United States v. Briggs

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P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Vol. 592 (Pp. 1–208; 901–1300)
UNITED STATES REPORTS
Part 1
Volume 592 U. S. - Part 1
Pages 1–208; 901–1300
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
Beginning of Term
October 5, 2020, Through February 22, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the
bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Publishing Offce
Washington, D.C. 20402

J U S T I C E S
of the
S U P R E M E C O U R T
during the time of these reports*
JOHN G. ROBERTS, Jr., Chief Justice.
CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice.
RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice.
1
STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice.
SAMUEL A. ALITO, Jr., Associate Justice.
SONIA SOTOMAYOR, Associate Justice.
ELENA KAGAN, Associate Justice.
NEIL M. GORSUCH, Associate Justice.
BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, Associate Justice.
AMY CONEY BARRETT, Associate Justice.
2
retired
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, Associate Justice.
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice.
DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice.
ofcers of the court
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General.
3
JEFFREY A. ROSEN, Acting Attorney General.
4
MONTY WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General.
5
JEFFREY B. WALL, Acting Solicitor General.
6
ELIZABETH PRELOGAR, Acting Solicitor
General.
7
SCOTT S. HARRIS, Clerk.
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF, Reporter of
Decisions.
8
DERRICK LINDSEY, Acting Reporter of Decisions.
RICHARD NELSON, Acting Marshal.
LINDA S. MASLOW, Librarian.
* For notes, see p. ii.
i

NOTES
1
Justice Ginsburg died at her home in Washington, D. C. on Septem-
ber 18, 2020. See post, p. v.
2
The Honorable Amy Coney Barrett, of Illinois, formerly a Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, was nominated
by President Trump on September 26, 2020, to be an Associate Justice of
this Court; the nomination was confrmed by the Senate on October 26,
2020; she was commissioned and took the oaths on October 27, 2020.
3
Attorney General Barr resigned effective December 23, 2020.
4
Mr. Rosen became Acting Attorney General December 24, 2020. Mr.
Rosen resigned effective January 20, 2021.
5
Mr. Wilkinson became Acting Attorney General January 20, 2021.
6
Mr. Wall resigned effective January 20, 2021.
7
Ms. Prelogar became Acting Solicitor effective January 20, 2021.
8
Ms. Womeldorf was appointed Reporter of Decisions effective Janu-
ary 25, 2021. See post, p. vii and 1232.
ii

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Allotment of Justices
It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits,
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such
allotment be entered of record, effective October 19, 2018, viz.:
For the District of Columbia Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Chief Justice.
For the First Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate
Justice.
For the Third Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Associate
Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, Neil M. Gorsuch, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, Elena Kagan, Associate Justice.
For the Tenth Circuit, Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice.
For the Eleventh Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice.
For the Federal Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
October 19, 2018.
(For next previous allotment, see 586 U. S., Pt. 1, p. iii.)
(For next subsequent allotment, see post, p. iv.)
iii

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Allotment of Justices
It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits,
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such
allotment be entered of record, effective November 20, 2020, viz.:
For the District of Columbia Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Chief Justice.
For the First Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice.
For the Third Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, Amy Coney Barrett, Associate Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, Elena Kagan, Associate Justice.
For the Tenth Circuit, Neil M. Gorsuch, Associate Justice.
For the Eleventh Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice.
For the Federal Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
November 20, 2020.
(For next previous allotment, see ante, p. iii.)
iv

DEATH OF JUSTICE GINSBURG
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER, 5, 2020
Present: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas,
Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor,
Justice Kagan, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice
Kavanaugh.
The Chief Justice said:
I note that memorial drapery has been erected on the door
of our courtroom and on the Bench to signify mourning for
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who died on September 18,
2020. Justice Ginsburg was born in Brooklyn, New York,
March 15, 1933. She received her B. A. from Cornell Uni-
versity and married Martin D. Ginsburg shortly after gradu-
ation. They briefy lived in Oklahoma, where Marty was
stationed when called to active duty in the Army. They
both pursued a career in law. She attended Harvard Law
School and received her LL.B. from Columbia Law School in
1959, tied for frst in her class.
Justice Ginsburg served as a law clerk to the Honorable
Edmund L. Palmieri, Judge of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, from 1959 to
1961. From 1961 to 1963, she was a research associate and
then associate director of the Columbia Law School Project
on International Procedure.
Justice Ginsburg was a professor of law at Rutgers Uni-
versity School of Law from 1963 to 1972, and Columbia Law
School from 1972 to 1980. In 1971, she was instrumental in
v

vi DEA
TH OF JUSTICE GINSBURG
launching the Women's Rights Project of the American Civil
Liber
ties Union. She argued six signifcant gender discrim-
ination cases in this Court, winning fve.
President Carter appointed Justice Ginsburg to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
and she served there as a Circuit Judge from 1980 to 1993.
President Clinton appointed her to this Court in 1993. She
was the second woman appointed to the Court and served
more than 27 years. During her time on the Court, she au-
thored 483 majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
Justice Ginsburg 's contributions as advocate, jurist, and
citizen are immeasurable. We at the Court will remember
her as a dear friend and treasured colleague.
Justice Ginsburg is survived by her two children: Jane
Carol Ginsburg and James Steven Ginsburg; four grandchil-
dren; two step-grandchildren; and one great-grandchild.
We extend our condolences to her children, extended family,
and countless admirers.
At an appropriate time, the traditional memorial service
of the Court and Bar will be held in our Courtroom.

APPOINTMENT OF REPORTER OF DECISIONS
Supreme Court of the United States
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2021
Present: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas,
Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor,
Justice Kagan, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh,
and Justice Barrett.
The Chief Justice said:
I am pleased to announce that the Court has appointed
Rebecca Anne Womeldorf as Reporter of Decisions. Ms.
Womeldorf was formerly Chief Counsel to the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States. We wish her well in
her service as the Court's 17th Reporter of Decisions, which
she commenced on January 25th.
vii

I N D E X
(Vol. 592 U. S., Part 1)
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW. See United States Railroad Retire-
ment Board.
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF
1996.
AEDPA de ference rea ffir med—Mi t i ga t io n-prejud ice ana lysis re-
versed—Summary disposition issued.—Under deferential standard of
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Ninth Circuit ex-
ceeded its authority in rejecting state court's determination that Kayer
failed to show prejudice in his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Shinn v. Kayer, p. 111.
ARKANSAS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974.
ARTICLE III STANDING. See Federal Jurisdiction.
No Article III injury—Able-and-ready theory insuffcient—Dismissed
for lack of standing.—Because plaintiff Adams has not shown that he was
“able and ready” to apply for judicial vacancy in imminent future, Grats
v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 262, he has failed to demonstrate Article III
standing to challenge Delaware Constitution's political balance require-
ment for appointments to State's major courts. Carney v. Adams, p. 53.
AUTOMATIC STAYS. See Bankruptcy Law.
BANKRUPTCY LAW.
Retention is not control—No § 362 automatic stay violation—Turn-
over lies under § 542.—Mere retention of estate property after fling of a
bankruptcy petition does not violate 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(3), which operates
as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over property of estate. Chi-
cago v. Fulton, p. 154.
CAPITAL SENTENCING. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996.
CENSUS. See Federal Jurisdiction.
ix

x INDEX
CERTIFIED QUESTION.
Pro
test organizer liability—Unsettled state-law liability—Certifca-
tion to Louisiana Supreme Court.—Under unusual circumstances of this
case, Fifth Circuit should not have ventured into such an uncertain area
of state tort law without frst using state certifcation procedures to seek
guidance from Louisiana Supreme Court. Mckesson v. Doe, p. 1.
CIVIL LIABILITY. See Certifed Question.
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT. See Immunity from Suit.
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING. See Federal Jurisdiction.
COVID–19 RESTRICTIONS. See Preliminary In junctions.
DELAWARE. See Article III Standing.
DOMESTIC TAKINGS RULE. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.
EIGHTH AMENDMENT. See Immunity from Suit.
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974.
ERISA pre-emption rejected—State PBM reimbursement rules up-
held—Act 900 sustained.—Arkansas' Act 900—which effectively requires
pharmacy beneft managers to reimburse Arkansas pharmacies for cost of
drugs covered by prescription-drug plans at a price equal to or higher than
pharmacy's wholesale cost—is not pre-empted by Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974. Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Manage-
ment Assn., p. 80.
EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT. See Riparian Rights.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION.
Apportionment dispute unripe—Jurisdiction lacking—Vacatur and re-
mand ordered.—Because plaintiffs have not shown standing and because
claims presented are not ripe for adjudication, District Court's judgment
is vacated, and case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. Trump v. New York, p. 125.
FIRST AMENDMENT. See Certifed Question.
FIRST AMENDMENT. See Preliminary In junctions.
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT.
Domestic takings rule controls—FSIA expropriation exception inap-
plicable—Jurisdiction barred.—Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's ex-
propriation exception, 28 U. S. C. § 1605(a)(3), incorporates domestic tak-
ings rule, which recognizes that a foreign sovereign's taking of its own

INDEX xi
FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT—Continued.
nationals' property is not a violation of international law. Federal Repub-
l
ic of Germany v. Philipp, p. 169.
Domestic takings rule controls—FSIA expropriation exception inap-
plicable—Jurisdiction barred.—Judgment vacated and case remanded to
District of Columbia Circuit for further proceedings consistent with Fed-
eral Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U. S. 169 (2021). Republic of
Hungary v. Simon, p. 207.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION. See Preliminary In junctions.
HABEAS CORPUS. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996.
HEALTH CARE COSTS. See Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974.
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
Obvious cruelty defeats immunity—Extreme conditions of con fne-
ment—Summary reversal granted.—Because any reasonable correctional
offcer should have realized that inmate Taylor's conditions of confnement
offended Eighth Amendment, Fifth Circuit erred in granting offcers qual-
ifed immunity. Taylor v. Riojas, p. 7.
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY LIABILITY OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS.
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. See Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
INTERSTATE COMPACTS. See Riparian Rights.
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS. See Article III Standing.
J U DICI A L REV I EW. See Un it ed St at es Ra i l road Reti rement
Board.
LOUISIANA. See Certifed Question.
MILITARY COURTS. See Uniform Code of Military Justice.
MONEY DAMAGES. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993.
NEW MEXICO. See Riparian Rights.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. See Riparian Rights.
PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS. See Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974.

xii INDEX
PRE-EMPTION OF STATE REGULATIONS. See Employee Retire-
ment
Income Security Act of 1974.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS.
Worship capacity caps enjoined—Free Exercise strict scrutiny—Irrep-
arable harm shown.—Respondent is enjoined from enforcing Executive
Order 202.68's 10- and 25-person occupancy limits on Applicant pending
disposition of appeal in Second Circuit and disposition of petition for a writ
of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, p. 14.
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS. See Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974.
PRISONER RIGHTS. See Immunity from Suit.
PROTESTS. See Certifed Question.
PUBLIC HEALTH ORDERS. See Preliminary In junctions.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY. See Immunity from Suit.
RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT OF 1974. See United States Rail-
road Retirement Board.
RA I LROA D U N EM PLOY MEN T INSU RA NCE ACT. See Un it ed
States Railroad Retirement Board.
RAPE. See Uniform Code of Military Justice.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993.
RFRA damages remedy recognized—Indiv idual-capaci ty liabili ty
available—Text and history control.—Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993's express remedies provision, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb–1(c), per-
mits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages against federal
offcials in their individual capacities. Tanzin v. Tanvir, p. 43.
REMEDIES. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.
RESTITUTION CLAIMS. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
RETIREMENT BENEFITS. See United States Railroad Retire-
ment Board.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
Pecos River credit resolved—Special Master affrmed—No additional
relief.—Texas's motion to review Pecos River Master's determination—
that New Mexico was entitled to a delivery credit for evaporated water
stored at Texas's request under Pecos River Compact—is denied. Texas
v. New Mexico, p. 98.

INDEX xiii
RIPENESS. See Article III Standing.
RI
PENESS. See Federal Jurisdiction.
SECTION 1983. See Immunity from Suit.
SECURED CREDITORS. See Bankruptcy Law.
SEXUAL ASSAULT. See Uniform Code of Military Justice.
SPECIAL MASTER. See Riparian Rights.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Article III Standing.
STATE REGULATION. See Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974.
STATE TORT LAW. See Certifed Question.
STAT U T E OF LI M I TATIONS. See Un ifor m Code of M i l it ar y
Justice.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. See Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993.
SUPREME COURT.
1. Notice of death of Justice Ginsburg, p. v.
2. Appointment of Rebecca A. Womeldorf as Reporter of Decisions,
p. vii.
TEXAS. See Riparian Rights.
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.
No time bar for rape—UCMJ prosecutions revived—Convictions rein-
stated.—Respondents' prosecutions for military rape were timely com-
menced under Uniform Code of Military Justice's statute of limitations.
United States v. Briggs, p. 69.
UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD.
RRB reopening decisions reviewable—Judicial review available—Re-
mand to the Board.—United States Railroad Retirement Board's denial of
a request to reopen a prior benefts determination under Railroad Retire-
ment Act of 1974 and Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act is subject to
judicial review. Salinas v. Railroad Retirement Bd., p. 188.

TABLE OF CA SES REPORTED
(Vol. 592 U. S., Part 1)
Notes:
This volume provides the permanent United States Reports citation for
all reported cases. Cases reported before page 901 are those decided
with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on
page 901 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Although the
Table of Cases Reported does not list orders denying a petition for writ
of certiorari, such orders are included chronologically in this volume.
The syllabus in a case constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court
but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience
of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200
U. S. 321, 337 (1906).
A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in a reported case, and who
were members of the Court's Bar at the time the case was argued, are
included in the United States Reports along with the Court's opinion in
the case.
Page
A.; A. I. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Abbott; Planned Parenthood Center for Choice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Abutaleb v. Abutaleb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Adams; Carney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Adams & Boyle, P. C.; Slatery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Administrator of penal or correctional institution. See name or
title of administrator.
Agudath Israel of America v. Cuomo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
A. I. v. M. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Akel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168,1261
Akers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Alamu; McCoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259
Alaska Native Village Corp. Assn. v. Confederated Tribes . . . . . . 1163
Albritton v. Brnovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Alcaraz-Enriquez; Rosen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Alford, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1196
Allen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Allen v. Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
xv

xvi T
ABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Allen v. Mine .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Alston; American Athletic Conference v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156,1166
Alston; National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156,1166
American Athletic Conference v. Alston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156,1166
American College of Obstetricians; FDA v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1196
AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Comm'n . . . 908,1084
Archer & White Sales, Inc.; Henry Schein, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 168,909
Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1085,1166
Arthrex, Inc.; Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1085,1165
Arthrex, Inc.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1165
Arunachalam, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1085
Assistant Clerk, Super. Ct. of N. C., Buncombe Cty.; Womack v. 1138
Atkins v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Allen v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Allen v. Total Visa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Allen v. Tri-Lift North Carolina, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Allison; Duran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Allred v. Uttecht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Ally Financial Inc. v. Haskins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
American Medical Assn. v. Cochran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Ames; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Ames v. HSBC Bank, USA, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Ammar I. v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Amos v. Bowen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Amtrak; Goodwine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Anaya, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Anderson v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Anderson v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Andino v. Middleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Annett Holdings, Inc.; Ellerbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Apple, Inc.; Arunachalam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Arana-Molina v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. . . . . . . 1094
Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic National Committee . . . 1234
Arkansas v. Gresham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1166
Arkansas Teacher Ret. System; Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. . . . 1144
Arnold; Ranteesi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Arunachalam v. Apple, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Arunachalam v. Presidio Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Arunachalam v. SAP America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Arunachalam v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Aspen Pitkin County Housing Authority; Mulcahy v. . . . . . . . . . . 1194

T
ABLE OF CASES REPORTED
xvii
Page
Attorney General; Arana-Molina v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Barnes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1139
Beggs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1300
Berks County, Pa.; Smiles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Bernards Township Planning Bd.; Barth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Attorney General; Benavides v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Attorney General v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Attorney General; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Attorney General; Heidari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Attorney General of Ariz.; Albritton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Attorney General of Ariz. v. Democratic National Committee . . . 1234
Attorney General of Cal.; Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. 1162
Attorney General of Cal.; Thomas More Law Center v. . . . . . . . . 1162
Attorney General of Tenn. v. Adams & Boyle, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md.; Rheinstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Azar v. Gresham. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1166
Azar v. Philbrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1166
Azeez v. West Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Bailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Ball v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Banco Santander Puerto Rico; Rosado-Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Bank of America, N. A.; Sachs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Bank of New York Mellon; Ruttkamp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Banks v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Baptiste v. Koenig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Barnes v. Dowling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Barr; Arana-Molina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Barr; Benavides v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Barr v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Barr; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Barr; Heidari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Barth v. Bernards Township Planning Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
BASF; Kitchen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Baskin; Hadsell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Baylor; Petrano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Becerra; Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Becerra; Thomas More Law Center v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Becker; Holmes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Belanus v. Dutton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Benavides v. Barr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Benitez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Bennett; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Bennett v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Berger v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071

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Berry, In re .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Berry v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Beshear; Danville Christian Academy, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Bey v. Doughtery Cty. State Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Biden v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Biden v. Sierra Club . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234,1243
Biden; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Bishop; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
B. L.; Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Boockvar; Republican Party of Pa. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1068
Buxton v. Dougherty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259
By Design Furniture; Dutta-Roy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Blacher v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Blancas, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Blaszczak v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Bogan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Bombardier Recreational Products Inc.; Arctic Cat Inc. v. . . . . . . 1094
Bonds; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Boockvar; Donald J. Trump for President Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Boockvar; Scarnati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Borden v. Swarthout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Boucher v. Lyons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Bowell v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Bowen; Amos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Bowman v. Boyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Boyd; Bowman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
BP p. l. c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Bracken, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Bradford, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Braunstein v. Braunstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Briggs; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Britton-Harr, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Brnovich; Albritton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Brown v. Davenport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Brown v. Department of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Brown; Lynn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Brown; Stubblefeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Brownlee v. Capozza. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Brumbley; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Brun; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Brzowski v. Executive Committee of the U. S. District Court . . . 1154
Buchanan; Vance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Burnside v. Rewerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195

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Cabello v. United States .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1148
Cain; Lavergne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Calhoun v. Florida Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
California; Biden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
California; Blacher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
California; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
California; Gutierrez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
California; Hanna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
California; Harrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
California; Lange v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1065,1113,1234
California; McColm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
California; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
California Contractors State License Bd.; Dummer v. . . . . . . . . . 1111
California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation; Dunigan v. . . 1259
California Dept. of Industrial Relations; Drevaleva v. . . . . . . . . . 1299
Calmese, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Calton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,911
Calton v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Cameron v. Walrath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Campbell v. Bennett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Caniglia v. Strom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Capiro; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Capozza; Brownlee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Cargill, Inc. v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Carmell v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Carney v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Carr v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1166
Carrasco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Carrier v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Castro; Henry-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Caterbone v. Lancaster Cty. Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083,1167
Caterbone v. National Security Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,1104
Catron; Van Auken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Cattail Creek Community Assn.; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Cave v. Delta Dental of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Cean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1225
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094,1122
Centene Corp.; Stone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Cesspooch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Chades, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Charlton; Coppedge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Chavez; Pham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Chicago v. Fulton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

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Chief Justice, Sup. Ct. of U. S.; Kuang-Bao Ou-Young v. .
. . . . . . 1226
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner.
Commissioner of Social Security; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1119
Commissioner of Social Security; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1166
Commissioner of Social Security; Hilliard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1166
Cooley; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112,1218
Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner.
Chief Justice, Sup. Ct. of U. S.; Yi Tai Shao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Chief of Police, City of Carlsbad, Cal.; Diggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Cho v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Christian v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1217
Chukwuani v. Solon City School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Circosta; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Circosta; Wise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Cirota v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash.; Trump v. . . . . . . 1233
City. See name of city.
City of Jackson, Miss.; Felton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Clark v. Fye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Clerk, Circuit Court of Ill., Cook Cty.; Stubblefeld v. . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Cochran; American Medical Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Cochran v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Cochran; Oregon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Collier; Valentine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Collins; Erickson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Collins v. Mnuchin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Collins; Mnuchin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Colorado; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Colorado; Carrier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc. . . . . . 1120
Comcast Corp. v. Viamedia, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Commissioner; Heffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Commissioner; Kannry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Commissioner of Social Security; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Commissioner of Social Security; Rumzis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Cone v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Conerly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Confederated Tribes; Alaska Native Village Corp. Assn. v. . . . . . 1163
Confederated Tribes; Mnuchin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Connecticut; Ammar I. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Continental Automotive Systems US, Inc.; Ukpai v. . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Coppedge v. Charlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Corbett; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Cortez; Curtin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999

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Costa Mesa Police Dept.; Lopez v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1122
Coughlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Coultas v. Tichenor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
County. See name of county.
Court of Appeal of Cal., First App. Dist.; Drevaleva v. . . . . . . . . 1299
Court of Appeal of Cal., Sixth App. Dist.; Sepehry-Fard v. . . 1233,1259
Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Hamilton Cty.; Simpson v. . . 1022,1149
Court of Common Pleas of Pa., Northampton Cty.; Scarborough v. 1111
Cox v. Texas Workforce Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Crayton v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Credit Bureau Center, LLC; Federal Trade Comm'n v. . . . . . . 908,1084
Crosby v. True . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083,1165
Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P. L. L. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Cuomo; Agudath Israel of America v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Cuomo; Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Curtin v. Cortez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Dahood; Lussy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Dai; Rosen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Dakota Cty. Social Services; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Danville Christian Academy, Inc. v. Beshear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Darden v. Fort Worth, Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Dauphin Cty. Social Services for Children and Youth; R. W. v. . . . 1194
Davenport; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Davis v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Davis; Jaime Jimenez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Davis v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1166
Dawson v. Pakenham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Day v. Watson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Deal; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Debera P. v. Maine Dept. of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . 1121
DeCarlo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Defense Finance and Accounting Service; Rizk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
de Jesus-Concepcion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Delaware; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Deloach; Pugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Delta Dental of Cal.; Cave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Demery, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Democratic National Committee; Arizona Republican Party v. . . . 1234
Democratic National Committee; Brnovich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature 1039
Deng, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Department of Ed.; Lan Tu Trinh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Department of Homeland Security v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262

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Department of Justice v. House Committee on the Judiciary .
. 909,1112
Department of Justice; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Robert R. McCormick Found. . . . . 909,1120
Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title
Department of Labor; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Department of Veterans Affairs; Shepard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.; Timbes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Diggs v. Gallucci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Diggs v. Shiomoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Director of California Dept. of Motor Vehicles; Diggs v. . . . . . . . . 1299
of director.
Director, United States Patent and Trademark Offce; Morsa v. 1094
District Court. See U. S. District Court.
District Judge. See U. S. District Judge.
Dizzley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104,1196
Duguid; Facebook, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Dumas; Thorpe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
DISH Network L. L. C. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
District Attorney of the County of New York; Trump v. . . . . . . . 1260
District of Columbia; Lattisaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
District of Columbia; S. O. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
District of Columbia; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Dixon v. Ames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Dobin; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
Dobson v. Stolle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Doe; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Doe; Cargill, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Doe; Mckesson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Doe; Nestlé USA, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Doe Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Donahue v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1085
Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Donald J. Trump for President v. Elkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Donald J. Trump for President v. Philadelphia Bd. of Elections 1167
Dougherty; Buxton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259
Doughtery Cty. State Court; Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Dowling; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Drevaleva v. California Dept. of Industrial Relations . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Drevaleva v. Court of Appeal of Cal., First Appellate Dist. . . . . . 1299
Drevaleva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1122
Driessen v. Miami-Dade County, Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Dubin v. Offce of Disciplinary Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Ducey; Taebel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Duffy; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138

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Dummer v. California Contractors State License Bd. .
. . . . . . . . . 1111
Fairchild-Littlefeld, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1118
Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169,1084
Federal Trade Comm'n; AMG Capital Management, LLC v. . . 908,1085
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC . . . . . . 908,1084
Florida; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1167
Florida Dept. of Corrections; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Foley; Sanderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Dunahue v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Dunigan v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . 1259
Dunn v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255,1258
Dupuy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Duran v. Allison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Dutta-Roy v. By Design Furniture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Dutta-Roy v. Jysk Bed'n Linen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Dutton; Belanus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Ebner Family Trust; Sancho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Edwards v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Eighth Judicial District Court of Nev., Clark County; Shawn v. 1300
Elansari, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Ellerbee v. Annett Holdings, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Ellerbee v. TMC Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Ellis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,1195
Erickson v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Esper; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Estevez; McClung v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Evans, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Evans v. Kahele . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Executive Committee of the U. S. District Court; Brzowski v. . . . 1154
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Felix, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Felton v. Jackson, Miss. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Findlay, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Fineman; Lan Tu Trinh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Finkelstein; Womack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
First Merchant's Bank; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Fishman; Markovic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Fleming; McNeal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Florida; Cone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Florida v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Florida; Ingraham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Florida; Safford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Florida Dept. of Corrections; Calhoun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225

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FDA v. American College of Obstetricians .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1196
Fort Worth, Tex.; Darden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Foster; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1261
Francisco Vega v. Poppell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Francois v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Frawley v. Frawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Frawley; Frawley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Friendship Pavilion Acquisition Co., LLC; Sundy v. . . . . . . . . . 994,1071
Fulton; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Fulton v. Philadelphia, Pa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Fye; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Gallucci; Diggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Garry v. Trane Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Gary; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163,1260
Gear v. Wisconsin State Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Georgia; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Georgia Secretary of State; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Ghazavi v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Gibson; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Gish v. Newsom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Glick v. Guiffrida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Gohmert v. Pence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Golden, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1138
Golden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Ret. System . . . 1144
Goodwine v. Amtrak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Governor of Ariz.; Taebel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Governor of Cal.; Gish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Governor of Cal.; Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1254
Governor of Cal.; South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. . . . . . 1243
Governor of Colo.; High Plains Harvest Church v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Governor of Ky.; Danville Christian Academy, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Governor of Mich.; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Governor of Nev.; Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Governor of N. J.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Governor of N. Y.; Agudath Israel of America v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Governor of Tex.; Planned Parenthood Center for Choice v. . . . . . 1232
Grant v. Roanoke, Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Gray; Jury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Greer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Greiner v. Macomb County, Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Gresham; Arkansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1166
Gresham; Azar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1166
Griffn; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111

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Guam v. United States .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1254
Hassid; Cedar Point Nursery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094,1122
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 168,909
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refning v. Renewable Fuels Assn. . . 999,1163
Hooker v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Guiffrida; Glick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Gurrola v. Walgreen Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Gutierrez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Gutierrez v. Saenz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Guzman Chavez; Pham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Hadsell v. Baskin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Hall v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Hall; Barr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Hall v. Inch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Hall; Vickery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Hanna v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Harrell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Harrington; Kehano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Hartke; Waldner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Haskins; Ally Financial Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Hayes v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Hayes; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Heffin v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Heghmann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Heidari v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Hendrix; Stinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Henning v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Henry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Henry-Bey v. Castro. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Hernandez v. PNMAC Mortgage Opportunity Fund Investors . . . . 1195
Herrera; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Heyman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Higgs; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
High Plains Harvest Church v. Polis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Hill; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Hill v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Hilliard v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1166
Hollie v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Hollihan v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Holmes v. Becker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Hologic, Inc.; Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Honn; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Hoon; M. S. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908

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Horton v. Methodist University, Inc. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
House Committee on the Judiciary; Department of Justice v. . . 909,1112
Horton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Hotels.com, L. P.; San Antonio, Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Howell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
HSBC Bank, USA, N. A.; Ames v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Hudson v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Hughes v. Northwestern Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Huntington Hospital; Oyibo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Hyun Cho v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
I. v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
I. v. M. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Jimenez v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1072
Iancu; Morsa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
IAW; Mam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Illinois; Hooker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Illinois; Mrazek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Illinois; Wanke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Image Processing Technologies LLC; United States v. . . . . . . . . . 990
Immigration and Customs Enforcement v. Padilla . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Inch; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Inch; Cirota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Inch; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Inch; LaGasse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Inch; Newson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Inch; Reilly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Inch; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Inch; Wheeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Inch; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Ingraham v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Innovation Law Lab; Mayorkas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243
Innovation Law Lab; Wolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243
Jackson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Jackson v. Brun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Jackson v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,1122
Jackson; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Jaffe v. Sherman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Jaime Jimenez v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Jenkins v. Florida Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Jenkins v. O'Rourke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Jernigan v. Wilkie
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Jha v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909

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Johnson v. Gibson .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Johnson v. Marlar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Johnson v. Performant Recovery, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Johnson v. Rosen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Johnson v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Jones, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,912,1122
Jones v. Brumbley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Jones v. Capiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Jones v. Lamar Co., LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Jones; Latimer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Jones v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Jones v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Jones; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Jordan; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Judge; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Judge; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Judge, Superior Court of Ariz., Cochise Cty; Erickson v. . . . . . . . 1225
Jung Hyun Cho v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Jury v. Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Jysk Bed'n Linen; Dutta-Roy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Kahele; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Kandulski; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Kannry v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Karupaiyan v. New York City Dept. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Kayer; Shinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Kehano v. Harrington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Keller, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1261
Kelley; Dunahue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Kelley v. Herrera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Kelly v. Bishop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Kelly v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1166
Kelly-Leppert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Kelly Services, Inc.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Kennection Installation, LLC; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Khera; Sameer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Kilroy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
King v. Whitmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Kirk v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Kitchen v. BASF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Koch; Rounds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Koehl, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1154
Koenig; Baptiste v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Kong-Brown; Li Qin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154

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Kuang-Bao Ou-Young v. Roberts .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
L.; Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
LaFlamme v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
LaGasse v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Lamar Co., LLC; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Lambert v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Lancaster v. Los Angeles, Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Lancaster Cty. Prison; Caterbone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083,1167
Lange v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1065,1113,1234
Lan Tu Trinh v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Lan Tu Trinh v. Fineman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
LaRosa; Pidanick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149,1218
Latimer v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Lattisaw v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Laurent; PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Laux v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Lavergne v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Lee; Polidi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Lincoln Cty. Jail; Stringer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Lingfei Sun v. New York, New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Linsangan v. Taijeron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Li Qin v. Kong-Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Li Qin v. 99 Cents Only Stores, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Liverman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Livingston v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1122
Liviz v. Supreme Judicial Court of Mass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Lopez v. Costa Mesa Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1122
Lopez v. Newport Beach Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1122
Lopez; Soro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1113
Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Los Angeles, Cal.; Lancaster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Los Angeles County, Cal.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Lotersztain; Witkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Louisiana; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Louisiana v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Louisiana; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Louisiana; Lambert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Louisiana; Mayeux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Louisiana; Ruffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Louisiana State Bd. of Nursing; McQueary-Layne v. . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Lout v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Lumpkin; Carmell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Lumpkin; Crayton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Lumpkin; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261

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Lumpkin; LaFlamme v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Lumpkin; Matthews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Lumpkin; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Lumpkin; Staples v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Lumpkin; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Lumpkin; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Lumpkin; Talkington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Lumpkin; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259
Luquin-Coronel v. Rosen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Lussy v. Dahood. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Lussy v. Lussy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Lynn v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Lyons; Boucher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
M. A.; A. I. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Macomb County, Mich.; Greiner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Maine Dept. of Health and Human Services; Debera P. v. . . . . . . 1121
Malftano; McAllister v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Mam v. IAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Manuel Torres v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Marcotte; Weixing Wang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Marcus v. Marcus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Markovic v. Fishman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Markovic v. Rahaman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Marlar; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Marvel Entertainment, LLC; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Marvin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Masiz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
Massachusetts; New Hampshire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Mathis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Matthews v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Matylinsky, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
May; Williamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Mayeux v. Louisiana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Mayfeld; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore; BP p. l. c. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore; Cochran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore; Yang Mei v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Mayorkas v. Innovation Law Lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1243
McAllister v. Malftano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
McClung v. Estevez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
McColm v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
McCoy v. Alamu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259

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McDonald; Shove v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Mohammed, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1023
Montgomery v. Watson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Moore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1154
McGill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
McIntyre; Rodgers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
McKay; Rynn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
McKenzie, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Mckesson v. Doe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
McNeal v. Fleming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
McQueary-Layne v. Louisiana State Bd. of Nursing . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
McWhorter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Mei v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Mentor Worldwide, LLC; Laux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Mercer v. Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Merrill, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Merrill, Ala. Secretary of State v. People First of Ala. . . . . . . . . . 1035
Methodist University, Inc.; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Meyer; Rangel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Miami-Dade County, Fla.; Driessen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Michael, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Michigan Attorney Grievance Comm'n; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Middleton; Andino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Miller v. Deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Miller v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Mine; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Ming Dai; Rosen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Minh Van Truong; Tan Phan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Mississippi; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Mississippi; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Mississippi v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Mitchell v. Dakota County Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Mnuchin v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Mnuchin; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Mnuchin v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation . . . 1163
Monds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Montana; Lout v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Montana v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Montano, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Montano v. Oakland County Circuit Court Judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Montano v.
Wimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Montgomery; Rosen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Montgomery; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206

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Moore; Allen v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Moore v. Circosta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Morabito v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Morsa v. Iancu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Moynihan v. West Chester Area School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Mrazek v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
M. S. v. Hoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Mulcahy v. Aspen Pitkin County Housing Authority . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Muniz; Risenhoover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Murphy; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Myers v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Narayan v. Prasad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
National Assn. of Broadcasters v. Prometheus Radio Project . . . 1162
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Alston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156,1166
National Security Agency; Caterbone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,1104
National Urban League; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Nebraska; Livingston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1122
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Netfix, Inc.; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
New Hampshire v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
New Jersey; PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243
New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98,1085,1113
Newport Beach Police Dept.; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1122
Newsom; Gish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Newsom; Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1254
Newsom; South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243
Newson v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
New York; Department of Homeland Security v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
New York; Morabito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
New York; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125,1022,1112
New York City Dept. of Ed.; Karupaiyan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
New York, New York; Lingfei Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
New York State Offce of Children and Family Services; Sykes v. 1023
Nguyen Vu v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
99 Cents Only Stores, LLC; Li Qin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
N'Jai, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
North Carolina; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
North Carolina; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
North Carolina State Bd. of Elections; Berger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Northwestern Univ.; Hughes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
O. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Oakland County Circuit Court Judge; Montano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Oberwise, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023

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O'Connor; Pelmear v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Offce of Disciplinary Counsel; Dubin v.
Oklahoma; Christian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1217
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Oklahoma; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Oklahoma; Yerton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Olan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Oliver v. Oliver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Oliver; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Omaha School Dist.; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Ononuju v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Oregon v. Cochran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
O'Rourke; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Osornio, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Oyibo v. Huntington Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
P. v. Maine Dept. of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Palomar-Santiago; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163,1260
Pearson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167,1255
Pennsylvania; Donahue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1085
Pennsylvania; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1166
Philadelphia Law Dept.; Polites v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Padilla; Immigration and Customs Enforcement v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Pakenham; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Palumbo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1148
Patti, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Payne; Pinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Pecina v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Pelletier, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Pelmear v. O'Connor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Pence; Gohmert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243
Pennsylvania; Hollihan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Pennsylvania; Nguyen Vu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Pennsylvania; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
People First of Ala.; Merrill, Ala. Secretary of State v. . . . . . . . . 1035
Pepke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Performant Recovery, Inc.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Perry v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Petrano v. Baylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Pham v. Guzman Chavez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Pham v. Ragbir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Phan v. Minh Van Truong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn.; Rutledge v. . . . . . . . . . 80
Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn.; Wilke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259
Philadelphia, Pa.; Fulton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908

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Philbrick; Azar v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Philipp; Federal Republic of Germany v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169,1084
President of United States v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1234,1243
President of United States v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125,1022,1112
President of United States v. Sierra Club . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1234,1243
Real, U. S. District Judge; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Reeves v. Esper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Phillips; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Pidanick v. LaRosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149,1218
Pinney v. Payne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Planned Parenthood Center for Choice v. Abbott . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
PNMAC Mortgage Opportunity Fund Investors; Hernandez v. . . 1195
Polidi v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Polis; High Plains Harvest Church v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Polites v. Philadelphia Law Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Poppell; Francisco Vega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Prasad; Narayan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Preczewski; Uzuegbunam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Premier Rehab Keller, P. L. L. C.; Cummings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
President of United States v. Citizens for Responsibility . . . . . . . 1233
President of United States v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
President of United States; Manuel Torres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
President of United States v. San Jose, Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
President of United States v. Useche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
President of United States; Weidrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Presiding Judge, Okla. Court of Criminal Appeals; White v. . . . . 1259
Presidio Bank; Arunachalam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Laurent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Prometheus Radio Project; Federal Communications Comm'n v. 1162
Prometheus Radio Project; National Assn. of Broadcasters v. . . . 1162
Pugh v. Deloach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Qin v. Kong-Brown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Qin v. 99 Cents Only Stores, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Raffensperger; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Ragbir; Pham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Raghubir, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Rahaman; Markovic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Railroad Retirement Bd.; Salinas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Raively v. Whelihan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Ramirez; TransUnion LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Ramsey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Rangel v. Meyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Ranteesi v. Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Raymond v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194

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Page
Reilly v. Inch .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Renewable Fuels Assn.; HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refning v. . . 999,1163
Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1068
Republic of Hungary v. Simon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207,1085
Rewerts; Burnside v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Rheinstein v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Richards, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Richardson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Richardson; Kirk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Richardson v. Omaha School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Riley v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Riojas; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Risenhoover v. Muniz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Rith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Rizk v. Defense Finance and Accounting Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Roanoke, Va.; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Robert R. McCormick Found.; Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. . . . 909,1120
Roberts; Kuang-Bao Ou-Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Roberts; Yi Tai Shao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Robertson v. Honn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Robinson v. Kandulski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Robinson v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Robles v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1167
Rodgers v. McIntyre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Romain, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167,1168,1261
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Rope, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1195
Rosado-Sanchez v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Rose v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Rosen v. Alcaraz-Enriquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Rosen; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Rosen; Luquin-Coronel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Rosen v. Ming Dai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Rosen v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Ross v. National Urban League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Rounds v. Koch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Routten v. Routten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Rovi Guides, Inc.; Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. . . . . . 1120
Rudolph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Ruffn v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Rumzis v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn. . . . . . . . . . . 80
Ruttkamp v. Bank of New York Mellon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
R. W. v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth 1194

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Rynn v. McKay.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
S. v. Hoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Saul; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1166
Secretary of Health and Human Servs. v. Gresham . . . . . . . . 1126,1166
Secretary of Health and Human Servs v. Philbrick . . . . . . . . 1121,1166
Secretary of penal or correctional institution. See name or title
of secretary.
Secretary of Pa.; Republican Party of Pa. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1068
Secretary of Pa.; Scarnati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Secretary of Treasury v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Sachs v. Bank of America, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Saenz; Gutierrez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Safford v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
St. Hubert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Salahuddin v. Shinn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Salinas v. Railroad Ret. Bd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Sameer v. Khera. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
San Antonio, Tex. v. Hotels.com, L. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Sanchez v. Real, U. S. District Judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Sanchez v. Wolf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Sancho v. Ebner Family Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Sanders v. Foster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1261
Sanderson v. Foley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
San Jose, Cal.; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
SAP America, Inc.; Arunachalam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Sarhan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Satterfeld, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Saul; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Saul; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Saul; Hilliard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Saul; Rumzis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Sayed v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Scarborough v. Court of Common Pleas of Pa., Northampton Cty. 1111
Scarnati v. Boockvar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Schiff, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
Scyphers v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Seadin v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Sealed Appellee; Sealed Appellant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Secretary, Fla. Dept. of Children and Families; Francisco Vega v. 1083
Secretary of Commerce v. National Urban League . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Secretary of Defense; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Secretary of Homeland Security v. Innovation Law Lab . . . . . . . 1243
Secretary of Pa.; Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1167

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Secretary of Treasury; Collins v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Robles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1167
Simon; Republic of Hungary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207,1084
Smith, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1261
Smith; Dunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255,1258
Smith v. Los Angeles Cty., Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Secretary of Treasury v. Confederated Tribes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Hollie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Jernigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Pecina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Seidman v. Weiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.; Jung Hyun Cho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Sepehry-Fard v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Sixth App. Dist. . . . 1233,1259
Shah, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Shahin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Shao v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Shaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Shawn v. Eighth Judicial District Court of Nev., Clark Cty. . . . . . 1300
Shepard v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Sherer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Sherman; Jaffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Shinn v. Kayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Shinn; Salahuddin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Shiomoto; Diggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Shong-Ching Tong v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles Cty. 1164
Shove v. McDonald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Shumake v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Sierra Club; Biden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Sierra Club; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Simpson v. Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Hamilton Cty. . . 1022,1149
Sims, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Singhderewa v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles Cty. . . . . . . 1218
Sisolak; Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Skidmore v. Zeppelin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Slatery v. Adams & Boyle, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Smiles v. Berks County, Pa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Smith v. Dobin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
Smith v. Hayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Smith v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Smith v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Smith v. Kelly Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Smith v. Mayfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905

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Smith v. North Carolina .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Smith; Twitty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Smith v. United States Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Smith v. Warden, Federal Correctional Institution Beaumont . . . 1300
Smith v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1085,1165
Smith & Nephew, Inc.; Arthrex, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1085,1166
Smith-Weeks v. United States Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
S. O. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Solon City School Dist.; Chukwuani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Soro v. Lopez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1113
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243
Sowell v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Spaulding, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Spencer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Staples v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Starling, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1196
State Bar of Cal.; Bowell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Steele v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Stefanyuk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Stewart v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Stewart; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Stinson v. Hendrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Stolle; Dobson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Stone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Stone v. Centene Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Storms; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Stringer v. Lincoln Cty. Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Strom; Caniglia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Strother, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Stubblefeld v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Sun v. New York, New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Sundy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Sundy v. Friendship Pavilion Acquisition Co., LLC . . . . . . . . . 994,1071
Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or
title of superintendent.
Superior Ct. of Cal., Los Angeles Cty.; Shong-Ching Tong v. . . . . 1164
Superior Ct. of Cal., Los Angeles Cty.; Singhderewa v. . . . . . . . . 1218
Supreme Judicial Court of Mass.; Liviz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Swarthout; Borden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Swenson v. Wisconsin State Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Sykes v. New York State Offce of Children and Family Services 1023
Taebel v. Ducey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Taijeron; Linsangan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233

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Page
Tai Shao v. Roberts .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Talbert, In re
True; Crosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083,1165
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Talkington v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Talley v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Tanamor-Steffan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Tan Phan v. Minh Van Truong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Tanvir; Tanzin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Tanzin v. Tanvir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Taylor v. Riojas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Telfair, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Tennessee; Mississippi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Territory. See name of Territory.
Terry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163,1261
Texas; Calton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98,1072,1113
Texas v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Texas; Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Texas Workforce Comm'n; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Thomas v. Corbett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Thomas More Law Center v. Becerra. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Thompson v. Cattail Creek Community Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Thompson v. Griffn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Thorpe v. Dumas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Tichenor; Coultas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1299
Timbes v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP; Sowell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
TMC Transportation; Ellerbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Tona v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Torres v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Total Visa; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Trane Co.; Garry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Treantos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Tri-Lift North Carolina, Inc.; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Trinh v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Trinh v. Fineman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Trump v. Biden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Trump v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Trump v. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. . . . . . . 1233
Trump v. Dist. of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Trump; Manuel Torres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Trump v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125,1022,1112

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Trump v. San Jose, Cal. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Trump v. Sierra Club . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Trump v. Useche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Trump v. Vance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Trump; Weidrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Truong; Tan Phan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Tu Trinh v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Tu Trinh v. Fineman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Twitty v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Tyler v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Ukpai v. Continental Automotive Systems US, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Underwood, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
United States v. Briggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
United States v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
United States v. Daniels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
U. S. Congressman; Jafte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
U. S. Congressman v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1166
U. S. District Court; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
U. S. District Court; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
U. S. District Court; Raymond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
U. S. District Court; Talley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
U. S. District Court; Vinkov v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
U. S. District Court; Wilkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Virginia; Shumake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Vu v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
United States Parole Comm'n; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Useche; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Uttecht; Allred v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Valentine v. Collier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Van Auken v. Catron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Vance v. Buchanan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Vance; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Vannoy; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Van Truong; Tan Phan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Vega; Mercer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Vega v. Poppell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Viamedia, Inc.; Comcast Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Vice President of United States; Gohmert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Vickery v.
Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Vinkov v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Virginia; Ghazavi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Virginia; Ononuju v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990

xl T
ABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
W. v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth .
. . 1194
Waldner v. Hartke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Walgreen Co.; Gurrola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Walrath; Cameron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Walton v. First Merchant's Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Wang v. Marcotte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Wanke v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Ward, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Ward v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Ward v. Michigan Attorney Grievance Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Warden. See name of warden.
Warden, Federal Correctional Institution Beaumont; Smith v. . . . 1300
Warren v. Kennection Installation, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Washington v. Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Washington; Montana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Washington; Scyphers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Woods v. . . . . 1111
Waters v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Watkins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Watson; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Watson; Montgomery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Weidrick v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Weiler; Seidman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Weissert, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Weixing Wang v. Marcotte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Arunachalam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Berry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Yazdchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
West Chester Area School Dist.; Moynihan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
West Va.; Azeez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Wheeler v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Whelihan; Raively v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
White v. Lumpkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259
Whitehead v. Netfix, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Whitmer; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Wilcox, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Wilke v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259
Wilkie; Hollie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Wilkie; Jernigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Wilkie; Pecina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Wilkie; Robles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1167
Wilkie; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Wilkins v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Wilkinson; Francois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226

T
ABLE OF CASES REPORTED
xli
Page
Williams, In re .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Wolf, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1154
Wright, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1085,1234
Ybarra, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1139
Young, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1154
Zimmermann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
Williams v. Duffy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Williams v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Williams; Sayed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Williams; Seadin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Williamson v. May . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Wilson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1167
Wilson; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Wilson v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Wilson v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Wimmer; Montano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Wisconsin; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Wisconsin Elections Comm'n; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Wisconsin State Legislature; Democratic National Committee v. 1039
Wisconsin State Legislature; Gear v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Wisconsin State Legislature; Swenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Wise v. Circosta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Witkin v. Lotersztain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Wolf; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Womack v. Finkelstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Wood v. Raffensperger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Wooden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Woods, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Woods v. Storms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Woods v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority . . . . . 1111
Woolsey-Ross, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Wren, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Yang Mei v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242
Yazdchi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260
Yerton v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
Yi Tai Shao v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
YoungBear, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Zeppelin; Skidmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Zimmer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910

CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2020
MCKESSON v. DOE
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the fth circuit
No. 19–1108. Decided November 2, 2020
Petitioner DeRay Mckesson organized a demonstration at a Baton Rouge
police station to protest a shooting. The protest spread to a highway
in front of the police station, and an unidentifed protester threw an
object that struck respondent Offcer Doe in the face, causing him devas-
tating injuries. Offcer Doe sought to recover damages from Mckesson
under Louisiana law on the theory that Mckesson negligently staged the
protest that resulted in the assault. The District Court dismissed Doe's
negligence claim as barred by the First Amendment, but a divided Fifth
Circuit panel reversed. While recognizing that Louisiana law generally
imposes no duty to protect others from the criminal activities of third
persons, the panel majority held that a jury could plausibly fnd that
Mckesson breached his “duty not to negligently precipitate the crime of
a third party” because “a violent confrontation with a police offcer was
a foreseeable effect of negligently directing a protest” onto the highway.
945 F. 3d 818, 827. The panel majority also rejected Mckesson's argu-
ment that NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, forbids
liability for speech-related activity that negligently causes a violent act
unless the defendant specifcally intended that result. Because Mckes-
son allegedly directed an unlawful obstruction of a highway, the Fifth
Circuit held that the First Amendment did not shield Mckesson from
liability for the downstream consequences.
1

2M
CKESSON v. DOE
Per Curiam
Held: The question presented—whether the theory of state tort liability
adopted
by the Fifth Circuit violates the First Amendment—turns on
novel questions of state law that the Fifth Circuit should have certifed
to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Mckesson contends that his role in
leading the protest onto the highway, even if negligent, cannot make
him personally liable for the violent act of an individual whose only
association with him was attendance at the protest. This undeniably
important constitutional issue is implicated only if Louisiana law per-
mits recovery under these circumstances. The dispute thus could be
“greatly simplife[d]” by guidance from the Louisiana Supreme Court on
the meaning of Louisiana law. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 151.
The Rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court permit federal courts to
certify dispositive questions of Louisiana law for resolution. La. Sup.
Ct. Rule 12, §§ 1–2. While certifcation in the face of unsettled state
law is discretionary, Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U. S. 386, 391, cer-
tifcation is advisable before addressing a constitutional issue in an ex-
ceptional case like this one, see Bellotti, 428 U. S., at 151, for two rea-
sons. First, the dispute presents novel issues of state law peculiarly
calling for the exercise of judgment by the state courts. See Lehman
Brothers, 416 U. S., at 391. Second, certifcation would ensure that any
confict in this case between state law and the First Amendment is not
purely hypothetical. The Fifth Circuit should not have ventured into
so uncertain an area of tort law—one laden with value judgments and
fraught with implications for First Amendment rights—without frst
seeking guidance on potentially controlling Louisiana law from the Loui-
siana Supreme Court.
Certiorari granted; 945 F. 3d 841, vacated and remanded.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner DeRay Mckesson organized a demonstration in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to protest a shooting by a local po-
lice offcer. The protesters, allegedly at Mckesson's direc-
tion, occupied the highway in front of the police headquar-
ters. As offcers began making arrests to clear the highway,
an unknown individual threw a “piece of concrete or a similar
rock-like object,” striking respondent Offcer Doe in the face.
945 F. 3d 818, 823 (CA5 2019). Offcer Doe suffered devas-
tating injuries in the line of duty, including loss of teeth and
brain trauma.
Though the cu lpr it remains unidentified, Officer Doe
sought to recover damages from Mckesson on the theory that

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 1 (2020)
3
Per Curiam
he negligently staged the protest in a manner that caused
the
assault. The District Court dismissed the negligence
claim as barred by the First Amendment. 272 F. Supp. 3d
841, 847–848 (MD La. 2017).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed. As the Fifth Circuit recognized at the outset,
Louisiana law generally imposes no “ `duty to protect others
from the criminal activities of third persons.' ” 945 F. 3d, at
827 (quoting Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999–1222, p. 5
(La. 11/30/99), 752 So. 2d 762, 766). But the panel majority
held that a jury could plausibly fnd that Mckesson breached
his “duty not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third
party” because “a violent confrontation with a police offcer
was a foreseeable effect of negligently directing a protest”
onto the highway. 945 F. 3d, at 827. The dissent would
have demanded something more—a “special relationship”
between Mckesson and Offcer Doe—before recognizing such
a duty under Louisiana law. Id., at 836–838, and n. 11 (Wil-
lett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dis-
sent likewise doubted that an intentional assault is the “par-
ticular risk” for which Offcer Doe could recover for a breach
of “Louisiana's prohibitions on highway-blocking,” which
“have as their focus the protection of other motorists.” Id.,
at 844, n. 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The panel majority also rejected Mckesson's argument
that NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886
(1982), forbids liability for speech-related activity that negli-
gently causes a violent act unless the defendant specifcally
intended that the violent act would result. According to the
Fifth Circuit, the First Amendment imposes no barrier to
tort liability so long as the rock-throwing incident was “one
of the `consequences' of `tortious activity,' which itself was
`authorized, directed, or ratifed' by Mckesson in violation
of his duty of care.” 945 F. 3d, at 829 (quoting Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U. S., at 927). Because Mckesson allegedly
directed an unlawful obstruction of a highway, see La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 14:97 (West 2018), the Fifth Circuit held that the

4M
CKESSON v. DOE
Per Curiam
First Amendment did not shield him from liability for the
d
ownstream consequences. 945 F. 3d, at 829. Again,
the dissent disagreed, deeming the “novel `negligent protest'
theory of l iabi l ity” to be “ i ncompatible w ith the First
Amendment and foreclosed—squarely—by” Claiborne Hard-
ware. 945 F. 3d, at 842 (opinion of Willett, J.).
The Fifth Circuit subsequently deadlocked 8 to 8 on Mc-
kesson's petition for rehearing en banc. 947 F. 3d 874, 875
(2020) (per curiam). Members of the Court of Appeals
wrote separately to express further disagreement with both
the panel decision's interpretation of state law, id., at 879
(Higginson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc),
and its application of Claiborne Hardware, 947 F. 3d, at 878
(Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
The question presented for our review is whether the the-
ory of personal liability adopted by the Fifth Circuit violates
the First Amendment. When violence occurs during activ-
ity protected by the First Amendment, that provision man-
dates “precision of regulation” with respect to “the grounds
that may give rise to damages liability” as well as “the per-
sons who may be held accountable for those damages.”
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U. S., at 916–917 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Mckesson contends that his role in
leading the protest onto the highway, even if negligent and
punishable as a misdemeanor, cannot make him personally
liable for the violent act of an individual whose only associa-
tion with him was attendance at the protest.
We think that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of state
law is too uncertain a premise on which to address the ques-
tion presented. The constitutional issue, though undeniably
important, is implicated only if Louisiana law permits recov-
ery under these circumstances in the frst place. The dis-
pute thus could be “greatly simplife[d]” by guidance from
the Louisiana Supreme Court on the meaning of Louisiana
law. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 151 (1976).
Fortunately, the Rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court,
like the rules of 47 other States, provide an opportunity to

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 1 (2020)
5
Per Curiam
obtain such guidance. In the absence of “clear controlling
precedents
in the decisions of the” Louisiana Supreme Court,
those Rules specify that the federal courts of appeals may
certify dispositive questions of Louisiana law on their own
accord or on motion of a party. La. Sup. Ct. Rule 12, §§ 1–
2 (2019). Certifcation is by no means “obligatory” merely
because state law is unsettled; the choice instead rests “in
the sound discretion of the federal court.” Lehman Broth-
ers v. Schein, 416 U. S. 386, 391 (1974). Federal courts have
only rarely resorted to state certifcation procedures, which
can prolong the dispute and increase the expenses incurred
by the parties. See id., at 394–395 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring). Our system of “cooperative judicial federalism” pre-
sumes federal and state courts alike are competent to apply
federal and state law. Id., at 391 (opinion of the Court); cf.
Taffin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455, 465 (1990).
In exceptional instances, however, certifcation is advis-
able before addressing a constitutional issue. See Bellotti,
428 U. S., at 151; Clay v. Sun Ins. Offce Ltd., 363 U. S. 207,
212 (1960). Two aspects of this case, taken together, per-
suade us that the Court of Appeals should have certifed to
the Louisiana Supreme Court the questions (1) whether Mc-
kesson could have breached a duty of care in organizing and
leading the protest and (2) whether Offcer Doe has alleged
a particular risk within the scope of protection afforded by
the duty, provided one exists. See 945 F. 3d, at 839 (opinion
of Willett, J.).
First, the dispute presents novel issues of state law pecu-
liarly calling for the exercise of judgment by the state
courts. See Lehman Brothers, 416 U. S., at 391. To impose
a duty under Louisiana law, courts must consider “various
moral, social, and economic factors,” among them “the fair-
ness of imposing liability,” “the historical development of
precedent,” and “the direction in which society and its insti-
tutions are evolving.” Posecai, 752 So. 2d, at 766. “Specu-
lation by a federal court about” how a state court would
weigh, for instance, the moral value of protest against the

6M
CKESSON v. DOE
Per Curiam
economic consequences of withholding liability “is particu-
lar
ly gratuitous when the state courts stand willing to ad-
dress questions of state law on certifcation.” Arizonans
for Offcial English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 79 (1997) (inter-
nal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Second, certifcation would ensure that any confict in this
case between state law and the First Amendment is not
purely hypothetical. The novelty of the claim at issue here
only underscores that “[w]arnings against premature adjudi-
cation of constitutional questions bear heightened attention
when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State's law.”
Ibid. The Louisiana Supreme Court, to be sure, may an-
nounce the same duty as the Fifth Circuit. But under the
unusual circumstances we confront here, we conclude that
the Fifth Circuit should not have ventured into so uncertain
an area of tort law—one laden with value judgments and
fraught with implications for First Amendment rights—
without frst seeking guidance on potentially controlling
Louisiana law from the Louisiana Supreme Court. We ex-
press no opinion on the propriety of the Fifth Circuit certify-
ing or resolving on its own any other issues of state law that
the parties may raise on remand.
We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari,
vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, and remand the case to that court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.
Justice Thomas dissents.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
7
Per Curiam
TAYLOR v. RIOJAS et al.
on
petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the fth circuit
No. 19–1261. Decided November 2, 2020
Petitioner Trent Taylor is an inmate in the custody of the Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice. Taylor alleges that, for six full days, correc-
tional offcers confned him to shockingly unsanitary cells. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit properly held that such conditions of
confnement violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. But, based on its assessment that “ [t]he law
wasn't clearly established” that “prisoners couldn't be housed in cells
teeming with human waste” for “only six days,” the court concluded
that the prison offcials responsible for Taylor's confnement did not have
fair warning that their specifc acts were unconstitutional.
Held: The Fifth Circuit erred in granting the offcers qualifed immunity.
“Qualifed immunity shields an offcer from suit when she makes a deci-
sion that, even if constitutionally defcient, reasonably misapprehends
the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 198 (per curiam). No reasonable correctional
offcer could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of
this case, the Constitution permits confning Taylor for six days under
the deplorably unsanitary conditions described. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U. S. 730, 741. The Fifth Circuit identifed no evidence that the condi-
tions of Taylor's confnement were compelled by necessity or exigency,
and the record reveals no reason to suspect that the conditions of Tay-
lor's confnement could not have been mitigated.
Certiorari granted; 946 F. 3d 211, reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner Trent Taylor is an inmate in the custody of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Taylor alleges that,
for six full days in September 2013, correctional offcers con-
fned him in a pair of shockingly unsanitary cells.
1
The frst
1
The Fifth Circuit accepted Taylor's “verifed pleadings [as] competent
evidence at summary judgment.” Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F. 3d 211, 221
(2019). As is appropriate at the summary-judgment stage, facts that are

8 T
AYLOR v. RIOJAS
Per Curiam
cell was covered, nearly foor to ceiling, in “ `massive
amounts'
of feces”: all over the foor, the ceiling, the window,
the walls, and even “ `packed inside the water faucet.' ”
Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F. 3d 211, 218 (CA5 2019). Fearing
that his food and water would be contaminated, Taylor did
not eat or drink for nearly four days. Correctional offcers
then moved Taylor to a second, frigidly cold cell, which was
equipped with only a clogged drain in the foor to dispose of
bodily wastes. Taylor held his bladder for over 24 hours,
but he eventually (and involuntarily) relieved himself, caus-
ing the drain to overfow and raw sewage to spill across the
foor. Because the cell lacked a bunk, and because Taylor
was confned without clothing, he was left to sleep naked
in sewage.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit properly held
that such conditi ons of confi nement vi olate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
But, based on its assessment that “[t]he law wasn't clearly
established” that “prisoners couldn't be housed in cells
teeming with human waste” “for only six days,” the court
concluded that the prison offcials responsible for Taylor's
confnement did not have “ `fair warning ' that their specifc
acts were unconstitutional.” 946 F. 3d, at 222 (quoting Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U. S. 730, 741 (2002)).
The Fifth Circuit erred in granting the offcers qualifed
immunity on this basis. “Qualifed immunity shields an of-
fcer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if con-
stitutionally defcient, reasonably misapprehends the law
governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam). But no rea-
sonable correctional offcer could have concluded that, under
the extreme circumstances of this case, it was constitution-
ally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsani-
subject to genuine dispute are viewed in the light most favorable to Tay-
lor's claim.

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 7 (2020)
9
Per Curiam
tary conditions for such an extended period of time. See
H
ope, 536 U. S., at 741 (explaining that “ `a general constitu-
tional rule already identifed in the decisional law may apply
with obvious clarity to the specifc conduct in question' ”
(quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 271 (1997)));
536 U. S., at 745 (holding that “[t]he obvious cruelty inher-
ent” in putting inmates in certain wantonly “degrading and
dangerous” situations provides offcers “with some notice
that their alleged conduct violate[s]” the Eighth Amend-
ment). The Fifth Circuit identifed no evidence that the
conditions of Taylor's confnement were compelled by neces-
sity or exigency. Nor does the summary-judgment record
reveal any reason to suspect that the conditions of Taylor's
confnement could not have been mitigated, either in degree
or duration. And although an offcer-by-offcer analysis will
be necessary on remand, the record suggests that at least
some offcers involved in Taylor's ordeal were deliberately
indifferent to the conditions of his cells. See, e. g., 946 F. 3d,
at 218 (one offcer, upon placing Taylor in the frst feces-
covered cell, remarked to another that Taylor was “ `going to
have a long weekend' ”); ibid., and n. 9 (another offcer, upon
placing Taylor in the second cell, told Taylor he hoped Taylor
would “ `f ***ing freeze' ”).
Confronted with the particularly egregious facts of this
case, any reasonable offcer should have realized that Tay-
lor's conditions of confnement offended the Constitution.
2
We therefore grant Taylor's petition for a writ of certiorari,
vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
2
In holding otherwise, the Fifth Circuit noted “ambiguity in the ca-
selaw” regarding whether “a time period so short [as six days] violated
the Constitution.” 946 F. 3d, at 222. But the case that troubled the Fifth
Circuit is too dissimilar, in terms of both conditions and duration of con-
fnement, to create any doubt about the obviousness of Taylor's right.
See Davis v. Scott, 157 F. 3d 1003, 1004 (1998) (no Eighth Amendment
violation where inmate was detained for three days in dirty cell and pro-
vided cleaning supplies).

10 T
AYLOR v. RIOJAS
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
Circuit, and remand the case for further proceedings consist-
ent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.
Justice Thomas dissents.
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment.
Because the Court has granted the petition for a writ of
certiorari, I will address the question that the Court has
chosen to decide. But I fnd it hard to understand why the
Court has seen ft to grant review and address that question.
I
To see why this petition is ill-suited for review, it is impor-
tant to review the procedural posture of this case. Peti-
tioner, an inmate in a Texas prison, sued multiple prison of-
fcers and asserted a variety of claims, including both the
Eighth Amendment claim that the Court addresses (placing
and keeping him in flthy cells) and a related Eighth Amend-
ment claim (refusing to take him to a toilet). The District
Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all
but one of petitioner's claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b), which permitted petitioner to appeal the
dismissed claims. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affrmed as
to all the claims at issue except the toilet-access claim. On
the claim concerning the conditions of petitioner's cells, the
court held that the facts alleged in petitioner's verifed com-
plaint were suffcient to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment
violation, but it found that the offcers were entitled to quali-
fed immunity based primarily on a statement in Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), and the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Davis v. Scott, 157 F. 3d 1003 (1998).
The Court now reverses the affrmance of summary judg-
ment on the cell-conditions claim. Viewing the evidence in
the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 7 (2020)
11
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
petitioner, the Court holds that a reasonable corrections of-
fcer
would have known that it was unconstitutional to con-
fne petitioner under the conditions alleged. That question,
which turns entirely on an interpretation of the record in
one particular case, is a quintessential example of the kind
that we almost never review. As stated in our Rules, “[a]
petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of . . . the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law,” this Court's Rule 10. That is precisely
the situation here. The Court does not dispute that the
Fifth Circuit applied all the correct legal standards, but the
Court simply disagrees with the Fifth Circuit's application
of those tests to the facts in a particular record. Every
year, the courts of appeals decide hundreds if not thousands
of cases in which it is debatable whether the evidence in a
summary judgment record is just enough or not quite enough
to carry the case to trial. If we began to review these deci-
sions we would be swamped, and as a rule we do not do so.
Instead, we have well-known criteria for granting review,
and they are not met here. The question that the Court
decides is not one that has divided the lower courts, see this
Court's Rule 10, and today's decision adds virtually nothing
to the law going forward. The Court of Appeals held that
the conditions alleged by petitioner, if proved, would violate
the Eighth Amendment, and this put correctional offcers in
the Fifth Circuit on notice that such conditions are intolera-
ble. Thus, even without our intervention, qualifed immu-
nity would not be available in any similar future case.
We have sometimes granted review and summarily re-
versed in cases where it appeared that the lower court had
conspicuously disregarded governing Supreme Court prece-
dent, but that is not the situation here. On the contrary, as
I explain below, it appears that the Court of Appeals erred
largely because it read too much into one of our decisions.
It is not even clear that today's decision is necessary to
protect petitioner's interests. We are generally hesitant to
grant review of non-fnal decisions, and there are grounds for

12 T
AYLOR v. RIOJAS
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
such wariness here. If we had denied review at this time,
petiti
oner may not have lost the opportunity to contest the
grant of summary judgment on the issue of respondents' en-
titlement to qualifed immunity on his cell-conditions claim.
His case would have been remanded for trial on the claims
that remained after the Fifth Circuit's decision (one of which
sought relief that appears to overlap with the relief sought
on the cell-conditions claim), and if he was dissatisfed with
the fnal judgment, he may have been able to seek review by
this Court of the cell-conditions qualifed immunity issue at
that time. Major League Baseball Players Assn. v. Garvey,
532 U. S. 504, 508, n. 1 (2001) (per curiam). And of course,
there is always the possibility that he would have been satis-
fed with whatever relief he obtained on the claims that went
to trial.
Today's decision does not even conclusively resolve the
issue of qualifed immunity on the cell-conditions claim be-
cause respondents are free to renew that defense at trial,
and if the facts petitioner alleges are not ultimately estab-
lished, the defense could succeed. Indeed, if petitioner can-
not prove the facts he alleges, he may not be able to show
that his constitutional rights were violated.
In light of all this, it is not apparent why the Court has
chosen to grant review in this case.
II
While I would not grant review on the question the Court
addresses, I agree that summary judgment should not have
been awarded on the issue of qualifed immunity. We must
view the summary judgment record in the light most favor-
able to petitioner, and when petitioner's verifed complaint is
read in this way, a reasonable factfnder could infer not just
that the conditions in the cells in question were horrifc but
that respondents chose to place and keep him in those partic-
ular cells, made no effort to have the cells cleaned, and did
not explore the possibility of assignment to cells with better

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 7 (2020)
13
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
conditions. A reasonable corrections offcer would have
known
that this course of conduct was unconstitutional, and
the cases on which respondents rely do not show otherwise.
Although this Court stated in Hutto that holding a pris-
oner in a “flthy” cell for “a few days” “might be tolerable,”
437 U. S., at 686–687, that equivocal and unspecifc dictum
does not justify what petitioner alleges. There are degrees
of flth, ranging from conditions that are simply unpleasant
to conditions that pose a grave health risk, and the concept
of “a few days” is also imprecise. In addition, the statement
does not address potentially important factors, such as the
necessity of placing and keeping a prisoner in a particular
cell and the possibility of cleaning the cell before he is housed
there or during the course of that placement. A reasonable
offcer could not think that this statement or the Court of
Appeals' decision in Davis meant that it is constitutional
to place a prisoner in the flthiest cells imaginable for up to
six days despite the availability of other preferable cells or
despite the ability to arrange for cleaning of the cells in
question.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.

14 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, NEW
Y
ORK v. CUOMO, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK
on application for injunctive relief
No. 20A87. Decided November 25, 2020
The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and Agudath Israel of America,
see Agudath Israel of America, et al., v. Cuomo, No. 20A90, fled emer-
gency applications seeking relief from occupancy limits the Governor of
New York imposed on houses of worship during the COVID–19 pan-
demic. Applicants contend that the limits, which restrict attendance at
religious services to 10 people in areas classifed as “red zones” and 25
people in areas classifed as “orange zones,” violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. The applications seeking to enjoin
enforcement of those restrictions pending resolution of the applicants'
appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit were presented
to Justice Breyer and by him referred to the Court.
Held: Respondent is enjoined from enforcing the 10- and 25-person occu-
pancy limits on applicants pending disposition of appellate proceedings
in the Second Circuit and disposition of petitions for certiorari, if such
writs are timely sought.
The applicants are likely to prevail on the merits of their First
Amendment claims. They have made a strong showing that the chal-
lenged restrictions single out houses of worship for especially harsh
treatment. In a red zone, houses of worship may not admit more than
10 persons, but businesses the State categorizes as “essential” may
admit as many people as they wish. The disparate treatment is even
more striking in an orange zone. While attendance at houses of wor-
ship is limited to 25 persons, even non-essential businesses may decide
for themselves how many persons to admit. Because the challenged
restrictions are not “neutral” and of “general applicability,” they must
satisfy “strict scrutiny.” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hia-
leah, 508 U. S. 520, 546.
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the restrictions must be “narrowly tailored”
to serve a “compelling ” state interest. Ibid. While stemming the
spread of COVID–19 is a compelling interest, the challenged limits are
not “narrowly tailored” because there are many other less restrictive
rules that could be adopted to minimize the risk to those attending reli-
gious services, including linking the maximum attendance to the size of
the venue.
The challenged restrictions, if enforced, will cause irreparable harm
to the great majority of those who wish to attend religious services. A

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
15
Per Curiam
loss of First Amendment freedoms, even if temporary, “unquestionably
constitutes
irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 373 (plu-
rality opinion). Remote viewing does not mitigate that injury because
only personal attendance allows for observance of certain religious tra-
ditions. Granting injunctive relief will not harm the public because the
State has not claimed that in-person attendance at the applicants' serv-
ices has resulted in the spread of the disease, and it has not shown that
public health would be imperiled if less restrictive measures were
imposed.
Relief is warranted even though the Governor reclassifed the areas
in question from orange to yellow, which means that the applicants may
currently hold services at 50% of their maximum occupancy. The mat-
ter is not moot, and injunctive relief is still called for because the appli-
cants remain under a constant threat that the area in question will be
reclassifed as red or orange. If that occurs, the reclassifcation will
almost certainly bar individuals in the affected area from attending
services before judicial relief can be obtained.
For these reasons, the Court holds that enforcement of the Governor's
severe restrictions on the applicants' religious services must be enjoined.
Application for injunctive relief granted.
Per Curiam.
The application for injunctive relief presented to Justice
Breyer and by him referred to the Court is granted. Re-
spondent is enjoined from enforcing Executive Order 202.68's
10- and 25-person occupancy limits on applicant pending dis-
position of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit and disposition of the petition for a
writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the
petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall
terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ
of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the
sending down of the judgment of this Court.
***
This emergency application and another, Agudath Israel
of America, et al. v. Cuomo, No. 20A90, present the same
issue, and this opinion addresses both cases.
Both applications seek relief from an Executive Order is-
sued by the Governor of New York that imposes very severe

16 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Per Curiam
restrictions on attendance at religious services in areas clas-
si
fed as “red” or “orange” zones. In red zones, no more
than 10 persons may attend each religious service, and in
orange zones, attendance is capped at 25. The two applica-
tions, one fled by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
and the other by Agudath Israel of America and affliated
entities, contend that these restrictions violate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the First Amendment, and they ask us to
enjoin enforcement of the restrictions while they pursue ap-
pellate review. Citing a variety of remarks made by the
Governor, Agudath Israel argues that the Governor specif-
cally targeted the Orthodox Jewish community and gerry-
mandered the boundaries of red and orange zones to ensure
that heavily Orthodox areas were included. Both the Dio-
cese and Agudath Israel maintain that the regulations treat
houses of worship much more harshly than comparable secu-
lar facilities. And they tell us without contradiction that
they have complied with all public health guidance, have im-
plemented additional precautionary measures, and have op-
erated at 25% or 33% capacity for months without a single
outbreak.
The applicants have clearly established their entitlement
to relief pending appellate review. They have shown that
their First Amendment claims are likely to prevail, that de-
nying them relief would lead to irreparable injury, and that
granting relief would not harm the public interest. See
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S.
7, 20 (2008). Because of the need to issue an order promptly,
we provide only a brief summary of the reasons why immedi-
ate relief is essential.
Likelihood of success on the merits. The applicants have
made a strong showing that the challenged restrictions vio-
late “the minimum requirement of neutrality” to religion.
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S.
520, 533 (1993). As noted by the dissent in the court below,
statements made in connection with the challenged rules can

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
17
Per Curiam
be v iewed as t argeti ng the “ `u ltra-Or thodox [Jew ish]
c
ommunity. ' ” 980 F. 3d 222 (CA 2 2020) (Park, J.,
dissenting). But even if we put those comments aside,
the reg u lati ons cannot be v iewed as neutra l because
they si ng le out houses of worsh ip for especia l ly harsh
treatment.
1
In a red zone, while a synagogue or church may not admit
more than 10 persons, businesses categorized as “essential”
may admit as many people as they wish. And the list of
“essential” businesses includes things such as acupuncture
facilities, camp grounds, garages, as well as many whose
services are not limited to those that can be regarded as
essential, such as all plants manufacturing chemicals and mi-
croelectronics and all transportation facilities. See New
York State, Empire State Development, Guidance for Deter-
mining Whether a Business Enterprise is Subject to a Work-
force Reduction Under Recent Executive Orders, https://
esd.ny.gov/guidance-executive-order-2026. The disparate
treatment is even more striking in an orange zone. While
attendance at houses of worship is limited to 25 persons,
even non-essential businesses may decide for themselves
how many persons to admit.
These categorizations lead to troubling results. At the
hearing in the District Court, a health department offcial
testifed about a large store in Brooklyn that could “literally
have hundreds of people shopping there on any given day.”
App. to Application in No. 20A87, Exh. D, p. 83. Yet a
nearby church or synagogue would be prohibited from allow-
ing more than 10 or 25 people inside for a worship service.
And the Governor has stated that factories and schools have
contributed to the spread of COVID–19, id., Exh. H, at 3;
App. to Application in No. 20A90, pp. 98, 100, but they
are treated less harshly than the Diocese's churches and
1
Compare Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 702 (2018) (directive “neutral
on its face”).

