Wooden v. United States

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 595 U. S. Part 2
Pages 360–397
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 7, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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360 OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
Syllabus
WOODEN v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 20–5279. Argued October 4, 2021—Decided March 7, 2022
A jury convicted William Dale Wooden of being a felon in possession of a
frearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g). The Government asked the
District Court to sentence Wooden under the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA). ACCA mandates a 15-year minimum penalty for § 922(g)
offenders with at least three prior convictions for specifed felonies
“committed on occasions different from one another. ” § 924(e)(1).
Wooden's relevant criminal record included ten burglary convictions
arising out of a single criminal episode in 1997, during which Wooden
had unlawfully entered a one-building storage facility and stolen items
from ten different storage units. Prosecutors indicted Wooden on ten
counts of burglary—one for each storage unit—and Wooden pleaded
guilty to all counts. Years later, at Wooden's sentencing hearing on his
§ 922(g) conviction, the District Court applied ACCA's penalty enhance-
ment in accordance with the Government's view that Wooden had com-
menced a new “occasion” of criminal activity each time he left one stor-
age unit and entered another. The resulting sentence was almost
sixteen years, much higher than the statutory maximum for Wooden's
crime absent such an enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affrmed, rea-
soning that ACCA's occasions clause is satisfed whenever crimes take
place at different moments in time—that is, sequentially rather than
simultaneously.
Held: Wooden's ten burglary offenses arising from a single criminal epi-
sode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one
prior conviction for purposes of ACCA. Pp. 366–376.
(a) Wooden's successive burglaries occurred on one “occasion” under
a natural construction of that term. An ordinary person using lan-
guage in its normal way would describe Wooden's entries into the stor-
age units as happening on a single occasion, rather than on ten
“occasions different from one another.” § 924(e)(1). The Government's
contention that an “occasion” ends at the discrete moment when an of-
fense's elements are established contravenes the ordinary usage of the
word. An occasion may itself encompass multiple, temporally distinct
activities. For example, the occasion of a wedding may include a cere-
mony, cocktail hour, dinner, and dancing. Those activities need not—
and often do not—occur simultaneously; yet they nevertheless compose
one occasion. The same is true for sequential criminal offenses. In-

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361
Syllabus
deed, the Court has often used the word “occasion” to encompass multi-
ple
, temporally discrete offenses. See, e. g., United States v. Bryant,
579 U. S. 140, 151. The Government's contrary view—that each sequen-
tial offense forms its own “occasion”—can make someone a career of-
fender in the space of a minute. But that view goes far toward collaps-
ing ACCA's two separate statutory conditions for imposing an enhanced
penalty on a § 922(g) offender. ACCA's enhancement kicks in only if (1)
the offender has three previous convictions for specifed felonies; and (2)
those predicate felonies were committed on “occasions different from
one another.” § 924(e)(1). The Government's approach would largely
collapse the two conditions and give ACCA's three-occasions require-
ment no work to do. Pp. 366–369.
(b) Given what “occasion” ordinarily means, whether criminal activi-
ties occurred on one occasion or different occasions requires a multi-
factored inquiry that may depend on a range of circumstances, including
timing, location, and the character and relationship of the offenses. For
the most part, the determination will be straightforward and intuitive.
In many cases, a single factor—especially of time or place—can deci-
sively differentiate occasions. In hard cases, the inquiry may involve
keeping an eye on ACCA's history and purpose. Here, every relevant
consideration shows that Wooden burglarized ten storage units on a sin-
gle occasion. Indeed it was because the burglaries “ar[ose] from the
same conduct” that Georgia law required the prosecutor to charge all
ten in a single indictment. Ga. Code Ann. § 16–1–7(b). Pp. 369–371.
(c) Statutory history and purpose confrm the Court's view of the oc-
casions clause's meaning, as well as the Court's conclusion that Wooden
is not a career offender. Congress added the occasions clause only after
a court applied ACCA's enhancement to Samuel Petty—an offender who,
much like Wooden, was convicted of multiple counts of robbery for one
night in one restaurant. See United States v. Petty, 798 F. 2d 1157.
Petty sought review in this Court, and the Solicitor General confessed
error, stating that ACCA should not be construed to reach multiple
felony convictions arising out of a single criminal episode. Shortly
thereafter, Congress amended ACCA to require that the requisite of-
fenses occur on “occasions different from one another.” Minor and
Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4402.
That statutory change, rejecting the original outcome in Petty in light
of the Solicitor General's confession of error, is at odds with the Govern-
ment's current view of the occasions clause. The Government attempts
to distinguish the facts of Petty, but nothing about the Solicitor Gener-
al's confession of error, or Congress's amendment of ACCA, suggests
any concern for whether an offender's crimes were committed
simultaneously or sequentially. Instead, each was based on another
idea—that a person who has robbed a restaurant, and done nothing else,

362 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
is not a career offender. The history of the occasions clause thus aligns
w
ith what this Court has always recognized as ACCA's purpose: to ad-
dress the “special danger” posed by the eponymous “armed career crim-
inal.” Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137, 146. Wooden's burglary
of a single storage facility does not suggest that kind of danger, any
more than Petty's robbery of a single restaurant did. Pp. 371–376.
945 F. 3d 498, reversed.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joi ned, and i n
which Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, JJ., joined as to all but Part II–B.
Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 376. Kavanaugh, J.,
fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 376. Barrett, J., fled an opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J.,
joined, post, p. 379. Gorsuch, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment, in which Sotomayor, J., joined as to Parts II, III, and IV, post,
p. 384.
Allon Kedem argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Andrew T. Tutt, Stephen K. Wirth, Jayce
Born, Steven L. Mayer, and R. Reeves Anderson.
Erica L. Ross argued the cause for the United States urg-
ing affrmance. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor
General Prelogar, Deputy Solicitor General Feigin, and
Paul T. Crane.*
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the course of one evening, William Dale Wooden burgla-
rized ten units in a single storage facility. He later pleaded
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for FAMM by Greg-
ory G. Rapawy, Minsuk Han, and Mary Price; for Human Rights for Kids
by Tony W. Torain II, James Dold, Suzanne S. La Pierre, and John
Ellem; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Peter
B. Siegal, Jeffrey T. Green, and David Oscar Markus; for the National
Association of Federal Defenders by Michael R. Dreeben, Michael C. Hol-
ley, Joshua B. Carpenter, Jennifer Niles Coffn, Renee Pietropaolo, Car-
men A. Smarandoiu, Davina T. Chen, and Shelley M. Fite; for Professors
of Criminal Law by Matthew M. Madden, Donald Burke, Daniel R. Ortiz,
John R. Mills, and Jenny W. L. Osborne; and for the Roderick & Solange
MacArthur Justice Center by Devi M. Rao.
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guilty, for that night's work, to ten counts of burglary—one
for
each storage unit he had entered. Some two decades
later, the courts below concluded that those convictions were
enough to subject Wooden to enhanced criminal penalties
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). That stat-
ute mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for unlawful gun
possession when the offender has three or more prior convic-
tions for violent felonies like burglary “committed on occa-
sions different from one another.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(1).
The question presented is whether Wooden's prior convic-
tions were for offenses occurring on different occasions, as
the lower courts held, because the burglary of each unit hap-
pened at a distinct point in time, rather than simultaneously.
The answer is no. Convictions arising from a single crimi-
nal episode, in the way Wooden's did, can count only once
under ACCA.
I
Begin in 1997, when Wooden and three confederates un-
lawfully entered a one-building storage facility at 100 Wil-
liams Road in Dalton, Georgia, next door to Wooden's home.
The burglars proceeded from unit to unit within the facility,
“crushing the interior drywall” between them. App. 32 (in-
dictment); see Addendum to Brief for Petitioner 6a (state-
ment of Assistant District Attorney at plea hearing) (“[O]nce
they made entry” into the facility, they “burrowed through
from . . . unit to unit”). The men stole items from, all told,
ten different storage units. So Georgia prosecutors charged
them with ten counts of burglary—though, as state law pre-
scribes, in a single indictment. See Ga. Code Ann. § 16–1–
7(b) (1996) (requiring “crimes arising from the same conduct”
to be prosecuted together). Wooden pleaded guilty to all
counts. The judge sentenced him to eight years' impris-
onment for each conviction, with the ten terms to run
concurrently.
Fast forward now to a cold November morning in 2014,
when Wooden responded to a police offcer's knock on his
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364 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
door. The offcer asked to speak with Wooden's wife. And
noti
ng the chill in the air, the offcer asked if he could step
inside, to stay warm. Wooden agreed. But his good deed
did not go unpunished. Once admitted to the house, the of-
fcer spotted several guns. Knowing that Wooden was a
felon, the offcer placed him under arrest. A jury later con-
victed him for being a felon in possession of a frearm, in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g).
