration understood, too, that Tribes
remained otherwise free to govern their internal affairs
without state interference. See id., at 1041–1042, 1065–
1067. In a letter to the Governor of Pennsylvania, President
Washington stated curtly that “the United States . . . pos-
sess[es] the only authority of regulating an intercourse with
[the Indians], and redressing their grievances.” Letter to T.
Miffin (Sept. 4, 1790), in 6 Papers of George Washington:
Presidential Series 396 (D. Twohig ed. 1996). Even Thomas
Jefferson, the great defender of the States' powers, agreed
that “under the present Constitution” no “State [has] a right
to Treat with the Indians without the consent of the General
Government.” Letter to H. Knox (Aug. 10, 1791), in 22 Pa-
pers of Thomas Jefferson 27 (C. Cullen, E. Sheridan, & R.
Lester eds. 1986).
Nor was this view confned to the Executive Branch.
Congress quickly exercised its new constitutional authority.
In 1790, it enacted the frst Indian Trade and Intercourse
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Act, which pervasively regulated commercial and social ex-
changes
among Indians and non-Indians. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
Congress also provided for federal jurisdiction over crimes
by non-Indians against Indians on tribal lands. §§ 5–6, id.,
at 138. States, too, recognized their lack of authority. See
Ablavsky 1019, 1043. In 1789, South Carolina Governor
Charles Pinckney acknowledged to Washington that “the
sole management of India[n] affairs is now committed” to
“the general Government.” Letter to G. Washington (Dec.
14), in 4 Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series
401, 404 (D. Twohig ed. 1993). Initially, even Georgia took
the same view. See Letter from Georgia House of Repre-
sentatives to Gov. E. Telfair (June 10, 1790), in 3 Documen-
tary History of the Ratifcation of the Constitution: Dela-
ware, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut 178 (M. Jensen
ed. 1978) (Microform Supp. Doc. No. 50).
It was against this background that Chief Justice Marshall
faced Worcester. After gold was discovered in Cherokee
territory in the 1820s, Georgia's Legislature enacted laws
designed to “seize [the] whole Cherokee country, parcel it out
among the neighboring counties of the state . . . abolish [the
Tribe's] institutions and its laws, and annihilate its politi-
cal existence.” Worcester, 6 Pet., at 542. Like Oklahoma
today, Georgia also purported to extend its criminal laws to
Cherokee lands. See ibid.; see also S. Breyer, The Cherokee
Indians and the Supreme Court, 87 The Georgia Historical
Q. 408, 416–418 (2003) (Breyer). In refusing to sanction
Georgia's power grab, this Court explained that the State's
“assertion of jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation” was
“void,” because under our Constitution only the federal gov-
ernment possessed the power to manage relations with the
Tribe. Worcester, 6 Pet., at 542, 561–562.
B
Two years later, and exercising its authority to regulate
tribal affairs in the shadow of Worcester, Congress adopted
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the General Crimes Act of 1834 (GCA). That law extended
federa
l criminal jurisdiction to tribal lands for certain crimes
and, in doing so, served two apparent purposes. First, as a
“courtesy” to the Tribes, the law represented a promise by
the federal government “to punish crimes committed . . . by
and against our own [non-Indian] citizens.” H. R. Rep.
No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1834) (H. R. Rep. No. 474).
That jurisdictional arrangement was also consistent with,
and even seemingly compelled by, the federal government's
treaties with various Tribes. See F. Cohen, Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 731 (N. Newton et al. eds. 2005) (Cohen);
R. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over In-
dian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 Ariz. L. Rev. 951,
958–962 (1975) (Clinton). Second, because Worcester held
that States lacked criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands, Con-
gress sought to ensure a federal forum for crimes committed
by and against non-Indians. See H. R. Rep. No. 474, at 13.
Otherwise, Congress understood, non-Indian settlers would
be subject to tribal jurisdiction alone. See id., at 13, 18;
R. Barsh & J. Henderson, The Betrayal, Oliphant v. Suqua-
mish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 Minn.
L. Rev. 609, 625–626 (1979). Congress reenacted the GCA
in 1948 with minor amendments, but it remains in force
today more or less in its original form. See 18 U. S. C.
§ 1152 (1946 ed., Supp. II).
Shortly after it adopted the GCA, the Senate ratifed the
Treaty of New Echota with the Cherokee in 1836. After
the Tribe's removal from Georgia, the United States prom-
ised the Cherokee that they would enjoy a new home in the
West where they could “establish . . . a government of their
choice.” Treaty with the Cherokee, Preamble, Dec. 29, 1835,
7 Stat. 478. Acknowledging the Tribe's past “diffculties . . .
under the jurisdiction and laws of the State Governments,”
the treaty also pledged that the Tribe would remain forever
free from “State sovereignties.” Ibid.; see Art. 5, id., at
481. These promises constituted an “indemnity,” guaran-
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teed by “the faith of the nation,” that “[t]he United States
and
the Indian tribes [would be] the sole parties” with power
on new western reservations like the Cherokee's. H. R. Rep.
No. 474, at 18 (emphasis in original).
Over time, Congress revised some of these arrangements.
In 1885, dissatisfed with how the Sioux Tribe responded to
the murder of a tribal member, Congress adopted the Major
Crimes Act (MCA). See R. Anderson, S. Krakoff, & B.
Berger, American Indian Law: Cases and Commentary 90–
96 (4th ed. 2008) (Anderson). There, Congress directed
that, moving forward, only the federal government, not the
Tribes, could prosecute certain serious offenses by tribal
members on tribal lands. See 18 U. S. C. § 1153(a). On its
own initiative, this Court then went a step further. Relying
on language in certain laws admitting specifc States to the
Union, the Court held that States were now entitled to pros-
ecute crimes by non-Indians against non-Indians on tribal
lands. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621, 623
(1882); Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 243, 247 (1896).
Through all these developments, however, at least one prom-
ise remained: States could play no role in the prosecution of
crimes by or against Native Americans on tribal lands. See
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959).
In 1906, Congress reaffrmed this promise to the Cherokee
in Oklahoma. As a condition of its admission to the Union,
Congress required Oklahoma to “declare that [it] forever dis-
claim[s] all right and title in or to . . . all lands lying within
[the State's] limits owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or
nation.” 34 Stat. 270. Instead, Congress provided that
tribal lands would “remain subject to the jurisdiction, dis-
posal, and control of the United States.” Ibid. As if the
point wasn't clear enough, Congress further provided that
“nothing contained in the [new Oklahoma state] constitution
shall be construed to . . . limit or affect the authority of the
Government of the United States . . . respecting [the State's]
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if this Act had never been passed.” Id., at 267–268. The
fol
lowing year, Oklahoma adopted a State Constitution con-
sistent with Congress's instructions. Art. I, § 3; see also
Clinton 961.
In the years that followed, certain States sought arrange-
ments different from Oklahoma's. And once more, Congress
intervened. In 1940, Kansas asked for and received permis-
sion from Congress to exercise jurisdiction over crimes “by
or against Indians” on tribal lands. 18 U. S. C. § 3243.
Through the rest of the decade, Congress experimented with
similar laws for New York, Iowa, and North Dakota.
1
Then,
in 1953, Congress adopted Public Law 280. That statute
granted fve additional States criminal “jurisdiction over of-
fenses . . . by or against Indians” and established procedures
by which further States could secure the same authority.
See § 2, 67 Stat. 588. Ultimately, however, some of these
arrangements proved unpopular. Not only with affected
Tribes. See C. Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the
Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44
UCLA L. Rev. 1405, 1406–1407 (1997) (Goldberg-Ambrose).
These arrangements also proved unpopular with certain
States that viewed their new law enforcement responsibil-
ities on tribal lands as unfunded federal mandates. See An-
derson 436. A few States even renounced their Public Law
280 jurisdiction. See Cohen 579.
By 1968, the federal government came to conclude that, “as
a matter of justice and as a matter of enlightened social policy,”
the “time ha[d] come to break decisively with the past and to
create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is
determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.” President's
Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 6 Weekly Comp. of
Pres. Doc. 894 (1970). Consistent with that vision, Congress
1
See Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224 (25 U. S. C. § 232) (New
York); Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa), repealed, Act of
Dec. 11, 2018, Pub. L. 115–301, 132 Stat. 4395; Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279,
60 Stat. 229 (North Dakota).
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amended Public Law 280 to require tribal consent before any
St
ate could assume jurisdiction over crimes by or against
Indians on tribal lands. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, § 401, 82 Stat.