18 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Per Curiam
Agudath Israel's synagogues, which have admirable safety
records.
Because
the challenged restrictions are not “neutral” and
of “general applicability,” they must satisfy “strict scrutiny,”
and this means that they must be “narrowly tailored” to
serve a “compelling ” state interest. Church of Lukumi, 508
U. S., at 546. Stemming the spread of COVID–19 is unques-
tionably a compelling interest, but it is hard to see how the
challenged regulations can be regarded as “narrowly tai-
lored.” They are far more restrictive than any COVID–
related regulations that have previously come before the
Court,
2
much tighter than those adopted by many other ju-
risdictions hard-hit by the pandemic, and far more severe
than has been shown to be required to prevent the spread of
the virus at the applicants' services. The District Court
noted that “there ha[d] not been any COVID–19 outbreak in
any of the Diocese's churches since they reopened,” and it
praised the Diocese's record in combatting the spread of the
disease. 495 F. Supp. 3d 118, 121 (EDNY 2020). It found
that the Diocese had been constantly “ahead of the curve,
enforcing stricter safety protocols than the State required.”
Id., at 120. Similarly, Agudath Israel notes that “[t]he Gov-
ernor does not dispute that [it] ha[s] rigorously implemented
and adhered to all health protocols and that there has been
no outbreak of COVID–19 in [its] congregations.” Applica-
tion in No. 20A90, at 36.
Not only is there no evidence that the applicants have con-
tributed to the spread of COVID–19 but there are many
other less restrictive rules that could be adopted to minimize
the risk to those attending religious services. Among other
things, the maximum attendance at a religious service could
2
See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 591 U. S. 1042 (2020)
(directive limiting in-person worship services to 50 people); South Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S. 965 (2020) (Executive
Order limiting in-person worship to 25% capacity or 100 people, whichever
was lower).

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
19
Per Curiam
be tied to the size of the church or synagogue. Almost all
of
the 26 Diocese churches immediately affected by the Exec-
utive Order can seat at least 500 people, about 14 can accom-
modate at least 700, and 2 can seat over 1,000. Similarly,
Agudath Israel of Kew Garden Hills can seat up to 400. It
is hard to believe that admitting more than 10 people to a
1,000–seat church or 400–seat synagogue would create a
more serious health risk than the many other activities that
the State allows.
Irreparable harm. There can be no question that the
challenged restrictions, if enforced, will cause irreparable
harm. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irrepa-
rable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 373 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion). If only 10 people are admitted to each serv-
ice, the great majority of those who wish to attend Mass on
Sunday or services in a synagogue on Shabbat will be barred.
And while those who are shut out may in some instances be
able to watch services on television, such remote viewing is
not the same as personal attendance. Catholics who watch
a Mass at home cannot receive communion, and there are
important religious traditions in the Orthodox Jewish faith
that require personal attendance. App. to Application in
No. 20A90, at 26–27.
Public interest. Finally, it has not been shown that
granting the applications will harm the public. As noted,
the State has not claimed that attendance at the applicants'
services has resulted in the spread of the disease. And the
State has not shown that public health would be imperiled if
less restrictive measures were imposed.
Members of this Court are not public health experts, and
we should respect the judgment of those with special exper-
tise and responsibility in this area. But even in a pandemic,
the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten. The re-
strictions at issue here, by effectively barring many from
attending religious services, strike at the very heart of the

20 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Per Curiam
First Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty. Before
a
llowing this to occur, we have a duty to conduct a serious
examination of the need for such a drastic measure.
The dissenting opinions argue that we should withhold re-
lief because the relevant circumstances have now changed.
After the applicants asked this Court for relief, the Governor
reclassifed the areas in question from orange to yellow, and
this change means that the applicants may hold services at
50% of their maximum occupancy. The dissents would deny
relief at this time but allow the Diocese and Agudath Israel
to renew their requests if this recent reclassifcation is
reversed.
There is no justifcation for that proposed course of action.
It is clear that this matter is not moot. See Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449,
462 (2007); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environ-
mental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189 (2000). And
injunctive relief is still called for because the applicants re-
main under a constant threat that the area in question will
be reclassifed as red or orange. See, e. g., Susan B. An-
thony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158 (2014). The Gov-
ernor regularly changes the classifcation of particular areas
without prior notice.
3
If that occurs again, the reclassifca-
tion will almost certainly bar individuals in the affected area
from attending services before judicial relief can be obtained.
At most Catholic churches, Mass is celebrated daily, and “Or-
thodox Jews pray in [Agudath Israel's] synagogues every
day.” Application in No. 20A90, at 4. Moreover, if reclassi-
fcation occurs late in a week, as has happened in the past,
there may not be time for applicants to seek and obtain relief
from this Court before another Sabbath passes. Thirteen
days have gone by since the Diocese fled its application, and
3
Recent changes were made on the following dates: Monday, November
23; Thursday, November 19; Wednesday, November 18; Wednesday, No-
vember 11; Monday, November 9; Friday, November 6; Wednesday, Octo-
ber 28; Wednesday, October 21.

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
21
Gorsuch, J., concurring
Agudath Israel's application was fled over a week ago.
W
hile we could presumably act more swiftly in the future,
there is no guarantee that we could provide relief before an-
other weekend passes. The applicants have made the show-
ing needed to obtain relief, and there is no reason why they
should bear the risk of suffering further irreparable harm in
the event of another reclassifcation.
For these reasons, we hold that enforcement of the Gover-
nor's severe restrictions on the applicants' religious services
must be enjoined.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, concurring.
Government is not free to disregard the First Amendment
in times of crisis. At a minimum, that Amendment prohibits
government offcials from treating religious exercises worse
than comparable secular activities, unless they are pursuing
a compelling interest and using the least restrictive means
available. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hia-
leah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993). Yet recently, during the
COVID pandemic, certain States seem to have ignored these
long-settled principles.
Today's case supplies just the latest example. New York's
Governor has asserted the power to assign different color
codes to different parts of the State and govern each by ex-
ecutive decree. In “red zones,” houses of worship are all
but closed—limited to a maximum of 10 people. In the Or-
thodox Jewish community that limit might operate to ex-
clude all women, considering 10 men are necessary to estab-
lish a minyan, or a quorum. In “orange zones,” it's not
much different. Churches and synagogues are limited to a
maximum of 25 people. These restrictions apply even to the
largest cathedrals and synagogues, which ordinarily hold
hundreds. And the restrictions apply no matter the precau-
tions taken, including social distancing, wearing masks, leav-
ing doors and windows open, forgoing singing, and disinfect-
ing spaces between services.

22 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Gorsuch, J., concurring
At the same time, the Governor has chosen to impose no
capacity
restrictions on certain businesses he considers “es-
sential.” And it turns out the businesses the Governor con-
siders essential include hardware stores, acupuncturists, and
liquor stores. Bicycle repair shops, certain signage compa-
nies, accountants, lawyers, and insurance agents are all es-
sential too. So, at least according to the Governor, it may
be unsafe to go to church, but it is always fne to pick up
another bottle of wine, shop for a new bike, or spend the
afternoon exploring your distal points and meridians. Who
knew public health would so perfectly align with secular
convenience?
As almost everyone on the Court today recognizes, squar-
ing the Governor's edicts with our traditional First Amend-
ment rules is no easy task. People may gather inside for
extended periods in bus stations and airports, in laundro-
mats and banks, in hardware stores and liquor shops. No
apparent reason exists why people may not gather, subject
to identical restrictions, in churches or synagogues, espe-
cially when religious institutions have made plain that they
stand ready, able, and willing to follow all the safety precau-
tions required of “essential” businesses and perhaps more
besides. The only explanation for treating religious places
differently seems to be a judgment that what happens there
just isn't as “essential” as what happens in secular spaces.
Indeed, the Governor is remarkably frank about this: In his
judgment laundry and liquor, travel and tools, are all “essen-
tial” while traditional religious exercises are not. That is ex-
actly the kind of discrimination the First Amendment forbids.
Nor is the problem an isolated one. In recent months,
certain other Governors have issued similar edicts. At
the fick of a pen, they have asserted the right to privilege
rest aurants, mar ijuana dispensar ies, and casi nos over
churches, mosques, and temples. See Calvary Chapel Day-
ton Valley v. Sisolak, 591 U. S. 1042, 1050 (2020) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief ).

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
23
Gorsuch, J., concurring
In far too many places, for far too long, our frst freedom has
fa
llen on deaf ears.
*
What could justify so radical a departure from the First
Amendment's terms and long-settled rules about its applica-
tion? Our colleagues offer two possible answers. Initially,
some point to a solo concurrence in South Bay Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S. 965 (2020), in which The Chief
Justice expressed willingness to defer to executive orders
in the pandemic's early stages based on the newness of the
emergency and how little was then known about the disease.
Post, at 37–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting). At that time,
COVID had been with us, in earnest, for just three months.
Now, as we round out 2020 and face the prospect of entering
a second calendar year living in the pandemic's shadow, that
rationale has expired according to its own terms. Even if
the Constitution has taken a holiday during this pandemic,
it cannot become a sabbatical. Rather than apply a nonbind-
ing and expired concurrence from South Bay, courts must
resume applying the Free Exercise Clause. Today, a major-
ity of the Court makes this plain.
Not only did the South Bay concurrence address different
circumstances than we now face, that opinion was mistaken
from the st ar t. To justi fy its resu lt, the concurrence
reached back 100 years in the U. S. Reports to grab hold of
our decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11
(1905). But Jacobson hardly supports cutting the Constitu-
tion loose during a pandemic. That decision involved an en-
tirely different mode of analysis, an entirely different right,
and an entirely different kind of restriction.
Start with the mode of analysis. Although Jacobson pre-
dated the modern tiers of scrutiny, this Court essentially ap-
plied rational basis review to Henning Jacobson's challenge
to a state law that, in light of an ongoing smallpox pandemic,
required individuals to take a vaccine, pay a $5 fne, or estab-
lish that they qualifed for an exemption. Id., at 25 (asking

24 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Gorsuch, J., concurring
whether the State's scheme was “reasonable”); id., at 27
(
same); id., at 28 (same). Rational basis review is the test
this Court normally applies to Fourteenth Amendment chal-
lenges, so long as they do not involve suspect classifcations
based on race or some other ground, or a claim of fundamen-
tal right. Put differently, Jacobson didn't seek to depart
from normal legal rules during a pandemic, and it supplies
no precedent for doing so. Instead, Jacobson applied what
would become the traditional legal test associated with the
right at issue—exactly what the Court does today. Here,
that means strict scrutiny: The First Amendment tradition-
ally requires a State to treat religious exercises at least as
well as comparable secular activities unless it can meet the
demands of strict scrutiny—showing it has employed the
most narrowly tailored means available to satisfy a compel-
ling state interest. Church of Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546.
Next, consider the right asserted. Mr. Jacobson claimed
that he possessed an implied “substantive due process” right
to “bodily integrity” that emanated from the Fourteenth
Amendment and allowed him to avoid not only the vaccine
but also the $5 fne (about $140 today) and the need to show
he qualifed for an exemption. 197 U. S., at 13–14. This
Court disagreed. But what does that have to do with our
circumstances? Even if judges may impose emergency re-
strictions on rights that some of them have found hiding in
the Constitution's penumbras, it does not follow that the
same fate should befall the textually explicit right to reli-
gious exercise.
Finally, consider the different nature of the restriction.
In Jacobson, individuals could accept the vaccine, pay the
fne, or identify a basis for exemption. Id., at 12, 14. The
imposition on Mr. Jacobson's claimed right to bodily integ-
rity, thus, was avoidable and relatively modest. It easily
survived rational basis review, and might even have survived
strict scrutiny, given the opt-outs available to certain objec-
tors. Id., at 36, 38–39. Here, by contrast, the State has

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
25
Gorsuch, J., concurring
effectively sought to ban all traditional forms of worship in
affec
ted “zones” whenever the Governor decrees and for as
long as he chooses. Nothing in Jacobson purported to ad-
dress, let alone approve, such serious and long-lasting intru-
sions into settled constitutional rights. In fact, Jacobson
explained that the challenged law survived only because it
did not “contravene the Constitution of the United States”
or “infringe any right granted or secured by that instru-
ment.” Id., at 25.
Tellingly no Justice now disputes any of these points.
Nor does any Justice seek to explain why anything other
than our usual constitutional standards should apply during
the current pandemic. In fact, today the author of the
South Bay concurrence even downplays the relevance of Ja-
cobson for cases like the one before us. Post, at 32–33 (Rob-
erts, C. J., dissenting). All this is surely a welcome devel-
opment. But it would require a serious rewriting of history
to suggest, as The Chief Justice does, that the South Bay
concurrence never really relied in signifcant measure on Ja-
cobson. That was the frst case South Bay cited on the sub-
stantive legal question before the Court, it was the only case
cited involving a pandemic, and many lower courts quite un-
derstandably read its invocation as inviting them to slacken
their enforcement of constitutional liberties while COVID
lingers. See, e. g., Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v.
Pritzker, 962 F. 3d 341, 347 (CA7 2020); Legacy Church, Inc.
v. Kunkel, 472 F. Supp. 3d 926, 1082–1083 (NM 2020).
Why have some mistaken this Court's modest decision in
Jacobson for a towering authority that overshadows the
Constitution during a pandemic? In the end, I can only
surmise that much of the answer lies in a particular judicial
impulse to stay out of the way in times of crisis. But if
that impulse may be understandable or even admirable in
other circumstances, we may not shelter in place when the
Constitution is under attack. Things never go well when
we do.

26 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Gorsuch, J., concurring
*
That
leaves my colleagues to their second line of argu-
ment. Maybe precedent does not support the Governor's
actions. Maybe those actions do violate the Constitution.
But, they say, we should stay our hand all the same. Even
if the churches and synagogues before us have been subject
to unconstitutional restrictions for months, it is no matter
because, just the other day, the Governor changed his color
code for Brooklyn and Queens where the plaintiffs are lo-
cated. Now those regions are “yellow zones” and the chal-
lenged restrictions on worship associated with “orange” and
“red zones” do not apply. So, the reasoning goes, we should
send the plaintiffs home with an invitation to return later if
need be.
To my mind, this reply only advances the case for inter-
vention. It has taken weeks for the plaintiffs to work their
way through the judicial system and bring their case to us.
During all this time, they were subject to unconstitutional
restrictions. Now, just as this Court was preparing to act
on their applications, the Governor loosened his restrictions,
all while continuing to assert the power to tighten them
again anytime as conditions warrant. So if we dismissed
this case, nothing would prevent the Governor from reinstat-
ing the challenged restrictions tomorrow. And by the time
a new challenge might work its way to us, he could just
change them again. The Governor has fought this case at
every step of the way. To turn away religious leaders
bringing meritorious claims just because the Governor de-
cided to hit the “off ” switch in the shadow of our review
would be, in my view, just another sacrifce of fundamental
rights in the name of judicial modesty.
Even our dissenting colleagues do not suggest this case is
moot or otherwise outside our power to decide. They coun-
sel delay only because “the disease-related circumstances
[are] rapidly changing.” Post, at 38 (opinion of Breyer, J.).

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
27
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
But look at what those “rapidly changing ” circumstances
suggest.
Both Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio have
“indicated it's only a matter of time before [all] fve bor-
oughs” of New York City are fipped from yellow to orange.
J. Skolnik, D. Goldiner, & D. Slattery, Staten Island Goes
`Orange' As Cuomo Urges Coronavirus `Reality Check' Ahead
of Thanksgiving, N. Y. Daily News (Nov. 23, 2020), https://
www.nydailynews.com/coronavirus/ny-coronavirus-cuomo-
thanksgiving-20201123-yyhxfo3kzbdinbf bsqos3tvrku-story-
html. On anyone's account, then, it seems inevitable this
dispute will require the Court's attention.
It is easy enough to say it would be a small thing to re-
quire the parties to “refle their applications” later. Post, at
35 (opinion of Breyer, J.). But none of us are rabbis won-
dering whether future services will be disrupted as the High
Holy Days were, or priests preparing for Christmas. Nor
may we discount the burden on the faithful who have lived
for months under New York's unconstitutional regime unable
to attend religious services. Whether this Court could de-
cide a renewed application promptly is beside the point.
The parties before us have already shown their entitlement
to relief. Saying so now will establish clear legal rules and
enable both sides to put their energy to productive use,
rather than devoting it to endless emergency litigation.
Saying so now will dispel, as well, misconceptions about the
role of the Constitution in times of crisis, which have already
been permitted to persist for too long.
It is time—past time—to make plain that, while the pan-
demic poses many grave challenges, there is no world in
which the Constitution tolerates color-coded executive edicts
that reopen l iquor stores and bike shops but shutter
churches, synagogues, and mosques.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
I vote to grant the applications of the Roman Catholic Dio-
cese of Brooklyn and Agudath Israel of America for tempo-

28 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
rary injunctions against New York's 10-person and 25-person
caps
on attendance at religious services. On this record,
temporary injunctions are warranted because New York's
severe caps on attendance at religious services likely violate
the First Amendment. Importantly, the Court's orders
today are not fnal decisions on the merits. Instead, the
Court simply grants temporary injunctive relief until the
Court of Appeals in December, and then this Court as appro-
priate, can more fully consider the merits.
To begin with, New York's 10-person and 25-person caps
on attendance at religious services in red and orange zones
(which are areas where COVID–19 is more prevalent) are
much more severe than most other States' restrictions, in-
cluding the California and Nevada limits at issue in South
Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S. 965
(2020), and Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 591
U. S. 1042 (2020). In South Bay, houses of worship were
limited to 100 people (or, in buildings with capacity of under
400, to 25% of capacity). And in Calvary, houses of worship
were limited to 50 people.
New York has gone much further. In New York's red
zones, most houses of worship are limited to 10 people; in
orange zones, most houses of worship are limited to 25 people.
Those strict and infexible numerical caps apply even to large
churches and synagogues that ordinarily can hold hundreds
of people and that, with social distancing and mask require-
ments, could still easily hold far more than 10 or 25 people.
Moreover, New York's restrictions on houses of worship
not only are severe, but also are discriminatory. In red and
orange zones, houses of worship must adhere to numerical
caps of 10 and 25 people, respectively, but those caps do not
apply to some secular buildings in the same neighborhoods.
In a red zone, for example, a church or synagogue must ad-
here to a 10-person attendance cap, while a grocery store,
pet store, or big-box store down the street does not face the
same restriction. In an orange zone, the discrimination

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
29
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
against religion is even starker: Essential businesses and
many
non-essential businesses are subject to no attendance
caps at all.
The State's discrimination against religion raises a serious
First Amendment issue and triggers heightened scrutiny, re-
quiring the State to provide a suffcient justifcation for the
discrimination. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 537–538 (1993); Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S.
872, 884 (1990). But New York has not suffciently justifed
treating houses of worship more severely than secular
businesses.
The State argues that it has not impermissibly discrimi-
nated against religion because some secular businesses such
as movie theaters must remain closed and are thus treated
less favorably than houses of worship. But under this
Court's precedents, it does not suffce for a State to point
out that, as compared to houses of worship, some secular
businesses are subject to similarly severe or even more se-
vere restrictions. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 537–538; Smith,
494 U. S., at 884; see also Calvary, 591 U. S., at 1055–1056
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of application for in-
junctive relief ). Rather, once a State creates a favored class
of businesses, as New York has done in this case, the State
must justify why houses of worship are excluded from that fa-
vored class. Here, therefore, the State must justify imposing
a 10-person or 25-person limit on houses of worship but not on
favored secular businesses. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 537–
538; Smith, 494 U. S., at 884. The State has not done so.
To be clear, the COVID–19 pandemic remains extraordi-
narily serious and deadly. And at least until vaccines are
readily available, the situation may get worse in many parts
of the United States. The Constitution “principally en-
trusts the safety and the health of the people to the politi-
cally accountable offcials of the States.” South Bay, 590
U. S., at 967 (Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial of applica-

30 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
tion for injunctive relief ) (internal quotation marks and al-
terati
on omitted). Federal courts therefore must afford
substantial deference to state and local authorities about how
best to balance competing policy considerations during the
pandemic. See ibid. But judicial deference in an emer-
gency or a crisis does not mean wholesale judicial abdication,
especially when important questions of religious discrimina-
tion, racial discrimination, free speech, or the like are raised.
In light of the devastating pandemic, I do not doubt the
State's authority to impose tailored restrictions—even very
strict restrictions—on attendance at religious services and
secular gatherings alike. But the New York restrictions on
houses of worship are not tailored to the circumstances given
the First Amendment interests at stake. To reiterate, New
York's restrictions on houses of worship are much more se-
vere than the California and Nevada restrictions at issue in
South Bay and Calvary, and much more severe than the re-
strictions that most other States are imposing on attendance
at religious services. And New York's restrictions discrimi-
nate against religion by treating houses of worship signif-
cantly worse than some secular businesses.
For those reasons, I agree with The Chief Justice that
New York's “[n]umerical capacity limits of 10 and 25 people
. . . seem unduly restrictive” and that “it may well be that
such restrictions violate the Free Exercise Clause.” Post,
at 32. I part ways with The Chief Justice on a narrow
procedural point regarding the timing of the injunctions.
The Chief Justice would not issue injunctions at this time.
As he notes, the State made a change in designations a few
days ago, and now none of the churches and synagogues who
are applicants in these cases are located in red or orange
zones. As I understand it, The Chief Justice would not
issue an injunction unless and until a house of worship ap-
plies for an injunction and is still in a red or orange zone
on the day that the injunction is fnally issued. But the
State has not withdrawn or amended the relevant Executive

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
31
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
Order. And the State does not suggest that the applicants
lack
standing to challenge the red-zone and orange-zone caps
imposed by the Executive Order, or that these cases are
moot or not ripe. In other words, the State does not deny
that the applicants face an imminent injury today. In par-
ticular, the State does not deny that some houses of worship,
including the applicants here, are located in areas that likely
will be classifed as red or orange zones in the very near
future. I therefore see no jurisdictional or prudential barri-
ers to issuing the injunctions now.
There also is no good reason to delay issuance of the in-
junctions, as I see it. If no houses of worship end up in red
or orange zones, then the Court's injunctions today will im-
pose no harm on the State and have no effect on the State's
response to COVID–19. And if houses of worship end up in
red or orange zones, as is likely, then today's injunctions will
ensure that religious organizations are not subjected to the
unconstitutional 10-person and 25-person caps. Moreover,
issuing the injunctions now rather than a few days from now
not only will ensure that the applicants' constitutional rights
are protected, but also will provide some needed clarity for
the State and religious organizations.
***
On this record, the applicants have shown: a likelihood that
the Court would grant certiorari and reverse; irreparable
harm; and that the equities favor injunctive relief. I there-
fore vote to grant the applications for temporary injunctive
relief until the Court of Appeals in December, and then this
Court as appropriate, can more fully consider the merits.
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting.
I would not grant injunctive relief under the present cir-
cumstances. There is simply no need to do so. After the
Diocese and Agudath Israel fled their applications, the Gov-
ernor revised the designations of the affected areas. None

32 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
of the houses of worship identifed in the applications is
now
subject to any fxed numerical restrictions. At these
locations, the applicants can hold services with up to 50%
of capacity, which is at least as favorable as the relief they
currently seek.
Numerical capacity limits of 10 and 25 people, depending
on the applicable zone, do seem unduly restrictive. And it
may well be that such restrictions violate the Free Exercise
Clause. It is not necessary, however, for us to rule on that
serious and diffcult question at this time. The Governor
might reinstate the restrictions. But he also might not.
And it is a signifcant matter to override determinations
made by public health offcials concerning what is necessary
for public safety in the midst of a deadly pandemic. If the
Governor does reinstate the numerical restrictions the appli-
cants can return to this Court, and we could act quickly on
their renewed applications. As things now stand, however,
the applicants have not demonstrated their entitlement to
“the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Nken v. Holder,
556 U. S. 418, 428 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An order telling the Governor not to do what he's not doing
fails to meet that stringent standard.
As noted, the challenged restrictions raise serious con-
cerns under the Constitution, and I agree with Justice Kav-
anaugh that they are distinguishable from those we consid-
ered in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,
590 U. S. 965 (2020), and Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v.
Sisolak, 591 U. S. 1042 (2020). See ante, at 28, 30 (concur-
ring opinion). I take a different approach than the other
dissenting Justices in this respect.
To be clear, I do not regard my dissenting colleagues as
“cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic,” yielding
to “a particular judicial impulse to stay out of the way in
times of crisis,” or “shelter[ing] in place when the Constitu-
tion is under attack.” Ante, at 23, 25 (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring). They simply view the matter differently after careful

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
33
Breyer, J., dissenting
study and analysis refecting their best efforts to fulfll their
responsibi
lity under the Constitution.
One solo concurrence today takes aim at my concurring
opinion in South Bay. See ante, at 23–25 (opinion of Gor-
such, J.). Today's concurrence views that opinion with dis-
favor because “[t]o justify its result, [it] reached back 100
years in the U. S. Reports to grab hold of our decision in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905).” Ante, at
23. Today's concurrence notes that Jacobson “was the frst
case South Bay cited on the substantive legal question be-
fore the Court,” and “it was the only case cited involving a
pandemic.” Ante, at 25. And it suggests that, in the wake
of South Bay, some have “mistaken this Court's modest deci-
sion in Jacobson for a towering authority that overshadows
the Constitution during a pandemic.” Ibid. But while Ja-
cobson occupies three pages of today's concurrence, it war-
ranted exactly one sentence in South Bay. What did that
one sentence say? Only that “[o]ur Constitution principally
entrusts `[t]he safety and the health of the people' to the
politically accountable offcials of the States `to guard and
protect.' ” South Bay, 590 U. S., at 967 (Roberts, C. J., con-
curring in denial of application for injunctive relief ) (quoting
Jacobson, 197 U. S., at 38). It is not clear which part of this
lone quotation today's concurrence fnds so discomfting.
The concurrence speculates that there is so much more to
the sentence than meets the eye, invoking—among other in-
terpretive tools—the new “frst case cited” rule. But the
actual proposition asserted should be uncontroversial, and
the concurrence must reach beyond the words themselves to
fnd the target it is looking for.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
New York regulations designed to fght the rapidly spread-
ing—and, in many cases, fatal—COVID–19 virus permit the
Governor to identify hot spots where infection rates have
spiked and to designate those hot spots as red zones, the

34 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Breyer, J., dissenting
immediately surrounding areas as orange zones, and the outly-
i
ng areas as yellow zones. Brief in Opposition in No. 20A87,
p. 12. The regulations impose restrictions within these
zones (with the strictest restrictions in the red zones and the
least strict restrictions in the yellow zones) to curb transmis-
sion of the virus and prevent spread into nearby areas.
Ibid. In October, the Governor designated red, orange, and
yellow zones in parts of Brooklyn and Queens. Brief in Op-
position in Agudath Israel of America v. Cuomo, O. T. 2020,
No. 20A90, pp. 10–11 (Brief in Opposition in No. 20A90).
Among other things, the restrictions in these zones limit the
number of persons who can be present at one time at a gath-
ering in a house of worship to: the lesser of 10 people or 25%
of maximum capacity in a red zone; the lesser of 25 people
or 33% of maximum capacity in an orange zone; and 50% of
maximum capacity in a yellow zone. Id., at 8–9.
Both the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and Agu-
dath Israel of America (together with Agudath Israel of Kew
Garden Hills and its employee and Agudath Israel of Madi-
son and its rabbi) brought lawsuits against the Governor of
New York. They claimed that the fxed-capacity restric-
tions of 10 people in red zones and 25 people in orange zones
were too strict—to the point where they violated the First
Amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion.
Both parties asked a Federal District Court for a prelimi-
nary injunction that would prohibit the State from enforcing
these red and orange zone restrictions.
Af ter receiv i ng ev idence and hear i ng w itness testi-
mony, the D istr ic t Cour t i n the D i ocese's case found
that New York's regulations were “crafted based on science
and for epidemiological purposes.” 495 F. Supp. 3d 118,
131 (EDNY 2020). It wrote that they treated “rel i-
gious gatherings . . . more favorably than similar gatherings”
with comparable risks, such as “public lectures, concerts
or theatrical performances.” Id., at 129. The court also
recognized the Diocese's argument that the regulations

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
35
Breyer, J., dissenting
treated religious gatherings less favorably than what the
St
ate has called “essential businesses,” including, for exam-
ple, grocery stores and banks. Id., at 130. But the court
found these essential businesses to be distinguishable from
religious services and declined to “second guess the State's
judgment about what should qualify as an essential busi-
ness.” Ibid. The District Court denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction. The Diocese appealed, and the Dis-
trict Court declined to issue an emergency injunction pend-
ing that appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit also denied the Diocese's request for an emergency
injunction pending appeal, but it called for expedited briefng
and scheduled a full hearing on December 18 to address the
merits of the appeal. This Court, unlike the lower courts,
has now decided to issue an injunction that would prohibit
the State from enforcing its fxed-capacity restrictions on
houses of worship in red and orange zones while the parties
await the Second Circuit's decision. I cannot agree with
that decision.
For one thing, there is no need now to issue any such in-
junction. Those parts of Brooklyn and Queens where the
Diocese's churches and the two applicant synagogues are lo-
cated are no longer within red or orange zones. Brief in
Opposition in No. 20A90, at 17. Thus, none of the applicants
are now subject to the fxed-capacity restrictions that they
cha llenge in their applicati ons. The speci fic applicant
houses of worship are now in yellow zones where they can
hold services up to 50% of maximum capacity. And the ap-
plicants do not challenge any yellow zone restrictions, as the
conditions in the yellow zone provide them with more than
the relief they asked for in their applications.
Instead, the applicants point out that the State might re-
impose the red or orange zone restrictions in the future.
But, were that to occur, they could refle their applications
here, by letter brief if necessary. And this Court, if neces-
sary, could then decide the matter in a day or two, perhaps

36 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Breyer, J., dissenting
even in a few hours. Why should this Court act now with-
out
argument or full consideration in the ordinary course
(and prior to the Court of Appeals' consideration of the mat-
ter) when there is no legal or practical need for it to do so?
I have found no convincing answer to that question.
For another thing, the Court's decision runs contrary to
ordinary governing law. We have previously said that an
injunction is an “extraordinary remedy.” Nken v. Holder,
556 U. S. 418, 428 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
That is especially so where, as here, the applicants seek an
injunction prior to full argument and contrary to the lower
courts' determination. Here, we consider severe restric-
tions. Those restrictions limit the number of persons who
can attend a religious service to 10 and 25 congregants (irre-
spective of mask-wearing and social distancing). And those
numbers are indeed low. But whether, in present circum-
stances, those low numbers violate the Constitution's Free
Exercise Clause is far from clear, and, in my view, the appli-
cants must make such a showing here to show that they are
entitled to “the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
COVID–19 has infected more than 12 million Americans
and caused more than 250,000 deaths nationwide. At least
26,000 of those deaths have occurred in the State of New
York, with 16,000 in New York City alone. And the number
of COVID–19 cases is many times the number of deaths.
The Nation is now experiencing a second surge of infections.
In New York, for example, the 7-day average of new con-
frmed cases per day has risen from around 700 at the end of
the summer to over 4,800 last week. Nationwide, the num-
ber of new confrmed cases per day is now higher than it has
ever been. Brief in Opposition in No. 20A87, at 1; COVID in
the U. S.: Latest Map and Case Count (Nov. 24, 2020), http://
www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.
html#states; New York COVID Map and Case Count (Nov. 24,
2020), http://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2020/us/new-york-
coronavirus-cases.html.

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
37
Breyer, J., dissenting
At the same time, members of the scientifc and medical
communities
tell us that the virus is transmitted from person
to person through respiratory droplets produced when a per-
son or group of people talk, sing, cough, or breathe near each
other. Brief in Opposition in No. 20A87, at 3 (citing the
World Health Organization); Brief of the American Medical
Association as Amici Curiae 5–6. Thus, according to ex-
perts, the risk of transmission is higher when people are in
close contact with one another for prolonged periods of time,
particularly indoors or in other enclosed spaces. Id., at
3–6. The nature of the epidemic, the spikes, the uncertain-
ties, and the need for quick action, taken together, mean that
the State has countervailing arguments based upon health,
safety, and administrative considerations that must be bal-
anced against the applicants' First Amendment challenges.
That fact, along with others that Justice Sotomayor de-
scribes, means that the applicants' claim of a constitutional
violation (on which they base their request for injunctive re-
lief ) is far from clear. See post, p. 38 (dissenting opinion).
(All of these matters could be considered and discussed in
the ordinary course of proceedings at a later date.) At the
same time, the public's serious health and safety needs,
which call for swift government action in ever changing cir-
cumstances, also mean that it is far from clear that “the bal-
ance of equities tips in [the applicants'] favor,” or “that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008).
Relevant precedent suggests the same. We have pre-
viously recognized that courts must grant elected offcials
“broad” discretion when they “undertake to act in areas
fraught with medical and scientifc uncertainties.” South
Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S. 965, 967
(2020) (Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial of application for
injunctive relief ) (alteration omitted). That is because the
“Constitution principally entrusts the safety and the health of
the people to the politically accountable offcials of the States.”
Ibid. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

38 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The elected branches of state and national governments can
marsha
l scientifc expertise and craft specifc policies in re-
sponse to “changing facts on the ground.” Ibid. And they
can do so more quickly than can courts. That is particularly
true of a court, such as this Court, which does not conduct
evidentiary hearings. It is true even more so where, as
here, the need for action is immediate, the information likely
limited, the making of exceptions diffcult, and the disease-
related circumstances rapidly changing.
I add that, in my view, the Court of Appeals will, and
should, act expeditiously. The State of New York will, and
should, seek ways of appropriately recognizing the religious
interests here at issue without risking harm to the health
and safety of the people of New York. But I see no practical
need to issue an injunction to achieve these objectives.
Rather, as I said, I can fnd no need for an immediate injunc-
tion. I believe that, under existing law, it ought not to issue.
And I dissent from the Court's decision to the contrary.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan joins,
dissenting.
Amidst a pandemic that has already claimed over a quar-
ter million American lives, the Court today enjoins one of
New York's public health measures aimed at containing the
spread of COVID–19 in areas facing the most severe out-
breaks. Earlier this year, this Court twice stayed its hand
when asked to issue similar extraordinary relief. See South
Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S. 965
(2020); Ca l v ar y Chapel Day t o n Va ll ey v. Siso l ak, 591
U. S. 1042 (2020). I see no justifcation for the Court's
change of heart, and I fear that granting applications such
as the one fled by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
(Diocese) will only exacerbate the Nation's suffering.
1
1
Ironically, due to the success of New York's public health measures,
the Diocese is no longer subject to the numerical caps on attendance it
seeks to enjoin. See Brief in Opposition in Agudath Israel of America

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
39
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
South Bay and Calvary Chapel provided a clear and work-
able
rule to state offcials seeking to control the spread of
COVID–19: They may restrict attendance at houses of wor-
ship so long as comparable secular institutions face restric-
tions that are at least equally as strict. See South Bay, 590
U. S., at 966 (Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial of applica-
tion for injunctive relief ). New York's safety measures fall
comfortably within those bounds. Like the States in South
Bay and Calvary Chapel, New York applies “[s]imilar or
more severe restrictions . . . to comparable secular gather-
ings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator
sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of
people gather in close proximity for extended periods of
time.” Ibid. Likewise, New York “treats more leniently
only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores,
banks, and laundromats, in which people neither congregate
in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended
periods.” Ibid. That should be enough to decide this case.
The Diocese attempts to get around South Bay and
Calvary Chapel by disputing New York's conclusion that
attending religious services poses greater risks than, for
i nst ance, shoppi ng at big box stores. Appl icati on i n
No. 20A87, p. 23 (Application). But the District Court
rejected that argument as unsupported by the factual
record. 495 F. Supp. 3d 118, 128–130 (EDNY 2020). Unde-
terred, Justice Gorsuch offers up his own examples of
secular activities he thinks might pose similar risks as
religious gatherings, but which are treated more leni-
ently under New York's rules (e. g., going to the liquor
store or getting a bike repaired). Ante, at 22 (concurring
opi ni on). But Justice Gorsuch does not even try to
v. Cuomo, No. 20A90, p. 17. Yet the Court grants this application to en-
sure that, should infection rates rise once again, the Governor will be
unable to reimplement the very measures that have proven so successful
at allowing the free (and comparatively safe) exercise of religion in New
York.

40 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
square his examples with the conditions medical experts tell
us
facilitate the spread of COVID–19: large groups of people
gathering, speaking, and singing in close proximity indoors
for extended periods of time. See App. to Brief in Opposi-
tion in No. 20A87, pp. 46–51 (declaration of Debra S. Blog,
Director of the Div. of Epidemiology, NY Dept. of Health);
Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as Amicus
Curiae 3–6 (Brief for AMA). Unlike religious services,
which “have every one of th[ose] risk factors,” Brief for AMA
6, bike repair shops and liquor stores generally do not fea-
ture customers gathering inside to sing and speak together for
an hour or more at a time. Id., at 7 (“Epidemiologists and
physicians generally agree that religious services are among
the riskiest activities”). Justices of this Court play a deadly
game in second guessing the expert judgment of health off-
cials about the environments in which a contagious virus, now
infecting a million Americans each week, spreads most easily.
In truth, this case is easier than South Bay and Calvary
Chapel. While the state regulations in those cases gener-
ally applied the same rules to houses of worship and secular
institutions where people congregate in large groups, New
York treats houses of worship far more favorably than their
secular comparators. Compare, e. g., Calvary Chapel, 591
U. S., at 1056 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of ap-
plication for injunctive relief ) (noting that Nevada subjected
movie theaters and houses of worship alike to a 50-person
cap) with App. to Brief in Opposition in No. 20A87, p. 53
(requiring movie theaters, concert venues, and sporting are-
nas subject to New York's regulation to close entirely, but
allowing houses of worship to open subject to capacity re-
strictions). And whereas the restrictions in South Bay and
Ca l v ar y Chapel appl ied st atew ide, New York 's fixed-
capacity restrictions apply only in specially designated areas
experiencing a surge in COVID–19 cases.
The Diocese suggests that, because New York's regulation
singles out houses of worship by name, it cannot be neutral

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 14 (2020)
41
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
with respect to the practice of religion. Application 22.
Thus,
the argument goes, the regulation must, ipso facto, be
subject to strict scrutiny. It is true that New York's policy
refers to religion on its face. But as I have just explained,
that is because the policy singles out religious institutions
for preferential treatment in comparison to secular gather-
ings, not because it discriminates against them. Surely the
Diocese cannot demand laxer restrictions by pointing out
that it is already being treated better than comparable secu-
lar institutions.
2
Finally, the Diocese points to certain statements by Gov-
ernor Cuomo as evidence that New York's regulation is im-
permissibly targeted at religious activity—specifcally, at
combatting heightened rates of positive COVID–19 cases
among New York's Orthodox Jewish community. Applica-
tion 24. The Diocese suggests that these comments supply
“an independent basis for the application of strict scrutiny.”
Reply Brief in No. 20A87, p. 9. I do not see how. The Gov-
ernor's comments simply do not warrant an application of
strict scrutiny under this Court's precedents. Just a few
Terms ago, this Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny
to a Presidential Proclamation limiting immigration from
Muslim-majority countries, even though President Trump
2
Justice Kavanaugh cites Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hia-
leah, 508 U. S. 520, 537–538 (1993), and Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 884 (1990), for the proposition
that States must justify treating even noncomparable secular institutions
more favorably than houses of worship. Ante, at 29 (concurring opinion).
But those cases created no such rule. Lukumi struck down a law that
allowed animals to be killed for almost any purpose other than animal
sacrifce, on the ground that the law was a “ `religious gerrymander' ” tar-
geted at the Santeria faith. 508 U. S., at 535. Smith is even farther
afeld, standing for the entirely inapposite proposition that “the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).” 494 U. S., at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).

42 ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
had described the Proclamation as a “Muslim Ban,” origi-
na
lly conceived of as a “ `total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States until our country's rep-
resentatives can fgure out what is going on.' ” Trump v.
Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 700 (2018). If the President's state-
ments did not show “that the challenged restrictions violate
the `minimum requirement of neutrality' to religion,” ante,
at 16 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533), it is hard to see
how Governor Cuomo's do.
***
Free religious exercise is one of our most treasured and
jealously guarded constitutional rights. States may not dis-
criminate against religious institutions, even when faced
with a crisis as deadly as this one. But those principles are
not at stake today. The Constitution does not forbid States
from responding to public health crises through regulations
that treat religious institutions equally or more favorably
than comparable secular institutions, particularly when those
regulations save lives. Because New York's COVID–19 re-
strictions do just that, I respectfully dissent.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
43
Syllabus
TANZIN et al. v. TANVIR et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 19–71. Argued October 6, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) was enacted in
the wake of Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v.
Smith, 494 U. S. 872, to provide a remedy to redress Federal Govern-
ment violations of the right to free exercise under the First Amend-
ment. Respondents are practicing Muslims who sued under RFRA,
claiming that federal agents placed them on the No Fly List for refusing
to act as informants against their religious communities. They sought
injunctive relief against the agents in their offcial capacities and mone-
tary damages against the agents in their individual capacities. As rele-
vant here, the District Court found that RFRA does not permit mone-
tary relief and dismissed their individual-capacity claims. The Second
Circuit reversed, holding that RFRA's remedies provision encompasses
money damages against Government offcials.
Held: RFRA's express remedies provision permits litigants, when appro-
priate, to obtain money damages against federal offcials in their individ-
ual capacities. Pp. 46–52.
(a) RFRA's text provides that persons may sue and “obtain appro-
priate relief against a government,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb–1(c), including
an “offcial (or other person acting under color of law) of the United
States,” § 2000bb–2(1). RFRA supplants the ordinary meaning of “gov-
ernment” with a different, express defnition that includes “offcial[s].”
It then underscores that “offcial[s]” are “person[s].” Under RFRA's
defnition, relief that can be executed against an “offcial . . . of the
Unites States” is “relief against a government.” This reading is con-
frmed by RFRA's use of the phrase “persons acting under color of law,”
which has long been interpreted by this Court in the 42 U. S. C. § 1983
context to permit suits against offcials in their individual capacities.
See, e. g., Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299,
305–306. Pp. 47–48.
(b) RFRA's term “appropriate relief ” is “open-ended” on its face;
thus, what relief is “ `appropriate' ” is “inherently context dependent.”
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 286. In the context of suits against
Government offcials, damages have long been awarded as appropriate
relief, and though more limited today, they remain an appropriate form
of relief. The availability of damages under § 1983 is particularly sa-

44 T
ANZIN v. TANVIR
Syllabus
lient here. When Congress frst enacted RFRA, the defnition of “gov-
er
nment” included state and local offcials. In order to reinstate the
pre-Smith substantive protections of the First Amendment and the
right to vindicate those protections by a claim, § 2000bb(b), the remedies
provision must have encompassed at least the same forms of relief au-
thorized by § 1983. Because damages claims have always been avail-
able under § 1983 for clearly established violations of the First Amend-
ment, that means RFRA provides, as one avenue for relief, a right to
seek damages against Government employees. The presumption in
Sossamon, 563 U. S. 277, is inapplicable because this case does not in-
volve sovereign immunity. Pp. 48–52.
894 F. 3d 449, affrmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Francisco, Assistant Attorney General Hunt, Deputy So-
licitor General Wall, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Mooppan, Austin L. Raynor, Benjamin H. Torrance, Sarah S.
Normand, Mary Hampton Mason, and Reginald M. Skinner.
Ramzi Kassem argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Naz Ahmad, Shayana Kadidal, Baher
Azmy, Jennifer R. Cowan, Erol Gulay, Christopher S. Ford,
and Sandy Tomasik.*
*Geoffrey T. Blackwell fled a brief for American Atheists et al. as amici
curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee by Christopher J. Wright, Jason
Neal, Iman Boukadoum, Abed A. Ayoub, and Anton G. Hajjar; for the
General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists by Gordon D. Todd; for the
Institute for Justice by Anya Bidwell and Patrick Jaicomo; for Muslim
Advocates by Matthew Callahan; for Religious and Civil-Rights Organiza-
tions by Richard B. Katskee, Alex J. Luchenitser, and Kenneth D. Upton;
for The Rutherford Institute by Michael J. Lockerby, George E. Quillin,
Joshua M. Hawkes and John W. Whitehead; for the Sikh Coalition by
James A. Sonne; for Statutory Interpretation Scholars by Alan E. Schoen-
feld and James D. Barton; for Fourteen Religious-Liberty Scholars et al.

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 43 (2020)
45
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)
prohibits the Federal Government from imposing substantial
burdens on religious exercise, absent a compelling interest
pursued through the least restrictive means. 107 Stat. 1488,
42 U. S. C. § 2000bb et seq. It also gives a person whose reli-
gious exercise has been unlawfully burdened the right to
seek “appropriate relief.” The question here is whether
“appropriate relief ” includes claims for money damages
against Government offcials in their individual capacities.
We hold that it does.
I
A
RFRA secures Congress' view of the right to free exercise
under the First Amendment, and it provides a remedy to
redress violations of that right. Congress passed the Act in
the wake of this Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept.
of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 885–
890 (1990), which held that the First Amendment tolerates
neutral, generally applicable laws that burden or prohibit
religious acts even when the laws are unsupported by a
narrowly tailored, compelling governmental interest. See
§ 2000bb(a). RFRA sought to counter the effect of that
holding and restore the pre-Smith “compelling interest
test” by “provid[ing] a claim . . . to persons whose reli-
gious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”
by Douglas Laycock, Thomas C. Berg, Kimberlee Wood Colby, Reed N.
Smith, K. Hollyn Hollman, and Jennifer L. Hawks; and for 67 Religious
Organizations by Adeel Mangi.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty by Lori H. Windham, Joseph C. Davis, and Nicholas R. Reaves;
for the Freedom from Religion Foundation et al. by Marci A. Hamilton
and Patrick C. Elliott; for Religious Organizations et al. by Kelly J. Shack-
el ford, Hiram S. Sasser III, Michael D. Berry, and Jeremiah G. Dys; and
for Jeffrey D. Kahn by Andrew T. Tutt, R. Stanton Jones, and Stephen
K. Wirth.

46 T
ANZIN v. TANVIR
Opinion of the Court
§§ 2000bb(b)(1)–(2). That right of action enables a person
t
o “obt ai n appropr iate rel ief agai nst a gover nment. ”
§ 2000bb–1(c). A “ `government' ” is defned to include “a
branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and offcial (or
other person acting under color of law) of the United States.”
§ 2000bb–2(1).
B
Respondents Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah, and
Naveed Shinwari are practicing Muslims who claim that
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents placed them on the
No Fly List in retaliation for their refusal to act as inform-
ants against their religious communities. Respondents sued
various agents in their offcial capacities, seeking removal
from the No Fly List. They also sued the agents in their
individual capacities for money damages. According to re-
spondents, the retaliation cost them substantial sums of
money: airline tickets wasted and income from job opportuni-
ties lost.
More than a year after respondents sued, the Department
of Homeland Security informed them that they could now
fy, thus mooting the claims for injunctive relief. The District
Court then dismissed the individual-capacity claims for money
damages, ruling that RFRA does not permit monetary relief.
The Second Circuit reversed. 894 F. 3d 449 (2018). It
determined that RFRA's express remedies provision, com-
bined with the statutory defnition of “Government,” au-
thorizes claims against federal offcials in their individual
capacities. Relying on our precedent and RFRA's broad
protections for religious liberty, the court concluded that
the open-ended phrase “appropriate relief ” encompasses
money damages against offcials. We granted certiorari, 589
U. S. 1078 (2019), and now affrm.
II
As usual, we start with the statutory text. E. g., Mission
Produc t Ho l d ings, Inc. v. Tempno l ogy, LLC, 587 U. S.
370, 379 (2019). A person whose exercise of religion has

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 43 (2020)
47
Opinion of the Court
been unlawfully burdened may “obtain appropriate relief
agai
nst a government.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb–1(c).
A
We frst have to determine if injured parties can sue Gov-
ernment offcials in their personal capacities. RFRA's text
provides a clear answer: They can. Persons may sue and
obtain relief “against a government,” § 2000bb–1(c), which is
defned to include “a branch, department, agency, instrumen-
tality, and offcial (or other person acting under color of
law) of the United States.” § 2000bb–2(1) (emphasis added).
The Government urges us to limit lawsuits against offcials
to suits against them in their offcial, not personal, capacities.
A lawsuit seeking damages from employees in their individ-
ual capacities, the Government argues, is not really “against
a government” because relief “can be executed only against
the offcial's personal assets.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U. S. 159, 166 (1985).
The problem with this otherwise plausible argument is
that Congress supplanted the ordinary meaning of “govern-
ment” with a different, express defnition. “ `When a statute
includes an explicit defnition, we must follow that defnition,'
even if it varies from a term's ordinary meaning.” Digital
Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 583 U. S. 149, 160 (quoting Bur-
gess v. United States, 553 U. S. 124, 130 (2008)). For exam-
ple, if a statute defnes a “State” to include territories and
districts, that addition to the plain meaning controls. See,
e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 267. So too here. A “government,” under
RFRA, extends beyond the term's plain meaning to include
offcials. And the term “offcial” does not refer solely to an
offce, but rather to the actual person “who is invested with
an offce.” 10 Oxford English Dictionary 733 (2d ed. 1989).
Under RFRA's defnition, relief that can be executed against
an “offcial . . . of the United States” is “relief against a gov-
ernment.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000bb–1(c), 2000bb–2(1).
Not only does the term “government” encompass offcials,
it also authorizes suits against “other person[s] acting under

48 T
ANZIN v. TANVIR
Opinion of the Court
color of law.” § 2000bb–2(1). The right to obtain relief
agai
nst “a person” cannot be squared with the Government's
reading that relief must always run against the United
States. Moreover, the use of the phrase “offcial (or other
person . . . )” underscores that “offcial[s]” are treated like
“person[s].” Ibid. (emphasis added). In other words, the
parenthetical clarifes that “a government” includes both in-
dividuals who are offcials acting under color of law and
other, additional individuals who are nonoffcials acting
under color of law. Here, respondents sued the former.
The legal “backdrop against which Congress enacted”
RFRA confrms the propriety of individual-capacity suits.
Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 487 (2005). The
phrase “persons acting under color of law” draws on one of
the most well-known civil rights statutes: 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
That statute applies to “person[s] . . . under color of any stat-
ute,” and this Court has long interpreted it to permit suits
against offcials in their individual capacities. See, e. g.,
Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S.
299, 305–306, and n. 8 (1986). Because RFRA uses the same
terminology as § 1983 in the very same feld of civil rights
law, “it is reasonable to believe that the terminology bears a
consistent meaning.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 323 (2012). A suit
against an offcial in his personal capacity is a suit against a
person acting under color of law. And a suit against a per-
son acting under color of law is a suit against “a govern-
ment,” as defned under RFRA. § 2000bb–1(c).
B
The question then becomes what “appropriate relief ” en-
tails. Without a statutory defnition, we turn to the phrase's
plain meaning at the time of enactment. See FCC v. AT&T
Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 403 (2011). “Appropriate” means “[s]pe-
cially ftted or suitable, proper.” 1 Oxford English Diction-
ary, at 586; see also Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Diction-

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 43 (2020)
49
Opinion of the Court
ary 57 (10th ed. 1996) (“especially suitable or compatible”).
Because
this language is “open-ended” on its face, what relief
is “ `appropriate' ” is “inherently context dependent.” Sos-
samon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 286 (2011) (interpreting identi-
cal language).
In the context of suits against Government offcials, dam-
ages have long been awarded as appropriate relief. In the
early Republic, “an array of writs . . . allowed individuals to
test the legality of government conduct by fling suit against
government offcials” for money damages “payable by the
offcer.” Pfander & Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills:
Indemnifcation and Govt Accountability in the Early Repub-
lic, 85 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1862, 1871–1875 (2010); see id., at 1875,
n. 52 (collecting cases). These common-law causes of action
remained available through the 19th century and into the
20th. See, e. g., Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804); El-
liott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137 (1836); Mitchell v. Harmony,
13 How. 115 (1852); Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334 (1866); Belk-
nap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896); Philadelphia Co. v. Stim-
son, 223 U. S. 605, 619–620 (1912) (“The exemption of the
United States from suit does not protect its offcers from
personal liability to persons whose rights of property they
have wrongfully invaded”).
Though more limited, damages against federal offcials re-
main an appropriate form of relief today. In 1988 the West-
fall Act foreclosed common-law claims for damages against
federal offcials, 28 U. S. C. § 2679, but it left open claims for
constitutional violations and certain statutory violations.
§§ 2679(b)(2)(A)–(B). Indeed, the Act expressly contem-
plates that a statute could authorize an action for damages
against Government employees. § 2679(b)(2)(B) (explaining
that the displacement of remedies “does not extend or apply
to a civil action against an employee of the Government . . .
which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United
States under which such action against an individual is oth-
erwise authorized”).

50 T
ANZIN v. TANVIR
Opinion of the Court
Damages are also commonly available against state and
loca
l government offcials. In 1871, for example, Congress
passed the precursor to § 1983, imposing liability on any per-
son who, under color of state law, deprived another of a con-
stitutional right. 17 Stat. 13; see also Myers v. Anderson,
238 U. S. 368, 379, 383 (1915) (affrming award of damages
against state election offcials). By the time Congress
enacted RFRA, this Court had interpreted the modern ver-
sion of § 1983 to permit monetary recovery against offcials
who violated “clearly established” federal law. E. g., Procu-
nier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 561–562 (1978); Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 231 (1991).
This availability of damages under § 1983 is particularly
salient in light of RFRA's origins. When frst enacted,
RFRA defned “ `government' ” to include an “offcial (or
other person acting under color of law) of the United States,
a State, or a subdivision of a State.” 107 Stat. 1489 (empha-
sis added). It made no distinction between state and federal
offcials. After this Court held that RFRA could not be en-
forced against the States, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U. S. 507, 511 (1997), Congress narrowly amended the defni-
tion “by striking `a State, or a subdivision of a State.' ” 114
Stat. 806. That context is important because RFRA made
clear that it was reinstating both the pre-Smith substantive
protections of the First Amendment and the right to vindi-
cate those protections by a claim. § 2000bb(b). There is no
doubt that damages claims have always been available under
§ 1983 for clearly established violations of the First Amend-
ment. See, e. g., Sause v. Bauer, 585 U. S. 957 (2018) (per cu-
riam) (reversing grant of qualifed immunity in a case seek-
ing damages under § 1983 based on alleged violations of free
exercise rights and Fourth Amendment rights); Murphy v.
Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 814 F. 2d 1252, 1259 (CA8
1987) (remanding to enter judgment for plaintiffs on a § 1983
free speech and free exercise claims and to determine and
order “appropriate relief, which . . . may, if appropriate, in-

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 43 (2020)
51
Opinion of the Court
clude an award” of damages). Given that RFRA reinstated
pre-
Smith protections and rights, parties suing under RFRA
must have at least the same avenues for relief against off-
cials that they would have had before Smith. That means
RFRA provides, as one avenue for relief, a right to seek
damages against Government employees.
A damages remedy is not just “appropriate” relief as
viewed through the lens of suits against Government em-
ployees. It is also the only form of relief that can remedy
some RFRA violations. For certain injuries, such as re-
spondents' wasted plane tickets, effective relief consists of
damages, not an injunction. See, e. g., DeMarco v. Davis,
914 F. 3d 383, 390 (CA5 2019) (destruction of religious prop-
erty); Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845 (RI 1990), opinion
withdrawn 750 F. Supp. 558 (RI 1990) (autopsy of son that
violated Hmong beliefs). Given the textual cues just noted,
it would be odd to construe RFRA in a manner that prevents
courts from awarding such relief. Had Congress wished to
limit the remedy to that degree, it knew how to do so. See,
e. g., 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3) (providing for “appropriate equi-
table relief ”); 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(g)(1) (providing for “equi-
table relief as the court deems appropriate”); 15 U. S. C.
§ 78u(d)(5) (providing for “any equitable relief that may be
appropriate or necessary”).*
Our opinion in Sossamon does not change this analysis.
Sossamon held that a State's acceptance of federal funding
did not waive sovereign immunity to suits for damages under
a related statute—the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
*Both the Government and respondents agree that government offcials
are entitled to assert a qualifed immunity defense when sued in their
individual capacities for money damages under RFRA. Indeed, respond-
ents emphasize that the “qualifed immunity defense was created for pre-
cisely these circumstances,” Brief for Respondents 22, and is a “powerful
shield” that “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who fout
clearly established law,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 42; see District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 62–64 (2018).

52 T
ANZIN v. TANVIR
Opinion of the Court
ized Persons Act of 2000—which also permits “ `appropriate
rel
ief.' ” 563 U. S., at 280, 282. The obvious difference is
that this case features a suit against individuals, who do not
enjoy sovereign immunity.
The Government also posits that we should be wary of
damages against government offcials because these awards
could raise separation-of-powers concerns. But this exact
remedy has coexisted with our constitutional system since
the dawn of the Republic. To be sure, there may be policy
reasons why Congress may wish to shield Government em-
ployees from personal liability, and Congress is free to do so.
But there are no constitutional reasons why we must do so
in its stead.
To the extent the Government asks us to create a new
policy-based presumption against damages against individual
offcials, we are not at liberty to do so. Congress is best
suited to create such a policy. Our task is simply to inter-
pret the law as an ordinary person would. Although back-
ground presumptions can inform the understanding of a
word or phrase, those presumptions must exist at the time
of enactment. We cannot manufacture a new presumption
now and retroactively impose it on a Congress that acted 27
years ago.
***
We conclude that RFRA's express remedies provision per-
mits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages
against federal offcials in their individual capacities. The
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit is affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
53
Syllabus
CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE v. ADAMS
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 19–309. Argued October 5, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020
Delaware's Constitution contains a political balance requirement for ap-
pointments to the State's major courts. No more than a bare majority
of judges on any of its fve major courts “shall be of the same political
party.” Art. IV, § 3. In addition, on three of those courts, those mem-
bers not in the bare majority “shall be of the other major political
party.” Ibid. Respondent James R. Adams, a Delaware lawyer and
political independent, sued in Federal District Court, claiming that Del-
aware's “bare majority” and “major party” requirements violate his
First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him ineligi-
ble to become a judge unless he joins a major political party. The Dis-
trict Court held that Adams had standing to challenge both require-
ments and that Delaware's balancing scheme was unconstitutional. The
Third Circuit affrmed in part and reversed in part. It held that Adams
did have standing to challenge the major party requirement, because it
categorically excludes independents from becoming judges on three
courts, but that he lacked standing to challenge the bare majority re-
quirement, which does not preclude independents from eligibility for
any vacancy.
Held: Because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply
for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he has failed to show a
“personal,” “concrete,” and “imminent” injury necessary for Article III
standing. Pp. 58–66.
(a) Two aspects of standing doctrine are relevant here. First, stand-
ing requires an “ `injury in fact' ” that must be “concrete and particular-
ized,” as well as “ `actual or imminent.' ” Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U. S. 555, 560. Second, a grievance that amounts to nothing
more than an abstract and generalized harm to a citizen's interest in the
proper application of the law does not count as an “injury in fact” and
does not show standing. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 706.
Pp. 58–59.
(b) Adams has not shown the necessary “injury in fact.” To establish
that he will suffer a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury be-
yond a generalized grievance, Adams must at least show that he is likely
to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future, if he
were not barred because of political affliation. He can show this only

54 CARNEY
v. ADAMS
Syllabus
if he is “ `able and ready' ” to apply. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S.
244,
262. Adams' only supporting evidence is two statements he made
that he wanted to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any of Dela-
ware's fve courts. Those statements must be considered in the context
of the record. Pp. 59–63.
(c) The record evidence fails to show that, at the time he commenced
the lawsuit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in the
reasonably foreseeable future. First, Adams' statements stand alone,
without any other supporting evidence, like efforts to determine possi-
ble judicial openings or other such preparations. Second, the context
suggests an abstract, generalized grievance, not an actual desire to be-
come a judge. For example, Adams did not apply for numerous existing
judicial vacancies while he was a registered Democrat and eligible for
those vacancies. He then read a law review article arguing that Dela-
ware's judicial eligibility requirements unconstitutionally excluded inde-
pendents, changed his political affliation to independent, and fled this
lawsuit shortly thereafter. Third, a holding that Adams' few words of
general intent were suffcient to show an “injury in fact” would signif-
cantly weaken the longstanding legal doctrine preventing this Court
from providing advisory opinions. Finally, precedent supports the con-
clusion that an injury in fact requires an intent that is concrete. See,
e. g., Lujan, supra. And arguably similar cases in which standing was
found all contained more evidence that the plaintiff was “able and
ready” than Adams has provided. See, e. g., Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200. Pp. 63–66.
922 F. 3d. 166, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, post,
p. 66.
Michael W. McConnell argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Steffen N. Johnson, Brian J.
Levy, Randy J. Holland, David C. McBride, Martin S.
Lessner, and Pilar G. Kraman.
David L. Finger argued the cause and fled a brief for
respondent.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Brennan Cen-
ter for Justice at NYU School of Law by Richard W. Clary and Wendy R.
Weiser; for the Campaign Legal Center by Caitlin Halligan, Philippe

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 53 (2020)
55
Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Th
is case concerns a Delaware constitutional provision
that requires that appointments to Delaware's major courts
refect a partisan balance. Delaware's Constitution states
that no more than a bare majority of members of any of its
fve major courts may belong to any one political party. Art.
IV, § 3. It also requires, with respect to three of those
courts, that the remaining members belong to “the other
major political party.” Ibid.
The plaintiff, a Delaware lawyer, brought this lawsuit
i n federa l cour t. He clai med that Delaware's par ty-
membership requirements for its judiciary violate the Fed-
eral Constitution. We agreed to consider the constitutional
question, but only if the plaintiff has standing to raise that
question. We now hold that he does not.
I
The Delaware Constitution contains a political balance re-
quirement applicable to membership on all fve of its courts:
Selendy, Paul M. Smith, Adav Noti, and Erin Chlopak; for the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America by Gregory G. Garre
and Daryl Joseffer; for the Delaware State Bar Association by Richard
A. Forsten, William E. Manning, and James D. Taylor, Jr.; for Former
Chief Justices of the Delaware Supreme Court by Virginia A. Seitz and
Kathleen Moriarty Mueller; for Former Governors of the State of Dela-
ware by Theodore N. Mirvis and Kevin S. Schwartz; for the Republican
National Committee by Richard B. Raile and Katherine L. McKnight; for
State and Local Government Associations by Kirti Datla and Lisa Soro-
nen; and for Brian D. Feinstein et al. by Eric F. Citron and Erica Oleszc-
zuk Evans.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Lawyers and
Professors by Joel Edan Friedlander; for the Libertarian National Com-
mittee by Oliver B. Hall; and for Public Citizen by Kaitlin E. Leary, Scott
L. Nelson, Allison M. Zieve, and Alan B. Morrison.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Cato Institute by Eugene Vo-
lokh and Ilya Shapiro; for the Conference of Chief Justices by Robert L.
Byer and Keith R. Fisher; for Professors et al. by Rodney A. Smolla, pro
se; and for Anthony Daunt et al. by Jason Torchinsky.

56 CARNEY
v. ADAMS
Opinion of the Court
the Supreme Court, the Chancery Court, the Superior Court,
the
Family Court, and the Court of Common Pleas. The
provision says that no more than a bare majority of judges
on any of these courts “shall be of the same political party.”
Ibid. (We shall call this requirement the “bare majority”
requirement.) The Delaware Constitution also contains a
second requirement applicable only to the Supreme Court,
the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court. It says that
the remaining members of those three courts (those not in
the bare majority) “shall be of the other major political
party.” Ibid. (We shall call this the “major party” require-
ment.) Thus, all fve courts are subject to the “bare major-
ity” requirement, and three of the fve courts are additionally
subject to the “major party” requirement.
On Febr uary 21, 2017, plainti ff-respondent James R.
Adams sued Delaware's Governor, John Carney, in Federal
District Court. Adams, then a newly registered political in-
dependent, claimed that both of Delaware's political balance
requirements violated his First Amendment right to freedom
of association by making him ineligible to become a judge
unless he rejoined a major political party.
Governor Carney moved to dismiss for lack of standing,
and Adams fled an amended complaint in an attempt to rec-
tify the problem. App. 1–2, 17–18. After discovery largely
centered on Adams' history and intentions in seeking a
judgeship, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
Governor Carney argued (1) that Adams lacked standing to
assert his constitutional claim, and (2) that, in any event, the
requirements were constitutional. Adams argued only that
he was entitled to summary judgment on the merits because
the political balance requirements made independents like
him ineligible for a judgeship.
The District Court denied Governor Carney's summary
judgment motion. Id., at 165; App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. It
held that Adams had standing to challenge both the “major
party” requirement for membership on the Supreme Court,
the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court and the “bare

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 53 (2020)
57
Opinion of the Court
majority” requirement for membership on the Family Court
and
the Court of Common Pleas. App. 173–175; App. to Pet.
for Cert. 70a–72a. It then granted summary judgment to
Adams on the merits, App. 165; App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a,
holding that Delaware's balancing scheme as a whole was un-
constitutional, App. 175–181; App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a–81a.
Governor Carney appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court affrmed
in part and reversed in part. Adams v. Governor of Del.,
922 F. 3d 166 (2019). Like the District Court, it held that
Adams had standing to challenge the major party require-
ment, id., at 175, but unlike the District Court, it held that
Adams did not have standing to challenge the bare majority
requirement (in any of the fve courts), id., at 174–175. The
court held that the bare majority requirement itself does
not preclude independents from eligibility for any vacancy.
Ibid.
The court then focused on the major party requirement,
which applies only to three of the fve courts. Did that con-
stitutional provision bar independent voters from becoming
judges on those courts? If so, was that bar constitutional?
If not, was that provision severable from the rest of the Dela-
ware Constitution's political balance provisions, in particular,
from the bare majority requirement as applied to the Su-
preme Court, the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court?
The Third Circuit concluded that the major party require-
ment categorically excludes independents and members of
third parties from becoming judges on the Supreme Court,
the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court. 922 F. 3d, at
182–183. It held that the major party requirement conse-
quently violates the Federal Constitution's First Amend-
ment. Ibid. And it held that the major party requirement
is not severable from the bare majority requirement. Id., at
183–184. The Circuit concluded that both requirements (as
applied to those three courts) are invalid. Ibid.
Governor Carney then fled a petition for a writ of certio-
rari. He asked us to consider, frst, whether the major party

58 CARNEY
v. ADAMS
Opinion of the Court
requirement is constitutional and, then, if it is not, whether
it
is severable from the bare majority requirement. Pet. for
Cert. i. We granted his petition but asked that the parties
frst address the question whether Adams has demonstrated
Article III standing to bring this lawsuit.
II
A
This case begins and ends with standing. The Constitu-
tion grants Article III courts the power to decide “Cases”
or “Controversies.” Art. III, § 2. We have long understood
that constitutional phrase to require that a case embody a
genuine, live dispute between adverse parties, thereby pre-
venting the federal courts from issuing advisory opinions.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 96–97 (1968); Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
(“[I]t was not for courts to pass upon . . . abstract, intellec-
tual problems but only if a concrete, living contest between
adversaries called for the arbitrament of law”). The doc-
trine of standing implements this requirement by insisting
that a litigant “prove that he has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 704 (2013);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992).
Two aspects of standing doctrine are relevant here.
First, standing requires an “ `injury in fact' ” that must be
“concrete and particularized,” as well as “ `actual or immi-
nent.' ” Id., at 560. It cannot be “ ` “conjectural or hypo-
thetical.” ' ” Ibid. Second, a grievance that amounts to
nothing more than an abstract and generalized harm to a
citizen's interest in the proper application of the law does
not count as an “injury in fact.” And it consequently does
not show standing. Hollingsworth, supra, at 706; see also
Lance v. Coffman, 549 U. S. 437, 439–441 (2007) (per curiam)

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 53 (2020)
59
Opinion of the Court
(describing this Court's “lengthy pedigree” in refusing to
serve
as a forum for generalized grievances).
In other words, a plaintiff cannot establish standing by
asserting an abstract “general interest common to all mem-
bers of the public,” id., at 440, “no matter how sincere” or
“deeply committed” a plaintiff is to vindicating that general
interest on behalf of the public, Hollingsworth, supra, at
706–707. Justice Powell explained the reasons for this limi-
tation. He found it “inescapable” that to fnd standing
based upon that kind of interest “would signifcantly alter
the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift
away from a democratic form of government.” United
States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 188 (1974) (concurring
opinion). He added that “[w]e should be ever mindful of the
contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to per-
mit general oversight of the elected branches of government
by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated, judi-
cial branch.” Ibid.; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 222 (1974); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975). Cf. Federal Election
Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 21–25 (1998) (fnding standing
where a group of voters suffered concrete, though wide-
spread, harm when they were prevented from accessing pub-
licly disclosable voting-related material).
B
We here must ask whether Adams established that, at the
time he fled suit, Delaware's major party provision caused
him a concrete, particularized “injury in fact” over and above
the abstract generalized grievance suffered by all citizens of
Delaware who (if Adams is right) must live in a State subject
to an unconstitutional judicial selection criterion. We have
examined the record that was before the District Court at
summary judgment, keeping in mind that Adams bears the
burden of establishing standing as of the time he brought
this lawsuit and maintaining it thereafter. Lujan, supra,

60 CARNEY
v. ADAMS
Opinion of the Court
at 561 (plaintiff bears the burden of proving standing);
Fr
iends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv-
ices (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 191 (2000) (standing is as-
sessed “at the time the action commences”); id., at 189 (“ `The
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commence-
ment of the litigation . . . must continue throughout its exist-
ence' ”); see also Lujan, supra, at 569, n. 4. And we con-
clude that Adams did not show the necessary “injury in fact.”
Adams suffered a “generalized grievance” of the kind we
have just described. He, like all citizens of Delaware, must
live and work within a State that (in his view) imposes un-
constitutional requirements for eligibility on three of its
courts. Lawyers, such as Adams, may feel sincerely and
strongly that Delaware's laws should comply with the Fed-
eral Constitution. Accord, Hollingsworth, 570 U. S., at 706.
But that kind of interest does not create standing. Rather,
the question is whether Adams will suffer a “ `personal and
individual' ” injury beyond this generalized grievance—an
injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather
than “conjectural or hypothetical.” Id., at 705–706.
Adams says he has. He claims that Delaware's major
party requirement in fact prevents him, a political independ-
ent, from having his judicial application considered for three
of Delaware's courts. To prove this kind of harm, however,
Adams must at least show that he is likely to apply to become
a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future if Delaware did
not bar him because of political affliation. And our cases
make clear that he can show this only if he is “ `able and
ready' ” to apply. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 262
(2003); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993).
We have examined the summary judgment record to deter-
mine whether Adams made this showing. And, as we have
said, we conclude that he has not.
The only evidence supporting Adams is two statements he
made in his deposition and in his answer to interrogatories

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 53 (2020)
61
Opinion of the Court
that he wants to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any
of
Delaware's fve courts. He said:
“I would apply for any judicial position that I thought I
was qualifed for, and I believe I'm qualifed for any posi-
tion that would come up . . . [o]n any of the courts. I
would feel less comfortable on Chancery than any other
court. I would feel most comfortable on Superior
Court, Family Court, Court of Common Pleas, state Su-
preme Court based on my background, experience, and
what I have done in my career.” App. 34.
He added in his answer to interrogatories:
“Adams . . . would seriously consider and apply for any
judicial position for which he feels he is qualifed. . . .
Adams believes that he meets the minimum qualifca-
tions to apply for any judicial offcer position.” Id., at
62–63.
Those statements, however, must be considered in the con-
text of the record, which contains evidence showing that, at
the time he brought this lawsuit, Adams was not “able and
ready” to apply.
First, the record showed that, between 2012 and 2016, dur-
ing which time Adams was a practicing lawyer and a regis-
tered Democrat, Delaware's fve courts had a combined total
of 14 openings for which Adams, then a Democrat, would
have been eligible. Id., at 51–56, 144–164. Yet he did not
apply for any of them. When deposed during discovery,
Adams said that in 2014 he had wanted to apply for a Su-
preme Court or Superior Court judgeship. Id., at 35, 43–
46, 62. Adams said that he could not do so because only
Republicans were eligible for those positions that year.
Ibid. He was wrong about that. In particular, there were
three vacancies on those two courts in 2014 for which he, as
a Democrat, was eligible. Id., at 51–54. Adams later con-
ceded that he had indeed been eligible to apply for those
vacancies, but he had not done so. Id., at 43–46.