The penalty for that crime varies signifcantly depending
on whether ACCA applies. Putting ACCA aside, the maxi-
mum sentence for violating § 922(g) is ten years in prison.
See § 924(a)(2). But ACCA mandates a minimum sentence
of ffteen years if the § 922(g) offender has three prior convic-
tions for “violent felon[ies]” (like burglary) or “serious drug
offense[s]” that were “committed on occasions different from
one another.” § 924(e)(1). In Wooden's own case, the rec-
ord reveals the discrepancy as especially stark. Before the
Government decided to seek an ACCA enhancement, its Pro-
bation Offce recommended a sentence of 21 to 27 months.
See App. 38–39, 42. The ACCA minimum sentence is about
13 years longer.
The District Court's sentencing hearing focused on
whether Wooden's ten convictions for breaking into the stor-
age facility suffced to trigger ACCA. Wooden said they did
not because he had burglarized the ten storage units on a
single occasion, rather than “on occasions different from one
another.” § 924(e)(1). The burglaries, he explained, hap-
pened “during the same criminal episode,” “at the same busi-
ness location, under the same roof.” App. 50. And given
those facts, he continued, the burglaries were “charged in a
single indictment.” Ibid. But the District Court accepted
the Government's view that every time Wooden busted into
another storage unit, he commenced a new “occasion” of
criminal activity. The court reasoned, relying on Circuit
precedent, that the entry into “[e]ach separate [unit] provides
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Opinion of the Court
a discrete point at which the frst offense was completed and
the
second began and so on.” Id., at 59. Based on the ACCA
enhancement, the court sentenced Wooden to 188 months (al-
most 16 years) in prison for unlawfully possessing a gun.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affrmed the
sentence, on the same reasoning. “[I]t is possible,” the
court stated, “to discern the point at which Wooden's frst
offense” was “completed and the subsequent point at which
his second offense began.” 945 F. 3d 498, 505 (2019). After
all, “Wooden could not be in two (let alone ten) of [the stor-
age units] at once.” Ibid. In the court's view, the sequen-
tial nature of Wooden's crimes—his progression from one
unit in the storage facility to the next to the next—meant
that the crimes were “committed on occasions different from
one another.” And so, the court concluded, Wooden quali-
fed as a career offender under ACCA.
The Courts of Appeals have divided over the meaning of
ACCA's “occasions” clause. Some Circuits, like the Sixth,
deem the clause satisfed whenever crimes take place at dif-
ferent moments in time—that is, sequentially rather than
simultaneously.
1
Other Circuits undertake a more holistic
inquiry, considering not merely the precise timing but also
other circumstances of the crimes.
2
We granted certiorari,
592 U. S. ––– (2021), to resolve that split of authority.
3
1
See, e. g., United States v. Carter, 969 F. 3d 1239, 1243 (CA11 2020);
United States v. Morris, 821 F. 3d 877, 880 (CA7 2016); United States v.
Abbott, 794 F. 3d 896, 898 (CA8 2015) (per curiam); United States v. Ful-
ler, 453 F. 3d 274, 278–279 (CA5 2006).
2
See, e. g., United States v. Bordeaux, 886 F. 3d 189, 196 (CA2 2018);
United States v. Stearns, 387 F. 3d 104, 108 (CA1 2004).
3
Two amici curiae have briefed another question arising from ACCA's
occasions clause: whether the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury,
rather than a judge, resolve whether prior crimes occurred on a single
occasion. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers 13–19; Brief for National Association of Federal Defenders 21–32.
We do not address that issue because Wooden did not raise it.

366 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
II
F
ramed in terms of this case, the disputed question is
whether Wooden committed his crimes on a single occasion
or on ten separate ones.
The Government answers ten, relying on a legally fancifed
version of the Sixth Circuit's timing test. In the ACCA con-
text, the Government argues, an “occasion” happens “at a
particular point in time”—the moment “when [an offense's]
elements are established.” Brief for United States 9. So
offenses “occur on different `occasions' when the criminal
conduct necessary to satisfy the offense elements occurs at
different times.” Id., at 13. Applying that elements-based,
“temporal-distinctness test” to this case, the Government ex-
plains that Wooden's burglaries were “quintessentially se-
quential, rather than simultaneous.” Id., at 10, 20. After
all, a person can satisfy the elements of burglary only by
entering (or remaining in) a structure with criminal intent.
See, e. g., Ga. Code Ann. § 16–7–1(a). And it would have
been “physically impossible” for Wooden to have enter-
ed (or remained in) multiple storage units “at once.” Brief
for United States 12. Each of Wooden's ten entries thus
counts (so says the Government) as another “occasion,” trig-
gering ACCA's stringent penalties more than three times
over.
We th i nk not. The ordi nary meani ng of the word
“occasion”—essentially an episode or event—refutes the
Government's single-minded focus on whether a crime's
elements were established at a discrete moment in time.
And ACCA's history and purpose do so too: The origin of the
“occasions” clause confrms that multiple crimes may occur
on one occasion even if not at the same moment. Wooden's
night of crime is a perfect case in point. His one-after-
another-after-another burglary of ten units in a single stor-
age facility occurred on one “occasion,” under a natural
construction of that term and consistent with the reason it
became part of ACCA.
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A
Consider
frst how an ordinary person (a reporter; a police
offcer; yes, even a lawyer) might describe Wooden's ten
burglaries—and how she would not. The observer might
say: “On one occasion, Wooden burglarized ten units in a
storage facility.” By contrast, she would never say: “On ten
occasions, Wooden burglarized a unit in the facility.” Nor
would she say anything like: “On one occasion, Wooden bur-
glarized a storage unit; on a second occasion, he burglarized
another unit; on a third occasion, he burglarized yet another;
and so on.” She would, using language in its normal way,
group his entries into the storage units, even though not si-
multaneous, all together—as happening on a single occasion,
rather than on ten “occasions different from one another.”
§ 924(e)(1).
That usage fts the ordinary meaning of “occasion.” The
word commonly refers to an event, occurrence, happening, or
episode. See, e. g., American Heritage Dictionary 908
(1981); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1560
(3d ed. 1986). And such an event, occurrence, happening, or
episode—which is simply to say, such an occasion—may itself
encompass multiple, temporally distinct activities. The oc-
casion of a wedding, for example, often includes a ceremony,
cocktail hour, dinner, and dancing. Those doings are proxi-
mate in time and place, and have a shared theme (celebrating
the happy couple); their connections are, indeed, what makes
them part of a single event. But they do not occur at the
same moment: The newlyweds would surely take offense if a
guest organized a conga line in the middle of their vows.
That is because an occasion may—and the hypothesized one
does—encompass a number of non-simultaneous activities; it
need not be confned to a single one.
The same is true (to shift gears from the felicitous to the
felonious) when it comes to crime. In that sphere too, an
“occasion” means an event or episode—which may, in com-
mon usage, include temporally discrete offenses. Consider
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368 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
a couple of descriptions from this Court's cases. “On one
occasi
on,” we noted, “Bryant hit his live-in girlfriend on the
head with a beer bottle and attempted to strangle her.”
United States v. Bryant, 579 U. S. 140, 151 (2016). “On one
occasion”—regardless whether those acts occurred at once
(as the Government would require) or instead succeeded one
another. Ibid. Likewise, we said: “[T]he State has stipu-
lated that the robbery and murder arose out of `the same set
of facts, circumstances, and the same occasion.' ” Turner v.
Arkan sas, 407 U. S. 366, 368 – 369 (1972) (pe r cur i am).
“[T]he same occasion”—irrespective whether the murder
took place during (as the Government insists on) or instead
just after the robbery. Ibid. Or take a hypothetical sug-
gested by oral argument here: A barroom brawl breaks out,
and a patron hits frst one, then another, and then a third of
his fellow drinkers. The Government maintains those are
not just three offenses (assaults) but also three “occasions”
because they happened seriatim. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 52–
53, 61–62. But in making the leap from three offenses to
three occasions, based on a split-second separation between
punches, the Government leaves ordinary language behind.
The occasion in the hypothetical is the barroom brawl, not
each individual fsticuff.
By treating each temporally distinct offense as its own oc-
casion, the Government goes far toward collapsing two sepa-
rate statutory conditions. Recall that ACCA kicks in only if
(1) a § 922(g) offender has previously been convicted of three
violent felonies, and (2) those three felonies were committed
on “occasions different from one another.” § 924(e)(1); see
supra, at 364. In other words, the statute contains both a
three-offense requirement and a three-occasion requirement.
