Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 595 U. S. Part 1
Pages 1–8
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
October 18, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2021
RIVAS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 20–1539. Decided October 18, 2021
Police offcer Daniel Rivas-Villegas responded to a 911 report that a
woman and her two children were barricaded in a room of their home
because they feared the woman's boyfriend, respondent Ramon Cortes-
luna, who had a chainsaw, would hurt them. Rivas-Villegas, along with
other offcers, observed Cortesluna inside the home with what appeared
to be a weapon. Rivas-Villegas ordered Cortesluna to drop the weapon,
later identifed as a metal tool, and Cortesluna did so. Cortesluna com-
plied with orders to come outside, and Rivas-Villegas ordered him to
his knees. Another offcer noticed a knife protruding from Cortesluna's
pocket and ordered him to keep his hands up. Cortesluna failed to com-
ply and was shot twice with beanbag rounds. He then complied with
orders to raise his hands over his head and get down on the ground.
Rivas-Villegas straddled Cortesluna, placing his left knee on Corteslu-
na's back near the knife while raising Cortesluna's arms up behind his
back. Rivas-Villegas was in this position for no more than eight sec-
onds while another offcer removed the knife and tossed it away. After
Cortesluna was handcuffed, Rivas-Villegas lifted him up. Cortesluna
later brought a suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that Rivas-Villegas
used excessive force. The District Court granted Rivas-Villegas sum-
mary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that existing
Circuit precedent—specifcally LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204
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2 RIV
AS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA
Per Curiam
F. 3d 947—“put him on notice that his conduct constituted excessive
force
.”
Held: Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualifed immunity, which “attaches
when an offcial's conduct ` “does not violate clearly established statutory
or constituti ona l r ights of wh ich a reasonable person wou ld have
known.” ' ” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. 73, 78–79. Because the question
whether an offcer has used excessive force depends on “the facts and
circumstances of each particular case,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386,
396, Cortesluna must identify a case that put Rivas-Villegas on notice
that his specifc conduct was unlawful. A case directly on point is not
required, but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or con-
stitutional question beyond debate.” White, 580 U. S., at 79 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Neither Cortesluna nor the Court of Ap-
peals has identifed any Supreme Court case that does so. Even assum-
ing that circuit precedent can clearly establish law for § 1983 purposes,
the facts in this case are materially different from those in LaLonde,
where the offcers were responding to a noise complaint and encountered
an unarmed LaLonde, who later testifed that an offcer deliberately dug
his knee into LaLonde's back. On the facts of this case, neither La-
Londe nor any decision of this Court is suffciently similar to provide
Rivas-Villegas notice that his specifc use of force was excessive.
Certiorari granted; 979 F. 3d 645, reversed.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner Daniel Rivas-Villegas, a police offcer in Union
City, California, responded to a 911 call reporting that a
woman and her two children were barricaded in a room for
fear that respondent Ramon Cortesluna, the woman's boy-
friend, was going to hurt them. After confrming that the
family had no way of escaping the house, Rivas-Villegas and
the other offcers present commanded Cortesluna outside and
onto the ground. Offcers saw a knife in Cortesluna's left
pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and another offcer were in
the process of removing the knife and handcuffng Cortes-
luna, Rivas-Villegas briefy placed his knee on the left side
of Cortesluna's back. Cortesluna later sued under Rev. Stat.
§ 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging, as relevant, that Rivas-
Villegas used excessive force. At issue here is whether
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3
Per Curiam
Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualifed immunity because he
did
not violate clearly established law.
The undisputed facts are as follows. A 911 operator re-
ceived a call from a crying 12-year-old girl reporting that
she, her mother, and her 15-year-old sister had shut them-
selves into a room at their home because her mother's
boyfriend, Cortesluna, was trying to hurt them and had
a chainsaw. The girl told the operator that Cortesluna
was “ `always drinking,' ” had “ `anger issues,' ” was “ `really
mad,' ” and was using the chainsaw to “ `break something in
the house.' ” Cortesluna v. Leon, 979 F. 3d 645, 649 (CA9
2020). A police dispatcher relayed this information along
with a description of Cortesluna in a request for offcers to
respond.