62 CARNEY
v. ADAMS
Opinion of the Court
Second, on December 31, 2015, after roughly 12 years as a
lawyer
for the Delaware Department of Justice, Adams re-
tired. Id., at 32, 58. In February 2016, Adams changed his
bar membership from “Active” to “Emeritus” status. Id., at
61. He then returned to “Active” status in January 2017.
Ibid. In his deposition, he stated that at about that same
time in the “[b]eginning of the year, January/February,” he
read a law review article arguing that Delaware's judicial
eligibility requirements were unconstitutional because they
excluded independents. Id., at 38; see Friedlander, Is Dela-
ware's “Other Major Political Party” Really Entitled to Half
of Delaware's Judiciary? 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 1139 (2016).
Adams called the article's author and said, “ `I just read your
Law Review . . . article. I'd like to pursue this.' ” App. 38.
The author suggested several attorneys who might handle
the matter. Ibid.
Third, shortly thereafter, on February 13, 2017, Adams
changed his political affliation from Democrat to unaffliated
independent. Id., at 67. Before that, he had been a Demo-
crat his “whole life” and actively involved in the Delaware
Democratic Party. Id., at 41. Leaving the party made it
less likely that he would become a judge. But doing so
made it possible for him to vindicate his view of the law as
set forth in the article.
Fourth, after Adams became a political independent on
February 13, 2017, he fled this lawsuit eight days later on
February 21. Id., at 1.
Fifth, Adams said in his answer to interrogatories that he
“has no knowledge of what judicial positions may become
open in the next year.” Id., at 62.
Sixth, other than the act of fling the lawsuit itself, the
summary judgment record contains no evidence of conversa-
tions or other actions taken by Adams suggesting that he
was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship.
During his deposition, Adams provided explanations for
this negative evidence. He said that his failure to apply for

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as: 592 U. S. 53 (2020)
63
Opinion of the Court
available judgeships at the time when he was eligible re-
fec
ted his lack of interest in being a judge at that time. He
was then content to work at the Department of Justice. Id.,
at 35; Brief for Respondent 17–18. Adams added that his
return from retirement to “Active” bar membership in 2017
showed that he decided on becoming a judge later in life and
after a change in administration at the Delaware Depart-
ment of Justice. App. 33. (Adams did not explain his fail-
ure to apply in 2014, though, when, he said, he was interested
in a judgeship.) Adams further explained that his contem-
poraneous change of political affliation was because he
“tend[s] to be much more progressive and liberal than [D]em-
ocrats in Delaware.” Id., at 41. Although he had been a
lifelong Democrat, and actively involved with the Delaware
Democratic Party, he said then that he “probably consider[s]”
himself “more of a Bernie [Sanders] independent.” Id., at
42. Finally, in Adams' view, the lack of other evidence
proves little or nothing about his intentions.
C
This is a highly fact-specifc case. In our view, three con-
siderations, taken together, convince us that the record evi-
dence fails to show that, at the time he commenced the law-
suit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in
the reasonably foreseeable future. First, as we have just
laid out, Adams' words “I would apply . . . ” stand alone
without any actual past injury, without reference to an an-
ticipated timeframe, without prior judgeship applications,
without prior relevant conversations, without efforts to de-
termine likely openings, without other preparations or inves-
tigations, and without any other supporting evidence.
Second, the context offers Adams no support. It suggests
an abstract, generalized grievance, not an actual desire to
become a judge. Indeed, Adams' failure to apply previously
when he was eligible, his reading of the law review article,
his change of party affliation, and his swift subsequent fling

64 CARNEY
v. ADAMS
Opinion of the Court
of the complaint show a desire to vindicate his view of the
law
, as articulated in the article he read.
Third, if we were to hold that Adams' few words of general
intent—without more and against all contrary evidence—
were suffcient here to show an “injury in fact,” we would
signifcantly weaken the longstanding legal doctrine prevent-
ing this Court from providing advisory opinions at the re-
quest of one who, without other concrete injury, believes that
the government is not following the law. Adams did not
show that he was “able and ready” to apply for a vacancy in
the reasonably imminent future. Adams has not suffciently
differentiated himself from a general population of individu-
als affected in the abstract by the legal provision he attacks.
We do not decide whether a statement of intent alone under
other circumstances could be enough to show standing. But
we are satisfed that Adams' words alone are not enough here
when placed in the context of this particular record.
Precedent supports the conclusion that an injury in fact
requires an intent that is concrete. In Lujan, for example,
organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation sought to
enjoin enforcement of a federal regulation that they believed
would unlawfully harm endangered species. Lujan, 504
U. S., at 563–564. The organizations' members had pre-
viously visited the species' habitats abroad, and they said
that they intended to return to those foreign habitats in the
future. Ibid. This Court recognized that having to view
a species-impoverished habitat could constitute a cognizable
injury. Id., at 562–563. But it pointed out that the plain-
tiffs had not described any concrete plans to visit those habi-
tats, nor had they said when they would do so. Id., at 563–
564. The Court said that the organizations had set forth
only “ `some day' intentions.” Id., at 564. And “some day
intentions” do “not support a fnding of the `actual or immi-
nent' injury that our cases require.” Ibid.
For another thing, arguably similar cases in which this
Court has found standing all contained more evidence that

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 53 (2020)
65
Opinion of the Court
the plaintiff was “able and ready” than Adams has provided
here
. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200
(1995), for example, a subcontractor challenging a race-based
program for allocating contracts established standing by
showing that it “bids on every guardrail project in Colo-
rado,” that the defendant “is likely to let contracts involving
guardrail work . . . at least once per year in Colorado,” and
that the plaintiff “is very likely to bid on each such contract.”
Id., at 212.
In Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U. S., at 666, the
Court held that an association of contractors had standing to
attack as unlawful a race-based set-aside program for award-
ing contracts. The contractors showed that they were “able
and ready to bid on [future] contracts,” for it was undisputed
that they had “regularly bid on construction contracts in
Jacksonville, and that they would have bid on contracts set
aside pursuant to the city's ordinance were they so able.”
Id., at 666, 668. The Court noted that it “must assume that
[these allegations] are true” because they were not chal-
lenged in any way. Id., at 668–669.
In Gratz, 539 U. S., at 262, we held that a plaintiff had
standing to attack as unlawful a university's affrmative ac-
tion admissions policy. The plaintiff had applied for admis-
sion to the university as a freshman applicant in the recent
past and been rejected. Ibid. He said he intended to apply
to transfer to the university in the near future, should the
university cease using affrmative action in its transfer ad-
missions process. Ibid. And the university had a “rolling ”
transfer program open for application each year, so there
was no doubt that the plaintiff 's injury was imminent. Id.,
at 256. The Court therefore concluded that he was “ `able
and ready' ” to apply as a transfer student. Id., at 262. Un-
like Adams, none of these plaintiffs relied on a bare state-
ment of intent alone against the context of a record that
shows nothing more than an abstract generalized grievance.
Rather, each introduced at least some evidence that, e. g.,

66 CARNEY
v. ADAMS
Sotomayor, J., concurring
they had applied in the past, there were regular opportuni-
ties
available with relevant frequency, and they were “able
and ready” to apply for them.
By way of contrast, our precedents have also said that a
plaintiff need not “translat[e]” his or her “desire for a job . . .
into a formal application” where that application would be
merely a “futile gesture.” Teamsters v. United States, 431
U. S. 324, 365–366 (1977); see also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941, 944, n. 2 (1982). And we have
said that an “aggrieved party `need not allege that he would
have obtained the beneft but for the [unlawful] barrier
in order to establish standing.' ” Adarand Constructors,
supra, at 211; see also Gratz, supra, at 262; Associated Gen.
Contractors, supra, at 666. We do not here depart from or
modify these or any other of the precedents to which we
have referred.
Rather, our holding follows from a straightforward appli-
cation of precedent to the particular summary judgment rec-
ord before us. And, as we have explained, in the context
set forth by the evidence, Adams has not shown that he was
“able and ready” to apply in the imminent future. Conse-
quently, he has failed to show that “personal,” “concrete,” and
“imminent” injury upon which our standing precedents insist.
For these reasons, we reverse the Third Circuit's decision
in respect to standing, vacate the judgment, and remand
with instructions to dismiss the case.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring.
I agree that respondent Adams did not demonstrate Arti-
cle III standing to bring this suit. Because the constitu-
tional questions in this case will likely be raised again, I
write separately to highlight two important considerations
that may inform their answers.

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67
Sotomayor, J., concurring
First, there are potentially material differences between
two
separate rules the Delaware Constitution imposes on its
courts: the “major party” requirement and the “bare major-
ity” requirement. Bare majority requirements preclude any
single political party from having more than a bare majority
of the seats in a public body. Such requirements have ex-
isted in various forums for roughly 150 years, currently fea-
ture in a large number of public bodies, and have been shown
to help achieve ideological diversity. Major party require-
ments like Delaware's, by contrast, preclude anyone who is
not a member of the two major political parties from serving
in a public body. They are far rarer than their bare majority
cousins, and they arguably impose a greater burden on First
Amendment associational rights. These differences may re-
quire distinct constitutional analyses.
Second, that possibi l ity, i n tur n, raises the questi on
whether Delaware's major party and bare majority require-
ments are severable from one another, such that one require-
ment could remain even if the other were constitutionally
unenforceable. It is worth noting that federal courts are not
ideally positioned to address such a sensitive issue of state
constitutional law. They may therefore be well advised to
consider certifying such a question to the State's highest
court. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U. S. 137, 139 (1996) (per
curiam) (“Severability [of a state statute] is of course a mat-
ter of state law”); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472
U. S. 612, 624 (1985) (“It is for the New Mexico courts to
decide, as a matter of state law, whether the state legislature
would have enacted the statute without the invalid portion”);
see also Arizonans for Offcial English v. Arizona, 520 U. S.
43, 77 (1997) (encouraging certifcation of “novel or unsettled
questions of state law” to “hel[p] build a cooperative judicial
federalism” (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in
original)); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647, 662, n. 16 (1978)
(certifying a question of state law sua sponte because it was
“one in which state governments have the highest interest”).

68 CARNEY
v. ADAMS
Sotomayor, J., concurring
Certifcation may be especially warranted in a case such as
th
is, where invalidating a state constitutional provision
would affect the structure of one of the State's three major
branches of government.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
69
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the armed forces
No. 19–108. Argued October 13, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020*
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCM J) has long provided that
a military offense, “punishable by death, may be tried and punished
at any time without limitation.” 10 U. S. C. § 843(a). Other military
offenses are subject to a 5-year statute of limitations. § 843(b). Re-
spondents are three military service members, each convicted of rape.
When they were charged, the UCM J provided that rape could be “pun-
ished by death.” § 920(a) (1994 ed.). Because this Court held that the
Eighth Amendment forbids a death sentence for the rape of an adult
woman, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, respondents argue that they
could not, in fact, have been sentenced to death, and therefore the
UCM J's 5-year statute of limitations applies and bars their convictions.
Agreeing, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces set aside their
convictions.
Held: Respondents' prosecutions for rape under the UCM J were timely.
Pp. 71–78.
(a) Respondents contend that the UCM J phrase “punishable by
death” means capable of punishment by death when all applicable law
is taken into account. By contrast, the Government sees the phrase as
something of a term of art, meaning capable of punishment by death
under the penalty provisions of the UCMJ. Pp. 71–72.
(b) For three reasons, the phrase's context—appearing in a statute of
limitations provision for prosecutions under the UCM J—weighs heavily
in favor of the Government's interpretation. Pp. 72–78.
(1) First, the UCM J is a uniform code. As such, a natural referent
for a statute of limitations provision within the UCM J is other law in
the UCM J itself. The most natural place to look for Congress's answer
to whether rape was “punishable by death” within the meaning of
§ 843(a) is § 920's directive that rape could be “punished by death.”
That is so even if the UCM J's separate prohibition on “cruel or unusual
punishment,” § 855, would have been held to provide an independent
defense against the imposition of the death penalty for rape. Pp. 73–74.
(2) Second, respondents' interpretation of § 843(a) is not the sort of
limitations provision that Congress is likely to have chosen. Statutes
*Together with No. 19–184, United States v. Collins and United States
v. Daniels (see this Court's Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court.

70 UNITED
STATES v. BRIGGS
Syllabus
of limitations typically provide clarity, see United States v. Lovasco, 431
U
. S. 783, 789, and it is reasonable to presume that clarity is an objective
when lawmakers enact such provisions. But if “punishable by death”
means punishable by death after all applicable law is taken into account,
the deadline for fling rape charges would be unclear. That deadline
would depend on an unresolved constitutional question about Coker's
application to military prosecutions, on what this Court has described
as “ `evolving standards of decency' ” under the Eighth Amendment,
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 407, 419, and on whether § 855 of the
UCM J independently prohibits a death sentence for rape. Pp. 74–77.
(3) Third, the ends served by statutes of limitations differ sharply
from those served by provisions like the Eighth Amendment or UCM J
§ 855. Factors legislators may fnd important in setting a statute of
limitations—such as the diffculty of gathering evidence and mounting
a prosecution—play no part in the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis.
Thus, it is unlikely that lawmakers would want to tie a statute of limita-
tions to judicial interpretations of such provisions. Pp. 77–78.
No. 19–108, 78 M. J. 289; No. 19–184, 78 M. J. 415 (frst judgment) and 79
M. J. 199 (second judgment), reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members
joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the cases. Gorsuch, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 79.
Acting Solicitor General Wall argued the cause for peti-
tioner in both cases. On the briefs were Solicitor General
Francisco, Assistant Attorney General Benczkowski, Dep-
uty Solicitor General Feigin, Christopher G. Michel, Re-
becca Taibleson, Paul T. Crane, Mary Ellen Payne, and
Brian C. Mason.
Stephen I. Vladeck argued the cause for respondents in
both cases. With him on the brief were Terri R. Zimmer-
mann, J. Carl Cecere, Mark Schwartz, M. Dedra Campbell,
Johnathan D. Legg, David P. Sheldon, Tami L. Mitchell, and
William E. Cassara.†
†Allyson N. Ho, Bradley G. Hubbard, and Paul G. Cassell fled a brief
of amici curiae for Members of Congress urging reversal in both cases.
Jeffrey T. Green fled a brief of amicus curiae for the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers urging affrmance in both cases.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases for the U. S. Army De-
fense Appellate Division by Elizabeth G. Marotta, Tiffany D. Pond, Jo-

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as: 592 U. S. 69 (2020)
71
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
W
e must decide in these cases whether, under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCM J), a prosecution for a rape
committed during the period from 1986 to 2006 had to be
commenced within fve years of the commission of the
charged offense or whether such a prosecution could be
brought at any time, as is the rule at present. The Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), reversing its prior
decisions on this question, held that the statute of limitations
was fve years and that it therefore barred the rape convic-
tions of respondents, three military service members. See
78 M. J. 289 (2019); 78 M. J. 415 (2019); 79 M. J. 199 (2019).
We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. 1067 (2019), and now reverse.
I
The question before us is important, and there are reason-
able arguments on both sides, but resolving the question
does not require lengthy analysis. During the period at
issue, Article 120(a) of the UCM J provided that rape could
be “punished by death,” 10 U. S. C. § 920(a) (1982 ed.); § 920(a)
(1994 ed.), and Article 43(a), which was amended in 1986,
provided that an offense “punishable by death” could be tried
and punished “at any time without limitation,” National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, 100 Stat. 3908;
see 10 U. S. C. § 843(a) (1988 ed.). The crux of the question
before us is the meaning of the phrase “punishable by death”
in the latter provision. Respondents contend—and the
CAAF held—that the phrase means capable of punishment
by death when all applicable law is taken into account.
See United States v. Mangahas, 77 M. J. 220, 224 (2018). Be-
cause this Court held in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592
(1977), that the Eighth Amendment forbids a death sentence
seph C. Borland, Zachary A. Gray, Jason X. Hamilton, Paul T. Shirk,
and Brianna C. Tuohy; and for Harmony Allen et al. by Peter Coote and
Jonathan D. Herbst.

72 UNITED
STATES v. BRIGGS
Opinion of the Court
for the rape of an adult woman, respondents argue that they
cou
ld not, in fact, have been sentenced to death, and there-
fore the statute of limitations for their crimes (committed in
1998, 2000, and 2005) was the 5-year statute that generally
governed non-capital offenses. See 10 U. S. C. § 843(b)(1)
(1994 ed.); § 843(b)(1) (2000 ed.). By contrast, the Govern-
ment argues that Article 43(a)'s reference to “punishable by
death” means capable of punishment by death under the pen-
alty provisions of the UCMJ, and since Article 120(a) pro-
vided (despite Coker) that rape could be punished by death,
it follows that there was no time limit for fling rape charges
against respondents.
The interpretation advocated by respondents and adopted
by the CAAF fnds support at frst blush in contemporaneous
dictionary defnitions of the term “punishable.” See 12 Ox-
ford English Dictionary 845 (2d ed. 1989) (“Liable to punish-
ment; capable of being punished. . . . Of an offence: Entail-
ing punishment”); Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1843 (1986) (“deserving of, or liable to, punish-
ment: capable of being punished by law or right”); Black's
Law Dictionary 1110 (5th ed. 1979) (“Deserving of or capable
or liable to punishment; capable of being punished by law or
right”); Random House Dictionary of the English Language
1165 (1966) (“liable to or deserving punishment”). But upon
inspection, defnitions shed little light on the dispute because
they largely re-raise the question over which the parties di-
vide: capable of being punished under what law? In es-
sence, the Government sees the term “punishable” in Article
43(a) as something of a term of art that is defned by the
specifcation of the punishments set out in the penalty provi-
sions of the UCM J.
II
On balance, we fnd the Government's interpretation more
persuasive. The meaning of a statement often turns on the
context in which it is made, and that is no less true of statu-

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as: 592 U. S. 69 (2020)
73
Opinion of the Court
tory language. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 662 (2001);
Dea
l v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993); A. Scalia &
B. Garner, Reading Law 167 (2012). And in these cases,
context is determinative. The phrase “punishable by death”
appears in a statute of limitations provision for prosecutions
under the UCM J, and for at least three reasons, that context
weighs heavily in favor of the Government's interpretation.
A
First, a natural referent for a statute of limitations provi-
sion within the UCM J is other law in the UCM J itself. The
UCM J is, after all, a “uniform code,” one that reformed and
modernized the old system of military justice “from top to
bottom.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 141 (1953) (plural-
ity opinion). No one would read Article 43's references to
“offense[s]” to include those under state law, for example.
Rather, the UCM J establishes the jurisdiction of general
courts-martial “to try persons subject to this chapter for any
offense made punishable by this chapter.” 10 U. S. C. § 818
(1982 ed.). Courts-martial may then “adjudge any punish-
ment not forbidden by this chapter, including the penalty of
death when specifcally authorized by this chapter.” Ibid.
“[T]his chapter” is the UCM J, § 801 et seq., and during the
relevant time period, provisions within that chapter like Ar-
ticle 120 specifcally authorized the death penalty for certain
serious offenses, see, e. g., § 894 (mutiny or sedition); § 899
(misbehavior before the enemy); § 900 (subordinate compel-
ling surrender); § 901 (improper use of countersign); § 902
(forcing a safeguard); § 904 (aiding the enemy); § 906 (spies);
§ 918 (murder). When amending Article 43(a), the 1986 Con-
gress appears simply to have saved itself the trouble of main-
taining a long list of such offenses. Cf. § 843(a) (1982 ed.)
(listing “aiding the enemy, mutiny, or murder”). In the con-
text of the UCM J, therefore, Article 120's directive that rape
could be “punished by death” is the most natural place to look
for Congress's answer to whether rape was “punishable by

74 UNITED
STATES v. BRIGGS
Opinion of the Court
death” within the meaning of Article 43(a). We think that
is
so even if, as respondents argue, the separate prohibition
on “cruel or unusual punishment” in Article 55 of the UCM J
would have been held to provide an independent defense
against the imposition of the death penalty for rape. 10
U. S. C. § 855 (1982 ed.).
B
Second, one principal beneft of statutes of limitations is
that typically they provide clarity, see United States v. Lo-
vasco, 431 U. S. 783, 789 (1977) (“[S]tatutes of limitations . . .
provide predictable, legislatively enacted limits on prosecu-
torial delay . . . ”); Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U. S.
71, 91 (2018) (noting that one “primary purpos[e]” of limita-
tions statutes in the civil context is “preventing surprises”
to defendants (internal quotation marks omitted)), and it is
therefore reasonable to presume that clarity is an objective
for which lawmakers strive when enacting such provisions.
Other things being equal, certainty in statutes of limitations
generally serves the interests of all concerned, and that is
certainly true with respect to the statute of limitations for
rape. For prosecutors handling such cases, it is obviously
helpful to know the deadline by which charges must be fled.
For persons who know they may be under investigation, a
known statute of limitations provides a date after which they
may no longer fear arrest and trial. And for rape victims,
who often wrestle with the painful decision whether to iden-
tify their attackers and press charges, a clear deadline allows
them to know by when they must make that choice.
If “punishable by death” in Article 43(a) means punishable
by death under the penalty provisions of the UCM J, the rule
regarding the latest possible date for commencing a rape
prosecution is clear: The prosecution may be brought “at any
time without limitation.” By contrast, if “punishable by
death” meant punishable by death after all applicable law is
taken into account, the deadline for fling rape charges would
be unclear. The deadline would depend on the answer to an

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75
Opinion of the Court
unresolved constitutional question about which the parties
i
n these cases vigorously disagree. Respondents argue that
the logic of the decision in Coker applies equally to civilian
and military prosecutions, but the Government contends that
the military context dictates a different outcome. Among
other things, the Government argues that a rape committed
by a service member may cause special damage by critically
undermining unit cohesion and discipline and that, in some
circumstances, the crime may have serious international
implications.
That also appears to have been the view of Congress and
the Executive. After Coker was decided in 1977, Congress
changed the maximum penalty for rape in civilian cases from
death to life imprisonment, see Sexual Abuse Act of 1986,
100 Stat. 3663, but it made no such change in the UCM J.
On the contrary, in 2006 Congress noted that death would
remain an available punishment for rape “[u]ntil the Presi-
dent otherwise provide[d].” National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 119 Stat. 3263. And Presi-
dents continued until 2016 to provide for death as a
permissible punishment for rape under the UCM J. See
Exec. Order No. 13740, 3 CFR 510 (2016).
If Article 43(a) meant what respondents claim and what
the CAAF held, Congress would have adopted a statute of
limitations provision without knowing with certainty what
it would mean. Indeed, Congress would have adopted a
statute of limitations provision the meaning of which would
not be settled until this Court decided the disputed question
of Coker's applicability to the military, and there was no rea-
son to think at the time of Article 43(a)'s amendment in 1986
that this Court would resolve that question any time soon.
We have never considered a direct Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge to a sentence of death for rape under the UCM J. And
it was predictable that we would not reach the statute of
limitations question until cases like those now before us came
up for review—that is, until we had occasion to consider

76 UNITED
STATES v. BRIGGS
Opinion of the Court
cases in which defendants were convicted after being
charged
more than fve years after the commission of the
offense. That state of affairs virtually guaranteed that the
statute of limitations for rape under the UCM J would be up
in the air for years.
And the uncertainty would not end there. This Court has
held that the Eighth Amendment incorporates “ `evolving
standards of decency.' ” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S.
407, 419 (2008) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion); emphasis added). Thus, even if
we were to hold that rape could be punished by death in the
military context, the evolving-standards test could later lead
to a different result and thus a different statute of limitations
at some point in the future. Such evolution has been held
to have occurred on a number of past occasions. Compare
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 321 (2002) (Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits death penalty for defendant described as
mentally retarded), with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302,
340 (1989) (Eighth Amendment permits death penalty for
such a defendant); compare also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S.
551, 574–575 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits death pen-
alty for crime committed by person under 18 years of age),
with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 380 (1989) (Eighth
Amendment permits death penalty for defendants who are
at least 16 years of age).
Finally, if “punishable by death” under Article 43(a) meant
punishable by death when all applicable law is taken into
account, the statute of limitations would also turn on
whether, as respondents now maintain, Article 55 of the
UCM J independently prohibits a death sentence for rape.
Article 55 forbids “cruel or unusual punishment[s],” 10
U. S. C. § 855; § 855 (1982 ed.), and here again respondents
and the Government offer different interpretations. Re-
spondents argue that Article 55 of its own force applies Cok-
er's rule to the military, while the Government maintains
that Article 55 cannot reasonably be read to forbid a pun-

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77
Opinion of the Court
ishment that another provision of the UCM J specifcally
author
izes.
In short, if we accepted the interpretation of Article 43(a)
adopted by the CAAF and defended by respondents, we
would have to conclude that this provision set out a statute
of limitations that no one could have understood with any
real confdence until important and novel legal questions
were resolved by this Court. That is not the sort of limita-
tions provision that Congress is likely to have chosen.
C
Third, the factors that lawmakers are likely to take into
account when fxing the statute of limitations for a crime
differ signifcantly from the considerations that underlie our
Eighth Amendment decisions. We therefore should not
lightly assume that Congress tied the meaning of the stat-
utes of limitations in Article 43 to the Eighth Amendment.
One factor that legislators may fnd important in setting the
statute of limitations for a crime is the diffculty of gathering
evidence and mounting a prosecution for that offense. This
factor may have been infuential in calibrating the statutes
of limitations for rape and other sexual offenses in more re-
cent years. The trauma inficted by such crimes may im-
pede the gathering of the evidence needed to bring charges.
Victims may be hesitant for some time after the offense
about agreeing to testify. Thus, under current federal law,
many such offenses are subject to no statute of limitations.
See 18 U. S. C. § 3299 (permitting prosecution at any time
for felonies under §§ 2241–2248, 2251–2256, 2258–2260A, and
2421–2429); see also 10 U. S. C. § 843(a) (expressly setting no
limitations period under UCM J for prosecuting rape, sexual
assault, and rape or sexual assault of a child).
This factor—the diffculty of assembling evidence and put-
ting together a prosecution—obviously plays no part in our
Eighth Amendment analysis. As noted, in deciding whether
the Eighth Amendment permits a death sentence for a

78 UNITED
STATES v. BRIGGS
Opinion of the Court
particular category of offenses or offenders, the Court has
looked
to evolving societal standards of decency and has also
rendered its own independent judgment about whether a
death sentence would aptly serve the recognized purposes
of criminal punishment in certain categories of cases. See
Kennedy, 554 U. S., at 419–421, 441–446; Roper, 543 U. S., at
561, 571–575; Atkins, 536 U. S., at 318–321. Some Justices
have eschewed aspects of those approaches and have looked
instead to the original understanding of the Eighth Amend-
ment. See, e. g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, 99–102
(2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U. S., at 348–349
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815,
864, 872–873 (1988) (same); cf. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863,
894, 898–899 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). But under either
method, the inquiry is quite different from the one that a
lawmaker might make in fxing a statute of limitations. Ac-
cordingly, since the ends served by statutes of limitations
differ sharply from those served by provisions like the
Eighth Amendment or Article 55 of the UCM J, it is unlikely
that lawmakers would want to tie a statute of limitations to
judicial interpretations of such provisions.
***
Viewing Article 43(a) in context, we are convinced that
“punishable by death” is a term of art that is defned by the
provisions of the UCM J specifying the punishments for the
offenses it outlaws. And under this interpretation, respond-
ents' prosecutions were timely.
The judgments of the CAAF are reversed, and the cases
are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of these cases.

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 69 (2020)
79
Gorsuch, J., concurring
Justice Gorsuch, concurring.
I
continue to think this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
appeals directly from the CAAF. See Ortiz v. United
States, 585 U. S. 427, 463 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). But
a majority of the Court believes we have jurisdiction, and I
agree with the Court's decision on the merits. I therefore
join the Court's opinion.

80 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
RUTLEDGE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS v.
PHARMA
CEUTICAL CARE MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 18–540. Argued October 6, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020
Pharmacy beneft managers (PBMs) act as intermediaries between phar-
macies and prescription-drug plans. In that role, they reimburse phar-
macies for the cost of drugs covered by prescription-drug plans. To
determine the reimbursement rate for each drug, PBMs develop and
administer maximum allowable cost (MAC) lists. In 2015, Arkansas
passed Act 900, which effectively requires PBMs to reimburse Arkansas
pharmacies at a price equal to or higher than the pharmacy's wholesale
cost. To accomplish this result, Act 900 requires PBMs to timely up-
date their MAC lists when drug wholesale prices increase, Ark. Code
Ann. § 17–92–507(c)(2), and to provide pharmacies an administrative ap-
peal procedure to challenge MAC reimbursement rates, § 17–92–507(c)
(4)(A)(i)(b). Act 900 also permits Arkansas pharmacies to refuse to sell
a drug if the reimbursement rate is lower than its acquisition cost.
§ 17–92–507(e). Respondent Pharmaceutical Care Management Associ-
ation (PCMA), which represents the 11 largest PBMs in the country,
sued, alleging, as relevant here, that Act 900 is pre-empted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Follow-
ing Circuit precedent in a case involving a similar Iowa statute, the
District Court held that ERISA pre-empts Act 900. The Eighth Cir-
cuit affrmed.
Held: Arkansas' Act 900 is not pre-empted by ERISA. Pp. 86–92.
(a) ERISA pre-empts state laws that “relate to” a covered employee
beneft plan. 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). “[A] state law relates to an ERISA
plan if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 147. Act 900 has neither of those impermissible
relationships. Pp. 86–89.
(1) Act 900 does not have an impermissible connection with an
ERISA plan. To determine whether such a connection exists, this
Court asks whether the state law “governs a central matter of plan
administration or interferes with nationally uniform plan administra-
tion.” Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U. S. 312, 320. State rate
regulations that merely increase costs or alter incentives for ERISA
plans without forcing plans to adopt any particular scheme of substan-

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 80 (2020)
81
Syllabus
tive coverage are not pre-empted by ERISA. See New York State Con-
fe
rence of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U. S. 645, 668. Like the law at issue in Travelers, Act 900 is merely a
form of cost regulation that does not dictate plan choices. Pp. 86–88.
(2) Act 900 also does not “refer to” ERISA. It does not “ `ac[t]
immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans,' ” and “ `the existence
of ERISA plans is [not] essential to the law's operation.' ” Gobeille, 577
U. S., at 319–320. Act 900 affects plans only insofar as PBMs may pass
along higher pharmacy rates to plans with which they contract, and Act
900 regulates PBMs whether or not the plans they service fall within
ERISA's coverage. ERISA plans are therefore also not essential to
Act 900's operation. Pp. 88–89.
(b) PCMA's contention that Act 900 has an impermissible connection
with an ERISA plan because its enforcement mechanisms both directly
affect central matters of plan administration and interfere with nation-
ally uniform plan administration is unconvincing. First, its claim that
Act 900 affects plan design by mandating a particular pricing methodol-
ogy for pharmacy benefts is simply a long way of saying that Act 900
regulates reimbursement rates. Second, Act 900's appeal procedure
does not govern central matters of plan administration simply because
it requires administrators to comply with a particular process and may
require a plan to reprocess how much it owes a PBM. Taken to its
logical endpoint, PCMA's argument would pre-empt any suits under
state law that could affect the price or provision of benefts, but this
Court has held that ERISA does not pre-empt “state-law mechanisms
of executing judgments against” ERISA plans, Mackey v. Lanier Col-
lection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 831. Third, allowing
pharmacies to decline to dispense a prescription if the PBM's reimburse-
ment will be less than the pharmacy's cost of acquisition does not inter-
fere with central matters of plan administration. The responsibility for
offering the pharmacy a below-acquisition reimbursement lies frst with
the PBM. Finally, any “operational ineffciencies” caused by Act 900
are insuffcient to trigger ERISA pre-emption, even if they cause plans
to limit benefts or charge plan members higher rates. See De Buono
v. NYSA–ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 U. S. 806, 816.
Pp. 89–92.
891 F. 3d 1109, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of the case. Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion,
post, p. 92.

82 R
UTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASSN.
Counsel
Nicholas J. Bronni, Solicitor General of Arkansas, argued
the
cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Leslie
Rutledge, Attorney General, pro se, Vincent M. Wagner,
Deputy Solicitor General, Asher Steinberg and Dylan L. Ja-
cobs, Assistant Solicitors General, and Shawn J. Johnson, Se-
nior Assistant Attorney General.
Frederick Liu argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Francisco, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, G. William Scott, and Wayne R. Berry.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Catherine M. A. Carroll, Paul R. Q.
Wolfson, Michael B. Kimberly, Matthew A. Waring, and
Sarah P. Hogarth.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Cali-
fornia et al. by Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Michael J.
Mongan, Solicitor General, Matthew Rodriquez, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Joshua Patashnik, Deputy Solicitor General, Kathleen Boergers,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Karli Eisenberg, Deputy At-
torney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdic-
tions as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Kevin G. Clarkson of Alaska,
Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jen-
nings of Delaware, Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia, Ashley
Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Clare E. Connors of
Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Curtis T.
Hill, Jr., of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Daniel
Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Aaron M. Frey of Maine,
Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nes-
sel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi,
Timothy C. Fox of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, Aaron Ford
of Nevada, Gordon MacDonald of New Hampshire, Gurbir S. Grewal of
New Jersey, Letitia James of New York, Hector Balderas of New Mexico,
Joshua H. Stein of North Carolina, Wayne Steneh jem of North Dakota,
Dave Yost of Ohio, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Ellen F. Rosenblum of
Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island,
Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Ken
Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., of Ver-
mont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, Robert W. Ferguson of Washington,
Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; for

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 80 (2020)
83
Opinion of the Court
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Arkansas'
Act 900 regulates the price at which pharmacy
beneft managers reimburse pharmacies for the cost of drugs
covered by prescription-drug plans. The questi on pre-
sented in this case is whether the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., pre-empts Act 900. The
Court holds that the Act has neither an impermissible con-
nection with nor reference to ERISA and is therefore not
pre-empted.
I
A
Pharmacy beneft managers (PBMs) are a little-known but
important part of the process by which many Americans get
their prescription drugs. Generally speaking, PBMs serve
as intermediaries between prescription-drug plans and the
AARP et al. by Dara S. Smith, Barbara A. Jones, and William Alvarado
Rivera; for the AIDS Healthcare Foundation by Laura Boudreau; for the
Alliance for Transparent and Affordable Prescriptions by Daniel L. Geyser
and J. Carl Cecere; for the American Medical Association et al. by Jack R.
Bierig and Aphrodite Kokolis; for the Arkansas Pharmacists Association
et al. by Howard R. Rubin and Robert T. Smith; for the Community Oncol-
ogy Alliance, Inc., et al. by Jonathan E. Levitt and Todd Mizeski; for FMI
et al. by William E. Copley and Saul Cohen; for the National Association of
Chain Drug Stores, Inc., by Adam G. Unikowsky and Don L. Bell II; for the
National Association of Specialty Pharmacy by Robert M. Palumbos, Jona-
than L. Swichar, and Bradley A. Wasser; and for the National Council of
Insurance Legislators by Nathaniel S. Shapo and Thomas P. Peabody.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Academy of
Managed Care Pharmacy by Tacy F. Flint; for America's Health Insurance
Plans, Inc., by Anthony F. Shelley, Dawn E. Murphy-Johnson, Julie
Simon Miller, and Thomas M. Palumbo; for the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America et al. by Helgi C. Walker, Matthew S.
Rozen, and Daryl L. Joseffer; for Employers Health Purchasing Corp. by
Carter G. Phillips and Jennifer J. Clark; for J. B. Hunt Transport Serv-
ices, Inc., by Brandon P. Long, Mark D. Spencer, and Richard D. Nix; and
for the Society of Human Resource Management by Richard B. Lapp,
Camille A. Olson, and Mark Casciari.

84 R
UTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASSN.
Opinion of the Court
pharmacies that benefciaries use. When a benefciary of a
prescr
iption-drug plan goes to a pharmacy to fll a prescrip-
tion, the pharmacy checks with a PBM to determine that
person's coverage and copayment information. After the
benefciary leaves with his or her prescription, the PBM re-
imburses the pharmacy for the prescription, less the amount
of the benefciary's copayment. The prescription-drug plan,
in turn, reimburses the PBM.
The amount a PBM “reimburses” a pharmacy for a drug
is not necessarily tied to how much the pharmacy paid to
purchase that drug from a wholesaler. Instead, PBMs' con-
tracts with pharmacies typically set reimbursement rates ac-
cording to a list specifying the maximum allowable cost
(MAC) for each drug. PBMs normally develop and adminis-
ter their own unique MAC lists. Likewise, the amount that
prescription-drug plans reimburse PBMs is a matter of con-
tract between a given plan and a PBM. A PBM's reim-
bursement from a plan often differs from and exceeds a
PBM's reimbursement to a pharmacy. That difference gen-
erates a proft for PBMs.
In 2015, Arkansas adopted Act 900 in response to concerns
that the reimbursement rates set by PBMs were often too
low to cover pharmacies' costs, and that many pharmacies,
particularly rural and independent ones, were at risk of los-
ing money and closing. 2015 Ark. Acts no. 900. In effect,
Act 900 requires PBMs to reimburse Arkansas pharmacies
at a price equal to or higher than that which the pharmacy
paid to buy the drug from a wholesaler.
Act 900 accomplishes this result through three key en-
forcement mechanisms. First, the Act requires PBMs to
tether reimbursement rates to pharmacies' acquisition costs
by timely updating their MAC lists when drug wholesale
prices increase. Ark. Code Ann. § 17–92–507(c)(2) (Supp.
2019). Second, PBMs must provide administrative appeal
procedures for pharmacies to challenge MAC reimbursement
prices that are below the pharmacies' acquisition costs.

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as: 592 U. S. 80 (2020)
85
Opinion of the Court
§ 17–92–507(c)(4)(A)(i)(b). If a pharmacy could not have
acquired
the drug at a lower price from its typical whole-
saler, a PBM must increase its reimbursement rate to cover
the pharmacy's acquisition cost. § 17–92–507(c)(4)(C)(i)(b).
PBMs must also allow pharmacies to “reverse and rebill”
each reimbursement claim affected by the pharmacy's inabil-
ity to procure the drug from its typical wholesaler at a price
equal to or less than the MAC reimbursement price. § 17–
92–507(c)(4)(C)(iii). Third, and fnally, the Act permits a
pharmacy to decline to sell a drug to a benefciary if the
relevant PBM will reimburse the pharmacy at less than its
acquisition cost. § 17–92–507(e).
B
Respondent Pharmaceutical Care Management Associa-
tion (PCMA) is a national trade association representing the
11 largest PBMs in the country. After the enactment of Act
900, PCMA fled suit in the Eastern District of Arkansas,
alleging, as relevant here, that Act 900 is pre-empted by
ERISA. See 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (ERISA pre-empts “any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter re-
late to any employee beneft plan”).
Before the District Court issued its opinion in response to
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided, in a different case,
that ERISA pre-empts a similar Iowa statute. Pharmaceu-
tical Care Mgmt. Assn. v. Gerhart, 852 F. 3d 722 (2017). The
Eighth Circuit concluded that the Iowa statute was pre-
empted for two reasons. First, it made “implicit reference”
to ERISA by regulating PBMs that administer benefts for
ERISA plans. Id., at 729. Second, it was impermissibly
“connected with” an ERISA plan because, by requiring an
appeal process for pharmacies to challenge PBM reimburse-
ment rates and restricting the sources from which PBMs
could determine pricing, the law limited a plan administra-
tor's ability to control the calculation of drug benefts. Id.,

86 R
UTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASSN.
Opinion of the Court
at 726, 731. Concluding that Arkansas' Act 900 contains
si
milar features, the District Court held that ERISA like-
wise pre-empts Act 900. 240 F. Supp. 3d 951, 958 (ED Ark.
2017). The Eighth Circuit affrmed. 891 F. 3d 1109, 1113
(2018). This Court granted certiorari. 589 U. S. 1127 (2020).
II
ERISA pre-empts “any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee beneft plan”
covered by ERISA. 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). “[A] state law re-
lates to an ERISA plan if it has a connection with or refer-
ence to such a plan.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 147
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Act 900
has neither of those impermissible relationships with an
ERISA plan, ERISA does not pre-empt it.
A
To determine whether a state law has an “impermissible
connection” with an ERISA plan, this Court considers
ERISA's objectives “as a guide to the scope of the state law
that Congress understood would survive.” California Div.
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316, 325 (1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted). ERISA was enacted “to make the benefts
promised by an employer more secure by mandating certain
oversight systems and other standard procedures.” Go-
beille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U. S. 312, 320–321 (2016).
In pursuit of that goal, Congress sought “to ensure that
plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body
of benefts law,” thereby “minimiz[ing] the administrative
and fnancial burden of complying with conficting directives”
and ensuring that plans do not have to tailor substantive
benefits to the par ticu lar ities of mu ltiple jurisdicti ons.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 142 (1990).
ERISA is therefore primarily concerned with preempting
laws that require providers to structure beneft plans in par-

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as: 592 U. S. 80 (2020)
87
Opinion of the Court
ticular ways, such as by requiring payment of specifc bene-
fts,
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85 (1983), or by
binding plan administrators to specifc rules for determining
benefciary status, Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141. A state law may
also be subject to pre-emption if “acute, albeit indirect, eco-
nomic effects of the state law force an ERISA plan to adopt
a certain scheme of substantive coverage.” Gobeille, 577
U. S., at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a short-
hand for these considerations, this Court asks whether a
state law “governs a central matter of plan administration
or interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.”
Ibid. (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). If it
does, it is pre-empted.
Crucially, not every state law that affects an ERISA plan
or causes some disuniformity in plan administration has an
impermissible connection with an ERISA plan. That is es-
pecially so if a law merely affects costs. In New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995), this Court addressed a New
York law that imposed surcharges of up to 13% on hospital
billing rates for patients covered by insurers other than Blue
Cross/Blue Shield (Blues). Plans that bought insurance
from the Blues therefore paid less for New York hospital
services than plans that did not. This Court presumed that
the surcharges would be passed on to insurance buyers, in-
cluding ERISA plans, which in turn would incentivize
ERISA plans to choose the Blues over other alternatives in
New York. Id., at 659. Nevertheless, the Court held that
such an “indirect economic infuence” did not create an im-
permissible connection between the New York law and
ERISA plans because it did not “bind plan administrators to
any particular choice.” Ibid. The law might “affect a
plan's shopping decisions, but it [did] not affect the fact that
any plan will shop for the best deal it can get.” Id., at 660.
If a plan wished, it could still provide a uniform interstate
beneft package. Ibid.

88 R
UTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASSN.
Opinion of the Court
In short, ERISA does not pre-empt state rate regulations
that
merely increase costs or alter incentives for ERISA
plans without forcing plans to adopt any particular scheme
of substantive coverage. Id., at 668; cf. De Buono v. NYSA–
ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 U. S. 806, 816
(1997) (concluding that ERISA did not pre-empt a state tax
on gross receipts for patient services that simply increased
the cost of providing benefts); Dillingham, 519 U. S., at 332
(holding that ERISA did not pre-empt a California statute
that incentivized, but did not require, plans to follow certain
standards for apprenticeship programs).
The logic of Travelers decides this case. Like the New
York surcharge law in Travelers, Act 900 is merely a form
of cost regulation. It requires PBMs to reimburse pharma-
cies for prescription drugs at a rate equal to or higher than
the pharmacy's acquisition cost. PBMs may well pass those
increased costs on to plans, meaning that ERISA plans may
pay more for prescription-drug benefts in Arkansas than in,
say, Arizona. But “cost uniformity was almost certainly not
an object of pre-emption.” Travelers, 514 U. S., at 662.
Nor is the effect of Act 900 so acute that it will effectively
dictate plan choices. See id., at 668. Indeed, Act 900 is less
intrusive than the law at issue in Travelers, which created a
compelling incentive for plans to buy insurance from the
Blues instead of other insurers. Act 900, by contrast, ap-
plies equally to all PBMs and pharmacies in Arkansas. As
a result, Act 900 does not have an impermissible connection
with an ERISA plan.
B
Act 900 also does not “refer to” ERISA. A law refers to
ERISA if it “ `acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA
plans or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to
the law's operation.' ” Gobeille, 577 U. S., at 319–320 (quot-
ing Dillingham, 519 U. S., at 325; ellipsis omitted).
Act 900 does not act immediately and exclusively upon
ERISA plans because it applies to PBMs whether or not
they manage an ERISA plan. Indeed, the Act does not di-

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 80 (2020)
89
Opinion of the Court
rectly regulate health beneft plans at all, ERISA or other-
w
ise. It affects plans only insofar as PBMs may pass along
higher pharmacy rates to plans with which they contract.
ERISA plans are likewise not essential to Act 900's opera-
tion. Act 900 defnes a PBM as any “entity that administers
or manages a pharmacy benefts plan or program,” and it
defnes a “pharmacy benefts plan or program,” in turn, as
any “plan or program that pays for, reimburses, covers the
cost of, or otherwise provides for pharmacist services to indi-
viduals who reside in or are employed in [Arkansas].” Ark.
Code Ann. §§ 17–92–507(a)(7), (9). Under those provisions,
Act 900 regulates PBMs whether or not the plans they serv-
ice fall within ERISA's coverage.
1
Act 900 is therefore anal-
ogous to the law in Travelers, which did not refer to ERISA
plans because it imposed surcharges “regardless of whether
the commercial coverage [was] ultimately secured by an
ERISA plan, private purchase, or otherwise.” 514 U. S., at
656; see also Dillingham, 519 U. S., at 328 (concluding that
the relevant California law did not refer to ERISA plans
because the apprenticeship programs it regulated did not
need to be ERISA programs).
III
PCMA disagrees that Act 900 amounts to nothing more
than cost regulation. It contends that Act 900 has an imper-
missible connection with an ERISA plan because its enforce-
ment mechanisms both directly affect central matters of plan
administration and interfere with nationally uniform plan ad-
ministration. The mechanisms that PCMA identifes, how-
ever, do not require plan administrators to structure their
beneft plans in any particular manner, nor do they lead to
anything more than potential operational ineffciencies.
2
1
PBMs contract with a variety of healthcare plans and programs that
are not covered by ERISA, including Medicaid, Medicare, military, and
market place plans.
2
PCMA does not suggest that Act 900's enforcement mechanisms over-
lap with “fundamental components of ERISA's regulation of plan adminis-
tration.” Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U. S. 312, 323 (2016).

90 R
UTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASSN.
Opinion of the Court
PCMA frst claims that Act 900 affects plan design by man-
dati
ng a particular pricing methodology for pharmacy bene-
fts. As PCMA reasons, while a plan might prefer that
PBMs reimburse pharmacies using a MAC list constructed
with an eye toward containing costs and ensuring predict-
ability, Act 900 ignores that preference and instead requires
PBMs to reimburse pharmacies based on acquisition costs.
But that argument is just a long way of saying that Act 900
regulates reimbursement rates. Requiring PBMs to reim-
burse pharmacies at or above their acquisition costs does not
require plans to provide any particular beneft to any partic-
ular benefciary in any particular way. It simply establishes
a foor for the cost of the benefts that plans choose to pro-
vide. The plans in Travelers might likewise have preferred
that their insurers reimburse hospital services without pay-
ing an additional surcharge, but that did not transform New
York's cost regulation into central plan administration.
3
Act 900's appeal procedure likewise does not govern cen-
tral matters of plan administration. True, plan administra-
tors must “comply with a particular process, subject to state-
specifc deadlines, and [Act 900] dictates the substantive
standard governing the resolution of [an] appeal.” Brief for
Respondent 24. Moreover, if a pharmacy wins its appeal, a
plan, depending on the terms of its contract with a PBM,
may need to recalculate and reprocess how much it (and its
benefciary) owes. But any contract dispute implicating the
cost of a medical beneft would involve similar demands and
could lead to similar results. Taken to its logical endpoint,
PCMA's argument would pre-empt any suits under state law
that could affect the price or provision of benefts. Yet this
Court has held that ERISA does not pre-empt “state-law
mechanisms of executing judgments against ERISA welfare
3
PCMA also points to Act 900's requirement that PBMs update their
MAC lists to refect statutorily mandated prices. But that obligation does
not affect plan design for the same reasons. Moreover, if PBMs were not
required to update their MAC lists, they would be in constant noncompli-
ance with Act 900's cost regulation.

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as: 592 U. S. 80 (2020)
91
Opinion of the Court
beneft plans, even when those mechanisms prevent plan par-
ticipants
from receiving their benefts.” Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 831–832
(1988).
PCMA also argues that Act 900 interferes with central
matters of plan administration by allowing pharmacies to de-
cline to dispense a prescription if the PBM's reimbursement
will be less than the pharmacy's cost of acquisition. PCMA
contends that such a refusal effectively denies plan benefci-
aries their benefts, but that argument misunderstands the
statutory scheme. Act 900 requires PBMs to compensate
pharmacies at or above their acquisition costs. When a
pharmacy declines to dispense a prescription, the responsi-
bility lies frst with the PBM for offering the pharmacy a
below-acquisition reimbursement.
Finally, PCMA argues that Act 900's enforcement mecha-
nisms interfere with nationally uniform plan administration
by creating “operational ineffciencies.” Brief for Respond-
ent 34. But creating ineffciencies alone is not enough to
trigger ERISA pre-emption. See, e. g., Mackey, 486 U. S.,
at 831 (holding that ERISA did not pre-empt a state garnish-
ment procedure despite petitioners' contention that such ac-
tions would impose “substantial administrative burdens and
costs” on plans). PCMA argues that those operational inef-
fciencies will lead to increased costs and, potentially, de-
creased benefts. ERISA does not pre-empt a state law that
merely increases costs, however, even if plans decide to limit
benefts or charge plan members higher rates as a result.
See De Buono, 520 U. S., at 816 (“Any state tax, or other
law, that increases the cost of providing benefts to covered
employees will have some effect on the administration of
ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that every state
law with such an effect is pre-empted by the federal
statute”).
***
In sum, Act 900 amounts to cost regulation that does not
bear an impermissible connection with or reference to

92 R
UTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASSN.
Thomas, J., concurring
ERISA. The judgment of the Eighth Circuit is therefore
re
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.
Justice Thomas, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion in full because it properly applies
our precedents interpreting the pre-emptive effect of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
29 U. S. C. § 1144.
I write separately because I continue to doubt our ERISA
pre-emption jurisprudence. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 577 U. S. 312, 327 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). The
plain text of ERISA suggests a two-part pre-emption test:
(1) do any ERISA provisions govern the same matter as the
state law at issue, and (2) does that state law have a mean-
ingful relationship to ERISA plans? Only if the answers to
both are in the affrmative does ERISA displace state law.
But our precedents have veered from the text, transforming
§ 1144 into a “vague and `potentially boundless'. . . `purposes
and objectives' pre-emption” clause that relies on “general-
ized notions of congressional purposes.” Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U. S. 555, 587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judg-
ment). Although that approach may allow courts to arrive
at the correct result in individual cases, it offers little guid-
ance or predictability. We should instead apply the law as
written.
I
When construing a statutory provision, we begin with the
text. United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 356
(1994). Section 1144(a) provides that certain of ERISA's
provisions “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as

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93
Thomas, J., concurring
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee beneft
plan”
with certain exceptions not relevant in this case.
The term “supersede” precludes reading the statute as cat-
egorically pre-empting any state law related to employee
beneft plans. Rather, it suggests a replacement or substitu-
tion instead of a blanket pre-emption. See Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 2295 (1976) (defning “super-
sede” to mean, among other things, “to take the place of and
outmode by superiority”); District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S. 125, 135–136 (1992) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (noting the word “supersede” is “often
overlooked”).
Where Congress seeks to pre-empt state laws without re-
placing them, it typically uses different words. See, e. g., 84
Stat. 88, codifed in 15 U. S. C. § 1334(b) (stating in a “pre-
emption” section that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
sions of this Act”); 49 U. S. C. § 41713(b)(1) (“[A] State . . .
may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route,
or service of an air carrier”). Congress knows how to write
sweeping pre-emption statutes. But it did not do so here.
Applying the statutory text, the frst step is to ask whether
a provision in ERISA governs the same matter as the dis-
puted state law, and thus could replace it.
The next step is to determine whether the state law “re-
late[s] to” employee beneft plans. 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a).
The Court has expressed concern that a literal reading of
this phrase is so broad that it is meaningless. See New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 655 (1995). But many times it
is the ordinary, not literalist, meaning that is the better one.
See, e. g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 26 (1931)

94 R
UTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASSN.
Thomas, J., concurring
(“vehicle” in the 1930s did not include aircraft because “in
e
veryday speech `vehicle' calls up the picture of a thing mov-
ing on land”). “[A] reasonable person conversant with appli-
cable social conventions” would not understand “relate to” as
covering any state law with a connection to employee beneft
plans, no matter how remote the connection. Manning,
What Divides Textualists From Purposivists? 106 Colum.
L. Rev. 70, 77 (2006); see also California Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc.,
519 U. S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia J., concurring) (interpreting
“relate to” literally would lead to results “no sensible person
could have intended”). If someone, for instance, asserted
that he is “related to Joe,” it would be reasonable to presume
a close familial relationship. No one would assume that the
speaker was referencing a mutual tie to Adam and Eve. So
too here. A state law needs more than a “tenuous, remote,
or peripheral” connection with ERISA plans to trigger the
statute. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 100,
n. 21 (1983); cf. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William
Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 231 (1992) (“ `the law cares
not for trifes' ”).
II
Here, the parties have not pointed to any ERISA provi-
sion that governs the same matter as Act 900. That alone
should resolve the case. But the parties certainly cannot
be faulted for not raising this argument. Our amorphous
precedents have largely ignored this step. E. g., District of
Columbia, 506 U. S., at 129.
Instead, we have asked only if the state law “ `relate[d]
to' ” ERISA plans. Ibid. But this has proved problematic
because of “how much state law § 1144 would pre-empt if
read literally.” Gobeille, 577 U. S., at 328 (Thomas, J., con-
curring). Instead of reverting to the text, however, we de-
cided that “relate to” is so “indetermina[te]” that it cannot
“give us much help drawing the line.” Travelers, 514 U. S.,
at 655.

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95
Thomas, J., concurring
Having paid little attention to the actual statutory test,
we
crafted our own, asking whether the challenged state law
frustrates the “ `objectives' ” of ERISA. Gobeille, 577 U. S.,
at 320. Under this approach, the Court will declare as pre-
empted “state laws based on perceived conficts with broad
federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized
notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied
within the text of federal law.” Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 583
(opinion of Thomas, J.). Our case law states that under an
objectives and purposes pre-emption approach, a state law is
pre-empted if it has a “reference to” or an “impermissible
connection with” ERISA plans. Gobeille, 577 U. S., at 319–
320. But this vague test offered “no more help than” the
“ `relate to' ” one. Travelers, 514 U. S., at 656.
Our more recent efforts to further narrow the test have
just yielded more confusion. A state law references ERISA
only if it “ `acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA
plans. . . or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential
to the law's operation.' ” Gobeille, 577 U. S., at 319–320 (el-
lipsis in original). A connection with ERISA plans is imper-
missible only if it “ `governs. . . a central matter of plan ad-
ministration' ” or “ `interferes with nationally uniform plan
administration.' ” Id., at 320. (ellipsis in original).
1
Al-
though, at frst blush, that may seem more precise than ask-
ing if a law “relates to” ERISA, it has proven just as diffcult
to apply consistently, leading many members of the Court to
suggest still other methods. See, e. g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,
532 U. S. 141, 152 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U. S. 200, 222–224 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Instead of relying on this “accordion-like” test
1
We have also held that a state law might have an impermissible connec-
tion with ERISA plans if the indirect economic effects of the state law
“force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage
or effectively restrict its choice of insurers.” New York State Con ference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645,
668 (1995).

96 R
UTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASSN.
Thomas, J., concurring
that seems to expand or contract depending on the year,
Reece
, The Accordion Type Jurisprudence of ERISA Pre-
empti on Creates Unnecessary Uncer t ai nty, 88 UMKC
L. Rev. 115, 124, n. 71 (2019), perhaps we should just inter-
pret the text as written.
III
Stare decisis concerns need not caution against a return to
the text because the outcomes of our recent cases—if not the
reasoning—are generally consistent with a text-based ap-
proach. Indeed, since Travelers every state law this Court
has held pre-empted involved a matter explicitly addressed
by ERISA provisions. See, e. g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U. S.
833, 843–854 (1997) (pre-empting state law and discussing
ERISA provisions with which it conficts); Aetna Health, 542
U. S., at 204 (holding that states cannot create new causes of
action that confict with ERISA's “ `interlocking, interre-
lated, and interdependent remedial scheme,' ” located in
§ 502(a) of ERISA).
2
But it is not enough for this Court to reach the right con-
clusions. We should do so in the way Congress instructed.
Indeed, although we have generally arrived at the conclu-
sions we would arrive at under a text-based approach, our
capacious, nontextual test encourages departure from the
text. The decision below is testament to that problem. We
2
The Court has found something to be “a central matter of plan adminis-
tration” only when the matter is addressed by ERISA's text. E. g., Egel-
hoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 148 (2001); Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 577 U. S., at 321–322. And if the state law interferes with national
uniformity but ERISA does not address the matter, we have held that the
matter in question does not require uniformity. Travelers, 514 U. S.,
at 662; ante, at 5, (“not every state law that . . . causes some disuniformity
in plan administration” is pre-empted). We have also held that ERISA
does not pre-empt state laws regulating ERISA plans engaging in activity
not regulated by ERISA, like running a hospital. See De Buono v.
NYSA–ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 U. S. 806 (1997).
That makes sense because ERISA has noth i ng to say about those
activities.

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Thomas, J., concurring
unanimously reverse that decision today, but we can hardly
fau
lt judges when they apply the amorphous test that we
gave them. We can and should do better.

98 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
TEXAS v. NEW MEXICO
on
motion for review of the river master’s
nal determination
No. 65, Orig. Argued October 5, 2020—Decided December 14, 2020
The 1949 interstate Pecos River Compact provides for equitable appor-
tionment of the use of the Pecos River's water by New Mexico and
Texas. In a 1988 amended decree in this case, the Court appointed a
River Master to annually calculate New Mexico's obligations to Texas
under the Compact. See Texas v. New Mexico, 485 U. S. 388. The
Court also adopted the River Master's Manual, which elaborates on how
to make the necessary calculations to determine whether New Mexico
is complying with its obligations under the Compact. As relevant, § C.5
of the Manual provides that when water is stored “at the request of
Texas” in a facility in New Mexico, then New Mexico's delivery obliga-
tion “will be reduced by the amount of reservoir losses attributable to
its storage.”
In 2014, a tropical storm caused heavy rainfall in the Pecos River
Basin. To prevent fooding, Texas's Pecos River Commissioner re-
quested that some of the River's water be stored in New Mexico. New
Mexico's Commissioner agreed. Several months later, the water was
released. But critically for purposes of this dispute, a sig nificant
amount of water evaporated while the water was held in New Mexico.
For years thereafter, the States sought to reach an agreement on how
the evaporated water should be accounted for under the Compact. To
permit those negotiations to continue, the River Master outlined a pro-
cedure in 2015 that called for the future resolution of the issue. Neither
State objected. When negotiations eventually broke down, however,
New Mexico fled a motion with the River Master that sought delivery
credit for the evaporated water. As relevant here, the River Master
ruled in New Mexico's favor, rejecting Texas's argument that the motion
was untimely and concluding that the evaporated water was water
stored “at the request of Texas” under § C.5 of the River Master's
Manual.
Held:
1. New Mexico's motion for credit for the evaporated water was not
untimely. Both parties agreed to postpone the River Master's resolu-
tion of the evaporated-water issue. Neither party may now object to
the negotiation procedure outlined by the River Master for resolving
the dispute. P. 105.

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99
Opinion of the Court
2. New Mexico is entitled to delivery credit for the evaporated water.
Sec
tion C.5 of the River Master's Manual resolves this case. Texas re-
quested that New Mexico store water at a facility in New Mexico, and
New Mexico did so, with the understanding that the water belonged
to Texas. Texas's counterarguments—that the stored water was not
actually part of the “Texas allocation” referred to in § C.5, that New
Mexico did not “store” the water for § C.5 purposes, and that Texas
should not be charged for any evaporation occurring from March 15 until
the water was released in August 2015—are unpersuasive. Pp. 106–108.
Motion denied.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ.,
joined. Alito, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, post, p. 108. Barrett, J., took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of the case.
Kyle D. Hawkins, Solicitor General of Texas, argued the
cause for plaintiff. With him on the briefs were Ken Pax-
ton, Attorney General of Texas, Jeffrey C. Mateer, First As-
sistant Attorney General, Bill Davis, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral, Heather Gebelin Hacker, Assistant Solicitor General,
and Abigail M. Frisch, Assistant Attorney General.
Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Special Assistant Attorney General of
New Mexico, argued the cause for defendant. With him on
the brief were Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General of New
Mexico, Tania Maestas, Deputy Attorney General, and Mat-
thew A. Zidovsky, Dominique M. Work, and A. Nathaniel
Chakeres, Special Assistant Attorneys General.
Masha G. Hansford argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae in support of defendant. On the brief
were Solicitor General Francisco, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Frederick Liu, and Christopher B. Rich.
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a case about evaporated water. In the southwest-
ern United States, the Pecos River begins near Santa Fe,
New Mexico, and winds its way south for hundreds of miles
through New Mexico and Texas before fowing into the Rio
Grande River on the Texas-Mexico border. The 1949 inter-

100 TEXAS
v. NEW MEXICO
Opinion of the Court
state Pecos River Compact provides for equitable apportion-
ment
of the use of the River's water by New Mexico and Texas.
The dispute in this case started in 2014 when a tropical
storm hit the Pecos River Basin. To prevent fooding, Texas
asked New Mexico to temporarily store water from the
Pecos River that would otherwise fow into Texas. New
Mexico agreed to do so. A few months later, New Mexico
released the water to Texas. But in the interim, some of
the water evaporated.
The question presented is straightforward: Under the
Pecos River Compact, does New Mexico receive delivery
credit for the evaporated water even though that water was
not delivered to Texas? The answer is yes. The River
Master's Manual, which was approved by this Court in 1988,
implements the Compact and speaks directly to this ques-
tion: When water is stored in New Mexico “at the request of
Texas,” then New Mexico's delivery obligation “will be re-
duced by the amount of reservoir losses attributable to its
storage.” App. to Texas's Motion for Review 37a. Here,
the water was stored in New Mexico at the request of Texas,
so New Mexico's delivery obligation must be reduced by the
amount of water that evaporated during its storage.
For that reason, the River Master awarded New Mexico
delivery credit for the evaporated water. We agree with the
River Master's determination, and we deny Texas's motion
for review.
I
A
The Pecos River originates in the Sangre de Cristo Moun-
tains east of Santa Fe, New Mexico. The River fows south
into Texas, winding its way for hundreds of miles past the
oil felds, farms, ranches, and high school football stadiums
of west Texas. About 900 miles later, the Pecos pours into
the Rio Grande River a few miles west of the city of Del Rio
on the Texas-Mexico border.

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101
Opinion of the Court
Because of the dry landscape, farmers and ranchers in
N
ew Mexico and west Texas have long depended on Pecos
River water. Over time, Texas recognized that its water
supply was vulnerable because upriver New Mexico could (if
it wanted) restrict Texas's access to the water from the Pecos
River. Eventually, the two States struck a deal. In 1949,
the States ratifed and Congress approved the Pecos River
Compact to, among other things, “provide for the equitable
division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the
Pecos River” and “remove causes of present and future con-
troversies.” Art. I, 63 Stat. 160.
Because of the irregular fow of the Pecos River, the Com-
pact does not enumerate a specifc amount of water that New
Mexico must deliver to Texas each year. Rather, Article
III(a) of the Compact provides that “New Mexico shall not
deplete by man's activities the fow of the Pecos River at the
New Mexico-Texas state line below an amount which will
give to Texas a quantity of water equivalent to that available
to Texas under the 1947 condition.” Id., at 161.
Article VI(c) of the Compact in turn prescribes a method-
ology to implement Article III(a) and determine whether
New Mexico has met its annual delivery obligation: “the
infow-outfow method.” Id., at 163. Roughly speaking,
the infow-outfow method looks at how much water is in the
River in New Mexico, which in turn helps determine how
much water New Mexico must allow to fow into Texas.
In 1987, after a number of early disputes, this Court deter-
mined that New Mexico was not allowing suffcient water to
fow into Texas and was therefore breaching its Article III(a)
obligations. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U. S. 124, 127–128.
The Court issued a decree setting forth the States' rights
and duties. Id., at 135. In addition, in light of the States'
“natural propensity” to disagree, the Court decided to ap-
point a disinterested River Master “to make the calculations
provided for in this decree, annually and as promptly as pos-
sible as data are available.” Id., at 134.

102 TEXAS
v. NEW MEXICO
Opinion of the Court
In 1988, the Court appointed Neil S. Grigg as River Mas-
ter
, and he continues to serve in that position. Texas v. New
Mexico, 485 U. S. 388, 394 (per curiam). The Court also is-
sued an amended decree. The amended decree requires the
River Master to annually calculate: (i) New Mexico's delivery
obligation; (ii) any shortfall or overage based on what New
Mexico actually delivered; and (iii) the net shortfall, if any,
after subtracting any overages accumulated in previous
years. Id., at 391.
In making those calculations, the River Master must abide
by the River Master's Manual, which the Court described as
“an integral part of this Decree.” Id., at 389; see also id., at
391. New Mexico ordinarily receives credit only for water
that actually makes its way to Texas. But there are excep-
tions. Sometimes, as in this case, water may be stored in
New Mexico at Texas's request. Section C.5 of the River
Master's Manual addresses that situation. It is titled “Texas
Water Stored in New Mexico Reservoirs.” App. to Texas's
Motion for Review 37a. As relevant here, § C.5 provides:
“If a quantity of the Texas allocation is stored in facili-
ties constructed in New Mexico at the request of Texas,
then . . . this quantity will be reduced by the amount of
reservoir losses attributable to its storage, and, when
released for delivery to Texas, the quantity released less
channel losses is to be delivered by New Mexico at the
New Mexico-Texas state line.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
Procedurally, the decree (i) directs the River Master to
deliver an annual preliminary report to the States by May
15; (ii) requires the States to submit any objections prior to
June 15; (iii) specifes that the River Master deliver a fnal
report by July 1; and (iv) mandates that a State fle any re-
quest for review of the fnal report in this Court within 30
days of the fnal report. Texas, 485 U. S., at 391, 393. Each
State appoints a single Pecos River Commissioner to repre-
sent the State's interests.

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103
Opinion of the Court
B
In
the fall of 2014, Tropical Storm Odile caused heavy rain-
fall in the Pecos River Basin. The rain quickly flled a Texas
reservoir known as Red Bluff Reservoir. Red Bluff lies just
south of the New Mexico-Texas border along the Pecos
River, about 50 miles west of Kermit, Texas.
In November 2014, to prevent fooding, Texas's Pecos
River Commissioner wrote to his counterpart Commissioner
in New Mexico: “[I]t is my request that New Mexico store
Texas' portion of the fows until such time as they can be
utilized in Red Bluff Reservoir.” App. to Texas's Motion for
Review 61a. In response, New Mexico's Commissioner
agreed that water would be stored at the Brantley Reservoir
in New Mexico, a reservoir owned by the United States.
But he also explained that the water “belongs to Texas” and
that “[b]ut for Texas' request, New Mexico would have re-
leased” the water “to the Texas state line.” Id., at 63a.
The New Mexico Commissioner added that “[e]vaporative
losses . . . should thus be borne by Texas.” Ibid.
Beginning in August 2015, the water was fnally released
to Texas. But there was a problem: During the time that
the water was stored in New Mexico, a signifcant amount of
water (approximately 21,000 acre-feet) evaporated.
During the early months of 2015, Texas and New Mexico
discussed how to account for that evaporated water under
the Compact. But they did not reach an agreement. In
May 2015, the River Master issued his preliminary report for
2014. The preliminary report did not account for the evapo-
rated water, but instead explained that the States would be
“evaluating the issue and sending a recommendation about
how to proceed.” App. to State of New Mexico's Response 38.
The States still had not agreed on a course of action as of
the July 1, 2015, deadline for the River Master's fnal report.
Because the States had not submitted a joint proposal, the
fnal report reiterated that the dispute over the water would
be resolved later. In a section titled “Pending Issues,” the

104 TEXAS
v. NEW MEXICO
Opinion of the Court
report explained that the “States can reach agreement” or,
i
f not, either “State can initiate a motion to be considered by
the River Master.” Id., at 61.
Importantly, neither State objected to the preliminary or
fnal reports for 2014. In other words, neither State op-
posed the ongoing procedure outlined by the River Master
for resolving this dispute. In the months and years that fol-
lowed, the States continued to toil away on a joint proposal
for the River Master. But the negotiations between the
States eventually broke down, and in 2018, New Mexico fled
a motion with the River Master seeking delivery credit for
the evaporated water.
In September 2018, as relevant here, the River Master
ruled in favor of New Mexico. First, he rejected Texas's
argument that New Mexico had waited too long to fle its
motion for credit for the evaporated water. He stated that
“discussions about the food and accounting for it equitably
were continuous from the time the food occurred until the
present”; that the States “knew from the time of the food that
such an adjustment would be required”; and that the States
had not previously expressed any urgency about resolving the
matter. App. to Texas's Motion for Review 269a–270a.
Second, on the merits, the River Master concluded that the
evaporated water was “Texas Water Stored in New Mexico
Reservoirs” under § C.5 of the River Master 's Manua l.
Applying that provision of the Manual, the River Master de-
cided that New Mexico was entitled to delivery credit for the
evaporated water.
1
1
We note four aspects of the River Master's decision that are not at
issue here. First, the River Master determined that these stored waters
were not “unappropriated food waters” for purposes of the Compact.
Art. III(f ), 63 Stat. 161. Neither State challenges that determination.
Second, the River Master ruled that the States should be equally charged
for evaporation that occurred before March 1, 2015, because public safety
concerns in both States counseled against releasing the water before that
date. That aspect of the River Master's decision is likewise not at issue
in this Court. Third, in ruling for New Mexico, the River Master did not

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105
Opinion of the Court
In the wake of the River Master's decision, Texas invoked
th
is Court's original jurisdiction and fled a motion for re-
view of the River Master's determination.
II
Texas frst argues that New Mexico's 2018 motion to the
River Master for credit for the evaporated water was un-
timely. According to Texas, New Mexico fled the motion
after expiration of the amended decree's 30-day deadline for
a State to fle objections to the relevant preliminary report—
a deadline that in this case would have expired several years
ago. See Texas, 485 U. S., at 391.
Texas's argument disregards the history of the proceed-
ings in this case. Both States agreed to postpone the River
Master's resolution of the evaporated-water issue while they
negotiated and sought an agreement. The River Master's
annual reports in turn repeatedly explained that the States
were trying to negotiate a solution to the issue. Neither
State objected to the negotiation procedure. Texas cannot
now run away from the procedure that it agreed to.
Texas responds that the amended decree's deadlines for
objections are jurisdictional, meaning that the River Master
and the States could not postpone the deadlines for objecting
to the reports. But those time limits are plainly not juris-
dictional. Among other things, the time limits do not
“ `speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the
jurisdiction' ” of this Court. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562
U. S. 428, 438 (2011) (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394 (1982)).
We proceed to the merits.
rely on Article XII of the Compact, which applies to “consumptive use of
water by the United States.” Id., at 165. Although Texas asks us to
overturn the River Master's determination, Texas agrees that Article XII
does not apply here. We therefore need not address that provision.
Fourth, the River Master amended the Manual. That amendment does
not affect our resolution of this case, so we need not address it.

