Patel v. Garland

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 1
Pages 328–365
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 16, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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328 OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
Syllabus
PATEL et al. v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 20–979. Argued December 6, 2021—Decided May 16, 2022
In 2007, Pankajkumar Patel, who had entered the United States illegally
with his wife Jyotsnaben in the 1990s, applied to United States Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for discretionary adjustment of
status under 8 U. S. C. § 1255, which would have made Patel and his wife
lawful permanent residents. Because USCIS was aware that Patel had
previously checked a box on a Georgia driver's license application falsely
stating that he was a United States citizen, it denied Patel's application
for failure to satisfy the threshold requirement that the noncitizen be
statutorily admissible for permanent residence. § 1255(i)(2)(A); see also
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (rendering inadmissible a noncitizen “who falsely
represents . . . himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for
any purpose or beneft under” state or federal law).
Years later, the Government initiated removal proceedings against
Patel and his wife due to their illegal entry. Patel sought relief from
removal by renewing his adjustment of status request. Patel argued
before an Immigration Judge that he had mistakenly checked the “citi-
zen” box on the state application and thus lacked the subjective intent
necessary to violate the federal statute. The Immigration Judge dis-
agreed, denied Patel's application for adjustment of status, and ordered
that Patel and his wife be removed from the country. The Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissed Patel's appeal.
Patel petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, where a panel of that
court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claim. Federal law
prohibits judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of
relief ” under § 1255. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But see § 1252(a)(2)(D) (excep-
tion where the judgment concerns “constitutional claims” or “questions
of law”). The panel reasoned that the factual determinations of which
Patel sought review—whether he had testifed credibly and whether he
had subjectively intended to misrepresent himself as a citizen—each
qualifed as an unreviewable judgment. On rehearing, the en banc
court agreed with the panel. This Court granted certiorari to resolve
a Circuit confict as to the scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Held: Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of
discretionary-relief proceedings under § 1255 and the other provisions
enumerated in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Pp. 336–347.

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Syllabus
(a) This case largely turns on the scope of the word “judgment” as
used
in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). In support of the judgment below, Court-
appointed amicus defnes it as any authoritative decision—encompassing
any and all decisions relating to the granting or denying of discretionary
relief. By contrast, the Government argues that it refers exclusively
to a decision requiring the use of discretion, which the factual fndings
in this case are not. Patel agrees that “judgment” implies an exercise
of discretion but interprets the qualifying phrase “regarding the grant-
ing of relief ” as focusing the jurisdictional bar on only the Immigration
Judge's ultimate decision whether to grant relief. Everything else, he
says, is reviewable. Pp. 336–344.
(1) Only amicus' definition fits the text and context of§ 1252(a)
(2)(B)(i). “[T]he word `any' has an expansive meaning.” Babb v. Wil-
kie, 589 U. S. –––, –––, n. 2 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
As applied here, “any” means a judgment “ `of whatever kind' ” under
§ 1255 and the other enumerated provisions. United States v. Gonzales,
520 U. S. 1, 5. The word “regarding ” has a similarly “broadening ef-
fect.” Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. –––, –––.
Thus, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) encompasses not just “the granting of relief ” but
also any judgment relating to the granting of relief. Amicus' reading is
reinforced by Congress' later addition of § 1252(a)(2)(D), which preserves
review of legal and constitutional questions but makes no mention of
preserving review of questions of fact. Moreover, this Court has al-
ready relied on subparagraph (D) to all but settle that judicial review of
factfnding is unavailable. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589
U. S. –––; Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ––– (2020). Pp. 338–340.
(2) The Government's and Patel's interpretations read like elabo-
rate efforts to avoid the text's most natural meaning. The Government
cites dictionary defnitions such as “the mental or intellectual process of
forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing ” as indi-
cating that “judgment” refers exclusively to a discretionary decision,
which it describes as one that is “subjective or evaluative.” Brief
for Respondent 12. The factual fndings in this case, it says, do not ft
that description. The Government is wrong about both text and con-
text. A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discretion, nor does
context indicate that only discretionary judgments are covered by
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Rather than delineating a special category of discre-
tionary determinations, the cited defnitions—none of which expressly
references discretion—simply describe the decisionmaking process,
which might involve a matter that the Government treats as “subjec-
tive” or one that it deems “objective.” Using the word “judgment” to
describe the fact determinations at issue in this case is perfectly natural.
See, e. g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U. S.
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ATEL v. GARLAND
Syllabus
318, 327. To succeed, the Government must show that in context, the
k
ind of judgment to which § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) refers is discretionary. But
the text of that provision applies to “any judgment.” Had Congress
intended to limit the jurisdictional bar to “discretionary judgments,” it
could easily have used that language, as it did elsewhere in the immigra-
tion code. The Government's reliance on Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S.
233, is inapposite. That case said or implied nothing about review of
nondiscretionary decisions. Pp. 340–343.
(3) Neither does Patel's interpretation square with the text or con-
text of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). He claims that the phrase “any judgment re-
garding the granting of relief ” refers only to the ultimate grant or
denial of relief, leaving all eligibility determinations reviewable. Pa-
tel's interpretation reads “regarding ” out of the statute entirely. Patel
also fails to explain why subparagraph (B)'s bar should be read differ-
ently from subparagraph (C)'s prohibition on reviewing fnal orders of
removal for certain criminal offenses. Given the similarities of those
two provisions—each precludes judicial review in the same way and
bears the same relationship to subparagraph (D)—there is no reason to
think that subparagraph (B) would allow a court to review the factual
underpinnings of a decision when subparagraph (C) prohibits just that.
Pp. 343–344.
(b) Patel and the Government object that this Court's interpretation
would arbitrarily prohibit review of some factual determinations made
in the discretionary-relief context that would be reviewable if made else-
where in removal proceedings. But the distinction simply refects Con-
gress' choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary
relief. And while this Court does not decide what effect, if any, its
decision has on review of discretionary-relief determinations made out-
side of removal proceedings, the Court rejects Patel's and the Govern-
ment's contention that the risk of foreclosing such review should change
its interpretation here. As the Court has emphasized many times be-
fore, policy concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the statu-
tory text. Pp. 344–346.
(c) As a last resort, Patel and the Government argue that the statute
is ambiguous enough to trigger the presumption that Congress did not
intend to foreclose judicial review. Here, however, the text and context
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) clearly indicate that judicial review of fact determi-
nations is precluded in the discretionary-relief context, and the Court has
no reason to resort to the presumption of reviewability. Pp. 346–347.
971 F. 3d 1258, affrmed.
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., fled
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Opinion of the Court
a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.,
joi
ned, post, p. 347.
Mark C. Fleming argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Ira J. Kurzban, John P. Pratt, Ed-
ward F. Ramos, and Thomas G. Sprankling.
Austin L. Raynor argued the cause for respondent in sup-
port of petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Prelogar, Acting Solicitor General Fletcher, Dep-
uty Solicitor General Gannon, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Harrington, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley,
and Sara J. Bayram.
Taylor A. R. Meehan, by appointment of the Court, 594
U. S. –––, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae
in support of the judgment below.*
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress has comprehensively detailed the rules by which
noncitizens may enter and live in the United States. When
noncitizens violate those rules, Congress has provided proce-
dures for their removal. At the same time, there is room
for mercy: Congress has given the Attorney General power
to grant relief from removal in certain circumstances.
Federal courts have a very limited role to play in this proc-
ess. With an exception for legal and constitutional ques-
tions, Congress has barred judicial review of the Attorney
General's decisions denying discretionary relief from re-
moval. We must decide how far this bar extends—specif-
cally, whether it precludes judicial review of factual fndings
that underlie a denial of relief. It does.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Immigration Council et al. by Kathleen Hartnett and Adam S. Gershen-
son; for the American Immigration Lawyers Association by Romy Lerner,
Rebecca Sharpless, and Maureen Sweeney; for Former Executive Offce
for Immigration Review Judges by Richard W. Mark and Amer S. Ahmed;
for Law Professors by Holly L. Henderson-Fisher and David E. Carney;
and for the National Immigration Litigation Alliance et al. by Mary Ken-
ney, Charles Roth, Matthew P. Gordon, and Will M. Conley.