But under the Government's view, the two will generally boil
down to the same thing: When an offender's criminal history
meets the three-offense demand, it will also meet the three-
occasion one. That is because people seldom commit—
indeed, seldom can commit—multiple ACCA offenses at the

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exact same time. Take burglary. It is, just as the Govern-
ment
argues, “physically impossible” for an offender to enter
different structures simultaneously. Brief for United States
16–17; see supra, at 366. Or consider crimes defned by the
use of physical force, such as assault or murder. Except in
unusual cases (like a bombing), multiple offenses of that kind
happen one by one by one, even if all occur in a short spell.
The Government's reading, to be sure, does not render the
occasions clause wholly superfuous; in select circumstances,
a criminal may satisfy the elements of multiple offenses in a
single instant. But for the most part, the Government's
hyper-technical focus on the precise timing of elements—
which can make someone a career criminal in the space of a
minute—gives ACCA's three-occasions requirement no work
to do.
The inquiry that requirement entails, given what “occa-
sion” ordinarily means, is more multi-factored in nature.
From the wedding to the barroom brawl, all the examples
offered above suggest that a range of circumstances may be
relevant to identifying episodes of criminal activity. Timing
of course matters, though not in the split-second, elements-
based way the Government proposes. Offenses committed
close in time, in an uninterrupted course of conduct, will
often count as part of one occasion; not so offenses separated
by substantial gaps in time or signifcant intervening events.
Proximity of location is also important; the further away
crimes take place, the less likely they are components of the
same criminal event. And the character and relationship of
the offenses may make a difference: The more similar or in-
tertwined the conduct giving rise to the offenses—the more,
for example, they share a common scheme or purpose—the
more apt they are to compose one occasion.
For the most part, applying this approach will be straight-
forward and intuitive. In the Circuits that have used it, we
can fnd no example (nor has the Government offered one) of
judges coming out differently on similar facts. In many
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370 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
cases, a single factor—especially of time or place—can deci-
sively
differentiate occasions. Courts, for instance, have
nearly always treated offenses as occurring on separate occa-
sions if a person committed them a day or more apart, or at
a “signifcant distance.” United States v. Rideout, 3 F. 3d
32, 35 (CA2 1993); see, e. g., United States v. Riddle, 47 F. 3d
460, 462 (CA1 1995) (per curiam). In other cases, the in-
quiry just as readily shows a single occasion, because all
the factors cut that way. That is true, for example, in our
barroom-brawl hypothetical, where the offender has engaged
in a continuous stream of closely related criminal acts at one
location. Of course, there will be some hard cases in be-
tween, as under almost any legal test. When that is so, as-
sessing the relevant circumstances may also involve keeping
an eye on ACCA's history and purpose, which we next dis-
cuss. See infra, at 371–376. But in law as in life, it is usu-
ally not so diffcult to identify an “occasion”: Given that the
term in ACCA has just its ordinary meaning, most cases
should involve no extra-ordinary work.
And surely, this one does not. Here, every relevant con-
sideration shows that Wooden burglarized ten storage units
on a single occasion, even though his criminal activity re-
sulted in double-digit convictions. Wooden committed his
burglaries on a single night, in a single uninterrupted course
of conduct. The crimes all took place at one location, a one-
building storage facility with one address. Each offense
was essentially identical, and all were intertwined with the
others. The burglaries were part and parcel of the same
scheme, actuated by the same motive, and accomplished by
the same means. Indeed, each burglary in some sense facili-
tated the next, as Wooden moved from unit to unit to unit,
all in a row. And refecting all these facts, Georgia law
treated the burglaries as integrally connected. Because
they “ar[ose] from the same conduct,” the prosecutor had to
charge all ten in a single indictment. Ga. Code Ann. § 16–
1–7(b); see Morgan v. State, 220 Ga. App. 198, 199–200, 469
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S. E. 2d 340, 341–343 (1996) (holding that, under § 16–1–7(b),
si
milar drug offenses had to be charged together because
they occurred “very close in time” as “part of an ongoing
chain of events”); supra, at 363. The indictment thus con-
frms what all the circumstances suggest: One criminal occa-
sion notwithstanding ten crimes.
4
B
Statutory history and purpose confrm our view of the oc-
casions clause's meaning, as well as our conclusion that
Wooden is not a career offender. For the frst four years
of its existence, ACCA asked only about offenses, not about
occasions. Its enhanced penalties, that is, kicked in when-
ever a § 922(g) offender had three prior convictions for speci-
fed crimes—in the initial version, for robbery or burglary
alone, and in the soon-amended version, for any violent fel-
ony or serious drug offense. See Armed Career Criminal
Act of 1984, § 1802, 98 Stat. 2185; Career Criminals Amend-
ment Act of 1986, § 1402(a), 100 Stat. 3207–39. Congress
added the occasions clause only after a court applied ACCA
to an offender much like Wooden—a person convicted of mul-
tiple counts of robbery arising from a single criminal episode.
In that precipitating case, Samuel Petty received ACCA's
minimum 15-year penalty for gun possession based on his
earlier stickup of a Manhattan restaurant. Petty and three
4
Justice Gorsuch asserts that a multi-factor test provides too “little
guidance,” including in this very case. Post, at 385; see post, at 385–388
(opinion concurring in judgment). But to begin with, we did not choose
the test; Congress did. By directing an inquiry into whether prior of-
fenses were “committed on occasions different from one another,” Con-
gress required consideration of the varied factors that may defne an “oc-
casion.” And while the test Congress chose will produce some hard cases,
Wooden's is not one of them. The courts below reached a different conclu-
sion in this case only because they applied a categorical rule that sequen-
tial offenses always occur on different occasions (a rule Justice Gorsuch
agrees has no basis). See supra, at 365; post, at 384. Once that mistake
is corrected, Wooden's case becomes an easy one.
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372 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
associates had entered the establishment brandishing an as-
sor
tment of guns and ordered the patrons and employees to
the foor. See Addendum to Brief for Petitioner 11a–12a
(New York State's brief ). The gunmen then made their way
around the premises, collecting money and other valuables
from the prostrate victims. See id., at 12a–17a. For his
role in the crime, Petty was convicted of six counts of rob-
bery—one count for each of six individuals whose property
had been taken—and served concurrent 5-year sentences.
See United States v. Petty, 798 F. 2d 1157, 1159–1160 (CA8
1986). Some years later, Petty was caught possessing a
frearm and convicted of violating § 922(g). Federal prose-
cutors asked for heightened penalties under ACCA, pointing
to his six robbery convictions from the restaurant incident.
The District Court sentenced Petty on that basis, and the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affrmed. That
court held it irrelevant under ACCA that the six convictions
“ar[ose] out of the same transaction.” Id., at 1160.
But when Petty sought this Court's review, the Solicitor
General confessed error, stating that ACCA should not be
construed “to reach multiple felony convictions arising out
of a single criminal episode.” Addendum to Brief for Peti-
tioner 30a–31a. In taking that position—requiring the con-
victions to come instead from “multiple criminal episodes”—
the Solicitor General could not rely on ACCA's text. Id., at
26a. He acknowledged that ACCA lacked language found in
other penalty-enhancement laws requiring prior crimes to
have occurred on “occasions different from one another.”
Id., at 25a–26a (quoting 18 U. S. C. § 3575(e)(1) (1982 ed.); 21
U. S. C. § 849(e)(1) (1982 ed.)). But in the Solicitor General's
view, the legislative history showed that Congress intended
ACCA to have the same scope as those other laws. The
Solicitor General highlighted “references throughout the leg-
islative reports and the foor debates to `career criminals,'
`repeat offenders,' `habitual offenders,' `recidivists,' `revolv-
ing door' offenders, [and] `three time loser[s].' ” Addendum
to Brief for Petitioner 27a, and n. 6. Those references, along
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373
Opinion of the Court
with the very “title of the Act—the Armed Career Criminal
A
ct,” made clear that the courts in Petty's case had read
ACCA too broadly. Id., at 26a (internal quotation marks
omitted). According to the Solicitor General, Petty's six
robbery convictions—because they arose from “a single
criminal episode”—should have counted as just one. In
light of that changed position, this Court remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals for “further consideration.” Petty
v. United States, 481 U. S. 1034, 1034–1035 (1987). And this
time, the Eighth Circuit found in Petty's favor. See United
States v. Petty, 828 F. 2d 2, 3 (1987) (per curiam).
More important here, Congress amended ACCA to pre-
vent future Pettys from being sentenced as career criminals.