78, § 406, id., at 80 (25 U. S. C. §§ 1321(a), 1326). Recognizing
that certain States' enabling acts barred state authority
on tribal lands and required States to adopt constitutional
provisions guaranteeing as much, Congress also authorized
States to “amend, where necessary, their State constitution
or . . . statutes.” § 404, 82 Stat. 79 (25 U. S. C. § 1324). In
doing so, however, Congress emphasized that affected States
could not assume jurisdiction to prosecute offenses by or
against tribal members on tribal lands until they “appropri-
ately amended their State constitution or statutes.” Ibid.
To date, Oklahoma has not amended its state constitutional
provisions disclaiming jurisdiction over tribal lands. Nor
has Oklahoma sought or obtained tribal consent to the exer-
cise of its jurisdiction. See The Honorable E. Kelly Haney,
22 Okla. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 90–32, p. 72, (1991) (Haney).
Thus, Oklahoma has remained, in Congress's words, a State
“not having jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by
or against Indians in the areas of Indian country situated
within” its borders. 25 U. S. C. § 1321(a)(1).
C
Rather than seek tribal consent pursuant to Public Law
280 or persuade Congress to adopt a state-specifc statute
authorizing it to prosecute crimes by or against tribal mem-
bers on tribal lands, Oklahoma has chosen a different path.
In the decades following statehood, many settlers engaged
in schemes to seize Indian lands and mineral rights by sub-
terfuge. See A. Debo, And Still the Waters Run 92–125
(1940) (Debo). These schemes resulted in “the bulk of the
landed wealth of the Indians” ending up in the hands of the
new settlers. See ibid.; see also id., at 181–202. State off-
cials and courts were sometimes complicit in the process.
See id., at 182–183, 185, 195–196. For years, too, Oklahoma
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courts asserted the power to hear criminal cases involving
Native
Americans on lands allotted to and owned by tribal
members despite the contrary commands of the Oklahoma
Enabling Act and the State's own constitution. The State
only disavowed that practice in 1991, after defeats in state
and federal court. See Haney, 22 Okla. Op. Atty. Gen., at
71–74; see also State v. Klindt, 782 P. 2d 401, 404 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1989); Ross v. Neff, 905 F. 2d 1349, 1353 (CA10 1990).
Still, it seems old habits die slowly. Even after renounc-
ing the power to try criminal cases involving Native Ameri-
cans on allotted tribal lands, Oklahoma continued to claim
the power to prosecute crimes by or against Native Ameri-
cans within tribal reservations. The State did so on the
theory that at some (unspecifed) point in the past, Congress
had disestablished those reservations. In McGirt v. Okla-
homa, this Court rejected that argument in a case involving
the Muscogee (Creek) Tribe. 591 U. S. –––, ––– (2020). We
explained that Congress had never disestablished the Creek
Reservation. Nor were we willing to usurp Congress's au-
thority and disestablish that reservation by a lawless act of
judicial fat. See id., at –––. Accordingly, only federal and
tribal authorities were lawfully entitled to try crimes by or
against Native Americans within the Tribe's reservation.
Ibid. Following McGirt, Oklahoma's courts recognized that
what held true for the Creek also held true for the Cherokee:
Congress had never disestablished its reservation and, ac-
cordingly, the State lacked authority to try offenses by or
against tribal members within the Cherokee Reservation.
See Spears v. State, 2021 OK CR 7, ¶¶ 10–14, 485 P. 3d 873,
876–877.
Once more, Oklahoma could have responded to this devel-
opment by asking Congress for state-specifc legislation au-
thorizing it to exercise criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands,
as Kansas and various other States have done. The State
could have employed the procedures of Public Law 280 to
amend its own laws and obtain tribal consent. Instead,
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Oklahoma responded with a media and litigation campaign
seek
ing to portray reservations within its State—where fed-
eral and tribal authorities may prosecute crimes by and
against tribal members and Oklahoma can pursue cases in-
volving only non-Indians—as lawless dystopias. See Brief
for Cherokee Nation et al. as Amici Curiae 18 (Cherokee
Brief ) (“The State's tale of a criminal dystopia in eastern
Oklahoma is just that: A tale”).
That effort culminated in this case. In it, Oklahoma has
pursued alternative lines of argument. First, the State has
asked this Court to revisit McGirt and unilaterally eliminate
all reservations in Oklahoma. Second, the State has argued
that it enjoys a previously unrecognized “inherent” authority
to try crimes within reservation boundaries by non-Indians
against tribal members—a claim Oklahoma's own courts
have rejected. See Bosse v. State, 2021 OK CR 3, ¶¶23–28
484 P. 3d 286, 294–295.
Ultimately, this Court declined to entertain the State's
frst argument but agreed to review the second. Nominally,
the question comes to us in a case involving Victor Castro-
Huerta, a non-Indian who abused his Cherokee stepdaughter
within the Tribe's reservation. Initially, a state court con-
victed him for a state crime. After McGirt, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals determined that his conviction
was invalid because only federal and tribal offcials possess
authority to prosecute crimes by or against Native Ameri-
cans on the Cherokee Reservation. See App. to Pet. for
Cer t. 4a. The federa l gover nment sw i f tly rei ndic ted
Mr. Castro-Huerta, and a federal court again found him
guilty. Now before us, Oklahoma seeks to undo Mr. Castro-
Huerta's federal conviction and have him transferred from
federal prison to a state facility to resume his state sentence.
Really, though, this case has less to do with where
Mr. Castro-Huerta serves his time and much more to do with
Oklahoma's effort to gain a legal foothold for its wish to exer-
cise jurisdiction over crimes involving tribal members on
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tribal lands. To succeed, Oklahoma must disavow adverse
r
ulings from its own courts; disregard its 1991 recognition
that it lacks legal authority to try cases of this sort; and
ignore fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty, a treaty,
the Oklahoma Enabling Act, its own state constitution, and
Public Law 280. Oklahoma must pursue a proposition so
novel and so unlikely that in over two centuries not a single
State has successfully attempted it in this Court. Incredi-
bly, too, the defense of tribal interests against the State's
gambit falls to a non-Indian criminal defendant. The real
party in interest here isn't Mr. Castro-Huerta but the Chero-
kee, a Tribe of 400,000 members with its own government.
Yet the Cherokee have no voice as parties in these proceed-
ings; they and other Tribes are relegated to the fling of ami-
cus briefs.
II
A
Today the Court rules for Oklahoma. In doing so, the
Court announces that, when it comes to crimes by non-
Indians against tribal members within tribal reservations,
Oklahoma may “exercise jurisdiction.” Ante, at 636. But
this declaration comes as if by oracle, without any sense of
the history recounted above and unattached to any colorable
legal authority. Truly, a more ahistorical and mistaken
statement of Indian law would be hard to fathom.
The source of the Court's error is foundational. Through
most of its opinion, the Court proceeds on the premise that
Oklahoma possesses “inherent” sovereign power to prose-
cute crimes on tribal reservations until and unless Congress
“preempt[s]” that authority. Ante, at 636–649. The Court
emphasizes that States normally wield broad police powers
within their borders absent some preemptive federal law.
See ante, at 636–638; see also Virginia Uranium, Inc. v.
Warren, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (lead opinion).
But the effort to wedge Tribes into that paradigm is a
category error. Tribes are not private organizations within
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state boundaries. Their reservations are not glorifed pri-
vate
campgrounds. Tribes are sovereigns. And the pre-
emption rule applicable to them is exactly the opposite of the
normal rule. Tribal sovereignty means that the criminal
laws of the States “can have no force” on tribal members
within tribal bounds unless and until Congress clearly or-
dains otherwise. Worcester, 6 Pet., at 561. After all, the
power to punish crimes by or against one's own citizens
within one's own territory to the exclusion of other authori-
ties is and has always been among the most essential attrib-
utes of sovereignty. See, e. g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U. S.
524, 529 (1957) (per curiam) (“A sovereign nation has exclu-
sive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws com-
mitted within its borders”); see also Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812); E. de Vattel, Law of
Nations 81–82 (J. Chitty ed. 1835).