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ATEL v. GARLAND
Opinion of the Court
I
A
A
noncitizen who enters the United States illegally or who
otherwise violates its laws may be removed from the coun-
try. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182, 1227, 1229a. Removal proceedings
are conducted by immigration judges in the United States
Department of Justice who exercise the authority of the
Attorney General. § 1229a(a)(1); 8 CFR §§ 1240.1(a)(1),
1245.2(a)(1)(i) (2021). If an immigration judge decides that
a noncitizen is removable, the judge is authorized to order
the removal of the noncitizen from the United States. 8
U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(5).
Being found removable is not always the end of the story,
though, because Congress has authorized relief from removal
in certain contexts. For example, the Attorney General has
discretion to adjust the status of an eligible noncitizen who
entered the United States illegally to that of lawful perma-
nent resident, forgiving the illegal entry and protecting the
noncitizen from removal on that ground. See § 1255(i). (As
with authority over removal generally, the Attorney General
has delegated to immigration judges the ability to grant re-
lief from removal. 8 CFR § 1240.1(a)(1)(ii).) To be eligible
for such relief, a noncitizen must show that he satisfes vari-
ous threshold requirements established by Congress. Yet
eligibility only gets a noncitizen so far. Because relief from
removal is always “ `a matter of grace,' ” even an eligible non-
citizen must persuade the immigration judge that he merits
a favorable exercise of discretion. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S.
289, 308 (2001). And if the judge decides that denial would
be appropriate regardless of eligibility, the judge need not
address eligibility at all. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U. S.
24, 25–26 (1976) (per curiam).
Congress has sharply circumscribed judicial review of the
discretionary-relief process. Title 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)
provides:

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Opinion of the Court
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statu-
tory
or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28,
or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361
and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subpara-
graph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, deci-
sion, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court
shall have jurisdiction to review—
“(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief
under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of
this title.”
This bar has an important qualifcation: “Nothing in subpara-
graph (B) . . . shall be construed as precluding review of
constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a peti-
tion for review fled with an appropriate court of appeals
in accordance with this section.” § 1252(a)(2)(D). Notably,
this qualifcation does not preserve review of questions of
fact.
B
Pankajkumar Patel and his wife Jyotsnaben entered the
United States illegally in the 1990s. In 2007, Patel applied
to United States Citizensh ip and Immigrati on Services
(USCIS) (a component of the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS)) for adjustment of status under § 1255(i). See 8
CFR § 245.2(a)(1) (giving USCIS authority over applications
for adjustment of status made outside of removal proceed-
ings). If granted, this adjustment would have excused Pa-
tel's illegal entry and made him a lawful permanent resident.
(Patel's wife, the other petitioner in this case, applied for
derivative adjustment of status based on Patel's application.)
While his request to USCIS was pending, Patel also applied
for a Georg ia dr iver 's license. On that appl icati on, he
checked a box falsely stating that he was a United States
citizen.
USCIS denied Patel's application for adjustment of status
because of that misrepresentation. One of the eligibility re-
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ATEL v. GARLAND
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quirements for adjustment is that the noncitizen be stat-
utor
i ly admissible for per manent residence. 8 U. S. C.
§ 1255(i)(2)(A). USCIS decided that Patel failed to satisfy
this requirement. Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) renders inad-
missible an “alien who falsely represents, or has falsely rep-
resented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United
States for any purpose or beneft under” state or federal law.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has interpreted
this provision to apply when a noncitizen (1) makes a false
representation of citizenship (2) that is material to a purpose
or beneft under the law (3) with the subjective intent of
obtaining the purpose or beneft. Matter of Richmond, 26
I. & N. Dec. 779, 786–787 (2016). Applying this test, USCIS
concluded that Patel had violated § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) and
was therefore ineligible for status adjustment.
Several years later, DHS initiated removal proceedings
against the Patels because they were present in the United
States without having been admitted—the same illegal entry
that Patel had sought to remedy in his initial application
for adjustment of status. See § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Patel con-
ceded that he was removable on that ground but sought re-
lief from removal by repeating his request for discretionary
adjustment to lawful permanent resident status.
Now before an Immigration Judge, Patel's request for re-
lief raised the same question that had been at issue in his
application before USCIS: whether the misrepresentation of
citizenship on his driver's license application rendered him
ineligible for discretionary adjustment. He conceded that
he had checked the “citizen” box on that application. But
he argued that he had done so by accident—and therefore
without the subjective intent that the BIA has interpreted
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to require.
The Immigration Judge concluded otherwise. The judge
explained that Patel was evasive when asked exactly how he
had made a mistake. And though Patel testifed that he had
provided his alien registration number on his application,
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Opinion of the Court
which would have identifed him as a noncitizen, the actual
appl
ication showed that he had not. The judge also noted
that Patel had falsely represented his manner of entry into
the United States on an application for asylum. Based on
this evidence, the judge found that Patel's testimony was not
credible and that he had intentionally represented that he
was a citizen. The judge accordingly denied Patel's applica-
tion for adjustment of status and ordered that he and his
wife be removed from the United States. Patel appealed
the decision to the BIA, which determined that the judge's
factual fndings were not clearly erroneous and dismissed
the appeal.
Patel petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, arguing
that any reasonable judge would have been “compelled to
conclude” that his testimony was credible and that he had
made an honest mistake on the form. See § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(“[A]dministrative fndings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary”). A panel of that court held that it lacked juris-
diction to consider Patel's claim because federal law prohibits
judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of
relief ” under § 1255, the adjustment-of-status provision.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). And the factual determinations of which
Patel sought review—whether he had testifed credibly and
whether he had subjectively intended to misrepresent him-
self as a citizen—each qualifed, in the panel's view, as a
“judgment regarding the granting of relief.” See Patel v.
United States Atty. Gen., 917 F. 3d 1319, 1327 (2019).
On rehearing en banc, both Patel and the Government ar-
gued that the panel had erred. Patel contended that the bar
on judicial review applied only to the ultimate decision to
grant or deny adjustment of status—not to any subsidiary
decisions regarding an applicant's eligibility to be considered
for relief. The Government argued that the bar applied not
only to the ultimate decision to grant or deny relief but also
to any discretionary determinations made at the eligibility
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stage. And in the Government's view, the Immigration
J
udge's factual fndings were “nondiscretionary” determina-
tions to which the bar did not apply.
A majority of the full Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
panel decision and held that all factual determinations made
as part of considering a request for discretionary relief fall
within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)'s prohibition on judicial review.
Patel v. United States Atty. Gen., 971 F. 3d 1258, 1272–1273
(2020). In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit
deepened a split among the courts of appeals as to the scope
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
1
We granted certiorari to resolve the confict. 594 U. S.
––– (2021). Because the Government has continued to take
the position that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not prohibit review of
the fact determinations at issue, we invited Taylor A. R.
Meehan to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in
support of the judgment below. 594 U. S. ––– (2021). She
has ably discharged her responsibilities.
II
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdiction to re-
view “any judgment regarding the granting of relief ” under
1
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear to interpret § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
the way that the Eleventh Circuit does. See Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F. 3d
475, 480 (CA4 2006); Cevilla v. Gonzales, 446 F. 3d 658, 660–661 (CA7
2006). Other Courts of Appeals distinguish between discretionary and
nondiscretionary judgments but do so in a way that seems to preclude all
review of fact questions. See Castro v. Holder, 727 F. 3d 125, 128–129
(CA1 2013); Rosario v. Holder, 627 F. 3d 58, 61 (CA2 2010); Arambula-
Medina v. Holder, 572 F. 3d 824, 828 (CA10 2009). The remainder to
weigh in on the question take the Government's position. See Mendez-
Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F. 3d 176, 178–179 (CA3 2003); Garcia-
Melendez v. Ashcroft, 351 F. 3d 657, 661 (CA5 2003); Santana-Albarran v.
Ashcroft, 393 F. 3d 699, 703 (CA6 2005); Ortiz-Cornejo v. Gonzales, 400
F. 3d 610, 612 (CA8 2005); Mamigonian v. Biggs, 710 F. 3d 936, 943–946
(CA9 2013).