106 TEXAS
v. NEW MEXICO
Opinion of the Court
III
On
the merits, Texas contends that it should receive credit
for the water that evaporated while New Mexico was storing
the water. New Mexico and the United States argue that
Texas is not entitled to credit because the water was stored
in New Mexico at Texas's request. We agree with New
Mexico and the United States.
Recall that Article VI(c) of the Compact provides that “the
infow-outfow method . . . shall be used” to calculate New
Mexico's Article III(a) delivery obligation. 63 Stat. 163.
To implement the Compact, as we have explained, this
Court's 1988 amended decree adopted the River Master's
Manual, which elaborates on how to make the proper calcula-
tions. See Texas, 485 U. S., at 389 (describing the Manual
as “an integral part of this Decree”). In particular, since
1988, the Manual has included § C.5, which states:
“If a quantity of the Texas allocation is stored in facili-
ties constructed in New Mexico at the request of Texas,
then . . . this quantity will be reduced by the amount of
reservoir losses attributable to its storage, and, when
released for delivery to Texas, the quantity released less
channel losses is to be delivered by New Mexico at the
New Mexico-Texas state line.” App. to Texas's Motion
for Review 37a (emphasis added).
We agree with the River Master that the text of § C.5 of
the Manual easily resolves this case. Texas's Pecos River
Commissioner asked that the water be stored at a facility in
New Mexico when, in November 2014, he sent New Mexico's
Commissioner an e-mail with the plainspoken subject line
“Texas request for storage.” Id., at 61a. In that e-mail,
Texas requested that New Mexico hold Texas's “portion of
the fows until such time as they can be utilized in Red Bluff
Reservoir.” Ibid. New Mexico did so. But New Mexico
was careful to remind Texas that the water “belongs to
Texas,” and that, “[b]ut for Texas' request, New Mexico

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107
Opinion of the Court
would have released” the water “to the Texas state line.”
Id.
, at 63a. New Mexico also added (correctly, as it turns
out) that “[e]vaporative losses . . . should thus be borne by
Texas.” Ibid.
The text of § C.5 and the record evidence of the States'
correspondence establish that New Mexico is entitled to de-
livery credit for the water that evaporated while New Mex-
ico was storing the water at Texas's request.
In response, Texas offers various arguments, but none is
persuasive.
First, Texas suggests that the stored water was not actu-
ally part of the “Texas allocation” referred to in § C.5 of the
Manual. But under that provision, Texas's “allocation” is
the amount of water that Texas would have received if the
water had not been stored in New Mexico. See Compact,
Art. III(a), 63 Stat. 161 (entitling Texas to the “quantity of
water equivalent to that available to Texas under the 1947
condition”); Art. VI(c), id., at 163 (requiring the use of the
“infow-outfow method”). Here, Texas requested that New
Mexico store water that otherwise would have fowed across
the state line and counted toward Texas's allocation. The
stored water was therefore part of Texas's allocation under
§ C.5.
Second, Texas asserts that New Mexico did not “store” the
water for purposes of § C.5. Texas suggests that the term
“stored” in that provision means holding the water long-term
for benefcial use. But § C.5 of the Manual does not purport
to defne “stored” in any way other than its ordinary mean-
ing of holding water for Texas. Consistent with that ordi-
nary meani ng, the St ates reg u lar ly used var iati ons of
the term “store” to describe the storage of the water in this
case. Indeed, Texas's initial request to New Mexico came in
an e-mail with the hard-to-misunderstand subject line
“Texas request for storage.” App. to Texas's Motion for Re-
view 61a. For purposes of § C.5, New Mexico stored the
water.

108 TEXAS
v. NEW MEXICO
Opinion of Alito, J.
Third, Texas contends that it did not request that the
water
be stored in New Mexico after March 2015. There-
fore, according to Texas, any evaporation that occurred from
March 2015 until the water was released to Texas in August
2015 should be charged to New Mexico. But Texas initially
requested storage in November 2014. Even as late as July
2015, shortly before the water was released, Texas still had
not requested the release of the water. Because Texas did
not rescind its request for storage or otherwise ask for re-
lease before August 2015, the River Master did not err in
awarding New Mexico delivery credit for evaporation that
occurred after March 2015.
***
The water was stored in New Mexico at the request of
Texas. Some of the water then evaporated before it was
released to Texas. Under those circumstances, as the River
Master correctly concluded, New Mexico is entitled to deliv-
ery credit for the evaporated water. That result is both le-
gally accurate and entirely fair. We deny Texas's motion
for review.
2
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court's rejection of Texas's argument
that New Mexico forfeited any objection to the River Mas-
2
The Court has previously stated that the River Master's determina-
tions are reviewed only for clear error. Texas v. New Mexico, 485 U. S.
388, 393 (1988) (per curiam) (a fnal determination “shall be subject to
review by this Court only on a showing that the Final Determination is
clearly erroneous”). Here, New Mexico prevails even under de novo re-
view, so the standard of review does not affect our judgment in this case.

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 98 (2020)
109
Opinion of Alito, J.
ter's 2014 report because it did not fle an objection by the
deadl
ine imposed by the amended decree. On this issue,
there were violations all around. The River Master violated
the deadlines imposed by the amended decree for fling his
reports. See Texas v. New Mexico, 485 U. S. 388, 391 (1988)
(per curiam); App. to State of New Mexico's Response 61.
New Mexico did not fle its objections in time, see Texas v.
New Mexico, 485 U. S., at 391; App. to State of New Mexico's
Response 38, 59–61, and Texas essentially acquiesced for
months, if not years, see Texas's Motion for Review 9; App.
to Texas's Motion for Review 269a. Under the circum-
stances, Texas forfeited its objection. Going forward, the
States and the River Master should take better care to abide
by the terms of the amended decree.
On the question whether the River Master properly allo-
cated the water that evaporated, I would vacate and remand,
with instructions to the River Master to redo his analysis in
accordance with the relevant terms of the amended decree
and the manual. In sanctioning the River Master's handling
of this issue, the Court ignores critical facts. The decision
to store the water, as well as the decision eventually to re-
lease it, was made by the federal Bureau of Reclamation.
Id., at 68a–69a, 236a; App. to State of New Mexico's Re-
sponse 93. The Federal Government asserts that the water
was held for food control purposes, Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 7–8; App. to Texas's Motion for Review
68a. And, because Texas was not a party to a contract for
storage, it appears that it would have been unlawful for the
federal authorities to store the water simply because Texas
requested that they do so. Id., at 68a; see also Warren Act,
43 U. S. C. § 523.
In light of these facts, the relevance of Texas's request for
storage and New Mexico's agreement with that request is
unclear. Perhaps the States' exchange of e-mails should be
seen as simply an agreement that the Bureau should hold
the water to prevent fooding. Perhaps the River Master

110 TEXAS
v. NEW MEXICO
Opinion of Alito, J.
thought that the Bureau acted ultra vires and stored the
water
for all or part of the time in question simply because
Texas so requested. In any event, it is necessary to ft to-
gether in a coherent picture the actions taken by the federal
and state authorities. I would instruct the River Master to
tackle that task in the frst instance on remand.
Unless the River Master determines that the water was
not held for food control purposes for the entirety of the
time in question, it should analyze how evaporative losses of
water kept for those purposes should be treated. There are
several possibilities.
One is that the water constituted “unappropriated food
waters.” Pecos River Compact, Art. II(i), 63 Stat. 161; see
also Art. III(f ), ibid.; Art. VI(d), id., at 164. The River Mas-
ter has already held that the water did not fall into this cate-
gory, and neither State disputes that fnding. See Texas's
Motion for Review 13; New Mexico's Response 13–14. Un-
less the River Master or the States have second thoughts on
remand, that possibility can be ruled out.
Another possibility is that evaporation of the water in
questi on represented “consumptive use” by the United
States. Art. XII, 63 Stat. 165. If that is so, the Compact
specifes how such consumptive use is to be handled. Ibid.
And a third possibility is that the water does not fall into
either of the above categories.
Finally, I would hold that the River Master's amendment
to the manual, insofar as it changed the deadlines imposed
by the amended decree, is invalid. The River Master does
not have the authority to alter the amended decree. See
Texas v. New Mexico, 485 U. S., at 391. The Court declines
to reach this question because it concludes that it has no
effect on the principal issues before us, but I would clarify
the status of this amendment so that the River Master will
conform to the terms of the amended decree going forward.
By declining to reach this question, the Court may be invit-
ing future problems.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
111
Syllabus
SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
v. KAYER
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 19–1302. Decided December 14, 2020
After being found guilty of frst-degree murder by an Arizona jury, re-
spondent George Kayer sought “to expedite the sentencing process” and
refused to fully cooperate with a mitigation specialist. Arizona law at
that time authorized a judge to impose a sentence of death upon the
showing of at least one qualifying aggravating circumstance and no miti-
gating circumstance suffcient to call for leniency. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13–703. At sentencing, the judge found that the State had
proved two aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and that
Kayer had demonstrated only one nonstatutory mitigating factor.
Weighing those factors, the trial judge sentenced Kayer to death, and
the Arizona Supreme Court affrmed.
Kayer subsequently fled a petition for postconviction relief in Arizona
Superior Court in which he argued that he had received ineffective as-
sistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to investigate mitigating
circumstances. Following a 9-day evidentiary hearing, the state court
applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, and denied relief. The
court concluded that trial counsel's performance was not defcient given
Kayer's refusal to cooperate and, in the alternative, that Kayer would
have suffered no prejudice even if his counsel's performance had been
defcient. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Kayer's petition for fur-
ther review. Kayer then fled a habeas petition in Federal District
Court. The District Court re jected Kayer 's ineffective-assistance
claim, but a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that Kayer's
attorneys should have begun to pursue mitigation evidence promptly
after their appointment and that trial counsel's alleged failings likely
affected Kayer's sentence.
Held: The court below erred in ordering issuance of a writ of habeas cor-
pus despite ample room for reasonable disagreement about the prison-
er's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Pp. 117–124.
(a) Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), state courts play the leading role in assessing challenges
to state sentences based on federal law. A federal habeas court may
not disturb a state-court adjudication applying the correct legal stand-
ard unless it is so obviously wrong that its error lies “beyond any possi-

112 SHINN
v. KAYER
Per Curiam
bility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S.
86,
103. Because the state court here appropriately assessed Kayer's
ineffective assistance claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S.
668, the Court examines only whether the state court's decision involved
an “unreasonable application of ” this Court's precedent, 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d). And because Strickland provides a general standard, the
state court has great latitude “to reasonably determine that a defendant
has not satisfed that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. 111,
123. Pp. 117–119.
(b) The Ninth Circuit's decision conficts with AEDPA and the
Court's precedents. The state court's judgment must stand if a fair-
minded jurist could agree with either of its alternative holdings on def-
cient performance and prejudice. The state court's fnding that Kayer
failed to show prejudice is suffcient for present purposes. The most
probable reason for the state court's no-prejudice determination is sim-
ply that the new mitigation evidence offered in the postconviction pro-
ceeding did not create a substantial likelihood of a different sentencing
outcome. Reasonable jurists could debate that conclusion, but it is not
obviously wrong or beyond the possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Kayer relies on State v. Brookover, 124 Ariz. 38—a decision vacating a
death sentence in a different capital case—but capital sentencing neces-
sarily involves an individualized determination, and prior decisions on
that topic are unlikely to provide clear guidance about how courts would
weigh evidence in other cases. Here, the Brookover decision falls far
short of placing the state court's prejudice determination beyond the
realm of fairminded disagreement. Pp. 119–124.
Certiorari granted; 923 F. 3d 692, vacated and remanded.
Per Curiam.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) restricts the power of federal courts to grant
writs of habeas corpus based on claims that were “adjudi-
cated on the merits” by a state court. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
When a state court has applied clearly established federal
law to reasonably determined facts in the process of adjudi-
cating a claim on the merits, a federal habeas court may not
disturb the state court's decision unless its error lies “beyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011). In this case, the Court
of Appeals erred in ordering issuance of a writ of habeas

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 111 (2020)
113
Per Curiam
corpus despite ample room for reasonable disagreement
about
the prisoner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals clearly violated this
Court's AEDPA jurisprudence. We therefore grant the pe-
tition for certiorari and vacate the judgment below.
I
A
Respondent George Kayer murdered Delbert Haas in
1994. Haas, Kayer, and Lisa Kester were on a trip to gam-
ble in Laughlin, Nevada. While there, Kayer borrowed
money from Haas and lost it gambling. Kayer then devised
a plan to rob Haas, but Kester questioned whether he could
get away with robbing someone he knew. Kayer responded,
“ `I guess I'll just have to kill him.' ” State v. Kayer, 194
Ariz. 423, 428, 984 P. 2d 31, 36 (1999). While the three drove
home, Kayer took a detour to a secluded area and stopped
on the side of a dirt road. After Haas exited the vehicle to
urinate, Kayer grabbed a gun, sneaked up to him, and shot
him pointblank in the head. After dragging Haas' body into
some bushes, Kayer stole his wallet, watch, and jewelry, and
drove away. Kayer soon realized that he had forgotten to
take Haas' house keys, and he therefore returned to the
scene of the crime. Fearing that Haas might not be dead,
Kayer shot him in the head again while retrieving his keys.
Subsequently, Kayer stole a variety of frearms and other
things of value from Haas' home after instructing Kester to
use a police scanner to look out for police activity. The two
sold many of the stolen items under aliases, but Kayer was
arrested after Kester went to the police. After a jury trial
before Judge William T. Kiger, Kayer was found guilty of
premeditated frst-degree murder and related offenses.
After being found guilty, Kayer “made clear his desire to
expedite the sentencing process.” Id., at 429, 984 P. 2d, at
37. He refused to fully cooperate with a mitigation special-
ist. When Kayer's counsel stated that the specialist needed

114 SHINN
v. KAYER
Per Curiam
more time to evaluate Kayer's case, Kayer refused to agree
to
a continuance, and the trial court ruled him competent to
make that choice. At sentencing, the judge again asked
Kayer whether he would like more time for investigation,
but Kayer “refused the offer and stated he would not cooper-
ate with [the specialist] no matter how long sentencing was
delayed.” Id., at 429–430, 984 P. 2d, at 37–38.
The court proceeded to sentencing. At that time, Arizona
law required a judge, not a jury, to determine whether cer-
tain aggravating circumstances had been established, and a
judge was authorized to impose a sentence of death only if
at least one such aggravating circumstance was shown and
there was no mitigating circumstance that was suffcient to
call for leniency. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–703 (Supp.
1998); cf. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 609 (2002) (subse-
quently requiring juries “to fnd an aggravating circum-
stance necessary for imposition of the death penalty”). In
Kayer's case, the judge found that the State had proved two
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the
court concluded that Kayer had been “previously convicted
of a serious offense,” § 13–703(F)(2), based on his conviction
for frst-degree burglary in 1981, see § 13–703(H)(9); Kayer,
194 Ariz., at 433, 984 P. 2d, at 41. Second, it determined
that Kayer murdered Haas for “pecuniary gain,” see § 13–
703(F)(5). On the other side of the balance, the court found
that Kayer had demonstrated only one nonstatutory mitiga-
tor: his importance in his son's life. Weighing the aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors, Judge Kiger sentenced Kayer to
death, and the Arizona Supreme Court affrmed his convic-
tion and sentence.
B
Kayer subsequently fled a petition for postconviction re-
lief in Arizona Superior Court. Among his many claims,
Kayer argued that he received ineffective assistance of coun-
sel because his attorneys failed to investigate mitigating cir-

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 111 (2020)
115
Per Curiam
cumstances at the outset of the criminal proceedings. The
sentenci
ng judge held a 9-day evidentiary hearing.
Kayer's evidence at the hearing broke down into four main
categories: evidence that he was addicted to alcohol and gam-
bling; evidence that he had suffered a heart attack about six
weeks before the murder; evidence of mental illness, includ-
ing a diagnosis of bipolar disorder; and evidence that mem-
bers of his family had suffered from similar addictions and
illnesses in the past and that this had affected his childhood.
See Kayer v. Ryan, 923 F. 3d 692, 708–713 (CA9 2019) (de-
scribing evidence in detail).
The court denied relief after applying the familiar two-
part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668
(1984). The court found that trial counsel's performance
was not defcient because Kayer had refused to cooperate
with his mitigation team's efforts to gather more mitigation
evidence. And, in the alternative, the court held that “if
there had been a fnding that the performance prong of the
Strickland standard had been met, . . . no prejudice to the
defendant can be found.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 189. The
court added that “[i]n stating this conclusion[, it] ha[d] con-
sidered the assertion of mental illness, physical illness, jail
conditions, childhood development, and any alcohol or gam-
bling addictions.” Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court de-
nied Kayer's petition to review the denial of postconviction
relief. State v. Kayer, No. CR–07–0163–PC (Nov. 7, 2007).
C
Kayer then fled an unsuccessful habeas petition in Federal
District Court. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254. Relevant here, the
District Court rejected Kayer's ineffective-assistance claim
for failure to show prejudice. As an initial matter, the court
concluded that Kayer could not “show prejudice because he
waived an extension of the sentencing date and thereby
waived present ati on of the fu ll-sca le mitigati on case. ”
Kayer v. Ryan, 2009 WL 3352188, *21 (D Ariz., Oct. 19, 2009)

116 SHINN
v. KAYER
Per Curiam
(citing Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U. S. 465 (2007)). More-
over
, the court reasoned that Kayer's mitigation evidence
“fell short of the type of mitigation information that would
have i nfluenced the sentenci ng decisi on. ” 2009 WL
3352188, *21.
A divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed. On the question
of trial counsel's performance, the panel rejected the state
court's judgment because, in the judgment of the panel, Kay-
er's attorneys should have begun to pursue mitigation evi-
dence promptly after their appointment. And on the ques-
tion of prejudice, the court conducted its own review of the
evidence and found that trial counsel's alleged failings likely
affected Kayer's sentence. Based on a “comparison of Kay-
er's case with other Arizona cases,” the panel drew two con-
clusions: frst, that “the evidence he presented to the [state
postconviction] court was suffcient to establish a statutory
mitigating circumstance” of mental impairment, 923 F. 3d, at
718, and second, that there was a reasonable probability that
the Arizona Supreme Court would have vacated Kayer's
death sentence on direct review had it been presented with
the mitigating evidence offered at the state postconviction
relief hearing. For these reasons, the panel majority found
that “there is a reasonable probability Kayer's sentence
would have been less than death, and that the state [postcon-
viction] court was unreasonable in concluding otherwise.”
Id., at 723.
Judge Owens dissented in relevant part, explaining that
the Arizona postconviction court had not unreasonably ap-
plied federal law in light of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in this case. In his view, Kayer's mitigating
evidence was “hardly overwhelming,” and he argued that the
majority had given short shrift to the “undisputedly strong
aggravating factor” of pecuniary gain. Id., at 727. The ma-
jority's holding, he concluded, resulted from “impermissibly
substitut[ing] its own judgment that Kayer was prejudiced”
for that of the state court. Ibid.

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 111 (2020)
117
Per Curiam
Arizona then sought, and the Ninth Circuit denied, rehear-
i
ng en banc. Judge Bea authored a dissent from the denial
of en banc review, which was joined by 11 other judges. See
Kayer v. Ryan, 944 F. 3d 1147, 1156 (2019). Judge Bea as-
serted that “the panel majority cast aside . . . AEDPA's
highly deferential standard of review.” Id., at 1158. In-
stead, he wrote, the panel majority had applied a “de-novo-
masquerading-as-deference approach” that the “Supreme
Court has repeatedly condemned.” Id., at 1168; see also id.,
at 1157, n. 1 (citing 14 cases since 2002 in which this Court
has reversed the Ninth Circuit's application of AEDPA).
Under AEDPA and this Court's precedent, he contended,
“there [was] no ignoring the obvious conclusion that a rea-
sonable jurist could conclude that Kayer was not in fact prej-
udiced by his counsel's failings in this case.” Id., at 1164.
The mitigating impact of Kayer's new evidence was, at best,
“highly debatable.” Id., at 1169 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Applying the proper standard of review, Judge
Bea explained that “it [was] possible that fairminded jurists
could fnd [Kayer's] evidence insuffcient to establish a rea-
sonable probability of a different outcome.” Id., at 1168
(citing Richter, 562 U. S., at 102).
After the denial of rehearing en banc, Arizona fled a peti-
tion for certiorari in this Court.
II
A
Kayer asserts that his death sentence was imposed in vio-
lation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. As the state court recognized, this Court's deci-
sion in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), pro-
vides the proper framework for assessing that claim. Under
Strickland, Kayer must show that his counsel provided “de-
fcient” performance that “prejudiced the defense.” Id., at
687. In the capital sentencing context, the prejudice inquiry
asks “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent

118 SHINN
v. KAYER
Per Curiam
the errors, the sentencer—including an appellate court, to
the
extent it independently reweighs the evidence—would
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances did not warrant death.” Id., at 695. The
Strickland standard is “highly demanding.” Kimmelman
v. Morrison, 477 U. S. 365, 382 (1986). A reasonable proba-
bility means a “ `substantial,' not just `conceivable,' likelihood
of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170,
189 (2011) (quoting Richter, 562 U. S., at 112).
When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is pre-
sented in a federal habeas petition, a state prisoner faces
additional burdens. Among other things, no relief may be
granted “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudica-
tion of the claim,” as relevant here, “resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d).
Here, the state court applied “the correct governing legal
principle . . . to the facts of the prisoner's case,” Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 75 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted), so the question is whether its decision involved an
“unreasonable application of ” this Court's precedent. To
meet that standard, a prisoner must show far more than that
the state court's decision was “merely wrong ” or “even clear
error.” Virginia v. LeBlanc, 582 U. S. 91, 94 (2017) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prisoner
must show that the state court's decision is so obviously
wrong that its error lies “beyond any possibility for fair-
minded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U. S., at 103. Con-
gress “meant” this standard to be “diffcult to meet.” Id.,
at 102.
We have recognized the special importance of the AEDPA
framework in cases involving Strickland claims. Ineffective-
assistance claims can function “as a way to escape rules of

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 111 (2020)
119
Per Curiam
waiver and forfeiture,” Richter, 562 U. S., at 105, and they
can
drag federal courts into resolving questions of state law.
Moreover, we have recognized that “the more general the
rule, the more leeway state courts have.” Sexton v. Beau-
dreaux, 585 U. S. 961, 968 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting Re-
nico v. Lett, 559 U. S. 766, 776 (2010); quotation modifed).
“[B]ecause the Strickland standard is a general standard, a
state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine
that a defendant has not satisfed that standard.” Knowles
v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. 111, 123 (2009).
B
The Ninth Circuit resolved this case in a manner funda-
mentally inconsistent with AEDPA. Most striking, the
panel “essentially evaluated the merits de novo, only tacking
on a perfunctory statement at the end of its analysis assert-
ing that the state court's decision was unreasonable.” Beau-
dreaux, 585 U. S., at 968; see Richter, 562 U. S., at 101–102.
In other words, it appears “to have treated the unreason-
ableness question as a test of its confdence in the result it
would reach under de novo review.” Id., at 102. More spe-
cifcally, the panel concluded de novo that “there is a reason-
able probability Kayer's sentence would have been less than
death,” and then simply appended the statement that “the
state [postconviction review] court was unreasonable in con-
cluding otherwise.” 923 F. 3d, at 723. Indeed, the panel
repeatedly reached conclusions—such as that the “evidence
presented to the [postconviction] court established the statu-
tory mitigating circumstance of mental impairment,” id., at
719, and that there was a “causal connection between Kay-
er's mental impairment and the crime,” ibid.—without ever
framing the relevant question as whether a fairminded jurist
could reach a different conclusion.
Applying the proper standard of review, we vacate the
Court of Appeals' judgment. Judge Kiger found that Kayer
had failed to show defcient performance and, assuming def-

120 SHINN
v. KAYER
Per Curiam
cient performance, that he failed to show prejudice.
1
F
ed-
eral courts may not disturb the judgments of state courts
unless “each ground supporting the state court decision is
examined and found to be unreasonable.” Wetzel v. Lam-
bert, 565 U. S. 520, 525 (2012) (per curiam). Thus, if a fair-
minded jurist could agree with either Judge Kiger's def-
ciency or prejudice holding, the reasonableness of the other
is “beside the point.” Id., at 524; see Parker v. Matthews,
567 U. S. 37, 42 (2012) (per curiam) (“[I]t is irrelevant
[whether] the court also invoked a ground of questionable
validity”); Richter, 562 U. S., at 102.
We focus on the state court's prejudice determination.
Insofar as the state court offered its conclusion on the preju-
dice question without articulating its reasoning supporting
that conclusion, we “must determine what arguments or the-
ories . . . could have supported the state court's” determina-
tion that Kayer failed to show prejudice. Id., at 102. Then
we must assess whether “ `fairminded jurists could disagree'
on the correctness of the state court's decision” if based on
one of those arguments or theories. Id., at 101 (quoting
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 664 (2004)); see Pin-
holster, 563 U. S., at 188.
1
Section 2254 calls for review of the “last state-court adjudication on
the merits.” Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. 34, 40 (2011). The Ninth Circuit
treated the Superior Court's decision, rather than the Arizona Supreme
Court's denial of review, as the last state-court adjudication on the merits.
Unreasoned dispositions by appellate courts sometimes qualify as adjudi-
cations on the merits. In those cases, we apply a rebuttable presumption
that the appellate court's decision rested on the same grounds as the rea-
soned decision of a lower court. See Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U. S. 122
(2018). We may assume without deciding that the Arizona Supreme
Court's denial of discretionary review was not a merits adjudication be-
cause we conclude that the Superior Court did not unreasonably apply
federal law. In these circumstances, there would be no need to consider
whether an unreasoned decision of a higher court may have rested on
different grounds than the decision of a lower court.

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as: 592 U. S. 111 (2020)
121
Per Curiam
Perhaps the most probable reason for Judge Kiger's no-
pre
judice determination is simply that the new mitigation
evidence offered in the postconviction proceeding did not
create a substantial likelihood of a different sentencing out-
come. The Ninth Circuit generally considered that possibil-
ity, but in so doing impermissibly “substituted its own judg-
ment for that of the state court” instead of applying
deferential review. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 25
(2002) (per curiam).
2
It characterized Kayer's prior-offense
aggravator (frst-degree burglary) as “relatively weak” in
comparison with other offenses that qualifed under the Ari-
zona capital sentencing law. 923 F. 3d, at 718. And on the
other side of the balance, it attributed considerable weight
to evidence that it viewed as showing that Kayer's “capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was signifcantly im-
paired.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–703(G)(1).
Perhaps some jurists would share those views, but that is
not the relevant standard. The question is whether a fair-
minded jurist could take a different view. See Visciotti, 537
U. S., at 24–27; see also Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 200–202.
And the answer is yes. For one thing, a fairminded jurist
might differently evaluate the effect of Kayer's prior-offense
aggravator (let alone the pecuniary gain aggravator). Ari-
zona frst-degree burglary required as an element that he or
an accomplice was “armed with explosives, a deadly weapon
or a dangerous instrument.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–
2
In its efforts to distinguish Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, the
panel found it “critically important” that Visciotti involved postconviction
review by a State Supreme Court. The panel emphasized that here, by
contrast, it did not “know how the Arizona Supreme Court would have
assessed [the new] evidence on collateral review because the Court denied
without explanation Kayer's petition for review.” Kayer v. Ryan, 923
F. 3d 692, 724 (2019). But the lower court and the parties have not identi-
fed anything in AEDPA or this Court's precedents permitting reduced
deference to merits decisions of lower state courts. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254.

122 SHINN
v. KAYER
Per Curiam
1508(A) (1978). And Judge Kiger determined that Kayer
“was
armed with a .41 caliber handgun” during his prior of-
fense. Excerpts of Record in No. 09–99027 (CA9), p. 935.
A fairminded jurist could see Kayer's past conviction as hav-
ing substantial weight in the context of this murder by
shooting.
Fairminded jurists also could take a different view of Kay-
er's mitigating evidence. Kayer offered evidence that he
suffered from bipolar disorder and untreated drinking and
gambling addictions at the time of the crime, but reasonable
jurists could debate the extent to which these factors sig-
nifcantly impaired his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law at the
time of the murder. For example, the record reveals that
Kayer had extensive opportunities to consider his actions—
planning the murder in advance, driving his victim to a re-
mote area, and subsequently returning to the murder scene
and shooting the victim in the head a second time. More-
over, Kayer's planning of the murder, efforts to hide the
body, interactions with Kester before and after the murder,
and attempts to proft from his crimes using an alias display
a measure of control and intentionality. On this record, a
fairminded jurist reasonably could conclude that Kayer's evi-
dence of mental impairment, in the words of Judge Owens,
was “hardly overwhelming.” 923 F. 3d, at 727; see also 944
F. 3d, at 1168–1171 (Bea, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc).
Kayer counters that his claim is unusually strong because
the Arizona Supreme Court would have “independently re-
weigh[ed] the evidence” on direct appeal. Strickland, 466
U. S., at 695. In his view, the similarity between his post-
conviction case and judgments that the State Supreme Court
has issued in other cases on direct review supports his
Strickland claim. Arizona responds that the State Supreme
Court would not have reweighed the evidence in the manner
contemplated by Strickland. And it asks this Court to hold

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 111 (2020)
123
Per Curiam
that past state judgments on direct review are categorically
irrele
vant to AEDPA review.
We need not address these broad questions in order to
resolve this case. Even if Arizona's sentencing practices in-
volved reweighing evidence on direct appeal, capital sentenc-
ing requires “an individualized determination on the basis
of the character of the individual and the circumstances of
the crime.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 879 (1983).
For present purposes, it suffces to say that, because the
facts in each capital sentencing case are unique, the weighing
of aggravating and mitigating evidence in a prior published
decision is unlikely to provide clear guidance about how a
state court would weigh the evidence in a later case.
Kayer, like the panel below, focuses his argument on the
Arizona Supreme Court's decision in State v. Brookover, 124
Ariz. 38, 601 P. 2d 1322 (1979), but that decision falls far
short of placing the state court's prejudice determination in
this case beyond the realm of fairminded disagreement. In
Brookover, there was only one aggravating circumstance (a
prior conviction for a serious offense), whereas Kayer's sen-
tencing involved two statutory aggravators.
3
And as for the
mitigating evidence in Brookover, while it is far from clear
exactly what mitigating evidence infuenced the court's indi-
vidualized sentencing determination, the opinion refers to
evidence that appears signifcantly different from that in this
case. The Brookover opinion refers to evidence of a “ `neu-
rological lesion' ” of a type that caused “ `a relinquishment of
one's self autonomy.' ” Id., at 41, 601 P. 2d, at 1325. By
contrast, a reasonable jurist could view Kayer's mitigation
evidence in a different light for the reasons explained above.
In these circumstances, the Brookover decision does not
3
The Ninth Circuit brushed past this distinction, reasoning that the Ari-
zona Supreme Court could have found a pecuniary gain aggravating factor
based on the facts of Brookover. But that does not change the fact that
the Brookover court did not weigh any second aggravating factor in reach-
ing its decision. See 124 Ariz., at 41–42, 601 P. 2d, at 1325–1326.

124 SHINN
v. KAYER
Per Curiam
come close to showing the sort of “extreme malfunctio[n] in
the
state criminal justice syste[m]” that would permit federal
court intervention. Richter, 562 U. S., at 102 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
***
Under AEDPA, state courts play the leading role in as-
sessing challenges to state sentences based on federal law.
A state court heard Kayer's evidence and concluded that he
failed to show prejudice. The court below exceeded its au-
thority in rejecting that determination, which was not so
obviously wrong as to be “beyond any possibility for fair-
minded disagreement.” Id., at 103. Under § 2254(d), that
is “ `the only question that matters.' ” Id., at 102.
We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, and remand the case to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice
Kagan dissent.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
125
Syllabus
TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
et
al. v. NEW YORK et al.
appeal from the united states district court for the
southern district of new york
No. 20–366. Argued November 30, 2020—Decided December 18, 2020
The Constitution requires an “Enumeration” of the Nation's population
every ten years “in such Manner” as Congress “shall by Law direct.”
Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The resulting census numbers infuence consequential
national affairs. See Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S.
752, 759–760. With the 2020 census count underway, President Trump
issued a memorandum to the Secretary of Commerce stating the admin-
istration's desire to exclude from the apportionment base of the 2020
census “aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status.” 85 Fed.
Reg. 44680. The President directed the Secretary to include in the cen-
sus report required by Congress under 13 U. S. C. § 141 not just the
tabulation of population according to the criteria promulgated by the
Census Bureau for counting each State's residents, 85 Fed. Reg. 44680,
but also, with certain caveats, additional information to facilitate imple-
mentation of that policy. Several legal actions challenging the policy
memorandum followed. A three-judge District Court held that plain-
tiffs (appellees here) had standing to proceed in federal court because
the memorandum was chilling aliens and their families from responding
to the census, thereby degrading the quality of census data used to
allocate federal funds and forcing some plaintiffs to divert resources to
combat the chilling effect. The District Court declared the memoran-
dum unlawful on numerous grounds and enjoined the Secretary from
providing information necessary to implement it in the required § 141(b)
report. The Government appealed.
Held: The Court lacks jurisdiction because standing has not been shown
and the case is not ripe for the Court's review. The administration has
made plain its desire to exclude aliens without lawful status from the
apportionment base. But the President qualifed in the policy memo-
randum at issue that the Secretary should gather information “to the
extent practicable” and that aliens should be excluded “to the extent
feasible.” 85 Fed. Reg. 44680. How the Executive Branch might even-
tually try to implement this general statement of policy is “no more
than conjecture” at this time, Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 108,
as is the feasibility of implementation. Plaintiffs concede that any chill-
ing effect from the memorandum dissipated when the census response

126 TR
UMP v. NEW YORK
Syllabus
period ended. They also admit the dispute will take more concrete
shape
once the Secretary delivers his report under § 141(b). While they
insist that the record already establishes a “substantial risk” of reduced
representation and federal resources, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA,
568 U. S. 398, 414, n. 5, that conclusion involves signifcant guesswork.
The count is complete; the present dispute concerns the apportionment
process, which remains at a preliminary stage. Given the legal and
practical constraints on the Government's eventual action, any predic-
tion about future injury, including changes in apportionment or funding,
is just that: a prediction. The District Court's injunction itself shows
the source of any injury to the plaintiffs to be Executive Branch action
that might be taken in the future to exclude unspecifed individuals from
the apportionment base—not the policy itself “in the abstract.” Sum-
mers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 494. Letting the Execu-
tive Branch's decisionmaking process run its course brings “more man-
ageable proportions” to the scope of the parties' dispute, Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 891, and ensures policy-
making is left to elected representatives, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
U. S. 693, 700. The plaintiffs currently suffer no concrete harm from
the challenged policy itself, which does not require them “to do anything
or to refrain from doing anything.” Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra
Club, 523 U. S. 726, 733. The Court concludes that the constitutional
and statutory claims presented are not suitable for adjudication at this
time, and expresses no view on the merits.
485 F. Supp. 3d 422, vacated and remanded.
Acting Solicitor General Wall argued the cause for appel-
lants. With him on the briefs were Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Clark, Hashim M. Mooppan, Sopan Joshi, and
Nicole Frazer Reaves.
Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General of New York,
argued the cause for government appellees. With her on
the brief were Letitia James, Attorney General of New
York, Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, Judith N.
Vale, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, Fiona J. Kaye,
Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Colangelo, and Elena
Goldstein, Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General of Colorado,
William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut, Kathleen
Jennings, Attorney General of Delaware, Karl A. Racine,

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 125 (2020)
127
Counsel
Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Clare E. Con-
no
rs, Attorney General of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul, Attorney
General of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General of
Maine, Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland,
Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Dana
Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, Keith Ellison, Attor-
ney General of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General
of Nevada, Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jer-
sey, Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General of New Mexico,
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General of North Carolina, Ellen
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General of Oregon, Josh Shapiro,
Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha, Attor-
ney General of Rhode Island, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Attor-
ney General of Vermont, Mark R. Herring, Attorney General
of Virginia, Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of Wash-
ington, Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General of Wisconsin, Mark
A. Flessner, Dennis J. Herrera, Peter S. Holmes, Rolando L.
Rios, Gary W. Kuc, Leslie J. Girard, and John Daniel Reaves.
Dale E. Ho argued the cause for private appellees. With
him on the brief were Adriel J. Cepeda-Derieux, Davin
Rosborough, Sophia Lin Lakin, Theresa J. Lee, Cecillia D.
Wang, David D. Cole, Sarah Brannon, Ceridwen Cherry,
John A. Freedman, Elisabeth S. Theodore, Perry Grossman,
Christopher Dunn, Arthur N. Eisenberg, Andre I. Segura,
and Peter J. Eliasberg.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ala-
bama by Steve Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, Edmund G. La-
Cour, Jr., Solicitor General, A. Barrett Bowdre, Deputy Solicitor General,
and James W. Davis, Win feld J. Sinclair, and Brenton M. Smith, Assist-
ant Attorneys General; for the State of Louisiana et al. by Jeff Landry,
Attorney General of Louisiana, Elizabeth B. Murrill, Solicitor General,
and Shae McPhee, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective jurisdiction as follows: Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas,
Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Eric Schmitt of
Missouri, Doug Peterson of Nebraska, Alan Wilson of South Carolina,
Jason Ravnsborg of South Dakota, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia;

128 TR
UMP v. NEW YORK
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
E
very ten years, the Nation undertakes an “Enumeration”
of its population “in such Manner” as Congress “shall by Law
for Citizens United et al. by Jeremiah L. Morgan, William J. Olson, Rob-
ert J. Olson, Herbert W. Titus, and Michael Boos; for the Eagle Forum
Education & Legal Defense Fund by Lawrence J. Joseph; for the Immigra-
tion Reform Law Institute by Christopher J. Hajec; and for Dr. John S.
Baker, Jr., by Dr. Baker, pro se, John C. Eastman, and Anthony T. Caso.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the United
States House of Representatives by Douglas N. Letter, Megan Barbero,
Lisa K. Helvin, David A. O'Neil, Joshua A. Geltzer, Mary B. McCord,
Annie L. Owens, and Neal Kumar Katyal; for the State of California et al.
by Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Michael J. Mongan,
Solicitor General, Aimee Feinberg and Joshua Patashnik, Deputy Solici-
tors General, Anthony R. Hakl, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, R.
Matthew Wise, Gabrielle D. Boutin, and Kristin A. Liska, Deputy Attor-
neys General, Kimberly M. Castle, Associate Deputy Solicitor General,
Marian M. Johnston, David I. Holtzman, Mike Feuer, Valerie Flores,
Michael J. Dundas, Sue Ann Salmon Evans, and Keith A. Yeomans; for
the City of San Jose, California, et al. by Richard P. Bress, Sadik Huseny,
Kristen Clarke, Jon M. Greenbaum, and Ezra D. Rosenberg; for Busi-
nesses and Business Organizations by Stuart F. Delery, Joshua M. Wes-
neski, and Lee R. Crain; for Common Cause et al. by Gregory L. Diskant,
Jonah M. Knobler, Peter A. Nelson, Emmet J. Bondurant, and Michael
B. Kimberly; for Faith-Based and Immigrants' Rights Organizations by
Heather B. Repicky and Iván Espinoza-Madrigal; for Historians of the
Census by Richard W. Clary, Antony L. Ryan, Helam Gebremariam, and
Mark Trachtenberg; for the League of Women Voters of the United States
et al. by Blaine I. Green and Kevin M. Fong; for Local Governments by
James R. Williams, Greta S. Hansen, Raphael N. Rajendra, Jessica M.
Scheller, Juan A. Gonzalez, Daniel N. Lopez, and Russell H. Roden; for
Members of Congress by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and
David H. Gans; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.,
by Sherrilyn A. Ifll, Janai S. Nelson, Samuel Spital, Leah C. Aden, and
Alan J. Stone; for the National Congress of American Indians by Daniel
Lewerenz and John E. Echohawk; for the National School Boards Associa-
tion et al. by Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., and Sonja H. Trainor; for the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. by Stephen W. Miller;
for Rep. Morris Jackson Brooks, Jr., et al. by Kris W. Kobach and John C.
Eastman; for Michael L. Rosin by Peter K. Stris, Michael N. Donofrio,

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 125 (2020)
129
Per Curiam
direct.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. This census plays a
cr
itical role in apportioning Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives among the States, allocating federal funds to the
States, providing information for intrastate redistricting,
and supplying data for numerous initiatives conducted by
governmental entities, businesses, and academic researchers.
Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752, 759–
760 (2019).
Congress has given both the Secretary of Commerce and
the President functions to perform in the enumeration and
apportionment process. The Secretary must “take a decen-
nial census of population . . . in such form and content as he
may determine,” 13 U. S. C. § 141(a), and then must report to
the President “[t]he tabulation of total population by States”
under the census “as required for the apportionment,”
§ 141(b). The President in turn must transmit to Congress
a “statement showing the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed, as ascertained” under the
census. 46 Stat. 26, 2 U. S. C. § 2a(a). In that statement,
the President must apply a mathematical formula called the
“method of equal proportions” to the population counts in
order to calculate the number of House seats for each State.
Ibid.; see Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U. S.
442, 451–452 (1992).
This past July, the President issued a memorandum to the
Secretary respecting the apportionment following the 2020
census. The memorandum announced a policy of excluding
“from the apportionment base aliens who are not in a lawful
Bridget C. Asay, and Elizabeth R. Brannen; and for Ilya Somin et al. by
Scott A. Eisman and Aaron R. Marcu.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Fair Lines America Foundation,
Inc., by Jason B. Torchinsky and Jonathan P. Lienhard; for LatinoJustice
PRLDEF et al. by Celeste L. M. Koeleveld, Peter Mucchetti, Michaela
Spero, and Juan Cartagena; for Kenneth Prewitt et al. by Brian A. Suth-
erland and David J. de Jesus; and for Andrew Reamer, Ph. D., by D.
Hunter Smith.

130 TR
UMP v. NEW YORK
Per Curiam
immigration status.” 85 Fed. Reg. 44680 (2020). To facili-
t
ate implementation “to the maximum extent feasible and
consistent with the discretion delegated to the executive
branch,” the President ordered the Secretary, in preparing
his § 141(b) report, “to provide information permitting the
President, to the extent practicable, to exercise the Presi-
dent's discretion to carry out the policy.” Ibid. The Presi-
dent directed the Secretary to include such information in
addition to a tabulation of population according to the crite-
ria promulgated by the Census Bureau for counting each
State's residents. Ibid.; see 83 Fed. Reg. 5525 (2018).
This case arises from one of several challenges to the mem-
orandum brought by various States, local governments, or-
ganizations, and individuals. A three-judge District Court
held that the plaintiffs, appellees here, had standing to pro-
ceed in federal court because the memorandum was chilling
aliens and their families from responding to the census,
thereby degrading the quality of census data used to allocate
federal funds and forcing some plaintiffs to divert resources
to combat the chilling effect. 485 F. Supp. 3d 442, 449–453,
(SDNY 2020) (pe r cur i am). Accordi ng to the D istr ict
Court, the memorandum violates § 141(b) by ordering the
Secretary to produce two sets of numbers—a valid tabula-
tion derived from the census, and an invalid tabulation ex-
cluding aliens based on administrative records outside the
census. Id., at 470. The District Court also ruled that the
exclusion of aliens on the basis of legal status would con-
travene the requirement in § 2a(a) that the President state
the “whole number of persons in each State” for purposes
of apportionment. Id., at 476– 477. The District Court
declared the memorandum unlawful and enjoined the Sec-
retary from including the information needed to imple-
ment the memorandum in his § 141(b) report to the Presi-
dent. Id., at 480–481. The Government appealed, and we
postponed consideration of our jurisdiction. 592 U. S. 1022
(2020).

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 125 (2020)
131
Per Curiam
A foundational principle of Article III is that “an actual
controversy
must exist not only at the time the complaint is
fled, but through all stages of the litigation.” Already, LLC
v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 90–91 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). As the plaintiffs concede, any chilling ef-
fect from the memorandum dissipated upon the conclusion
of the census response period. The plaintiffs now seek to
substitute an alternative theory of a “legally cognizable in-
jury” premised on the threatened impact of an unlawful
apportionment on congressional representation and federal
funding. Id., at 100. As the case comes to us, however, we
conclude that it does not—at this time—present a dispute
“appropr iately resolved through the judicia l process. ”
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 157 (2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Two related doctrines of justiciability—each originating in
the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III—underlie
this determination. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U. S. 332, 352 (2006). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing, including “an injury that is concrete, particularized,
and imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical.” Car-
ney v. Adams, 592 U. S. 53, 60 (2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Second, the case must be “ripe”—not dependent on
“contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U. S.
296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
At present, this case is riddled with contingencies and
speculation that impede judicial review. The President, to
be sure, has made clear his desire to exclude aliens without
lawful status from the apportionment base. But the Presi-
dent qualifed his directive by providing that the Secretary
should gather information “to the extent practicable” and
that aliens should be excluded “to the extent feasible.” 85
Fed. Reg. 44680. Any prediction how the Executive Branch
might eventually implement this general statement of policy
is “no more than conjecture” at this time. Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 108 (1983).

132 TR
UMP v. NEW YORK
Per Curiam
To begin with, the policy may not prove feasible to imple-
ment
in any manner whatsoever, let alone in a manner sub-
stantially likely to harm any of the plaintiffs here. Pre-
apportionment litigation always “presents a moving target”
because the Secretary may make (and the President may di-
rect) changes to the census up until the President transmits
his statement to the House. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U. S. 788, 797–798 (1992). And as the Government recog-
nizes, Tr. of Oral Arg. 39, any such changes must comply with
the constitutional requirement of an “actual Enumeration” of
the persons in each State, as opposed to a conjectural esti-
mate. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 475–476 (2002); see
also 13 U. S. C. § 195. Here the record is silent on which
(and how many) aliens have administrative records that
would allow the Secretary to avoid impermissible estimation,
and whether the Census Bureau can even match the records
in its possession to census data in a timely manner. See
Reply Brief 4–5. Uncertainty likewise pervades which (and
how many) aliens the President will exclude from the census
if the Secretary manages to gather and match suitable ad-
ministrative records. We simply do not know whether and
to what extent the President might direct the Secretary to
“reform the census” to implement his general policy with
respect to apportionment. Franklin, 505 U. S., at 798.
While the plaintiffs agree that the dispute will take a more
concrete shape once the Secretary delivers his report under
§ 141(b), Tr. of Oral Arg. 64, 75, they insist that the record
already establishes a “substantial risk” of reduced represen-
tation and federal resources, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA,
568 U. S. 398, 414, n. 5 (2013). That conclusion, however,
involves a signifcant degree of guesswork. Unlike other
pre-apportionment challenges, the Secretary has not altered
census operations in a concrete manner that will predictably
change the count. See, e. g., Department of Commerce v.
New York, 588 U. S., at 767–768; Department of Commerce v.
United States House of Representatives, 525 U. S. 316, 331–

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 125 (2020)
133
Per Curiam
332 (1999). The count here is complete; the present dispute
i
nvolves the apportionment process, which remains at a pre-
liminary stage. The Government's eventual action will
refect both legal and practical constraints, making any pre-
diction about future injury just that—a prediction.
Everyone agrees by now that the Government cannot fea-
sibly implement the memorandum by excluding the esti-
mated 10.5 million aliens without lawful status. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 20, 63–64. Yet the only evidence speaking to the pre-
dicted change in apportionment unrealistically assumes that
the President will exclude the entire undocumented popula-
tion. App. 344, Decl. of Christopher Warshaw ¶11. Noth-
ing in the record addresses the consequences of a partial im-
plementation of the memorandum, much less supports the
dissent's speculation that excluding aliens in ICE detention
will impact interstate apportionment. Post, at 139, 142
(opinion of Breyer, J.); see Reply Brief 6.
The impact on funding is no more certain. According to
the Government, federal funds are tied to data derived from
the census, but not necessarily to the apportionment counts
addressed by the memorandum. Brief for Appellants 19–20.
Under that view, changes to the Secretary's § 141(b) report
or to the President's § 2a(a) statement will not inexorably
have the direct effect on downstream access to funds or other
resources predicted by the dissent. Post, at 139–140. How
that question will be addressed by the Secretary and the
President is yet another fundamental uncertainty impeding
proper judicial consideration at this time.
The remedy crafted by the District Court underscores the
contingent nature of the plaintiffs' injuries. Its injunction
prohibits the Secretary from informing the President in his
§ 141(b) report of the number of aliens without lawful status.
In addition to implicating the President's authority under the
Opinions Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, the injunction
reveals that the source of any injury to the plaintiffs is the
action that the Secretary or President might take in the fu-

134 TR
UMP v. NEW YORK
Breyer, J., dissenting
ture to exclude unspecifed individuals from the apportion-
ment
base—not the policy itself “in the abstract,” Summers
v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 494 (2009). Letting
the Executive Branch's decisionmaking process run its
course not only brings “more manageable proportions” to the
scope of the parties' dispute, Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 891 (1990), but also “ensures that
we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking prop-
erly left to elected representatives,” Hollingsworth v. Perry,
570 U. S. 693, 700 (2013). And in the meantime the plaintiffs
suffer no concrete harm from the challenged policy itself,
which does not require them “to do anything or to refrain
from doing anything.” Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra
Club, 523 U. S. 726, 733 (1998).
At the end of the day, the standing and ripeness inquiries
both lead to the conclusion that judicial resolution of this
dispute is premature. Consistent with our determination
that standing has not been shown and that the case is not
ripe, we express no view on the merits of the constitutional
and related statutory claims presented. We hold only that
they are not suitable for adjudication at this time.
The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the
case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
The Constitution specifes that the number of Representa-
tives afforded to each State is based on an apportionment of
the total population, with each State receiving its propor-
tional share. The Government has announced a policy to
exclude aliens without lawful status from the apportionment
base for the decennial census. The Government does not
deny that, if carried out, the policy will harm the plaintiffs.
Nor does it deny that it will implement that policy immi-

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 125 (2020)
135
Breyer, J., dissenting
nently (to the extent it is able to do so). Under a straight-
for
ward application of our precedents, the plaintiffs have
standing to sue. The question is ripe for resolution. And,
in my view, the plaintiffs should also prevail on the merits.
The plain meaning of the governing statutes, decades of his-
torical practice, and uniform interpretations from all three
branches of Government demonstrate that aliens without
lawful status cannot be excluded from the decennial census
solely on account of that status. The Government's effort to
remove them from the apportionment base is unlawful, and
I believe this Court should say so.
The Court disagrees. It argues that it is now uncertain
just how fully the Secretary will implement the Presidential
memorandum. In my view, that uncertainty does not war-
rant our waiting to decide the merits of the plaintiffs' claim.
It is true that challenges to apportionment have often come
after the President has transmitted his tabulation to the
House. See Brief for Appellants 16 (deeming as preferable
“this Court's normal approach: to decide such cases post-
apportionment” (citing Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 458–459
(2002), Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U. S. 1, 10–11
(1996), and Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 790–
791 (1992))). The Government asked us to take that ap-
proach here. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7–8. But we have also
reached and resolved controversies concerning the decennial
census based on a substantial risk of an anticipated appor-
tionment harm. See Department of Commerce v. United
States House of Representatives, 525 U. S. 316, 332 (1999)
(holding that it is “not necessary for this Court to wait until
the census has been conducted to consider” government con-
duct that may affect apportionment). And that is what I
believe the Court should do here. Waiting to adjudicate
plaintiffs' claims until after the President submits his tabula-
tion to Congress, as the Court seems to prefer, ante, at 131–
132, risks needless and costly delays in apportionment. Be-
cause there is a “substantial likelihood that the [plaintiffs'] re-

136 TR
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quested relief . . . will redress the alleged injury,” United
Sta
tes House of Representatives, 525 U. S., at 332, I would
fnd that we can reach plaintiffs' challenge now, and affrm
the lower court's holding.
I
The Court reasons that “standing has not been shown” be-
cause it is too soon to tell if the Government will act “in a
manner substantially likely to harm any of the plaintiffs
here.” Ante, at 132, 134. As I have said, I believe to the
contrary. Plaintiffs have alleged a justiciable controversy,
and that controversy is ripe for resolution.
A
Begin with the threatened injury. The plaintiffs allege
two forms of future injury: a loss of representation in the
apportionment count and decreased federal funding tied to
the census totals. For an injury to satisfy Article III, it
“must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.” Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992); internal quotation
marks omitted). We have long said that when plaintiffs
“demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury
as a result of [a policy's] operation or enforcement,” they
need “ `not have to await the consummation of threatened
injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly
impending, that is enough.' ” Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442
U. S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U. S. 553, 593 (1923)).
Here, inquiry into the threatened injury is unusually
straightforward. The harm is clear on the face of the policy.
The title of the Presidential memorandum reads: “Excluding
Illegal Aliens From the Apportionment Base Following the
2020 Census.” 85 Fed. Reg. 44679 (2020) (Presidential mem-
orandum). That memorandum announces “the policy of the
United States [shall be] to exclude from the apportionment

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137
Breyer, J., dissenting
base aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status . . . to
the
maximum extent feasible and consistent with the discre-
tion delegated to the executive branch.” Id., at 44680.
Notwithstanding the “contingencies and speculation” that
“riddl[e]” this case, ante, at 131, the Government has not
backed away from its stated aim to exclude aliens without
lawful status from apportionment. See Brief for Appellants
14 (urging that the Secretary “be allowed to implement the
Memorandum, at which point suit can be brought”); see also
Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383,
393 (1988) (fnding standing where “plaintiffs have alleged an
actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced”
and the Government “has not suggested that the newly
enacted [policy] will not be enforced”). The memorandum
also announces the reason for this policy: to diminish the “po-
litical infuence” and “congressional representation” of States
“home to” unauthorized immigrants. 85 Fed. Reg. 44680.
It notes that “one State”—now known to be California, see
Brief for Appellee State of New York et al. 7—is “home to
more than 2.2 million illegal aliens,” and excluding such indi-
viduals from apportionment “could result in the allocation of
two or three [fewer] congressional seats than would other-
wise be allocated.” 85 Fed. Reg. 44680. Other consequences
will fow from this attempt to alter apportionment. We
have previously noted that “the States use the results in
drawing intrastate political districts,” and “[t]he Federal
Government [also] considers census data in dispensing funds
through federal programs to the States.” Wisconsin v. City
of New York, 517 U. S. 1, 5–6 (1996).
The implementation of the memorandum will therefore
bring about the very “representational and funding injuries”
that the plaintiffs seek to avoid. Brief for Appellee State of
New York et al. 10.
B
Given the clarity of the Presidential memorandum, it is
unsurprising the Government does not contest that plaintiffs

138 TR
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have alleged a threatened injury. Rather, it contends that
both
the alleged representational and funding injuries re-
main “too speculative” to satisfy Article III's ripeness re-
quirement prior to the President's actual enumeration.
Brief for Appellants 19. That is because—although the Sec-
retary's report to the President is due in just two weeks—
the Bureau's plan to implement the memorandum remains
uncertain and “depends on various unknowable contingen-
cies about the data,” and until “later in December or January,
the Bureau cannot predict or even estimate the results.”
Reply Brief 4. The Government contends that given these
uncertainties, “it is far from a `virtual certainty' that any
appellee will `lose a [House] seat' when the Memorandum is
implemented.” Id., at 5. It also says it is “too speculative”
that plaintiffs will be disproportionately deprived of federal
funding, as it is not yet certain that the tabulation the Presi-
dent submits to Congress for apportionment purposes will
also be used as the total population for federal statutes that
apportion funds on the basis of States' proportional popula-
tion. Brief for Appellants 19–20. At root, the Government
contends that “ripeness principles support deferring judicial
review of the Memorandum until it is implemented.” Id.,
at 21.
Whether viewed as a question of standing or ripeness, the
Government's arguments are insuffcient. We have said
that plaintiffs need not “demonstrate that it is literally cer-
tain that the harms they identify will come about” to estab-
lish standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U. S. 398,
414, n. 5 (2013). Rather, an “allegation of future injury may
suffce if the threatened injury is `certainly impending,' or
there is a ` “substantial risk” that the harm will occur.' ”
Driehaus, 573 U. S., at 158 (quoting Clapper, 568 U. S., at
409, 414, n. 5). Looking to the facts here, the memorandum
presents the “substantial risk” that our precedents require.
The Government's current plans suggest it will be able to
exclude a signifcant number of people under its policy. To

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Breyer, J., dissenting
start, even a few weeks out, the Government still does not
disclai
m its intent to carry out the policy to the full extent
it can do so. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9–10 (stating that “we
don't know what's feasible, about excluding all illegal aliens,”
but recognizing that “some subsets are going to be much
stronger cases for the exercise of [the President's] discretion
than other subsets”). Indeed, the Bureau is committed to
excluding as many people as possible even if it must act be-
yond the December 31 statutory deadline to do so. Id., at
6–7. And there is a “substantial risk” that it will be able to
do so to the point that it causes signifcant harm. Both here
and in related litigation below, the Government has said that
as of early December, it was already feasible to exclude
aliens without lawful status housed in ICE detention centers
on census day, a “category [that] is likely in the tens of thou-
sands, spread out over multiple States.” Reply Brief 6; see
also Brief for Appellee New York Immigration Coalition
et al. 15 (citing a prior Government estimate that doing so
will exclude approximately “50,000 ICE detainees”). Be-
yond these detainees, appellees note that the Government
has also identifed at least several million more aliens with-
out lawful status that it can “individually identify” and seek
to exclude from the tabulation. Id., at 15–16. We have
been told the Bureau is “working very hard to try to report
on” (and exclude from the apportionment tabulation) a large
number of aliens without lawful status, including “almost
200,000 persons who are subject to fnal orders of removal,”
“700,000 DACA recipients,” and about “3.2 million non-
detained individuals in removal proceedings.” Tr. of Oral
Arg. 28–29. All told, the Bureau already possesses the ad-
ministrative records necessary to exclude at least four to fve
million aliens. Id., at 29. Those fgures are certainly large
enough to affect apportionment.
Of equal importance, plaintiffs argue that aside from ap-
portionment itself, the exclusion of aliens without lawful sta-
tus from the apportionment count will also negatively affect

140 TR
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federal funding that is based on per-State proportional de-
cennia
l population totals. Brief for Appellee New York
Immigration Coalition et al. 18–19; see also Department
of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752, 767 (2019) (noting
that even a small undercount of noncitizen households can
lead those States to “lose out on federal funds that are
distributed on the basis of state population”). Indeed, a
number of federal statutes require that funding be allo-
cated based on the results “certifed,” 16 U. S. C. § 669c(c),
“stated, ” 49 U. S. C. § 47114(d)(1)(B), or “reported, ” 52
U. S. C. § 20901(d)(4), by the decennial census. These
phrases seem always to have been understood to refer to
the apportionment tabulation reported to the President by
the Secretary of Commerce (the report here at issue),
because that is the only tabulation that the law requires
to be “certifed” or “reported” as part of the decennial
census. See 16 U. S. C. § 669c(c); 52 U. S. C. § 20901(d)(4).
See generally Brief for Professor Andrew Reamer, Ph. D.,
as Amicus Curiae 2–3. The Government counters that
appellees have not identifed any reason why the individu-
als unlawfully removed from the tabulation could not be
added back in for purposes of applying funding statutes.
Reply Brief 7. But there is no indication that the Secre-
tary could or would do any such thing—unless of course a
court holds that the removal was unlawful. And the possi-
bility of adding back those who have otherwise been un-
lawfully removed from the count does not undercut a plain-
tiff 's standing to pursue a claim of unlawfulness in the
frst instance.
Moreover, the statute says that “the President shall trans-
mit to the Congress a statement showing the whole number
of persons in each State . . . as ascertained under the . . .
decennial census of the population.” 2 U. S. C. § 2a(a) (em-
phasis added). Statute after statute pegs its funding to a
State's share of “the total . . . population of all the States as
determined by the last preceding decennial census.” See,

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141
Breyer, J., dissenting
e. g., 7 U. S. C. § 361c(c)(2) (allocating funding by a State's
share
of “the total rural [and farm] population of all” States);
§ 2663(b)(4) (same); 49 U. S. C. § 5305(d)(1)(A)(i) (for State
share of “population of urbanized areas”); § 5311(c)(3)(B)(iii)
(for State share of “the population of all rural areas”);
see also U. S. Census Bureau, L. Blumerman & P. Vidal,
Uses of Population and Income Statistics in Federal Funds
Distribution—With a Focus on Census Bureau Data 18 (2009)
(estimating that as of 2009 at least 24 federal programs auto-
matically distributed at least $10 billion in annual funding to
States keyed directly to the decennial census' state popula-
tion fgures). Given the connection between the decennial
census and funding allocation, a change of a few thousand
people in a State's enumeration can affect its share of
federal resources.
I do not agree with the Court that the lingering uncer-
tainty over the Government's plans renders this litiga-
tion unripe, nor that the apportionment process is at a
“preliminary stage.” Ante, at 133. For one thing, the
Government has spent over a year collecting the administra-
tive records that will be used to fulfll the Presidential mem-
orandum. See Exec. Order No. 13880, 84 Fed. Reg. 33823
(2019) (calling for federal departments to share administra-
tive records so the Department of Commerce can “generate
a more reliable count of the unauthorized alien population in
the country . . . [and] an estimate of the aggregate number
of aliens unlawfully present in each State”). For another,
the Government has told us in related litigation that further
delays in proceeding with apportionment beyond the statu-
tory deadline would harm “the ability to meet contin-
gent redistricting deadlines” in the States, because “ `delays
would mean deadlines that are established in state consti-
tutions or statutes will be impossible to meet.' ” See
Reply Brief in Ross v. National Urban League, O. T. 2020,
No. 20A62, p. 11. Acting on that concern, we granted
the Government's stay pending appeal so as to hasten

142 TR
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the Government's efforts ahead of these deadlines. See
Ross
v. National Urban League, 592 U. S. 994 (2020). Pre-
sumably, waiting to resolve this issue until after the Presi-
dent submits his tabulation will cause further hardship by
delaying redistricting further. States will begin to consider
the consequences of reapportionment soon. See, e. g., Del.
Code Ann., Tit. 29, § 805 (2020) (“After the offcial reporting
of the 2020 federal decennial census by the President to Con-
gress . . . the General Assembly shall, not later than June 30,
2021, reapportion and redistrict the State . . . for the general
election of 2022”). It is of course possible that the Bureau
will be unable to fnd a signifcant number of matches be-
tween the millions of records it has and the census data it is
producing in time for the President to exclude them from his
tabulation submitted to Congress. But even if the Secretary
were to limit severely his compliance with the President's
memorandum—say, by choosing to “report” only those 50,000
aliens that are estimated to be in ICE detention centers and
omitting them from his census “tabulation”—that omission
alone presents a “substantial risk” of affecting the census
calculation for purposes of apportionment and funding.
That is the very kind of injury of which plaintiffs complain.
Taken together, these considerations demonstrate that now
is the appropriate time to resolve this case. Cf. Abbott Lab-
oratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
for the Court) (explaining that the timing of judicial review
turns on “the ftness of the issues for judicial decision and
the hardsh ip to the par ties of w ithholdi ng cour t
consideration”).
To repeat, the President's stated goal is to reduce the num-
ber of Representatives apportioned to the States that are
home to a disproportionate number of aliens without lawful
status. The Government has confrmed that it can identify
millions of these people through administrative records.
But if the Census Bureau fails to fulfll its mandate to ex-
clude aliens without lawful status and reduce the number of

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Breyer, J., dissenting
Representatives to which certain States are entitled, it will
be
for reasons not in the record. Where, as here, the Gov-
ernment acknowledges it is working to achieve an allegedly
illegal goal, this Court should not decline to resolve the case
simply because the Government speculates that it might not
fully succeed.
For these reasons, I believe that the plaintiffs have alleged
a “substantial risk” that unlawfully subtracting aliens with-
out lawful status from the tabulation of the total population
that the President submits to Congress will infict both ap-
portionment and appropriations injuries on them. Those in-
juries are substantially likely to occur in the reasonably near
future. This case squarely presents a concrete dispute and
we should resolve it now.
II
On the merits, I agree with the three lower courts that
have decided the issue, and I would hold the Government's
policy unlawful. See 485 F. Supp. 3d 422, 472–477 (SDNY
2020) (per curiam); San Jose v. Trump, 497 F. Supp. 3d
680, 734–743 (ND Cal. 2020); Useche v. Trump, No. 8:20–cv–
02225 (D Md., Nov. 6, 2020), pp. 21–30. Once again, the
memorandum calls for “the exclusion of illegal aliens from
the apportionment base” that will be used for the “reappor-
tionment of Representatives following the 2020 census,” and
orders the Secretary of Commerce to transmit information
permitting the President to carry out that policy. 85 Fed.
Reg. 44680. The plaintiffs challenge that policy on both con-
stitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that it contra-
venes the directives to report the “tabulation of total popula-
tion by States . . . as required for the apportionment,” 13
U. S. C. § 141(b), and to include the “whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.” U. S. Const.,
Amdt. 14, § 2; 2 U. S. C. § 2a(a). Consistent with this Court's
usual practice, I would avoid the constitutional dispute and
resolve this case on the statutory question alone.

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While that statutory question is important, it is not diff-
cu
lt. Our tools of statutory construction all point to “usual
residence” as the primary touchstone for enumeration in the
decennial census. The concept of residency does not turn,
and has never turned, solely on a person's immigration sta-
tus. The memorandum therefore violates Congress' clear
command to count every person residing in the country, and
should be set aside.
A
First, we have the text. The modern apportionment
scheme dates back to 1929. See 46 Stat. 21 (1929 Act). The
relevant language provides that the apportionment base
shall include “the whole number of persons in each State”
“as ascertained under the . . . decennial census.” § 22, id.,
at 26 (codifed at 2 U. S. C. § 2a(a)); see 13 U. S. C. § 141(b)
(requiring the Secretary to transmit the “tabulation of total
population by States” as required for apportionment (em-
phasis added)). The usual meaning of “persons,” of course,
includes aliens without lawful status. This Court has said
as much, and the Government does not argue otherwise.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 211 (1982). Similarly, the
plain meaning of the phrase “in each State,” both in 1929 and
now, does not turn on immigration status. Rather, as we
explained in Franklin, that phrase has always been under-
stood to connote some idea of “usual residence,” picking up
a person who is an “ `inhabitant' ” of the State. 505 U. S.,
at 804–805; see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 13
(1964). Neither “resident” nor “inhabitant” takes account of
whether someone is lawfully, as opposed to unlawfully, pres-
ent. See “Inhabitant,” Webster's New International Dic-
tionary 1109 (1927) (“One who dwells or resides permanently
in a place”); “Resident,” id., at 1814 (“One who resides in
a place; one who dwells in a place for a period of more or
less duration”).
Moreover, the statute (like the Constitution) explicitly ex-
cludes only one category of persons from the apportionment,

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“Indians not taxed,” 2 U. S. C. § 2a(a), though it is evident
they
“reside” within the United States. Congress clearly
knew how to exclude a certain population that would other-
wise meet the traditional residency requirement when it
wished to do so. Yet it did not single out aliens without
lawful status in the 1929 Act.
Second, historical practice leaves little doubt about the
statute's meaning. From the founding era until now, enu-
meration in the decennial census has always been concerned
with residency, not immigration status. The very frst Act
setting forth the decennial census procedure stated that per-
sons should be counted if they “ `usually resid[e] in the
United States.' ” Franklin, 505 U. S., at 804 (citing Act of
Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 5, 1 Stat. 103). The 1820 decennial
census included “foreigners not nationalized” among the
schedule of whole number of persons to be tabulated within
each State. See Act of March 14, 1820, 3 Stat. 550. The
1860 census included escaped slaves living in the North,
although those persons were unlawfully present at that time.
See San Jose, 497 F. Supp. 3d, at 693 (citing Record in
No. 5:20–cv–5167, Doc. 64–22, pp. 5–7 (Decl. of Shannon
D. Lankenau)). The 1920 census population count included
a minor who had been denied lawful admission to the United
States, but who was nonetheless paroled within the country
during World War I until she could be sent home. See
Record in No. 1:20–cv–5770, Doc. 149–2, Exh. 61, ¶3 (Decl.
of Jennifer Mendelsohn) (discussing the inclusion of the
minor petitioner in Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U. S. 228 (1925), in
the census count). All told, at the time Congress wrote the
1929 Act, the United States had conducted more than a dozen
decennial censuses. As the Government acknowledged
below, none of them excluded residents solely because of im-
migration status. 485 F. Supp. 3d, at 476. Any contempo-
rary understanding of the words “persons in each State”
as ascertained under the “decennial census” would have
reflected th is longstanding and uni for m prac tice. See

146 TR
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McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 398, n. 3 (2013) (“Con-
gress
legislates against the backdrop of existing law”).
Taken together, the history is clear as to the statute's reach;
it includes the people who reside here, lawful status or not.
Third, the records from the legislative debate confrm that
Congress was aware that the words of the statute bore this
meaning. By 1929, federal immigration laws had been on
the books for more than four decades, if not longer. See
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 761 (1972). Some
state laws for apportioning representatives explicitly ex-
cluded aliens, aware that an apportionment based simply on
“the whole number of persons” under the federal decennial
census would otherwise include them. See 71 Cong. Rec.
1977 (1929) (discussing a New York state statute that defned
the apportionment base to include the number of “inhabit-
ants, excluding aliens”). Time and again throughout the de-
bate over what became the 1929 Act, members considered
(and rejected) proposals that would have excluded aliens
from the apportionment base. See, e. g., id., at 2065–2068,
2360, 2451–2455. The debates evince a shared understand-
ing that without such an amendment, the Act would include
those “aliens” present “without the consent of the American
people.” Id., at 1919. See also id., at 1976 (Sen. Barkley)
(discussing “unlawful immigrants” “who have no legal sta-
tus”). This understanding was shaped not only by the or-
dinary meaning of the words, but also by legislators' view
of the meaning of those words as they appear in the
Constitution.
In particular, Senator David A. Reed of Pennsylvania
noted his support for the policy of excluding aliens without
lawful status, but refrained from voting in favor of a proposal
to do just that because he did not believe that the Constitu-
tion allowed it. Id., at 1958. See also id., at 1821–1822 (re-
printing C. Turney, Power of Congress To Exclude Aliens
From Enumeration for Purposes of Apportionment of Repre-
sentatives (April 30, 1929)); 71 Cong. Rec. 2065–2066 (dis-

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cussing a proposed amendment that would immediately re-
move
aliens from apportionment “upon the ratifcation of any
amendment to the Constitution excluding aliens”). That
same year, two constitutional amendments were introduced
in Congress to exclude aliens from the apportionment base.
Neither succeeded. See San Jose, 497 F. Supp. 3d, at 690
(citing Hearing on H. J. Res. 102 and H. J. Res. 351 before
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1 (1929)). All told, Congress was well aware of the implica-
tions of its chosen language for the precise question we
face here.
Fourth, the decades following the 1929 Act tell the same
story. Just like every census that came before, no census
since has excluded people based solely on immigration status.
Instead, the census has continued to look to usual residence
as the relevant criterion. At numerous points, the Execu-
tive Branch has reaffrmed its view that the law simply does
not allow for the exclusion of aliens without lawful status
who reside in the United States. See, e. g., 135 Cong. Rec.
22521 (1989) (printing Letter from C. Crawford, Assistant
Attorney Gen., to Sen. Bingaman (Sept. 22, 1989)); Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation,
and Government Processes of the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, Enumeration of Undocumented Aliens in
the Decennial Census, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 (1985) (“Tra-
ditional understanding of the Constitution and the legal di-
rection provided by the Congress has meant that for every
census since the frst one in 1790, we have tried to count
residents of the country, regardless of their status”) (state-
ment of Census Bureau Director J. Keane); Federation for
Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564,
576 (DC 1980) (“The Census Bureau has always attempted
to count every person residing in a state on census day, and
the population base for purposes of apportionment has al-
ways included all persons, including aliens both lawfully and
unlawfully within our borders”). Those in the Legislative

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Branch have routinely reached the same result. See, e. g.,
135
Cong. Rec. 14551 (statement of Sen. Bumpers); Hearing
on S. 2366 before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Pro-
liferation, and Federal Services of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1980) (state-
ment of Sen. Javits); 86 Cong. Rec. 4372 (1940) (statement of
Rep. Celler). While some members may have considered
the constitutional question unsettled, all accepted that the
governing statutes would have to be changed to exclude un-
documented immigrants. See, e. g., 135 Cong. Rec. 14540
(statement of Sen. Shelby) (proposing an amendment to
allow the Census Bureau to depart from its “established pol-
icy” and exclude aliens); Hearing on S. 2366, at 1 (discussing
a bill that would “require that the numbers be adjusted
downward to account for people who are not in this country
legally”). The apparently uniform view was that the statute
requires the inclusion of all people who usually reside within
the United States. See Franklin, 505 U. S., at 804. Each
branch, interpreting the law for itself, has followed the text
and history to the same conclusion.
The 2020 census, in fact, proceeded along this course, at
least until the Presidential memorandum. According to the
Census Bureau's regulations, the “enumeration procedures”
for the 2020 census “are guided by the constitutional and
statutory mandates to count all residents of the several
states.” 83 Fed. Reg. 5526 (2018). In adopting the Rule,
the Census Bureau considered a comment expressing con-
cern over the inclusion of “undocumented people,” but ad-
hered to its policy of counting all foreign citizens “if, at the
time of the census, they are living and sleeping most of the
time at a residence in the United States.” Id., at 5530. The
Rule goes on to clarify that “[p]eople in federal detention
centers on Census Day, such as . . . Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE) Service Processing Centers, and
ICE contract detention facilities” will be “counted at the
facility.” Id., at 5535. That Rule did not suggest that enu-

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Breyer, J., dissenting
meration would turn on immigration status. The novelty of
the
interpretation refected in the memorandum, after nearly
100 years of a contrary and consistent position, is yet another
strong indication that the Government's reading of the stat-
ute is wrong. See Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U. S. 368, 387
(2011).
To summarize: The text of the 1929 Act is concerned with
usual residence, not immigration status. The history, both
before and after the legislation, has for decades been in
accord with that straightforward interpretation. And all
three branches of Government, when facing the exact ques-
tion presented in this case, have uniformly arrived at the
same result.
B
In the face of this evidence, the Government principally
relies on scattered historic sources from the founding era,
which it argues imbue the words of the statute with a more
restrictive meaning. The Government's argument relies on
two assumptions. First, the Framers intended for the con-
stitutional language “whole number of free persons” to be
read as synonymous with the word “inhabitant,” a legal term
of art the Government believes excludes those who are in
the country in violation of the law. Second, when Congress
carried forward the constitutional text into the 1929 Act, it
understood those words to have that narrower meaning.
There are defects in both links of this chain. First, the
argument is not convincing with respect to the widely ac-
cepted meaning of the Constitution, either in the founding
era or at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted.
In Franklin, we understood the term “inhabitant” as compa-
rable to the concept of “usual residency,” which, as the analy-
sis above demonstrates, does not turn on immigration status.
505 U. S., at 804–805. The historical evidence put forward
by the Government does not undermine that result.
Many of the Government's sources simply show that the
“usual residence” criterion has been applied to immigrants.