Nor is this “ `notion,' ” ante, at 636, some discarded artifact
of a bygone era. To be sure, Washington, Jefferson, Mar-
shall, and so many others at the Nation's founding appreci-
ated the sovereign status of Native American Tribes. See
Part I–A, supra. But this Court's own cases have consist-
ently reaffrmed the point. Just weeks ago, the Court held
that federal prosecutors did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause based on the essential premise that tribal criminal
law is the product of a “separate sovereig[n]” exercising its
own “retained sovereignty.” Denezpi v. United States, 596
U. S. 591, 598–599 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Recently, too, this Court confrmed that Tribes enjoy sover-
eign immunity from suit. See Michigan v. Bay Mills In-
dian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 788–789 (2014). Through-
out our history, “the basic policy of Worcester” that Tribes
are separate sovereigns “has remained.” Williams v. Lee,
358 U. S., at 219.
2
2
See also Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U. S. 685, 689 (2022);
United States v. Cooley, 593 U. S. 345, 349–350 (2021); Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U. S. 505, 509
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Because Tribes are sovereigns, this Court has consistently
recog
nized that the usual “standards of pre-emption” are
“unhelpful.” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U. S. 136, 143 (1980); see also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U. S. 163, 176 (1989); Moe v. Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U. S. 463,
475–476 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411
U. S. 164, 170–172 (1973). In typical preemption cases,
courts “start with the assumption” that Congress has not
displaced state authority. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). But when a State tries to regulate
tribal affairs, the same “backdrop” does not apply because
Tribes have a “claim to sovereignty [that] long predates that
of our own Government.” McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 172;
see also Bracker, 448 U. S., at 143. So instead of searching
for an Act of Congress displacing state authority, our cases
require a search for federal legislation conferring state au-
thority: “[U]nless and until Congress acts, the tribes retain
their historic sovereign authority.” Bay Mills Indian Com-
munity, 572 U. S., at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see United States v. Cooley, 593 U. S. 345, 350 (2021) (in-
structing courts to ask if a “treaty or statute has explicitly
divested Indian tribes of the . . . authority at issue”); Ander-
son 317. What is more, courts must “tread lightly” before
concluding Congress has abrogated tribal sovereignty in
favor of state authority. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U. S., at
60. Any ambiguities in Congress's work must be resolved
in favor of tribal sovereignty and against state power. See
ibid.; see also Cotton Petroleum, 490 U. S., at 177. And, if
anything, these rules bear special force in the criminal con-
text, which lies at the heart of tribal sovereignty and in
(1991); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322–323 (1978); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56 (1978); United States v. Mazu-
rie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, 383–384
(1896); United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381–382 (1886); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831).

670 OKLAH
OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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which Congress “has provided a nearly comprehensive set of
st
atutes allocating criminal jurisdiction” among federal,
tribal, and state authorities. Cohen 527.
3
B
From 1834 to 1968, Congress adopted a series of laws gov-
erning criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands. Those laws are
many, detailed, and clear. Each operates against the back-
drop understanding that Tribes are sovereign and that in
our constitutional order only Congress may displace their au-
thority. Nor does anything in Congress's work begin to con-
fer on Oklahoma the authority it seeks.
1
Start with the GCA, frst adopted by Congress in 1834 and
most recently reenacted in 1948. The GCA provides:
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
general laws of the United States as to the punishment
of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
3
In the civil context, Congress has not always provided comprehensive
rules allocating jurisdiction. See Cohen 527. In light of that fact, this
Court has, in “exception[al]” cases, id., at 524, allowed certain state laws
to apply on tribal lands without express congressional approval, see, e. g.,
Washington v. Con federated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134,
154–159 (1980). But even in the civil context this Court has proceeded
against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty, followed the presumption
against state authority, sought to abide its own repeated admonitions to
tread cautiously, and generally refused to consider competing state inter-
ests. See, e. g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136,
143–144 (1980); Cohen 520–525. So, for example, in Con federated Tribes,
this Court allowed the application of a state civil law only on a showing
that the State sought to regulate market activities with primarily off-
reservation effects and “in which the tribes ha[d no] signifcant interest.”
447 U. S., at 152. Meanwhile, in Bracker this Court refused to permit a
State to apply its civil tax laws on tribal lands even though Congress had
not expressly prohibited the State from doing so. 448 U. S., at 143.
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“This section shall not extend to offenses committed
by
one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the
Indian country who has been punished by the local law
of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations,
the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may
be secured to the Indian tr ibes respec tively. ” 18
U. S. C. § 1152.
As recounted above, Congress adopted the GCA in the af-
termath of Worcester's holding that the federal government
alone may regulate tribal affairs and States do not possess
inherent authority to apply their criminal laws on tribal
lands. Responding to that decision, Congress did not choose
to exercise its authority to allow state jurisdiction on tribal
lands. Far from it. Congress chose only to extend federal
law to tribal lands—and even then only for certain crimes
involving non-Indian settlers. Otherwise, Congress recog-
nized, those settlers might be subject to tribal criminal juris-
diction alone. See Part I–B, supra. Several features of the
law confrm this understanding. Take just three.
First, the GCA compares “Indian country” to “place[s]
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.” § 1152. The latter category refers to federal en-
claves like national parks and military bases that the Consti-
tution places under exclusive federal control. See Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 17; United States v. Cowboy, 694 F. 2d 1228, 1234
(CA10 1982); see also Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 567
(1883). And state laws generally do not apply in federal en-
claves. See, e. g., Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S.
525, 532–533 (1885). Rather than unambiguously endow
States with any sort of prosecutorial authority on tribal
lands, the GCA thus makes plain that tribal lands are to be
treated like federal enclaves subject to federal, not state,
control.
Second, the GCA provides that the “general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses” shall apply
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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
on tribal lands. § 1152. Again, nothing here purports to
extend
state criminal laws to tribal lands. Quite the con-
trary. It would hardly make sense to apply federal general
criminal law—to address all crimes ranging from murder to
jaywalking—if state general criminal law already did the
job. Traditionally, this Court does not assume multiple
“sets of [general] criminal laws” apply to those subject to
federal protection. Lewis v. United States, 523 U. S. 155,
163 (1998). Instead, when Congress converts an area into a
federal enclave, we usually presume later-enacted state law
“does not apply.” Parker Drilling Management Services,
Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019).
Third, after applying the federal government's general
criminal laws to tribal lands, the GCA carves out some ex-
ceptions. It provides that federal law “shall not extend” to
crimes involving only Indians, crimes by Indians where the
perpetrator “has been punished by the local law of the tribe,”
or where a treaty grants a Tribe exclusive jurisdiction.
§ 1152. These exceptions ensure that the federal govern-
ment does not meddle in cases most likely to implicate tribal
sovereignty. And it defes the imagination to think Con-
gress would have taken such care to limit federal authority
over these most sensitive cases while (somewhere, somehow)
leaving States, so often the Tribes' “deadliest enemies,” to
enjoy free rein. United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 384
(1886).
2
When Congress enacted the MCA in 1885, it proceeded
once more against the “backdrop” rule that only tribal crimi-
nal law applies on tribal lands, that States enjoy no inherent
authority to prosecute cases on tribal lands, and that only
Congress may displace tribal power. Nor, once more, did
Congress's new legislation purport to allow States to prose-
cute crimes on tribal lands. In response to concerns with
how tribal authorities were handling major crimes com-
mitted by tribal members, in the MCA Congress took a step
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673
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beyond the GCA and instructed that, in the future, the fed-
e
ral government would have “exclusive jurisdiction” to pros-
ecute certain crimes by Indian defendants on tribal lands.
18 U. S. C. § 1153(a); see also Part I–B, supra. Here again,
Congress's work hardly would have been necessary or made
sense if States already possessed jurisdiction to try crimes
by or against Indians on tribal reservations. Plainly, Con-
gress's “purpose” in adopting the MCA was to answer the
“objection” that major crimes by tribal members on tribal
lands would otherwise be subject to prosecution by tribal
authorities alone. See Kagama, 118 U. S., at 383–385.
3
Consider next the Treaty of New Echota and the Oklahoma
Enabling Act. In 1835, the United States entered into a
treaty with the Cherokee. In that treaty, the Nation prom-
ised that, within a new reservation in what was to become
Oklahoma, the Tribe would enjoy the right to govern itself and
remain forever free from “State sovereignties” and the “juris-
diction of any State.” Treaty with the Cherokee, Preamble
and Art. 5, 7 Stat. 478, 481. This Court has instructed that
tribal treaties must be interpreted as they “would naturally be
understood by the Indians” at ratifcation. Herrera v. Wyo-
ming, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). And having just lost their traditional homelands to
Georgia, who can doubt that the Cherokee understood this
promise as a guarantee that they would retain their sovereign
authority over crimes by or against tribal members subject
only to federal, not state, law? That was certainly the con-
temporaneous understanding of the House Committee on In-
dian Affairs, which observed that “[t]he United States and the
Indian tribes [would be] the sole parties” with power over
new reservations in the West. H. R. Rep. No. 474, at 18; see
also Part I–B, supra. This Court has long shared the same
view. “By treaties and statutes,” the Court has said, “the
right of the Cherokee [N]ation to exist as an autono-

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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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mous body, subject always to the paramount authority of the
U
nited States, has been recognized.” Talton v. Mayes, 163
U. S. 376, 379–380 (1896).
4
4
In a feeting aside, the Court suggests that the treaty was “supplanted”
by the Oklahoma Enabling Act in 1906, which endowed the State with
“inherent” authority to try crimes by or against tribal members on tribal
lands. Ante, at 653–654. But the Court cites no proof for its ipse dixit,
nor could it. As we shall see, Congress took pains to abide its treaty
promises when it adopted the Oklahoma Enabling Act and has never re-
voked them. Nor may this Court abrogate treaties or statutes by wishing
them away in passing remarks. In a Nation governed by the rule of law,
not men (or willful judges), only Congress may withdraw this Nation's
treaty promises or revise its written laws. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591
U. S. –––, ––– (2020). Even on its own terms, too, the Court's discussion
of the treaty turns out to be dicta. In the end, the Court abandons any
suggestion that, with its admission to the Union, the Cherokee's treaties
somehow evaporated and Oklahoma gained an “inherent” right to prose-
cute crimes by or against tribal members on tribal lands. Instead, the
Court resorts to a case-specifc “balancing test” that acknowledges state
law may not apply on tribal lands even in the absence of a preemptive
statute. See Part III–A, in fra.