Just one year after the Solicitor General confessed error,
Congress added the occasions clause—demanding, exactly as
in the other laws he had cited, that the requisite prior crimes
occur on “occasions different from one another.” Minor and
Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988, § 7056, 102
Stat. 4402. In placing the amendment on the Senate calen-
dar, Senator Robert Byrd introduced an analysis, on behalf
of the Judiciary Committee, setting out the genesis and pur-
pose of the new language. “The proposed amendment,” the
analysis explained, “would clarify the armed career criminal
statute to refect the Solicitor General's construction” in
Petty. 134 Cong. Rec. 13783 (1988). His “interpretation
plainly expresses,” the analysis continued, “what is meant by
a `career criminal,' that is, a person who over the course of
time commits three or more of the enumerated kinds of fel-
onies.” Ibid. The statement concluded that “clarify[ing]
the statute in this regard” would “insure that its rigorous
sentencing provisions apply only as intended in cases merit-
ing such strict punishment.” Ibid. Congress enacted the
amendment with near-unanimous support. See 134 Cong.
Rec. 24924, 30826, 32678, 33318.
5
5
Contrary to Justice Barrett's characterization, we do not claim that
Congress ratifed every jot and tittle of the Solicitor General's brief. Post,
at 379–381 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But
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374 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
That statutory change, rejecting the original outcome in
P
etty in light of the Solicitor General's confession of error, is
at odds with the Government's current view of the occasions
clause. After all, that view does not (as the former Solicitor
General's did) demand “multiple criminal episodes” as ordi-
narily understood: To the contrary, it enables ACCA “to
reach multiple felony convictions arising out of a single crim-
inal episode” so long as the crimes' elements are not satisfed
at once. Addendum to Brief for Petitioner 26a, 31a (confes-
sion of error); see supra, at 366, 368–369. To be sure, the
Government proposes a way to reconcile its test with the
rejection of the enhanced sentence given to Petty: The res-
taurant robberies, the Government says, happened on one
occasion because “the defendants ordered all the victims to
turn over their belongings at once, under a continuous show
of force, and multiple gunmen gathered the victims' items
simultaneously.” Brief for United States 25. But even if
that is true—the briefs and opinions in the case do not
clearly say—the Government's theory makes the “how many
occasions” question turn on trifes. Suppose Petty and his
cohorts had proceeded without all this purported simultane-
ity. Suppose they had robbed everyone in the dining room
frst, then everyone in the kitchen. Or suppose the robbers
had gone from booth to booth to booth, turning their guns
on their victims in turn. The Government says that with
any such “sequenc[ing],” a different result would obtain.
Ibid.; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 52–53, 60–62. What it does not
do, except in the most technical sense, is explain why. Noth-
ing about the Solicitor General's confession of error, or the
action Congress took in its wake, suggests any concern for
the exact ordering of Petty's actions. Each was based in-
stead on another idea: A person who has robbed a restaurant,
neither do we blind ourselves to the fact—which even the Government
here fully accepts—that Congress added the occasions clause to ACCA “in
response” to “the government's confession of error” in Petty. Brief for
United States 10, 24.
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375
Opinion of the Court
and done nothing else, is not a “habitual offender[ ]” or “ca-
reer
criminal[ ].” Addendum to Brief for Petitioner 27a; see
also 134 Cong. Rec. 13782–13783.
The history of the occasions clause thus aligns with what
this Court has always recognized as ACCA's purpose. Con-
gress enacted ACCA to address the “special danger” posed
by the eponymous “ar med career cr i mi na l. ” Begay v.
United States, 553 U. S. 137, 146 (2008). The theory of the
statute is that “those who commit a large number of fairly
serious crimes as their means of livelihood” are especially
likely to infict grave harm when in possession of a frearm.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 587–588 (1990). And
so the statute targets “a particular subset of offender[s]”—
those who have repeatedly committed v i olent cr i mes.
Begay, 553 U. S., at 147. It was that focus on “revolving
door” felons that the Solicitor General referenced in arguing
that the courts in Petty had construed ACCA too broadly.
See Addendum to Brief for Petitioner 27a, and n. 6; supra,
at 372–373. And it was that focus to which Congress itself
returned in adding the occasions clause—once again, “to in-
sure that [ACCA's] rigorous sentencing provisions apply only
as intended in cases meriting such strict punishment.” 134
Cong. Rec. 13783; see supra, at 373.
Wooden's burglary of a storage facility does not create that
kind of case, any more than Petty's robbery of a restaurant
did. Wooden's convictions, much like Petty's, arose from a
closely related set of acts occurring on the same night, at the
same place—making up, just as the former Solicitor General
said, “a single criminal episode.” Addendum to Brief for
Petitioner 31a; see supra, at 372. Wooden did not become a
career criminal when he moved from the second storage unit
to the third, as Petty did not when he moved from the second
to the third of the restaurant's patrons. Wooden and Petty
both served signifcant sentences for their crimes, and
rightly so. But in enacting the occasions clause, Congress
made certain that crimes like theirs, taken alone, would not
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376 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
subject a person to a 15-year minimum sentence for illegally
possessi
ng a gun.
III
For the reasons stated, Wooden's ten burglary convictions
were for offenses committed on a single occasion. They
therefore count only once under ACCA. We reverse the
judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court because on the facts of
this case, it is clear that Wooden's prior convictions did not
take place “on occasions different from one another,” as re-
quired for the sentencing enhancement to apply. 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e)(1). Justice Gorsuch raises questions about the
clarity of the record below, but in my view, those questions
only underscore the Government's failure to carry its burden
of proving the enhancement's application. See Pereida v.
Wilkinson, 592 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (citing Johnson v. United
States, 559 U. S. 133, 137 (2010)). I agree with Justice
Gorsuch, however, that the rule of lenity provides an inde-
pendent basis for ruling in favor of a defendant in a closer
case, and I join Parts II–IV of his opinion concurring in the
judgment.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion in full. In light of Justice
Gorsuch's thoughtful concurrence in the judgment, I write
separately to briefy explain why the rule of lenity has appro-
priately played only a very limited role in this Court's crimi-
nal case law. And I further explain how another principle—
the presumpti on of men s rea— can address Justice
Gorsuch's important concern, which I share, about fair no-
tice in federal criminal law.
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377
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
A common formulation of the rule of lenity is as follows:
If
a federal criminal statute is grievously ambiguous, then
the statute should be interpreted in the criminal defendant's
favor. See Ocasio v. United States, 578 U. S. 282, 295, n. 8
(2016). Importantly, the rule of lenity does not apply when
a law merely contains some ambiguity or is diffcult to deci-
pher. As this Court has often said, the rule of lenity applies
only when “ `after seizing everything from which aid can be
derived,' ” the statute is still grievously ambiguous. Ibid.
(quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125, 138–139
(1998)); see Shular v. United States, 589 U. S. –––, –––, –––
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The rule “comes into
operation at the end of the process of construing what Con-
gress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” Callanan v.
United States, 364 U. S. 587, 596 (1961). Our repeated use of
the term “grievous ambiguity” underscores that point. See,
e. g., Shaw v. United States, 580 U. S. 63, 71 (2016); Salman
v. United States, 580 U. S. 39, 51 (2016); Abramski v. United
States, 573 U. S. 169, 188, n. 10 (2014).
Properly applied, the rule of lenity therefore rarely if ever
plays a role because, as in other contexts, “hard interpretive
conundrums, even relating to complex rules, can often be
solved.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019); see also
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843, n. 9 (1984). And if “a reviewing
court employs all of the traditional tools of construction, the
court will almost always reach a conclusion about the best
interpretation of the [law] at issue.” Kisor, 588 U. S., at –––
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment).
In short, because a court must exhaust all the tools of stat-
utory interpretation before resorting to the rule of lenity,
and because a court that does so often determines the best
reading of the statute, the rule of lenity rarely if ever comes
into play. In other words, “if lenity invariably comes in
`last,' it should essentially come in never.” D. Kahan, Len-
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378 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
ity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S. Ct. Rev. 345,
386.
As I see it, that explains why this Court rarely relies
on the rule of lenity, at least as a decisive factor.
I would not upset our rule of lenity case law by making
the ambiguity trigger any easier to satisfy. For example, I
would not say that any front-end ambiguity in the statute
justifes resort to the rule of lenity even before exhausting
the tools of statutory interpretation. One major problem
with that kind of ambiguity trigger is that ambiguity is in
the eye of the beholder and cannot be readily determined on
an objective basis. Applying a looser front-end ambiguity
trigger would just exacerbate that problem, leading to sig-
nifcant inconsistency, unpredictability, and unfairness in ap-
plication. See B. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2136–2139 (2016).
For those reasons, I would not alter our rule of lenity case
law. That said, I very much agree with Justice Gorsuch
about the importance of fair notice in federal criminal law.
But as I see it, that concern for fair notice is better addressed
by other doctrines that protect criminal defendants against
arbitrary or vague federal criminal statutes—in particular,
the presumption of mens rea.