150 TR
UMP v. NEW YORK
Breyer, J., dissenting
See Dept. of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census,
Th
irteenth Census of the United States: Instructions to Enu-
merators, April 15, 1910, p. 21 (stating that “aliens who have
left this country” should not be counted because “nothing
defnite can be known as to whether such aliens intend to
return to this country”); Bas v. Steele, 2 F. Cas. 988, 993 (No.
1,088) (CC Pa. 1818) (concluding a foreign trader visiting a
port with cargo had not established “domicil[e]” in the
United States because “[g]oing to a place to obtain a cargo,
and coming away, does not give [him] a domicil[e], or make
him an inhabitant”). Other sources show that immigration
laws themselves have taken account of similar criteria for
other purposes. See Department of Homeland Security v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U. S. 103, 138 (2020) (discussing the sig-
nifcance of “ `acquir[ing] any domicil[e] or residence within
the United States' ” for Due Process rights to attach for
those not naturalized or otherwise offcially admitted to the
country (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S.
651, 660 (1892))); see also Kaplan, 267 U. S., at 230 (asking
whether a minor was legally “dwelling ” in the United States
for purposes of a naturalization statute). These few in-
stances of a court asking whether an immigrant is “domi-
ciled” in the country or has an “intent to return” to the
United States do not show that immigration status is some-
how a proxy for the concept of residency. To the contrary,
they show that these principles can be applied to those law-
fully and unlawfully present on the same terms.
The Government's argument for a narrower construction
of “inhabitant” turns largely on Vattel's founding-era treatise
on the law of nations, which distinguishes between the “in-
habitants” and “citizens” of a nation. Brief for Appellants
35–36 (citing 1 E. deVattel, The Law of Nations § 213, p. 92
(1760)). Even assuming that the Government offers the best
reading of his work, and that this reading of Vattel informed
the Framers' understanding of that feld, his treatise simply
cannot bear the weight the Government puts on it. Vattel's

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as: 592 U. S. 125 (2020)
151
Breyer, J., dissenting
work discussed international law, not the United States'
scheme
for apportionment among the States, an issue not
intrinsically related to the law of nations nor one for which
founding-era thinkers drew on Vattel. The Apportionment
Clause emerged from an extensive and uniquely American
debate over both state representation and taxation. The
fnal language tied the two together, such that the burdens
of taxation would fow in proportion to the benefts of repre-
sentation. See Brief for Historians of the Census as Amici
Curiae 6–11. And however infuential Vattel may have
been for other topics, the Federal Government did not begin
to restrict immigration into the United States until after the
Civil War. See Brief for State of California et al. as Amici
Curiae 17. While the Government offers isolated works
from a different body of law—regarding a word that does not
appear in the constitutional text—the better guide to the
Constitution's meaning is the specifc historical evidence
about domestic apportionment, as well as the decades of con-
sistent practice that comports with the Clause's plain terms.
Second, and more importantly for this case, the Framers'
intent is not our focus. Instead, the question is the meaning
of the statute enacted in 1929. Even if the Government's
sources evince some ambiguity over the meaning of the Con-
stitution's census provisions in 1787 or 1868—a doubtful
proposition—the historical record had resolved it by the time
of the 1929 Act. There is simply no basis for thinking that
when Congress enacted the statute that mirrored the consti-
tutional language it was intending to depart so fundamen-
tally from the procedures that had been consistently applied
up to that point.
Apart from the historical evidence, the Government offers
little more than its assertion that excluding aliens without
lawful status makes good policy sense. As the memoran-
dum reasons, “[e]xcluding . . . illegal aliens from the ap-
portionment base is more consonant with the principles of
representative democracy underpinning our system of Gov-

152 TR
UMP v. NEW YORK
Breyer, J., dissenting
ernment.” 85 Fed. Reg. 44680. Whatever the merits of
that
policy, it is not the approach to representative democ-
racy that is set forth in the statute. Congress chose instead
a view of democracy wherein the Representatives are appor-
tioned based on “the whole number of persons in each state,”
not the whole number of voters, citizens, or lawful residents.
The Government is surely correct that the statute pro-
vides the President and the Secretary some degree of discre-
tion in carrying out their statutory responsibilities. The
concept of “usual residence” is an indeterminate one, which
“has continued to hold broad connotations.” Franklin, 505
U. S., at 805. The exercise of that discretion may involve a
number of judgment calls. How long must a person reside
in a State before it can be presumed that she intends to re-
main? Should prisoners be counted in the State of their in-
carceration, or the State where they resided prior to, and
where they intend to return following, their confnement?
In resolving such issues, the Executive's judgment has con-
sistently been directed toward the meaning of “usual resi-
dence.” A policy that draws lines based on immigration sta-
tus does no such thing. Most aliens without lawful status
have lived exclusively in the United States for many years.
See Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn, Pew Research Center, Five
Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U. S. (2019). The
Government does not suggest otherwise. Its own Resi-
dency Rule, which treated ICE detainees' residency in the
same manner as other federal prisoners, recognizes the lack
of any logical relationship between immigration status and
residence. Put simply, discretion to interpret and apply a
statutory command is not a blank check to depart from it.
That, I fear, is what the Government has tried to do here.
Thus, the touchstone for counting persons in the decennial
census is their usual residence, not their immigration status.
That alone is enough to resolve this case, because the memo-
randum seeks to exclude anywhere between tens of thou-
sands and millions of persons from the census count based

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as: 592 U. S. 125 (2020)
153
Breyer, J., dissenting
solely on their immigration status, and it does so for the
st
ated goal of changing the apportionment total at the ex-
pense of the plaintiffs. The Government seems to believe
that its policy can stand so long as any alien without lawful
status is excludable on some other basis. However reason-
able such an ad hoc approach might be in theory, that is not
the policy the memorandum announces, nor does it support
excluding aliens without lawful status as a class. To the
extent there is some overlap between aliens without lawful
status and persons who would not be counted under the ordi-
nary census procedures, that cannot justify the exclusion of
aliens simply on account of their immigration status. It is
our task to review the policy as promulgated, and that policy
draws a distinction that the statute does not allow.
III
It is worth considering the costs of the Presidential memo-
randum's departure from settled law. The modern census
emerged from periods of intense political confict, whereby
politicians sought to exploit census procedures to their ad-
vantage. See Evans, 536 U. S., at 497 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Department of Com-
merce v. Montana, 503 U. S. 442, 451–452, and n. 25 (1992).
In enacting the 1929 Act, Congress sought to address that
problem by using clear and broad language that would cabin
discretion and remove opportunities for political gamesman-
ship. History shows that, all things considered, that ap-
proach has served us fairly well. Departing from the text
is an open invitation to use discretion to increase an electoral
advantage. This produces the hostility that the 1929 Con-
gress sought to resolve.
Because I believe plaintiffs' claims are justiciable, ripe for
review, and meritorious, I would affrm the lower court's
holding. I respectfully dissent.

154 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS v. FULTON et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 19–357. Argued October 13, 2020—Decided January 14, 2021
The fling of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code automatically “creates
an estate” that, with some exceptions, comprises “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”
11 U. S. C. § 541(a). Section 541 is intended to include within the estate
any property made available by other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 542 is one such provision, as it provides that an entity
in possession of property of the bankruptcy estate “shall deliver to the
trustee, and account for” that property. The fling of a petition also
automatically “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of efforts to
collect prepetition debts outside the bankruptcy forum, § 362(a), includ-
ing “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate,”
§ 362(a)(3). Here, each respondent fled a bankruptcy petition and re-
quested that the city of Chicago (City) return his or her vehicle, which
had been impounded for failure to pay fnes for motor vehicle infractions.
In each case, the City's refusal was held by a bankruptcy court to violate
the automatic stay. The Seventh Circuit affrmed, concluding that by
retaining possession of the vehicles the City had acted “to exercise con-
trol over” respondents' property in violation of § 362(a)(3).
Held: The mere retention of estate property after the fling of a bank-
ruptcy petition does not violate § 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Under that provision, the fling of a bankruptcy petition operates as a
“stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate.
Taken together, the most natura l readi ng of these ter ms is that
§ 362(a)(3) prohibits affrmative acts that would disturb the status quo
of estate property as of the time when the bankruptcy petition was fled.
Respondents' alternative reading would create at least two serious
problems. First, reading § 362(a)(3) to cover mere retention of property
would render § 542's central command—that an entity in possession
of cer t ai n est ate proper ty “sha l l deliver to the tr ustee . . . such
property”—largely superfuous, even though § 542 appears to be the pro-
vision governing the turnover of estate property. Second, respondents'
reading would render the commands of § 362(a)(3) and § 542 contradic-
tory. Section 542 carves out exceptions to the turnover command.
Under respondents' reading, an entity would be required to turn over

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 154 (2020)
155
Syllabus
property under § 362(a)(3) even if that property were exempt from turn-
over
under § 542. The history of the Bankruptcy Code confrms the
better reading. The Code originally included both § 362(a)(3) and
§ 542(a), but the former provision lacked the phrase “or to exercise control
over property of the estate.” When that phrase was later added by
amendment, Congress made no mention of transforming § 362(a)(3) into
an affrmative turnover obligation. It is unlikely that Congress would
have made such an important change simply by adding the phrase “exer-
cise control,” rather than by adding a cross-reference to § 542(a) or some
other indication that it was so transforming § 362(a)(3). Pp. 158–162.
926 F. 3d 916, vacated and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members
joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case. Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 162.
Craig Goldblatt argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Danielle Spinelli, Joel Millar, Isley
Gostin, Mark A. Flessner, Benna Ruth Solomon, and My-
riam Zreczny Kasper.
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the
brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney
General Hunt, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, and Mark
B. Stern.
Eugene R. Wedoff argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were John P. Wonais, Michael A.
Miller, Catherine Steege, and Carl Wedoff.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the National Asso-
ciation of Counties et al. by Scott Burnett Smith, Amanda Kellar Karras,
and Lisa E. Soronen; and for Ralph Brubaker et al. by Michael L. Cook.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Nusrat J. Choudhury, Rebecca Glenberg,
David Cole, Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, Clark M. Neily III, Jay R. Sch-
weikert, William R. Maurer, Kirby Thomas West, Nila Bala, Charles
Duan, and John W. Whitehead; for Bankruptcy Law Professors by David
R. Kuney and Mary Joanne Dowd; for Geraci Law L. L. C. by Nathan E.
Curtis and Peter F. Geraci; for the National Association of Bankruptcy
Trustees by Dean A. Ziehl and Bradford J. Sandler; for the National
Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees by Henry E. Hildebrand III

156 CHICA
GO v. FULTON
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
W
hen a debtor fles a petition for bankruptcy, the Bank-
ruptcy Code protects the debtor's interests by imposing an
automatic stay on efforts to collect prepetition debts outside
the bankruptcy forum. Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Ma-
sonry, LLC, 589 U. S. 35, 42 (2020). Those prohibited efforts
include “any act . . . to exercise control over property” of the
bankruptcy estate. 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(3). The question in
this case is whether an entity violates that prohibition by
retaining possession of a debtor's property after a bank-
ruptcy petition is fled. We hold that mere retention of
property does not violate § 362(a)(3).
I
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the fling of a bankruptcy
petiti on has cer tain immediate consequences. For one
thing, a petition “creates an estate” that, with some excep-
tions, comprises “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
i n proper ty as of the commencement of the case. ”
§ 541(a)(1). Section 541 “is intended to include in the estate
any property made available to the estate by other provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code.” United States v. Whiting
Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 205 (1983). One such provision,
§ 542, is important for present purposes. Titled “Turnover
of property to the estate,” § 542 provides, with just a few
exceptions, that an entity (other than a custodian) in posses-
sion of property of the bankruptcy estate “shall deliver to
the trustee, and account for” that property.
A second automatic consequence of the fling of a bank-
ruptcy petition is that, with certain exceptions, the petition
“operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of efforts to
collect from the debtor outside of the bankruptcy forum.
and James M. Davis; for the National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Cen-
ter et al. by G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Henry J. Sommer, and Tara Twomey;
and for John A. E. Pottow et al. by John A. E. Pottow, pro se.

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as: 592 U. S. 154 (2021)
157
Opinion of the Court
§ 362(a). The automatic stay serves the debtor's interests
by
protecting the estate from dismemberment, and it also
benefts creditors as a group by preventing individual credi-
tors from pursuing their own interests to the detriment of
the others. Under the Code, an individual injured by any
willful violation of the stay “shall recover actual damages,
including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, may recover punitive damages.” § 362(k)(1).
Among the many collection efforts prohibited by the stay
is “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or
of property from the estate or to exercise control over prop-
erty of the estate.” § 362(a)(3) (emphasis added). The pro-
hibition against exercising control over estate property is
the subject of the present dispute.
In the case before us, the city of Chicago (City) impounded
each respondent's vehicle for failure to pay fnes for motor
vehicle infractions. Each respondent fled a Chapter 13
bankruptcy petition and requested that the City return his
or her vehicle. The City refused, and in each case a bank-
ruptcy court held that the City's refusal violated the auto-
matic stay. The Court of Appeals affrmed all of the judg-
ments in a consolidated opinion. In re Fulton, 926 F. 3d 916
(CA7 2019). The court concluded that “by retaining posses-
sion of the debtors' vehicles after they declared bankruptcy,”
the City had acted “to exercise control over” respondents'
property in violation of § 362(a)(3). Id., at 924–925. We
granted certiorari to resolve a split in the Courts of Ap-
peals over whether an entity that retains possession of the
property of a bankruptcy estate violates § 362(a)(3).
1
589
U. S. 1126 (2019). We now vacate the judgment below.
1
Compare In re Fulton, 926 F. 3d 916, 924 (CA7 2019), In re Weber, 719
F. 3d 72, 81 (CA2 2013), In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F. 3d 1147, 1151–1152
(CA9 1996), and In re Knaus, 889 F. 2d 773, 774–775 (CA8 1989), with In
re Denby-Peterson, 941 F. 3d 115, 132 (CA3 2019), and In re Cowen, 849
F. 3d 943, 950 (CA10 2017).

158 CHICA
GO v. FULTON
Opinion of the Court
II
The
language used in § 362(a)(3) suggests that merely re-
taining possession of estate property does not violate the
automatic stay. Under that provision, the fling of a bank-
ruptcy petition operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise
control” over the property of the estate. Taken together,
the most natural reading of these terms—“stay,” “act,” and
“exercise control”—is that § 362(a)(3) prohibits affrmative
acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property as
of the time when the bankruptcy petition was fled.
Taking the provision's operative words in turn, the term
“stay” is commonly used to describe an order that “sus-
pend[s] judicial alteration of the status quo.” Nken v.
Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 429 (2009) (brackets in original; in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). An “act” is “[s]omething
done or performed . . . ; a deed.” Black's Law Dictionary
30 (11th ed. 2019); see also Webster's New International Dic-
tionary 25 (2d ed. 1934) (“[t]hat which is done,” “the exercise
of power,” “a deed”). To “exercise” in the sense relevant
here means “to bring into play” or “make effective in action.”
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 795 (1993).
And to “exercise” something like control is “to put in prac-
tice or carry out in action.” Webster's New International
Dictionary, at 892. The suggestion conveyed by the combi-
nation of these terms is that § 362(a)(3) halts any affrmative
act that would alter the status quo as of the time of the fling
of a bankruptcy petition.
We do not maintain that these terms defnitively rule out
the alternative interpretation adopted by the court below
and advocated by respondents. As respondents point out,
omissions can qualify as “acts” in certain contexts, and the
term “ `control' ” can mean “ `to have power over.' ” Thomp-
son v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F. 3d 699, 702
(CA7 2009) (quoting Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Diction-
ary 272 (11th ed. 2003)). But saying that a person engages
in an “act” to “exercise” his or her power over a thing com-
municates more than merely “having ” that power. Thus the

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159
Opinion of the Court
language of § 362(a)(3) implies that something more than
merely
retaining power is required to violate the disputed
provision.
Any ambiguity in the text of § 362(a)(3) is resolved decid-
edly in the City's favor by the existence of a separate provi-
sion, § 542, that expressly governs the turnover of estate
property. Section 542(a), with two exceptions, provides as
follows:
“[A]n entity, other than a custodian, in possession, cus-
tody, or control, during the case, of property that the
trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this
title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522
of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for,
such property or the value of such property, unless such
property is of inconsequential value or beneft to the
estate.”
The exceptions to § 542(a) shield (1) transfers of estate prop-
erty made from one entity to another in good faith without
notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and (2) good-
faith transfers to satisfy certain life insurance obligations.
See §§ 542(c), (d). Reading § 362(a)(3) to cover mere reten-
tion of property, as respondents advocate, would create at
least two serious problems.
First, it would render the central command of § 542 largely
superfuous. “The canon against surplusage is strongest
when an interpretation would render superfuous another
part of the same statutory scheme.” Yates v. United States,
574 U. S. 528, 543 (2015) (plurality opinion; internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted). Reading “any act . . . to exer-
cise control” in § 362(a)(3) to include merely retaining posses-
sion of a debtor's property would make that section a blanket
turnover provision. But as noted, § 542 expressly governs
“[t]urnover of property to the estate,” and subsection (a) de-
scribes the broad range of property that an entity “shall de-
liver to the trustee.” That mandate would be surplusage if
§ 362(a)(3) already required an entity affrmatively to relin-

160 CHICA
GO v. FULTON
Opinion of the Court
quish control of the debtor's property at the moment a bank-
r
uptcy petition is fled.
Respondents and their amici contend that § 542(a) would
still perform some work by specifying the party to whom the
property in question must be turned over and by requiring
that an entity “account for . . . the value of ” the debtor's
property if the property is damaged or lost. But that is a
small amount of work for a large amount of text in a section
that appears to be the Code provision that is designed to
govern the turnover of estate property. Under this alterna-
tive interpretation, § 362(a)(3), not § 542, would be the chief
provision governing turnover—even though § 362(a)(3) says
nothing expressly on that question. And § 542 would be re-
duced to a footnote—even though it appears on its face to
be the governing provision. The better account of the two
provisions is that § 362(a)(3) prohibits collection efforts out-
side the bankruptcy proceeding that would change the status
quo, while § 542(a) works within the bankruptcy process to
draw far-fung estate property back into the hands of the
debtor or trustee.
Second, respondents' reading would render the commands
of § 362(a)(3) and § 542 contradictory. Section 542 carves out
exceptions to the turnover command, and § 542(a) by its
terms does not mandate turnover of property that is “of in-
consequential value or beneft to the estate.” Under re-
spondents' reading, in cases where those exceptions to turn-
over under § 542 would apply, § 362(a)(3) would command
turnover all the same. But it would be “an odd construc-
tion” of § 362(a)(3) to require a creditor to do immediately
what § 542 specifcally excuses. Citizens Bank of Md. v.
Strumpf, 516 U. S. 16, 20 (1995). Respondents would have
us resolve the conficting commands by engrafting § 542's ex-
ceptions onto § 362(a)(3), but there is no textual basis for
doing so.
The history of the Bankruptcy Code confrms what its text
and structure convey. Both § 362(a)(3) and § 542(a) were in-

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as: 592 U. S. 154 (2021)
161
Opinion of the Court
cluded in the original Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See Bank-
r
uptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2570, 2595. At the time,
§ 362(a)(3) applied the stay only to “any act to obtain posses-
sion of property of the estate or of property from the estate.”
Id., at 2570. The phrase “or to exercise control over
property of the estate” was not added until 1984. Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 98
Stat. 371.
Respondents do not ser i ously dispute that § 362(a)(3)
imposed no turnover obligation prior to the 1984 amend-
ment. But transforming the stay in § 362 into an affrma-
tive turnover obligation would have constituted an impor-
tant change. And it would have been odd for Congress to
accomplish that change by simply adding the phrase “exer-
cise control,” a phrase that does not naturally comprehend
the mere retention of property and that does not admit of
the exceptions set out in § 542. Had Congress wanted to
make § 362(a)(3) an enforcement arm of sorts for § 542(a), the
least one would expect would be a cross-reference to the lat-
ter provision, but Congress did not include such a crossrefer-
ence or provide any other indication that it was trans-
forming § 362(a)(3). The better account of the statutory
history is that the 1984 amendment, by adding the phrase
regarding the exercise of control, simply extended the stay
to acts that would change the status quo with respect to
intangible property and acts that would change the status
quo with respect to tangible property without “obtain[ing]”
such property.
***
Though the parties debate the issue at some length, we
need not decide how the turnover obligation in § 542 oper-
ates. Nor do we settle the meaning of other subsections of
§ 362(a).
2
We hold only that mere retention of estate prop-
2
In respondent Shannon's case, the Bankruptcy Court determined that
by retaining Shannon's vehicle and demanding payment, the City also had
violated §§ 362(a)(4) and (a)(6). Shannon presented those theories to the

162 CHICA
GO v. FULTON
Sotomayor, J., concurring
erty after the fling of a bankruptcy petition does not violate
§
362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring.
Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
fling of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay” of “any
act . . . to exercise control over property of the [bankruptcy]
estate.” 11 U. S. C. § 362(a)(3). I join the Court's opinion
because I agree that, as used in § 362(a)(3), the phrase “exer-
cise control over” does not cover a creditor's passive reten-
tion of property lawfully seized prebankruptcy. Hence,
when a creditor has taken possession of a debtor's property,
§ 362(a)(3) does not require the creditor to return the prop-
erty upon the fling of a bankruptcy petition.
I write separately to emphasize that the Court has not
decided whether and when § 362(a)'s other provisions may
require a creditor to return a debtor's property. Those pro-
visions stay, among other things, “any act to create, perfect,
or enforce any lien against property of the estate” and “any
act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against [a] debtor”
that arose prior to bankruptcy proceedings. §§ 362(a)(4), (6);
see, e. g., In re Kuehn, 563 F. 3d 289, 294 (CA7 2009) (holding
that a university's refusal to provide a transcript to a
student-debtor “was an act to collect a debt” that violated
the automatic stay). Nor has the Court addressed how
bankruptcy courts should go about enforcing creditors' sepa-
rate obligation to “deliver” estate property to the trustee
Court of Appeals, but the court did not reach them. 926 F. 3d, at 926,
n. 1. Neither do we.

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163
Sotomayor, J., concurring
or debtor under § 542(a). The City's conduct may very well
v
iolate one or both of these other provisions. The Court
does not decide one way or the other.
Regardless of whether the City's policy of refusing to re-
turn impounded vehicles satisfes the letter of the Code, it
hardly comports with its spirit. “The principal purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ` “fresh start” ' ” to debt-
ors. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U. S. 365, 367
(2007) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 286 (1991)).
When a debtor fles for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, as re-
spondents did here, “the debtor retains possession of his
property” and works toward completing a court-approved re-
payment plan. 549 U. S., at 367. For a Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy to succeed, therefore, the debtor must continue earn-
ing an income so he can pay his creditors. Indeed, Chapter
13 bankruptcy is available only to “individual[s] with regular
income.” 11 U. S. C. § 109(e).
For many, having a car is essential to maintaining em-
ployment. Take, for example, respondent George Peake.
Before the City sei zed h is car, Peake rel ied on h is
200,000-mile 2007 Lincoln MKZ to travel 45 miles each day
from his home on the South Side of Chicago to his job in
Joliet, Illinois. In June 2018, when the City impounded
Peake's car for unpaid park i ng and red-l ight tickets,
the vehicle was worth just around $4,300 (and was already
serving as collateral for a roughly $7,300 debt). Without
his car, Peake had to pay for rides to Joliet. He fled for
bankruptcy, hoping to recover his vehicle and repay his
$5,393.27 debt to the City through a Chapter 13 plan.
The City, however, refused to return the car until either
Peake paid $1,250 upfront or after the court confrmed
Peake's bankruptcy plan. As a result, Peake's car remained
in the City's possession for months. By denying Peake ac-
cess to the vehicle he needed to commute to work, the
City jeopardized Peake's ability to make payments to all
his creditors, the City included. Surely, Peake's vehicle

164 CHICA
GO v. FULTON
Sotomayor, J., concurring
would have been more valuable in the hands of its owner
than
parked in the City's impound lot.
1
Peake's situation is far too common.
2
Drivers in low-
income communities across the country face similar vicious
cycles: A driver is assessed a fne she cannot immediately
pay; the balance balloons as late fees accrue; the local gov-
ernment seizes the driver's vehicle, adding impounding and
storage fees to the growing debt; and the driver, now with-
out reliable transportation to and from work, fnds it all but
impossible to repay her debt and recover her vehicle. See
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 11–16, 31–32. Such drivers may turn to Chapter 13
bankruptcy for a “fresh start.” Marrama, 549 U. S., at 367
(internal quotation marks omitted).
3
But without their ve-
hicles, many debtors quickly fnd themselves unable to make
their Chapter 13 payments. The cycle thus continues, dis-
proportionately burdening communities of color, see Brief for
American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 17,
and interfering not only with debtors' ability to earn an
income and pay their creditors but also with their access
to childcare, groceries, medical appointments, and other
necessities.
1
Even though § 362(a)(3) does not require turnover, whether and when
the City may sell impounded cars is an entirely different matter. See,
e. g., In re Cowen, 849 F. 3d 943, 950 (CA10 2017) (“It's not hard to come
up with examples of . . . `acts' that `exercise control' over, but do not
`obtain possession of,' the estate's property, e. g., a creditor in possession
who improperly sells property belonging to the estate”).
2
See, e. g., Ramos, Chicago Seized and Sold Nearly 50,000 Cars Over
Tickets Since 2011, Sticking Owners With Debt, WBEZ News (Jan. 7,
2019) (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov).
3
The 10-year period from 2007 to 2017, for instance, saw a tenfold
increase in the number of Chicagoans fling Chapter 13 bankruptcies
that involved debt to the City. See Sanchez & Kambhampati, Driven
Into Debt: How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists Into Bank-
r uptcy, ProPublica Illinois (Feb. 27, 2018) (online source arch ived at
www.supremecourt.gov).

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 154 (2021)
165
Sotomayor, J., concurring
Although the Court today holds that § 362(a)(3) does not
require
creditors to turn over impounded vehicles, bank-
ruptcy courts are not powerless to facilitate the return of
debtors' vehicles to their owners. Most obviously, the Court
leaves open the possibility of relief under § 542(a). That sec-
tion requires any “entity,” subject to some exceptions, to
turn over “property” belonging to the bankruptcy estate.
11 U. S. C. § 542(a). The debtor, in turn, must be able to
provide the creditor with “adequate protection” of its inter-
est in the returned property, § 363(e); for example, the debtor
may need to demonstrate that her car is suffciently insured.
In this way, § 542(a) maximizes value for all parties in-
volved in a bankruptcy: The debtor is able to use her asset,
which makes it easier to earn an income; the debtor's un-
secured creditors, in turn, receive timely payments from the
debtor; and the debtor 's secured creditor, for its par t,
receives “adequate protection [to] replace the protection
afforded by possession.” United States v. Whiting Pools,
Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 207 (1983). Secured creditors cannot opt
out of this arrangement. As even the City acknowledges,
§ 542(a) “impose[s] a duty of turnover that is mandatory
when the statute's conditions . . . are met.” Brief for Peti-
tioner 37.
The trouble w ith § 542(a), however, is that tur nover
proceedings can be quite slow. The Federal Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure treat most “proceeding[s] to recover . . .
property” as “adversary proceedings.” Rule 7001(1). Such
actions are, in simplifed terms, “essentially full civil lawsuits
carried out under the umbrella of [a] bankruptcy case.”
Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U. S. 496, 505 (2015). Be-
cause adversary proceedings require more process, they take
more time. Of the turnover proceedings fled after July
2019 and concluding before June 2020, the average case was
pending for over 100 days. See Administrative Offce of the
United States Courts, Time Intervals in Months From Filing
to Closing of Adversary Proceedings Filed Under 11 U. S. C.

166 CHICA
GO v. FULTON
Sotomayor, J., concurring
§ 542 for the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2020, Wash-
i
ngton, DC: Sept. 25, 2020.
One hundred days is a long time to wait for a creditor to
return your car, especially when you need that car to get to
work so you can earn an income and make your bankruptcy-
plan payments. To address this problem, some courts have
adopted strategies to hurry things along. At least one
bankruptcy court has held that § 542(a)'s turnover obligation
is automatic even absent a court order. See In re Larimer,
27 B. R. 514, 516 (Idaho 1983). Other courts apparently will
permit debtors to seek turnover by simple motion, in lieu of
fling a full adversary proceeding, at least where the creditor
has received adequate notice. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 81 (coun-
sel for the City stating that “[i]n most bankruptcy courts, if
a creditor responds to a motion [for turnover] by” arguing
that the debtor should have instituted an adversary proceed-
ing, the bankruptcy judge will ask whether the creditor re-
ceived “actual notice”); Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 32 (reporting that “some courts have granted [turn-
over] orders based solely on a motion”); but see, e. g., In re
Denby-Peterson, 941 F. 3d 115, 128–131 (CA3 2019) (holding
that debtors must seek turnover through adversary proceed-
ings). Similarly, even when a turnover request does take
the form of an adversary proceeding, bankruptcy courts may
fnd it prudent to expedite proceedings or order preliminary
relief requiring temporary turnover. See, e. g., In re Reid,
423 B. R. 726, 727–728 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 2010); see gener-
ally 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 7065.02 (16th ed. 2019).
Ultimately, however, any gap left by the Court's ruling
today is best addressed by rule drafters and policymakers,
not bankruptcy judges. It is up to the Advisory Committee
on Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to consider amendments
to the Rules that ensure prompt resolution of debtors' re-
quests for turnover under § 542(a), especially where debtors'
vehicles are concerned. Congress, too, could offer a statu-
tory fx, either by ensuring that expedited review is available

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 154 (2021)
167
Sotomayor, J., concurring
for § 542(a) proceedings seeking turnover of a vehicle or by
enac
ting entirely new statutory mechanisms that require
creditors to return cars to debtors in a timely manner.
Nothing in today's opinion forecloses these alternative so-
lutions. With that understanding, I concur.

168 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Per Curiam
SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals
for the fth circuit
No. 19–963. Argued December 8, 2020—Decided January 25, 2021
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 935 F. 3d 274.
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were William T. Marks, Stacie M.
Fahsel, Paul F. Schuster, Cynthia Keely Timms, and Rich-
ard C. Godfrey.
Daniel L. Geyser argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Lewis T. LeClair and Gary Cruciani.*
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently
granted.
It is so ordered.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging vacatur were fled for Benco Dental Sup-
ply Co. by Kenneth L. Racowski and Mark A. Kasten; for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America by Andrew J. Pincus, Archis
A. Parasharami, and Daniel E. Jones; and for DRI-The Voice of the De-
fense Bar by David M. Axelrad, Felix Shafr, and John F. Querio.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Association for Justice et al. by Matthew W. H. Wessler, Jennifer D.
Bennett, Leah M. Nicholls, and Tobias L. Millrood; for Arbitrators et al.
by Imre Stephen Szalai and Richard D. Faulkner; for the Constitutional
Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Ash-
win P. Phatak; and for William R. Weinstein by William R. Weinstein,
pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Daniel D. Barnhizer et al. by Erin
Glenn Busby, Lisa R. Eskow, and Michael F. Sturley; and for George A.
Bermann by J. Samuel Tenenbaum.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
169
Syllabus
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY et al. v.
PHILIPP
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 19–351. Argued December 7, 2020—Decided February 3, 2021
Respondents are the heirs of German Jewish art dealers who formed a
consor tium dur i ng the wani ng years of the Wei mar Republic to
purchase a collection of medieval relics known as the Welfenschatz.
The heirs allege that when the Nazi government rose to power, it
unlawfully coerced the consortium into selling the collection to Prussia
for a third of its value. The relics are currently maintained by the
Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (SPK), an instrumentality of the
Federa l Republic of Ger many, and displayed at a Ber li n museum.
Af ter unsuccessfu lly seeki ng compensati on in Germany, the heirs
brought severa l common law proper ty clai ms i n United St ates
D istr ic t Cour t agai nst Ger many and SPK (col lectively Ger many).
Germany moved to dismiss, arguing that it was immune from suit under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. As relevant, Germany asserted
that the heirs' claims did not fall within the FSIA's exception to sover-
eign immunity for “property taken in violation of international law,” 28
U. S. C. § 1605(a)(3), because a sovereign's taking of its own nationals'
property is not unlawful under the international law of expropriation.
The heirs countered that the exception did apply because Germany's
purchase of the Welfenschatz was an act of genocide, and the relics were
therefore taken in violation of international human rights law. The
District Court denied Germany's motion to dismiss, and the D. C. Cir-
cuit affrmed.
Held: The phrase “rights in property taken in violation of international
law,” as used in the FSIA's expropriation exception, refers to violations
of the international law of expropriation and thereby incorporates the
domestic takings rule. Pp. 175–187.
(a) The heirs contend that their claims fall within the FSIA's excep-
tion for cases involving “property taken in violation of international
law,” § 1605(a)(3)—a provision known as the expropriation exception—
because the forced sale of the Welfenschatz constituted an act of geno-
cide, and genocide is a violation of international human rights law.
Germany argues that the relevant international law is not the law of
genocide but the international law of expropriation, under which a for-

170 FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP
Syllabus
eign sovereign's taking of its own nationals' property remains a domes-
tic
affair. Pp. 175–185.
(1) The “domestic takings rule” invoked by Germany derives from
the premise that international law customarily concerns relations among
states, not between states and individuals. Historically, a sovereign's
taking of a foreign national's property implicated international law be-
cause it constituted an injury to the state of the alien's nationality. A
domestic taking, by contrast, did not interfere with relations among
states. This domestic takings rule endured even as a growing body of
human rights law made states' treatment of individual human beings a
matter of international concern. And those who criticized the treat-
ment of property rights under international law did so on the ground
that all sovereign takings, not just domestic takings, were outside the
scope of that law. This dispute over the existence of international law
constraints on sovereign takings eventually reached the Court in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 436. Hesitant to delve
into this controversy, the Court instead invoked the act of state doc-
trine. In response, Congress passed the Second Hickenlooper Amend-
ment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, which prohibits United
States courts from applying the act of state doctrine where a “right[ ]
to property is asserted” based upon a “taking . . . by an act of that state
in violation of . . . international law.” 22 U. S. C. § 2370(e)(2). Courts
and commentators understood the Amendment to permit adjudication
of claims Sabbatino had avoided deciding, i. e., claims against other
countries for expropriation of American-owned property. But nothing
in the Amendment purported to alter any rule of international law, in-
cluding the domestic takings rule. Congress used nearly identical lan-
guage when it crafted the FSIA's expropriation exception twelve years
later. Based on this historical and legal background, courts reached a
“consensus” that the expropriation exception's “reference to `violation
of international law' does not cover expropriations of property belong-
ing to a country's own nationals.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann,
541 U. S. 677, 713 (Breyer, J., concurring). Pp. 176–180.
(2) The heirs concede that the international law of expropriation
retained the domestic takings rule at the time of the FSIA's enactment,
but they read “rights in property taken in violation of international law”
to incorporate any international norm, including international human
rights law, rather than merely the international law of expropriation.
The text of the FSIA's expropriation exception, however, supports Ger-
many's reading. The exception places repeated emphasis on property
and property-related rights, while injuries and acts associated with vio-
lations of human rights law, such as genocide, are notably lacking—a
remarkable omission if the provision was intended to provide relief for

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 169 (2021)
171
Syllabus
atrocities such as the Holocaust. A statutory phrase concerning prop-
er
ty rights most sensibly references the international law governing
property rights, rather than the law of genocide. The heirs' position
would arguably force courts themselves to violate international law not
only by ignoring the domestic takings rule, but also by derogating inter-
national law's preservation of sovereign immunity for violations of
human rights law. Germany's interpretation of the exception is also
more consistent with the FSIA's express goal of codifying the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, 28 U. S. C. § 1602, under which immunity
extends to a sovereign's public, but not private, acts. It would destroy
the Act's distinction between private and public acts were the Court to
subject all manner of sovereign public acts to judicial scrutiny under the
FSIA by transforming the expropriation exception into an all-purpose ju-
risdictional hook for adjudicating human rights violations. Pp. 180–183.
(3) Other FSIA provisions confrm Germany's position. The heirs'
approach would circumvent the reticulated boundaries Congress placed
in the FSIA with regard to bringing claims asserting human rights vio-
lations. One FSIA exception, for example, provides jurisdiction over
claims “in which money damages are sought against a foreign state
for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property,” but
only where the relevant conduct “occurr[ed] in the United States.”
§ 1605(a)(5). And the FSIA's terrorism exception eliminates sovereign
immunity for state sponsors of terrorism, but only for certain human
rights claims, brought by certain victims, against certain defendants.
§§ 1605A(a),(h). Such restrictions would be of little consequence if
human rights abuses could be packaged as violations of property rights
and thereby brought within the expropriation exception. Pp. 183–185.
(b) The heirs' counterarguments cannot overcome the text, context,
and history of the expropriation exception. They claim that the 2016
Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarifcation Act—
which amends the FSIA to explain that participation in specifed “art
exhibition activities” does not qualify as “commercial activity” under
the expropriation exception, § 1605(h)—demonstrates that Congress an-
ticipated that Nazi-era claims could be adjudicated under the exception.
Congress's effort to preserve sovereign immunity in a narrow, partic-
ularized context, however, does not support the broad elimination of
sovereign immunity across all areas of law. Other statutes aimed at
promoting restitution to Holocaust victims, on which the heirs rely, gen-
erally encourage redressing those injuries outside of public court sys-
tems and do not speak to sovereign immunity. See, e. g., Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 130 Stat. 1524. Pp. 185–187.
(c) This Court does not address Germany's argument that the District
Court was obligated to abstain from deciding the case on international

172 FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP
Syllabus
comity grounds or the heirs' alternative argument that the sale of the
W
elfenschatz is not subject to the domestic takings rule because the
consortium members were not German nationals at the time of the
transaction. P. 187.
894 F. 3d. 406, vacated and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Jonathan M. Freiman argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Tadhg Dooley, Benjamin M.
Daniels, and David R. Roth.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wall, Sopan
Joshi, Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak, Sharon Swingle, and Joshua
K. Handell.
Nicholas M. O'Donnell argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief was Erika L. Todd.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Foreign Interna-
tional Law Scholars et al. by Lisa M. Geary; for Société Nationale SNCF
SA by John B. Bellinger III, Sally L. Pei, and R. Reeves Anderson;
and for Davis R. Robinson et al. by James H. Hulme and Timothy J.
Feighery.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists et al. by Arthur R. Traldi and
Stephen R. Greenwald; for the Florida Holocaust Museum et al. by Donald
S. Burris, Joshua Magidson, and Andrew Sasso; for the Holocaust Art
Restitution Project, Inc., by Pierre Ciric; for the Holocaust Survivors
Foundation USA, Inc., et al. by Samuel J. Dubbin; for Members of the
United States House of Representatives by Akiva Shapiro; for the Na-
tional Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs et al. by Nathan
Lewin, Alyza D. Lewin, and Dennis Rapps; and for the World Jewish
Congress et al. by Thomas R. Kline and L. Eden Burgess.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Holocaust and Nuremberg Histori-
ans by Owen C. Pell; for The 1939 Society et al. by Benjamin G. Shatz,
Stanley A. Goldman, and Stanley W. Levy; for William S. Dodge et al. by
Geoffrey M. Klineberg and Daniel S. Severson; for Samuel Estreicher
et al. by Amelia L. B. Sargent; and for Peter Toren by Lawrence S. Rob-
bins, Gary A. Orseck, Ariel N. Lavinbuk, and D. Hunter Smith.

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 169 (2021)
173
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Cour
t.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that for-
eign nations are presumptively immune from the jurisdiction
of United States courts. The statute, however, sets forth
several specifc exceptions. One such exception provides
that a sovereign does not enjoy immunity in any case “in
which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue.” 28 U. S. C. § 1605(a)(3). The question
presented is whether a country's alleged taking of property
from its own nationals falls within this exception.
I
This case concerns several dozen medieval relics and devo-
tional objects known as the Welfenschatz. The treasure
(“schatz”) of the German Welf dynasty, the pieces date back
to the early days of the Holy Roman Empire and occupy a
unique position in German history and culture. The collec-
tion was assembled within Germany's Brunswick Cathedral
over the course of several centuries, before being moved to
a Hanoverian chapel in 1671 and later to Switzerland for
safekeeping in the wake of World War I.
During the waning years of the Weimar Republic, a con-
sortium of three art frms owned by Jewish residents of
Frankfurt purchased the Welfenschatz from the Duke of
Brunswick. By 1931, the consortium had sold about half of
the collection's pieces to museums and individuals in Europe
and the United States, including many to the Cleveland Mu-
seum of Art, where they reside today.
Conditions facing the consortium changed dramatically
after the collapse of the German economy and the rise of
the Nazi government. After ascending to power, Hermann
Goering—Adolf Hitler's deputy and the Prime Minister of
Prussia—became interested in the remainder of the Welfen-
schatz. The complaint alleges that he employed a combina-
tion of political persecution and physical threats to coerce
the consortium into selling the remaining pieces to Prussia

174 FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP
Opinion of the Court
in 1935 for approximately one-third of their value. Two of
the
consortium members fed the country following the sale,
and the third died in Germany shortly thereafter.
The United States took possession of the Welfenschatz in
the course of the occupation of Nazi Germany at the end of
the war, eventually turning the collection over to the Federal
Republic of Germany. For nearly 60 years, the treasure has
been maintained by Stif tung Preussischer Ku lturbesitz
(SPK)—the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation—and it
is now displayed at a museum in Berlin. SPK is an instru-
mentality of the Federal Republic.
Respondents are two United States citizens and a citizen
of the United Kingdom who trace their lineages back to
the three members of the consortium. The heirs frst ap-
proached SPK claiming that the sale of the Welfenschatz to
the Prussian Government was unlawful. SPK conducted its
own investigation of the sale and determined that the trans-
action occurred at a fair market price without coercion.
In 2014, the parties agreed to submit the claim to the
German Advisory Commission for the Return of Cultural
Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially
Jewish Property. Germany established the Advisory Com-
mission under the Washington Conference Principles on
Nazi-Confiscated Ar t, an initiative spearheaded by the
United States to encourage the development of new mecha-
nisms for resolving Nazi-era claims. See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 4. After hearing from expert wit-
nesses and reviewing documentary evidence, the Commis-
sion likewise concluded that the sale had occurred at a fair
price without duress.
Disappointed by the proceedings in Germany, the heirs
fled suit in Federal District Court in Washington, D. C.
They brought several common law property claims against
Germany and SPK, seeking $250 million in compensation.
Petitioners SPK and the Federal Republic of Germany—
collectively Germany—moved to dismiss the case. Relevant

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 169 (2021)
175
Opinion of the Court
here, Germany argued that it was immune from suit because
the
heirs' claims did not fall within the FSIA's exception to
immunity for “property taken in violation of international
law.” See 28 U. S. C. § 1605(a)(3); see also § 1603(a) (defning
“foreign state” to include “an agency or instrumentality of
a foreign state”). In doing so, Germany reasoned that the
purchase of the Welfenschatz could not have violated inter-
national law because a sovereign's taking of its own nation-
als' property is not unlawful under the international law of
expropriation. The heirs responded that the exception did
apply because Germany's purchase of the Welfenschatz was
an act of genocide and the taking therefore violated the in-
ternational law of genocide.
The D istr ic t Cour t denied Ger many's moti on, 248
F. Supp. 3d 59, 70–74 (DC 2017), and a panel of the D. C.
Circuit affrmed, 894 F. 3d 406 (2018). The panel agreed
with the heirs that the exception for property taken in viola-
tion of international law was satisfed because “genocide per-
petrated by a state even against its own nationals is a vio-
lati on of i nter nati ona l law. ” Id., at 410 – 411 (quoti ng
Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F. 3d 127, 145 (CADC
2016); alterations omitted). The D. C. Circuit declined Ger-
many's request for en banc review. 925 F. 3d 1349 (2019)
(per curiam).
Judge Katsas dissented from the denial of rehearing en
banc. In his view, the majority's analysis erroneously
“ma[de] the district court sit as a war crimes tribunal to ad-
judicate claims of genocide,” while “clear[ing] the way for a
wide range of litigation against foreign sovereigns for public
acts committed within their own territories.” Id., at 1350.
We granted certiorari. 591 U. S. 1025 (2020).
II
Enacted in 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
supplies the ground rules for “obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state in the courts of this country.” Argentine Re-

176 FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP
Opinion of the Court
public v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 443
(1989).
The Act creates a baseline presumption of immunity
from suit. § 1604. “[U]nless a specifed exception applies,
a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim
against a foreign state.” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U. S.
349, 355 (1993).
The heirs contend that their claims fall within the excep-
tion for “property taken in violation of international law,”
§ 1605(a)(3), because the coerced sale of the Welfenschatz,
their property, constituted an act of genocide, and genocide
is a violation of international human rights law. Germany
argues that the exception is inapplicable because the rele-
vant international law is the international law of property—
not the law of genocide—and under the international law of
property a foreign sovereign's taking of its own nationals'
property remains a domestic affair. This “domestic takings
rule” assumes that what a country does to property belong-
ing to its own citizens within its own borders is not the sub-
ject of international law. See Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 581 U. S.
170, 181 (2017) (citing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States § 712 (1986) (Restatement
(Third))).
A
Known at the founding as the “law of nations,” what we
now refer to as international law customarily concerns rela-
tions among sovereign states, not relations between states
and individuals. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U. S. 398, 422 (1964) (“The traditional view of interna-
tional law is that it establishes substantive principles for de-
termining whether one country has wronged another.”).
The domestic takings rule invoked by Germany derives
from this premise. Historically, a sovereign's taking of a
foreigner's property, like any injury of a foreign national,
implicated the international legal system because it “consti-
tuted an injury to the state of the alien's nationality.” Brad-

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 169 (2021)
177
Opinion of the Court
ley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
Harv. L. Rev. 815, 831, n. 106 (1997); see S. Friedman, Expro-
priation in International Law 5, 139 (1953). Such mistreat-
ment was an affront to the sovereign, and “therefore the
alien's state alone, and not the individual, could invoke the
remedies of international law.” Bradley, supra, at 831,
n. 106. A domestic taking by contrast did not interfere with
relations among states. See E. de Vattel, 3 The Law of Na-
tions § 81, p. 138 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916) (“Even the prop-
erty of individuals, taken as a whole, is to be regarded as the
property of the Nation with respect to other Nations.”); see
also United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 332 (1937)
(“What another country has done in the way of taking over
property of its nationals . . . is not a matter for judicial
consideration here.”).
The domestic takings rule has deep roots not only in inter-
national law but also in United States foreign policy. Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull most famously expressed the prin-
ciple in a 1938 letter to the Mexican Ambassador following
that country's nationalization of American oil felds. The
Secretary conceded “the right of a foreign government to
treat its own nationals in this fashion if it so desires. This
is a matter of domestic concern.” Letter from C. Hull to
C. Nájera (July 21, 1938), reprinted in 5 Foreign Relations
of the United States Diplomatic Papers 677 (1956). The
United States, however, could not “accept the idea” that
“these plans can be carried forward at the expense of our
citizens.” Ibid.
The domestic takings rule endured even as international
law increasingly came to be seen as constraining how states
interacted not just with other states but also with individu-
als, including their own citizens. The United Nations Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention on the
Prevention of Genocide became part of a growing body of
human rights law that made “how a state treats individual

178 FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP
Opinion of the Court
human beings . . . a matter of international concern.” Brad-
ley
, supra, at 832 (quoting Restatement (Third), pt. VII, In-
troductory Note, at 144–145). These human rights docu-
ments were silent, however, on the subject of property
rights. See Friedman, supra, at 107. International tribu-
nals therefore continued to maintain that international law
governed “confscation of the property of foreigners,” but
“measures taken by a State with respect to the property of
its own nationals are not subject to these principles.” Gud-
mundsson v. Iceland, Appl. No. 511/59, 1960 Y. B. Eur. Conv.
on H. R. 394, 423–424 (decision of the European Commission
on Human Rights).
Some criticized the treatment of property rights under in-
ternational law, but they did so on the ground that all sover-
eign takings were outside the scope of international law, not
just domestic takings. In the 1950s and 1960s, a growing
chorus of newly independent states, particularly in Latin
America, resisted any foreign restraint on their ability to
nationalize property. See Young, The Story of Banco Nacio-
nal de Cuba v. Sabbatino, in Federal Courts Stories 422–423
(V. Jackson & J. Resnik eds. 2010). Put differently, states
and scholars disagreed over whether international law pro-
vided a remedy for a sovereign's interference with anyone's
property rights, not whether domestic takings were outside
the purview of international law. That principle was be-
yond debate.
We confronted this dispute over the existence of interna-
tional law constraints on sovereign takings in Sabbatino,
where we were asked to decide claims arising out of Cuba's
nationalization of American sugar interests in 1960. 376
U. S., at 403. This Court observed that there were “few if
any issues in international law today on which opinion seems
to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to ex-
propriate the property of aliens.” Id., at 428 (emphasis
added). Hesitant to delve into this controversy, we instead
invoked the act of state doctrine, which prevents United

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179
Opinion of the Court
States courts from determining the validity of the public acts
of
a foreign sovereign. Id., at 436.
Congress did not applaud the Court's reticence. Within
months of Sabbatino, it passed the Second Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. The
Amendment prohibits United States courts from applying
the act of state doctrine where a “right[ ] to property is as-
serted” based upon a “taking . . . by an act of that state in
violation of the principles of international law.” 22 U. S. C.
§ 2370(e)(2). Cour ts and commentators understood the
Amendment to permit adjudication of claims the Sabbatino
decision had avoided—claims against foreign nations for ex-
propriation of American-owned property. But nothing in
the Amendment purported to alter any rule of international
law, including the domestic takings rule. See F. Palicio y
Compania, S. A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (SDNY 1966)
(interpreting the Hickenlooper Amendment to displace Sab-
batino but dismissing the suit on the ground that “confsca-
tions by a state of the property of its own nationals, no
matter how fagrant . . . , do not constitute violations of
international law”), summarily aff 'd, 375 F. 2d 1011 (CA2
1967); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F. 2d 166, 173–
176 (CA2 1967); Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States § 185 (1965) (Restatement (Sec-
ond)); Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the
International Legal Order, 11 Va. J. Int'l L. 9, 29, 34 (1970).
Congress used language nearly identical to that of the Sec-
ond Hickenlooper Amendment 12 years later in crafting the
FSIA's expropriation exception. As noted, it provides that
United States courts may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign in any case “in which rights in property taken
in violation of international law are in issue.” 28 U. S. C.
§ 1605(a)(3).
Based on this historical and legal background, courts ar-
rived at a “consensus” that the expropriation exception's
“reference to `violation of international law' does not cover

180 FEDERAL
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Opinion of the Court
expropriations of property belonging to a country's own na-
ti
onals.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677,
713 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
B
The heirs urge us to change course. They read “rights in
property taken in violation of international law” not as an
invocation of the international law governing property
rights, but as a broad incorporation of any international
norm. Focusing on human rights law, the heirs rely on the
United Nations Convention on Genocide, which defnes geno-
cide as “deliberately inficting on [a] group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Art. II, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U. N. T. S.
277, 280. According to the heirs, the forced sale of their
ancestors' art constituted an act of genocide because the con-
fscation of property was one of the conditions the Third
Reich inficted on the Jewish population to bring about
their destruction.
We need not decide whether the sale of the consortium's
property was an act of genocide, because the expropriation
exception is best read as referencing the international law of
expropriation rather than of human rights. We do not look
to the law of genocide to determine if we have jurisdiction
over the heirs' common law property claims. We look to the
law of property.
And in 1976, the state of that body of law was clear: A
“taking of property” could be “wrongful under international
law” only where a state deprived “an alien” of property.
Restatement (Second) § 185; see also Permanent Mission of
India to United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U. S. 193,
199–200 (2007) (noting our consistent practice of interpreting
the FSIA in keeping with “international law at the time of
the FSIA's enactment” and looking to the contemporary
Restatement for guidance). As explained above, this rule

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181
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survived the advent of modern human rights law, including
the
United Nations Convention on Genocide. Congress
drafted the expropriation exception and its predecessor, the
Hickenlooper Amendment, against that legal and histori-
cal backdrop. See Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U. S. 554, 560
(2019).
The heirs concede that at the time of the FSIA's enactment
the international law of expropriation retained the domestic
takings rule. See Restatement (Second) § 192. But they
argue that Congress captured all of international law
i n the excepti on—not just the i nter nati ona l law of
expropriation—and that other areas of international law do
not shield a sovereign's actions against its own nationals.
In support of that assertion, they note that the exception
concer ns “proper ty taken i n v i olati on of i nter nati ona l
law”—not “property takings in violation of international
law.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 70. This distinction between “tak-
ings” and “taken,” they say, is the difference between incor-
porating the specifc international law governing takings of
property and incorporating international law writ large.
Ibid.
We would not place so much weight on a gerund. The
text of the expropriation exception as a whole supports Ger-
many's reading. In its entirety the clause provides that
United States courts may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign in any case
“in which rights in property taken in violation of inter-
national law are in issue and that property or any prop-
erty exchanged for such property is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
that property or any property exchanged for such prop-
erty is owned or operated by an agency or instrumental-
ity of the foreign state and that agency or instrumental-
ity is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1605(a)(3).

182 FEDERAL
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Opinion of the Court
The exception places repeated emphasis on property and
proper
ty-related rights, while injuries and acts we might as-
sociate with genocide are notably lacking. That would be
remarkable if the provision were intended to provide relief
for atrocities such as the Holocaust. A statutory phrase
concerning property rights most sensibly references the in-
ternational law governing property rights, rather than the
law of genocide.
What is more, the heirs' interpretation of the phrase
“taken in violation of international law” is not limited to vio-
lations of the law of genocide but extends to any human
rights abuse. Their construction would arguably force
courts themselves to violate international law, not only ig-
noring the domestic takings rule but also derogating interna-
tional law's preservation of sovereign immunity for viola-
tions of human rights law. As the International Court of
Justice recently ruled when considering claims brought by
descendants of citizens of Nazi-occupied countries, “a State
is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is
accused of serious violations of international human rights
law.” Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v.
Italy), 2012 I. C. J. 99, 139 (Judgt. of Feb. 3); see also Brad-
ley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual
Offcials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 Green Bag 2d 9,
21 (2009). Respondents would overturn that rule whenever
a violation of international human rights law is accompanied
by a taking of property.
Germany's interpretation of the exception is also more
consistent with the FSIA's express goal of codifying the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity. § 1602. Under the
absolute or classical theory of sovereign immunity, foreign
sovereigns are categorically immune from suit. Altmann,
541 U. S., at 690. Under the restrictive view, by contrast,
immunity extends to a sovereign's public but not its private
acts. Ibid. Most of the FSIA's exceptions, such as the ex-
ception for “commercial activity carried on in the United

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183
Opinion of the Court
States,” comport with the overarching framework of the re-
str
ictive theory. § 1605(a)(2).
It is true that the expropriation exception, because it per-
mits the exercise of jurisdiction over some public acts of ex-
propriation, goes beyond even the restrictive view. In this
way, the exception is unique; no other country has adopted a
comparable limitation on sovereign immunity. Restatement
(Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 455,
Reporters' Note 15 (2017).
History and context explain this nonconformity. As
events such as Secretary Hull's letter and the Second Hick-
enlooper Amendment demonstrate, the United States has
long sought to protect the property of its citizens abroad as
part of a defense of America's free enterprise system. Sab-
batino, 376 U. S., at 430.
Given that the FSIA “largely codifes” the restrictive the-
ory, however, we take seriously the Act's general effort to
preserve a dichotomy between private and public acts. Nel-
son, 507 U. S., at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted). It
would destroy that distinction were we to subject all manner
of sovereign public acts to judicial scrutiny under the FSIA
by transforming the expropriation exception into an all-
purpose jurisdictional hook for adjudicating human rights
violations. See Helmerich, 581 U. S., at 181 (rejecting the
suggestion that Congress intended the expropriation excep-
tion to operate as a “radical departure” from the “basic prin-
ciples” of the restrictive theory).
C
Other provisions of the FSIA confrm Germany's position.
The heirs' approach, for example, would circumvent the re-
ticulated boundaries Congress placed in the FSIA with re-
gard to human rights violations. Where Congress did tar-
get injuries associated with such acts, including torture or
death, it did so explicitly and with precision. The noncom-
mercial tort exception provides jurisdiction over claims

184 FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP
Opinion of the Court
“in which money damages are sought against a foreign state
for
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of prop-
erty,” but only where the relevant conduct “occurr[ed] in
the United States.” § 1605(a)(5). Similarly, the terrorism
exception eliminates sovereign immunity for state sponsors
of terrorism but only for certain human rights claims,
brought by certain victims, against certain defendants.
§§ 1605A(a), (h).
These restrictions would be of little consequence if human
rights abuses could be packaged as violations of property
rights and thereby brought within the expropriation excep-
tion to sovereign immunity. And there is no reason to sup-
pose Congress thought acts of genocide or other human
rights violations to be especially deserving of redress only
when accompanied by infringement of property rights. We
have previously rejected efforts to insert modern human
rights law into FSIA exceptions ill suited to the task. Nel-
son, 507 U. S., at 361 (commercial activity exception does not
encompass claims that foreign state illegally detained and
tortured United States citizen, “however monstrous such
abuse undoubtedly may be”). We do so again today.
We have recognized that “ `United States law governs do-
mestically but does not rule the world.' ” Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 115 (2013) (quoting Mi-
crosoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 437, 454 (2007)). We
interpret the FSIA as we do other statutes affecting interna-
tional relations: to avoid, where possible, “producing friction
in our relations with [other] nations and leading some to re-
ciprocate by granting their courts permission to embroil the
United States in expensive and diffcult litigation.” Helm-
erich, 581 U. S., at 183 (internal quotation marks omitted);
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S.
325, 335 (2016) (interpreting civil Racketeer Infuenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act “to avoid the international dis-
cord that can result when U. S. law is applied to conduct in
foreign countries”); Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 116 (interpreting

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185
Opinion of the Court
Alien Tort Statute so as not to “adopt an interpretation of
U
. S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly
intended by the political branches”).
As a Nation, we would be surprised—and might even initi-
ate reciprocal action—if a court in Germany adjudicated
claims by Americans that they were entitled to hundreds of
millions of dollars because of human rights violations com-
mitted by the United States Government years ago. There
is no reason to anticipate that Germany's reaction would be
any different were American courts to exercise the jurisdic-
tion claimed in this case.
III
The heirs offer several counterarguments, but none can
overcome the text, context, and history of the expropria-
tion exception.
First, the heirs rely on the 2016 Foreign Cultural Ex-
change Jurisdictional Immunity Clarifcation Act. The Act
amends the FSIA to explain that participation in specifed
“art exhibition activities” does not qualify as “commercial
activity” within the meaning of the expropriation exception.
28 U. S. C. § 1605(h). This clarifcation responded to deci-
sions of federal courts holding to the contrary, see, e. g., Ma-
lewicz v. Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 313–315 (DC
2005), and enables foreign states to loan art to American mu-
seums without fear that the work's presence in the United
States will subject them to litigation here. The provision,
however, does not apply to claims brought against Germany
arising out of the period from January 1933 through May
1945. §§ 1605(h)(2), (3). According to the heirs, this clari-
fcation of the expropriation exception shows that Congress
anticipated Nazi-era claims could be adjudicated by way of
that exception.
We agree with the heirs, but only to a limited extent.
Claims concerning Nazi-era art takings could be brought
under the expropriation exception where the claims involve
the taking of a foreign national's property. See, e. g., Alt-

186 FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP
Opinion of the Court
mann, 541 U. S., at 680–682 (claim concerning Austrian tak-
i
ng of Czechoslovakian national's art brought under the ex-
propriation exception). As for the heirs' suggestion that the
Clarifcation Act demonstrates that Congress meant to abro-
gate immunity for any Nazi-era claim, however, we do not
interpret Congress's effort to preserve sovereign immunity
in a narrow, particularized context—art shows—as support-
ing the broad elimination of sovereign immunity across all
areas of law. The Clarifcation Act did not purport to amend
the critical phrase here—“taken in violation of international
law”—and we will not construe it to do so.
The heirs also rely on other statutes aimed at promoting
restitution to the victims of the Holocaust. The Acts include
the Holocaust Victims Redress Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 15; the
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (HEAR
Act), 130 Stat. 1524; and the Justice for Uncompensated Sur-
vivors Today (JUST) Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–171, 132 Stat.
1288. These laws, the heirs suggest, demonstrate Con-
gress's desire for American courts to hear disputes about
Holocaust-era property claims.
The statutes do promote restitution for the victims of the
Holocaust, but they generally encourage redressing those in-
juries outside of public court systems. The HEAR Act, for
example, states that “the use of alternative dispute resolu-
tion” mechanisms will “yield just and fair resolutions in a
more effcient and predictable manner” than litigation in
court. § 2(8), 130 Stat. 1525. Germany has adopted just
such an alternative mechanism, the Advisory Commission,
and the heirs availed themselves of that opportunity to re-
solve their claims. Ibid. See also Brief for Petitioners 5
(“[T]he German government has provided roughly $100 bil-
lion (in today's dollars) to compensate Holocaust survivors
and other victims of the Nazi era.”).
These laws do not speak to sovereign immunity. That is
the province of the FSIA, which provides the carefully con-
structed framework necessary for addressing an issue of

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187
Opinion of the Court
such international concern. The heirs have not shown that
the
FSIA allows them to bring their claims against Germany.
We cannot permit them to bypass its design.
IV
We hold that the phrase “rights in property taken in viola-
tion of international law,” as used in the FSIA's expropria-
tion exception, refers to violations of the international law
of expropriation and thereby incorporates the domestic tak-
ings rule.
We do not address Germany's argument that the District
Court was obligated to abstain from deciding the case on
international comity grounds. Nor do we consider an alter-
native argument noted by the heirs: that the sale of the Wel-
fenschatz is not subject to the domestic takings rule because
the consortium members were not German nationals at the
time of the transaction. See Brief for Respondents 27–28;
but see Brief for Petitioners 19, n. 7 (claiming that the heirs
forfeited this argument). The Court of Appeals should di-
rect the District Court to consider this argument, including
whether it was adequately preserved below.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit
is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

188 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
SALINAS v. UNITED STATES RAILROAD
RETIREMENT
BOARD
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 19–199. Argued November 2, 2020—Decided February 3, 2021
In 1992, petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas began seeking disability benefts
under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA) based on serious inju-
ries he suffered during his 15-year career with the Union Pacifc Rail-
road. Salinas' frst three applications were denied, but he was granted
benefts after he fled his fourth application in 2013. He timely sought
reconsideration of the amount and start date of his benefts. After re-
consideration was denied, he fled an administrative appeal, arguing that
his third application, fled in 2006, should be reopened because the U. S.
Railroad Retirement Board (Board) had not considered certain medical
records. An intermediary of the Board denied the request to reopen
because it was not made “[w]ithin four years” of the 2006 decision, and
the Board affrmed. 20 CFR § 261.2(b). Salinas sought review with
the Fifth Circuit, but the court dismissed the petition for lack of juris-
diction, holding that federal courts cannot review the Board's refusal to
reopen a prior benefts determination.
Held: The Board's refusal to reopen a prior benefts determination is sub-
ject to judicial review. Pp. 193–202.
(a) The RRA makes judicial review available to the same extent that
review is available under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act
(RUIA). See 45 U. S. C. § 231g. Thus, to qualify for judicial review,
the Board's refusal to reopen Salinas' 2006 application must constitute
“any fnal decision of the Board.” § 355(f ). It does. Pp. 193–199.
(1) The phrase “any fnal decision” “denotes some kind of terminal
event,” and similar language in the Administrative Procedure Act has
been interpreted to refer to an agency action that “both (1) mark[s] the
consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process and (2) is one by
which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences will fow.” Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. 471, 479, 481.
The Board's refusal to reopen Salinas' 2006 denial of benefts satisfes
these criteria. First, the decision was the “terminal event” in the
Board's administrative review process. After appealing the intermedi-
ary's denial of reopening to the Board, Salinas' only recourse was to
seek judicial review. Second, the features of a reopening decision make
it one “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from

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189
Syllabus
which legal consequences will fow.” Id., at 481. For example, a re-
openi
ng is defned as “a conscious determination . . . to reconsider an
otherwise fnal decision for purposes of revising that decision.” 20
CFR § 261.1(c). It therefore entails substantive changes that affect
benefts and obligations under the RRA. The Board reads § 355(f )'s
earlier reference to “any other party aggrieved by a fnal decision under
subsection (c)” to mean that each authorized party may seek review of
only “a fnal decision under” § 355(c). Section 355(f ), however, uses the
broad phrase “any fnal decision” without tying it to the earlier refer-
ence to § 355(c)—a notable omission, since Congress used such limiting
language elsewhere in § 355, see § 355(c)(5). Pp. 194–197.
(2) Any ambiguity in the meaning of “any fnal decision” must be
resolved in Salinas' favor under the “strong presumption favoring judi-
cial review of administrative action.” Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC,
575 U. S. 480, 486. The Board attempts to rebut that presumption
by arguing that various cross-references within § 355 prove that § 355(f )
and § 355(c) are coextensive. There are several indications, however,
that § 355(f ) is broader than § 355(c). For example, under § 355(g),
determinations that certain unexpended funds may be used to pay
benefts or refunds are subject to review exclusively under § 355(f ), yet
the Board concedes that such decisions fall outside § 355(c). Pp. 197–199.
(b) The Board's remaining arguments also fall short. First, the
Board analogizes § 355(f ) to the judicial-review provision addressed in
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99. But the latter provision contains an
express limitation that § 355(f ) does not, distinguishing Califano from
this case. Second, the Board argues that reopening does not qualify for
judicial review because it is simply a “refusal to make a new determina-
tion” of rights or liabilities, like the denial of reopening in Your Home
Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U. S. 449, 453. The stat-
ute in Your Home, however, did not implicate the presumption in favor
of judicial review and was narrower than § 231g, which simply incorpo-
rates § 355(f ) into the RRA. Finally, the fact that the Board could de-
cline to offer reopening does not mean that, having chosen to provide it,
the Board may avoid the plain text of § 355(f ). The Board's decision to
grant or deny reopening is ultimately discretionary, however, and there-
fore subject to reversal only for abuse of discretion. See 20 CFR
§ 261.11. Pp. 199–202.
765 Fed. Appx. 79, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., Breyer, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled a
dissenting opinion, in which Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined,
post, p. 202.

190 SALIN
AS v. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BD.
Opinion of the Court
Sarah M. Har r is arg ued the cause for petiti oner.
W
ith her on the briefs were Lisa S. Blatt and Charles L.
McCloud.
Austin L. Raynor argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Deputy
Solicitor General Kneedler, Assistant Attorney General
Hunt, Charles W. Scarborough, and Sonia M. Carson.
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA), 50 Stat. 307,
as restated and amended, 45 U. S. C. § 231 et seq., establishes
a system of disability, retirement, and survivor benefts for
railroad employees. That system is administered by the
U. S. Railroad Retirement Board (Board). The Board de-
nied benefts to petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas, a former
railroad employee, when he applied in 2006, but it later
granted him benefts when he reapplied in 2013. Salinas
then requested that the Board reopen its decision to deny
his 2006 application, but the Board declined. This case asks
whether the Board's refusal to reopen the prior denial of
benefts is subject to judicial review. The Court holds that
it is.
I
A
The RRA provides long-term benefts to railroad employ-
ees who have accrued enough years of service and who have
either reached a certain age or become disabled. See 45
U. S. C. §§ 231a(a)(1), (b). It also provides benefts for eligi-
ble employees' spouses and survivors under certain condi-
tions. §§ 231a(c)–(d). These benefits complement those
provided by another statute, the Railroad Unemployment In-
surance Act (RUIA), 52 Stat. 1094, 45 U. S. C. § 351 et seq.,
which covers short-term periods of unemployment and sick-
ness. See § 352. This case concerns benefts under the
RRA only. Both statutes, however, are relevant, as dis-
cussed below.

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191
Opinion of the Court
To administer benefts under the RRA, the Board has im-
plemented
a multistep system of administrative review.
First, an individual applies for benefts and receives an initial
decision from the appropriate division of the Board, such as
the Disability Benefts Division. 20 CFR § 260.1(a) (2020).
If the individual is dissatisfed, she may seek reconsideration
from the Board's Reconsideration Section. § 260.3(a). If
denied again, she may appeal to the Board's Bureau of Hear-
ings and Appeals (Bureau). § 260.5(a). Lastly, the appli-
cant may take a fnal appeal to the Board itself. § 260.9(a).
This four-step sequence is the primary form of administra-
tive review for benefts determinations. Applicants have a
right to seek each of the above levels of review within 60
days. See, e. g., 45 U. S. C. § 231f(b)(3); 20 CFR § 260.9(b).
Once an applicant completes the review process, or the dead-
line for seeking further review passes, the benefts determi-
nation becomes “fnal” under the Board's regulations. See
20 CFR § 261.1(b).
After a determination becomes fnal, an applicant can re-
quest that the Board reopen it. See § 261.1(a). “Reopening
. . . means a conscious determination on the part of the
agency to reconsider an otherwise fnal decision for purposes
of revising that decision.” § 261.1(c) (emphasis deleted).
Whether to grant reopening is ultimately discretionary.
See § 261.11. The Board, however, has established substan-
tive criteria to guide its discretion. For example, as rele-
vant here, a decision may be reopened “[w]ithin four years
of the date of the notice of such decision, if there is new and
material evidence.” § 261.2(b).
B
Salinas is a former carpenter and assistant foreman for the
Union Pacifc Railroad. During his 15-year railroad career,
he suffered two serious injuries on the job. In 1989, a co-
worker dropped a sledge hammer from an overhead bridge,
hitting Salinas on the top of his hardhat. Then, in 1993, a

192 SALIN
AS v. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BD.
Opinion of the Court
wooden railroad tie fell from a truck and struck Salinas in
the
head. As a result, Salinas underwent two spinal fusion
surgeries. After receiving treatment, Salinas continued to
experience pain, anxiety, and depression. He began seeking
RRA disability benefts in 1992. His frst two applications
were denied, and he did not seek reconsideration of either.
On February 28, 2006, Salinas fled his third application
for RRA benefts. The Board denied Salinas' application on
August 28, 2006, concluding that his impairments were not
severe enough to qualify for relief. After missing the dead-
line for seeking reconsideration, Salinas sent a letter to the
Board requesting that it reconsider its decision “even though
the 60 days had passed. ” Record 207. Sa l inas noted,
among other things, that he had “more medical records to
provide.” Ibid. The Reconsideration Section denied Sali-
nas' request, fnding that he had failed to demonstrate good
cause for his late fling. See 20 CFR § 260.3(c). Salinas did
not appeal.
Seven years later, on December 26, 2013, Salinas fled his
fourth application for RRA benefts. This time, his applica-
tion was granted. Although Salinas was deemed disabled
as of October 9, 2010, his benefts began on December 1, 2012,
12 months prior to the date on which he fled his successful
application. Under the RRA, disability benefts begin on
the latest of several alternative start dates, and Salinas'
application-based start date was later than his disability
onset date. See Record 8; 45 U. S. C. § 231d(a)(ii); 20 CFR
§ 218.9(c).
Salinas timely sought reconsideration of the amount and
start date of his benefts. The Reconsideration Section de-
nied relief, and Salinas appealed to the Bureau. On appeal,
Salinas argued that his 2006 application should be reopened
because the Board had not considered certain medical rec-
ords in existence at the time when it denied him benefts.
Salinas submitted the records as part of his appeal.