In the course of its dicta on the treaty, the Court highlights still two
other irrelevant facts—that the Cherokee engaged in treaties with the
Confederacy during the Civil War and that “Congress abolished treaty-
making with the Indian nations in 1871.” Ante, at 651–652, n. 7, 653, n. 8
(internal quotation marks omitted). In truth, while some members of the
Tribe did side with the Confederacy, others fought for the Union. See 1
Litton 222, 224, 239. Regardless, after the Civil War the federal govern-
ment punished the entire Tribe by stripping some of its lands in the 1866
Treaty of Washington. See id., at 245. But that pact did not terminate
the government's other existing treaty promises. To the contrary, the
new treaty expressly confrmed that “[a]ll provisions of treaties, heretofore
ratifed . . . and not inconsistent with the provisions of this treaty, are
hereby reaffrmed.” Treaty with the Cherokee, Art. XXXI, 14 Stat. 806.
As for the 1871 statute the Court cites, it makes plain that “nothing herein
contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any
treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratifed with any . . . Indian nation or
tribe.” 16 Stat. 566. Recognizing as much, this Court in 1896 expressly
recognized that the Tribe's “guarantee of self government” in the Treaty
of New Echota remained in force. Talton, 163 U. S., at 380. In the years
since, this Court and others have recognized the continuing vitality of

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675
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
In 1906, Congress sought to deliver on its treaty promises
when
it adopted the Oklahoma Enabling Act. That law
paved the way for the new State's admission to the Union.
But in doing so, Congress took care to require Oklahoma to
“agree and declare” that it would “forever disclaim all right
and title in or to . . . all lands lying within [the State's] limits
owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or nation.” 34 Stat. 270.
Instead of granting the State some new power to prosecute
crimes by or against tribal members, Congress insisted that
tribal lands “shall be and remain subject to the jurisdiction,
disposal, and control of the United States.” Ibid. Oklahoma
complied with Congress's instructions by adopting both of
these commitments verbatim in its Constitution. Art. I, § 3.
Underscoring the nature of this arrangement, the En-
abling Act further provided that “nothing contained in the
[Oklahoma] constitution shall be construed . . . to limit or
affect the authority of the Government of the United States
to make any law or regulation respecting such Indians, their
lands, property, or other rights by treaties, agreement, law,
or otherwise, which it would have been competent to make if
this Act had never been passed.” 34 Stat. 267–268 (emphasis
added). Prior to statehood, too, no one could have ques-
tioned Congress's exclusive authority to regulate tribal lands
and affairs i n the Oklahoma terr itory. See, e. g., U. S.
Const., Art. IV; Kagama, 118 U. S., at 380 (citing federal gov-
ernment's “exclusive sovereignty” over federal territories);
Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162, 168 (1899) (“In the Territo-
ries of the United States, Congress has the entire dominion
and sovereignty, . . . Federal and state”); Harjo v. Kleppe,
420 F. Supp. 1110, 1121 (DC 1976) (federal courts had pre-
statehood jurisdiction); Clinton 960–962. The Oklahoma
various aspects of the treaty too. See, e. g., Choctaw Nation v. Okla-
homa, 397 U. S. 620, 628 (1970); EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F. 2d 937,
938 (CA10 1989). And in this very case, the federal government has con-
frmed that the Nation's treaties continue to “protect” the Tribe. See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 121.
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Enabling Act and the commitments it demanded in the new
Oklahoma
Constitution sought to maintain this status quo.
Recognizing the point, this Court has explained that, “[i]n
passing the enabling act for the admission of the State of
Oklahoma . . . Congress was careful to preserve the authority
of the Government of the United States over the Indians,
their lands and property, which it had prior to the passage
of the act.” Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286,
309 (1911) (emphasis added). This Court has explained, too,
that the “grant of statehood” to Oklahoma did nothing to
disturb “the long-settled rule” that the “guardianship of the
United States” over Native American Tribes in Oklahoma
“has not been abandoned.” United States v. Ramsey, 271
U. S. 467, 469 (1926). Instead, this Court has acknowledged,
the federal government's “authority in respect of crimes
committed by or against Indians continued after the admis-
sion of the state as it was before.” Ibid. In fact, the Court
has long interpreted nearly identical language in the Arizona
Enabling Act—enacted close in time to its Oklahoma coun-
terpart—as reinforcing the traditional rule “that the States
lac[k] jurisdiction” on tribal lands over crimes by or against
Native Americans. McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 175; see also
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S.
685, 687, n. 3 (1965).
5
5
In places, the Court seems to suggest that the Oklahoma Enabling Act
endowed the State with “inherent” jurisdiction to try any crime com-
mitted within its borders. See ante, at 653–654. But in the end the Court
abandons any suggestion that with statehood Oklahoma gained an inher-
ent right to try cases involving tribal members within tribal bounds. See
Part III–A, in fra. So, once more, the Court's discussion of the Oklahoma
Enabling Act turns out to be dicta future litigants are free to correct.
Much correction is warranted. Not only does the Court fail to quote,
let alone offer any analysis of, the relevant statutory text. Its suggestion
that the Oklahoma Enabling Act granted the State criminal jurisdiction
over tribal lands would require us to suppose that Congress abrogated
two treaties with the Cherokee without ever saying so—an interpretation
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
4
The
few occasions on which Congress has even arguably
authorized the application of state criminal law on tribal res-
ervations still do not come anywhere near granting Okla-
homa the power it seeks. In the late 1800s, this Court in
McBratney and Draper held that federal statutes admitting
certain States to the Union effectively meant those States
could now prosecute crimes on tribal lands involving only
non-Indians. Yet, as aggressive as these decisions were,
they took care to safeguard the rule that a State's admission
to the Union does not convey with it the power to punish
“crimes committed by or against Indians.” McBratney, 104
U. S., at 624; Draper, 164 U. S., at 247. Indeed, soon after
Oklahoma became a State, this Court explained that the
“grant of statehood” may have endowed Oklahoma with au-
thority to try crimes “not committed by or against Indians,”
but with statehood did not come any authority to try “crimes
by or against Indians” on tribal lands. Ramsey, 271 U. S.,
at 469; see also n. 5, supra; Donnelly v. United States, 228
U. S. 243, 271 (1913); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 220; Cohen
that would grossly defy our Nation's promises and this Court's obligation
to read congressional work as a harmonious whole. Reading the Okla-
homa Enabling Act in line with the Court's ill-considered dicta would also
defy this Court's longstanding precedents in Tiger, Ramsey, and McCla-
nahan. Of course, the Court tries to invoke McBratney and Draper as
contrary authority. But as we will see in a moment, both cases carefully
reiterated the rule that statehood does not imply the right to try crimes
on tribal lands by or against tribal members. The Court also cites Orga-
nized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60 (1962). But that case involved
Alaska's Anti-Fish-Trap Conservation Law, not the Oklahoma Enabling
Act. Admittedly, Egan quotes comments from a 1954 legislative commit-
tee hearing about the Alaska Enabling Act in which a few participants
also happened to express views on the meaning of the Oklahoma Enabling
Act, passed almost 50 years earlier. See id., at 71. But surely this Court
cannot think a few stray post-enactment legislative comments, “unmoored
from any statutory text,” ante, at 642, control over the statutory terms or
our more specifc precedents.