The deeply rooted presumption of mens rea generally re-
quires the Government to prove the defendant's mens rea
with respect to each element of a federal offense, unless Con-
gress plainly provides otherwise. See Rehaif v. United
States, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019); see also Flores-Figueroa v.
United States, 556 U. S. 646, 652 (2009); W. Eskridge, Inter-
preting Law: A Primer on How To Read Statutes and the
Constitution 350–351 (2016); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 303–312 (2012). In
addition, with respect to federal crimes requiring “willful-
ness,” the Court generally requires the Government to prove
that the defendant was aware that his conduct was unlawful.
See Bryan v. United States, 524 U. S. 184, 191–193 (1998);
Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 201–203 (1991).

379
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Opinion of Barrett, J.
To be sure, if a federal criminal statute does not contain a
“w
illfulness” requirement and if a defendant is prosecuted
for violating a legal prohibition or requirement that the de-
fendant honestly was unaware of and reasonably may not
have anticipated, unfairness can result because of a lack of
fair notice. That scenario could arise with some malum
prohibitum federal crimes, for example. But when that
fair notice problem arises, one solution where appropriate
could be to require proof that the defendant was aware
that his conduct was unlawful. Alternatively, another solu-
tion could be to allow a mistake-of-law defense in certain
circumstances—consistent with the longstanding legal prin-
ciple that an act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty.
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 250–252
(1952).
In sum, I would not invite the inconsistency, unpredictabil-
ity, and unfairness that would result from expanding the rule
of lenity beyond its very limited place in the Court's case
law. I would, however, continue to vigorously apply (and
where appropriate, extend) mens rea requirements, which
as Justice Robert Jackson remarked, are “as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of
the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the nor-
mal individual to choose between good and evil.” Id., at 250.
Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join all but Part II–B of the Court's opinion. I agree
with the Court's analysis of the ordinary meaning of the
word “occasion” and its conclusion that Wooden's burglaries
count only once under the Armed Career Criminal Act. But
I do not share the Court's view that Congress ratifed the
Solicitor General's brief confessing error in United States v.
Petty, 798 F. 2d 1157 (CA8 1986), when it amended the Act
to add the occasions clause. This argument depends on two
fawed inferences: frst, that Congress specifcally intended
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380 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of Barrett, J.
to reject the Eighth Circuit's initial decision in Petty, and
second,
that it embraced the former Solicitor General's rea-
soning for why that decision was wrong. The latter error,
in particular, is likely to work mischief down the line.
***
As an initial matter, the Court errs in asserting that the
occasions clause was crafted to reject the result that the
Eighth Circuit initially reached in Petty. (Recall that the
Eighth Circuit changed its view on remand after the Solicitor
General confessed error in this Court.) The Court's evi-
dence for that proposition consists of nothing but a short anal-
ysis that Senator Byrd submitted for the Congressional Rec-
ord in calendaring the proposed amendment. Ante, at 373.
Petty's tenuous tie to the statute distinguishes this case
from the many in which we have recognized that a judicial
decision or line of decisions has provided the impetus for
legislation. In some instances, enacted fndings have explic-
itly connected the statute to a prior decision. See, e. g.,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 694
(2014) (“Congress responded to [Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990)] by
enacting ” the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); 42
U. S. C. §§ 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1) (stating that RFRA was meant
to restore the legal framework in place prior to Smith). In
others, a well-established legal backdrop has revealed Con-
gress' reasons for acting. See, e. g., Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U. S. 428, 436 (2000) (“Given [the statute's]
express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of
admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and
the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list
of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by
its enactment to overrule” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966)). But here, no enacted language mentions Petty, and
the Court wisely does not portray the case—a single, subse-
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Opinion of Barrett, J.
quently vacated court of appeals opinion—as part of the set-
tled
legal landscape against which ACCA was amended.
The only thread connecting the occasions clause to Petty is
legislative history, and the problems with legislative history
are well rehearsed. See, e. g., American Broadcasting Cos.
v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U. S. 431, 458 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court had treated “a few isolated snippets
of legislative history” as “authoritative evidence of congres-
sional intent even though they come from a single report
issued by a committee whose members make up a small frac-
tion of one of the two Houses of Congress”).
The Court needs the Petty backstory, though, to make its
second, more signifcant leap: that Congress endorsed the
reasoning behind the Solicitor General's confession of error
in that case. Ante, at 373. This move goes bigger than leg-
islative history because it goes beyond the standard error of
treating legislators' views about statutory language as au-
thoritative. It presents Senator Byrd's statement as defn-
itive approval of the Solicitor General's position in Petty (an
error of the standard variety), and then uses that approval
to graft the particulars of the Solicitor General's brief onto
the statute (which is really a bridge too far).
Again, I will not belabor why this approach is fawed.
See, e. g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U. S. 87, 98 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(“That the Court should refer to the citation of three District
Court cases in a document issued by a single committee of a
single house as the action of Congress displays the level of
unreality that our unrestrained use of legislative history has
attained”); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter-
pretation of Legal Texts 386 (2012) (“Even if the members
of each house wish to do so, they cannot assign responsibility
for making law—or the details of law—to one of their num-
ber, or to one of their committees”). But it is worth discuss-
ing the Court's jump from legislative history to litigation
history because of what it might mean in later cases.
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v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of Barrett, J.
The Court elevates the Solicitor General's brief to the sta-
tus
of a governing test. Consider how that choice plays out
in this case. The Government argues that Wooden's bur-
glaries occurred on separate occasions because they were
committed sequentially (unlike Petty's robberies, which the
Government says were committed simultaneously). That
argument fails for the reasons that the Court explains in
Part II–A of its opinion, which I join: Such close-in-time
crimes, even if sequential, happen on the same “occasion.”
But rather than resting only on the statutory language, the
Court also invokes the reasoning in the Petty brief. It says
that the Government cannot be right because
“[n]othing about the Solicitor General's confession of
error, or the action Congress took in its wake, suggests
any concern for the exact ordering of Petty's actions.
Each was based instead on another idea: A person who
has robbed a restaurant, and done nothing else, is not a
`habitual offender[ ]' or `career criminal[ ].' . . . It was
that focus on `revolving door' felons that the Solicitor
General referenced in arguing that the courts in Petty
had construed ACCA too broadly.” Ante, at 374–375
(quoting Addendum to Brief for Petitioner 27a and citing
134 Cong. Rec. 13782–13783 (1988)).
Thus, in the Court's view, the Government's argument fails
not only because of the statutory text but also because the
Solicitor General's 35-year-old brief, which the statute sup-
posedly incorporates, rules it out. That is not how statutory
interpretation is supposed to work.*
The Court's approach will likely have downstream effects
because it invites both litigants and lower courts to mine
*The Court disclaims any intent to ratify the Solicitor General's brief.
Ante, at 373, n. 5. If the brief is not essential to the Court's holding, then
one might wonder why the Court quotes it extensively and uses it as a
yardstick to measure (and reject) the Government's current view. Lower
courts should take this disclaimer at face value, though, as notice that the
Court's remarks on the details of the Petty brief are nonbinding dicta.
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Opinion of Barrett, J.
the Solicitor General's brief for guidance on the scope of the
occasi
ons clause—as the parties did in this case. To be sure,
the most important indicators of whether crimes occurred
on a single “occasion”—proximity in time and location—will
matter most. But on top of that, lower courts may place
weight on the buzzwords that the Court highlights in the
Solicitor General's brief: “repeat offenders,” “habitual of-
fenders, ” “recidivists, ” “revolving door offenders, ” and
“ three time loser[s]. ” An te, at 372 (inter na l quotati on
marks omitted). And that could sow unnecessary confusion.
Take a case involving three drug sales that occurred at 8
o'clock on three consecutive evenings at three different loca-
tions. Applying the ordinary meaning of the text seems
straightforward enough: The three offenses are separate oc-
casions because they occurred a day apart and at different
locations, notwithstanding the similarity of the crimes. Yet
factor in the details of the Solicitor General's brief, and the
result is not so clear. Is a defendant who committed three
crimes over the course of three days really a “revolving door
offende[r]” or a true “recidivis[t]”? Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Maybe not—those labels evoke a distinct
inquiry. And though the labels may capture what Congress
was getting at, the statute chooses a particular way of get-
ting there: the text of the occasions clause. We should leave
it at that.
***
The Court glosses this statute by leaning on weak evi-
dence of Congress' impetus for amending the statute, fol-
lowed by still weaker evidence that Congress embraced the
reasoning of a brief fled by the Solicitor General. I would
impute to Congress only what can fairly be imputed to it:
the words of the statute. Crimes within a spree like Wood-
en's do not count as separate ACCA predicates because of
the statutory language, not because those who drafted the
amendment had either Petty's case or the Solicitor General's
prose in mind.