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Opinion of the Court
On August 26, 2016, the Bureau denied Salinas' request to
reopen
the 2006 decision. The Bureau concluded that Sali-
nas had failed to seek reopening based on “new and material
evidence” within four years of the decision at issue, as
required by regulation. 20 CFR § 261.2(b). Salinas ap-
pealed to the Board, which affrmed the Bureau's decision on
the ground that Salinas had not met the criteria for
reopening under § 261.2. The Board notifed Salinas that he
could seek judicial review of the Board's decision within
one year.
Salinas fled a timely pro se petition for review with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
765 Fed. Appx. 79, 80–81 (2019) (per curiam). In a previous
decision, the Fifth Circuit had joined the majority of
Circuits in holding that federal courts cannot review the
Board's refusal to reopen a prior benefts determination.
See Roberts v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 346 F. 3d 139, 141
(2003). The Fifth Circuit noted a longstanding split among
the Circuits on this issue. 765 Fed. Appx., at 80–81 (citing
cases).
We granted certiorari to resolve the confict among the
Courts of Appeals. 589 U. S. 1127 (2020).
II
Section 231g of the RRA provides that, except for the
deadline for seeking review, “[d]ecisions of the Board deter-
mining the rights or liabilities of any person” under the RRA
“shall be subject to judicial review in the same manner, sub-
ject to the same limitations, and all provisions of law shall
apply in the same manner as though the decision were a de-
termination of corresponding rights or liabilities under the
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act.” 45 U. S. C. § 231g.
In other words, § 231g makes judicial review available under
the RRA to the same extent that review is available under

194 SALIN
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Opinion of the Court
the RUIA.
1
Th
is case, therefore, turns on the RUIA's judi-
cial review provision, 45 U. S. C. § 355(f ).
Section 355(f ) provides: “Any claimant, or any railway
labor organization organized in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Railway Labor Act . . . , of which claimant is a
member, or any base-year employer of the claimant, or any
other party aggrieved by a fnal decision under subsection
(c) of this section, may . . . obtain a review of any fnal deci-
sion of the Board.”
2
To qualify for judicial review under
this provision, the Board's refusal to reopen its denial of Sali-
nas' 2006 application must constitute “any fnal decision of
the Board.” It does.
A
The text of § 355(f ) starts our analysis. The phrase “any
fnal decision” is broad, and it refects Congress' intent to
defne the scope of review “expansively.” Smith v. Berry-
hill, 587 U. S. 471, 479 (2019) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted). The phrase “denotes some kind of
terminal event,” such as the “fnal stage of review.” Ibid.
1
Every Court of Appeals to interpret these statutes has reached the
same conclusion. See Stovic v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 826 F. 3d 500,
502 (CADC 2016) (Kavanaugh, J., for the court); Cunningham v. Railroad
Retirement Bd., 392 F. 3d 567, 571 (CA3 2004); Roberts v. Railroad Retire-
ment Bd., 346 F. 3d 139, 140 (CA5 2003); Rivera v. Railroad Retirement
Bd., 262 F. 3d 1005, 1008 (CA9 2001); Harris v. Railroad Retirement Bd.,
198 F. 3d 139, 141 (CA4 1999); Abbruzzese v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 63
F. 3d 972, 974, n. 4 (CA10 1995); Clifford v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 3
F. 3d 536, 538, n. 4 (CA1 1993); Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F. 2d 884, 888 (CA8
1987); Steebe v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 708 F. 2d 250, 252 (CA7 1983);
Railroad Concrete Crosstie Corp. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 709 F. 2d
1404, 1406, n. 2 (CA11 1983); Szostak v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 370 F. 2d
253, 254 (CA2 1966) (interpreting § 231g 's predecessor provision); accord,
Brief for Petitioner 15; Brief for Respondent 12.
2
“[S]ubsection (c),” i. e., 45 U. S. C. § 355(c), governs administrative re-
view of benefts determinations under the RUIA. It addresses decisions
awarding or denying benefts, including “initial determination[s],” as well
as decisions about the recovery of improperly awarded benefts. 45
U. S. C. §§ 355(c)(1)–(4).

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Opinion of the Court
Similar language in the Administrative Procedure Act has
been
interpreted to refer to an agency action that “both (1)
mark[s] the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking
process and (2) is one by which rights or obligations have
been determined, or from which legal consequences will
fow.” Id., at 481 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154,
177–178 (1997); internal quotation marks omitted).
The Board's refusal to reopen the prior denial of benefts
satisfes these criteria. First, the decision was the “termi-
nal event” in the Board's administrative review process.
Smith, 587 U. S., at 479. After frst requesting reopening
before the Bureau, Salinas exhausted further agency review
by appealing to the Board itself. Salinas' only recourse
thereafter was to seek judicial review.
Second, the Board's decision was one “ `by which rights
or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences will fow.' ” Army Corps of Engineers v.
Hawkes Co., 578 U. S. 590, 597 (2016). The Board has de-
fned reopening as “a conscious determination . . . to recon-
sider an otherwise fnal decision for purposes of revising that
decision.” 20 CFR § 261.1(c). Reopening therefore entails
substantive changes that affect benefts and obligations
under the RRA. Consistent with its substantive nature, the
decision to grant or deny reopening is guided by objective
criteria, including whether “there is new and material evi-
dence or there was adjudicative error not consistent with the
evidence of record at the time of adjudication.” § 261.2(b).
If reopening is granted, any revision the Board makes may
be reviewed in the same manner as a primary determination
of benefts; otherwise, the revision is “binding.” §§ 261.7,
261.8. In light of these features, a decision about reopening
fts within the meaning of “any fnal decision” as that phrase
is used in § 355(f ).
The Board disagrees because it interprets the phrase “any
fnal decision” to mean “any fnal decision under § 355(c).”
The Board's argument goes like this: Section 355(f ) author-

196 SALIN
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Opinion of the Court
izes four parties to seek judicial review: (1) a claimant for
benefts,
(2) a claimant's railway labor organization, (3) a
claimant's base-year employer, and (4) “any other party ag-
grieved by a fnal decision under subsection (c) of this sec-
tion.” 45 U. S. C. § 355(f ). The phrase “any other” means
that, in order to obtain judicial review, each of the enumer-
ated parties must be “aggrieved by a fnal decision under
subsection (c).” This implies, in turn, that each party may
seek judicial review of only the decision “under subsection
(c)” by which it was aggrieved. A denial of reopening is not
a decision “under subsection (c)” because it is not a determi-
nation granting or denying benefts. See §§ 355(c)(1)–(4).
Thus, the Board argues, reopening decisions are not subject
to judicial review.
The Board's interpretation is inconsistent with the text of
§ 355(f ). Congress conspicuously chose the broad language
“any fnal decision,” without tying that phrase to the earlier
reference to “a fnal decision under subsection (c).” This
omission is especially notable because Congress used such
limiting references elsewhere in § 355. Under § 355(c)(5),
Congress established rules for “[f]inal decision[s] of the
Board in the cases provided for in the preceding three para-
graphs” (in other words, under §§ 355(c)(2)–(4)). 45 U. S. C.
§ 355(c)(5). In the same paragraph, Congress authorized any
properly interested and notifed party to obtain judicial re-
view of “any such decision by which he claims to be ag-
grieved.” Ibid. By using the language “such” and “by
which he claims to be aggrieved,” Congress clearly referred
to the particular type of decision described earlier in
§ 355(c)(5), thus limiting judicial review to fnal decisions
“provided for” in §§ 355(c)(2)–(4).
This type of limiting language is absent from § 355(f ).
“Where Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello

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197
Opinion of the Court
v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation
marks
and brackets omitted). Section 355(f ) authorizes ju-
dicial review of “any” fnal decision, not “such” fnal decision
“under subsection (c).” The Board's denial of reopening
qualifes for review under the language Congress chose.
3
B
To the extent there is ambiguity in the meaning of “any
fnal decision,” it must be resolved in Salinas' favor under
the “strong presumption favoring judicial review of adminis-
trative action.” Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480,
486 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). This default
rule is “ `well-settled,' ” and Congress is presumed to legis-
late with it in mind. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 252
(2010). To rebut the presumption, the Board bears a “heavy
burden” of showing that the statute's “language or struc-
ture” forecloses judicial review. Mach Mining, 575 U. S., at
486 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Board has not met its burden. The Board argues that
various cross-references within § 355 indicate that § 355(f )
covers only decisions made under § 355(c). For instance,
§ 355(c)(7) provides for review solely “pursuant to this sub-
section and subsection (f ).” 45 U. S. C. § 355(c)(7); see also
§ 355(c)(5). Meanwhile, § 355(f ) requires that “all adminis-
trative remedies within the Board,” including review under
§ 355(c), must be exhausted before a party can seek judicial
review. Finally, § 355(g) provides that “[f]indings of fact
and conclusions of law of the Board in the determination of
3
The Court need not resolve the parties' dispute about whether each
type of party listed in § 355(f ) must be “aggrieved by a fnal decision under
subsection (c),” or whether that phrase modifes only the closest anteced-
ent. Either way, Salinas is a proper party because he qualifes as both a
“claimant” and a “claimant . . . aggrieved by a fnal decision under subsec-
tion (c).” Salinas has fled four separate applications for benefts under
the RRA, and he claims to have been aggrieved by the Board's decision
on each, including the Board's allegedly incorrect assessment of the bene-
fts he is owed based on his 2013 application.

198 SALIN
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Opinion of the Court
any claim for benefts or refund” and “the determination of
any
other matter pursuant to subsection (c)” shall be re-
viewed exclusively under § 355(f ). In the Board's view,
these cross-references prove that §§ 355(f ) and 355(c) are
coextensive.
The structure of § 355 shows that § 355(c) feeds exclusively
into § 355(f ), but nothing in the statute suggests that the
exclusivity runs the other way. To the contrary, several
clues indicate that § 355(f ) encompasses decisions beyond
those described in § 355(c). For example, § 355(g) lists three
types of decisions that are subject to review exclusively
under § 355(f ): determinations of claims for benefts or re-
funds, deter mi nati ons of other matters under § 355(c),
and determinations that unexpended funds in the railroad
unemployment insurance account may be used to pay bene-
fts or refunds. See 45 U. S. C. §§ 355(g), 351(p), 360(a).
The Board concedes that the third type of decision falls out-
side § 355(c). See Brief for Respondent 22, n. 4.
4
In addi-
tion, the Board's own regulations appear to presume that
judicial review is available for decisions not covered by
§ 355(c), such as the Board's determinations of employers'
contribution rates. See 20 CFR § 345.307(c). Given these
indications that § 355(f ) is broader than § 355(c), the Board's
structural argument does not overcome the plain meaning of
4
The Board argues that § 355(g) merely precludes review of the Board's
fund decisions by the Comptroller General, who ordinarily makes determi-
nations related to the charging and settling of government accounts. See
Brief for Respondent 22, n. 4. That purpose, however, could have been
accomplished without also indicating that review is available “as provided
in subsection (f ).” 45 U. S. C. § 355(g). Indeed, the RUIA does exactly
this with respect to determinations about the use of funds from an admin-
istrative expense account. See § 361(c) (providing simply that the Board's
determinations “shall not be subject to review in any manner”). Ulti-
mately, we need not resolve whether the Board's fund decisions are subject
to judicial review. The point is that the Board's structural interpretation
is subject to doubt, and therefore does not overcome the presumption in
favor of judicial review.

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Opinion of the Court
“any fnal decision” and the presumption in favor of judicial
re
view.
C
The Board's remaining arguments also fall short. First,
the Board argues that this Court's precedent holds that re-
opening decisions are not subject to judicial review. In Cal-
ifano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977), this Court concluded
that § 405(g) of the Social Security Act, which authorizes ju-
dicial review of “ `any fnal decision of the Secretary made
after a hearing,' ” does not apply to refusals to reopen a prior
benefts determination. Id., at 102 (quoting 42 U. S. C.
§ 405(g)). As it is under the RRA, the opportunity to seek
reopening in Califano was “a second look that the agency
had made available to claimants as a matter of grace” after
the deadline for appealing an initial benefts determination
had passed. Smith, 587 U. S., at 485. Given this similarity,
many courts have applied Califano to the type of decision at
issue here. See, e. g., Roberts, 346 F. 3d, at 141; Harris v.
Railroad Retirement Bd., 198 F. 3d 139, 142 (CA4 1999); Ab-
bruzzese v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 63 F. 3d 972, 974
(CA10 1995).
A key textual difference in the respective judicial review
provisions, however, distinguishes Califano from this case.
Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act provides that re-
viewable decisions must be “made after a hearing,” whereas
§ 355(f ) of the RRA contains no such limitation. Compare
42 U. S. C. § 405(g) with 45 U. S. C. § 355(f ). Section 405(g)'s
hearing requirement was a signifcant basis for Califano's
conclusion that judicial review was unavailable, as “a petition
to reopen a prior fnal decision may be denied without a hear-
ing.” 430 U. S., at 108; see also ibid. (explaining that
§ 405(g) “clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of
agency action”). The other considerations identifed in Cali-
fano, including the fact that reopening was made available
only by regulation, corroborated the Court's interpretation
of this important textual limit. Ibid.; see also Smith, 587

200 SALIN
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Opinion of the Court
U. S., at 480–481. Section 355(f ), by contrast, contains no
such
express limitation, and the Board's decision fts within
the provision's plain language.
Second, the Board argues that § 355(f ) should be inter-
preted in light of § 231g 's reference to decisions “determining
the rights or liabilities of any person.” See 45 U. S. C.
§ 231g. The denial of reopening does not qualify for judicial
review, the Board claims, because it is simply a “refusal to
make a new determination” of rights or liabilities, like the
decision this Court addressed in Your Home Visiting Nurse
Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U. S. 449 (1999). Id., at 453
(emphasis deleted). In Your Home, this Court concluded
that an agency intermediary's refusal to reopen a prior
Medicare reimbursement determination was not subject
to further administrative review because it was not a “ `f-
nal determination . . . as to the amount of total pro-
gram reimbursement due. ' ” Ib i d. (quoti ng 42 U. S. C.
§ 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(i)). The agency argued that the denial of
reopening was not itself a determination “as to the amount,”
but rather a refusal to make such a determination. 525
U. S., at 453. This Court concluded that the agency's inter-
pretation was reasonable, and thus entitled to deference
under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Your Home, 525 U. S.,
at 453. The Court noted that the agency's interpretation
was also “the more natural” reading of the statute and was
“further confrmed” by two considerations from Califano:
The right to seek reopening existed only by regulation, and
permitting review would undermine the ordinary deadlines
for appealing the intermediary's reimbursement decisions.
525 U. S., at 453–454. The Board argues that its decision
here should be viewed in the same way.
The Board's argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, the statute in Your Home defned the scope of internal
agency review and thus did not implicate the presumption in
favor of judicial review. To the contrary, the Court ulti-

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201
Opinion of the Court
mately deferred to the agency's interpretation precluding re-
v
iew under Chevron. See 525 U. S., at 453. No such defer-
ence is due here because the scope of judicial review is
“hardly the kind of question that the Court presumes that
Congress implicitly delegated to an agency.” Smith, 587
U. S., at 486.
Second, the statute at issue in Your Home was narrower
than § 231g because it focused on a particular type of deter-
mination: one “as to the amount of total program reimburse-
ment due the provider.” See 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(i).
Section 231g, in contrast, broadly authorizes judicial review
of “[d]ecisions . . . determining the rights or liabilities of any
person under [the RRA].” This broader language, as well
as § 231g 's express direction that “all provisions of law shall
apply in the same manner as though the decision were a de-
termination of corresponding rights or liabilities under the
[RUIA],” indicates that § 231g simply incorporates § 355(f )
into the RRA. As the Board stated during oral argument,
§ 231g “effectively piggybacks” on § 355(f ). Tr. of Oral Arg.
46. Every Court of Appeals to interpret these statutes has
reached the same conclusion. See supra, at 194, n. 1. Thus,
the key language governing judicial review under both stat-
utes is the phrase “any fnal decision.”
Finally, the Board argues that the opportunity to seek re-
opening is a matter of administrative grace, and such solici-
tous discretion should not be discouraged by allowing judicial
review. But the fact that the Board could decline to offer
reopening does not mean that, having chosen to provide it,
the Board may avoid the plain text of § 355(f ). See Hawkes
Co., 578 U. S., at 602 (“[S]uch a `count your blessings' argu-
ment is not an adequate rejoinder to the assertion of a right
to judicial review”). Whether the availability of judicial re-
view will affect how the Board exercises its discretion is a
question properly reserved for Congress.
It is also worth noting that judicial review of reopening
decisions will be limited. The Board's decision to grant or

202 SALIN
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Thomas, J., dissenting
deny reopening, while guided by substantive criteria, is ulti-
mately
discretionary and therefore subject to reversal only
for abuse of discretion. See 20 CFR § 261.11; Stovic, 826
F. 3d, at 506; Szostak v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 370 F. 2d
253, 254 (CA2 1966) (Friendly, J., for the court). Most deci-
sions will be upheld under this deferential standard. See
ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 288 (1987) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Judicial review plays a modest, but
important, role in guarding against decisions that are arbi-
trary, inconsistent with the standards set by the Board's own
regulations, or otherwise contrary to law.
***
We hold that the Board's refusal to reopen a prior benefts
determination is a “fnal decision” within the meaning of
§ 355(f ), and therefore subject to judicial review. The judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito, Justice
Gorsuch and Justice Barrett join, dissenting.
The Court may well correctly interpret the judicial review
provision located in the Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Act (RUIA). See 45 U. S. C. § 355(f ). But this case con-
cerns the judicial review provision located in the Railroad
Retirement Ac t (RRA). See 45 U. S. C. § 231g. And
though the RRA references the RUIA to explain how to
obtain judicial review, it defnes separately what may be
reviewed—the key issue here.
The RRA provides that “[d]ecisions of the Board deter-
mining the rights or liabilities of any person under this sub-
chapter shall be subject to judicial review in the same man-
ner, subject to the same limitations, and all provisions of law
shall apply in the same manner as though the decision were

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203
Thomas, J., dissenting
a determination of corresponding rights or liabilities under
the
[RUIA].” Ibid. This language directs courts to assess
questions about reviewability in three steps. First, resolve
whether the Board's decision determined rights or liabilities.
Second, locate the rights or liabilities under the RUIA, if
any, that correspond to the ones determined by the Board.
And third, decide whether and how a determination of those
parallel rights or liabilities would be reviewed under the
RUIA.
The majority bypasses this structure entirely by overlook-
ing the question whether the Board's decision here deter-
mined any right or liability at all. It did not. A “right” is
“[a] power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a consti-
tution, statutes or decisional laws, or claimed as a result of
long usage.” Black's Law Dictionary 1189 (5th ed. 1979).
Similarly, a “liability” is “an obligation one is bound in law
or justice to perform.” Id., at 823. The Board here did not
assess a legal obligation or claim. As the majority points
out, the Board decided only the “ultimately discretionary”
matter of whether to reopen the 2006 decision. Ante, at 202.
Neither the RRA nor the RUIA provides any statutory right
to reopen a proceeding. And the regulations that create re-
opening procedures make clear that no one has a right to
that proceeding; the Board has plenary authority to “direct
that any decision, which is otherwise subject to reopening
under this part, shall not be reopened.” 20 CFR § 261.11
(2020).
Nor did the Board's decision determine any underlying
statutory entitlement to benefts, as petitioner contends.
The most recent reopening decision did not address the mer-
its of the 2006 decision. On the contrary, it briefy explained
that petitioner failed to meet any of the threshold regulatory
requirements to obtain a reopening in the frst place. As we
unanimously said in a similar context, the “more natural”
understanding of a reopening denial like this one is that it
was simply “the refusal to make a new determination.”

204 SALIN
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Thomas, J., dissenting
Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525
U
. S. 449, 453 (1999).
The majority skirts this analysis by noting that the statute
at issue in Your Home was narrower than the RRA. In
Your Home, the statute involved determinations of “program
reimbursement” amounts, 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(i),
whereas the statute here provides review for determinations
of “rights or liabilities,” 45 U. S. C. § 231g. But that distinc-
tion is irrelevant. The reasoning in Your Home was simply
that the refusal to reopen a determination “is not a fnal de-
termination . . . but rather the refusal to make a new deter-
mination.” 525 U. S., at 453 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). So too here.
1
The majority also tries to sidestep text and precedent by
invoking the presumption in favor of judicial review of ad-
ministrative action that this Court sometimes applies. But
we have explained that this presumption is nothing more
than a default rule that gives way to “a statute's language
or structure.” Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480,
486 (2015); see also Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,
467 U. S. 340, 351 (1984) (explaining that the presumption is
“overcome. . . whenever the congressional intent to preclude
judicial review is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, § 231g limits ju-
dicial review to Board decisions determining rights or liabili-
ties. The statutory language alone controls the outcome.
Any presumption is further undercut because petitioner
had full opportunity to seek judicial review of the 2006
decision that did determine his rights. Congress gave peti-
tioner 90 days to fle a petition for review in a court of
appeals. § 355(f ). Petitioner simply did not take advantage
of it. To require a court to review a reopening denial
now—15 years after the statutory time for review expired—
1
That the Court noted the best reading of the statute also happened to
be a reasonable one under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), does not undermine its logic.

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205
Thomas, J., dissenting
transforms a default presumption into a tool to “frustrate
the
statutory purpose of imposing a [time] limit on judicial
review.” Your Home, 525 U. S., at 454. The presumption
of judicial review is not a presumption of infnite judicial re-
view. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 108 (1977) (re-
jecting “an interpretation that would allow a claimant judi-
cial review simply by fling—and being denied—a petition to
reopen his claim”). We should not so readily allow a court-
created presumption to overcome statutory time limits.
The majority opinion is doubly incorrect because it creates
a new form of judicial review in a context where it is not
clear how it can be exercised. What standards a court could
use to review Board decisions denying reopening remain elu-
sive. There are no statutory cues to guide review—indeed,
it is not altogether clear that the Board has authority to re-
open its fnal decisions. See 45 U. S. C. § 355(g). And the
regulations that provide review give the Board discretion to
deny reopening whenever it “deem[s] proper,” even if a case
“is otherwise subject to reopening. 20 CFR § 261.11. The
“impossibility of devising an adequate standard of review”
for these sorts of decisions is yet another reason to conclude
that no review is warranted. ICC v. Locomotive Engineers,
482 U. S. 270, 282 (1987); cf. 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2) (extending
judicial review, “except to the extent that . . . agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law”).
2
Were courts to
try to impose standards governing when the Board can deny
reopening, the unintended effect may be to discourage the
Board from offering reopenings in the frst place. I would
not distort the RRA's judicial review provision to force
courts to review a decision where no standards of review
are evident.
2
Our precedent suggests that even if judicial review is generally pre-
cluded, it may still remain available for “the adjudication of colorable con-
stitutional claims.” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 109 (1977). But
we need not decide whether this exception applies because neither side
contends that the Board decided such an issue below.

206 SALIN
AS v. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BD.
Thomas, J., dissenting
Instead of reckoning with these serious questions, the ma-
jor
ity interprets § 231g to say nothing more than that the
RUIA's judicial review provision applies. Ante, at 193–194.
But that interpretive gloss ignores the words Congress
chose. Only Board decisions “determining the rights or lia-
bilities of any person” under the RRA are subject to judicial
review. 45 U. S. C. § 231g. Because the Board's decision
below did not determine any right or liability, the RRA does
not provide for judicial review. I respectfully dissent.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
207
Syllabus
REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY et al. v. SIMON et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 18–1447. Argued December 7, 2020—Decided February 3, 2021
911 F. 3d 1172, vacated and remanded.
Gregory Silbert argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs was Konrad L. Cailteux.
Benjamin W. Snyder argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Acting Solicitor General Wall, Deputy Solicitor
General Kneedler, Sopan Joshi, Sharon Swingle, and Joshua
K. Handell.
Sarah E. Harrington argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were Erica Oleszczuk Evans, Paul G.
Gaston, Charles S. Fax, Liesel J. Schopler, L. Marc Zell, and
David H. Weinstein.*
*John B. Bellinger III, Sally L. Pei, and R. Reeves Anderson fled a
brief for Société Nationale SNCF SA as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Ameri-
can Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists et al. by Arthur R. Traldi
and Stephen R. Greenwald; for the Holocaust Survivors Foundation
USA, Inc., et al. by Samuel J. Dubbin; for Members of the United States
House of Representatives by Akiva Shapiro; for the Raoul Wallen-
berg Centre for Human Rights et al. by Beth Heifetz and Alex Potapov;
for Victims of the Hungarian Holocaust by Robert James Pavich and
Richard H. Weisberg; for the World Jewish Congress et al. by Thomas R.
Kline and L. Eden Burgess; and for Mark B. Feldman by Mark B. Feld-
man, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for The 1939 Society et al. by
Benjamin G. Shatz, Stanley A. Goldman, and Stanley W. Levy; for
William S. Dodge et al. by Geoffrey M. Klineberg and Daniel S.
Sev e rso n; and for Samuel Estreicher et a l. by Amel i a L. B.
Sargent.

208 Cite
as: 592 U. S. 207 (2021)
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
The
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the D. C. Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the decision in Federal
Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U. S. 169 (2021).
It is so ordered.

Reporter’s Note
The next page is purposely numbered 901. The numbers between 208
and 901 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the offcial cita-
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.

ORDERS
FOR OCTOBER 5, 2020, THROUGH
FEBRUARY 22, 2021
October 5, 2020
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 19–1046. Pham, Senior Ofcial Performing the Du-
ties of the Director of U. S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement, et al. v. Ragbir et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consid-
eration in light of Department of Homeland Security v. Thurais-
sigiam, 591 U. S. 103 (2020). Reported below: 923 F. 3d 53.
No. 19–8126. Wilson v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re-
manded for further consideration in light of McGirt v. Oklahoma,
591 U. S. 894 (2020).
No. 19–8149. Lambert v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir.
Reported below: 2018–0777 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/27/19), 267 So. 3d 648;
No. 19–8337. Rufn v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir.
Reported below: 2018–1280 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/28/19); and;
No. 19–8338. Mayeux v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Reported
below: 2019–00369 (La. 1/29/20). Motions of petitioners for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judg-
ments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in
light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83 (2020).
No. 20–5091. Horton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur-
ther consideration in light of Davis v. United States, 589 U. S.
345 (2020) (per curiam). Reported below: 950 F. 3d 237.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 19–8383. Soro v. Lopez. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
901

902 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8450. Carmell v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
p
artment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 19–8480. Caterbone v. National Security Agency.
C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process,
the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in non-
criminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required
by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance
with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 786
Fed. Appx. 351.
No. 19–8531. Hall v. Inch et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed
not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from
petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid
and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See
Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1
(1992) (per curiam). Justice Kagan took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this motion and this petition.
No. 19 – 8534. Johnson v. Performant Recovery, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 19–8610. Sancho v. Ebner Family Trust. Sup. Ct. Cal.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 19–8671. Arunachalam v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this
Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further
petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the dock-
eting fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submit-

ORDERS 903
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
ted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Co-
lumb
ia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). The
Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of
this motion and this petition.
No. 19–8707. Arunachalam v. Apple, Inc., et al. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process,
the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in non-
criminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required
by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance
with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). The Chief Justice
took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and
this petition. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 977.
No. 19–8708. Arunachalam v. Presidio Bank. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). The Chief Justice took no part in
the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.
Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 750.
No. 19–8750. Arunachalam v. SAP America, Inc. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process,
the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in non-
criminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required
by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance
with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). The Chief Justice
took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and
this petition. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 750.
No. 19–8753. Banks v. United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Mo-

904 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 135.
No. 19–8780. Glick v. Guiffrida. Sup. Ct. Mont. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See th is Cour t's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 398 Mont. 446, 455 P. 3d 456.
No. 19–8797. Shove v. McDonald et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Re-
ported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 555.
No. 20–5118. Donahue v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 20–5124. Calton v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–5126. Day v. Watson, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 27.
No. 20–5138. McColm v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.

ORDERS 905
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5198. Smith v. Mayeld et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Mo-
ti
on of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 20–5209. Clark v. Fye et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–5229. Lopez v. Costa Mesa Police Department
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8.As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's
process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions
in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee
required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in
compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported
below: 792 Fed. Appx. 522.
No. 20–5230. Lopez v. Newport Beach Police Department
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this
Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further
petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the dock-
eting fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is sub-
mitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 535.
No. 20–5275. Manuel Torres v. Trump, President of the
United States, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dis-
missed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20 – 5311. Hollihan v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Jus-

906 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
tice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this
moti
on and this petition.
No. 20–5336. Jones v. Brumbley. Sup. Ct. Del. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See th is Cour t's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 234 A. 3d 1159.
No. 20–5475. Cabello, aka Palumbo v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's
Rule 39.8.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A55. Andino et al. v. Middleton et al. D. C. S. C.
Application for stay, presented to The Chief Justice, and by
him referred to the Court, granted in part, and the District
Court's September 18, 2020, order granting preliminary injunction
is stayed pending disposition of the appeal in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and disposition of the
petition for writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.
Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall
terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of
certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending
down of the judgment of this Court. The order is stayed except
to the extent that any ba l lots cast before th is st ay issues
and received within two days of this order may not be rejected
for failing to comply with the witness requirement. Justice
Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Gorsuch would grant the
application in full.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
The District Court enjoined South Carolina's witness require-
ment for absentee ballots because the court disagreed with the
State's decision to retain that requirement during the COVID–19
pandemic. For two alternative and independent reasons, I agree
with this Court's order staying in part the District Court's
injunction.
First, the Constitution “principally entrusts the safety and the
health of the people to the politically accountable offcials of the
States.” South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590

ORDERS 907
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
U. S. 965, 967 (2020) (Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial of appli-
cati
on for injunctive relief ) (internal quotation marks and alter-
ation omitted). “When those offcials `undertake[ ] to act in areas
fraught with medical and scientifc uncertainties,' their latitude
`must be especially broad.' ” Ibid. (quoting Marshall v. United
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974); alteration in original). It follows
that a State legislature's decision either to keep or to make
changes to election rules to address COVID–19 ordinarily “should
not be subject to second-guessing by an `unelected federal judi-
ciary,' which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to
assess public health and is not accountable to the people.” South
Bay, 590 U. S., at 967 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 545 (1985)). The District
Court's injunction contravened that principle.
Second, for many years, this Court has repeatedly emphasized
that federal courts ordinarily should not alter state election rules
in the period close to an election. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549
U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam). By enjoining South Carolina's wit-
ness requirement shortly before the election, the District Court
defed that principle and this Court's precedents. See 990 F. 3d
768, 771–774 (CA4 2020) (Wilkinson and Agee, JJ., dissenting from
denial of stay).
For those two alternative and independent reasons, I agree with
this Court's order staying in part the District Court's injunction.
No. 20M1. Thompson v. Cattail Creek Community Assn.;
No. 20M6. Vickery v. Hall, Warden, et al.;
No. 20M8. Safford v. Florida;
No. 20M9. Lan Tu Trinh v. Department of Education;
No. 20M10. Lan Tu Trinh v. Fineman;
No. 20M13. Rith v. United States;
No. 20M14. Ellis v. United States;
No. 20M15. Cesspooch v. United States;
No. 20M18. Kelley v. Herrera et al.;
No. 20M19. Lopez v. United States;
No. 20M21. Goodwine v. Amtrak;
No. 20M22. Washington v. Bonds, Administrator, South
Woods State Prison, et al.; and
No. 20M24. Sherer v. United States. Motions to direct the
Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.

908 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20M3. Henning v. United States;
N
o. 20M7. Conerly v. United States;
No. 20M11. S. O. et al. v. District of Columbia;
No. 20M12. Jackson v. United States;
No. 20M17. Henry v. United States; and
No. 20M23. Jenkins v. O’Rourke et al. Motions for leave
to fle petitions for writs of certiorari with supplemental appen-
dixes under seal granted.
No. 20M4. Whitehead v. Netix, Inc., et al.; and
No. 20M5. Albritton v. Brnovich, Attorney General
of Arizona, et al. Motions for leave to proceed as veterans
denied.
No. 20M16. M. S. v. Hoon et al. Motion to direct the Clerk
to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this Court's
Rule 14.5 denied.
No. 20M20. Davis v. California. Motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis with declaration of indigency
under seal denied.
No. 142, Orig. Florida v. Georgia. Exceptions to the Sec-
ond Report of the Special Master are set for oral argument in
due course. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 589 U. S. 1177.]
No. 152, Orig. Montana et al. v. Washington. The Acting
Solicitor General is invited to fle a brief in this case expressing
the views of the United States.
No. 18–1259. Jones v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Motion of
the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu-
ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 19–123. Fulton et al. v. City of Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of the Acting Solicitor
General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus cu-
riae and for divided argument granted. Motion of respondents
for divided argument granted.
No. 19–508. AMG Capital Management, LLC, et al. v.
Federal Trade Commission. C. A. 9th Cir.; and
No. 19–825. Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau
Center, LLC, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 591
U. S. 1028.] Motion to dispense with printing joint appendix
granted.

ORDERS 909
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–897. Pham, Senior Ofcial Performing the Du-
ties
of the Director of U. S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, et al. v. Guzman Chavez et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
[Certiorari granted sub nom. Albence v. Guzman Chavez, 590
U. S. 991.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing joint
appendix granted.
No. 19–963. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales,
Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 590 U. S. 991.] Motion
of petitioner for leave to fle joint appendix under seal with re-
dacted copies for the public record granted.
No. 19–1328. Department of Justice v. House Committee
on the Judiciary. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 591
U. S. 1025.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing joint
appendix granted.
No. 19–1401. Hughes et al. v. Northwestern University
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited to
fle a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.
No. 19–8501. Livingston v. Nebraska. Ct. App. Neb.;
No. 19–8641. Hanna v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 1;
No. 19–8657. Jha v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.;
No. 19–8717. Felton v. City of Jackson, Mississippi. C. A.
5th Cir.;
No. 19–8766. In re Wright;
No. 19–8767. In re Wright;
No. 19–8807. Cean v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.; and
No. 20–5180. Frawley v. Frawley. Ct. App. Mo., Western
Dist.; Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris denied. Petitioners are allowed until October 26, 2020,
within which to pay the docketing fees required by this Court's
Rule 38(a).
No. 20 – 8. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
et al. v. Robert R. McCormick Foundation et al. C. A. 2d
Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited to fle a brief in this
case expressing the views of the United States. Justice Alito
took no part in the consideration of this petition.
No. 20–5155. Coughlin v. United States. C. A. D. C. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.

910 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
Petitioner is allowed until October 26, 2020, within which to pay
the
docketing fee required by this Court's Rule 38(a). Justice
Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this
motion.
No. 19–8685. In re Fairchild-Littleeld;
No. 20–78. In re YoungBear;
No. 20–5145. In re Talbert;
No. 20–5189. In re Smith;
No. 20–5194. In re Moore;
No. 20–5287. In re Jackson;
No. 20–5349. In re Zimmer;
No. 20–5573. In re Underwood;
No. 20–5582. In re Dupuy;
No. 20–5605. In re Koehl;
No. 20–5607. In re Allen; and
No. 20–5609. In re Barnes. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 19–8777. In re Bracken. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.9. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 20–5125. In re Calton. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 19–1321. In re Wolf et al.;
No. 19–8374. In re Sims;
No. 19–8734. In re Deng;
No. 19–8854. In re Strother;
No. 19–8905. In re Matylinsky;
No. 20–5040. In re Spencer;
No. 20–5096. In re Evans;
No. 20–5136. In re Mohammed; and
No. 20–5324. In re Ybarra. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus denied.

ORDERS 911
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–1343. In re Starling. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 19–8384. In re Spaulding. Motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ
of mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 19–8860. In re Arunachalam. Motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ
of mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). The Chief Justice took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 20–5212. In re Calton. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 19–1286. In re Shahin;
No. 19–1287. In re Sarhan et al.;
No. 19–1377. In re Shahin;
No. 19–8436. In re Young;
No. 20–44. In re Golden; and
No. 20–5012. In re Woolsey-Ross. Petitions for writs of
mandamus and/or prohibition denied.
No. 19–8491. In re Sundy; and
No. 19–8492. In re Sundy. Motions of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petitions for writs of
mandamus and/or prohibition dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8.
No. 20–5045. In re Jones;

912 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5046. In re Jones; and
N
o. 20–5047. In re Jones. Motions of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petitions for writs of
mandamus and/or prohibition dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process,
the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in non-
criminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required
by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance
with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 20–5465. In re Felix. Petition for writ of prohibition
denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–942. Forgus v. Esper, Secretary of Defense.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 753 Fed.
Appx. 150.
No. 19–872. Hinson v. Bias et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 927 F. 3d 1103.
No. 19–953. Farrar v. Williams, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 924 F. 3d 1126.
No. 19–985. Native Wholesale Supply Co. v. California
ex rel. Becerra, Attorney General, et al. Ct. App. Cal.,
3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 37 Cal. App.
5th 73, 249 Cal. Rptr. 3d 445.
No. 19–988. Living Essentials, LLC, et al. v. Washing-
ton. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8
Wash. App. 2d 1, 436 P. 3d 857.
No. 19–1029. Austin v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019 IL 123910, 155 N. E. 3d 439.
No. 19–1067. Browder et al. v. Nehad et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 929 F. 3d 1125.
No. 19–1091. Evans v. Sandy City, Utah, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 847.
No. 19–1094. Dailey v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 283 So. 3d 782.

ORDERS 913
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–1099. City of Bakerseld, California, et al. v.
Cra
wford. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
944 F. 3d 1070.
No. 19–1138. Knight v. Grossman. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 942 F. 3d 336.
No. 19–1147. Willowood, LLC, et al. v. Syngenta Crop
Protection, LLC. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 944 F. 3d 1344.
No. 19–1157. Weatherly et al. v. Pershing, L. L. C. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 915.
No. 19–1181. Estate of Steinbeck et al. v. Kaffaga, as
Executrix of the Estate of Steinbeck. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 938 F. 3d 1006.
No. 19–1203. Children’s Hospital Association of Texas
et al. v. Azar, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
933 F. 3d 764.
No. 19 –1204. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935
F. 3d 1319.
No. 19–1218. Robinson v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 454 P. 3d 229.
No. 19–1221. Williams v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 942 F. 3d 1187.
No. 19–1242. Castro-Chavez v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1246. McDaniel, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of McDaniel, Deceased v.
Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 941.
No. 19–1248. Dunn v. Hatch et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 449.
No. 19–1253. Shelton v. Patterson. Commw. Ct. Pa. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 208 A. 3d 213.

914 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–1254. Pennsylvania v. Davis. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio-
rar
i denied. Reported below: 656 Pa. 213, 220 A. 3d 534.
No. 19–1264. Boykin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 1001.
No. 19–1265. Friends of DeVito et al. v. Wolf, Governor
of Pennsylvania, et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 658 Pa. 165, 227 A. 3d 872.
No. 19–1267. Ford Motor Company of Canada, Ltd. v.
Bell et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–1269. TCL Communication Technology Holdings
Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 1360.
No. 19 –1276. White, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of White, Deceased v.
Medtronic, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1277. Thorpe v. Dumas et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 644.
No. 19–1278. Fussell v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2019–01061 (La. 12/11/19), 286
So. 3d 1011.
No. 19–1279. LaTurner, Kansas State Treasurer v.
United States et al.; and
No. 19–1285. Lea, Arkansas State Auditor v. United
States et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 933 F. 3d 1354.
No. 19–1281. Toromanova v. Summit Real Estate Serv-
ices, LLC, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 785 Fed. Appx. 501.
No. 19–1283. Tolle v. Northam, Governor of Virginia,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1288. Singer v. Mondex Corp. Ct. App. Ariz. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19 –1289. Benavides v. Barr, At torney General,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797
Fed. Appx. 886.

ORDERS 915
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–1290. Bennett v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC.
C
. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed.
Appx. 987.
No. 19–1292. Meitzner v. Schuette et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1296. Helix TCS, Inc. v. Kenney. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 939 F. 3d 1106.
No. 19–1299. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Techtronic In-
dustries Co. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 935 F. 3d 1341.
No. 19–1303. Woods v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1304. Indian River County, Florida, et al. v. De-
partment of Transportation et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 515.
No. 19–1305. Vazquez-Garced, Governor of Puerto Rico,
et al. v. Financial Oversight and Management Board for
Puerto Rico et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 945 F. 3d 3.
No. 19–1306. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. New York
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 942
F. 3d 554.
No. 19–1309. Phipps v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 166 Idaho 1, 454 P. 3d 1084.
No. 19–1310. Jalbert, Trustee of the F2 Liquidating
Trust v. Securities and Exchange Commission. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 587.
No. 19–1311. Kirk v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–1312. Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of
Delaware. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
938 F. 3d 384.
No. 19–1314. Anderson v. Robitaille. Sup. Ct. N. H. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 172 N. H. 20, 205 A. 3d 1105.

916 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–1317. Areizaga v. ADW Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 205.
No. 19–1318. Deem v. DiMella-Deem et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 62.
No. 19–1319. Morabito et ux. v. New York et al. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1320. Johnson v. Rock Solid Janitorial, Inc., et al.
Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1322. Vaughn v. Bray et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–1324. Center for Immigration Studies v. Cohen
et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
806 Fed. Appx. 7.
No. 19–1325. Bourt zakis v. Barr, At torney General,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940
F. 3d 616.
No. 19–1326. Scarborough v. Court of Common Pleas of
Pennsylvania, Northampton County, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 238.
No. 19–1327. Zocco v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019 WI App 54, 388 Wis. 2d 622, 935
N. W. 2d 554.
No. 19–1329. Strong v. U. S. Bank Trust N. A., as Trustee
for LSF9 Master Participation Trust. Ct. App. Ore. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 302 Ore. App. 186, 456 P. 3d 698.
No. 19–1330. Michigan v. Walker. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 505 Mich. 1057, 941 N. W. 2d 926.
No. 19–1331. Xiu Jian Sun v. Sanders et al. App. Div.,
Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 176 App. Div. 3d 405, 107 N. Y. S. 3d 665.
No. 19–1332. Knowles v. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796
Fed. Appx. 1026.
No. 19–1334. Signode Industrial Group LLC et al. v.
Stone et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 943 F. 3d 381.

ORDERS 917
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–1335. Dummer v. California Contractors State
License
Board et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–1336. National Retirement Fund et al. v. Metz
Culinary Management, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 946 F. 3d 146.
No. 19–1337. Phillippi v. Humble Design, L. L. C., et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed.
Appx. 223.
No. 19–1338. Piper v. Young, Warden. Sup. Ct. S. D. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 S.D. 65, 936 N. W. 2d 793.
No. 19–1339. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. et al.
v. Senne, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Simi-
larly Situated, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 934 F. 3d 918.
No. 19–1340. Tribble et al. v. First Security Bank et al.
Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1342. Mulcahy v. Aspen Pitkin County Housing
Authority. Dist. Ct. Colo., Pitkin County. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1344. Singh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 765.
No. 19 –1346. Benkovitch v. Deutsche Bank National
Trust Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
777 Fed. Appx. 968.
No. 19–1347. Douglas v. Kondaur Capital Corp. Ct. App.
Mich. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1349. Miller, Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate
of HomeBanc Corp. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 801.
No. 19–1350. Green v. Hooks et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 411.
No. 19–1351. Ameranth, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed.
Appx. 780.

918 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19 –1353. AGI Consulting LLC, by Al -As saf as
Trustee/Owner/
Plan Administrator of an Alleged Non-
Integrated Dened Benet Plan v. American National
Insurance Co. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 798 Fed. Appx. 296.
No. 19–1354. Tan Phan v. Minh Van Truong et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 420.
No. 19–1355. Jernigan v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
809 Fed. Appx. 927.
No. 19–1356. Skelton v. Supreme Court of Illinois. Sup.
Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1358. Michigan v. Shoulders. Ct. App. Mich. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–1359. Murphy v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 641.
No. 19–1360. Cannon, as Special Representative for
Cannon, et al. v. Savory. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 947 F. 3d 409.
No. 19–1361. Jordan et al. v. Georgia Department of
Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 947 F. 3d 1322.
No. 19–1364. Henry et vir v. CMBB, LLC. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 258.
No. 19–1366. Shiyang Huang v. Schultz et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 638.
No. 19–1367. Havens v. O’Connor, Chief Justice, Supreme
Court of Ohio, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1369. TRUMPF, Inc. v. CSI Worldwide, Inc. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 661.
No. 19–1370. Thames v. City of Westland, Michigan,
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796
Fed. Appx. 251.
No. 19–1371. Waldner v. Hartke et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 919
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–1372. Ayala-Vazquez v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir
. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1373. Ming Wei v. Pennsylvania Civil Service
Commission. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 212 A. 3d 146.
No. 19–1374. Gutierrez v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–1375. Katz v. Incline Village General Improve-
ment District. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 135 Nev. 670, 452 P. 3d 411.
No. 19–1376. Algignis, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1380. Olson v. Amatuzio et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 433.
No. 19–1381. BioDelivery Sciences International, Inc. v.
Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc., fka MonoSol RX, LLC.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935 F. 3d
1362.
No. 19–1382. Sterling Jewelers, Inc. v. Jock et al. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 942 F. 3d 617.
No. 19–1383. Leidig et al. v. BuzzFeed, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 76.
No. 19–1384. Pietrangelo v. Hudson. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th
App. Dist., Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 2019-Ohio-1988, 136 N. E. 3d 867.
No. 19–1386. D. C., a Minor, By and Through His Guard-
ian ad Litem, Garter v. San Diego County, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783
Fed. Appx. 766.
No. 19–1387. Daker v. Jackson, Sheriff, Fulton County,
Georgia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 942 F. 3d 1252.
No. 19–1390. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 174.

920 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–1391. Whitely v. McCoy, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 680.
No. 19–1393. Davis v. American Airlines, Inc., et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed.
Appx. 265.
No. 19–1394. Arnold v. Slatery, Attorney General of
Tennessee. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1395. Rogers v. Discover Bank. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 269 N. C. App. 109, 836 S. E.
2d 346.
No. 19–1396. Stephens v. Kenney et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 715.
No. 19–1397. Gray v. Department of Justice. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1399. Shelby Advocates for Valid Elections
et al. v. Hargett, Tennessee Secretary of State, et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d 977.
No. 19 –1400. Rehabilitation Center at Hollywood
Hills, LLC v. State of Florida, Agency for Health Care
Administration. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–1403. Vartanian v. State Bar of California et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed.
Appx. 597.
No. 19–1404. Lieberman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 665.
No. 19–1405. Jacobson v. Blaise et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 175
App. Div. 3d 1629, 108 N. Y. S. 3d 515.
No. 19–1406. Lord, Lewis & Coleman, LLC v. Bellaco,
Inc., et al. Ct. App. Tex., 12th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1407. Ainabe v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 938 F. 3d 685.
No. 19–1408. Coppedge et al v. Charlton. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 747.

ORDERS 921
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–1409. Bloomgarden v. California. Ct. App. Cal.,
2d
App. Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1410. Bulluck v. Newtek Small Business Fi-
nance, Inc., dba Newtek Business Services, Inc., et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed.
Appx. 698.
No. 19–1413. Abazari v. Department of Education et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed.
Appx. 831.
No. 19–1416. Fijalkowski v. Wheeler et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 906.
No. 19–1417. Cesar v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 779 Fed. Appx. 824.
No. 19–1418. Zoie H. v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 304 Neb. 868, 937 N. W. 2d 801.
No. 19–1419. Henry-Bey v. Castro et al. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1420. Herrmann v. McCarthy, Secretary of the
Army. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1421. LaFlamme v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
795 Fed. Appx. 272.
No. 19–1422. Jackson v. Brun, Judge, et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1423. Vortman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 470.
No. 19–1424. LeBeau v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 334.
No. 19–1425. Palm Valley Health Care, Inc. v. Azar, Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d 321.
No. 19–1426. Pecina v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
795 Fed. Appx. 124.

922 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–1428. Morin v. Montana Ofce of Disciplinary
Counsel.
Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1429. Pena v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 581 S. W. 3d 467.
No. 19–1430. Polidi v. Lee et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 778.
No. 19–1431. Olson et al. v. O’Brien et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 717.
No. 19–1432. Sinek v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 910.
No. 19–1435. Thomas v. Iancu, Director, United States
Patent and Trademark Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 743.
No. 19–1438. Abernathy v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 596.
No. 19–1439. Jurgensen v. Pompeo, Secretary of State,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785
Fed. Appx. 117.
No. 19–1443. S. O., Individually and on Behalf of Her
Minor Son, B. O. v. Hinds County School District et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed.
Appx. 427.
No. 19–1444. GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. United Food and
Commercial Workers Local 1776 and Participating Em-
ployers Health and Welfare Fund et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 749.
No. 19–1446. Kearney et al. v. Travelers Casualty &
Surety Company of America. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 671.
No. 19–1448. Excel Modular Scaffold & Leasing Co.,
dba Excel Scaffold & Leasing v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 748.
No. 19–1449. Davis v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788
Fed. Appx. 618.

ORDERS 923
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–1450. Russell v. Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 275.
No. 19 –1451. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 916.
No. 19–1454. Palaniappan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 665.
No. 19–1455. Youngblood-West v. Aac Inc. et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx.
985.
No. 19–1457. Hudak v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (2d) 180487–U.
No. 19–1460. Mengedoht, Individually, and as Executor
of the Mengedoht Estate and as Trustee of the H C J
Holdings Trust v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 841.
No. 19–1462. Principal Life Insurance Co. v. Rozo. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 1071.
No. 19–1463. Oliver v. Oliver et al. Ct. App. Miss. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–1464. Primbas et al. v. Iancu, Director, United
States Patent and Trademark Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 1038.
No. 19–1465. Marcelis v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 220 A. 3d 669.
No. 19–1466. Korthals v. Strozeski. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 967.
No. 19–1467. Ortloff v. Brnovich, Attorney General of
Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1468. Wiley v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1469. Hasbrouck v. State Bar of Nevada. Sup.
Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 Nev. 818, 533
P. 3d 688.

924 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–1470. Gurrola v. Walgreen Co. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 503.
No. 19–1471. Tkacz v. Bogden et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 528.
No. 19–1472. Davis v. Crow, Director, Oklahoma Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 683.
No. 19–1473. Hartseld v. Dorethy, Warden. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 307.
No. 19–1474. Herndon v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1478. Larsgard v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–6804. Helms v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed.
Appx. 895.
No. 19–7191. Baker v. Macy’s Florida Stores, LLC. Dist.
Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 280
So. 3d 68.
No. 19–7426. Njonge v. Gilbert, Superintendent. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 773 Fed. Appx.
1005.
No. 19–7501. Livaditis v. Davis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 933 F. 3d 1036.
No. 19–7621. Benton v. Brewer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 942 F. 3d 305.
No. 19–7731. Herrold v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 941 F. 3d 173.
No. 19–7778. Hill v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 937 F. 3d 188.
No. 19–7825. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 979.
No. 19–7904. Bonds v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 323.

ORDERS 925
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–7939. Pope v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari
denied.
Reported below: 2019 WI 106, 389 Wis. 2d 390, 936 N. W.
2d 606.
No. 19–8006. Greiner v. Macomb County, Michigan, et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8009. Panah v. Broomeld, Acting Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935 F. 3d 657.
No. 19–8039. Clark v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2012–0508 (La. 6/28/19), 285 So. 3d 414.
No. 19–8062. LeBouef v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8105. Anderson v. Payne, Director, Arkansas Di-
vision of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 938 F. 3d 949.
No. 19–8197. Furnish v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8221. Fagatele v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 1230.
No. 19–8262. Algarin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8296. Milla-Perez v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8300. Hyden v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 308 Ga. 218, 839 S. E. 2d 506.
No. 19–8341. Knight v. Florida Department of Correc-
tions. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 936
F. 3d 1322.
No. 19–8378. Howell v. Garman, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 939 F. 3d 260.
No. 19–8386. Culverhouse v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8388. Williams v. Burt, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 966.

926 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8392. Balderas v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 19–8396. Hill v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jersey
State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8398. White v. Detroit East Community Mental
Health et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8403. Miguel Lopez v. Sherman, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8405. Reyes v. Kaiser Permanente. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 605.
No. 19–8407. Ramirez v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 287 So. 3d 541.
No. 19–8409. Thanksnieky Phuong v. Hill, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8414. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 163.
No. 19–8418. Stamps v. Capalupo et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 780 Fed. Appx. 45.
No. 19–8419. Traczyk v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8420. Wilson v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8421. Tello v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19 – 8424. Yeyille v. Miami-Dade County Public
Schools et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8425. Anderson v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8427. McNeley v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &
Hampton LLP et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 597.
No. 19–8428. Wyatt v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 927
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8429. Maqbool v. Hicks, Commissioner, New Jer-
sey
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8430. LaTouche v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8432. LaFlamme v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d
App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 19– 8433. John v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–8434. Ukkerd v. State Bar of California. Sup.
Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8435. Williams v. Duffy et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8438. Emil v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 135 Nev. 640, 448 P. 3d 553.
No. 19–8441. Vieira v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8442. Walker v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 287 So. 3d 572.
No. 16409 – 8443. Young v. Jackson-Mitchell, Warden.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8444. Zacke v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 19– 8446. Twitty v. Smith, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Houtzdale, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8448. Dantzler v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st) 170233–U.
No. 19–8452. Strickland v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st) 161098,
146 N. E. 3d 15.
No. 19–8454. Boykin v. Inch, Secretary, Florida, Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

928 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8455. Bruzzone v. McManis et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 503.
No. 19–8457. Allen v. Mine et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 181.
No. 19 – 8458. Allen v. Jordan et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8460. Gomez v. Braun et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 460.
No. 19–8462. Perez v. Jones et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8465. Moore v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jer-
sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8471. Vaughn v. Hawkins et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8472. Young v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–8473. Rogers v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 285 So. 3d 872.
No. 19–8476. Yerton v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8481. Veteto v. Estes, Warden, et al. (two judg-
ments). Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8482. Gray v. Frakes, Director, Nebraska De-
partment of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19 – 8484. Mehdipour v. Midwest City, Oklahoma,
et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8487. Berger v. Adams, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed. Appx. 663.
No. 19–8488. Brown v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785
Fed. Appx. 120.
No. 19–8490. Stevens v. Collins, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 393.

ORDERS 929
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8495. Abdul-Kareem v. Vermont Department of
Heal
th. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8496. C. K. J. v. M. J. T. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–8498. Diggs v. Gallucci, Chief of Police, City of
Carlsbad, California; and Diggs v. Shiomoto, Director, Cal-
ifornia Department of Motor Vehicles. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8499. Hoyt v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 8 Cal. 5th 892, 456 P. 3d 933.
No. 19–8502. Beverly v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (4th) 160168–U.
No. 19–8505. Tolbert v. Waggoner et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8507. Taylor v. Corporation Worldwide. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8511. Morrison v. Hale. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 558.
No. 19–8514. Popal v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 3d 943, 147 N. E. 3d 568.
No. 19–8516. Mrazek v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8517. Novotny v. Plexus Corp. et al. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 164.
No. 19–8518. Newson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 488.
No. 19–8519. Myers v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 304 Neb. 789, 937 N. W. 2d 181.
No. 19–8521. Daniels v. Kowalski, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8522. Felton v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 Mass. App. 1117, 140 N. E.
3d 943.

930 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8526. Talley v. Mazzocca et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 61.
No. 19–8527. Eaves v. Colorado Department of Correc-
tions et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 803 Fed. Appx. 185.
No. 19–8528. Russell v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 198.
No. 19–8529. Cain v. Rewerts, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8532. Lynch v. Cabell, Warden. Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8533. Lajeunesse v. Chambers et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19 – 8538. Smiles v. Berks County, Pennsylvania,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 778
Fed. Appx. 84.
No. 19–8539. Spencer v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 160102–U.
No. 19–8541. Abdulrazzak v. South Dakota Board of Par-
dons and Paroles. Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 2020 S.D. 10, 940 N. W. 2d 672.
No. 19–8545. Blake v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 289 So. 3d 483.
No. 19–8547. Blueford v. Hooper, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 789.
No. 19–8549. Adeyinka v. Barrs et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19– 8550. Nicolaison v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8551. Patterson v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 311 Kan. 59, 455 P. 3d 792.
No. 19–8552. McTizic v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 931
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8553. Phillips v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 6th App. Dist.,
Lucas
County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-Ohio-
3707.
No. 19–8554. Sutherland v. Saul, Commissioner of Social
Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
789 Fed. Appx. 612.
No. 19–8556. Elebute v. Village Capital & Investment,
LLC. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795
Fed. Appx. 312.
No. 19–8561. Corona-Perez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 965.
No. 19–8565. Andersen v. Taylor. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8571. King v. Ohio Department of Job and Family
Services. Ct. App. Ohio, 9th App. Dist., Summit County. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-Ohio-2989.
No. 19 – 8573. Konepachit v. California. Sup. Ct. Ca l.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8574. Latimer v. North Carolina Department of
Transportation. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 797 Fed. Appx. 781.
No. 19–8577. Roscoe v. Horton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8580. Plumlee v. Baca, Warden. Ct. App. Nev.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 Nev. 702.
No. 19–8581. Harmon v. Sharp, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 936 F. 3d 1044.
No. 19–8583. Hechavarria v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed.
Appx. 56.
No. 19–8587. Young v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 942 F. 3d 349.
No. 19 – 8590. Marr v. Doyle. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer ti orar i
denied.

932 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8591. Pennington v. Payne, Director, Arkansas
Division
of Correction, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–8592. Almonte, aka La Fuerte, aka Montana v.
United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 952 F. 3d 83.
No. 19–8593. Crim v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App. Dist.,
Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-
Ohio-3771.
No. 19–8595. Williams v. Hogan, Governor of Maryland,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791
Fed. Appx. 416.
No. 19–8596. VanDyck v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 495.
No. 19–8599. Pratt v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 779 Fed. Appx. 867.
No. 19–8600. Torres v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 304 Neb. 753, 936 N. W. 2d 730.
No. 19–8601. Walker v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8602. Washington v. Santa Rita Jail. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8604. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 781.
No. 19–8605. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 191.
No. 19–8606. Thorson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8607. Thompson v. Grifn, Superintendent, Sul-
livan Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–8608. Robertson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 912.
No. 19–8609. Sameer v. Khera et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

ORDERS 933
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8611. Scott v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 19–8612. Stamper v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 382.
No. 19–8613. Wiggins v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–8615. Zhiry et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8616. Helton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 198.
No. 19–8617. Perez Chavez v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 215.
No. 19–8618. Daniels v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 349 Ga. App. 681, 824 S. E. 2d 754.
No. 19–8619. Cobb v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8620. Prior v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 228.
No. 19–8622. McQueary-Layne v. Louisiana State Board
of Nursing et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8623. Moseley v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 428.
No. 19 – 8624. DeFreitas v. Callado, Superintendent,
Shawangunk Correctional Facility. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 172
App. Div. 3d 1811, 100 N. Y. S. 3d 779.
No. 19–8625. Davis v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 289 So. 3d 871.
No. 19–8627. Cardenas v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8628. Norman, Administrator of the Estate of
Shearlds, Deceased v. Temple University Health System,

934 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
dba Temple University Hospital, et al. Super. Ct. Pa.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 208 A. 3d 1115.
No. 19–8629. Nyenekor v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 810.
No. 19–8630. Lussy v. Lussy et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 426.
No. 19–8631. Simpson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 418.
No. 19–8632. Rumanek v. Fallon et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8633. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8634. Bey, fka Brown v. Doughtery County State
Court. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8636. Peterson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8637. Reeves v. Stoddard, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 865.
No. 19–8638. Brzowski v. Executive Committee of the
United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Repor ted
below: 798 Fed. Appx. 22.
No. 19–8639. Allen v. Wire et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 182.
No. 19–8640. Littles v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8642. Davis v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 480.
No. 19–8643. Evatt v. Stephan, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 771 Fed. Appx. 330.
No. 19–8644. King v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 834.

ORDERS 935
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8645. Ross v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rar
i denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 243.
No. 19–8646. Grifn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 759.
No. 19–8647. Diez v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 837.
No. 19–8648. McNeal v. Fleming et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8649. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 952.
No. 19–8651. Remillard v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 5th App.
Dist., Knox County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-
Ohio-3545.
No. 19–8652. Sanchez v. Real, Judge, United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8653. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 188.
No. 19–8654. Senese v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 499.
No. 19–8655. Barrios-Alvarado v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 187.
No. 19–8658. King v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 639.
No. 19–8659. Segovia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 438.
No. 19–8660. Riley v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 248 Ariz. 154, 459 P. 3d 66.
No. 19–8662. Scott v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 467.
No. 19–8663. Keith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

936 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8664. Kirvin v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8665. Jackson v. Supreme Court of Illinois. Sup.
Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8666. Mayes v. Lebo, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8667. Alfred v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 434.
No. 19–8669. Tyson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d 139.
No. 19–8670. Ramos Tapia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 729.
No. 19–8672. Bridges v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st) 163032–U.
No. 19–8673. Burress-El v. Born et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8674. Paez v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 947 F. 3d 649.
No. 19–8675. Chandler v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 492.
No. 19–8676. Small v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 675.
No. 19–8677. Ashen v. Distefano et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8678. Fall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 363.
No. 19–8680. Zitalpopoca-Hernandez v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed.
Appx. 494.
No. 19–8681. Sung Hong et ux. v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 151.
No. 19–8682. Fulmer v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 312.

ORDERS 937
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8683. Grande v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 302.
No. 19–8684. Hill v. United States District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 192.
No. 19–8686. Harris v. Bozzuto Group et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8687. Ghazavi v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–8688. Ingram v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 462.
No. 19–8689. Lawrence v. Medtronic. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 679.
No. 19–8690. Wheeler v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8691. Infante-Caballero v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 614.
No. 19–8692. Shields v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 728.
No. 19–8693. Trujillo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 952.
No. 19–8694. Rouse v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8696. DiTomasso v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 932 F. 3d 58.
No. 19 – 8697. Davis v. Oklahoma. Ct. Cr im. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8698. Stone v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8699. Spencer v. Minter et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8700. Strodtman v. Frakes, Director, Nebraska
Department of Correctional Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

938 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8701. Raymond v. United States District Court
for
the District of South Dakota. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8702. Sedberry v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19 – 8703. Sosa-Baladron et ux. v. United States.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed.
Appx. 313.
No. 19–8704. Alvarado v. Horton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8705. Arkim, aka Mason v. Noeth, Superintend-
ent, Attica Correctional Facility. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 177 App.
Div. 3d 1327, 110 N. Y. S. 3d 365.
No. 19–8706. Butcher v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 12th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8710. Frazier v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 790.
No. 19–8713. Bailey v. Wainwright, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 343.
No. 19–8714. Tree v. Robertson, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8715. Trefnger v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 428.
No. 19–8716. Pepke v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 156.
No. 19–8718. Miller v. Capra, Warden. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 493.
No. 19–8719. Laster v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 397.
No. 19–8720. Puri v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 859.
No. 19–8721. Argentino v. Stamps et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 975.

ORDERS 939
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19– 8722. Morris-Calderon v. James Randi Educa-
tional
Foundation. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 5. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8723. Irish v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 3d App. Dist.,
Mercer County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-Ohio-
2765, 140 N. E. 3d 209.
No. 19–8724. Garry v. Trane Co. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8725. Glenn v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 505 Mich. 996, 939 N. W. 2d 269.
No. 19–8726. Goodman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8727. Humphries v. Sherman, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8728. Harrell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st
App. Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8729. Gilbert v. Barrios-Gilbert. Ct. App. Cal.,
4th App. Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8730. Kennedy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 697.
No. 19–8731. Gelin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 712.
No. 19–8732. Leyva Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 382.
No. 19–8736. Clark v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8737. Steiner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940 F. 3d 1282.
No. 19–8738. Clark v. Laughlin, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8739. Womack v. Finkelstein, Assistant Clerk,
Superior Court of North Carolina, Buncombe County.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed.
Appx. 123.

940 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8742. Nichols v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8743. Guerra v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 20.
No. 19–8744. Castro v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 272.
No. 19–8745. Scott v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8746. Group v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 7th App. Dist.,
Mahoning County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-
Ohio-3958.
No. 19–8747. Coronado v. Stinson, Warden, et al. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8748. Knuth v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8749. Crayton v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8751. Basra v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Wash. App. 2d 279, 448 P. 3d
107.
No. 19–8752. Allen v. Moore et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 212.
No. 19–8754. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 610.
No. 19–8755. West v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 322.
No. 19 – 8756. Ingram v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d 1021.
No. 19–8757. Gibbs v. LeGrand, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 497.
No. 19–8758. Li Qin et al. v. 99 Cents Only Stores, LLC,
et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 941
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8759. Ray v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 599.
No. 19–8760. Stewart v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8761. Riascos v. United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 811.
No. 19 – 8762. St. George v. Ransom, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8763. Delglyn v. Barros et al. Sup. Ct. Wis. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8764. Burney v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 293 So. 3d 1019.
No. 19–8765. Arega v. Sadler, Judge, et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158 Ohio St. 3d 1509, 2020-
Ohio-2815, 144 N. E. 3d 463.
No. 19–8768. Albritton v. Brnovich, Attorney General
of Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8769. Shumake v. Virginia. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 299.
No. 19–8770. St. Preux v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 731.
No. 19–8771. Risenhoover v. Muniz, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8772. Torres v. Hansen et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8773. Harrison v. Laughlin, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19 – 8774. Gutierrez v. Texas Health and Human
Services Commission. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–8775. Gardner v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-
tiorari denied.

942 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8776. Hatter v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
p
artment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 229.
No. 19–8778. Allen v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 248 Ariz. 352, 460 P. 3d 1236.
No. 19–8779. Elhuzayel v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 621.
No. 19–8781. Francis v. Superior Court of North Caro-
lina, Wake County. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 815.
No. 19–8782. Graham v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8783. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 30.
No. 19–8784. Brown v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 277.
No. 19– 8785. Williams v. Cooper, Governor of North
Carolina, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 797 Fed. Appx. 811.
No. 19–8786. Jones v. Mays, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8787. James v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 336.
No. 19–8788. Job v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 98.
No. 19–8789. Verduzco v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8790. Whichard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 633.
No. 19–8791. Vasquez-Soto v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 475.
No. 19–8792. Hummel v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions

ORDERS 943
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
807
Fed. Appx. 282.
No. 19–8793. R. W. v. Dauphin County Social Services
for Children and Youth. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8794. Tyler v. Hooks, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 173.
No. 19–8795. Loper v. Knutson, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8796. Rodgers v. McIntyre et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 317.
No. 19–8798. Salahuddin v. Shinn, Director, Arizona De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.
No. 19 – 8800. Knight v. Alabama. Ct. Cr i m. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8801. Jones et al. v. Lamar Co., LLC. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 291
So. 3d 559.
No. 19–8802. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8803. Adams v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 7th App. Dist.,
Mahoning County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-
Ohio-4090.
No. 19–8804. A. M. v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 134 N. E. 3d 361.
No. 19–8805. Bruce v. Great Britain et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8806. Dixon v. Ames, Superintendent, Mount
Olive Correctional Complex. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8808. Ashford v. Stephan, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 275.
No. 19–8809. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 910.

944 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8810. Davidson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 800.
No. 19–8811. Crane v. Shinn, Director, Arizona Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 19–8812. Pineda-Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 789.
No. 19 – 8813. Franks v. Kirk, Deputy Sheriff, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed.
Appx. 610.
No. 19–8815. Nunez-Lopez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 475.
No. 19–8817. Harrell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 479.
No. 19–8818. Johnson v. Superior Court of California,
Los Angeles County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 1.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8819. Rivera v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 200.
No. 19–8820. Velazquez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8822. Montero v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 928.
No. 19–8823. Pedrin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8824. Newton v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8825. Navarro v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 644.
No. 19 – 8826. Genret te v. Bank of New York Mellon
Trust Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
797 Fed. Appx. 739.
No. 19–8827. Fowler v. Indymac Bank, FSB, et al. App.
Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 176 App. Div. 3d 682, 107 N. Y. S. 3d 708.

ORDERS 945
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8828. Leggett v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8829. Purnell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 858.
No. 19–8830. Oxendine v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 766.
No. 19–8833. Mann v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 466 Md. 473, 221 A. 3d 965.
No. 19–8834. Dutta-Roy v. Jysk Bed’n Linen, dba By De-
sign Furniture, as Successor to Quick Ship Holding, Inc.,
dba By Design Furniture. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 608.
No. 19–8836. Culpepper v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 12th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8837. Nipper v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 197.
No. 19–8839. Morrow v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 3d 265.
No. 19–8840. Cooper v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8841. Moore v. Orange County, California, et al.
Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8842. Prado v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 597.
No. 19–8843. Pushkarovych v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8844. Piccone v. United States Patent and Trade-
mark Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 791 Fed. Appx. 932.
No. 19–8845. Brant v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 284 So. 3d 398.
No. 19–8846. Nowakowski v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 220 A. 3d 658.

946 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8847. Nixon v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 925.
No. 19–8848. Phillips v. Oberlander et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8849. Pedroza v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 291 So. 3d 541.
No. 19–8851. Szanto v. Jurgens. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8852. Sameer v. Khera. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19 – 8853. Sajous v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8855. Johnson v. Tester et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8856. Brown v. Brown. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 267.
No. 19–8858. Lymas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 789.
No. 19–8859. Maus v. Eckstein, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8861. Aptiliasimov v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8862. Allen v. Total Visa et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 170.
No. 19–8863. Strausbaugh v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8864. Williams v. Samson Resources Corp. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 364.
No. 19–8865. Schultz v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2020 WI 24, 390 Wis. 2d 570, 939
N. W. 2d 519.
No. 19–8866. Chum v. Coyne-Fague, Director, Rhode Is-
land Department of Corrections. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 438.

ORDERS 947
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8867. Bradley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 989.
No. 19–8868. Tims v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 348.
No. 19–8869. Wade v. Monroe County District Attorney
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800
Fed. Appx. 114.
No. 19–8870. Vallejo Recio v. Vasquez et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8871. Schulte v. Barr, Attorney General, et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8872. Simpson v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 703.
No. 19–8874. Scully v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 656.
No. 19–8876. Jalloh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 409.
No. 19–8877. Lomas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 274.
No. 19–8878. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 733.
No. 19–8879. Sekhon v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8880. Harman v. Zatecky, Superintendent, Pen-
dleton Correctional Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–8881. Foote v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 135 N. E. 3d 168.
No. 19–8882. Hatt v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 11 Wash. App. 2d 113, 452 P. 3d
577.
No. 19 – 8883. Gundy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

948 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8884. Gray v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 19–8885. Cadenas-Urena v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 287.
No. 19–8886. Erickson v. Collins, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Cochise County, et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8887. Pena-Rivera v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 719.
No. 19–8888. Oviedo v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 948 F. 3d 386.
No. 19–8890. Hodge v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 160.
No. 19–8891. Howard v. Management & Training Corp.
et al. Ct. App. Ohio, 3d App. Dist., Marion County. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019-Ohio-4408.
No. 19–8892. Perez-Cubertier v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 81.
No. 19–8893. Henry v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–8894. Halliburton v. Board of Professional Re-
sponsibility; and Halliburton v. Tennessee Board of Judi-
cial Conduct. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied.
No. 19 – 8895. Rodriguez v. Lawson, Justice, Supreme
Court of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8896. Reyes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 262.
No. 19–8897. Smith v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 374 N. C. 751, 842 S. E. 2d
596.
No. 19–8901. Fuentes Rosas v. Filson, Warden, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed.
Appx. 373.

ORDERS 949
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 19–8902. Patino-Villalobos v. United States. C. A.
11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8906. Kinard v. Hoffman et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8907. Boyer v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8908. Pope v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 934 F. 3d 770.
No. 19– 8909. Haze v. Poole, Administrator, Scotland
Correctional Institution. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 74.
No. 19–8911. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 338.
No. 19–8912. Arce-Calderon v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 379.
No. 19–8913. Abbassi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 484.
No. 19–8914. Ferguson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8915. Glassgow v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8916. Hamilton v. Ramey, Warden. Sup. Ct. Mo.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8917. Hale v. Indiana Department of Child Serv-
ices et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
784 Fed. Appx. 956.
No. 19–8918. Davis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 105.
No. 19–8919. Clevenger v. Phillips, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8920. Colbert v. Burt, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8922. Craker v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 11th Dist.
Certiorari denied.

950 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8923. Leggett v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 378.
No. 19–8925. Lundberg v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 725.
No. 19–8926. Clemente Govea v. United States. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 423.
No. 19–8927. Mitchell v. Sharp, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 183.
No. 19– 8928. Campos-Lagunas, aka Lopez-Lomali, aka
Ortiz, aka Lagunas Campos, aka Garcia v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed.
Appx. 304.
No. 19–8930. Dunahue v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas De-
partment of Correction, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 628.
No. 20–1. Davis v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 2. Valentin v. City of Rochester, New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783
Fed. Appx. 97.
No. 20–3. Balvin v. Rain & Hail, LLC. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 1134.
No. 20–4. Woodroof v. Cunningham et al. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 221 A. 3d 917.
No. 20–6. Burke v. Progressive Gulf Insurance Com-
pany. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791
Fed. Appx. 432.
No. 20–7. Berka v. City of Middletown, Connecticut.
App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 195 Conn.
App. 760, 227 A. 3d 78.
No. 20–9. Puri et al. v. Khalsa et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 563.
No. 20–12. Speer v. Seaport Capital Partners, LLC.
App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 951
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–13. Lavergne v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 780 Fed. Appx. 165.
No. 20–15. Pennymac Financial Services, Inc., et al. v.
Heidrich et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 792 Fed. Appx. 540.
No. 20–16. Binns v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 305.
No. 20–17. Robertson v. Honn et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 640.
No. 20–21. Fleshner v. Tiedt et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 956.
No. 20–24. Great Lakes Minerals, LLC v. Ohio et al.
Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 597 S. W. 3d
169.
No. 20–25. Rodriguez v. Virginia State Bar Disciplinary
Board. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–29. Discepolo v. Department of Justice. C. A.
D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–30. Martin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 662.
No. 20–32. Morsa v. Iancu, Director, United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 913.
No. 20 – 33. Grace International Assembly of God v.
Festa et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Repor ted
below: 797 Fed. Appx. 603.
No. 20–34. Grimes v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–35. Frankel v. United States et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 176.
No. 20–36. McGowan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–41. Wexler v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 425.