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506–509. The decision whether and when this arrangement
shou
ld “cease” “rest[ed] with Congress alone.” Ramsey, 271
U. S., at 469.
The truth is, Congress has authorized the application of
state criminal law on tribal lands for offenses committed by
or against Native Americans only in very limited circum-
stances. The most notable examples can be found in Public
Law 280 and related statutes. In 1940, Kansas successfully
lobbied Congress for criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.
Nearly identical laws for North Dakota, Iowa, and New York
followed close behind. Then in 1953, Congress adopted Pub-
lic Law 280 in which it authorized fve States to exercise
criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands and established proce-
dures for additional States to assume similar authority. In
1968, Congress amended Public Law 280. Now, before a
State like Oklahoma may try crimes by or against Native
Americans arising on tribal lands, it must take action to
amend any state law disclaiming that authority; then, the
State must seek and obtain tribal consent to any extension
of state jurisdiction. See Part I–B, supra; Clinton 958–962.
Unless a State takes these steps, it does “not hav[e] jurisdic-
tion.” 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321(a), 1323(b).
6
5
The Court's suggestion that Oklahoma enjoys “inherent”
authority to try crimes against Native Americans within the
Cherokee Reservation makes a mockery of all of Congress's
work from 1834 to 1968. The GCA and MCA? On the
6
The Court observes that Public Law 280 and related statutes did more
than just grant States jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against In-
dians on tribal lands—“the issue here.” Ante, at 648. Congress also
granted “States jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians.” Ibid.
(emphasis in original). But that observation fails to answer the fact that,
under the Court's view, a major portion of all these laws is surplusage—
and none of them was necessary if States really enjoyed “inherent” crimi-
nal jurisdiction on tribal lands from the start.

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Court's account, Congress foolishly extended federal crimi-
na
l law to tribal lands on a mistaken assumption that only
tribal law would otherwise apply. Unknown to anyone until
today, state law applied all along. The treaty, the Oklahoma
Enabling Act, and the provision in Oklahoma's constitution
that Congress insisted upon as a condition of statehood?
The Court effectively ignores them. The Kansas Act and
its sibling statutes? On the Court's account, they were
needless too. Congress's instruction in Public Law 280 that
States may not exercise jurisdiction over crimes by or against
tribal members on tribal lands until they amend contrary state
law and obtain tribal consent? Once more, it seems the Court
thinks Congress was hopelessly misguided.
Through it all, the Court makes no effort to grapple with
the backdrop rule of tribal sovereignty. The Court proceeds
oblivious to the rule that only a clear act of Congress may
impose constraints on tribal sovereignty. The Court ig-
nores the fact that Congress has never come close to subject-
ing the Cherokee to state criminal jurisdiction over crimes
against tribal members within the Tribe's reservation. The
Court even disregards our precedents recognizing that the
“grant of statehood” to Oklahoma did not endow the State with
any power to try “crimes committed by or against Indians” on
tribal lands but reserved that authority to the federal govern-
ment and Tribes alone. Ramsey, 271 U. S., at 469; see also
Tiger, 221 U. S., at 309. From start to fnish, the Court defes
our duty to interpret Congress's laws and our own prior
work “harmoniously” as “part of an entire corpus juris.” A.
Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 252 (2012); see also Good-
year Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U. S. 174, 184–185 (1988).
C
Putting aside these astonishing errors, Congress's work and
this Court's precedents yield three clear principles that frmly
resolve this case. First, tribal sovereign authority excludes
the operation of other sovereigns' criminal laws unless and

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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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until Congress ordains otherwise. Second, while Congress
has
extended a good deal of federal criminal law to tribal lands,
in Oklahoma it has authorized the State to prosecute crimes by
or against Native Americans within tribal boundaries only if
it satisfes certain requirements. Under Public Law 280, the
State must remove state-law barriers to jurisdiction and ob-
tain tribal consent. Third, because Oklahoma has done nei-
ther of these things, it lacks the authority it seeks to try crimes
against tribal members within a tribal reservation. Until
today, all this settled law was well appreciated by this Court,
the Executive Branch, and even Oklahoma.
Consider first our own precedents and those of other
courts. In 1946 in Williams v. United States, this Court
recognized that, while States “may have jurisdiction over
offenses committed on th[e] reservation between persons
who are not Indians, the laws and courts of the United
States, rather than those of [the States], have jurisdiction
over offenses committed there . . . by one who is not an In-
dian against one who is an Indian.” 327 U. S. 711, 714 (foot-
note omitted). In Williams v. Lee, issued in 1959, this
Court was clear again: “[I]f the crime was by or against an
Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on
other courts by Congress has remained exclusive.” 358
U. S., at 220. As early as 1926, this Court made the same
point while speaking directly to Oklahoma. Ramsey, 271
U. S., at 469–470. It is a point our cases have continued to
make in recent years.
7
It is a point a host of other courts—
including state courts issuing decisions contrary to their own
interests—have acknowledged too.
8
7
See, e. g., United States v. Bryant, 579 U. S. 140, 146 (2016); Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U. S. 353, 365 (2001); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 465, n. 2
(1984); Washington v. Con federated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation,
439 U. S. 463, 470–471 (1979); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411
U. S. 164, 170–171 (1973).
8
See, e. g., State v. Cungtion, 969 N. W. 2d 501, 504–505 (Iowa 2022);
State v. Sebastian, 243 Conn. 115, 128, and n. 21, 701 A. 2d 13, 22, and
n. 21 (1997); State v. Larson, 455 N. W. 2d 600, 600–601 (S. D. 1990); State
v. Flint, 157 Ariz. 227, 228, 756 P. 2d 324, 324–325 (App. 1988); State v. Green-

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681
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
The Executive Branch has likewise understood the States
to
lack authority to try crimes by or against Indians in In-
dian country absent congressional authorization. Not only
did the Washington Administration recognize as much. See
Part I–A, supra. The same view has persisted throughout
the Nation's history. In 1940, the Acting Secretary of the
Interior advised Congress that state criminal jurisdiction ex-
tends “only to situations where both the offender and the
victim” are non-Indians. S. Rep. No. 1523, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess., 2 (Vol. 2). A few decades later, the Solicitor General
made a similar representation to this Court. See Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae in Arizona v. Flint, O. T.
1988, No. 88–603, p. 3 (Flint Amicus Brief ). In McGirt,
the federal government once more acknowledged that States
cannot prosecute crimes by or against tribal members within
still-extant tribal reservations. See Brief for United States
as Ami cu s Cur i ae i n M cG ir t v. Ok l aho m a, O. T. 2019,
No. 18–9526, p. 38. In this case, the government has es-
poused the same view yet again. See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 4; see also Dept. of Justice, Crimi-
nal Resource Manual 685 (updated Jan. 22, 2020).
9
In the past, even Oklahoma has more or less conceded the
point. The last time Oklahoma was before us, it asked this
walt, 204 Mont. 196, 204–205, 663 P. 2d 1178, 1182–1183 (1983); State v.
Warner, 71 N. M. 418, 421–422, 379 P. 2d 66, 68–69 (1963); State v. Kuntz,
66 N. W. 2d 531, 532 (N. D. 1954); State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 430, 16
N. W. 2d 752, 754–755 (1944); see also United States v. Langford, 641 F. 3d
1195, 1199 (CA10 2011); United States v. Bruce, 394 F. 3d 1215, 1221 (CA9
2005).
9
As sometimes happens when the government considers a legal question
over centuries, differing views have occasionally popped up. In 1979, the
Offce of Legal Counsel opined—with little analysis—that States might be
able to exercise concurrent criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands, though it
conceded the question was “exceedingly diffcult.” 3 Op. OLC 111, 117,
120. This kind of surface-level, hedged analysis is hardly robust evidence.
In any event, the Executive Branch reverted to its traditional position in
short order. That makes the Court's repeated reliance on this isolated
opinion—and its failure to acknowledge the mountain of contradictory evi-
dence—especially bewildering. See ante, at 644–647.

682 OKLAH
OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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Court to usurp congressional authority and disestablish the
Creek
Reservation because, otherwise, the State “would not
have jurisdiction over” “crimes committed against Indians”
within its boundaries. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in McGirt v.
Oklahoma, No. 18–9526, O. T. 2019, p. 54; see also McGirt,
591 U. S., at ––– – –––. In 1991, Oklahoma's attorney gen-
eral formally resolved that major “[c]rimes committed by or
against Indians . . . are under the exclusive province of the
United States,” while Tribes retain exclusive jurisdiction
over “minor crimes committed by Indians.” Haney, 22 Okla.
Opp. Atty. Gen., at 73–74. And Oklahoma's own courts have
recently taken the same position even in the face of vehe-
ment opposition from the State's executive branch. See,
e. g., Spears, 485 P. 3d, at 875, 877.