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§ 1255. The outcome of this case largely turns on the scope
of
the word “judgment,” an issue on which the parties and
amicus have three competing views.
Amicus maintains that “judgment” means any authorita-
tive decision. See Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary 1223 (1993) (“a formal utterance or pronouncing of
an authoritative opinion after judging,” or “an opinion so
pronounced”); 8 Oxford English Dictionary 294 (2d ed. 1989)
(“[t]he pronouncing of a deliberate opinion upon a person or
thing, or the opinion pronounced”). Under this broad def-
nition, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)'s prohibition “encompasses any and
all decisions relating to the granting or denying ” of discre-
tionary relief. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae
22–23. Factual fndings fall within this category, amicus
says, so the courts lack jurisdiction to review them.
The Government argues that, at least when used outside
the context of a fnal judgment of a court, “judgment” does
not refer to just any decision. According to the Govern-
ment, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)'s use of “judgment” refers exclusively
to a decision that requires the use of discretion. Brief for
Respondent 16–18. On this approach, some eligibility deter-
minations are reviewable and others are not. For example,
the determination that a noncitizen's removal would not re-
sult in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for a
spouse, parent, or child involves discretion (which makes it
an unreviewable “judgment”), but the decision that an appli-
cant has fewer than 10 years of continuous presence in the
United States does not (which makes it reviewable). See
id., at 42 (citing 971 F. 3d, at 1296 (Martin, J., dissenting));
but see Trejo v. Garland, 3 F. 4th 760 (CA5 2021) (concluding
to the contrary that hardship is nondiscretionary and so re-
viewable); Singh v. Rosen, 984 F. 3d 1142 (CA6 2021) (same).
The Government classifes the factual fndings at issue in
this case—the Immigration Judge's conclusions that Patel's
testimony was not credible and that he had lied on the
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ATEL v. GARLAND
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form—as nondiscretionary and therefore outside the juris-
dic
tional bar.
2
Patel agrees with the Government that “judgment” im-
plies an exercise of discretion, but unlike the Government,
he would not sift through eligibility determinations to clas-
sify them as discretionary or nondiscretionary. Instead,
Patel reads the phrase “regarding the granting of relief ” to
focus the jurisdictional bar narrowly on a single discretion-
ary judgment: the immigration judge's decision whether to
grant relief to an applicant eligible to receive it. Every-
thing else, Patel says, is reviewable. Justice Gorsuch
adopts Patel's approach, rejecting the Government's inter-
pretation as well as amicus'. See post, at 354–355 (dissent-
ing opinion).
A
Amicus' interpretation is the only one that fts § 1252(a)
(2)(B)(i)'s text and context. The provision does not restrict
itself to certain kinds of decisions. Rather, it prohibits re-
view of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under
§ 1255 and the other enumerated provisions. As this Court
has “repeatedly explained,” “ ` “the word `any' has an expan-
sive meaning.” ' ” Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U. S. –––, –––, n. 2
(2020); see also Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary, at 97 (defning “any” as “one or some indiscriminately of
whatever kind”). Here, “any” means that the provision ap-
plies to judgments “ `of whatever kind' ” under § 1255, not just
discretionary judgments or the last-in-time judgment. See
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997). Similarly, the
2
Prior to 2001, the Government took the position that amicus now de-
fends. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52–53. It adopted its current understanding as
a matter of constitutional avoidance following this Court's decision in INS
v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289 (2001). Tr. of Oral Arg. 53–54. Though the Gov-
ernment says that Congress' subsequent amendments to other parts of
§ 1252, see in fra, at 339, “ameliorat[ed] the constitutional concerns,” it has
not reverted to its original interpretation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), Tr. of Oral
Arg. 54.
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use of “regarding ” “in a legal context generally has a broaden-
i
ng effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not
only its subject but also matters relating to that subject.”
Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. –––, –––
(2018); see also Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary, at 1911 (defning “regarding ” as “with respect to” or “con-
cerning ”). Thus, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) encompasses not just “the
granting of relief ” but also any judgment relating to the grant-
ing of relief. That plainly includes factual fndings.
Section 1252(a)(2)(D), which preserves review of constitu-
tional claims and questions of law, reinforces that conclusion.
Congress added this subparagraph after we suggested in
St. Cyr that barring review of all legal questions in removal
cases could raise a constitutional concern. See 533 U. S.,
at 300, 314. The amendment is precise. While Congress
could have responded to St. Cyr by lifting § 1252's prohibi-
tions on judicial review altogether, it instead excised only
the legal and constitutional questions that implicated our
concern. See § 1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in subparagraph (B)
or (C)” or other similar provisions “shall be construed as pre-
cluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law”);
§§ 1252(a)(2)(B), (C) (continuing to prohibit review “except as
provided in subparagraph (D)”). And if Congress made such
questions an exception, it must have left something within
the rule. The major remaining category is questions of fact.
No surprise, then, that we have already relied on subpara-
graph (D) to all but settle that judicial review of factfnding
is unavailable. In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. –––
(2020), we had to decide whether subparagraph (C)—which
bars review of “any fnal order of removal against an alien
who is removable by reason of having committed” certain
criminal offenses—prohibits review of how a legal standard
applies to undisputed facts. Our answer turned on whether
such an application counts as a question of law for purposes
of subparagraph (D). Id., at ––– – –––. In holding that it
does, we explained that subparagraph (D) “will still forbid
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appeals of factual determinations” themselves under subpar-
agraph
(C). Id., at ––– – –––. Had we thought otherwise,
we would simply have said that questions of fact, like ques-
tions of law, are reviewable—end of story.
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ––– (2020), addresses Patel's
situation even more directly. There, we held that a court
has jurisdiction to review a factual challenge to an order de-
nying relief under the Convention Against Torture, because
that order falls outside of subparagraph (C)'s prohibition on
reviewing fnal orders of removal. In reaching that conclu-
sion, we emphasized that our decision would have “no effect”
on those orders that do fall within a jurisdiction-stripping
provision—including “orders denying discretionary relief ”
under § 1252(a)(2)(B). Id., at –––. And so, we explained, a
noncitizen “may not bring a factual challenge to orders deny-
ing discretionary relief, including . . . adjustment of status.”
Ibid. We adhere to that view today.
B
In contrast to amicus' straightforward interpretation,
both the Government's and Patel's arguments read like elab-
orate efforts to avoid the most natural meaning of the text.
1
We begin with the Government's argument that “judg-
ment” refers exclusively to a “discretionary” decision, which
the Government describes as a decision that is “subjective
or evaluative.” Brief for Respondent 12. According to the
Government, this requirement is evident in defnitions like
this one: “ `the mental or intellectual process of forming an
opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing,' ” or “ `an
opinion or estimate so formed.' ” Id., at 16–17 (quoting
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at 1223).
The Government's argument is subtle, to say the least, given
that none of the defnitions it cites expressly references dis-
cretion. Evidently, the nature of the decisionmaking proc-
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ess does the work: If the process occurs as the defnitions
descr
ibe, then the decision it yields is discretionary and
counts as a judgment. And the Government says that the
factual fndings in this case do not ft that description.
We do not see how the Government's cited defnitions
narrow the feld in the way that the Government claims.
Rather than delineating a special category of discretionary
determinations, they simply describe the decisionmaking
process. That process might involve a matter that the Gov-
ernment treats as “subjective” or one that it deems “objec-
tive.” Either counts as a judgment, even under the defni-
tions that the Government offers.
Take the credibility determination at issue in this case. It
is easily described as an “opinion or evaluation” formed “by
discerning and comparing ” the evidence presented. The
Immigration Judge weighed Patel's testimony, reviewed doc-
uments, and considered Patel's history to conclude that he
was an evasive and untrustworthy witness. Using the word
“judgment” to describe that kind of credibility determination
is perfectly natural—in fact, we have used it this way our-
selves. See, e. g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. San-
doz, Inc., 574 U. S. 318, 327 (2015) (discussing “ `credibility
judgments' ” about a witness). It is just as natural in other
factfnding contexts, like the Immigration Judge's determina-
tion that Patel lied on his driver's license application. Find-
ing that fact involved the same exercise of evaluating con-
ficting evidence to make a judgment about what happened.