952 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–42. Solares Mijangos v. Barr, Attorney General.
C
. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed.
Appx. 588.
No. 20–43. Reich et al. v. City of Elizabethtown, Ken-
tucky, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 945 F. 3d 968.
No. 20–46. Port of Corpus Christi Authority of Nueces
County, Texas v. Sherwin Alumina Co., LLC, et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 229.
No. 20–49. Myma v. Wroe. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–51. Benevides v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–52. Aponte-Bermudez v. Colon et al. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 963.
No. 20–55. Anderson v. American General Life Insur-
ance Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
802 Fed. Appx. 548.
No. 20–56. Wen Chiann Yeh v. North Carolina State
University et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 154.
No. 20–59. Campbell v. Bennett et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 144.
No. 20–61. Orie Melvin v. Zappala et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 706.
No. 20–63. Pierce v. Yale University et al. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 20–64. McMahon et al. v. Hartzell et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 266.
No. 20–65. Reinhaus v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Cin-
cinnati. Ct. App. Ohio, 1st App. Dist., Hamilton County. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–66. G&M Realty L. P. et al. v. Castillo et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 155.
No. 20–67. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 953
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–68. Cheetah Omni LLC v. AT&T Services, Inc.,
et
al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949
F. 3d 691.
No. 20–69. Fuller, as Successor Personal Representa-
tive of the Estate of Fuller v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Ar-
gentaria, S. A. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 946 F. 3d 120.
No. 20–70. Mahadevan v. Bikkina. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–71. Brown v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–72. Himsel et al. v. 4/9 Livestock, LLC, et al. Ct.
App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 122 N. E. 3d 935.
No. 20 –73. IV Solutions, Inc. v. PacifiCare Life &
Health Insurance Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 497.
No. 20–75. Heston v. G. B. Capital Holdings, LLC. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 304.
No. 20–76. Hage v. Mhanna. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–77. Ivey v. Corcoran. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–79. Daniels v. Davey, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–80. Blodgett et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 921.
No. 20–81. Berber v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–84. Canuto v. Alexander et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–85. Dimps v. Taconic Correctional Facility et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed.
Appx. 601.
No. 20 – 87. Nobles v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 373 N. C. 471, 838 S. E. 2d
373.

954 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–89. Rhodes v. Smith, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 1032.
No. 20–90. Slone v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–91. Martin v. Department of Homeland Security.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed.
Appx. 867.
No. 20–93. Doe, a Minor Child Who is Unborn, By and
Through Her Father and Next Friend, Doe v. Hunter,
Attorney General of Oklahoma, et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 532.
No. 20–94. Dekom v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. Ct. App.
N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 3d 957, 147
N. E. 3d 1158.
No. 20–95. Hicks-Washington v. Housing Authority of
the City of Fort Lauderdale. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20 – 99. Schuchardt v. Trump, President of the
United States, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 69.
No. 20–103. Stockman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d 253.
No. 20–104. Smith v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 6 Wash. App. 2d 1027.
No. 20–108. Poupart v. Landry, Attorney General of
Louisiana, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 804 Fed. Appx. 299.
No. 20–110. Kannry et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
788 Fed. Appx. 88.
No. 20–113. Hammann v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. (two
judgments). Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–115. Kinney v. United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 955
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–116. Robles Rodriguez v. Andrew M. Saul, Com-
mis
sioner of Social Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–117. Sequeira v. Republic of Nicaragua et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed.
Appx. 681.
No. 20 –118. Greer v. General Dynamics Information
Technology, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 808 Fed. Appx. 191.
No. 20–119. Ruggiero v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–121. Spiegal v. Kim. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 844.
No. 20–123. Rheinstein v. Attorney Grievance Com-
mis sion of Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Cer ti orar i denied.
Reported below: 466 Md. 648, 223 A. 3d 505.
No. 20–127. Way v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 504.
No. 20–129. Badawi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 621.
No. 20–130. Hung Dang v. Washington Department of
Health, Medical Quality Assurance Commission. Ct. App.
Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Wash. App. 2d
650, 450 P. 3d 1189.
No. 20–133. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 685.
No. 20–137. McCurdy v. Maine. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–143. Lowman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–145. Skidmore v. Lizarraga, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–146. Benavides v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied.

956 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–155. New England Teamsters and Trucking In-
dustry
Pension Fund v. Sun Capital Partners III, LP,
et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 943
F. 3d 49.
No. 20–158. SRAM, LLC v. FOX Factory, Inc. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 1366.
No. 20–160. Halim v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 482.
No. 20–162. Claiborne v. McCarthy, Secretary of the
Army. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798
Fed. Appx. 128.
No. 20–167. Michelson v. Department of the Army. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx.
995.
No. 20–169. Metsch v. Hajdasz. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 884.
No. 20–173. Hefin et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
797 Fed. Appx. 334.
No. 20–174. Baehr et ux. v. Creig Northrop Team, P. C.,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953
F. 3d 244.
No. 20–181. Miles v. Svinicki et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20 –189. Barnes v. Stange, Warden. Sup. Ct. Mo.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–191. Silva v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 787.
No. 20–198. Williams v. City of Sherwood, Arkansas.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d
1107.
No. 20–203. Degan et al. v. Board of Trustees of the
Dallas Police and Fire Pension System. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 813.

ORDERS 957
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–205. Z. B., By and Through His Mother, Sanchez
v
. District of Columbia. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 559.
No. 20–206. Albritten v. California Department of For-
estry and Fire Protection et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–214. Fard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 618.
No. 20–221. Flores de Freitas v. United States. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 687.
No. 20–226. Ratliff v. Aransas County, Texas, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 281.
No. 20–238. Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co., Ltd. v.
Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII. Sup. Ct.
Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 5th 125, 460
P. 3d 764.
No. 20–266. Bieganski v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–282. Carmon v. CSX Transportation, Inc. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 395.
No. 20–286. United States ex rel. Janssen, as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Duffy v. Lawrence Memo-
rial Hospital. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 949 F. 3d 533.
No. 20–292. Pinder v. Crowther, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 165.
No. 20–5001. Norris v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5002. Ayun-Flores v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 549.
No. 20–5004. Zeroni v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 950.
No. 20–5005. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 379.

958 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5006. Olivas-Guevara v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir
. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5007. Foley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 681.
No. 20–5008. Garza v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 305.
No. 20–5009. Wiggins v. Golden Corral Corp. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 812.
No. 20–5010. Warner v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 400 Mont. 556, 461 P. 3d 144.
No. 20–5011. Wanniarachchi v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed.
Appx. 167.
No. 20–5013. Newson v. Superior Court of California,
Pima County, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 964.
No. 20–5014. Peralta v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 268 N. C. App. 260, 836 S. E.
2d 254.
No. 20–5015. Sumter v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 195.
No. 20–5016. Butler v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 230.
No. 20–5017. Modisette v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 241.
No. 20–5018. Middleton v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5019. Barrera-Velasquez, aka Barrera, aka Vel-
asquez Barrera, aka Velasquez-Barrera v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed.
Appx. 372.
No. 20 – 5020. Allen v. Tri-Lift North Carolina, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805
Fed. Appx. 245.

ORDERS 959
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5021. Allen v. North Carolina et al. C. A. 4th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 246.
No. 20–5022. Allen v. Glines et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 247.
No. 20–5023. Anderson v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 297.
No. 20–5024. Brown v. Williams, Clerk, Superior Court
of North Carolina, Wake County. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 194.
No. 20–5025. Amos v. Bowen. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5026. Arbaugh v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 167.
No. 20–5027. Allred v. Uttecht, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5031. Ramirez-Arroyo v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5033. Marron, aka Mu’Min v. Clarke, Director,
Virginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 804.
No. 20–5034. Martin v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5035. McLendon et al. v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 780 Fed. Appx.
738.
No. 20–5036. Perry v. Woods, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5038. Olangian v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 536.
No. 20–5039. Spencer v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5041. Sain v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 511.

960 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5042. Silva-Aguilar v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir
. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5043. Rizk v. Defense Finance and Accounting
Service. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5044. Liviz v. Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 484 Mass. 1039, 144 N. E. 3d 284.
No. 20–5048. Bowman v. Boyd, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5049. Martin v. Galipeau, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 444.
No. 20–5050. Leslie v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5051. Staggers v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 745.
No. 20–5052. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5053. Brown v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 243.
No. 20–5054. Davis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 572.
No. 20–5055. Castellanos Muratella v. United States.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 541.
No. 20–5056. Cortez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed. Appx. 773.
No. 20–5057. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 349.
No. 20–5058. Estevez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 519.
No. 20–5059. Goodin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5061. Emiabata v. BB&T et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 774 Fed. Appx. 816.

ORDERS 961
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5062. Byrd v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 272 So. 3d 1289.
No. 20–5063. Blackburn v. Saul, Commissioner of Social
Security. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5065. Bogle v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 288 So. 3d 1065.
No. 20–5066. Spillard v. Superior Court of California,
Humboldt County, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5067. Riggs v. Cassady, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5068. Li Qin v. Kong-Brown et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 581.
No. 20–5069. Rosado-Sanchez v. Banco Santander Puerto
Rico. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5070. Rams v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5071. Moran v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 5073. Martinez-Hernandez v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed.
Appx. 434.
No. 20–5076. Ceja-Valdez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 244.
No. 20–5077. Cipriano-Ortega v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 596.
No. 20–5078. Adzhemyan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 77.
No. 20–5079. Finchum v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 316.
No. 20–5080. Wiggin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 320.
No. 20–5081. Hoffert v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 782.

962 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5082. Schwartz v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5083. Kavantzas v. Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 999.
No. 20–5084. Ellis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 163.
No. 20–5086. Calhoun v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5088. Ponce-Mares v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5092. Cortez-Hernandez v. Clarke, Director, Vir-
ginia Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5093. Clayborn v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 937.
No. 20–5095. Clairvoyant v. Florida Department of Cor-
rections et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5097. Wilkerson v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 5098. Tsukerman v. Western Community Unit
School District No. 12. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 312.
No. 20–5099. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 450.
No. 20–5101. Visage v. Woodall et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 406.
No. 20– 5102. Haile v. Conteh. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5103. Haile v. Kaiser Permanente Tysons Cor-
ner. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797
Fed. Appx. 114.
No. 20–5104. Tapp v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 400.

ORDERS 963
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5105. Temple v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5106. Whitten v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 5107. Montgomery v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 227 A. 3d 1062.
No. 20–5108. Ojeda-Amarillas v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 607.
No. 20–5109. Otgoo v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st) 153346.
No. 20–5110. Cardona-Ramirez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5111. Sanders v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5112. Robinson v. Polis, Governor of Colorado,
et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810
Fed. Appx. 619.
No. 20–5113. Robertson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 1168.
No. 20 – 5114. Romero-Ochoa v. Washington. Sup. Ct.
Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 Wash. 2d 341,
440 P. 3d 994.
No. 20–5115. Serrano-Ramirez v. United States. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 327.
No. 20–5116. Anderson v. Winn, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5117. Rodgers v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 288 So. 3d 1038.
No. 20–5120. Cotto v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 122.
No. 20–5121. Gutierrez-Diaz v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 512.

964 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5122. Flores-Lezama v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 623.
No. 20–5127. Espinoza v. Colorado et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 254.
No. 20–5128. Chapman v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5129. Sheer v. Warren, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5130. Lozano Solis v. Shinn, Director, Arizona
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5131. Kimbrew v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 810.
No. 20–5134. Barren v. Daniels, Director, Nevada De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5135. Bowell v. State Bar of California. Sup. Ct.
Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5137. Myles v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 184.
No. 20–5139. Jones v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 38.
No. 20–5140. Torres v. City of New York, New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5141. Williford v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 332.
No. 20–5142. Ward v. Corizon. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 825.
No. 20–5143. Ward v. Idaho et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 823.
No. 20–5144. Levatte v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 658.
No. 20–5146. Warenback v. Neven, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 965
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5147. Taebel v. Ortega et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 20–5148. Wood v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5149. Malachowski v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5150. Jenkins v. Clarke, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5151. Reed v. Paramo, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5152. Arredondo-Moreno v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 446.
No. 20–5153. Sims v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 362.
No. 20–5154. Herrera Salguero v. California. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5156. Contreras Saucedo v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 437.
No. 20–5158. Silvers v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5159. Roybal v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5160. Henderson v. Miles, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5161. Gonzalez-Gatica v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 436.
No. 20–5162. Terry v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5163. Welsh v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5164. Welsh v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.

966 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5165. Welsh v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rar
i denied.
No. 20–5167. McIntosh v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5168. Wilson v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5169. Thomas v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 9th App. Dist.,
Summit County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-Ohio-
4247.
No. 20–5170. Williams v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5171. Watkins v. Hutchison, Warden, et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5173. Domingo Velazquez v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App.
Tex. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5174. Thomas v. Muniz, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 376.
No. 20–5175. Wilson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5176. Harris v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5177. Felix-Carrazco v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 441.
No. 20–5178. Fernetus v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 712.
No. 20–5179. Guillen v. McTighe et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5181. Chongnengwt Vang v. Saul, Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 398.
No. 20–5182. Williams v. Wells, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 242.
No. 20–5183. Hoglund v. Neal, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 819.

ORDERS 967
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5185. Nelson v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5186. Butler v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5187. Brennan v. Stein, Attorney General of
North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 798 Fed. Appx. 775.
No. 20–5188. Barnes v. Dowling, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 559.
No. 20–5190. Rodriguez v. United States District Court
for the District of Nevada, Reno, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5191. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 275.
No. 20–5192. Moser v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 382.
No. 20–5193. McWhorter v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 298.
No. 20–5195. Carrasco v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 275.
No. 20–5196. McConnell v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 298 So. 3d 1145.
No. 20–5197. Moore v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5199. Simms v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5200. Sanford v. Tennessee Department of Cor-
rection et al. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5201. Crawford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 758.
No. 20–5203. Jim v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 895.

968 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5204. Lerner v. Cowen. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.,
D
iv. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5205. Lewis v. Joyner, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5206. Knuth v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20 – 5207. Long v. Jaime, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5208. Jones v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799
Fed. Appx. 251.
No. 20–5210. Dunn v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 778.
No. 20–5211. Dobson v. Stolle et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 281.
No. 20–5213. Cody, aka Thompson v. Slusher et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5214. Haynes v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
789 Fed. Appx. 218.
No. 20–5215. Lang v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 305 Neb. 726, 942 N. W. 2d 388.
No. 20–5218. Page v. Baker, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5219. Binh Nguyen v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 277.
No. 20–5220. Groomes v. Arkansas. Ct. App. Ark. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2019 Ark. App. 408, 586 S. W. 3d
196.
No. 20–5221. Martin v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 311 So. 3d 778.
No. 20–5222. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 278.

ORDERS 969
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5223. Madrid-Uriarte v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 287.
No. 20–5224. Clark v. Diaz, Secretary, California De-
partment of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 185.
No. 20–5225. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 220.
No. 20–5226. Flores-Dominguez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 310.
No. 20 – 5227. Hernandez-Medrano v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed.
Appx. 303.
No. 20–5231. S. T. et al. v. Vermont Department for
Children and Families et al. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 2020 VT 3, 227 A. 3d 504.
No. 20 – 5232. Anderson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5233. Burns v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5234. Bryant v. District of Columbia Ofce of
Human Rights et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5238. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 30.
No. 20–5239. Grifn v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 683.
No. 20–5240. Gilmore v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 320.
No. 20–5241. Potts v. Garza. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 554.
No. 20–5242. Miles v. California Department of Correc-
tions and Rehabilitation Correctional Ofcers et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5244. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 302.

970 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5245. Walker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 702.
No. 20–5246. Luke v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5247. Burnside v. Rewerts, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5248. Bernal v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5250. Avila-Jaimes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 301.
No. 20–5251. Harriot v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 215.
No. 20–5252. Grace v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 786.
No. 20–5253. Farrar v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 483.
No. 20–5255. Mashak v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5257. Moore v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 411.
No. 20–5258. Hunter v. Government Employees Insur-
ance Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
777 Fed. Appx. 697.
No. 20–5259. Who v. Department of the Treasury. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5262. Henderson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5265. Sayed v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5267. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 151.
No. 20–5268. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 166.

ORDERS 971
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5272. Washington v. Chapman, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir
. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5273. Hargett v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 765.
No. 20–5274. Harris v. Korneman, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5276. Thompson v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 942 N. W. 2d 350.
No. 20–5280. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 848.
No. 20–5281. Robinson, aka Moore v. United States. Ct.
App. D. C. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5283. Lemus v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 266.
No. 20–5284. Lam v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 796.
No. 20 – 5286. Rodriguez Infante v. Martel, Warden,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953
F. 3d 560.
No. 20–5290. Perez, aka Valdez v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 124.
No. 20–5291. Johnson v. Marlar. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 791.
No. 20–5292. Chaudhari v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 297.
No. 20–5293. Bates v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 217.
No. 20–5294. Becton v. Phillips, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5299. Benson v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 600 S. W. 3d 896.
No. 20–5300. Santana-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied.

972 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20 – 5301. Shanks v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 317.
No. 20–5302. Gongora-Baltan v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx.
597.
No. 20–5306. Horrell v. Gomez, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5309. Harriot v. Department of Justice et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed.
Appx. 226.
No. 20–5312. Brown v. California Department of Cor-
rections and Rehabilitation. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 253.
No. 20–5315. Stabnow v. Harpstead, Commissioner, Min-
nesota Department of Human Services. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5317. Rodgers v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 292 So. 3d 434.
No. 20–5319. Avila-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5320. Burks v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5321. Wadena v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5323. Wright v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 774 Fed. Appx. 127.
No. 20–5325. Woodard v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5326. Alonso Garcia v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 413.
No. 20–5327. Huggins v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5329. Scyphers v. Washington. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

ORDERS 973
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5334. Kieren v. Ford, Attorney General of Ne-
v
ada. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5335. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 329.
No. 20–5337. Meza v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 463.
No. 20–5338. McCants v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 416.
No. 20–5339. Jennings v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 305 Neb. 809, 942 N. W. 2d 753.
No. 20 – 5340. Majid v. Central Intelligence Agency.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed.
Appx. 143.
No. 20–5343. Brome v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 942 F. 3d 550.
No. 20–5345. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 731.
No. 20–5346. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 169.
No. 20–5347. McCant v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 859.
No. 20–5348. Miller v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 963.
No. 20–5351. Wade v. Williams, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5353. Wright v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5357. Collymore v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 334 Conn. 431, 223 A. 3d 1.
No. 20–5358. Fuentes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5359. Eustice v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 686.

974 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5361. Torres-Marquez v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 829.
No. 20–5362. Allen v. Mitchell, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 858.
No. 20–5364. Kaminski v. Semple, Commissioner, Connect-
icut Department of Correction, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 36.
No. 20–5369. Farmer v. Booker, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 415.
No. 20–5372. Gamage v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5373. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5376. Estrada-Eugenio, aka Medina, aka Estar-
ada, aka Eugenio-Estrada, aka Amezquita v. United
States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797
Fed. Appx. 884.
No. 20–5377. Buckles v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 785.
No. 20–5380. Pitt v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 778.
No. 20–5382. Graham v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5385. Harmon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 836.
No. 20–5388. Buck v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5389. Bayisa v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5390. Betts v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 426.
No. 20–5391. Lambert v. Paersson. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

ORDERS 975
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5392. Jones v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 433.
No. 20–5393. McCullough v. Dennison, Warden. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5394. Mona v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 871.
No. 20–5402. Savicki v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5403. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 143.
No. 20–5405. Hardy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 718.
No. 20–5408. Jodoin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 394.
No. 20–5409. Keen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 735.
No. 20–5410. Aparicio-Leon v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 470.
No. 20–5411. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 101.
No. 20–5412. Bluew v. Horton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5415. Long v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5418. Veloz, aka Rivera v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 418.
No. 20–5423. Peralta-Castro v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 291.
No. 20–5424. Hanzy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 191.
No. 20–5427. Porter v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (4th) 170546–U.
No. 20–5428. Morales-Mercado v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 907.

976 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5429. Neville v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 950.
No. 20–5432. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 383.
No. 20–5433. Wind v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 887.
No. 20–5435. Lloyd v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 750.
No. 20–5436. Santiago v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 220.
No. 20–5437. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5439. Santibanez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 207.
No. 20 – 5440. Tejada v. Mas sachuset ts. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 484 Mass. 1, 143
N. E. 3d 397.
No. 20–5441. Saunders v. Garman, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5442. Smith v. Department of Education et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5444. Sanders v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 919.
No. 20–5445. Walker v. Sheldon, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5446. Zheng v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5450. Washington v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 296 So. 3d 567.
No. 20–5457. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 883.
No. 20–5470. Milla-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 835.

ORDERS 977
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 5, 2020
No. 20–5472. Dailey v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 20–5473. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 390.
No. 20–5474. Clayton v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 50.
No. 20–5478. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5479. Mondragon Benitez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 243.
No. 20–5481. Brown v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 105.
No. 20–5488. Lopez Toala v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 804.
No. 20–5490. Payton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 654.
No. 20–5527. Benton v. Capozza, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Fayette, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–847. Reisman v. Associated Faculties of the Uni-
versity of Maine et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of Freedom
Foundation for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 939 F. 3d 409.
No. 19–926. Davis v. Ermold et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 936 F. 3d 429.
Statement of Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito
joins, respecting the denial of certiorari.
In Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015), the Court read a
right to same-sex marriage into the Fourteenth Amendment, even
though that right is found nowhere in the text. Several Members
of the Court noted that the Court's decision would threaten the
religious liberty of the many Americans who believe that mar-
riage is a sacred institution between one man and one woman.
If the States had been allowed to resolve this question through
legislation, they could have included accommodations for those

978 OCTOBER
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Statement of Thomas, J. 592 U. S.
who hold these religious beliefs. Id., at 711 (Roberts, C. J.,
dissenti
ng); id., at 734 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court, how-
ever, bypassed that democratic process. Worse still, though it
briefy acknowledged that those with sincerely held religious ob-
jections to same-sex marriage are often “decent and honorable,”
id., at 672, the Court went on to suggest that those beliefs es-
poused a bigoted worldview, ibid. See also id., at 670 (noting
that such a view of marriage is “demean[ing]” to gays and lesbians
because it “teach[es] that gays and lesbians are unequal”); id., at
671 (describing the view of marriage dictated by the religious
beliefs of many as “impos[ing] stigma and injury”); id., at 675
(characterizing the traditional view of marriage as “disrespect-
[ful]” to gays and lesbians). The dissenting Justices predicted
that “[t]hese . . . assaults on the character of fairminded people
will have an effect, in society and in court,” id., at 712 (opinion
of Roberts, C. J.), allowing “governments, employers, and
schools” to “vilify” those with these religious beliefs “as bigots,”
id., at 741 (opinion of Alito, J.). Those predictions did not take
long to become reality.
Kim Davis, a former county clerk in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, was responsible for authorizing marriage licenses.
Davis is also a devout Christian. When she began her tenure as
clerk, Davis' sincerely held religious beliefs—that marriage exists
between one man and one woman—corresponded with the defni-
tion of marriage under Kentucky law. See Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 402.005 (1998); Ky. Const. § 233A (2004). Within weeks of this
Court granting certiorari in Obergefell, Davis began lobbying for
amendments to Kentucky law that would protect the free exercise
rights of those who had religious objections to same-sex marriage.
But those efforts were cut short by this Court's decision in
Obergefell.
As a result of this Court's alteration of the Constitution, Davis
found herself faced with a choice between her religious beliefs
and her job. When she chose to follow her faith, and without
any statutory protection of her religious beliefs, she was sued
almost immediately for violating the constitutional rights of same-
sex couples.
Davis may have been one of the frst victims of this Court's
cavalier treatment of religion in its Obergefell decision, but she
will not be the last. Due to Obergefell, those with sincerely held
religious beliefs concerning marriage will fnd it increasingly dif-

ORDERS 979
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St
atement of Thomas, J.
fcult to participate in society without running afoul of Obergefell
and
its effect on other antidiscrimination laws. It would be one
thing if recognition for same-sex marriage had been debated and
adopted through the democratic process, with the people deciding
not to provide statutory protections for religious liberty under
state law.* But it is quite another when the Court forces that
choice upon society through its creation of atextual constitutional
rights and its ungenerous interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, leaving those with religious objections in the lurch.
Moreover, Obergefell enables courts and governments to brand re-
ligious adherents who believe that marriage is between one man
and one woman as bigots, making their religious liberty concerns
that much easier to dismiss. For example, relying on Obergefell,
one member of the Sixth Circuit panel in this case described
Davis' sincerely held religious beliefs as “anti-homosexual ani-
mus.” 936 F. 3d 429, 438 (2019) (Bush, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). In other words, Obergefell was read to
suggest that being a public offcial with traditional Christian val-
ues was legally tantamount to invidious discrimination toward
homosexuals. This assessment fows directly from Obergefell's
language, which characterized such views as “disparag[ing]” ho-
mosexuals and “diminish[ing] their personhood” through “[d]igni-
tary wounds.” 576 U. S., at 672, 678. Since Obergefell, parties
have continually attempted to label people of good will as bigots
merely for refusing to alter their religious beliefs in the wake of
prevailing orthodoxy. See Campaign for Southern Equality v.
Bryant, 197 F. Supp. 3d 905, 910 (SD Miss. 2016) (recognizing the
plaintiffs' argument equating an accommodation allowing religious
objectors to recuse themselves from signing same-sex licenses
with impermissible discrimination); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v.
Phoenix, 244 Ariz. 59, 66, 418 P. 3d 426, 434 (App. 2018) (describing
*Under this Court's precedents, “the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion proscribes (or prescribes). ” Employment D iv.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 879 (1990) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). As a result of Smith, accommodations for
those with sincerely held religious beliefs have generally been viewed as the
domain of positive state and federal law. See, e. g., Klein v. Oregon Bureau
of Labor & Industries, 289 Ore. App. 507, 543–546, 410 P. 3d 1051, 1074–
1076 (2017) (rejecting a Free Exercise claim under Smith).

980 OCTOBER
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October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
owners of wedding studio who declined to participate in same-sex
weddi
ngs for religious reasons as treating homosexuals like “ `so-
cial outcasts' ” (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado
Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U. S. 617, 631 (2018))).
***
This petition implicates important questions about the scope of
our decision in Obergefell, but it does not cleanly present them.
For that reason, I concur in the denial of certiorari. Neverthe-
less, this petition provides a stark reminder of the consequences
of Obergefell. By choosing to privilege a novel constitutional
right over the religious liberty interests explicitly protected in
the First Amendment, and by doing so undemocratically, the
Court has created a problem that only it can fx. Until then,
Obergefell will continue to have “ruinous consequences for reli-
gious liberty.” 576 U. S., at 734 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
No. 19–1045. Kaur v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 241 Md. App. 743.
Statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of
certiorari.
Although I join the Court's decision to deny certiorari, I write
separately to address a concerning feature of this petition: The
prosecutors who tried this case had extensive knowledge of de-
fense counsel's confdential communications with the defendant,
petitioner Raminder Kaur. For the reasons stated below, I fear
that, in this case, the criminal justice system failed to live up to
its highest ideals.
In 2014, Kaur was convicted of frst-degree murder by a Mary-
land jury. Shortly thereafter, she moved for a new trial on the
ground that her defense attorney had provided her with ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. The trial court ordered Kaur to turn
over her “entire defense fle” so that prosecutors could respond
adequately to her motion. 2019 WL 2407997, *5 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App., June 7, 2019). After holding a multiday hearing, the court
concluded that “the interests of justice required granting Ms.
Kaur a new trial.” Id., at *6; see Md. Rule 4–331(a) (2020).
Because she had disclosed “a considerable amount of privileged
information, including communications between [her] and her law-
yers, communications between her lawyers and their support
staff, and her lawyers' investigative and strategic work-product,”

ORDERS 981
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St
atement of Sotomayor, J.
Kaur asked the court for a protective order barring the prosecu-
tors
who had personally reviewed her defense fle from retrying
her case. 2019 WL 2407997, *1. The court agreed to prohibit
the State from making use of Kaur's privileged information at
trial, but it denied her request to be tried by an untainted prose-
cution team. As a result, the same lawyers who were “exposed
to all of Ms. Kaur's privileged information” tried Kaur a second
time. Id., at *17. Kaur was again convicted, and she was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment.
Kaur appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
arguing (as relevant here) that the State violated her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by permitting attorneys who had
reviewed her privileged information to prosecute her case. As
an initial matter, the court rejected the State's contention that,
by disclosing confdential information in the course of seeking a
new trial, Kaur had effectively waived her attorney-client privi-
lege for all purposes. But the court also rejected Kaur's conten-
tion that the prosecutors' knowledge of her defense strategy was-
presumptively prejudicial. Instead, the court concluded that Kaur
had to demonstrate a realistic possibility that she was harmed in the
second trial by the prosecutors' access to her privileged information
or that the prosecutors used such information to their advantage.
After comparing the records of Kaur's two trials, the court deter-
mined that Kaur had failed to make the requisite showing.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, the State's highest court,
denied further review. Kaur then fled a petition for a writ of
certiorari in this Court.
“[I]t has long been recognized that the essence of the Sixth
Amendment right is privacy of communication with counsel. ”
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 563 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). In
Weatherford, this Court considered whether a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right had been violated when, at the defendant's invi-
tation, an undercover agent attended a meeting between the de-
fendant and his lawyer. Id., at 550–551, 558. Based in part on
the fact that there had been “no communication of defense strat-
egy to the prosecution,” the Court rejected the defendant's claim.
Id., at 558. But the Court noted that the defendant “would have
[had] a much stronger case” “had the prosecution learned . . . the
details of the [lawyer-client] conversations about trial prepara-
tions.” Id., at 554.

982 OCTOBER
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Statement of Sotomayor, J. 592 U. S.
Since Weatherford, many federal and state courts have strug-
g
led to defne what burden, if any, a defendant must meet to
demonstrate prejudice from a prosecutor's wrongful or negligent
acquisition of privileged information. Unlike the defendants in
those cases, however, Kaur disclosed (albeit at the trial court's
direction) privileged information to the prosecutors for the limited
purpose of vindicating her right to effective assistance of counsel.
The prosecutors did not obtain Kaur's information surreptitiously.
Few courts have had occasion to opine on whether the Sixth
Amendment bars prosecutors from retrying a defendant in such
circumstances. Cf. Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F. 3d 715, 722 (CA9
2003) (holding that a waiver of attorney-client privilege for pur-
poses of raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim does not
extend to retrial, in part because “[e]xtending the waiver . . .
would immediately and perversely skew the second trial in the
prosecution's favor”). Because this question could beneft from
further consideration by the lower courts, I agree with the deci-
sion to deny certiorari in this case.
But three important points bear mention. First, it is deeply
disconcerting that the State has suggested that defendants who
raise ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims during the trial
phase must forfeit their right to privileged communications with
counsel. To vindicate the past denial of her Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel, a defendant should not
have to waive her Sixth Amendment right to attorney-client con-
fdentiality for purposes of any retrial to which she is entitled.
See Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 394 (1968) (“[W]e
fnd it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another”).
Second, this case demonstrates the many insidious ways that
potential Sixth Amendment violations can affect the course of a
trial. Take, for example, Kaur's ability to testify in her own
defense. After the trial court denied her motion to be tried by
new prosecutors, Kaur fled a motion “to limit the scope of the
State's cross-examination in the event that [she] chose to testify.”
2019 WL 2407997, *19. Kaur's concern that the State might use
her privileged information for its own advantage was hardly hy-
pothetical: One of the prosecutors had, in fact, already informed
the court that she had taken the opportunity to “ `scour' ” Kaur's
defense fle and that she had “ `made a list of all the negatives
that [would] befall the defendant' ” should she choose to testify.

ORDERS 983
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St
atement of Sotomayor, J.
Id., at *18 (some alterations omitted). After a “three-way discus-
si
on between counsel and the trial court,” it was agreed that the
prosecutor would “rely solely upon her recollection of Ms. Kaur's
prior testimony” from the hearing on her motion for a new trial,
but that one of the prosecutor's assistants could review the tran-
script “for exact wording.” Id., at *19. The court then “re-
served any ruling on the scope of possible cross-examination until
Ms. Kaur completed her direct testimony.” Ibid. Perhaps un-
surprisingly, Kaur declined to testify.
This is just one example of the many ways in which the prose-
cutors' possession of Kaur's privileged information could have
subtly but indelibly affected the course of her trial. One can
think of many others. The prosecutors, either intentionally or
subconsciously, may have selected a different mix of jurors. They
may have changed their pretrial preparation, perhaps by empha-
sizing different parts of the State's case or focusing on different
weaknesses in the defense. Or they may have considered differ-
ent lines of questioning, brainstormed different objections, or
anticipated different arguments. The trouble with all of these
scenarios is that, while the Court of Special Appeals no doubt
dutifully reviewed the record, it is exceedingly diffcult to prove
a negative. It would be an impossible task for any court, no
matter how diligent, to identify and assess all potential sources
of prejudice simply by comparing the records of two trials.
Finally and crucially, the decision whether to allow the original
prosecution team to retry Kaur was not the court's alone to make.
The prosecutors, too, had a choice. And in making that choice,
as with all prosecutorial decisions, those lawyers acted as “the
representative[s] not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of
a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”
Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935). Prosecutors
wield an immense amount of power, and they do so in the name
of the State itself. That unique privilege comes with the excep-
tional responsibility to ensure that the criminal justice system
indeed serves the ends of justice. Prosecutors fall short of this
task, and therefore do a grave disservice to the people in whose
name they litigate, when they permit themselves to enjoy unfair
trial advantages at defendants' expense. Here, regardless of the
reason for their acquisition of Kaur's privileged information, and
regardless of whatever minimum conduct was required of them

984 OCTOBER
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October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
by the Sixth Amendment, the prosecutors should have recused
themselves
from participating in Kaur's second trial as a matter
of professional conscience. Their failure to do so casts a troubling
and unnecessary shadow over Kaur's conviction and sentence to
life imprisonment.
No. 19–1220. Szonyi v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A.
9th Cir. Motion of Pacifc Legal Foundation for leave to fle brief
as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
942 F. 3d 874.
No. 19–1252. Campbell et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Motion of Center for Auto Safety for leave to fle brief as
amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 932
F. 3d 1331.
No. 19–1255. Baker, Warden, et al. v. Rose. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 5.
No. 19–1307. Thomas, Warden v. Barnes. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 938 F. 3d 526.
No. 19–1341. Van Auken, as Trustee and Beneciary v.
Catron et al. Ct. App. N. M. Motion of Center for Estate
Administration Reform et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1415. Dierlam v. Trump, President of the United
States, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari before judgment
denied.
No. 19–1440. Ammons et al. v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd.
Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail Transportation
Workers-Transportation Division, et al. for leave to fle brief as
amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019
IL 124454.
No. 19–7688. Noble v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 216 A. 3d 387.
No. 19–8560. Noble v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 216 A. 3d 369.

ORDERS 985
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No. 19–8614. Fields v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 949 F. 3d
1240.
No. 19–8621. Peterson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 797 Fed.
Appx. 117.
No. 19–8656. Jacoby v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 797 Fed.
Appx. 412.
No. 19–8735. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Alito and Justice Kagan took no part
in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 19–8814. Davis v. Sharp, Interim Warden. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 943
F. 3d 1290.
No. 19–8857. Jones v. Douglas County Jail. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 19–8924. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 20–57. McGinnis, by His Conservator Jones v. Per-
due, Secretary of Agriculture, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 950 F. 3d
886.
No. 20–98. Wood, Individually and as Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of Wood v. Boeing Co. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 946 F. 3d
607.
No. 20–106. Vilar et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this petition.

986 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–122. Taylor v. Trump, President of the United
St
ates, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari before judgment
denied.
No. 20–142. Skidmore, as Trustee for the Randy Craig
Wolfe Trust v. Zeppelin et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of
Pullman Group, LLC, et al. and California Society of Entertain-
ment Lawyers for leave to fle briefs as amici curiae granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 1051.
No. 20–220. VBS Distribution, Inc., et al. v. Nutrivita
Laboratories, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of Law
Offce of J. Edward Niehaus and Erwin Chemerinsky for leave to
fle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 811 Fed. Appx. 1005.
No. 20–265. Ramirez et al. v. ConocoPhillips Co. et al.
Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part
in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
599 S. W. 3d 296.
No. 20–5028. Lussy v. Dahood. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari
denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 400 Mont. 558, 462
P. 3d 244.
No. 20–5029. Lussy v. Lussy. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari de-
nied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition. Reported below: 400 Mont. 558, 462
P. 3d 243.
No. 20–5094. Laux v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 786 Fed.
Appx. 84.
No. 20–5100. Turner v. United States District Court for
the Central District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari before judgment denied.
No. 20–5166. J. J. H. v. Waukesha County, Wisconsin. Ct.
App. Wis. Motion of National Association of the Deaf and Dis-
ability Rights Wisconsin for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae
granted. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5235. Bikundi v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the con-

ORDERS 987
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sideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 926 F. 3d
761.
N
o. 20–5243. Henness v. DeWine et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 287.
Statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of
certiorari.
The State of Ohio plans to execute petitioner using a three-drug
protocol of midazolam, a paralytic agent, and potassium chloride.
Petitioner challenges this method of execution as unconstitutional,
partly on the ground that midazolam is very likely to induce
sensations of suffocation and drowning, terror, and panic (akin to
that produced by waterboarding). After holding a 4-day eviden-
tiary hearing in which it considered the testimony of 18 witnesses,
the District Court agreed, noting that the scientifc case against
midazolam had grown “much stronger” over the past few years.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 159a. The District Court ultimately re-
jected petitioner's challenge, however, concluding that petitioner
had failed to identify a feasible and readily implemented alterna-
tive method of execution, a showing that this Court has required
since its decision in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863 (2015).
The Sixth Circuit affrmed the District Court's separate holding
that petitioner had failed to identify an appropriate alternative
method of execution. But, parting ways with the District Court,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that, even if petitioner is made to feel
as if he is drowning as he dies, Ohio's midazolam-based protocol
would not cause petitioner unconstitutionally severe pain. I
write to address the Sixth Circuit's novel and unsupported conclu-
sion that pain is constitutionally tolerable so long as it is no worse
than the suffering caused by a botched hanging.
1
1
Elsewhere I have written about the mounting evidence that midazolam-
based protocols may cause a prisoner to feel as though he is suffocating to
death, an excruciating process that could last as long as 18 minutes, and
about the troubling failure of courts of appeals to defer to district courts'
well-supported fndings as to the risk of such pain. See Irick v. Tennessee,
585 U. S. 1048, 1048–1049 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
application for stay); Otte v. Morgan, 582 U. S. 955, 955–956 (2017) (Soto-
mayor, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay and denial of certio-
rari); Arthur v. Dunn, 580 U. S. 1141, 1153–1154 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari). I have also separately written about this Court's
“perverse requirement that inmates offer alternative methods for their own
executions” and addressed the serious barriers inmates face in so doing.

988 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Statement of Sotomayor, J. 592 U. S.
The Sixth Circuit began its reasoning from the premise that
pai
n, to be constitutionally cognizable, must reach a certain level
of severity. Severe enough for constitutional recognition, in the
court's view, would be the pain caused by “breaking on the wheel,
faying alive, [and] rending asunder with horses.” In re Ohio
Execution Protocol Litig., 946 F. 3d 287, 290 (2019) (quoting
Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 131 (2019); alteration omitted).
Not severe enough, in contrast, would be the pain caused by a
botched hanging in which the prisoner “ `slowly' ” died of “suffoca-
tion” over the course of “several minutes,” instead of dying in-
stantly as a result of the sudden drop. 946 F. 3d, at 290 (quoting
Bucklew, 587 U. S., at 132). Even assuming, then, that Ohio's
three-drug protocol will cause petitioner to feel a sensation of
“drowning and suffocation” as he dies, the court concluded that
such pain is constitutionally acceptable because it looks “a lot like
the risks of pain associated with hanging.” 946 F. 3d, at 290.
The Sixth Circuit thus appears to have created a categorical rule
that a method of execution passes constitutional muster so long
as it poses no greater risk of pain than the slow suffocation of a
hanging gone wrong.
2
See Campbell v. Wood, 511 U. S. 1119,
1122 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(describing the experience of “[a] person who slowly asphyxiates
or strangulates while twisting at the end of a rope” during a
botched hanging).
McGehee v. Hutchinson, 581 U. S. 933, 935 (2017) (opinion dissenting from
denial of application for stay and denial of certiorari); see Zagorski v. Par-
ker, 586 U. S. 938, 941–942 (2018) (same); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863,
969–978 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The Sixth Circuit's opinion re-
fected many of these problems. And as I write here, the court erred in
enshrining hanging as a categorical measure of constitutionally tolerable suf-
fering. Because the Sixth Circuit's separate analysis that petitioner had
failed to identify a “feasible and readily implemented alternative method of
execution” is not clearly wrong under this Court's recent precedent, Bucklew
v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 134 (2019), however, I concur in the denial of
certiorari.
2
Even on the Sixth Circuit's own terms, it is not at all clear that midazo-
lam's risk of pain is no worse than that of a botched hanging. The Sixth
Circuit and this Court have described such a hanging as involving “several
minutes” of suffocation. 946 F. 3d, at 290 (quoting Bucklew, 587 U. S., at
132). By contrast, midazolam poses a risk that a condemned inmate will
“experience sensations of drowning, suffocating, and being burned alive from
the inside out,” for at least 10 and as many as 18 minutes. Irick, 585 U. S.,
at 1048 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay).

ORDERS 989
592 U. S.
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The Sixth Circuit erred in enshrining hanging as a permanent
measure
of constitutionally tolerable suffering. Its decision con-
ficts with this Court's recent precedent, which makes clear that
the proper inquiry is comparative, not categorical. See Bucklew,
587 U. S., at 134; Glossip, 576 U. S., at 878. Since Glossip, this
Court has held that a risk of pain raises constitutional problems
if it is “ `substantial when compared to a known and available
alternative' ” that is “feasible and readily implemented.” Buck-
lew, 587 U. S., at 134. If such an alternative exists, and a State
nonetheless refuses to adopt it without a legitimate penological
reason, then the State's chosen method “cruelly” (and unconstitu-
tionally) “superadds pain to [a] death sentence.” Ibid.
Although the Sixth Circuit cited Bucklew in support of its novel
standard, nowhere did this Court suggest that the pain caused by
a faulty hanging creates a constitutional foor for “cruel and un-
usual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Applying its
comparative standard, Bucklew merely noted that a traditional
method of execution like hanging is not “necessarily rendered
unconstitutional as soon as an arguably more humane method
. . . becomes available.” Ibid. (emphasis added). But that is only
because a State could have a legitimate reason for not immedi-
ately adopting the more humane method. Bucklew does not pro-
vide a categorical safe harbor for methods of execution that, in a
court's estimation, will cause no greater suffering than that
caused by certain traditional methods. See ibid. If there were a
feasible and readily implemented method of execution that would
prevent petitioner from experiencing a sensation akin to drowning
as he dies, it would be cruel and unusual for Ohio to refuse to
adopt it.
No. 20–5431. Ackerman v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 804 Fed.
Appx. 900.
No. 20–5469. Lee v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–7319. Waters v. Stewart et al., 589 U. S. 1281;
No. 19–7592. McAllister v. Maltano et al., 590 U. S. 907;

990 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 5, 8, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8061. Weixing Wang v. Marcotte, 591 U. S. 1018;
N
o. 19–8119. Williams v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, 590 U. S. 972;
No. 19–8251. Talkington v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 590 U. S. 995, sub nom. Talkington v. Davis;
No. 19–8380. Monds v. United States, 590 U. S. 974; and
No. 19–8493. Stinson v. Hendrix, Warden, 591 U. S. 1007.
Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 19–8305. Ononuju v. Virginia, 591 U. S. 1006. Motion
for leave to fle petition for rehearing denied.
October 8, 2020
Dismissals Under Rule 46
No. 20–74. United States v. Image Processing Technolo-
gies LLC, et al. [among other cases under this Court's Rule
12.4]. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari dismissed only with respect
to the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Image Processing
Technologies LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Nos. 2018–2156,
2019–1408, and 2019–1485 under this Court's Rule 46.2.
No. 20–5356. Rudolph v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Cer ti orar i dismissed under th is Cour t's Ru le 46. Repor ted
below: 806 Fed. Appx. 172.
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A34. Food and Drug Administration et al. v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
et al. D. C. Md. The Government seeks a stay of an injunction
preventing the Food and Drug Administration from enforcing in-
person dispensation requirements for the drug mifepristone dur-
ing the pendency of the public health emergency. The Govern-
ment argues that, at a minimum, the injunction is overly broad
in scope, given that it applies nationwide and for an indefnite
duration regardless of the improving conditions in any individual
State. Without indicating this Court's views on the merits of the
District Court's order or injunction, a more comprehensive record
would aid this Court's review. The Court will therefore hold the
Government's application in abeyance to permit the District Court
to promptly consider a motion by the Government to dissolve,

ORDERS 991
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modify, or stay the injunction, including on the ground that rele-
vant
circumstances have changed. See Febre v. United States,
396 U. S. 1225, 1225–1226 (1969) (Harlan, J., in chambers); see also
Parr v. United States, 351 U. S. 513, 520 (1956). The District
Court should rule within 40 days of receiving the Government's
submission.
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.
The Government has fled an emergency application to stay an
injunction against enforcement of a longstanding drug-safety rule
issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Six weeks
have passed since the application was submitted, but the Court
refuses to rule. Instead, it defers any action until the Govern-
ment moves in the District Court to modify the injunction and
the District Court rules on that motion, a process that may take
another six weeks or more.
There is no legally sound reason for this unusual disposition.
The only justifcation even hinted by the Court is the possibility
that modifcation of the injunction may be required due to changes
in the severity of the problems caused by the COVID–19 pan-
demic, but that possibility does not justify the Court's refusal to
rule. Indeed, for all practical purposes, there is little difference
between what the Court has done and an express denial of the
Government's application. In both situations, the FDA rule may
not be enforced, and in both situations, the Government is able
to move the District Court to modify the injunction based on
changed circumstances. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U. S. 433, 447
(2009) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) “provides a means
by which a party can ask a court to modify or vacate a judgment
or order if `a signifcant change . . . in factual conditions' . . .
renders continued enforcement `detrimental to the public inter-
est' ” (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U. S.
367, 384 (1992))).
There is, however, one difference (but not a legally signifcant
one) between what the Court has done and the express denial of
the Government's application. Expressly denying a stay would
highlight the inconsistency in the Court's rulings on COVID–19-
related public safety measures. In response to the pandemic,
state and local offcials have imposed unprecedented restrictions
on personal liberty, including severe limitations on First Amend-
ment rights. Offcials have drastically limited speech, banning or

992 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Alito, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
restricting public speeches, lectures, meetings, and rallies. The
free
exercise of religion also has suffered previously unimaginable
restraints, and this Court has stood by while that has occurred.
In South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S.
965 (2020), this hands-off approach was defended on the follow-
ing ground:
“Our Constitution principally entrusts `the safety and the
health of the people' to the politically accountable offcials of
the States `to guard and protect.' Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U. S. 11, 38 (1905). When those offcials `undertake
to act in areas fraught with medical and scientifc uncertain-
ties,' their latitude `must be especially broad.' Marshall v.
United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). Where those broad
limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to second-
guessing by an `unelected federal judiciary,' which lacks the
background, competence, and exper tise to assess publ ic
health and is not accountable to the people. See Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528,
545 (1985).” Id., at 967 (Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial
of application for injunctive relief ) (alterations omitted).
The extent of this deference was illustrated weeks later when
the Court deferred to the judgment of the Governor of Nevada
that attendance at worship services presented a greater threat to
public health than engaging in the diversions offered by the
State's casinos. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 591
U. S. 1042 (2020). The possibility that this dubious conclusion might
have been based less on science than on the infuence of the State's
powerful gaming industry and its employees was not enough to
move the Court. Near-total deference was the rule of the day.
In the present case, however, the District Court took a strik-
ingly different approach. While COVID–19 has provided the
ground for restrictions on First Amendment rights, the District
Court saw the pandemic as a ground for expanding the abortion
right recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973). At issue
is a requirement adopted by the FDA for the purpose of protect-
ing the health of women who wish to obtain an abortion by ingest-
ing certain medications, specifcally, mifepristone and misoprostol.
Under that requirement, a woman must receive a mifepristone
tablet in person at a hospital, clinic, or medical offce. Electronic
Court Filing in No. 8:20–cv–01320, Doc. 1–4 (D Md., May 27,

ORDERS 993
990
Alito,
J., dissenting
2020), p. 3. The FDA frst adopted the requirement in 2000, and
then
included it in a package of safety requirements under express
statutory authority in 2007. See 21 U. S. C. § 355–1(f )(3)(C).
Over the course of four presidential administrations, the FDA has
enforced this requirement and has not found it appropriate to
remove it. During the COVID–19 pandemic, the FDA suspended
in-person dispensing requirements for some drugs, but it evi-
dently decided that the mifepristone requirement should remain
in force.
Nevertheless, a District Court Judge in Maryland took it upon
himself to overrule the FDA on a question of drug safety. Disre-
garding The Chief Justice's admonition against judicial second-
guessing of offcials with public health responsibilities, the judge
concluded that requiring women seeking a medication abortion to
pick up mifepristone in person during the COVID–19 pandemic
constitutes an “undue burden” on the abortion right, and he there-
fore issued a nationwide injunction against enforcement of the
FDA's requirement. The judge apparently was not troubled by
the fact that those responsible for public health in Maryland
thought it safe for women (and men) to leave the house and en-
gage in numerous activities that present at least as much risk as
visiting a clinic—such as indoor restaurant dining, visiting hair
salons and barber shops, all sorts of retail establishments, gyms
and other indoor exercise facilities, nail salons, youth sports
events, and, of course, the State's casinos.* And the judge made the
injunction applicable throughout the country, including in locales
with very low infection rates and limited COVID–19 restrictions.
Under the approach recently taken by the Court in cases involv-
ing restrictions on First Amendment rights, the proper disposi-
tion of the Government's stay application should be clear: grant.
But the Court is not willing to do that. Nor is it willing to deny
the application. I see no reason for refusing to rule.
*See, e. g., Governor Hogan Announces Next Stage Two Reopenings, In-
cluding Indoor Dining and Outdoor Amusements (June 10, 2020), https://
governor.maryland.gov/2020/06/10/governor-hogan-announces-next-stage-two-
reopenings-including-indoor-dining-and-outdoor-amusements/; Governor
Hogan Announces Beginning of Stage Two of Maryland's COVID–19 Recov-
ery, Safe and Gradual Reopening of Workplaces and Businesses (June 3,
2020), https://governor.maryland.gov/2020/06/03/governor-hogan-announces-
beginning-of-stage-two-of-marylands-covid-19-recovery-safe-and-gradual-
reopening-of-workplaces-and-businesses/.

994 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 8, 13, 2020 592 U. S.
This case presents important issues that richly merit review.
The
District Court's decision, if reviewed, is likely to be reversed.
And if the FDA is right in its assessment of mifepristone, non-
enforcement of the requirement risks irreparable harm. A stay
is amply warranted.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
October 13, 2020
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–5249. Blacher v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–5401. Sundy v. Friendship Pavilion Acquisition
Co., LLC, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed.
See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 977.
No. 20–5581. Drevaleva v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A35. Arana-Molina et al. v. Barr, Attorney Gen-
eral. Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice
and referred to the Court, denied.
No. 20A62. Ross, Secretary of Commerce, et al. v. Na-
tional Urban League et al. D. C. N. D. Cal. Application
for stay, presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the
Court, granted. The District Court's September 24, 2020, order
granting preliminary injunction is stayed pending disposition of
the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari, if
such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for writ of certio-
rari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the

ORDERS 995
592 U. S.
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event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall
ter
minate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
Today, the Court stays a preliminary injunction requiring the
Census Bureau to follow the data collection plan the agency once
described as necessary to avoid “risking signifcant impacts on
data quality.” Electronic Case Filing in No. 5:20–cv–5799, Doc.
198–7 (ND Cal., Sept. 22, 2020), p. 131 (ECF). The injunction
required the Bureau to continue its data collection efforts until
October 31, 2020, a deadline the Bureau itself selected in response
to the signifcant operational disruptions caused by the COVID–
19 pandemic. The Government now claims that this Court's im-
mediate intervention is necessary because, absent a stay, the Bu-
reau will not be able to meet the December 31 statutory deadline
for reporting census results to the President. This representa-
tion is contrary to the Government's repeated assertions to the
courts below that it could not meet the statutory deadline under
any circumstances. Moreover, meeting the deadline at the ex-
pense of the accuracy of the census is not a cost worth paying,
especially when the Government has failed to show why it could
not bear the lesser cost of expending more resources to meet the
deadline or continuing its prior efforts to seek an extension from
Congress. This Court normally does not grant extraordinary re-
lief on such a painfully disproportionate balance of harms.
I
In Apr il 2020, the Bureau extended the deadli ne for self-
responses to the census questionnaire and for its NonResponse
Follow-Up feld operation from July 31, 2020, to October 31, 2020.
In the words of the Bureau's associate director for feld opera-
tions, it was “ludicrous” to expect the Bureau to “complete
100% of the nation's data collection earlier than [October 31]” in
the middle of a pandemic. 489 F. Supp. 3d 939, 956 (ND Cal.
2020).
The Bureau also rescheduled its anticipated report to the Presi-
dent. Under the Census Act, the Secretary of Commerce must
deliver to the President a report conveying the results of the
census by December 31, 2020. 13 U. S. C. § 141(b). The Bureau,
however, moved this deadline to April 30, 2021. President
Trump did not initially object, publicly stating that “ `I don't know

996 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
that you even have to ask [Congress]. This is called an act of
God.
This is called a situation that has to be.' ” 489 F. Supp.
3d, at 990, 2020 WL 5739144, *37. The Bureau nonetheless re-
quested that Congress formally extend the December 31 statutory
deadline by 120 days. The House of Representatives passed a
bill extending the deadline, and on July 23, 2020, a Senate Com-
mittee held a hearing on the bill.
On August 3, 2020, however, two weeks after President Trump
announced his intent to exclude undocumented immigrants from
the population base for congressional apportionment, Secretary
Ross announced the “Replan Schedule.” Under the Replan
Schedule, data collection would end on September 30, 2020. The
administration simultaneously stopped pushing Congress to ex-
tend the reporting deadline by 120 days.
II
Respondents, who are advocacy groups, cities, counties, and Na-
tive tribes, sued to enjoin the Replan Schedule. The District
Court issued detailed factual fndings, concluding that respondents
had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their
claim that the Bureau's reversal was arbitrary and capricious,
1
and that the harms to respondents absent an injunction vastly
outweighed any harm the injunction would cause the Government.
The court preliminarily enjoined the Replan Schedule's Septem-
ber 30 deadline for completing data collection (i. e., the deadline
for individuals to complete the census questionnaire and for the
Bureau to wrap up its feld operations) and the December 31
deadline for reporting the results to the President. The District
Court subsequently clarifed that the Bureau's original Octo-
ber 31 deadline for data collection would be reinstated. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the injunction as
to the December 31 deadline, but affrmed the reinstatement of
1
Specifcally, the District Court concluded that respondents were likely to
succeed because the Government failed to consider important aspects of the
problem; the Replan Schedule ran counter to the evidence before the agency;
the Government failed to consider an alternative to and articulate a satisfac-
tory explanation for its decision to adopt the Replan; and the Government
failed to consider reliance interests of municipalities and organizations who
publicized the October 31 deadline to their communities. 489 F. Supp. 3d
939, 981–1001 (ND Cal. 2020).

ORDERS 997
994
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
the October 31 deadline. The Government now asks this Court
to
intervene and stay the entire injunction.
I would deny a stay of that injunction. An applicant for a stay
“must demonstrate (1) `a reasonable probability' that this Court
will grant certiorari, (2) `a fair prospect' that the Court will then
reverse the decision below, and (3) `a likelihood that irreparable
harm [will] result from the denial of a stay.' ” Maryland v. King,
567 U. S. 1301, 1302 (2012) (Roberts, C. J., in chambers) (quoting
Conkright v. Frommert, 556 U. S. 1401, 1402 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
in chambers)). The Government fails to demonstrate that the
injunction is likely to cause it irreparable harm. Regardless of
the merits of respondents' claims, this failure, alone, requires de-
nying the requested stay.
The Government articulates a single harm: that if data collec-
tion continues through October 31, the Bureau will not meet the
December 31 statutory deadline to report census results to the
President. But it is unlikely the District Court's injunction will
be the cause of the Bureau's inability to do so. Indeed, for
months, senior Bureau offcials have represented that, whatever
the data collection deadline, meeting the December 31 reporting
deadline would be impossible. See 977 F. 3d 770, 779 (CA9
2020) (“ [T]he President, Depar tment of Commerce officia ls,
Bureau offcials, and outside analysis from the Offce of the Inspec-
tor General, the Census Scientifc Advisory Committee, and the
Government Accountability Offce all stated unequivocally, some
before and some after the adoption of the Replan, that the Bureau
would be unable to meet [the December 31] deadline under any
conditions”). Only recently have offcials begun to claim that
the Bureau might yet be able to meet the statutory deadline, and
even then, their story keeps changing. See ibid. (noting that the
Government's representation that it could meet the statu-
tory deadline if it ended collection by October 5 was at odds with
the September 22 declaration of a senior Bureau offcial). It
is in fact far from clear why the Government now believes that
the December 31 deadline was feasible under the Replan Schedule
but is impossible under the injunction. Notably, the Govern-
ment fails to explain why it cannot meet the statutory dead-
line by adding resources to accelerate data processing as it
did with data collection. App. to Application for Stay 117a
(Census Bureau press release explai ni ng that the Replan

998 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
Schedule required “hiring of more employees to accelerate the
completi
on of data collection and apportionment counts”).
That the Bureau has provided “ever-changing projections”
about the impact of the data collection deadline on its statutory
deadline is understandable given the complexity of the census and
the unanticipated impact of the COVID–19 pandemic. 977 F. 3d,
at 780; see also 489 F. Supp. 3d, at 953–955. But those ever-
changing projections demonstrate that any harm attributable to
the injunction is at best uncertain, and, more likely, nonexistent.
This is especially true given that, until recently, the Bureau
sought an extension of the December 31 statutory deadline, and
Congress had made signifcant progress toward granting it. The
Bureau's abrupt shift in focus from achieving an accurate count
to meeting its deadline at all costs belies its newfound concern
for issuing its report by December 31. See New York v. Trump,
490 F. Supp. 3d 736, 742 (SDNY 2020) (“As [the Government]
admit[s], there is no magic to the deadline for the Secretary's
Section 141(b) report” to the President).
In contrast to the Government's unsupported claims of ir-
reparable harm, respondents will suffer substantial injury if
the Bureau is permitted to sacrifce accuracy for expediency.
As the District Court found, and the Ninth Circuit credited,
“[a]n inaccurate count would affect the distribution of federal
and state funding, the deployment of services, and the alloca-
tion of local resources.” 489 F. Supp. 3d, at 1001; 977 F. 3d,
at 780. The Government attempts to downplay that risk by
asserting that over 99 percent of households in 49 States are
already accounted for.
2
Reply Brief 6. But even a fraction
of a percent of the Nation's 140 million households amounts
to hundreds of thousands of people lef t uncounted. See
2
Although this claim bears signifcant weight for the Government's argu-
ment, the emergency posture of this case prevents this Court from properly
evaluating the claim's accuracy. For example, as the District Court found,
Government oversight bodies have repeatedly warned that accelerating the
census schedule “increases the risks to obtaining a complete and accurate
2020 Census.” 489 F. Supp. 3d, at 957–959. Yet the Government addresses
data quality concerns primarily in a footnote. Application for Stay 7–8, n. 3;
Reply Brief 6–7. Without more, the Government's bald assertion that its
collection efforts are 99 percent complete cannot support its request for ex-
traordinary relief.

ORDERS 999
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 13, 2020
ECF Doc. 81–1, ¶36 (ND Cal., Sept. 4, 2020). And signifcantly,
the
percentage of nonresponses is likely much higher among mar-
ginalized populations and in hard-to-count areas, such as rural
and tribal lands. Id., ¶12 (discussing the Bureau's plan to develop
“culturally relevant advertisements targeting hard-to-count com-
munities”); Response to Application 30. When governments allo-
cate resources using census data, those populations will dispropor-
tionately bear the burden of any inaccuracies. See Department
of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752, 767 (2019) (States
“show[ed] that if noncitizen households are undercounted by as
little as 2% . . . they will lose out on federal funds that are
distributed on the basis of state population”). It is thus unsur-
prising that, for the 2010 census, the Bureau continued its feld
operations for a full month after reaching the 99 percent threshold
that the Government now deems good enough. See Response to
Application 29–30 (citing Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
A. Jackson, 2010 Census Nonresponse Followup Operations As-
sessment Report 47 (2012)). The harms caused by rushing this
year's census count are irreparable. And respondents will suffer
their lasting impact for at least the next 10 years.
***
The Government has not satisfed its “especially heavy burden”
to justify a stay pending appeal of the lower court's injunction.
Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U. S. 1319, 1320
(1994) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers). Because the harms associ-
ated with an inaccurate census are avoidable and intolerable, I
respectfully dissent from the grant of stay.
No. 20M25. HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC,
et al. v. Renewable Fuels Assn. et al.; and
No. 20M27. Ammar I. v. Connecticut. Motions for leave to
fle petitions for writs of certiorari with supplemental appendixes
under seal granted.
No. 20M26. Lattisaw v. District of Columbia. Motion to
direct the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time
denied.
No. 20–5296. A. I. v. M. A. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.; and
No. 20–5381. Curtin v. Cortez. C. A. 11th Cir. Motions
of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.

1000 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 13, 2020 592 U. S.
Petitioners are allowed until November 3, 2020, within which to
pay
the docketing fees required by this Court's Rule 38(a).
No. 20–5674. In re Ward;
No. 20–5691. In re Berry;
No. 20–5731. In re Alford; and
No. 20–5761. In re Bogan. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 20–5374. In re Elansari; and
No. 20–5726. In re Johnson. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus denied.
No. 20–5236. In re Rope; and
No. 20–5575. In re Williams. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus and/or prohibition denied.
No. 20–5260. In re Findlay;
No. 20–5534. In re Blancas; and
No. 20–5673. In re Watkins. Petitions for writs of prohibi-
tion denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 19–1434. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., et al.;
No. 19–1452. Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al. v. Arthrex,
Inc., et al.; and
No. 19 –1458. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari in No. 19–1434 granted as to
Federal Circuit case No. 2018–2140, and certiorari in Nos. 19–
1452 and 19–1458 granted, all limited to Questions 1 and 2 as set
forth in the July 22, 2020, Memorandum for the United States.
Cases consolidated, and a total of one hour is allotted for oral
argument. Reported below: 941 F. 3d 1320.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1085. Deasey et al. v. Slater et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 17.
No. 19–1137. Tennessee, By and Through the Tennessee
General Assembly, et al. v. Department of State et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 931 F. 3d 499.
No. 19–1186. Baker, Director, South Carolina Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services v. Planned Parent-

ORDERS 1001
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 13, 2020
hood South Atlantic et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Repor
ted below: 941 F. 3d 687.
No. 19–1352. Western Oilelds Supply Co., dba Rain for
Rent v. Scalia, Secretary of Labor, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 584.
No. 19–1378. Phazzer Electronics, Inc. v. Taser Interna-
tional, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Repor ted
below: 773 Fed. Appx. 1092.
No. 19–1433. Stavely v. Norman et al. Sup. Ct. Utah.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1456. KK–PB Financial, LLC v. 160 Royal Palm,
LLC. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785
Fed. Appx. 829.
No. 19–8588. Donelson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 496.
No. 19–8831. Reid v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019 Ark. 363, 588 S. W. 3d 725.
No. 19–8903. Gibson v. Indiana; and
No. 19–8904. Gibson v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 133 N. E. 3d 673.
No. 20–5. Blumenthal et al. v. Trump, President of the
United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 949 F. 3d 14.
No. 20–10. Kollaritsch et al. v. Michigan State Univer-
sity Board of Trustees et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 613.
No. 20–102. Hadsell v. Baskin et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 97.
No. 20–114. Bufkin v. Scottrade, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 838.
No. 20–124. Fusco v. Mays, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–125. Iron Stone Real Estate Fund I, L. P., et al.
v. Ratner et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 212 A. 3d 70.

1002 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 13, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–131. Essity Hygiene and Health AB v. Cascades
C
anada ULC et al. (Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 638); and
Essity Professional Hygiene North America LLC v. Cas-
cades Canada ULC (811 Fed. Appx. 643). C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20 –135. Customedia Technologies, LLC v. Dish
Network Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 1041.
No. 20 –141. Bloomgarden v. National Archives and
Records Administration. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 674.
No. 20–144. Spencer Savings Bank, SLA, et al. v. Seid-
man. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–148. Washington et al. v. Barr, Attorney Gen-
eral, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–159. Devos v. Rhino Contracting, Inc., et al.
Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940 N. W.
2d 821.
No. 20–165. Carroll v. Miller. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 WI 56, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N. W.
2d 542.
No. 20–168. Nusbaum v. Nusbaum et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 243 Md. App. 653, 221 A.
3d 1107.
No. 20–172. Ukpai v. Continental Automotive Systems
US, Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–175. Jinil Steel Co., Ltd. v. ValuePart, Inc., et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed.
Appx. 143.
No. 20–178. Prafada v. Mesa Unified School District.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed.
Appx. 531.
No. 20–185. Jones v. Barbera, Chief Judge, Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1003
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 13, 2020
No. 20–196. Soriano Nunez v. Barr, Attorney General.
C
. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed.
Appx. 184.
No. 20–211. Rosen v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 92.
No. 20–223. O’Donnell v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–228. ESIP Series 2, LLC v. Puzhen Life USA, LLC.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d
1378.
No. 20–232. Anderson v. Kennedy. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–252. Gannett Co., Inc., et al. v. Larson. Sup. Ct.
Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940 N. W. 2d 120.
No. 20–280. Georgiou v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 136.
No. 20–302. Dotson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 317.
No. 20–313. Acer America Corp. et al. v. Intellisoft,
Ltd., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Reported
below: 955 F. 3d 927.
No. 20–327. BBB Industries, LLC v. Cardone Industries,
Inc. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–335. Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v.
Harford County, Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 468 Md. 339, 227 A. 3d 230.
No. 20–338. Benjamin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 1124.
No. 20–345. Pueschel v. Chao, Secretary of Transporta-
tion, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 955 F. 3d 163.
No. 20–346. Pennington v. Butler. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 694.

1004 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 13, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5060. Graves v. Shinn, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5089. Kirkpatrick v. Chappell, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 1118.
No. 20–5119. Powell v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 6th App. Dist.,
Lucas County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-Ohio-
4286, 148 N. E. 3d 51.
No. 20–5228. United States ex rel. Lu v. Samra et al.;
and United States ex rel. Lu v. Trustees of Tufts College
et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5237. Manhard v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 So. 3d 941.
No. 20–5254. Brown v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5256. Marron, aka Mu’min v. Clarke, Director,
Virginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 796.
No. 20–5261. Houston v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5266. Rogers et al. v. Caddo Parish School Board.
Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5269. Valls v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5270. Wilson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 3d 285.
No. 20–5271. Willingham v. Bauman, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5277. Thompson v. Houma Terrebonne Housing
Authority et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5282. Zorikova v. Realvest, Inc. Ct. App. Mo.,
Southern Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5288. Schuler v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 184.

ORDERS 1005
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 13, 2020
No. 20–5289. Sanderson v. Foley, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ohio.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 159 Ohio St. 3d 1432, 2020-
Ohio-3634, 148 N. E. 3d 573.
No. 20–5295. Atkins v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 814
Fed. Appx. 150.
No. 20–5297. Bridges v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st) 152604–U.
No. 20–5298. Smith v. Barker et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 332.
No. 20–5305. Smith v. New York State Child Support
Processing Center et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5307. Gallogly v. Barr, Attorney General, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed.
Appx. 250.
No. 20–5310. Franklin v. Blair. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 261.
No. 20–5313. Tucker v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181
App. Div. 3d 103, 117 N. Y. S. 3d 401.
No. 20 – 5314. Stubblefield v. Brown, Clerk, Circuit
Court of Illinois, Cook County, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 401.
No. 20–5316. Smith v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5318. Rozenman v. Shinn, Director, Arizona De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5322. Torrence v. Alaska. Ct. App. Alaska. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5328. Giblin v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 11 Wash. App. 2d 1015.
No. 20–5330. Aucoin v. Cupil et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 379.

1006 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 13, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5331. Bruzzone v. Intel Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5333. Blanco v. Diaz, Secretary, California De-
partment of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5350. Venable v. City of Phoenix, Arizona, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5352. Woodward v. Ali et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5354. Jordan v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5370. Guillen v. Washburn, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5371. Farmer v. Lebo, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5421. Downer v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5430. Meyers v. Jess, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5447. Wilson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5458. Martin-Sosa v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 351.
No. 20–5464. Banks v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 186.
No. 20–5476. Horton v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5477. Idada v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 132.
No. 20–5482. Sorro v. Brnovich, Attorney General of
Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1007
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 13, 2020
No. 20–5487. Adams v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5496. Ram v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5498. Silvia v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 139.
No. 20–5507. Landers v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 897.
No. 20–5508. Moran v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5510. Pernell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 101.
No. 20–5513. McWilliams v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 589.
No. 20–5519. Wanke v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (2d) 170373–U.
No. 20–5520. Williamson v. May, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5523. Jury v. Gray, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5524. Johnson v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App. Dist.,
Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-
Ohio-3670, 119 N. E. 3d 914.
No. 20–5530. Gordon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 471.
No. 20–5533. McNamara v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5535. Platt v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 804.
No. 20–5540. Sanders v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 365.
No. 20–5542. Kugler v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (3d) 180305, 145
N. E. 3d 690.

1008 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 13, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5543. Galindo-Caballero v. United States. C. A.
5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 299.
No. 20–5548. Hood v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 291.
No. 20–5549. Lopez-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 257.
No. 20–5552. Ohio ex rel. Kerr v. Kelsey, Judge. Sup.
Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 160 Ohio St. 3d
45, 2020-Ohio-1057, 153 N. E. 3d 42.
No. 20–5553. Lawrence v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5554. Eagle Chasing v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 965 F. 3d 647.
No. 20–5555. Edwards v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (5th) 180300–U.
No. 20–5560. Fechner v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 954.
No. 20–5561. Hunnicutt v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 551.
No. 20–5568. Alberto Castro v. United States. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5569. Garcia-Toro v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App.
Dist., Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
2019-Ohio-5336.
No. 20–5571. Pacheco v. Maine. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5572. Witkin v. Lotersztain et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 883.
No. 20– 5574. Luis Torres v. Luther, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5576. Williams v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 1007.

ORDERS 1009
592 U. S.
Oc
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No. 20–5577. Timbers v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 927.
No. 20–5580. Phillips v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 291 So. 3d 552.
No. 20–5586. Zamudio-Silva v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 527.
No. 20–5587. Love v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 406.
No. 20–5590. Chacon-Lara v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 322.
No. 20–5595. Box v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 1025.
No. 20–5596. Green v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5597. Swenson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 IL 124688.
No. 20–5599. Greenwell v. Saul, Commissioner of Social
Security. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
811 Fed. Appx. 368.
No. 20–5601. Grinder v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 145.
No. 20–5603. Glover v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 225 A. 3d 1137.
No. 20–5604. Isibor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 76.
No. 20–5606. Brown v. Ramirez. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5611. Buxton v. Shapiro, Attorney General of
Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5612. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 318.
No. 20–5614. Felton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 330.