D
Against all this evidence, what is the Court's reply? It
acknowledges that, at the Nation's founding, tribal sover-
eignty precluded States from prosecuting crimes on tribal
lands by or against tribal members without congressional
authorization. See ante, at 636. But the Court suggests
this traditional “ `notion' ” fipped 180 degrees sometime in
“the latter half of the 1800s.” Ante, at 636, 652. Since then,
the Court says, Oklahoma has enjoyed the “inherent” power
to try at least crimes by non-Indians against tribal members
on tribal reservations until and unless Congress preempts
state authority.
But exactly when and how did this change happen? The
Court never explains. Instead, the Court seeks to cast
blame for its ruling on a grab bag of decisions issued by our
predecessors. But the failure of that effort is transparent.
Start with McBratney, which the Court describes as our
“leading case in the criminal context.” Ante, at 637. There,
as we have seen, the Court said that States admitted to the
Union may gain the right to prosecute cases involving only
non-Indians on tribal lands, but they do not gain any inher-
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ent right to punish “crimes committed by or against Indians”
on
tribal lands. McBratney, 104 U. S., at 624. The Court's
reliance on Draper fares no better, for that case issued a
similar disclaimer. See 164 U. S., at 247. Tellingly, not
even Oklahoma thinks McBratney and Draper compel a rul-
ing in its favor. See Brief for Petitioner 12. And if any-
thing, the Court's invocation of Donnelly, 228 U. S. 243, is
more baffing still. Ante, at 645–646, n. 3. There, the
Court once more reaffrmed the rule that “offenses com-
mitted by or against Indians” on tribal lands remain subject
to federal, not state, jurisdiction. Donnelly, 228 U. S., at
271; see also Ramsey, 271 U. S., at 469.
That leaves the Court to assemble a string of carefully
curated snippets—a clause here, a sentence there—from six
decisions out of the galaxy of this Court's Indian law juris-
prudence. Ante, at 636–637. But this collection of cases is
no more at fault for the Court's decision than the last. Or-
ganized Village of Kake v. Egan—which the Court seems to
think is some magic bullet, see ante, at 636, 652, 653–655—
addressed the prosaic question whether Alaska could apply
its fshing laws on lands owned by a native Alaska tribal
corporation. 369 U. S. 60, 61–63 (1962); see also n. 5, supra.
Subsequently, the Cour t cabi ned that case to circum-
stances “dealing with Indians who have left or never inhab-
ited reservations set aside for their exclusive use or who do
not possess the usua l accoutrements of tr iba l self-
government.” McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 167–168. Mean-
while, New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble allowed New York
to use civil proceedings to eject non-Indian trespassers on
Indian lands. 21 How. 366, 369–371 (1859). In Surplus
Trading Co. v. Cook, the crime at issue did not take place on
tribal lands but on a “supply station of the United States”
sold by Arkansas to the federal government. 281 U. S. 647,
649 (1930). In New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, this Court
merely reaffrmed McBratney and held that States could ex-
ercise jurisdiction over crimes involving only non-Indians.
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326 U. S. 496, 499–500 (1946). Both County of Yakima v.
C
onfederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation and Ne-
vada v. Hicks issued holdings about state civil jurisdiction,
not criminal jurisdiction striking at the heart of tribal sover-
eignty. See 502 U. S. 251, 256–258, 270 (1992); 533 U. S. 353,
361, 363, 374 (2001).
In the end, the Court cannot fault our predecessors for
today's decision. The blame belongs only with this Court
here and now. Standing before us is a mountain of statutes
and precedents making plain that Oklahoma possesses no au-
thority to prosecute crimes against tribal members on tribal
reservations until it amends its laws and wins tribal consent.
This Court may choose to ignore Congress's statutes and the
Nation's treaties, but it has no power to negate them. The
Court may choose to disregard our precedents, but it does
not purport to overrule a single one. As a result, today's
decision surely marks an embarrassing new entry into the
anticanon of Indian law. But its mistakes need not—and
should not—be repeated.
III
Doubtless for some of these reasons, even the Court ulti-
mately abandons its suggestion that Oklahoma is “inher-
ent[ly]” free to prosecute crimes by non-Indians against
tribal members on a tribal reservation absent a federal stat-
ute “preempt[ing]” its authority. Ante, at 646 (emphasis
added). In the end, the Court admits that tribal sover-
eignty can require the exclusion of state authority even ab-
sent a preemptive federal statute. Ante, at 649. But then,
after correcting course, the Court veers off once more. To
determine whether tribal sovereignty displaces state author-
ity in a case involving a non-Indian defendant and an Indian
victim on a reservation in Oklahoma, the Court resorts to
a “Bracker balancing ” test. Ibid. Applying that test, the
Court concludes that Oklahoma's interests in this case out-
weigh those of the Cherokee. All this, too, is mistaken root
and branch.
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A
Beg
in with the most fundamental problem. The Court in-
vokes what it calls the “Bracker balancing ” test with no
more appreciation of that decision's history and context than
it displays in its initial suggestion that the usual rules of
preemption apply to Tribes. The Court tells us nothing
about Bracker itself, its reasoning, or its limits. Perhaps
understandably so, for Bracker never purported to claim for
this Court the raw power to “balance” away tribal sover-
eignty in favor of state criminal jurisdiction over crimes by
or against tribal members—let alone ordain a wholly differ-
ent set of jurisdictional rules than Congress already has.
Bracker involved a relatively minor civil dispute. Arizona
sought to tax vehicles used by the White Mountain Apache
Tribe in logging operations on tribal lands. See Bracker,
448 U. S., at 138–140. The Tribe opposed the effort, point-
ing to a federal law that regulated tribal logging but did not
say anything about preempting the State's vehicle tax. See
id., at 141, 145. The Court began by recognizing that the
usual rules of preemption are not “properly applied” to
Tribes. Id., at 143. Instead, the Court started with the
traditional “ `backdrop' ” presumption that States lack juris-
diction in Indian country. Ibid. And the Court explained
that any ambiguities about the scope of federal law must be
“construed generously” in favor of the Tribes as sovereigns.
Id., at 143–144. With these rules in mind, the Court pro-
ceeded to turn back the State's tax based on a “particularized
inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal inter-
ests at stake.” Id., at 145. The Court judged that “tradi-
tional notions of [tribal] sovereignty,” the federal govern-
ment's “policy of promoting tribal self-suffciency,” and the
rule requiring it to resolve “[a]mbiguities” in favor of the
Tribe trumped any competing state interest. Id., at 143–
144, 151.
Nothing in any of this gets the Court close to where it
wishes to go. If Arizona had to proceed against the tradi-
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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
tional “backdrop” rule excluding state jurisdiction, Okla-
homa
must. And if Arizona could not overcome that back-
drop rule because it could not point to clear federal statutory
language authorizing its comparatively minor civil tax, it is
unfathomable how Oklahoma might overcome that rule here.
The State has pointed—and can point—to nothing in Con-
gress's work granting it the power to try crimes against
tribal members on a tribal reservation. In Bracker, the
Court found it instructive that Congress had “comprehen-
sive[ly]” regulated “the harvesting of Indian timber,” even
if it had not spoken directly to the question of vehicle taxes.
Id., at 145–146, 148. Here, Congress has not only perva-
sively regulated criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, it
has spoken to the very situation we face: States like Okla-
homa may exercise jurisdiction over crimes within tribal
boundaries by or against tribal members only with tribal
consent.
The simple truth is Bracker supplies zero authority for
this Court's course today. If Congress has not always “been
specifc about the allocation of civil jurisdiction in Indian
country,” the same can hardly be said about the allocation of
criminal authority. Cohen 527. Congress “has provided
a nearly comprehensive set of statutes allocating criminal
jurisdiction.” Ibid. In doing so, Congress has already
“balanced” competing tribal, state, and federal interests—and
its balance demands tribal consent. Exactly nothing in
Bracker permits us to ignore Congress's directive.
B
Plainly, the Court's balancing-test game is not one we
should be playing in this case. But what if we did? Sup-
pose this Court could (somehow) ignore Congress's decision
to allow States like Oklahoma to exercise criminal juris-
diction in cases like ours only with tribal consent. Suppose
we could (somehow) replace that rule with one of our own
creation. Even proceeding on that stunning premise, it is

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far from obvious how the Court arrives at its preferred
resu
lt.