Rivas-Villegas heard the broadcast and responded to the
scene along with four other offcers. The offcers spent sev-
eral minutes observing the home and reported seeing
through a window a man matching Cortesluna's description.
One offcer asked whether the girl and her family could exit
the house. Dispatch responded that they “ `were unable to
get out' ” and confrmed that the 911 operator had “ `hear[d]
sawing in the background' ” and thought that Cortesluna
might be trying to saw down the door. Cortesluna v. Leon,
2018 WL 6727824, *2 (ND Cal., Dec. 21, 2018).
After receiving this information, Rivas-Villegas knocked
on the door and stated loudly, “ `police department, come to
the front door, Union City police, come to the front door.' ”
Ib i d. Another officer yel led, “ ` he's comi ng and has a
weapon.' ” Ibid. A different offcer then stated, “ `use less-
lethal,' ” referring to a beanbag shotgun. Ibid. When
Rivas-Villegas ordered Cortesluna to “ `drop it,' ” Cortesluna
dropped the “weapon,” later identifed as a metal tool. Ibid.
Rivas-Villegas then commanded, “ `come out, put your
hands up, walk out towards me.' ” 979 F. 3d, at 650. Cor-
tesluna put his hands up and Rivas-Villegas told him to

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4 RIV
AS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA
Per Curiam
“ `keep coming.' ” Ibid. As Cortesluna walked out of the
house
and toward the offcers, Rivas-Villegas said, “ `Stop.
Get on your knees.' ” Ibid. Plaintiff stopped 10 to 11 feet
from the offcers. Another offcer then saw a knife sticking
out from the front left pocket of Cortesluna's pants and
shouted, “ `he has a knife in his left pocket, knife in his
pocket,' ” and directed Cortesluna, “ `don't put your hands
down,' ” “ `hands up.' ” 2018 WL 6727824, *2. Cortesluna
turned his head toward the instructing offcer but then low-
ered his head and his hands in contravention of the offcer's
orders. Another offcer twice shot Cortesluna with a bean-
bag round from his shotgun, once in the lower stomach and
once in the left hip.
After the second shot, Cortesluna raised his hands over
his head. The offcers shouted for him to “ `get down,' ”
which he did. Another offcer stated, “ `left pocket, he's got
a knife.' ” Ibid. Rivas-Villegas then straddled Cortesluna.
He placed his right foot on the ground next to Cortesluna's
right side with his right leg bent at the knee. He placed his
left knee on the left side of Cortesluna's back, near where
Cortesluna had a knife in his pocket. He raised both of Cor-
tesluna's arms up behind his back. Rivas-Villegas was in
this position for no more than eight seconds before standing
up while continuing to hold Cortesluna's arms. At that
point, another offcer, who had just removed the knife from
Cortesluna's pocket and tossed it away, came and handcuffed
Cortesluna's hands behind his back. Rivas-Villegas lifted
Cortesluna up and moved him away from the door.
Cortesluna brought suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming,
as relevant here, that Rivas-Villegas used excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court
granted summary judgment to Rivas-Villegas, but the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 979 F. 3d, at 656.
The Court of Appeals held that “Rivas-Villegas is not enti-
tled to qualifed immunity because existing precedent put
him on notice that his conduct constituted excessive force.”

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5
Per Curiam
Id., at 654. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Ap-
pea
ls relied solely on LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204
F. 3d 947 (CA9 2000). The court acknowledged that “the
offcers here responded to a more volatile situation than did
the offcers in LaLonde.” 979 F. 3d, at 654. Nevertheless,
it reasoned: “Both LaLonde and this case involve suspects
who were lying face-down on the ground and were not resist-
ing either physically or verbally, on whose back the defend-
ant offcer leaned with a knee, causing allegedly signifcant
injury.” Ibid.
Judge Collins dissented. As relevant, he argued that “the
facts of LaLonde are materially distinguishable from this
case and are therefore insuffcient to have made clear to
every reasonable offcer that the force Rivas-Villegas used
here was excessive.” Id., at 664 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We agree and therefore reverse. Even assuming that con-
trolling Circuit precedent clearly establishes law for pur-
poses of § 1983, LaLonde did not give fair notice to Rivas-
Villegas. He is thus entitled to qualifed immunity.