So to succeed, the Government must do more than point
to the word “judgment.” It must show that in context, the
kind of judgment to which § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) refers is discre-
tionary. But the text of the provision stops that argument
in its tracks because the bar on review applies to “any judg-
ment.” Had Congress intended instead to limit the jurisdic-
tional bar to “discretionary judgments,” it could easily have
used that language—as it did elsewhere in the immigration
code. See, e. g., § 1226(e) (“The Attorney General's discre-
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ATEL v. GARLAND
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tionary judgment regarding the application of this section
sha
ll not be subject to review” (emphasis added)); § 1252(b)
(4)(D) (“[T]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment
whether to grant relief under section 1158(a) of this title
shall be conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and
an abuse of discretion” (emphasis added)). We express no
view about what “discretionary judgment” means in those
provisions—the point is simply that the absence of any refer-
ence to discretion in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) undercuts the Govern-
ment's efforts to read it in.
The Government claims that Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S.
233 (2010), wh ich i nter preted neighbor i ng prov isi on
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), supports its argument. That provision
bars review of
“any other decision or action of the Attorney General or
the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for
which is specifed under this subchapter to be in the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief
under section 1158(a) of this title.”
We explained in Kucana that “[t]he proximity of clauses (i)
and (ii), and the words linking them—`any other decision'—
sugges[t] that Congress had in mind decisions of the same
genre, i. e., those made discretionary by legislation.” Id., at
246–247. “Read harmoniously,” we said, “both clauses con-
vey that Congress barred court review of discretionary deci-
sions only when Congress itself set out the Attorney Gener-
al's discretionary authority in the statute.” Id., at 247.
This reference to barring review of discretionary decisions,
the Government says, implies that review of nondiscretion-
ary decisions is allowed.
Kucan a's discussi on is i napposite. That opini on ad-
dressed whether the Attorney General could unilaterally
proscribe review of decisions “declared discretionary by the
Attorney General himself through regulation.” Id., at 237.
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In drawing the comparison between clauses (i) and (ii), we
thus
focused on the fact that each form of relief identifed in
clause (i) was entrusted to the Attorney General's discretion
by statute. Id., at 246. We neither said nor implied any-
thing about review of eligibility decisions made in the course
of exercising that statutory discretion.
In short, the Government is wrong about both text and
context. A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discre-
tion, nor does context indicate that only discretionary judg-
ments are covered by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
2
Unlike the Government, Patel interprets § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
to prohibit review of only the ultimate grant or denial of
relief, leaving all elig ibility determinations reviewable.
That, Patel says, is because the provision specifes the kind
of judgment to which the bar applies: “any judgment regard-
ing the granting of relief.” Eligibility determinations—
which Patel characterizes as “frst-step decisions”—are not
judgments regarding the granting of relief because eligibility
is a necessary but insuffcient condition for relief. The only
judgment that can actually grant relief is what Patel de-
scribes as the “second-step decision” whether to grant the
applicant the “ ` “grace” ' ” of relief from removal. Brief for
Petitioners 20 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 308). So, Patel
argues, that is the sole judgment to which the bar applies.
Like the Government, Patel cannot square his interpreta-
tion with the text of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). He claims that his is
the only interpretation that makes sense of “regarding the
granting of relief ”; as he sees it, “any judgment regarding
the granting of relief ” must narrow the meaning of “judg-
ment” to include only the decision “whether to grant relief.”
Brief for Petitioners 22–25, 37–39. To be sure, the reference
to “the granting of relief ” appears to constrain the provision
from sweeping in judgments that have nothing to do with
that subject. But as even the Government acknowledges,
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ATEL v. GARLAND
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§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not stop at just the grant or denial of
rel
ief; it extends to any judgment “regarding ” that ultimate
decision. See Brief for Respondent 18–20. Patel's inter-
pretation to the contrary reads “regarding ” out of the stat-
ute entirely.
Context further undermines Patel's position. He cannot
explain why the bar in subparagraph (B) should be read dif-
ferently from subparagraph (C)'s prohibition on reviewing
fnal orders of removal for certain criminal offenses. Patel
acknowledges that this bar on review of a “fnal order” also
precludes review of its factual support, including the very
kind of factfnding at issue in this case. Reply Brief for
Petitioners 7; Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at ––– – –––.
But if Congress had wanted to achieve that effect in subpara-
graph (B), he argues, it could have used “fnal order” there
too, rather than “judgment.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 7.
Yet Patel ignores a simple explanation for the shift in termi-
nology. Subparagraph (B) bars review of only one facet of
the removal process (consideration of discretionary relief )
whereas subparagraph (C) prohibits review of the entire pro-
ceeding (removal based on a criminal offense). Each statu-
tory label describes its target, but otherwise, the provisions
preclude judicial review in the same way and bear the same
relationship to subparagraph (D). Given those similarities,
we see no reason to think that subparagraph (B) would allow
a court to review the factual underpinnings of a decision
when subparagraph (C) prohibits just that.
C
Patel and the Government object that our interpretation
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) would arbitrarily prohibit review of some
factual determinations made in the discretionary-relief con-
text that would be reviewable if made elsewhere in removal
proceedings. In this case, for example, the question whether
Patel intended to falsely claim to be a citizen on his driver's
license application relates to whether he is statutorily inad-
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missible, which is both an obstacle to discretionary relief and
an
independent ground for removal. Presumably because
Patel openly acknowledged that he was removable for enter-
ing the country illegally, the Government did not premise
his removal on the contested claim that he had intentionally
misrepresented his citizenship. But if the Government had
taken that route, the Immigration Judge's determinations
would have been reviewable in the ordinary course.
That distinction is not arbitrary. It refects Congress'
choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discre-
tionary relief, the granting of which is “ `not a matter of right
under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter
of grace.' ” St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 308. That reduced protec-
tion is refected in the burden of proof too: The Government
bears the burden of proving removability by clear and con-
vincing evidence, while an applicant bears the burden of
establishing eligibility for discretionary relief. Compare
§ 1229a(c)(3)(A) with § 1229a(c)(4)(A). For both judicial re-
view and the burden of proof, the context in which a fact is
found explains the difference in protection afforded.
Patel and the Government also briefy suggest that inter-
preting § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) as we do will have the unintended
consequence of precluding all review of USCIS denials of
discretionary relief. Those decisions are made outside of
the removal context, and subparagraph (D) preserves review
of legal and constitutional questions only when raised in a
petition for review of a fnal order of removal. If the juris-
dictional bar is broad and subparagraph (D) is inapplicable,
Patel and the Government say, USCIS decisions will be
wholly insulated from judicial review.
The reviewability of such decisions is not before us, and
we do not decide it. But it is possible that Congress did, in
fact, intend to close that door.
3
The post-St. Cyr amend-
3
The parties do not address the independent question whether a USCIS
denial of adjustment of status made before the initiation of removal pro-
ceedings satisfes threshold fnality and exhaustion requirements for re-
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ments expressly extended the jurisdictional bar to judg-
ments
made outside of removal proceedings at the same time
that they preserved review of legal and constitutional ques-
tions made within removal proceedings. See §§ 1252(a)(2)(B),
(D). And foreclosing judicial review unless and until re-
moval proceedings are initiated would be consistent with
Congress' choice to reduce procedural protections in the con-
text of discretionary relief. See Lee v. USCIS, 592 F. 3d
612, 620 (CA4 2010) (“To the extent Congress decided to per-
mit judicial review of a constitutional or legal issue bearing
upon the denial of adjustment of status, it intended for the
issue to be raised to the court of appeals during removal
proceedings”). So it would be diffcult to maintain that this
consequence conficts with the statutory structure, and nei-
ther Patel nor the Government goes so far. Instead, they
urge us to interpret § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to avoid the risk of this
result. Yet we inevitably swerve out of our lane when we
put policy considerations in the driver's seat. As we have
emphasized many times before, policy concerns cannot trump
the best interpretation of the statutory text. See, e. g., Niz-
Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021); Jay v. Boyd,
351 U. S. 345, 357 (1956).
D
As a last resort, Patel and the Government insist that the
statute is ambiguous enough to trigger the presumption that
Congress did not intend to foreclose judicial review. We
disagree.