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384 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins
as
to Parts II, III, and IV, concurring in the judgment.
Once more we confront the Armed Career Criminal Act.
Disputes over the statute's meaning have occupied so much
of this Court's attention over so many years that various
pieces of the law and doctrines associated with it have
earned their own nicknames—the Elements Clause, the Re-
sidual Clause, the Categorical Approach. Now comes the
Occasions Clause. This subsection requires courts to im-
pose 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentences on indi-
viduals who unlawfully possess a gun if they also have three
or more prior convictions for certain crimes “committed
on occasi ons di fferent from one another. ” 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e)(1). For years, lower courts have struggled with the
Occasions Clause, reaching contradictory judgments on simi-
lar facts. We took this case hoping to bring some clarity to
at least this particular corner of the ACCA.
I
What do we resolve? The Court rejects the Sixth Cir-
cuit's rule that crimes occurring sequentially always occur
on different occasions. Sometimes, the Court holds, crimes
committed one after another can take place on a single occa-
sion. No one doubts that William Wooden had to break
through wall after wall dividing 10 separate storage units to
complete his crimes. Or that, by the end of it all, he com-
mitted 10 distinct criminal offenses. But, the Court ex-
plains, none of this automatically dictates the conclusion that
his crimes occurred on different occasions. Ante, at 366.
Beyond that clear holding, however, lies much uncertainty.
Rather than simply observe that sequential crimes can occur
on one occasion and return this case to the Court of Appeals
for resolution, the Court ventures further. It directs lower
courts faced with future Occasions Clause cases to employ a
“multi-factored” balancing test in which “a range of circum-
stances may be relevant.” Ante, at 369.
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385
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
The potentially relevant factors turn out to be many and
disparate
. The Court says that offenses committed close in
time “often”—but not always—take place on a single occa-
sion. Ibid. Offenses separated by “substantial gaps in
time or signifcant intervening events” usually occur on sepa-
rate occasions—though what counts as a “substantial” gap or
“signifcant” event remains unexplained. Ibid. “Proximity
of location” can be “important” too—but it is not necessarily
dispositive. Ibid. Whether the defendant's crimes involve
“similar or intertwined” conduct also “may”—or may not—
make a difference. Ibid. And even this long list of factors
probably is not exhaustive. Ante, at 369–370. Nor does
the list come with any instructions on how to weigh the rela-
tive importance of so many factors or how to resolve cases
when those factors point in different directions.
The Court's multi-factor balancing test may represent an
earnest attempt to bring some shape to future litigation
under the Occasions Clause. But it is still very much a judi-
cial gloss on the statute's terms—and one that is unnecessary
to resolve the case at hand. Multi-factor balancing tests of
this sort, too, have supplied notoriously little guidance in
many other contexts, and there is little reason to think one
might fare any better here. In fact, many lower courts
faced with Occasions Clause cases already look to the same
“multiplicity of factors” the Court prescribes today, including
geographic location, the nature of the offenses, the number
of victims, the means employed, and time. See, e. g., United
States v. Letterlough, 63 F. 3d 332, 335–336 (CA4 1995) (list-
ing factors and collecting cases). So far the results have
proven anything but predictable given the almost infnite
number of factual permutations these cases can present.
And all of this has yielded a grave problem: Some individuals
face mandatory 15-year prison terms while other similarly
situated persons do not—with the results depending on little
more than how much weight this or that judge chooses to
assign this or that factor.

386 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
Admittedly, a long list of factors may supply a clear answer
i
n some cases. Who doubts that a single gunshot hitting
two people involves two crimes on a single occasion—or that
two murders separated by years and miles take place on sep-
arate occasions? The problem is that beyond easy cases like
those lies a universe of hard ones, where a long list of non-
exhaustive, only sometimes relevant, and often incommensu-
rable factors promises to perpetuate confusion in the lower
courts and conficting results for those whose liberties hang
in the balance.
Consider some examples. Imagine a defendant who sells
drugs to the same undercover police offcer twice at the same
street corner one hour apart. Do the sales take place on the
same occasion or different ones? Remember, “[p]roximity
of location” and “similar or intertwined . . . conduct” suggest
a single occasion. Ante, at 369. But “substantial gaps in
time” often indicate two episodes. Ibid. With these fac-
tors pointing in different directions and no clear rule for re-
solving their conficting guidance, who can be surprised
when reasonable minds reach different conclusions?
Next, take the Court's barroom brawl hypothetical. Be-
cause it involves “a continuous stream of closely related
criminal acts at one location,” the Court says the crimes nec-
essarily occur on a single “occasion.” Ante, at 370. But
what if our hypothetical defendant assaults one victim inside
the bar and another 20 minutes later in the street outside, in
part because the second victim called the police? Are those
two assaults part of a “continuous stream” of conduct? Do
they even occur “at one location”?
Imagine, too, an individual who commits a robbery or bur-
glary then later assaults a pursuing police offcer: Does the
later assault happen on a separate “occasion” from the initial
crime? The times, locations, and crimes differ, but they are
related in certain respects too. Unsurprisingly, the courts
of appeals have disagreed in cases like these. Compare
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United States v. Leeson, 453 F. 3d 631, 639–640 (CA4 2006)
(
yes), with United States v. Graves, 60 F. 3d 1183, 1184–1185,
1187 (CA6 1995) (no).
Now return to Mr. Wooden. The Court rightly says that
crimes taking place sequentially can sometimes happen on a
single occasion. Ante, at 367. But the Court does not stop
there and remand this case to the Court of Appeals. After
prescribing a long list of factors for use in future cases, it
proceeds to declare that “every” factor points in the same
direc ti on i n th is case and dic t ates the conclusi on that
Mr. Wooden's crimes occurred on a single occasion. Ante,
at 370. In particular, the Court stresses that his crimes in-
volved storage units in the same building (location) and took
place over the same night (timing). Ibid.
But even when it comes to Mr. Wooden, it's not entirely
clear whether the Court's factors compel only one conclusion.
When it comes to location, each storage unit had its own
number and space, each burglary infringed on a different
person's property, and Mr. Wooden had to break through a
new wall to enter each one. Suppose this case involved not
adjacent storage units but adjacent townhomes or adjacent
stores in a mall. If Mr. Wooden had torn through the walls
separating them, would we really say his crimes occurred at
the same location?
The answer is no more certain when the question turns to
timing. Nothing in the record before us speaks to how long
Mr. Wooden lingered over his crimes—whether they spanned
one hour or many. Meanwhile, the record does show that
between each of his burglaries Mr. Wooden faced a choice
between walking away or breaking through another wall
into a new storage unit. In this way, each additional obsta-
cle presented a kind of intervening event. As the Sixth Cir-
cuit put it, there was no reason why Mr. Wooden could not
have “call[ed] it a night after the frst burglary.” 945 F. 3d
498, 505 (2019). Every judge who confronted this case be-
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388 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
fore us thought his crimes happened on different occasions.
And
it's not hard to see how different minds might come to
different conclusions.
So what accounts for the Court's disposition in Mr. Wood-
en's favor? The Court insists that its array of factors point
inexorably to the conclusion that his crimes occurred on a
single occasion. But when it comes to location, one could
view Mr. Wooden's crimes as having taken place in one loca-
tion or several, and the Court chooses the more lenient op-
tion. When it comes to timing, one could view his crimes as
transpiring in a single episode or as having many potential
breaks in the action, and again the Court chooses the more
forgiving course.
Respectfully, all this suggests to me that the key to this
case does not lie as much in a multiplicity of factors as it
does in the rule of lenity. Under that rule, any reasonable
doubt about the application of a penal law must be resolved
in favor of liberty. Because reasonable minds could differ
(as they have differed) on the question whether Mr. Wooden's
crimes took place on one occasion or many, the rule of lenity
demands a judgment in his favor. The rule seems destined
as well to play an important role in many other cases under
the Occasions Clause—a setting where the statute at issue
supplies little guidance, does not defne its key term, and the
word it does use (“occasions”) can lead different people to
different intuitions about the same set of facts. No list of
factors, however thoughtful, can resolve every case under a
law like that. Many ambiguous cases are sure to arise. In
them, a rule of decision is required—and lenity supplies it.
II
The “rule of lenity” is a new name for an old idea—the
notion that “penal laws should be construed strictly.” The
Adventure, 1 F. Cas. 202, 204 (No. 93) (CC Va. 1812) (Mar-
shall, C. J.). The rule frst appeared in English courts, justi-
fed in part on the assumption that when Parliament in-
tended to infict severe punishments it would do so clearly.