In reweighing competing state and tribal interests for it-
self, the Court stresses two points. First, the Court sug-
gests that its balance is designed to “help” Native Ameri-
cans. Ante, at 651 (suggesting that Indians would be
“second-class citizens” without this Court's intervention); Tr.
of Oral Arg. 66 (suggesting state jurisdiction is designed to
“help” tribal members). Second, the Court says state juris-
diction is needed on the Cherokee Reservation today because
“in the wake of McGirt” some defendants “have simply gone
free.” Ante, at 635. On both counts, however, the Court
conspicuously loads the dice.
1
Start with the assertion that allowing state prosecutions
in cases like ours will “help” Indians. The old paternalist
overtones are hard to ignore. Yes, under the laws Congress
has ordained Oklahoma may acquire jurisdiction over crimes
by or against tribal members only with tribal consent. But
to date, the Cherokee have misguidedly shown no interest in
state jursidiction. Thanks to their misjudgment, they have
rendered themselves “second-class citizens.” Ante, at 651.
So, the argument goes, fve unelected judges in Washington
must now make the “right” choice for the Tribe. To state the
Court's staggering argument should be enough to refute it.
Nor does the Court even pause to consider some of the
reasons why the Cherokee might not be so eager to invite
state prosecutions in cases like ours. Maybe the Cherokee
have so far withheld their consent because, throughout the
Nation's history, state governments have sometimes proven
less than reliable sources of justice for Indian victims. As
early as 1795, George Washington observed that “a Jury on
the frontiers” considering a crime by a non-Indian against an
Indian could “hardly be got to listen to a charge, much less
to convict a culprit.” Letter to E. Pendleton (Jan. 22), in 17
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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series 424, 426
(D
. Hoth & C. Ebel eds. 2013). Undoubtedly, too, Georgia
once proved among the Cherokee's “deadliest enemies.”
Kagama, 118 U. S., at 384.
Maybe the Cherokee also have in mind experiences partic-
ular to Oklahoma. Following statehood, settlers embarked
on elaborate schemes to deprive Indians of their lands, rents,
and mineral rights. “Many young allottees were virtually
kidnaped just before they reached their majority”; some
were “induced to sign deeds at midnight on the morning they
became of age.” Debo 197–198. Others were subjected to
predatory guardianships; state judges even “reward[ed] their
supporters [with] guardianship appointments.” Id., at 183.
Oklahoma's courts also sometimes sanctioned the “legalized
robbery” of these Native American children “through the
probate courts.” Id., at 182. Even almost a century on, the
federal government warned of “the possibility of prejudice
[against Native Americans] in state courts.” Flint Amicus
Brief 5.
Whatever may have happened in the past, it seems the
Court can imagine only a bright new day ahead. Moving
forward, the Court cheerily promises, more prosecuting au-
thorities can only “help.” Three sets of prosecutors—fed-
eral, tribal, and state—are sure to prove better than two.
But again it's not hard to imagine reasons why the Cherokee
might see things differently. If more sets of prosecutors are
always better, why not allow Texas to enforce its laws in
California? Few sovereigns or their citizens would see that
as an improvement. Yet it seems the Court cannot grasp
why the Tribe may not.
The Court also neglects to consider actual experience with
concurrent state jurisdiction on tribal lands. According to
a group of former United States Attorneys, in practice con-
current jurisdiction has sometimes “create[d] a pass-the-
buck dynamic . . . with the end result being fewer police and
more crime.” Brief for Former United States Attorneys
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
et al. as Amici Curiae 13; see also C. Goldberg, Public Law
280:
The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indi-
ans, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 535, 552, and n. 92 (1975); Goldberg-
Ambrose 1423. Federal authorities may reduce their in-
volvement when state authorities are present. In turn,
some States may not wish to devote the resources required
and may view the responsibility as an unfunded federal man-
date. Thanks to realities like these, “[a]lmost as soon as
Congress began granting States [criminal] jurisdiction”
through Public Law 280, “affected Tribal Nations began
seeking retrocession and repeal.” Brief for National Indig-
enous Women's Resource Center et al. as Amici Curiae 12.
Recently, a bipartisan congressional commission agreed that
more state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is often
not a good policy choice. See Indian Law and Order Com-
mission, A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer: Re-
port to the President and Congress of the United States xi,
xiv, 11–15 (Nov. 2013). Still, none of this fnds its way into
the Court's cost-beneft analysis.
2
Instead, the Court marches on. The second “factor” it
weighs in its “balance”—and the only history it seems inter-
ested in consulting—concerns Oklahoma's account of its ex-
periences in the last two years since McGirt. Adopting the
State's representations wholesale, the Court says that deci-
sion has posed Oklahoma with law-and-order “challenge[s].”
Ante, at 635. To support its thesis, the Court cites the State's
unsubstantiated “estimat[e]” that McGirt has forced it to
“transfer prosecutorial responsibility for more than 18,000
cases per year to” federal and tribal authorities. Ibid. Ap-
parently on the belief that the transfer of cases from state
to federal prosecutors equates to an eruption of chaos and
criminality, the Court remarks casually that traditional limi-
tations on state prosecutorial authority on tribal lands were
“insignifcant in the real world” before McGirt. Ante, at 647.
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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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But what does this prove? Put aside for the moment
questi
ons about the accuracy of Oklahoma's statistics and
what the number of cases transferred from state to federal
prosecutors may or may not mean for law and order. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 26 (questioning whether the State's “fgures”
might be “grossly exaggerated”). Taking the Court's ac-
count at face value, it might amount to a reason for Oklahoma
to lobby the Cherokee to consent to state jurisdiction. It
might be a reason for the State to petition Congress to revise
criminal jurisdictional arrangements in the State even with-
out tribal consent. But it is no act of statutory or constitu-
tional interpretation. It is a policy argument through and
through.
Nor is the Court's policy argument exactly complete in its
assessment of the costs and benefts. When this Court is-
sued McGirt, it expressly acknowledged that cases involving
crimes by or against tribal members within reservation
boundaries would have to be transferred from state to tribal
or federal authorities. 591 U. S., at ––– – –––. This Court
anticipated, too, that this process would require a period of
readjustment. But, the Court recognized, all this was nec-
essary only because Oklahoma had long overreached its au-
thority on tribal reservations and defed legally binding con-
gressional promises. See ibid.
Notably, too, neither the tribal nor the federal authorities
on the receiving end of this new workload think the “costs”
of this period of readjustment begin to justify the Court's
course. For their part, Tribes in Oklahoma have hired more
police offcers, prosecutors, and judges. See Cherokee Brief
10–11. Based on that investment, Oklahoma's Tribes have
begun to prosecute substantially more cases than they once
did. See id., at 12–13. And they have also shown a willing-
ness to work with Oklahoma, having signed hundreds of
cross-deputization agreements allowing local law enforce-
ment to collaborate with tribal police. Id., at 15–16, and
n. 39. Even Oklahoma's amici concede these agreements
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
have proved “an important tool” for law enforcement. Brief
for
Oklahoma District Attorneys Association et al. as Amici
Curiae 14.
Both of the federal government's elected branches have
also responded, if not in the way this Court happens to pre-
fer. Instead of forcing state criminal jurisdiction onto
Tribes, Congress has chosen to allocate additional funds for
law enforcement in Oklahoma. See, e. g., Consolidated Ap-
propriations Act, H. R. 2471, 117th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 (2022).
Meanwhile, the Solicitor General has offered the Executive
Branch's judgment that McGirt's “practical consequences” do
not justify this Court's intervention, explaining that the De-
partment of Justice is “working diligently with tribal and
State partners” in Oklahoma. See Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 32.
There is even more evidence cutting against the Court's
dystopian tale. According to a recent United States Attor-
ney in Oklahoma, “the sky isn't falling ” and “partnerships
between tribal law enforcement and state law enforcement”
are strong. A. Herrera, Trent Shores Refects on His Time
as U. S. Attorney, Remains Committed to Justice for Indian
Country, KOSU-NPR (Feb. 24, 2021), www.kosu.org/politics/
2021-02-24/trent-shores-refects-on-his-time-as-u-s-attorney-
remains-committed-to-justice-for-indian-country. A Federal
Bureau of Investigation special agent in charge of Oklahoma
has stated that violent crimes “ `are being pursued as heavily
as they were in the past, and in some cases, maybe even
stronger.' ” A. Brothers, Oklahoma Special Agent Says FBI
Faces Cha l lenges i n 3 Categor ies, News on 6 (Feb. 14,
2022), https://www.newson6.com/story/620b261bf 8cd4a07e5cb
845b/oklahoma-special-agent-says-f bi-faces-challenges-in-3-
categories. And the Tribes—those most affected by all this
supposed lawlessness within their reservations—tell us that,
after a period of adjustment, federal prosecutors are now
pursuing lower level offenses vigorously too. See Brief for
Muscogee (Creek) Nation as Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Cert.