Because “ `executive determinations generally are subject
to judicial review,' ” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at –––,
we presume that review is available when a statute is silent.
See Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 56
view. There appears to be disagreement on this question in the courts of
appeals. Compare Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F. 3d 512, 517–518 (CA5 2000);
McBrearty v. Perryman, 212 F. 3d 985, 987 (CA7 2000), with Pinho v.
Gonzales, 432 F. 3d 193, 200–202 (CA3 2005); Cabaccang v. USCIS, 627
F. 3d 1313, 1317 (CA9 2010).
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
(1993). But that presumption “may be overcome by specifc
lang
uage” in a provision or evidence “drawn from the statu-
tory scheme as a whole.” Block v. Community Nutrition
Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349 (1984). And as we have ex-
plained in detail, the text and context of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)—
which is, after all, a jurisdiction-stripping statute—clearly
indicate that judicial review of fact determinations is pre-
cluded in the discretionary-relief context. The plain mean-
ing of that provision, not any interpretative presumption,
drives our conclusion today. Because the statute is clear, we
have no reason to resort to the presumption of reviewability.
***
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as
part of discretionary-relief proceedings under § 1255 and the
other provisions enumerated in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We there-
fore affrm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Breyer, Justice
Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
It is no secret that when processing applications, licenses,
and permits the government sometimes makes mistakes.
Often, they are small ones—a misspelled name, a misplaced
application. But sometimes a bureaucratic mistake can
have life-changing consequences. Our case is such a case.
An immigrant to this country applied for legal residency.
The government rejected his application. Allegedly, the
government did so based on a glaring factual error. In cir-
cumstances like that, our law has long permitted individuals
to petition a court to consider the question and correct any
mistake.
Not anymore. Today, the Court holds that a federal bu-
reaucracy can make an obvious factual error, one that will
result in an individual's removal from this country, and noth-
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ing can be done about it. No court may even hear the case.
It
is a bold claim promising dire consequences for countless
lawful immigrants. And it is such an unlikely assertion of
raw administrative power that not even the agency that al-
legedly erred, nor any other arm of the Executive Branch,
endorses it. Today's majority acts on its own to shield the
government from the embarrassment of having to correct
even its most obvious errors. Respectfully, I dissent.
I
A
Pankajkumar Patel has lived in the United States for
nearly 30 years. He and his wife Jyotsnaben Patel cur-
rently reside in Georgia. They have three sons—one who is
already a U. S. citizen, and two who are lawful permanent
residents and spouses of U. S. citizens. As a young man,
Mr. Patel entered the country illegally. But in 2007, he tried
to make things right by applying for an adjustment of his
immigration status to a lawful permanent resident (also
known as a green card).
Mr. Patel had at least some reason to hope. The Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA) expressly authorizes the At-
torney General to grant relief in cases like his. The statute
sets forth a two-step process. At the frst step, the govern-
ment must determine if an individual is statutorily eligible
for an adjustment of status. Various circumstances speci-
fed by law, including prior criminal convictions, may render
an applicant ineligible for relief. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1255(i)
(2)(A), 1182. At the second step, once an individual has es-
tablished his statutory eligibility for relief, the Attorney
General or his designee is entitled to grant or deny an ad-
justment of status “in his discretion.” §§ 1255(a), (i)(2); see
also 8 CFR § 1240.1(a) (2021) (delegating this authority to
immigration judges). Because this second step is discre-
tionary, “mere eligibility” for relief does not “automatically
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result in a grant of the application.” Matter of Arai, 13 I. &
N
. Dec. 494, 495 (BIA 1970). Instead, “the actual granting
of relief . . . is in all cases a matter of grace.” INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U. S. 289, 308 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Seeking relief under this scheme, Mr. Patel fled an appli-
cation with the necessary paperwork. Soon, the govern-
ment responded by returning a document allowing Mr. Patel
to continue to work and remain in the country while it pro-
cessed his application. So far, so good.
But then a problem emerged. Several months after fling
his application, Mr. Patel sought to renew his Georgia driv-
er's license. When flling out the renewal form, Mr. Patel
answered the question “Are you a U. S. citizen?” by checking
a box that said “yes.” After discovering Mr. Patel's errone-
ous checkmark, Georgia authorities charged him with will-
fully falsifying his driver's license application. Later, how-
ever, the State dropped its prosecution after concluding it
lacked suffcient evidence to prove a crime. Not only has
Mr. Patel consistently claimed that he intended to deceive no
one and that he simply ticked the wrong box by mistake.
Under Georgia law, Mr. Patel was eligible to receive a license
without being a citizen because he had a pending application
seeking lawful permanent residence and a valid employment
authorization document. See Ga. Comp. Rules & Regs.,
Rules 375-3-1-.02(3)(e), (7) (2022).
Apparently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
saw things differently. Operating through United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the agency
denied Mr. Patel's application for adjustment of status, citing
his faulty driver's license application. According to USCIS,
Mr. Patel's conduct rendered him statutorily ineligible for
adjustment of status under a provision that excludes any
alien who “falsely represents . . . himself . . . to be a citizen
of the United States” to obtain a “beneft under . . . State
law. ” 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), 1255(i)(2)(A). On
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USCIS's view, Mr. Patel's application for adjustment of sta-
tus
failed at the frst step—and the Attorney General was
wholly without discretion to afford him relief at the second.
B
Some months later, the government elected to bring re-
moval proceedings against Mr. Patel. As a defense to re-
moval, Mr. Patel renewed his application for adjustment of
status consistent with regulations permitting him to do so.
See 8 CFR § 245.2(a)(5)( i i). At h is remova l hear i ng,
Mr. Patel repeated points he had made to state offcials, in-
sisting that he had harbored no intent to deceive anyone, and
submitting that he remained statutorily eligible for relief.
See Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 784 (BIA 2016)
(inadmissibility is triggered when a misrepresentation is
made “with the subjective intent of obtaining . . . benefts”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
None of this moved the immigration judge. Relevant
here, the immigration judge rested his decision on a factual
fnding. He said he did not believe Mr. Patel's testimony
that he checked the wrong box mistakenly. Instead, the im-
migration judge found, Mr. Patel intentionally represented
himself falsely to obtain a beneft under state law. Accord-
ing to the immigration judge, Mr. Patel had a strong incen-
tive to deceive state offcials because he could not have ob-
tained a Georgia driver's license if he had disclosed he was
“neither a citizen [n]or a lawful permanent resident.” And
because intentionally deceiving state offcials to obtain a ben-
eft is enough to render an applicant statutorily ineligible for
relief at step one, the immigration judge concluded, there
was no need to reach the second-step question whether
Mr. Patel warranted a favorable exercise of discretion.
Mr. Patel appealed the immigration judge's ruling to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In his appeal,
Mr. Patel argued that the immigration judge's fnding that
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he had an incentive to deceive state offcials was simply
wrong—under
Georgia law he was entitled to a driver's li-
cense without being a citizen or a lawful permanent resident
given his pending application for adjustment of status and
permission to work. Mr. Patel submitted, too, that all the
record evidence pointed to the conclusion he simply checked
the wrong box by mistake; even state offcials agreed they
had no case to bring against him for deception. In the end,
however, a divided panel of the BIA rejected the appeal by
a vote of 2 to 1.
Mr. Patel next petitioned for review in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. There, he argued that the BIA's fnding that he inten-
tionally sought to deceive state offcials was wholly unrea-
sonable given the evidence before the agency. In response,
the federal government agreed that the Eleventh Circuit had
the power to hear Mr. Patel's case but asked the court to
affrm the BIA's decision on the merits. Instead, a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit charted its own path, holding that it
lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's factual fndings no
matter how wrong they might be. See Patel v. United
States Atty. Gen., 917 F. 3d 1319, 1324 (2019). Eventually,
the full court agreed to rehear the case and, by a vote of 9
to 5, reached the same conclusion. See Patel v. United
States Atty. Gen., 971 F. 3d 1258 (2020). In doing so, the
court acknowledged that it had to overrule “numerous” cir-
cuit precedents holding that it possessed the power to review
cases like Mr. Patel's. Id., at 1262. It acknowledged, too,
that its new ruling conficted with the holdings of most other
courts of appeals. Id., at 1277, and n. 22.