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1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 88
(1765)
(Blackstone); 2 M. Hale, The History of the Pleas of
the Crown 335 (1736); see also L. Hall, Strict or Liberal Con-
struction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 749–751
(1935). In the hands of judges in this country, however, len-
ity came to serve distinctively American functions—a means
for upholding the Constitution's commitments to due process
and the separation of powers. Accordingly, lenity became a
widely recognized rule of statutory construction in the Re-
public's early years.
1
Consider lenity's relationship to due process. Under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the federal gov-
ernment nor the States may deprive individuals of “life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law.” U. S. Const.,
Amdts. 5, 14. Generally, that guarantee requires govern-
ments seeking to take a person's freedom or possessions to
adhere to “those settled usages and modes of proceeding ”
found in the common law. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856); N. Chap-
man & M. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1774–1775 (2012). And among those
“settled usages” is the ancient rule that the law must afford
ordinary people fair notice of its demands. See, e. g., Ses-
sions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2018) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Lenity
works to enforce the fair notice requirement by ensuring that
an individual's liberty always prevails over ambiguous laws.
Early cases confrm the message. In United States v.
Wiltberger, a sailor had killed an individual on a river in
1
See, e. g., United States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464, 475 (1840); United States
v. Eighty-Four Boxes of Sugar, 7 Pet. 453, 462–463 (1833); Ronkendorff v.
Taylor's Lessee, 4 Pet. 349, 359 (1830); Carver v. Jackson, 4 Pet. 1, 92–93
(1830); United States v. Sheldon, 2 Wheat. 119, 121–122 (1817); United
States v. Lawrence, 3 Dall. 42, 45 (1795); Prescott v. Nevers, 19 F. Cas.
1286, 1288–1289 (No. 11,390) (CC Me. 1827) (Story, J.); The Enterprise, 8
F. Cas. 732, 734–735 (No. 4,499) (CC NY 1812) (Livingston, J.); Bray v. The
Atalanta, 4 F. Cas. 37, 38 (No. 1,819) (DC SC 1794).
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China. 5 Wheat. 76, 77 (1820). But the federal statute
under
which he was charged criminalized manslaughter only
on the “ `high seas.' ” Id., at 93 (quoting Act of Apr. 30, 1790,
§ 12, 1 Stat. 115). Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that
other parts of the law might have suggested Congress in-
tended to capture the sailor's conduct. 5 Wheat., at 105.
But he insisted that “penal laws are to be construed strictly”
because of “the tenderness of the law for the rights of indi-
viduals”—and, more specifcally, the right of every person to
suffer only those punishments dictated by “the plain mean-
ing of words.” Id., at 95–96. Where the text of a law man-
dates punishment for the defendant's conduct in terms an
ordinary person can understand, a court's job is to apply it
as written. Id., at 95. But where uncertainty exists, the
law gives way to liberty.
United States v. Mann tells a similar story. 26 F. Cas.
1153 (No. 15,718) (CC NH 1812). There, Justice Story faced
the question whether a federal statute authorized punish-
ment against a shipowner. After concluding the statutory
text did not supply a “defnite” answer, Justice Story ex-
plained that “[i]t is a principle grown hoary in age and wis-
dom, that penal statutes are to be construed strictly.” Id.,
at 1157. And that principle more or less resolved the case.
“I will not be the frst judge,” Justice Story wrote, “to strain
a proviso against [a] citizen, beyond the fair import of its
expressions.” Ibid. Here again, the connection between
lenity and fair notice was clear: If the law inficting punish-
ment does not speak “plainly” to the defendant's conduct,
liberty must prevail. Ibid.
Of course, most ordinary people today don't spend their
leisure time reading statutes—and they probably didn't in
Justice Marshall's and Justice Story's time either. But leni-
ty's emphasis on fair notice isn't about indulging a fantasy.
It is about protecting an indispensable part of the rule of
law—the promise that, whether or not individuals happen to
read the law, they can suffer penalties only for violating
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standing rules announced in advance. As the framers un-
derstood,
“subjecting . . . men to punishment for things
which, when they were done, were breaches of no law . . .
ha[s] been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable in-
strumen[t] of tyranny.” The Federalist No. 84, pp. 511–512
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); see also McBoyle v.
United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931) (“Although it is not
likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the
law . . . fair warning should be given to the world in language
that the common world will understand”).
Closely related to its fair notice function is lenity's role in
vindicating the separation of powers. Under our Constitu-
tion, “[a]ll” of the federal government's “legislative Powers”
are vested in Congress. Art. I, § 1. Perhaps the most im-
portant consequence of this assignment concerns the power
to punish. Any new national laws restricting liberty re-
quire the assent of the people's representatives and thus
input from the country's “many parts, interests and classes.”
The Federalist No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison). Lenity helps
safeguard this design by preventing judges from intention-
ally or inadvertently exploiting “doubtful” statutory “ex-
pressions” to enforce their own sensibilities. Mann, 26 F.
Cas., at 1157. It “places the weight of inertia upon the party
that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly,” forcing
the government to seek any clarifying changes to the law
rather than impose the costs of ambiguity on presumptively
free persons. United States v. Santos, 553 U. S. 507, 514
(2008) (plurality opinion). In this way, the rule helps keep
the power of punishment frmly “in the legislative, not in the
judicial department.” Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., at 95.
Doubtless, lenity carries its costs. If judges cannot en-
large ambiguous penal laws to cover problems Congress
failed to anticipate in clear terms, some cases will fall
through the gaps and the legislature's cumbersome processes
will have to be reengaged. But, as the framers appreciated,
any other course risks rendering a self-governing people

392 WOODEN
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“slaves to their magistrates,” with their liberties dependent
on
“the private opinions of the judge.” 4 Blackstone 371
(1769). From the start, lenity has played an important role
in realizing a distinctly American version of the rule of law—
one that seeks to ensure people are never punished for vio-
lating just-so rules concocted after the fact, or rules with no
more claim to democratic provenance than a judge's surmise
about legislative intentions.
III
It may be understandable why the Court declines to dis-
cuss lenity today. Certain controversies and misunder-
standings about the rule have crept into our law in recent
years. I would take this opportunity to answer them.
Begin with the most basic of these controversies—the de-
gree of ambiguity required to trigger the rule of lenity.
Some have suggested that courts should consult the rule of
lenity only when, after employing every tool of interpreta-
tion, a court confronts a “grievous” statutory ambiguity.
See, e. g., Shaw v. United States, 580 U. S. 63, 71 (2016) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). But ask yourself: If the sher-
iff cited a loosely written statute as authority to seize your
home, would you be satisfed with a judicial explanation that,
yes, the law was ambiguous, but the sheriff wins anyway
because the ambiguity isn't “grievous”? If a judge sen-
tenced you to decades in prison for conduct that no law
clearly proscribed, would it matter to you that the judge con-
sidered the law “merely”—not “grievously”—ambiguous?
This “grievous” business does not derive from any well-
considered theory about lenity or the mainstream of this
Court's opinions. Since the founding, lenity has sought to
ensure that the government may not infict punishments on
individuals without fair notice and the assent of the people's
representatives. See supra, at 388–392. A rule that al-
lowed judges to send people to prison based on intuitions about
“merely” ambiguous laws would hardly serve those ends.
Tellingly, this Court's early cases did not require a “griev-
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ous” ambiguity before applying the rule of lenity. Instead,
they
followed other courts in holding that, “[i]n the construc-
tion of a penal statute, it is well settled . . . that all reason-
able doubts concerning its meaning ought to operate in favor
of [the defendant].” Harrison v. Vose, 9 How. 372, 378 (1850)
(emphasis added).
2
Nineteenth century treatises seeking to
record the rule put the point this way: “[I]f there is such an
ambiguity in a penal statute as to leave reasonable doubts of
its meaning, it is the duty of a court not to infict the pen-
alty.” J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 353, p. 444 (1891); see also 1 J. Bishop, Commentaries on
the Criminal Law § 133, p. 172 (2d ed. 1858) (Bishop). Many
of this Court's contemporary cases employ the same stand-
ard too, if sometimes in slightly different words.
3
2
See also United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 628 (1890) (conduct
must be “plainly and unmistakably within the statute”); United States v.
Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 395–396 (1868) (observing that “penal laws are to
be construed strictly,” such that “they must . . . leave no room for a reason-
able doubt” as to the legislature's meaning); The Merino, 9 Wheat. 391,
403–404 (1824) (affrming a conviction under a “highly penal” law after
concluding that “no reasonable doubt” existed as to its application); The
Enterprise, 8 F. Cas., at 734 (“It should be a principal of every criminal
code, and certainly belongs to ours, that no person be adjudged guilty of
an offence unless it be created and promulgated in terms which leave no
reasonable doubt of their meaning ”); The Adventure, 1 F. Cas. 202, 204
(No. 93) (CC Va. 1812) (observing that lenity applies “in cases where the
[ legislature's] intention is not distinctly perceived,” such that “the mind
balances and hesitates between . . . two constructions”).