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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
11–12, and nn. 21–22 (collecting indictments). The federal
gover
nment has made a similar representation to this Court.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 118. Nor is it any secret that those con-
victed of federal crimes generally receive longer sentences
than individuals convicted of similar state offenses. See,
e. g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State
Courts, 2006—Statistical Tables 9 (2009) (Table 1.6).
In recounting all this, I do not profess certainty about the
optimal law enforcement arrangements in Oklahoma. I do
not pretend to know all the relevant facts, let alone how to
balance each of them in this complex picture. Nor do I claim
to know what weight to give historical wrongs or future
hopes. I offer the preceding observations only to illustrate
the one thing I am sure of: This Court has no business usurp-
ing congressional decisions about the appropriate balance be-
tween federal, tribal, and state interests. If the Court's rul-
ing today sounds like a legislative committee report touting
the benefts of some newly proposed bill, that's because it is
exactly that. And given that a nine-member court is a poor
substitute for the people's elected representatives, it is no
surprise that the Court's cost-beneft analysis is radically in-
complete. The Court's decision is not a judicial interpreta-
tion of the law's meaning; it is the pastiche of a legislative
process.
C
As unsound as the Court's decision is, it would be a mis-
take to overlook its limits. In the end, the Court admits
that tribal sovereignty can displace state authority even
without a preemptive statute. See Part III–A, supra. To
be sure, the Court proceeds to disparage a federal statute
requiring Oklahoma to obtain tribal consent before trying
any crime involving an Indian victim within the Cherokee
Reservation. But look at what the Court leaves unresolved.
The Court does not pass on Public Law 280's provision that
States “shall not” be entitled to assume jurisdiction on tribal
lands until they “appropriately amen[d]” state laws disclaim-
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
ing authority over tribal reservations. 25 U. S. C. § 1324.
The
Court gestures toward the Cherokee's treaties and the
Oklahoma Enabling Act, but ultimately abandons any argu-
ment that those treaties were lawfully abrogated or that the
Oklahoma Enabling Act endowed Oklahoma with inherent
authority to try cases involving Native Americans within
tribal bounds. See ante, at 649. Nor does the Court ad-
dress the relevant text of those treaties or the Enabling
Act—let alone come to terms with our precedents holding
that Oklahoma's “grant of statehood” did not include the
power to try “crimes committed by or against Indians” on
tribal lands. Ramsey, 271 U. S., at 469; see also Tiger, 221
U. S., at 309. Nothing in today's decision could or does
begin to preclude the Cherokee or other Tribes from press-
ing arguments along any of these lines in future cases. The
unamended Oklahoma Constitution and other state statutes
and judicial decisions may stand as independent barriers to
the assumption of state jurisdiction as a matter of state law
too.
The Court's decision is limited in still other important
ways. Most signifcantly, the Court leaves undisturbed the
ancient rule that States cannot prosecute crimes by Native
Americans on tribal lands without clear congressional au-
thorization—for that would touch the heart of “tribal self-
government.” Ante, at 648. At least that rule (and maybe
others) can never be balanced away. Indeed, the Court's
ruling today rests in signifcant part on the fact that Tribes
currently lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who
commit crimes on tribal lands—a factor that obviously does
not apply to cases involving Native American defendants.
Ante, at 650.
Additionally, nothing in the “Bracker balancing ” test the
Court employs foreordains today's grim result for different
Tribes in different States. Bracker instructs courts to focus
on the “specifc context” at issue, taking cognizance of the
particular circumstances of the Tribe in question, including
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OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
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all relevant treaties and statutes. 448 U. S., at 145. Nor
a
re Tr ibes and their treaties “fung ible. ” S. Prakash,
Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1069, 1071–
1072 (2004). There are nearly 600 federally recognized In-
dian Tribes across the country. See Anderson 3. Some of
their treaties appear to promise tribal freedom from state
criminal jurisdiction in express terms. See, e. g., Treaty
with the Navajo Indians, Art. I, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667
(guaranteeing that those who commit crimes against tribal
members will be “arrested and punished according to the
laws of the United States”). Any analysis true to Bracker
must take cognizance of all of this. Any such analysis must
recognize, too, that the standards of preemption applicable
“in other areas of the law” are “unhelpful” when it comes
to Tribes. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 143. Instead, courts must
proceed against the “ `backdrop' ” of tribal sovereignty, ibid.,
with an “assumption that the States have no power to regu-
late the affairs of Indians on a reservation” or other tribal
lands, Williams, 358 U. S., at 219–220. To overcome that
backdrop assumption, a clear congressional statement is re-
quired and any ambiguities must be “construed generously”
in favor of the Tribes. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 143–144; see
also Cotton Petroleum, 490 U. S., at 177–178.
The Court today may ignore a clear jurisdictional rule pre-
scribed by statute and choose to apply its own balancing test
instead. The Court may misapply that balancing test in an
effort to address one State's professed “law and order” con-
cerns. In the process, the Court may even risk unsettling
longstanding and clear jurisdictional rules nationwide. But
in the end, any faithful application of Bracker to other Tribes
in other States should only confrm the soundness of the tra-
ditional rule that state authorities may not try crimes like
this one absent congressional authorization.
10
10
In a fnal drive-by fourish, the Court asserts that its “jurisdictional
holding[s]” today apply “throughout the United States.” For emphasis,
the Court repeats the point in a footnote. Ante, at 655, n. 9, 656. But
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Nor must Congress stand by as this Court sows needless
confusi
on across the country. Even the Court acknowledges
that Congress can undo its decision and preempt state au-
thority at any time. Ante, at 638. And Congress could do
exactly that with a simple amendment to Public Law 280.
It might say: A State lacks criminal jurisdiction over crimes
by or against Indians in Indian Country, unless the State
complies with the procedures to obtain tribal consent out-
lined in 25 U. S. C. § 1321, and, where necessary, amends its
constitution or statutes pursuant to 25 U. S. C. § 1324. Of
course, that reminder of the obvious should hardly be neces-
sary. But thanks to this Court's egregious misappropriation
of legislative authority, “the ball is back in Congress' court.”
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U. S. 618, 661
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
not only does the Court acknowledge that Congress may preempt state
jurisdiction over crimes like this one. See ante, at 638. The truth is, in
this case involving one Tribe in one State the Court does not purport to
evaluate the (many) treaties, federal statutes, precedents, and state laws
that may preclude state jurisdiction on specifc tribal lands around the
country. Nor are we legislators entitled to pass new laws of general appli-
cability, but a court charged with resolving cases and controversies involv-
ing particular parties who are entitled to make their own arguments in
their own cases. The very precedent the Court invokes as authority to
reach its decision today recognizes as much—and demands future courts
conduct any analysis sensitive to the “specifc context” of each Tribe, its
treaties, and relevant laws. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 145. For that matter,
even when it comes to the Cherokee the Court leaves much unanswered.
The Court does not confront the relevant text of the Cherokee's treaties,
the Oklahoma Enabling Act, or the relevant portions of our precedents
interpreting both. And the Court does not mention the terms of Public
Law 280 that require Oklahoma to amend its laws before asserting juris-
diction. Even more than all that, the Court ultimately retreats from its
claim that statehood confers an “inherent” right to prosecute crimes by
non-Indians against tribal members on tribal lands. It rests instead on a
“balancing test” that makes anything it does say about the “inherent”
right of States to try cases within Indian country dicta through and
through.

696 OKLAH
OMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
*
In
the 1830s, this Court struggled to keep our Nation's
promises to the Cherokee. Justice Story celebrated the de-
cision in Worcester: “ `Thanks be to God, the Court can wash
[its] hands clean of the iniquity of oppressing the Indians and
disregarding their rights.' ” Breyer 420. “ `The Court had
done its duty,' ” even if Georgia refused to do its own. Ibid.
Today, the tables turn. Oklahoma's courts exercised the for-
titude to stand athwart their own State's lawless disregard
of the Cherokee's sovereignty. Now, at the bidding of Okla-
homa's executive branch, this Court unravels those lower-
court decisions, defes Congress's statutes requiring tribal
consent, offers its own consent in place of the Tribe's, and
allows Oklahoma to intrude on a feature of tribal sovereignty
recognized since the founding. One can only hope the politi-
cal branches and future courts will do their duty to honor
this Nation's promises even as we have failed today to do
our own.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 661, line 5: the ellipsis between “crimes” and “committed” is deleted
p. 670, last line: “the” is inserted before “Indian”
p. 678, n. 6, line 4: the ellipsis is deleted
p. 684, line 12 from bottom: “(emphasis added)” is inserted after “646”