II
As it comes to us, this case poses the question: Does a
federal court have statutory authority to review and correct
a BIA decision holding an individual ineligible for relief when
that decision rests on a glaring factual error? Today, the
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majority insists the answer is no. It does not matter if the
BIA
and immigration judge in Mr. Patel's case erred badly
when they found he harbored an intent to deceive state off-
cials. It does not matter if the BIA declares other individu-
als ineligible for relief based on even more obvious factual
errors. On the majority's telling, courts are powerless to
correct bureaucratic mistakes like these no matter how
grave they may be.
It is an eye-catching conclusion. Normally in this coun-
try, federal courts shoulder the responsibility of reviewing
agency decisions to ensure they are at least supported by
“substantial evidence.” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(E). A similar, if
surely more deferential, principle fnds voice in the INA.
As relevant here, that statute endows federal courts of ap-
peals with the power to review “all questions of law and fact
. . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought
to remove an alien from the United States.” 8 U. S. C.
§ 1252(b)(9). And the law further provides that a court may
reject the agency's factual fndings underlying an order of
removal if it concludes that no “reasonable adjudicator” could
adopt them. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Garland v. Ming Dai,
593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021).
That is exactly the sort of argument Mr. Patel seeks to
pursue. He hopes to persuade a court of law that the BIA's
factual errors in his case are so obvious no reasonable fact-
fnder could adopt them. It is a claim expressly permitted
by statute. Tellingly, in the proceedings before us the gov-
ernment has continued to maintain that, however his case is
fnally resolved, Mr. Patel is entitled to his day in court.
Nor is this some new position. For at least 20 years the
government has taken the view that the law permits judicial
review in cases like these. Yet even in the face of all this,
the majority balks. It holds that no court may entertain
Mr. Patel's challenge. And its reasoning promises that
countless future immigrants will be left with no avenue to
correct even more egregious agency errors.
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A
H
ow does the majority manage to reach such an unlikely
conclusion? It depends on a Court-appointed amicus who
offers arguments for the government that even the govern-
ment refuses to advance on its own behalf. It turns out, too,
that all of those arguments hinge on a narrow exception to
the usual rule of judicial review—one found in 8 U. S. C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). As relevant here, that exception reads:
“Denials of discretionary relief
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . and
regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action
is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have ju-
risdiction to review—(i) any judgment regarding the
granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title.”
This language does not begin to do the work the majority
demands of it. Recall that requests for adjustment of status
involve a two-step process. First, the Attorney General,
acting through the BIA, must determine whether an individ-
ual is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status. See
8 U. S. C. §§ 1255(a), (i). If so, the Attorney General may
proceed to the second step and decide whether to grant an
adjustment request “in his discretion.” §§ 1255(a), (i)(2)(A).
Undoubtedly, the exception in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) creates a spe-
cial rule insulating from judicial review the second and
purely discretionary decision. But nothing in it disturbs the
general rule that courts may entertain challenges to the
BIA's factual fndings and legal analysis associated with its
frst-step eligibility determination.
This much follows directly from the statute's terms. Sub-
paragraph (B)(i) renders unreviewable only those judgments
“regarding the granting of relief.” That phrase has a well-
understood meaning. To “grant relief ” is to supply “redress
or beneft.” United States v. Denedo, 556 U. S. 904, 909 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). And where, as here,
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the BIA issues a judgment only at step one, it never reaches
the
question whether to grant relief or supply some redress
or beneft. Instead, the agency resolves only the antecedent
question whether an individual is statutorily eligible to peti-
tion for relief, redress, or a beneft. As the BIA has ex-
plained, a judgment at step one can never “result in a grant
of the application.” Arai, 13 I. & N., at 495. Any “judg-
ment regarding the granting of relief ” comes only at step
two where the INA expressly vests the Attorney General
with substantial discretion. See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 307
(noting the traditional and longstanding “distinction between
eligibility for discretionary relief, on the one hand, and the
favorable exercise of discretion, on the other hand” (empha-
sis added)).
All of which leads us back to Mr. Patel's case. Before the
Eleventh Circuit, Mr. Patel sought to challenge the BIA's
step-one determination that he was statutorily ineligible for
adjustment of status, arguing that no reasonable adjudicator
could have found the facts as the agency did. The INA ex-
pressly authorizes courts to hear claims like his. 8 U. S. C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Unprompted, however, the Eleventh Circuit
held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) effectively undoes this arrange-
ment. That court's self-directed legal analysis was mis-
taken. Subparagraph (B)(i) only deprives courts of jurisdic-
tion to review the Attorney General's step-two discretionary
decision to grant or deny relief, not the BIA's step-one judg-
ments regarding whether an individual is eligible to be con-
sidered for such relief.
B
The majority, of course, offers a different view. Following
the Eleventh Circuit's lead, the majority contends that sub-
paragraph (B)(i)'s phrase “any judgment regarding the
granting of relief ” under § 1255 sweeps more broadly. On
its account, the statute denies courts the power to correct
all agency decisions with respect to an adjustment-of-status
application under § 1255—both the agency's step-one eligibil-

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ity decisions and its step-two discretionary decisions. Ante,
a
t 338 – 339. As a resu lt, no cour t may correc t even the
agency's most egregious factual mistakes about an individual's
statutory eligibility for relief. It is a novel reading of a 25-
year-old statute. One at odds with background law permit-
ting judicial review. And one even the government disavows.
It is easy to see why. We do not normally suppose that
Congress blithely includes words in its laws that perform no
work. See, e. g., Liu v. SEC, 591 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (noting
the “ `cardinal principle of interpretation that courts must
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a stat-
ute' ”). Yet that is exactly what the majority's interpreta-
tion requires of us. If subparagraph (B)(i) operated as the
majority imagines, Congress would have had no need to deny
courts jurisdiction over “any judgment regarding the grant-
ing of relief under section 1255.” Instead, Congress could
have simply omitted the italicized words and denied jurisdic-
tion over “any judgment under section 1255.” Plainly, all
those additional words must do something. And the work
they perform is clear—the phrase directs us to the Attorney
General's second-step discretionary judgment to grant relief.
That alone is a judgment “regarding the granting of relief.”
And under the statute's terms, that judgment alone is
shielded from judicial review.
The majority's attempt to resolve its surplusage problem
only underscores the gravity of its error. First, the major-
ity tells us that, as used in subparagraph (B)(i), the words
“any judgment” mean “any authoritative decision.” Ante,
at 336, 337. Then the majority tells us that the phrase “re-
garding the granting of relief ” expands the universe of cov-
ered judgments further, because the word “regarding ” “ `gen-
erally has a broadening effect.' ” Ante, at 338–339. But
how could that be? Under the majority's reading of the word
“judgment,” the statute already precludes judicial review of
any authoritative decision “under section 1255.” There is
no further corner of the universe left to explore. Once

356 P
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more, the words regarding the granting of relief are left
w
ithout work to perform. Rather than sort out its surplus-
age problem, the majority's answer only highlights its bind.
What is more, the majority's argument rests on a faulty
premise. The majority insists that the word “regarding ”
has “a broadening effect.” Ibid. It even suggests that fail-
ing to give the term that effect would be to read it “out of
the statute entirely.” Ante, at 344. But in truth, the word
can have either a broadening or narrowing effect depending
on context. Cf. Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 537
(2015) (plurality opinion) (“In law as in life . . . the same
words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean differ-
ent things”). And in subparagraph (B)(i), “regarding ” is
much more likely to serve a narrowing function, focusing our
attention on a specifc subset of judgments—namely, those
step-two discretionary judgments “regarding the granting
of relief.”
To appreciate the point, consider a hypothetical. Imagine
I said: “Please bring me any book regarding the history of
the American West from that shelf of history books.” In
this sentence, the phrase “regarding the history of the Amer-
ican West” does not broaden the referenced set. Instead, it
directs you to a narrow subset of books: those regarding the
history of the American West. Any other interpretation
misses the point and leaves me with a pile of unwanted
volumes.