“Qualifed immunity attaches when an offcial's conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. 73, 78–79 (2017) (per cu-
riam) (internal quotation marks omitted). A right is clearly
established when it is “suffciently clear that every reason-
able offcial would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 11
(2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Al-
though “this Court's case law does not require a case directly
on point for a right to be clearly established, existing prece-
dent must have placed the statutory or constitutional ques-
tion beyond debate.” White, 580 U. S., at 79 (alterations
and internal quotation marks omitted). This inquiry “must
be undertaken in light of the specifc context of the case, not
as a broad general proposition.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543

6 RIV
AS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA
Per Curiam
U. S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“
[S]pecifcity is especially important in the Fourth Amend-
ment context, where . . . it is sometimes diffcult for an offcer
to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive
force, will apply to the factual situation the offcer con-
fronts.” Mullenix, 577 U. S., at 12 (alterations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Whether an offcer has used ex-
cessive force depends on “the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
of the offcers or others, and whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by fight.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989); see also Tennessee v. Gar-
ner, 471 U. S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the offcer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious
physical harm, either to the offcer or to others, it is not
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using
deadly force”). However, Graham's and Garner's standards
are cast “at a high level of generality.” Brosseau, 543 U. S.,
at 199. “[I]n an obvious case, these standards can `clearly
establish' the answer, even without a body of relevant case
law.” Ibid. But this is not an obvious case. Thus, to show
a violation of clearly established law, Cortesluna must iden-
tify a case that put Rivas-Villegas on notice that his specifc
conduct was unlawful.
Cortesluna has not done so. Neither Cortesluna nor the
Court of Appeals identifed any Supreme Court case that
addresses facts like the ones at issue here. Instead, the
Court of Appeals relied solely on its precedent in LaLonde.
Even assuming that circuit precedent can clearly establish
law for purposes of § 1983, LaLonde is materially distin-
guishable and thus does not govern the facts of this case.
In LaLonde, offcers were responding to a neighbor's com-
plaint that LaLonde had been making too much noise in his
apartment. 204 F. 3d, at 950–951. When they knocked on
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7
Per Curiam
LaLonde's door, he “appeared in his underwear and a T-shirt,
holdi
ng a sandwich in his hand.” Id., at 951. LaLonde tes-
tifed that, after he refused to let the offcers enter his home,
they did so anyway and informed him he would be arrested
for obstruction of justice. Ibid. One offcer then knocked
the sandwich from LaLonde's hand and “grabbed LaLonde
by his ponytail and knocked him backwards to the ground.”
Id., at 952. After a short scuffe, the offcer sprayed La-
Londe in the face with pepper spray. At that point, La-
Londe ceased resisting and another offcer, while handcuffng
LaLonde, “deliberately dug his knee into LaLonde's back
with a force that caused him long-term if not permanent back
injury.” Id., at 952, 960, n. 17.
The situation in LaLonde and the situation at issue here
diverge in several respects. In LaLonde, offcers were re-
sponding to a mere noise complaint, whereas here they were
responding to a serious alleged incident of domestic violence
possibly involving a chainsaw. In addition, LaLonde was
unarmed. Cortesluna, in contrast, had a knife protruding
from his left pocket for which he had just previously ap-
peared to reach. Further, in this case, video evidence
shows, and Cortesluna does not dispute, that Rivas-Villegas
placed his knee on Cortesluna for no more than eight seconds
and only on the side of his back near the knife that offcers
were in the process of retrieving. LaLonde, in contrast, tes-
tifed that the offcer deliberately dug his knee into his back
when he had no weapon and had made no threat when ap-
proached by police. These facts, considered together in the
context of this particular arrest, materially distinguish this
case from LaLonde.
“Precedent involving similar facts can help move a case
beyond the otherwise hazy borders between excessive and
acceptable force and thereby provide an offcer notice that a
specifc use of force is unlawful.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584
U. S. –––, ––– (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted). On the facts of this case, neither LaLonde nor any
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8 RIV
AS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA
Per Curiam
decision of this Court is suffciently similar. For that rea-
son,
we grant Rivas-Villegas' petition for certiorari and re-
verse the Ninth Circuit's determination that Rivas-Villegas
is not entitled to qualifed immunity.
It is so ordered.
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