3
See, e. g., United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019); Yates v.
United States, 574 U. S. 528, 547–548 (2015) (plurality opinion); Skilling v.
United States, 561 U. S. 358, 410–411 (2010); United States v. Santos, 553
U. S. 507, 513–515 (2008) (plurality opinion); Scheidler v. National Organi-
zation for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393, 409 (2003); Cleveland v. United
States, 531 U. S. 12, 25 (2000); United States v. Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 54
(1994); Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 158 (1990); United States
v. Kozminski, 487 U. S. 931, 951–952 (1988); McNally v. United States, 483
U. S. 350, 359–360 (1987); Dowling v. United States, 473 U. S. 207, 228
(1985); Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419, 427 (1985); United States
v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348–349 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S.
808, 812 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 83 (1955).

394 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
So where did the talk about “grievous” ambiguities begin?
The
problem may trace to Huddleston v. United States, 415
U. S. 814, 831 (1974). That decision came during a “bygone
era” characterized by a more freewheeling approach to statu-
tory construction. Food Marketing Institute v. Argus
Leader Media, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Nor did the decision pause to consider,
let alone overrule, any of this Court's pre-existing cases ex-
plaining lenity's original and historic scope. Indeed, in the
years that followed Huddleston, this Court routinely re-
turned to a more traditional understanding. See n. 3, supra.
And even in Huddleston itself, the discussion of “grievous”
ambiguities was dicta—the Court found no ambiguity of any
kind in the statute at issue. See 415 U. S., at 831–832.
These peculiar circumstances hardly supply any court with
a sound basis for ignoring or restricting one of the most an-
cient rules of statutory construction—let alone one so closely
connected to the Constitution's protections.
4
A second and related misunderstanding has crept into our
law. Sometimes, Members of this Court have suggested
that we possess the authority to punish individuals under
ambiguous laws in light of our own perceptions about some
piece of legislative history or the statute's purpose. See,
4
Supporters of the “grievous” ambiguity standard sometimes point to
cases suggesting that lenity applies only after courts have “seiz[ed] every
thing from which aid can be derived” in ascertaining a statute's meaning.
See, e. g., Ocasio v. United States, 578 U. S. 282, 295, n. 8 (2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But the “every thing from which aid can be
derived” language originated in United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386
(1805). And as uttered by Chief Justice Marshall, it had nothing to do
with lenity. Instead, it concerned only the question whether a court could
use a statute's title in ascertaining its meaning. See ibid. What's more,
when the Court frst applied the phrase to lenity, it expressly reiterated
the rule that, “before we choose the harsher alternative,” it is necessary
that “Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and defnite.”
United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221–222
(1952). None of this supports requiring a “grievous” ambiguity before
applying the rule of lenity.
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e. g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 109–111 (1990);
U
nited States v. R. L. C., 503 U. S. 291, 305 (1992) (plurality
opinion). Today's decision seemingly nods in the same di-
rection. In a sentence in Part II–A, the Court says that
statutory purpose is one factor a judge may “kee[p] an eye
on” when deciding whether to enhance an individual's sen-
tence under the Occasions Clause. Ante, at 370. The Court
then proceeds to discuss the Clause's legislative history at
length in Part II–B. It may be that the Court today intends
to suggest only that judges may consult legislative history
and purpose to limit, never expand, punishment under an
ambiguous statute. But even if that's so, why take such a
long way around to the place where lenity already stands
waiting?
The right path is the more straightforward one. Where
the traditional tools of statutory interpretation yield no clear
answer, the judge's next step isn't to legislative history or
the law's unexpressed purposes. The next step is to lenity.
As Justice Story explained, because “penal statutes are con-
strued strictly . . . forfeitures are not to be inficted by strain-
ing the words so as to reach some conjectural policy.”
United States v. Open Boat, 27 F. Cas. 354, 357 (No. 15,968)
(CC Me. 1829). “[I]f [cases] are not provided for in the text
of the act, courts of justice do not adventure on the usurpa-
tion of legislative authority.” Ibid. Or as Chief Justice
Marshall put it, “[t]o determine that a case is within the in-
tention of a statute, its language must authorise us to say
so.” Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., at 96. Any other approach
would be “unsafe” and “dangerous”—risking the possibility
that judges rather than legislators will control the power to
defne crimes and their punishments. Ibid.; see also Hughey
v. United States, 495 U. S. 411, 422 (1990) (“[L]ongstanding
principles of lenity . . . preclude our resolution of the ambigu-
ity . . . on the basis of general declarations of policy in the
statute and legislative history”); R. L. C., 503 U. S., at 307–
311 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment); Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 83 (1955).
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396 WOODEN
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
At least one more misconception has arisen in recent
years.
In debating the merits of the rule of lenity, some
have treated the rule as an island unto itself—a curiosity
unique to criminal cases. But in truth, lenity has long ap-
plied outside what we today might call the criminal law.
5
And it is just one of a number of judicial doctrines that seek
to protect fair notice and the separation of powers. Vague-
ness doctrine and others besides spring from similar aspira-
tions. From time to time and for historically contingent
reasons, one or another of these doctrines has come into or
gone out of fashion. But narrow one avenue and the same
underlying rule-of-law imperatives will eventually fnd an-
other way to express themselves. None of these doctrines
should be artifcially divorced from the others; all are worthy
of our respect.
6
5
Historically, lenity applied to all “penal” laws—that is, laws inficting
any form of punishment, including ones we might now consider “civil”
forfeitures or fnes. See, e. g., Bishop § 114, at 155–156; The Enterprise,
8 F. Cas., at 734; Eighty-Four Boxes of Sugar, 7 Pet., at 462; see also
C. Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 Yale L. J. 2446,
2498–2500 (2016).
6
Justice Kavanaugh does not contest lenity's grounding in our history
or its connection to our Constitution's commitments. Nor does he offer
any reason to believe the “grievous” ambiguity standard is anything other
than a modern phenomenon grounded in dicta. Even so, he insists that
lenity should “rarely if ever” apply, because judges “ `will almost always
reach a conclusion about the best interpretation' ” that resolves ambiguity.
Ante, at 377 (concurring opinion). I agree that judges sometimes jump
too quickly to ambiguity. But doctrines like lenity and contra proferen-
tem have played an essential role in our law for centuries, resolving ambi-
guities where they persist. Likewise, while I agree with Justice Kava-
naugh about the importance of the mens rea presumption, I do not see it
as a substitute for the rule of lenity so much as one instantiation of it.
Ante, at 378–379. Indeed, this Court has often observed that “requiring
mens rea is in keeping with our longstanding recognition of ” lenity's de-
mands. Liparota, 471 U. S., at 419; United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 437 (1978); Eighty-Four Boxes of Sugar, 7 Pet., at
462–463 (applying lenity to hold that a penal law cannot be premised on
mere “accident or mistake”).

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IV
The
rule of lenity has a critical role to play in cases under
the Occasions Clause. The statute contains little guidance,
and reasonable doubts about its application will arise often.
When they do, they should be resolved in favor of liberty.
Today, the Court does not consult lenity's rule, but neither
does it forbid lower courts from doing so in doubtful cases.
That course is the sound course. Under our rule of law, pun-
ishments should never be products of judicial conjecture
about this factor or that one. They should come only with
the assent of the people's elected representatives and in laws
clear enough to supply “fair warning . . . to the world.” Mc-
Boyle, 283 U. S., at 27.
7
7
A constitutional question simmers beneath the surface of today's case.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments generally require the government in
criminal cases to prove every fact essential to an individual's punishment
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Haymond, 588
U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019) (plurality opinion). In this case, however, only
judges found the facts relevant to Mr. Wooden's punishment under the
Occasions Clause, and they did so under only a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. Because Mr. Wooden did not raise a constitutional chal-
lenge to his sentence, the Court does not consider the propriety of this
practice. But there is little doubt we will have to do so soon. See United
States v. Dudley, 5 F. 4th 1249, 1273–1278 (CA11 2021) (Newsom, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning whether the Occasions
Clause inquiry can be squared with the Constitution); United States v.
Perry, 908 F. 3d 1126, 1134–1136 (CA8 2018) (Stras, J., concurring) (same);
United States v. Thompson, 421 F. 3d 278, 287–295 (CA4 2005) (Wilkins,
C. J., dissenting) (same). And it is hard not to wonder: If a jury must fnd
the facts supporting a punishment under the Occasions Clause beyond a
reasonable doubt, how may judges impose a punishment without equal
certainty about the law's application to those facts?
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 365, n. 1, line 1, “cert. pending, No. 21–5754” is deleted