What is true of this hypothetical is true of subparagraph
(B)(i). The phrase “regarding the granting of relief ” does
not expand the set—again, the sentence already speaks of
“any judgment . . . under section . . . 1255.” Instead, it func-
tions as “limiting language” that narrows the kind of judg-
ments under § 1255 the command means to cover. iTech
U. S., Inc. v. Renaud, 5 F. 4th 59, 65 (CADC 2021). And
here that means limiting our attention to the agency's step-
two decision, the only place where it can issue a “judgment
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regarding the granting of relief.” Any other reading ren-
ders
the statute a garble.
1
III
A
To the extent doubt remains about the proper construction
of subparagraph (B)(i), it dissipates quickly with a look to
the larger statutory context. Here the clues are many—yet
the majority pauses to consider almost none of them.
Take frst a neighboring statutory provision. After deny-
ing courts the power to review “any judgment regarding the
granting of relief ” in subparagraph (B)(i), Congress pro-
ceeded in the very next clause to deny courts jurisdiction to
entertain another category of cases: “any other decision . . .
the authority for which is specifed . . . to be in the discre-
tion of the Attorney General.” § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis
added). That phrasing has a clear implication: “The proxim-
ity of clauses (i) and (ii), and the words linking them—`any
other decision'—suggests that Congress had in mind deci-
sions of the same genre, i. e., those made discretionary by
legislation.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 246–247
(2010). And as we have seen, the only judg ment under
1
Perhaps sensing that its textual arguments cannot bear the weight it
seeks to place on them, the majority suggests that, right or wrong, exist-
ing precedent commands its reading, pointing us to Guerrero-Lasprilla v.
Barr, 589 U. S. ––– (2020), and Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ––– (2020).
Ante, at 339–340. But neither case speaks to, much less resolves, the
question before us. Guerrero-Lasprilla does not even discuss subpara-
graph (B)(i). As for Nasrallah's passing observation that an individual
“may not bring a factual challenge to orders denying discretionary relief,
including . . . adjustment of status,” 590 U. S., at –––, nothing about that
statement conficts with a correct reading of subparagraph (B)(i). By its
terms, Nasrallah's observation is explicitly limited to “determinations
made discretionary by statute”—that is, step-two judgments “regarding
the granting of relief,” not judgments regarding statutory eligibility.
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Once more, the majority's argu-
ments fold quickly under pressure.

358 P
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§ 1255 that fts that description is the Attorney General's
second-step
decision to grant or deny adjustment of status
“in his discretion.” §§ 1255(a), (i)(2); see also St. Cyr, 533
U. S., at 308 (noting that second-step decisions to grant relief
are “a matter of grace”).
Next, consider the other statutes subparagraph (B)(i) ad-
dresses. It doesn't just bar review of “judgments regarding
the granting of relief ” under § 1255 for adjustment of status.
Subparagraph (B)(i) also bars review of “judgment[s] regard-
ing the granting of relief under section[s] 1182(h), 1182(i),
1229b, [and] 1229c. ” § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). These provisions
bear many differences. But they all have one thing in com-
mon: a two-step structure in which the Attorney General
makes a statutory determination, followed by a step-two dis-
cretionary decision whether to grant relief.
2
That hardly
seems a coincidence. More likely, it is further indication
that subparagraph (B)(i) focuses on step-two discretionary
determinations, not threshold judgments about eligibility.
Here, too, subparagraph (B)(i) refects our law's longstanding
distinction between “[e]ligibility [determinations under] spe-
cifc statutory standards” and subsequent decisions about
whether to grant “ultimate relief ” through an “exercise of
discretion.” Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 353–354 (1956).
Still other clues confrm that subparagraph (B)(i) targets
second-step discretionary decisions. Take the title Con-
gress chose in § 1252(a)(2)(B). It labeled this provision “De-
nials of discretionary relief.” In doing so, Congress left
little doubt that subparagraph (B) and its accompanying
clauses (i) and (ii) are designed to bar review of only those
2
Section 1229b says the Attorney General “may” in his discretion cancel
removal, but only where an alien satisfes certain statutory criteria.
§§ 1229b(a), (b). Section 1229c says the Attorney General “may permit”
voluntary departure, but only if an alien meets certain legal requirements.
§§ 1229c(a), (b). Likewise, §§ 1182(h) and 1182(i) say the Attorney General
“may, in his discretion,” waive certain forms of inadmissibility, but only
for those aliens who satisfy the specifed criteria.
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decisions invested to the Attorney General's discretion, not
antecedent
statutory eligibility determinations.
Consider as well the statute's history. When Congress
borrows words from an established legal context, it “pre-
sumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached” to them. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S.
246, 263 (1952). And that's exactly what happened here.
Before Congress enacted subparagraph (B)(i), courts re-
viewed bo th first-step “elig ibility” deter minati ons and
second-step “discretionary” determinations. Foti v. INS,
375 U. S. 217, 228–230, and n. 15 (1963) (holding second-step
judgments reviewable “for arbitrariness and abuse of discre-
tion”). By adding subparagraph (B)(i) in 1996, Congress
clearly altered that regime. Yet Congress did so carefully.
In precluding review of judgments “regarding the granting
of relief,” Congress used language very similar to the lan-
guage this Court had long used to describe second-step dis-
cretionary determinations. See, e. g., INS v. Doherty, 502
U. S. 314, 323 (1992) (distinguishing “the discretionary grant
of relief ” from prima facie eligibility); id., at 333 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (dis-
tinguishing “the Attorney General's power to grant . . . re-
lief ” from judgments of “statutory ineligibility”); INS v.
Abudu, 485 U. S. 94, 105 (1988) (distinguishing “the ultimate
grant of relief ” from prima facie eligibility in adjustment-of-
status cases specifcally); INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U. S. 24,
26 (1976) (per curiam) (statute authorized “the Attorney
General in his discretion to grant relief,” but only “if certain
eligibility requirements are met”). All of which provides
still one more strong indication that Congress used the
phrase “regarding the granting of relief ” to target step-two
discretionary decisions alone.
B
Not only does the majority ignore most of these contextual
clues. Its own arguments from statutory context do more
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to hurt than help its cause. The majority frst directs us to
§
1252(a)(2)(D). That provisi on says that “ [n]oth i ng in
subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of this
chapter . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall
be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or
questions of law raised upon a petition for review fled with
an appropriate court of appeals.” According to the majority,
this language would make no sense and do no work unless
we read subparagraph (B)(i) to bar judicial review of any
decision under § 1255. As the majority puts it, subpara-
graph (D)'s directive preserving judicial review for constitu-
tional claims and questions of law necessarily implies that
“something” must remain unamenable to judicial review
under subparagraph (B)(i). Ante, at 339. And the only “re-
maining category” that could be immune from judicial review
is subparagraph (B)(i) cases involving “questions of fact” like
Mr. Patel's. Ibid.
This argument falters almost immediately. Everyone
agrees that, at the very least, subparagraph (B)(i) precludes
judicial review of the Attorney General's second-step discre-
tionary judgments “regarding the granting of relief.” And
everyone agrees that subparagraph (D) restores judicial re-
view of these discretionary judgments only to the extent a
legal question or constitutional claim is in play. So, for ex-
ample, if the Attorney General sought to exercise his discre-
tion to discriminate against an applicant on the basis of race,
subparagraph (D) would allow judicial review despite the
terms of subparagraph (B)(i). But if no legal or constitu-
tional defect is alleged, judicial review would be impermissi-
ble. It is hardly necessary to adopt the majority's interpre-
tation to ft these two provisions together and give each real
work to do.
Even more fundamentally, the majority's argument pro-
ceeds on a mistaken assumption. On its view, subparagraph
(D) must leave something unreviewable under subparagraph
(B)(i) for the former to make any sense as an exception. But
that takes far too blinkered a view of the statutory scheme;
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
it is not as if these are the only two provisions in our Nation's
i
mmigration laws. By its terms, subparagraph (D) operates
across a whole chapter of the U. S. Code. And in fact, sub-
paragraph (D) undoubtedly performs real work as an excep-
tion with respect to other provisions besides subparagraph
(B)(i). To take just one example, this Court has already de-
cided a case discussing subparagraph (D)'s implications for
cases arising under subparagraph (C). See, e. g., Guerrero-
Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (explaining sub-
paragraph (D)'s impact on § 1252(a)(2)(C)).
The majority's argument fails for still another reason. It
overlooks the “basic principle of statutory construction that
a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specifc subject
is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more
generalized spectrum.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U. S. 148, 153 (1976). Congress enacted subparagraph
(B)(i) in 1996 to address the narrow question of judicial re-
view over administrative “denials of discretionary relief.”
Meanwhile, as the majority acknowledges, Congress adopted
subparagraph (D) nearly a decade later and did so to address
a much larger problem—the potential that many statutes in
the INA foreclosing judicial review might be unconstitu-
tional in certain applications. Ante, at 339. Congress re-
sponded to this potential problem by allowing legal and con-
stitutional challenges under “any other provision of [an
entire] chapter ” of the U. S. Code. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In
doing so, subparagraph (D)'s later-in-time and more general
reference to “constitutiona l claims or questions of law”
across a full chapter of the U. S. Code did nothing to disturb
subparagraph (B)(i)'s targeted application to judgments “re-
garding the granting of relief ” under § 1255. Instead, the
statutes work in tandem. The majority's approach ignores
this conclusion, and along with it subparagraph (B)(i)'s spe-
cifc language.
3
3
There's at least one more problem here yet. The majority says sub-
paragraph (D) preserves constitutional and legal questions for judicial
review, and the majority further assumes that Mr. Patel's petition poses
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Perhaps sensing the weakness of its main contextual argu-
ment,
the majority tries another. It insists that Mr. Patel
“cannot explain” why subparagraph (B)(i) should be read to
allow courts to review the BIA's factual fndings when sub-
paragraph (C) prohibits courts from doing so. Ante, at 344.
But there is no incongruity here. The two subparagraphs
use different language and perform different work. Subpar-
agraph (B)(i) only disallows judicial review of judgments “re-
garding the granting of relief ” and covers the mine run of
cases. Subparagraph (C) speaks more broadly, precluding
review of “any fnal order of removal,” and addresses spe-
cifcally those aliens who are removable because of past crim-
inal offenses. And it is hardly surprising that Congress
might wish to use different language allowing greater judi-
cial review in cases involving noncriminal aliens than in
cases involving aliens who have been convicted of criminal
offenses in this country.
Tellingly too, the majority's contextual arguments yield an
inexplicable anomaly. On its view, subparagraph (B)(i) pre-
cludes judicial review of all adjustment-of-status applica-
tions, whether an individual seeks to challenge the agency's
step-one eligibility determination or its step-two discretion-
ary judgment. Subparagraph (D) then sweeps in to restore
judicial review for legal and constitutional questions. But
by its terms, subparagraph (D) applies only to “petition[s] for
review fled with an appropriate court of appeals.”
only a factual question. Ante, at 339–340. But the question Mr. Patel
seeks to pose in court is whether the agency's factual determinations are
ones no “reasonable adjudicator” could have adopted given the record be-
fore it. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see supra, at 352. The majority never
explains why that question is something other than a question of law that
subparagraph (D) expressly preserves for judicial review. But why
wouldn't it be? Cf. Colorado Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U. S. 23,
25 (1938) (“It is settled law that a fnding of fact [made by an agency] will
not be disturbed on review if it is supported by substantial evidence. But
whether there is substantial evidence to support a fnding is a question
of law”).
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This feature of the law has profound consequences under
the
majority's reading of the INA. Yes, on its account, those
like Mr. Patel who are subject to removal orders can still
challenge at least the agency's legal and constitutional errors
by petitioning for review in a federal court of appeals. But
individuals frequently seek to adjust their status and secure
a green card outside the removal context. And when the
government rejects an application for adjustment of status
in these cases, individuals routinely seek judicial review in
district court. See Brief for Respondent 39; see also San-
chez v. Mayorkas, 593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (reviewing one
such challenge). There, subparagraph (D) does not apply to
preserve review of legal and constitutional questions. So
under the majority's construction of subparagraph (B)(i), in-
dividuals who could once secure judicial review to correct
administrative errors at step one in district court are now,
after its decision, likely left with no avenue for judicial relief
of any kind. An agency may err about the facts, the law,
or even the Constitution and nothing can be done about it.
Nor is this some small sideshow. As the government,
Mr. Patel, and amici stress, thousands of individuals seek to
obtain a green card every year outside the removal con-
text—the student hoping to remain in the country, the for-
eigner who marries a U. S. citizen, the skilled worker spon-
sored by her employer. In the last three months of 2021
alone, USCIS denied more than 13,000 green-card applica-
tions, with nearly 790,000 still pending.
4
The agency issues
decisions on those applications in unpublished and terse let-
ters, which appear to receive little or no administrative re-
view within DHS. See Brief for National Immigration Liti-
gation Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae 25. With so many
4
See USCIS, Number of I– 485 Applicati ons to Reg ister Per ma-
nent Residence or Adjust Status by Category, Case Status, and USCIS
Field Office of Serv ice Center Location, Oc tober 1, 2021–December
31, 2021, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/fles/document/reports/I485_
performancedata_fy2022_qtr1.pdf (May 6, 2022).

364 P
ATEL v. GARLAND
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applications receiving such abbreviated treatment, who can
be
surprised that DHS sometimes makes serious errors, or
may even be tempted to take shortcuts inconsistent with the
law? See id., at 23–27 (documenting DHS errors). Until
today, courts could correct mistakes like these. But the ma-
jority's construction of subparagraph (B)(i) will almost surely
end all that and foreclose judicial review for countless law-
abiding individuals whose lives may be upended by bureau-
cratic misfeasance.
The majority's response is hardly satisfying. The major-
ity does not try to explain how its interpretation fts with the
usual presumption of judicial reviewability of administrative
actions—a presumption it claims to endorse and no party
before us questions. Ante, at 346–347. Instead, the major-
ity muses that denying green-card applicants any ability to
seek judicial review might be “consistent with Congress'
choice to reduce procedural protections in the context of dis-
cretionary relief.” Ante, at 346. But a hunch about unex-
pressed legislative intentions is no response to our usual pre-
sumption of judicial review. Nor is it any answer to the
mountain of textual and contextual evidence suggesting that
Congress limited judicial review only with respect to second-
step discretionary decisions, not decisions about statutory
eligibility.
Just look, too, at all the guesswork lurking behind the ma-
jority's hunch. The majority's argument frst depends on a
hypothesis that Congress intentionally designed a scheme
that encourages individuals who receive erroneous rulings
on their green-card applications to overstay their visas and
remain in this country unlawfully. Next, it depends on a
second-level hypothesis that Congress replaced a presump-
tive promise of judicial review with a scheme in which judi-
cial review depends on the happenstance of a governmental
decision to seek removal. Finally, the majority's position re-
lies on a third supposition—that Congress might have with-
drawn judicial review for thousands upon thousands of law-
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fu l ly present persons annua l ly, and done so w ithout
expressly
discussing the question. Often this Court rejects
as implausible statutory interpretations that seek to squeeze
elephants into mouseholes. See, e. g., Whitman v. Ameri-
can Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001). Today's
interpretation seeks to cram a veritable legislative zoo into
one clause of one subparagraph of one subsection of our Na-
tion's vast immigration laws.
*
The majority concludes that courts are powerless to cor-
rect an agency decision holding an individual ineligible for
relief from removal based on a factual error, no matter how
egregious the error might be. The majority's interpretation
has the further consequence of denying any chance to correct
agency errors in processing green-card applications outside
the removal context. Even the government cannot bring it-
self to endorse the majority's arresting conclusions. For
good reason. Those conclusions are at war with all the evi-
dence before us. They read language out of the statute and
collapse the law's clear two-step framework. They disre-
gard the lessons of neighboring provisions and even ignore
the statute's very title. They make no sense of the statute's
history. Altogether, the majority's novel expansion of a nar-
row statutory exception winds up swallowing the law's gen-
eral rule guaranteeing individuals the chance to seek judicial
review to correct obvious bureaucratic missteps. It is a con-
clusion that turns an agency once accountable to the rule
of law into an authority unto itself. Perhaps some would
welcome a world like that. But it is hardly the world Con-
gress ordained.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None