1010 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 13, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5615. Gordon v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 315.
No. 20–5620. Soto-Barraza et al. v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5622. Starks v. United States District Court for
the Central District of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5623. Stefanyuk v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 761.
No. 20–5625. Williams v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5628. Corona-Verduzco v. United States. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 720.
No. 20–5635. Smith v. Warden, Federal Correctional In-
stitution Beaumont. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 272.
No. 20–5636. Figueroa v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 716.
No. 20–5637. Page v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5644. Limary v. Maine. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2020 ME 83, 235 A. 3d 860.
No. 20–5648. Guidry v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 676.
No. 20–5650. Cruz-Rivera v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 410.
No. 20–5652. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 444.
No. 20–5653. Espinoza Espinoza v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 246.
No. 20–5654. Acuna-Duenas v. United States (Reported
below: 799 Fed. Appx. 888); Bocanegra Lupian v. United

ORDERS 1011
592 U. S.
Oc
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States (808 Fed. Appx. 260); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. United
St
ates (802 Fed. Appx. 158); Jaramillo-Vasquez v. United
States (811 Fed. Appx. 904); Lopez-Barron v. United States
(805 Fed. Appx. 315); Ortuno-Olea v. United States (811 Fed.
Appx. 268); Madriz Sandoval v. United States (807 Fed. Appx.
398); and Valdez Rojas v. United States (799 Fed. Appx. 882).
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5655. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 268.
No. 20–5656. Ellis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 780.
No. 20–5658. Racioppi v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 153.
No. 20 – 5660. St. George v. Ransom, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5666. Mendoza v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 270.
No. 20–5668. Sundberg v. Oreol, Executive Director of
Patton State Hospital. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5669. George v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 1181.
No. 20–5670. Givins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 929.
No. 20–5681. Sumlin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 879.
No. 20–5685. Sanchez v. Silva et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5687. Bryant v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 712.
No. 20–5688. Berry v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 3d App. Dist.,
Franklin County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019-
Ohio-3902.
No. 20–5692. Wise v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 245.

1012 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 13, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5695. DuPree v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
D
ist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5704. Borden v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 599 Fed. Appx. 890.
No. 20–5706. Berg v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 1213.
No. 20–5709. Cole v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 291.
No. 20–5710. Coca-Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 285.
No. 20–5711. Smith-Garcia, fka Atwood v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed.
Appx. 822.
No. 20–5717. Bradner v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 450.
No. 20–5720. Garcia-Moreno v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 578.
No. 20–5721. Douprea v. Espinoza, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 410.
No. 20–5727. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5737. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 877.
No. 20–5743. Melendez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5744. Miller v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 131.
No. 20–5745. Monical v. Towers et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 540.
No. 20–5749. Hart v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 737.
No. 20–5756. Chen Xu v. City of New York, New York.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1013
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Oc
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No. 19–1057. Rodriguez et al. v. City of San Jose, Cali-
fornia,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Gun Owners of Califor-
nia et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 930 F. 3d 1123.
No. 19–1272. Retzlaff v. Van Dyke. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion
of 16 Media Organizations and Advocacy Groups for leave to fle
brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 781 Fed. Appx. 368.
No. 19–1280. Idaho Department of Correction et al. v.
Edmo. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935
F. 3d 757.
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.
I would hold that the case is moot and direct that the decision
below be vacated. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S.
36 (1950).
No. 19–1284. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software
Group USA, LLC. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 946 F. 3d 1040.
St atement of Justice Thomas respec ti ng the denia l of
certiorari.
This petition asks us to interpret a provision commonly called
§ 230, a federal law enacted in 1996 that gives Internet platforms
immunity from some civil and criminal claims. 47 U. S. C. § 230.
When Congress enacted the statute, most of today's major In-
ternet platforms did not exist. And in the 24 years since, we
have never interpreted this provision. But many courts have
construed the law broadly to confer sweeping immunity on some
of the largest companies in the world.
This case involves Enigma Software Group USA and Malware-
bytes, two competitors that provide software to enable individuals
to flter unwanted content, such as content posing security risks.
Enigma sued Malwarebytes, alleging that Malwarebytes engaged
in anticompetitive conduct by reconfguring its products to make
it diffcult for consumers to download and use Enigma products.
In its defense, Malwarebytes invoked a provision of § 230 that
states that a computer service provider cannot be held liable for
providing tools “to restrict access to . . . material” that it “considers

1014 OCTOBER
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Statement of Thomas, J. 592 U. S.
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, flthy, excessively violent, harass-
i
ng, or otherwise objectionable.” § 230(c)(2)(A). The Ninth Cir-
cuit relied heavily on the “policy” and “purpose” of § 230 to con-
clude that immunity is unavailable when a plaintiff alleges
anticompetitive conduct.
The decision is one of the few where courts have relied on
purpose and policy to deny immunity under § 230. But the court's
decision to stress purpose and policy is familiar. Courts have
long emphasized nontextual arguments when interpreting § 230,
leaving questionable precedent in their wake.
I agree with the Court's decision not to take up this case. I
write to explain why, in an appropriate case, we should consider
whether the text of this increasingly important statute aligns
with the current state of immunity enjoyed by Internet platforms.
I
Enacted at the dawn of the dot-com era, § 230 contains two
subsections that protect computer service providers from some
civil and criminal claims. The frst is defnitional. It states, “No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.” § 230(c)(1). This pro-
vision ensures that a company (like an e-mail provider) can host
and transmit third-party content without subjecting itself to the
liability that sometimes attaches to the publisher or speaker of
unlawful content. The second subsection provides direct immu-
nity from some civil liability. It states that no computer service
provider “shall be held liable” for (A) good-faith acts to restrict
access to, or remove, certain types of objectionable content; or
(B) giving consumers tools to flter the same types of content.
§ 230(c)(2). This limited protection enables companies to create
community guidelines and remove harmful content without worry-
ing about legal reprisal.
Congress enacted this statute against specifc background legal
principles. See Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 487
(2005) (interpreting a law by looking to the “backdrop against
which Congress” acted). Traditionally, laws governing illegal
content distinguished between publishers or speakers (like news-
papers) and distributors (like newsstands and libraries). Publish-
ers or speakers were subjected to a higher standard because they

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St
atement of Thomas, J.
exercised editorial control. They could be strictly liable for
t
ransmitting illegal content. But distributors were different.
They acted as a mere conduit without exercising editorial control,
and they often transmitted far more content than they could be
expected to review. Distributors were thus liable only when they
knew (or constructively knew) that content was illegal. See, e. g.,
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710,
*3 (Sup. Ct. NY, May 24, 1995); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 581 (1976); cf. Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 153 (1959)
(applying a similar principle outside the defamation context).
The year before Congress enacted § 230, one court blurred this
distinction. An early Internet company was sued for failing to
take down defamatory content posted by an unidentifed com-
menter on a message board. The company contended that it
merely distributed the defamatory statement. But the company
had also held itself out as a family-friendly service provider that
moderated and took down offensive content. The court deter-
mined that the company's decision to exercise editorial control
over some content “render[ed] it a publisher” even for content it
merely distributed. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, *3–*4.
Taken at face value, § 230(c) alters the Stratton Oakmont rule
in two respects. First, § 230(c)(1) indicates that an Internet pro-
vider does not become the publisher of a piece of third-party
content—and thus subjected to strict liability—simply by hosting
or distributing that content. Second, § 230(c)(2)(A) provides an
additional degree of immunity when companies take down or re-
strict access to objectionable content, so long as the company acts
in good faith. In short, the statute suggests that if a company
unknowingly leaves up illegal third-party content, it is protected
from publisher liability by § 230(c)(1); and if it takes down certain
third-party content in good faith, it is protected by § 230(c)(2)(A).
This modest understanding is a far cry from what has prevailed
in court. Adopting the too-common practice of reading extra im-
munity into statutes where it does not belong, see Baxter v. Bra-
cey, 590 U. S. 1011 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari), courts have relied on policy and purpose arguments
to grant sweeping protection to Internet platforms. E. g., 1
R. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 4:86, p. 4–380 (2d ed. 2019)
(“[C]ourts have extended the immunity in § 230 far beyond any-
thing that plausibly could have been intended by Congress); ac-

1016 OCTOBER
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Statement of Thomas, J. 592 U. S.
cord, Rustad & Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 Wash. L.
Re
v. 335, 342–343 (2005) (similar). I address several areas of
concern.
A
Courts have discarded the longstanding distinction between
“publisher” liability and “distributor” liability. Although the text
of § 230(c)(1) grants immunity only from “publisher” or “speaker”
liability, the frst appellate court to consider the statute held that
it eliminates distributor liability too—that is, § 230 confers immu-
nity even when a company distributes content that it knows is
illegal. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 331–334
(CA4 1997). In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed that
permitting distributor liability “would defeat the two primary
purposes of the statute,” namely, “immuniz[ing] service providers”
and encouraging “selfregulation.” Id., at 331, 334. And subse-
quent decisions, citing Zeran, have adopted this holding as a cate-
gorical rule across all contexts. See, e. g., Universal Communi-
cation Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F. 3d 413, 420 (CA1 2007);
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of NY, Inc., 17 N. Y. 3d 281, 288–
289, 952 N. E. 2d 1011, 1017 (2011); Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL
3813758, *18 (ED Tex., Dec. 27, 2006).
To be sure, recognizing some overlap between publishers and
distributors is not unheard of. Sources sometimes use language
that arguably blurs the distinction between publishers and dis-
tributors. One source respectively refers to them as “primary
publishers” and “secondary publishers or disseminators,” explain-
ing that distributors can be “charged with publication.” W. Kee-
ton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
Law of Torts 799, 803 (5th ed. 1984).
Yet there are good reasons to question this interpretation.
First, Congress expressly imposed distributor liability in the
very same Act that included § 230. Section 502 of the Communi-
cations Decency Act makes it a crime to “knowingly . . . display”
obscene material to children, even if a third party created that
content. 110 Stat. 133–134 (codifed at 47 U. S. C. § 223(d)). This
section is enforceable by civil remedy. 47 U. S. C. § 207. It is
odd to hold, as courts have, that Congress implicitly eliminated
distributor liability in the very Act in which Congress explicitly
imposed it.
Second, Congress enacted § 230 just one year after Stratton
Oakmont used the terms “publisher” and “distributor,” instead

ORDERS 1017
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atement of Thomas, J.
of “primary publisher” and “secondary publisher.” If, as courts
suggest,
Stratton Oakmont was the legal backdrop on which Con-
gress legislated, e. g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F. 3d 1187,
1195 (CA10 2009), one might expect Congress to use the same
terms Stratton Oakmont used.
Third, had Congress wanted to eliminate both publisher and
distributor liability, it could have simply created a categorical
immunity in § 230(c)(1): No provider “shall be held liable” for in-
formation provided by a third party. After all, it used that exact
categorical language in the very next subsection, which governs
removal of content. § 230(c)(2). Where Congress uses a particu-
lar phrase in one subsection and a different phrase in another, we
ordinarily presume that the difference is meaningful. Russello
v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983); cf. Doe v. America On-
line, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1025 (Fla. 2001) (Lewis, J., dissenting)
(relying on this rule to reject the interpretation that § 230 elimi-
nated distributor liability).
B
Courts have also departed from the most natural reading of the
text by giving Internet companies immunity for their own con-
tent. Section 230(c)(1) protects a company from publisher liabil-
ity only when content is “provided by another information content
provider.” (Emphasis added.) Nowhere does this provision pro-
tect a company that is itself the information content provider.
See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates
.Com, LLC, 521 F. 3d 1157, 1165 (CA9 2008). And an information
content provider is not just the primary author or creator; it
is anyone “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development” of the content. § 230(f )(3) (emphasis added).
But from the beginning, courts have held that § 230(c)(1) pro-
tects the “exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions—
such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
content.” E. g., Zeran, 129 F. 3d, at 330 (emphasis added); cf. id.,
at 332 (stating also that § 230(c)(1) protects the decision to “edit”).
Only later did courts wrestle with the language in § 230(f )(3) sug-
gesting providers are liable for content they help develop “in
part.” To harmonize that text with the interpretation that
§ 230(c)(1) protects “traditional editorial functions,” courts relied
on policy arguments to narrowly construe § 230(f )(3) to cover only
substantial or material edits and additions. E. g., Batzel v. Smith,
333 F. 3d 1018, 1031, and n. 18 (CA9 2003) (“[A] central purpose

1018 OCTOBER
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Statement of Thomas, J. 592 U. S.
of the Act was to protect from liability service providers and
users
who take some affrmative steps to edit the material
posted”).
Under this interpretation, a company can solicit thousands of
potentially defamatory statements, “selec[t] and edi[t] . . . for pub-
lication” several of those statements, add commentary, and then
feature the fnal product prominently over other submissions—all
while enjoying immunity. Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment
Recordings LLC, 755 F. 3d 398, 403, 410, 416 (CA6 2014) (inter-
preting “development” narrowly to “preserv[e] the broad immu-
nity th[at § 230] provides for website operators' exercise of tradi-
tional publisher functions”). To say that editing a statement and
adding commentary in this context does not “creat[e] or develo[p]”
the fnal product, even in part, is dubious.
C
The decisions that broadly interpret § 230(c)(1) to protect tradi-
tional publisher functions also eviscerated the narrower liability
shield Congress included in the statute. Section 230(c)(2)(A) en-
courages companies to create content guidelines and protects
those companies that “in good faith . . . restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, flthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable.” Taken together, both provisions in
§ 230(c) most naturally read to protect companies when they un-
knowingly decline to exercise editorial functions to edit or remove
third-party content, § 230(c)(1), and when they decide to exercise
those editorial functions in good faith, § 230(c)(2)(A).
But by construing § 230(c)(1) to protect any decision to edit or
remove content, Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F. 3d 1096, 1105 (CA9
2009), courts have curtailed the limits Congress placed on deci-
sions to remove content, see e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v.
Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2210029, *3 (MD Fla., Feb. 8, 2017) (reject-
ing the interpretation that § 230(c)(1) protects removal decisions
because it would “swallo[w] the more specifc immunity in (c)(2)”).
With no limits on an Internet company's discretion to take down
material, § 230 now apparently protects companies who racially
discriminate in removing content. Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Face-
book, Inc., 697 Fed. Appx. 526 (CA9 2017), aff'g 144 F. Supp. 3d
1088, 1094 (ND Cal. 2015) (concluding that “ `any activity that
can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that

ORDERS 1019
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St
atement of Thomas, J.
third parties seek to post online is perforce immune' ” under
§
230(c)(1)).
D
Courts also have extended § 230 to protect companies from a
broad array of traditional product-defect claims. In one case,
for example, several victims of human traffcking alleged that an
Internet company that allowed users to post classifed ads for
“Escorts” deliberately structured its website to facilitate illegal
human traffcking. Among other things, the company “tailored
its posting requirements to make sex traffcking easier,” accepted
anonymous payments, failed to verify e-mails, and stripped meta-
data from photographs to make crimes harder to track. Jane
Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F. 3d 12, 16–21 (CA1 2016).
Bound by precedent creating a “capacious conception of what it
means to treat a website operator as the publisher or speaker,”
the court held that § 230 protected these website design decisions
and thus barred these claims. Id., at 19; see also M. A. v. Village
Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1048 (ED
Mo. 2011).
Consider also a recent decision granting full immunity to a
company for recommending content by terrorists. Force v. Face-
book, Inc., 934 F. 3d 53, 65 (CA2 2019), cert. denied, 590 U. S. 942
(2020). The court frst pressed the policy argument that, to pur-
sue “Congress's objectives, . . . the text of Section 230(c)(1) should
be construed broadly in favor of immunity.” 934 F. 3d, at 64. It
then granted immunity, reasoning that recommending content “is
an essential result of publishing.” Id., at 66. Unconvinced, the
dissent noted that, even if all publisher conduct is protected by
§ 230(c)(1), it “strains the English language to say that in target-
ing and recommending these writings to users . . . Facebook is
acting as `the publisher of . . . information provided by another
information content provider.' ” Id., at 76–77 (Katzmann, C. J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting § 230(c)(1)).
Other examples abound. One court granted immunity on a
design-defect claim concerning a dating application that allegedly
lacked basic safety features to prevent harassment and imperson-
ation. Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 Fed. Appx. 586, 591 (CA2
2019), cert. denied, 589 U. S. 977 (2019). Another granted immu-
nity on a claim that a social media company defectively designed
its product by creating a feature that encouraged reckless driving.

1020 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 13, 2020 592 U. S.
Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1107, 1113 (CD
Ca
l. 2020).
A common thread through all these cases is that the plaintiffs
were not necessarily trying to hold the defendants liable “as the
publisher or speaker” of third-party content. § 230(c)(1). Nor
did their claims seek to hold defendants liable for removing con-
tent in good faith. § 230(c)(2). Their claims rested instead on
alleged product design faws—that is, the defendant's own miscon-
duct. Cf. Accusearch, 570 F. 3d, at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concur-
ring) (stating that § 230 should not apply when the plaintiff sues
over a defendant's “conduct rather than for the content of the
information”). Yet courts, fltering their decisions through the
policy argument that “Section 230(c)(1) should be construed
broadly,” Force, 934 F. 3d, at 64, give defendants immunity.
II
Paring back the sweeping immunity courts have read into § 230
would not necessarily render defendants liable for online miscon-
duct. It simply would give plaintiffs a chance to raise their
claims in the frst place. Plaintiffs still must prove the merits of
their cases, and some claims will undoubtedly fail. Moreover,
States and the Federal Government are free to update their liabil-
ity laws to make them more appropriate for an Internet-driven
society.
Extending § 230 immunity beyond the natural reading of the
text can have serious consequences. Before giving companies im-
munity from civil claims for “knowingly host[ing] illegal child
pornography,” Bates, 2006 WL 3813758, *1, or for race discrimina-
tion, Sikhs for Justice, 697 Fed. Appx., at 526, we should be
certain that is what the law demands.
Without the beneft of briefng on the merits, we need not
decide today the correct interpretation of § 230. But in an appro-
priate case, it behooves us to do so.
No. 19–1291. Hamner v. Burls, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Motion of Federal Corrections Directors for leave to fle
brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 937 F. 3d 1171.
No. 20 –100. Barth v. Bernards Township Planning
Board et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition.

ORDERS 1021
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Oc
tober 13, 2020
No. 20–154. Byzon et al. v. PNC Bank, N. A., Successor by
Merger
to National City Bank. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of this petition. Reported below: 221 A. 3d 1272.
No. 20–227. Madej et al. v. Maiden, Athens County Engi-
neer. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of Disability Rights Organizations
for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 951 F. 3d 364.
No. 20–259. Minhnga Nguyen v. Boeing Co. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 809 Fed.
Appx. 380.
No. 20–318. Equal Means Equal et al. v. Ferriero, Ar-
chivist of the United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari be-
fore judgment denied.
No. 20–5332. Bush v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari before judgment denied.
No. 20–5564. Akel v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx.
1002.
No. 20–5583. Crosby v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 814 Fed.
Appx. 431.
No. 20–5661. Shelton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–8246. Thomas v. Corbett et al., 590 U. S. 994. Peti-
tion for rehearing denied.
No. 19–1004. Jaffe v. Sherman, United States Congress-
man, 590 U. S. 905; and
No. 19–7624. Shaw v. United States, 589 U. S. 1286. Mo-
tions for leave to fle petitions for rehearing denied.

1022 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 16, 19, 2020 592 U. S.
October 16, 2020
Probabl
e Jurisdiction Postponed
No. 20 – 366. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. New York et al. Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y.
Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to
hearing of case on the merits. Case is set for argument on Mon-
day, November 30, 2020. Appellants' brief on the merits, and any
amicus curiae briefs in support of appellants or in support of
neither party, shall be fled on or before Friday, October 30, 2020.
Appellees' briefs on the merits, and any amicus curiae briefs in
support of appellees, shall be fled on or before Monday, November
16, 2020. Reply brief shall be fled by 2 p.m., Monday, November
23, 2020.
October 19, 2020
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–5451. Tyler v. North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Re-
ported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 139.
No. 20–5480. Ball v. Doe et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See th is Cour t's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 790 Fed. Appx. 223.
No. 20–5497. Simpson v. Court of Common Pleas of Ohio,
Hamilton County, et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion of petitioner
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari
dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported below: 158
Ohio St. 3d 1509, 2020-Ohio-2815, 144 N. E. 3d 459.
No. 20–5659. Robles v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 527.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A53. Scarnati et al. v. Boockvar, Secretary of
Pennsylvania, et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Application for stay, pre-
sented to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court, de-

ORDERS 1023
592 U. S.
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tober 19, 2020
nied. Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, and
Justice
Kavanaugh would grant the application.
No. 20A54. Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boock-
var, Secretary of Pennsylvania, et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Appli-
cation for stay, presented to Justice Alito, and by him referred
to the Court, denied. Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice
Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh would grant the application.
No. 20M28. Marcus v. Marcus;
No. 20M29. Warren v. Kennection Installation, LLC,
et al.;
No. 20M30. Sykes v. New York State Ofce of Children
and Family Services et al.;
No. 20M31. Stringer v. Lincoln County Jail et al.; and
No. 20M32. Rose v. Department of Justice. Motions to
direct the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of
time denied.
No. 19–5807. Edwards v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 590 U. S. 929.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor
General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus cu-
riae and for divided argument granted.
No. 20 – 28. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP et al. v.
Laurent, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Simi-
larly Situated, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. The Acting Solicitor
General is invited to fle a brief in this case expressing the views
of the United States.
No. 20–5532. Golden v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.; and
No. 20–5539. Rumzis v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until
November 9, 2020, within which to pay the docketing fees re-
quired by this Court's Rule 38(a).
No. 20–5837. In re Oberwise. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 20–5365. In re N’Jai; and
No. 20–5367. In re Mohammed. Petitions for writs of man-
damus denied.
No. 20–5406. In re Mohammed. Petition for writ of manda-
mus and/or prohibition denied.

1024 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 19, 2020 592 U. S.
Certiorari Granted
N
o. 19–1212. Wolf, Acting Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity, et al. v. Innovation Law Lab et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 1073.
No. 20–18. Lange v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari granted.
No. 20–138. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Sierra Club et al.; and Trump, President of the
United States, et al. v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 874 (frst judg-
ment) and 926 (second judgment).
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1260. Demma v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 722.
No. 19–1323. B. E. Technology, L. L. C. v. Facebook, Inc.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940 F. 3d
675.
No. 19–1357. Angel Perez v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8832. Van Der End v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 98.
No. 20–22. Bhai, aka Virani, et al. v. Barr, Attorney
General. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
799 Fed. Appx. 269.
No. 20–39. AVIC International Holding Corp. et al. v.
Soaring Wind Energy, L. L. C., et al.; and
No. 20 – 40. CATIC USA Inc. v. Soaring Wind Energy,
L. L. C., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 946 F. 3d 742.
No. 20–147. Brown v. U. S. Bank N. A. et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 732.
No. 20–149. Uzamere v. New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–151. Blessett v. Garcia. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 945.

ORDERS 1025
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 19, 2020
No. 20–152. Wullschleger et al. v. Royal Canin U. S. A.,
Inc.,
et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
953 F. 3d 519.
No. 20–156. Connors v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–161. City of Sacramento, California, et al. v.
Mann et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 803 Fed. Appx. 142.
No. 20–164. Johnson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 291 So. 3d 1233.
No. 20–170. Han v. Hankook Tire Co., Ltd. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 347.
No. 20–180. George v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–182. Stanback et al. v. Humphrey, as Parent and
Legal Guardian of Minor Child, O. H., et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 395.
No. 20–184. Ellerbee v. Annett Holdings, Inc., dba TMC
Transportation, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 188.
No. 20–192. Serane v. Crump et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 234.
No. 20–194. Cox v. Texas Workforce Commission et al.
Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–212. Canuto v. Pelosi et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–215. Bernholz v. Internal Revenue Service.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed.
Appx. 45.
No. 20–224. Pitch, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Pitch, et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 1226.
No. 20–230. Baker v. Iancu, Director, United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Ofce, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 552.

1026 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 19, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–233. Hmong 2 et al. v. United States et al. C. A.
9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 508.
No. 20–258. Medina v. Federal Aviation Administration.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–274. Bueno v. United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 651.
No. 20–279. Torres, aka Torres Medina v. Barr, Attor-
ney General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 793 Fed. Appx. 572.
No. 20–295. Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. v. Food
and Drug Administration et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 936 F. 3d 1341.
No. 20–311. Walton v. First Merchant’s Bank. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 450.
No. 20–368. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 214.
No. 20–376. DNF Associates, LLC v. McAdory. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 1089.
No. 20–387. Howard v. DeFrates et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 376.
No. 20–5072. Newberry v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 288 So. 3d 1040.
No. 20–5087. Napa Moreira v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 702.
No. 20–5263. Schroeder v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 305 Neb. 527, 941 N. W. 2d 445.
No. 20–5368. Oyibo v. Huntington Hospital et al. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5378. Styers v. Shinn, Director, Arizona Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5383. Grigsby v. Neven, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1027
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 19, 2020
No. 20–5384. Grant v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5386. Hawkins v. Morgan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5387. Augustin v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5397. Banks v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5399. Latimer, aka Smith v. Jones et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 241.
No. 20–5413. English v. Gentry, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5414. Lewis v. Seventh Circuit Court, South Da-
kota Unied Judicial System, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 464.
No. 20–5419. Dyer v. Smith, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5420. Suarez Clark v. Republic of Peru. C. A.
D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx.
797.
No. 20–5425. Gamble v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 179
App. Div. 3d 580, 117 N. Y. S. 3d 580.
No. 20–5426. Moss v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5438. Robinson v. Geisinger Hospital et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 670.
No. 20–5443. Rondeau v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 139 N. E. 3d 749.
No. 20–5448. Williams v. Pollard, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5449. Dawson v. Pakenham. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.

1028 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 19, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5456. Robertson v. Pace et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 955.
No. 20–5460. Calvin v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5463. Rogers v. Skipper, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 500.
No. 20–5491. M. C. v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 N. E. 3d 453.
No. 20–5494. Snow v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 137 N. E. 3d 965.
No. 20–5503. Martin v. Nicholson. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5504. Martin v. Capron et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5506. Lopez v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 N. E. 3d 73.
No. 20–5514. Nelson v. Brown, Acting Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5525. Bailey v. United States et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5528. Romero v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 Cal. App.
5th 381, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 537.
No. 20–5536. McKinney v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2019–01569 (La. 5/26/20), 296
So. 3d 1011.
No. 20–5544. Jackson v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808
Fed. Appx. 383.
No. 20–5546. Carryl v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5585. Nikolla v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 51.

ORDERS 1029
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 19, 2020
No. 20–5613. Smith v. Nagy, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 192.
No. 20–5630. Thacker v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20 – 5647. Moynihan v. Inch, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5676. Venegas v. Rewerts, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5690. Loff v. Brnovich, Attorney General of Ari-
zona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5707. Reeves v. Esper, Secretary of Defense,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5714. Koshmider v. Lesatz, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5719. Cruz v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5730. Butler v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 311.
No. 20–5738. Washington v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 332.
No. 20–5739. Rothenberg v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 771.
No. 20–5740. Mahan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 292.
No. 20–5741. Sanchez-Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 319.
No. 20 – 5751. Fernandez-de Campa v. United States.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed.
Appx. 743.
No. 20–5752. Faulkner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

1030 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 19, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5753. Redd v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 20–5757. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5759. Williamson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5770. Bridgewater v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5783. Lee v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5785. Cook v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5791. Anthony Moreno v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5793. Zendejas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5794. Wilbert v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5816. Acevedo-Lemus v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1298. Rogers County Board of Tax Roll Correc-
tions et al. v. Video Gaming Technologies, Inc. Sup. Ct.
Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 OK 83, 475
P. 3d 824.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
Earlier this year, the Court “disregard[ed] the `well settled'
approach required by our precedents” and transformed half of
Oklahoma into tribal land. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U. S.
894, 939 (2020) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). That decision “pro-
foundly destabilized the governance of eastern Oklahoma” and
“create[d] signifcant uncertainty” about basic government func-
tions like “taxation.” Id., at 938. The least we could do now is
mitigate some of that uncertainty.
This case presents a square confict on an important question:
Does federal law silently pre-empt state laws assessing taxes on

ORDERS 1031
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 19, 2020
ownership of electronic gambling equipment when that equipment
is
located on tribal land but owned by non-Indians? Here, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court said yes. But a few years earlier, the
Second Circuit said no. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Ledyard,
722 F. 3d 457 (2013). This disagreement alone merits review.
“[T]axes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt and
certain availability an imperious need.” Bull v. United States,
295 U. S. 247, 259 (1935). By enjoining a tax on ownership of
property, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has disrupted funding for
schools, health departments, and law enforcement. And although
this case concerns only electronic gambling equipment, it injects
uncertainty about whether state and local governments can tax
the ownership of many other kinds of property located on millions
of acres of now-tribal land. The sooner localities in Oklahoma
receive a clear answer, the sooner they can plan accordingly and
avoid serious funding shortfalls.
This case also presents an opportunity to clear up tension
among courts about how to apply pre-emption principles at the
intersection of federal law, state law, and tribal land. This Court
has created a “fexible” test for evaluating whether federal law
implicitly pre-empts state taxation of non-Indians on tribal land.
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163, 176 (1989).
But our “fexible” test has provided little guidance other than that
courts should balance federal, tribal, and state interests. White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142, 144–145
(1980). This vague test is no prescription for the “certain avail-
ability” of tax revenue. Bull, 295 U. S., at 259.
Because the Court declines to take up this case, geographical
happenstance will continue to play an outsized role in a State's
ability to raise revenues, and pre-emption law will remain amor-
phous. “The State of Oklahoma deserves more respect under our
Constitution's federal system” than we give it today. McGirt,
591 U. S., at 796 (Thomas, J., dissenting). I respectfully dissent
from the Court's decision to deny certiorari.
No. 19–1301. Bovat v. Vermont. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019 VT 81, 224 A. 3d 103.
Statement of Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Soto-
mayor and Justice Kagan join, respecting the denial of certiorari.
The “knock and talk” is an increasingly popular law enforce-
ment tool, and it's easy to see why. All an offcer has to do is

1032 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Statement of Gorsuch, J. 592 U. S.
approach a home's front door, knock, and win the homeowner's
consent
to a search. Because everything is done with permission,
there's usually no need to bother with a warrant, or worry
whether exigent circumstances might forgive one's absence.
After all, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches, and consensual searches are rarely that.
But with the rise of the knock and talk have come more and
more cases testing the boundaries of the consent on which they
depend. Sometimes, offcers appear with overbearing force or
otherwise seek to suggest that a homeowner has no choice but to
cooperate. Other times, offcers fail to head directly to the front
door to speak with the homeowner, choosing to wander the prop-
erty frst to search for whatever they can fnd.
This Court addressed the second sort of problem in Florida v.
Jardines, 569 U. S. 1 (2013). There, the Court recognized that a
home's “curtilage,” the area immediately surrounding it, is pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment much like the home itself. Id.,
at 6. So, to comply with the Constitution, law enforcement
agents not only need a warrant, exigent circumstances, or consent
to enter a home, they usually need one of those things to reach
the home's front door in the frst place. After surveying the
Fourth Amendment's original meaning and history, Jardines ac-
knowledged that a doorbell or knocker on the front door often
signals a homeowner's consent allowing visitors to “approach the
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefy to be re-
ceived, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” Id.,
at 8. The Court recognized, too, that law enforcement agents,
like everyone else, may take up this “implied license” to approach.
But, the Court stressed, offcers may not abuse the limited scope
of this license by snooping around the premises on their way
to the front door. Whether done by a private person or a law
enforcement agent, that kind of conduct is an unlawful trespass—
and, when conducted by the government, it amounts to an unrea-
sonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On this
much, the Court unanimously agreed. See id., at 19 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“A visitor cannot traipse through the garden, meander
into the backyard, or take other circuitous detours that veer from
the pathway that a visitor would customarily use”); id., at 20
(“The license is limited to the amount of time it would customarily
take to approach the door, pause long enough to see if someone
is home, and (if not expressly invited to stay longer) leave”).

ORDERS 1033
1031
St
atement of Gorsuch, J.
It's hard to see how the case before us could have been decided
w
ithout reference to Jardines. Suspecting Clyde Bovat of unlaw-
fully hunting a deer at night (Vermont calls it a “deer jacking ”),
game wardens decided to pay him a visit to—in their words—
“investigate further.” But the wardens admit that “pretty soon
after arriving ” they focused on a window in Mr. Bovat's detached
garage. Heading there and peering inside, the wardens spotted
what they thought could be deer hair on the tailgate of a
parked truck.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a.
Nor, apparently, was this detour a brief one. According to
Mr. Bovat's wife, the wardens lingered on the property for per-
haps ffteen minutes and never even made it to the front door.
Instead, after watching from inside, she fnally decided to go out
to speak with the wardens—and it was only then they fnally
sought consent for a search. Mrs. Bovat refused the request, but
by that point, of course, the whole exercise of seeking consent
was pointless—the wardens had all they needed, forget about any
knock or talk. They left the property only to return promptly
with a search warrant premised on what they had seen through
the garage window.
For reasons that remain unclear, the Vermont Supreme Court
analyzed the propriety of the wardens' conduct without mention-
ing Jardines. Instead, the court held that the offcers' initial visit
and search of the property was perfectly appropriate in light of
the “plain view” doctrine—the commonsense principle that the
Fourth Amendment doesn't normally require an offcer to ignore

1034 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Statement of Gorsuch, J. 592 U. S.
what he sees lying before him. But that doctrine applies only
when
an offcer fnds himself in a place he is lawfully permitted
to occupy. No one, after all, thinks an offcer can unlawfully
break into a home, witness illegal activity, and then claim the
beneft of the plain view doctrine. So, in an effort to suggest the
wardens' lingering at the garage window was lawful, the Vermont
Supreme Court proceeded to cite one of its pre-Jardines cases for
the notion that driveways constitute “semiprivate areas” within
the curtilage, and “ `observations made from such' ” areas “ `are
not covered by the Fourth Amendment.' ” 2019 VT 81, ¶18, 211
Vt. 301, 308, 224 A. 3d 103, 108 (quoting State v. Pike, 143 Vt.
283, 288, 465 A. 2d 1348, 1351 (1983)). The upshot? Under the
court's logic, it seems, an offcer who keeps ten toes in a home's
driveway may stay and search just as he pleases.
None of this is easy to square with Jardines, and that case's
teachings almost certainly required a different result. Maybe a
court could have discredited Mrs. Bovat's testimony about how
long the wardens wandered around the garage. Maybe a court
could have attempted to offer some explanation why items view-
able only through a garage window were within the “plain view”
of visitors proceeding directly and without delay from the street
to the front door. But it seems a good deal more likely that any
court applying Jardines would have agreed with Chief Justice
Reiber, who explained in dissent that the wardens exceeded the
scope of their implied license to approach the front door by head-
ing to the garage and spending so much time peering through its
window. As Chief Justice Reiber noted, Jardines plainly held
that the home's curtilage and observations made anywhere within
its bounds are covered by the Fourth Amendment; no exceptions.
And the Fourth Amendment hardly tolerates the sort of meander-
ing search that took place here. The wardens violated the Con-
stitution, and the warrant they received premised on the fruits of
their unlawful search was thus tainted.
Despite the Vermont Supreme Court's error, I acknowledge
that understandable reasons exist for my colleagues' decision to
let this case go. For one, it is unclear whether Jardines's mes-
sage about the protections due a home's curtilage has so badly
eluded other state or federal courts. For another, there might
be reason to hope that, while Vermont missed Jardines in one
deer-jacking case, its oversight will prove a stray mistake. But
however all that may be, the error here remains worth highlight-

ORDERS 1035
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 19, 21, 2020
ing to ensure it does not recur. Under Jardines, there exist no
“semipr
ivate areas” within the curtilage where governmental
agents may roam from edge to edge. Nor does Jardines afford
offcers a ffteen-minute grace period to run around collecting as
much evidence as possible before the clock runs out or the home-
owner intervenes. The Constitution's historic protections for the
sanctity of the home and its surroundings demand more respect
from us all than was displayed here.
No. 20–153. Blessett v. Ofce of the Attorney General
of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.
No. 20–241. Jordan v. Department of Labor. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 20–5565. Weidrick v. Trump, President of the United
States, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari before judgment
denied.
No. 20–5755. Jones v. Google LLC. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–8232. Jackson v. Mississippi, 590 U. S. 963;
No. 19–8279. LaGasse v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, 590 U. S. 963;
No. 19–8280. Jaime Jimenez v. Davis, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 591 U. S. 1005;
No. 19–8348. Kehano v. Harrington, Warden, et al., 591
U. S. 1019; and
No. 19–8357. Lout v. Montana, 591 U. S. 1019. Petitions for
rehearing denied.
October 21, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A67. Merrill, Alabama Secretary of State, et al.
v. People First of Alabama et al. D. C. N. D. Ala. Applica-
tion for stay, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred
to the Court, granted, and the District Court's September 30,

1036 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 21, 2020 592 U. S.
2020, order granting permanent injunction is stayed pending dis-
positi
on of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit and disposition of the petition for writ of
certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for
writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automati-
cally. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted,
the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment
of this Court.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer and Justice
Kagan join, dissenting.
This stay application arises from the Alabama secretary of
state's decision to ban curbside voting despite the ongoing
COVID–19 crisis and the willingness of certain Alabama counties
to assist voters with disabilities. Following a lengthy trial and
resting on an extensive record, the District Court found, among
other things, that the secretary's ban violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) by forcing voters with disabilities, for
whom COVID–19 is disproportionately likely to be fatal, to risk
unnecessary exposure to the virus if they wish to vote in person.
The District Court enjoined the secretary's ban, thus allowing
counties that are ready to adopt curbside voting to do so. I
would not upset the District Court's record-based, reasoned, and
narrowly tailored judgment, which the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit let stand.
1
The severity of the COVID–19 pandemic should, by now, need
no elaborati on. As of October 20, 2020, Alabama's Depar t-
ment of Public Health has identifed 174,528 cases of COVID–19
i n the St ate, leadi ng to 19,801 hospit a l i zati ons and 2,805
deaths.
2
Those fgures include about 37,000 new cases and 400
more deaths since the District Court issued its fndings of fact
less than a month ago. See 491 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1093 (ND
Ala. 2020). COVID–19 presents par ticu lar ly ser i ous r isks
for those w ith chronic medica l conditi ons. As Alabama
1
The District Court also held that the ban on curbside voting violates
the plaintiffs' fundamental right to vote under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Because I believe the injunction was appropriate under the
ADA, I do not address the constitutional issues.
2
Alabama Dept. of Public Health, Characteristics of COVID–19 Cases
(Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.alabamapublichealth.gov/covid19/assets/cov-al-
cases-102020.pdf.

ORDERS 1037
1035
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
State Health Offcer Dr. Scott Harris warned, “ `[c]hronic disease
fac
tors are a real risk for dying from this disease, and chronic
diseases are found in about a third of our citizens.' ” Id., at 1096.
Over 95 percent of Alabamians who have died from COVID–19
had underlying health conditions that made them especially vul-
nerable to that virus. Ibid.
To combat the spread of COVID–19, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention recommend that States consider curbside
voting, that is, permit voters to vote from their car by handing
their ballot to a poll worker. Id., at 1130. This is no radical
recommendation: The Department of Justice has sanctioned curb-
side voting as a remedy to ADA violations, see Dept. of Justice,
Project Civic Access Fact Sheet, https://www.ada.gov/civicfac.htm,
and some 28 States and the District of Columbia already permit
curbside voting, see App. to Brief for American Diabetes Associa-
tion et al. as Amici Curiae 1–3. The Alabama secretary of state,
however, has prohibited counties from offering curbside voting,
even for voters with disabilities for whom COVID–19 is dispro-
portionately likely to be fatal. If those vulnerable voters wish
to vote in person, they must wait inside, for as long as it takes,
in a crowd of fellow voters whom Alabama does not require to
wear face coverings. See 491 F. Supp. 3d, at 1100–1101.
On May 1, 2020, several at-risk Alabama voters and associated
organizations sued to enjoin that ban, along with other restrictive
voting laws not at issue here. The District Court expedited dis-
covery and held a trial from September 8 to 18. Id., at 1092.
Based on the trial evidence, the District Court concluded, in rele-
vant part, that the secretary's ban on curbside voting violated the
ADA and that a policy allowing, but not requiring, counties to
implement curbside voting was a reasonable accommodation.
The Eleventh Circuit upheld that portion of the District Court's
injunction. See People First of Ala. v. Secretary of State for
Ala., 2020 WL 6074333, *1 (CA11, Oct. 13, 2020). The secretary,
among others, now seeks a stay of that decision.
I would deny the stay. The secretary has not shown any legal
error below. We should not substitute the District Court's rea-
sonable, record-based fndings of fact with our own intuitions
about the risks of traditional in-person voting during this pan-
demic or the ability of willing local offcials to implement adequate
curbside voting procedures.

1038 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
The District Court for good reason found that the secretary's
ban
deprives disabled voters of the equally effective “opportunity
to participate in” the “beneft” of in-person voting. 28 CFR
§ 35.130(b)(1)(ii) (2019). The secretary does not meaningfully dis-
pute that the plaintiffs have disabilities, that COVID–19 is dispro-
portionately likely to be fatal to these plaintiffs, and that tradi-
tional in-person voting will meaningfully increase their risk of
exposure. He argues only that the relevant “beneft” under the
ADA is voting generally, not in-person voting specifcally, and
that absentee voting ensures access to that beneft. But under
the ADA, “[t]he beneft itself . . . cannot be defned in a way that
effectively denies otherwise qualifed handicapped individuals the
meaningful access to which they are entitled.” Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 301 (1985). In-person voters receive assist-
ance from poll workers; need no witnesses, notaries, or copies of
their photo IDs, as Alabama law requires for absentee ballots;
and know their ballot will not arrive too late or be rejected for
failure to comply with absentee ballots' many requirements.
491 F. Supp. 3d, at 1159. Absentee and in-person voting are
different benefts, and voters with disabilities are entitled to equal
access to both.
The District Court's modest injunction is a reasonable accom-
modation, given the short time before the election. It does not
require all counties to adopt curbside voting; it simply gives pre-
pared counties the option to do so. This remedy respects both
the right of voters with disabilities to vote safely and the State's
interest in orderly elections. The District Court's compromise
likewise does not risk creating “voter confusion and consequent
incentive to remain away from the polls.” Purcell v. Gonzalez,
549 U. S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam). The injunction lifts burden-
some requirements rather than imposing them, and permits
county offcials to help educate voters about whether curbside
voting is available in their county. See 491 F. Supp. 3d, at 1141.
Moreover, the injunction neither invalidates state law nor prohib-
its the secretary from issuing guidance consistent with the Dis-
trict Court's ruling. Id., at 1142–1143, 1162–1163.
Plaintiff Howard Porter, Jr., a Black man in his seventies with
asthma and Parkinson's Disease, told the District Court: “ `[S]o
many of my [ancestors] even died to vote. And while I don't
mind dying to vote, I think we're past that—we're past that
time.' ” Id., at 1104, 1109. Election offcials in at least Montgom-

ORDERS 1039
592
U. S. October 21, 26, 2020
ery and Jefferson Counties agree. They are ready and willing to
help
vulnerable voters like Mr. Porter cast their ballots without
unnecessarily risking infection from a deadly virus. This Court
should not stand in their way. I respectfully dissent.
October 26, 2020
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A64. Swenson et al. v. Wisconsin State Legisla-
ture et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Application to vacate stay, pre-
sented to Justice Kavanaugh, and by him referred to the
Court, denied.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Justice So-
tomayor join, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Democratic National Com-
mittee v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 592 U. S. 1039, 1056
(2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate
stay).
No. 20A65. Gear et al. v. Wisconsin State Legislature
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Application to vacate stay, presented to
Justice Kavanaugh, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
No. 20A66. Democratic National Committee et al. v. Wis-
consin State Legislature et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Application
to vacate stay, presented to Justice Kavanaugh, and by him
referred to the Court, denied.
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring.
In this case, as in several this Court has recently addressed, a
District Court intervened in the thick of election season to enjoin
enforcement of a State's laws. Because I believe this interven-
tion was improper, I agree with the decision of the Seventh Cir-
cuit to stay the injunction pending appeal. I write separately to
note that this case presents different issues than the applications
this Court recently denied in Scarnati v. Boockvar, 592 U. S. 1022
(2020), and Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boockvar, 592
U. S. 1023 (2020). While the Pennsylvania applications implicated
the authority of state courts to apply their own constitutions to elec-
tion regulations, this case involves federal intrusion on state law-
making processes. Different bodies of law and different precedents
govern these two situations and require, in these particular circum-

1040 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Gorsuch, J., concurring 592 U. S.
stances, that we allow the modifcation of election rules in Penn-
sylvania
but not Wisconsin.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Kavanaugh joins,
concurring.
Weeks before a national election, a Federal District Judge de-
creed that Wisconsin law violates the Constitution by requiring
absentee voters to return their ballots no later than election day.
The court issued its ruling even though over 30 States have long
enforced the very same absentee voting deadline—and for under-
standable reasons: Elections must end sometime, a single dead-
line supplies clear notice, and requiring ballots be in by election
day puts all voters on the same footing. “Common sense, as well
as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government
must play an active role in structuring elections,” and States have
always required voters “to act in a timely fashion if they wish to
express their views in the voting booth.” Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U. S. 428, 433, 438 (1992).
Why did the district court seek to scuttle such a long-settled
tradition in this area? COVID. Because of the current pan-
demic, the court suggested, it was free to substitute its own elec-
tion deadline for the State's. Never mind that, in response to the
pandemic, the Wisconsin Elections Commission decided to mail
registered voters an absentee ballot application and return enve-
lope over the summer, so no one had to ask for one. Never mind
that voters have also been free to seek and return absentee bal-
lots since September. Never mind that voters may return their
ballots not only by mail but also by bringing them to a county
clerk's offce, or various “no touch” drop boxes staged locally, or
certain polling places on election day. Never mind that those
unable to vote on election day have still other options in Wiscon-
sin, like voting in-person during a 2-week voting period before
election day. And never mind that the court itself found the
pandemic posed an insuffcient threat to the health and safety
of voters to justify revamping the State's in-person election
procedures.
So it's indisputable that Wisconsin has made considerable ef-
forts to accommodate early voting and respond to COVID. The
district court's only possible complaint is that the State hasn't
done enough. But how much is enough? If Wisconsin's statu-
tory absentee voting deadline can be discarded on the strength of

ORDERS 1041
1039
Gorsuch,
J., concurring
the State's status as a COVID “hotspot,” what about the identical
deadl
ines in 30 other States? How much of a “hotspot” must a
State (or maybe some sliver of it) be before judges get to impro-
vise? Then there's the question what these new ad hoc deadlines
should be. The judge in this case tacked 6 days onto the State's
election deadline, but what about 3 or 7 or 10, and what's to stop
different judges choosing (as they surely would) different dead-
lines in different jurisdictions? A widely shared state policy
seeking to make election day real would give way to a Babel of
decrees. And what's to stop courts from tinkering with in-person
voting rules too? This judge declined to go that far, but the
plaintiffs thought he should have, and it's not hard to imagine
other judges accepting invitations to unfurl the precinct maps and
decide whether States should add polling places, revise their
hours, rearrange the voting booths within them, or maybe even
supplement existing social distancing, hand washing, and ventila-
tion protocols.
The Constitution dictates a different approach to these how-
much-is-enough questions. The Constitution provides that state
legislatures—not federal judges, not state judges, not state gover-
nors, not other state offcials—bear primary responsibility for set-
ting election rules. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. And the Constitution pro-
vides a second layer of protection too. If state rules need
revision, Congress is free to alter them. Ibid. (“The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Repre-
sentatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations . . . ”). Nothing in our founding docu-
ment contemplates the kind of judicial intervention that took place
here, nor is there precedent for it in 230 years of this Court's
decisions.
Understandably so. Legislators can be held accountable by the
people for the rules they write or fail to write; typically, judges
cannot. Legislatures make policy and bring to bear the collective
wisdom of the whole people when they do, while courts dispense
the judgment of only a single person or a handful. Legislatures
enjoy far greater resources for research and factfnding on ques-
tions of science and safety than usually can be mustered in litiga-
tion between discrete parties before a single judge. In reaching
their decisions, legislators must compromise to achieve the broad
social consensus necessary to enact new laws, something not eas-

1042 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 592 U. S.
ily replicated in courtrooms where typically one side must win
and
the other lose.
Of course, democratic processes can prove frustrating. Be-
cause they cannot easily act without a broad social consensus,
legislatures are often slow to respond and tepid when they do.
The clamor for judges to sweep in and address emergent prob-
lems, and the temptation for individual judges to fll the void of
perceived inaction, can be great. But what sometimes seems like
a fault in the constitutional design was a feature to the framers,
a means of ensuring that any changes to the status quo will not
be made hastily, without careful deliberation, extensive consulta-
tion, and social consensus.
Nor may we undo this arrangement just because we might be
frustrated. Our oath to uphold the Constitution is tested by hard
times, not easy ones. And succumbing to the temptation to side-
step the usual constitutional rules is never costless. It does dam-
age to faith in the written Constitution as law, to the power of
the people to oversee their own government, and to the authority
of legislatures, for the more we assume their duties the less incen-
tive they have to discharge them. Last-minute changes to long-
standing election rules risk other problems too, inviting confusion
and chaos and eroding public confdence in electoral outcomes.
No one doubts that conducting a national election amid a pan-
demic poses serious challenges. But none of that means individ-
ual judges may improvise with their own election rules in place
of those the people's representatives have adopted.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
Approximately 30 States, including Wisconsin, require that ab-
sentee ballots be received by election day in order to be counted.
Like most States, Wisconsin has retained that deadline for the
November 2020 election, notwithstanding the COVID–19 pan-
demic. In advance of the November election, however, a Federal
District Court in Wisconsin unilaterally changed the State's dead-
line for receipt of absentee ballots. Citing the pandemic, the
court extended the deadline for receipt of absentee ballots by six
days—from election day, November 3, to November 9, so long as
the ballots are postmarked on or before election day, November 3.
The Seventh Circuit stayed the District Court's injunction, rul-
ing that the District Court had violated this Court's precedents

ORDERS 1043
1039
Ka
vanaugh, J., concurring
in two fundamental ways: frst, by changing state election rules
too
close to an election; and second, by usurping the state legisla-
ture's authority to either keep or make changes to state election
rules in light of the pandemic.
Applicants here ask that we vacate the Seventh Circuit's stay
and reinstate the District Court's order extending the deadline
for absentee ballots to be received in Wisconsin. The Court
today denies the applications and maintains the Seventh Circuit's
stay of the District Court's order. I agree with the Court's deci-
sion to deny the applications, and I write separately to explain
why.
I
For three alternative and independent reasons, I conclude that
the District Court's injunction was unwarranted.
First, the District Court changed Wisconsin's election rules too
close to the election, in contravention of this Court's precedents.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that federal courts ordi-
narily should not alter state election laws in the period close to
an election—a principle often referred to as the Purcell principle.
See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); see also
Merrill v. People First of Ala., 592 U. S. 1035 (2020) (Merrill II);
Andino v. Middleton, 592 U. S. 906 (2020); Merrill v. People First
of Ala., 591 U. S. 1024 (2020) (Merrill I); Clarno v. People Not
Politicians, 591 U. S. 1073 (2020); Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 591
U. S. 1060 (2020); Republican National Committee v. Democratic
National Committee, 589 U. S. 423 (2020) (per curiam) (RNC).
The Court's precedents recognize a basic tenet of election law:
When an election is close at hand, the rules of the road should be
clear and settled. That is because running a statewide election
is a complicated endeavor. Lawmakers initially must make a host
of diffcult decisions about how best to structure and conduct the
election. Then, thousands of state and local offcials and volun-
teers must participate in a massive coordinated effort to imple-
ment the lawmakers' policy choices on the ground before and
during the election, and again in counting the votes afterwards.
And at every step, state and local offcials must communicate to
voters how, when, and where they may cast their ballots through
in-person voting on election day, absentee voting, or early voting.
Even seemingly innocuous late-in-the-day judicial alterations to
state election laws can interfere with administration of an election
and cause unanticipated consequences. If a court alters election

1044 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 592 U. S.
laws near an election, election administrators must frst under-
st
and the court's injunction, then devise plans to implement that
late-breaking injunction, and then determine as necessary how
best to inform voters, as well as state and local election offcials
and volunteers, about those last-minute changes. It is one thing
for state legislatures to alter their own election rules in the late
innings and to bear the responsibility for any unintended conse-
quences. It is quite another thing for a federal district court to
swoop in and alter carefully considered and democratically
enacted state election rules when an election is imminent.
That important principle of judicial restraint not only prevents
voter confusion but also prevents election administrator confu-
sion—and thereby protects the State's interest in running an or-
derly, effcient election and in giving citizens (including the losing
candidates and their supporters) confdence in the fairness of the
election. See Purcell, 549 U. S., at 4–5; Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd., 553 U. S. 181, 197 (2008) (plurality opinion).
The principle also discourages last-minute litigation and instead
encourages litigants to bring any substantial challenges to elec-
tion rules ahead of time, in the ordinary litigation process. For
those reasons, among others, this Court has regularly cautioned
that a federal court's last-minute interference with state election
laws is ordinarily inappropriate.
In this case, however, just six weeks before the November elec-
tion and after absentee voting had already begun, the District
Court ordered several changes to Wisconsin's election laws, in-
cluding a change to Wisconsin's deadline for receipt of absentee
ballots. Although the District Court's order was well intentioned
and thorough, it nonetheless contravened this Court's longstand-
ing precedents by usurping the proper role of the state legislature
and rewriting state election laws in the period close to an election.
Applicants retort that the Purcell principle precludes an appel-
late court—such as the Seventh Circuit here—from overturning
a district court's injunction of a state election rule in the period
close to an election. That argument defes common sense and
would turn Purcell on its head. Correcting an erroneous lower
court injunction of a state election rule cannot itself constitute a
Purcell problem. Otherwise, appellate courts could never correct
a late-breaking lower court injunction of a state election rule.
That obviously is not the law. To be sure, it would be preferable
if federal district courts did not contravene the Purcell principle

ORDERS 1045
1039
Ka
vanaugh, J., concurring
by rewriting state election laws close to an election. But when
they
do, appellate courts must step in. See, e. g., Andino, 592
U. S. 906; RNC, 589 U. S., at 425.
Second, even apart from the late timing, the District Court
misapprehended the limited role of the federal courts in COVID–
19 cases. This Court has consistently stated that the Constitu-
tion principally entrusts politically accountable state legislatures,
not unelected federal judges, with the responsibility to address
the health and safety of the people during the COVID–19
pandemic.
The COVID–19 pandemic has caused the deaths of more than
200,000 Americans, and it remains a serious threat, including in
Wisconsin. The virus poses a particular risk to the elderly and
to those with certain pre-existing conditions. But federal judges
do not possess special expertise or competence about how best to
balance the costs and benefts of potential policy responses to the
pandemic, including with respect to elections. For that reason,
this Court's cases during the pandemic have adhered to a basic
jurisprudential principle: When state and local offcials “ `under-
take[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientifc uncer-
tainties,' their latitude `must be especially broad.' ” Andino, 592
U. S., at 907 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of application
for stay). It follows “that a State legislature's decision either to
keep or to make changes to election rules to address COVID–19
ordinarily `should not be subject to second-guessing by an un-
elected federal judiciary, which lacks the background, competence,
and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to
the people.' ” Ibid. (some internal quotation marks omitted). As
the Seventh Circuit rightly explained, “the design of electoral
procedures is a legislative task,” including during the pandemic.
Democra t i c Na t io n a l Co mmi t tee v. Bostelm ann, 977 F. 3d
639, 642 (2020).
Over the last seven months, this Court has stayed numerous
federal district court injunctions that second-guessed state legis-
lative judgments about whether to keep or make changes to elec-
tion rules during the pandemic. See Merrill II, 592 U. S. 1035;
Andino, 592 U. S. 906; Merrill I, 591 U. S. 1024; Clarno, 591 U. S.
1073; Little, 591 U. S. 1060; RNC, 589 U. S. 423.
To be sure, in light of the pandemic, some state legislatures
have exercised their Article I, § 4, authority over elections and
have changed their election rules for the November 2020 election.

1046 OCTOBER
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring 592 U. S.
Of particular relevance here, a few States such as Mississippi no
longer
require that absentee ballots be received before election
day. See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. § 23–15–637 (2020). Other States
such as Vermont, by contrast, have decided not to make changes
to their ordinary election-deadline rules, including to the election-
day deadline for receipt of absentee ballots. See, e. g., Vt. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 17, § 2543 (2020). The variation in state responses re-
fects our constitutional system of federalism. Different state
legislatures may make different choices. Assessing the compli-
cated tradeoffs involved in changing or retaining election dead-
lines, or other election rules, in light of public health conditions
in a particular State is primarily the responsibility of state legis-
latures and falls outside the competence of federal courts.
Applicants respond that this principle of deference to state leg-
islatures applies only when a state legislature has affrmatively
made some changes, but not others, to the election code in light
of COVID–19. And they say that Wisconsin's legislature has not
done so, unlike the South Carolina legislature in Andino, for ex-
ample. But the Wisconsin State Legislature's decision not to
modify its election rules in light of the pandemic is itself a policy
judgment worthy of the same judicial deference that this Court
afforded the South Carolina legislature in Andino, 592 U. S. 906.
In short, state legislatures, not federal courts, primarily decide
whether and how to adjust election rules in light of the pandemic.
Third, the District Court did not suffciently appreciate the
signifcance of election deadlines. This Court has long recognized
that a State's reasonable deadlines for registering to vote, re-
questing absentee ballots, submitting absentee ballots, and voting
in person generally raise no federal constitutional issues under
the traditional Anderson-Burdick balancing test. See Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S.
428 (1992).
To state the obvious, a State cannot conduct an election without
deadlines. It follows that the right to vote is not substantially
burdened by a requirement that voters “act in a timely fashion if
they wish to express their views in the voting booth.” Burdick,
504 U. S., at 438. For the same reason, the right to vote is not
substantially burdened by a requirement that voters act in a
timely fashion if they wish to cast an absentee ballot. Either
way, voters need to vote on time. A deadline is not unconstitu-
tional merely because of voters' “own failure to take timely steps”

ORDERS 1047
1039
Ka
vanaugh, J., concurring
to ensure their franchise. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752,
758
(1973). Voters who, for example, show up to vote at midnight
after the polls close on election night do not have a right to
demand that the State nonetheless count their votes. Voters who
submit their absentee ballots after the State's deadline similarly
do not have a right to demand that the State count their votes.
For important reasons, most States, including Wisconsin, re-
quire absentee ballots to be received by election day, not just
mailed by election day. Those States want to avoid the chaos
and suspicions of impropriety that can ensue if thousands of ab-
sentee ballots fow in after election day and potentially fip the
results of an election. And those States also want to be able to
defnitively announce the results of the election on election night,
or as soon as possible thereafter. Moreover, particularly in a
Presidential election, counting all the votes quickly can help the
State promptly resolve any disputes, address any need for re-
counts, and begin the process of canvassing and certifying the
election results in an expeditious manner. See 3 U. S. C. § 5.
The States are aware of the risks described by Professor Pildes:
“[L]ate-arriving ballots open up one of the greatest risks of what
might, in our era of hyperpolarized political parties and existential
politics, destabilize the election result. If the apparent winner
the morning after the election ends up losing due to late-arriving
ballots, charges of a rigged election could explode.” Pildes, How
to Accommodate a Massive Surge in Absentee Voting, U. Chi.
L. Rev. Online (June 26, 2020) (online source archived at www.
supremecourt.gov). The “longer after Election Day any signif-
cant changes in vote totals take place, the greater the risk that
the losing side will cry that the election has been stolen.” Ibid.
One may disagree with a State's policy choice to require that
absentee ballots be received by election day. Indeed, some
States require only that absentee ballots be mailed by election
day. See, e. g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 3–3–5(g)(2) (Lexis 2020). But
the States requiring that absentee ballots be received by election
day do so for weighty reasons that warrant judicial respect. Fed-
eral courts have no business disregarding those state interests
simply because the federal courts believe that later deadlines
would be better.
That constitutional analysis of election deadlines still applies in
the pandemic. After all, during the pandemic, a State still cannot
conduct an election without deadlines. And the States that re-

1048 OCTOBER
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring 592 U. S.
quire absentee ballots to be received by election day still have
strong
interests in avoiding suspicions of impropriety and an-
nouncing fnal results on or close to election night.
To be sure, more people are voting absentee during the pan-
demic. But the State of Wisconsin has repeatedly instructed vot-
ers to request and mail their ballots well ahead of time, and the
State has taken numerous steps to accommodate the increased
number of absentee ballots. Moreover, the State now has some
experience to draw upon when administering an election during
the pandemic. Wisconsin conducted primary elections in April
and August, and has incorporated the lessons from those ex-
periences into its extensive planning for the November election.
See Wisconsin Elections Commission, April 7, 2020 Absentee Vot-
ing Report 24 (May 15, 2020) (online source archived at www.
supremecourt.gov). And that planning has paid off so far: For
the November election, more than a million Wisconsin voters have
already voted by absentee ballot.
In attempting to justify the District Court's injunction, Appli-
cants also rely on this Court's decision in April regarding the
Wisconsin primary election. They claim that the Court there
approved the District Court's change of the deadline for receipt
of absentee ballots in the primary election, so long as the ballots
were postmarked by election day. RNC, 589 U. S. 423. That
assertion is incorrect. In that case, this Court explicitly stated
that the District Court's last-minute extension of the deadline for
receipt of absentee ballots was “not challenged in this Court.”
Id., at 423.
In sum, the District Court's injunction was unwarranted for
three alternative and independent reasons: The District Court
changed the state election laws too close to the election. It mis-
apprehended the limited role of federal courts in COVID–19 cases.
And it did not suffciently appreciate the signifcance of election
deadlines.
1
1
A federal court's alteration of state election laws such as Wisconsin's
differs in some respects from a state court's (or state agency's) alteration of
state election laws. That said, under the U. S. Constitution, the state courts
do not have a blank check to rewrite state election laws for federal elections.
Article II expressly provides that the rules for Presidential elections are
established by the States “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct.” § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The text of Article II means that “the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature must prevail” and that a state

ORDERS 1049
1039
Ka
vanaugh, J., concurring
II
The
dissent rejects all three of the above conclusions and ap-
plies the ordinary Anderson-Burdick balancing test for analyzing
state election rules. In the dissent's view, the District Court
permissibly concluded that the benefts of the State's deadline for
receipt of absentee ballots are outweighed by the burdens of the
deadline on voters. In light of the three alternative and inde-
pendent conclusions outlined above, I do not think that we may
conduct that kind of open-ended balancing test in this case. But
even on its own terms, the dissent's balancing analysis is faulty,
in my respectful view.
Start by considering the implications of the dissent's analysis.
In reinstating the District Court's order extending Wisconsin's
deadline for receipt of absentee ballots, the dissent's approach
would necessarily invalidate (or at least call into question) the
laws of approximately 30 States for the upcoming election and
compel all of those States to accept absentee ballots received
after election day. The dissent's de facto green light to federal
courts to rewrite dozens of state election laws around the country
over the next two weeks seems to be rooted in a belief that
federal judges know better than state legislators about how to
court may not depart from the state election code enacted by the legislature.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S. 98, 120 (2000) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring); see
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U. S. 70, 76–78 (2000) (per
curiam); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 25 (1892). In a Presidential
election, in other words, a state court's “signifcant departure from the legis-
lative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents a federal consti-
tutional question.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S., at 113 (Rehnquist, C. J., concur-
ring). As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in Bush v. Gore, the important
federal judicial role in reviewing state-court decisions about state law in a
federal Presidential election “does not imply a disrespect for state courts
but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state legisla-
tures. To attach defnitive weight to the pronouncement of a state court,
when the very question at issue is whether the court has actually departed
from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to en-
force the explicit requirements of Article II.” Id., at 115.
The dissent here questions why the federal courts would have a role in
that kind of case. Post, at 1064, n. 6 (opinion of Kagan, J.). The answer to
that question, as the unanimous Court stated in Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., and as Chief Justice Rehnquist persuasively explained in
Bush v. Gore, is that the text of the Constitution requires federal courts to
ensure that state courts do not rewrite state election laws.

1050 OCTOBER
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring 592 U. S.
run elections during a pandemic. But over the last several
months,
this Court has consistently rejected that federal-judges-
know-best vision of election administration.
The dissent does not fully come to grips with the destabilizing
consequences of its analysis, saying that the facts may differ in
other States. But the key facts underlying the District Court's
injunction are similar in other States: the existence of the virus
and its effects on election workers, voters, mail systems, and in-
person voting. The dissent's claim that its reasoning would not
necessarily invalidate the absentee-ballot deadlines of approxi-
mately 30 other States therefore rings hollow.
Turning to the dissent's balancing analysis, the dissent does not
suffciently appreciate the necessity of deadlines in elections, and
does not suffciently account for all the steps that Wisconsin has
already taken to help voters meet those deadlines.
The dissent claims that the State's election-day deadline for
receipt of absentee ballots will “disenfranchise” some Wisconsin
voters. But that is not what a reasonable election deadline does.
This Court has long explained that a State's election deadline
does not disenfranchise voters who are capable of meeting the
deadline but fail to do so. See Rosario, 410 U. S., at 757–758. In
other words, reasonable election deadlines do not “disenfranchise”
anyone under any legitimate understanding of that term. And
the dissent cannot plausibly argue that the absentee-ballot dead-
line imposed—and still in place as of today—in most of the States
is not a reasonable one. Those voters who disregard the dead-
lines or who fail to take the state-prescribed steps for meeting
the deadlines may have to vote in person. But no one is disen-
franchised by Wisconsin's reasonable and commonplace deadline
for receiving absentee ballots. Indeed, more than one million
Wisconsin voters have already requested, received, and returned
their absentee ballots.
To help voters meet the deadlines, Wisconsin makes it easy to
vote absentee and has taken several extraordinary steps this year
to inform voters that they should request and return absentee
ballots well before election day.
For starters, as the Seventh Circuit aptly noted, Wisconsin has
“lots of rules” that “make voting easier than do the rules of many
other states.” Luft v. Evers, 963 F. 3d 665, 672 (2020). Wiscon-
sin law allows voters to vote absentee without an excuse, no
questions asked. Wis. Stat. § 6.85 (2017–2018). Registered vot-

ORDERS 1051
1039
Ka
vanaugh, J., concurring
ers may request an absentee ballot by mail, e-mail, online, or
fax.
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Absentee Voting, https://
elections.wi.gov/voters/absentee.
Since August, moreover, the Wisconsin Elections Commission
has been regularly reminding voters of the need to act early so as
to avoid backlogs and potential mail delays. See, e. g., Wisconsin
Elections Commission, Wisconsin Voting Deadlines and Facts for
November 2020 (Aug. 20, 2020), http://elections.wi.gov/node/7039.
In August and September, for example, Wisconsin's chief elections
offcial explicitly urged voters not to wait to request a ballot: “It
takes time for Wisconsin clerks to process your request. Then it
may take up to seven days for you to receive your ballot in the
mail. It can then take another seven days for your ballot to be
returned by mail.” Wisconsin Elections Commission, Wisconsin
Mails Voting Information to Registered Voters (Sept. 3, 2020),
http://elections.wi.gov/node/7077.
Perhaps most importantly, in early September, Wisconsin de-
cided to leave little to chance and mailed every registered voter
in the State who had not already requested an absentee ballot
(2.6 million of Wisconsin's registered voters) an absentee ballot
application, as well as information about how to vote absentee.
Ibid.
Returning an absentee ballot in Wisconsin is also easy. To
begin with, voters can return their completed absentee ballots by
mail. But absentee voters who do not want to rely on the mail
have several other options. Until election day, voters may, for
example, hand-deliver their absentee ballots to the municipal
clerk's offce or other designated site, or they may place their
absentee ballots in a secure absentee ballot drop box. Some ab-
sentee ballot drop boxes are located outdoors, either for drive-
through or walk-up access, and some are indoors at a location like
a municipal clerk's offce. Memorandum from M. Wolfe, Adminis-
trator of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, et al. to All Wis-
consin Election Offcials (Aug. 19, 2020) (online source archived at
www.supremecourt.gov). The Wisconsin Elections Commission
has made federal grant money available to local municipalities to
purchase additional absentee ballot drop boxes to accommodate
expanded absentee voting.
Alternatively, absentee voters may vote “in-person absentee”
beginning two weeks before election day. Wis. Stat. § 6.86(1)(b).
A Wisconsin voter who votes “in-person absentee” flls out an

1052 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 592 U. S.
absentee ballot in person at a municipal clerk's offce or other
desig
nated location before election day. Some municipalities
have created drive-up absentee voting sites to allow voters to
vote “in-person absentee” without leaving their cars. See, e. g.,
City of Madison Clerk's Offce, In-Person Absentee Voting Hours
and Locations (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov).
Finally, on election day, a voter may drop off an absentee ballot
at a polling place until 8:00 p.m. Memorandum from M. Wolfe,
Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, to Wiscon-
sin Municipal Clerks (Mar. 31, 2020) (online source archived at
www.supremecourt.gov).
In sum, as the Governor of Wisconsin correctly said back in
March as the COVID–19 crisis broke: “The good news is that
absentee voting in Wisconsin is really easy.” Marley, The Dead-
line to Request an Absentee Ballot in Wisconsin Is Friday.
Here's How You Do It., Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Mar. 13, 2020
(online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov).
The current statistics for the November election bear out the
Governor's statement that absentee voting in Wisconsin is “really
easy.” In huge and unprecedented numbers, Wisconsin voters
have already taken advantage of the State's generous absentee
voting procedures for the November election. As of October 26,
2020, the Wisconsin Elections Commission has mailed 1,706,771
absentee ballots to Wisconsin voters. And it has already re-
ceived back from voters 1,344,535 completed absentee ballots.
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Absentee Ballot Report—No-
vember 3, 2020 General Election (Oct. 26, 2020), https://elections
.wi.gov/node/7207.
As those statistics suggest, the dissent's charge that Wisconsin
has disenfranchised absentee voters is not tenable. As the Sev-
enth Circuit explained, the “district court did not fnd that any
person who wants to avoid voting in person on Election Day
would be unable to cast a ballot in Wisconsin by planning ahead
and taking advantage of the opportunities allowed by state law.”
977 F. 3d, at 642.
The dissent insists, however, that “tens of thousands” and per-
haps even 100,000 votes will not be counted if we do not reinstate
the District Court's extension of the deadline. Post, at 1058 (opin-
ion of Kagan, J.). The District Court arrived at the same predic-
tion, but it was a prediction, not a fnding of fact. Indeed, the Dis-
trict Court did not include this prediction in the facts section of its

ORDERS 1053
1039
Ka
vanaugh, J., concurring
opinion. Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann, 488
F
. Supp. 3d 776, 808 (WD Wis., Sept. 21, 2020). For its part, the
dissent makes the same prediction by looking at the number of
absentee ballots that arrived after the primary election day in
April. But in the April primary, the received-by deadline had
been extended to allow receipt of absentee ballots after election
day. The dissent's statistic tells us nothing about how many vot-
ers might miss the deadline when voters know that the ballots
must be received by election day. To take an analogy: How many
people would fle their taxes after April 15 if the fling deadline
were changed to April 21? Lots. That fact tells us nothing
about how many people would fle their taxes after April 15 if
the deadline remained at April 15.
The dissent also seizes on the fact that Wisconsin law allows
voters to request absentee ballots until October 29, fve days
before election day. But the dissent does not grapple with the
good reason why the State allows such late requests. The State
allows those late requests for ballots because it wants to accom-
modate late requesters who still want to obtain an absentee ballot
so that they can drop it off in person and avoid lines at the polls
on election day. No one thinks that voters who request absentee
ballots as late as October 29 can both receive the ballots and mail
them back in time to be received by election day. As we stated
in April, “even in an ordinary election, voters who request an
absentee ballot at the deadline for requesting ballots . . . will
usually receive their ballots on the day before or day of the elec-
tion.” RNC, 589 U. S., at 425. Rather, those late requesters
would, after receiving the ballots, necessarily have to drop their
absentee ballots off in person at one of the designated locations.
In short, Wisconsin provides an option to request absentee ballots
until October 29 for voters who decide relatively late in the game
that they would prefer to avoid lines at the polls on election
day.
The dissent's October 29-based argument falls short for another
reason as well: The dissent's approach would actually penalize
Wisconsin for being too generous with its absentee voting regime.
Under the dissent's theory, if Wisconsin had just set a more re-
strictive deadline for voters to request absentee ballots—say, two
weeks before election day—there presumably would not be a con-
stitutional problem with the State's election-day deadline for re-
ceipt of absentee ballots. But it makes little sense to penalize

1054 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Kavanaugh, J., concurring 592 U. S.
Wisconsin for accommodating voters and making it easier for
them
to vote absentee and avoid lines on election day.
The dissent's rhetoric of “disenfranchisement” is misplaced for
still another reason. As the dissent uses that term, the dissent's
own position would itself “disenfranchise” voters. What about
voters who request an absentee ballot after October 29? What
about voters who mail their ballots after November 3? What
about voters who mail their ballots by November 3 but whose
ballots arrive after November 9? Even if we reinstated the Dis-
trict Court's order as the dissent would have us do, those votes
would not count. The dissent's position would itself therefore
“disenfranchise” some voters, at least as the dissent uses the
term. All of which simply shows that the dissent's rhetoric of
disenfranchisement is mistaken.
The dissent responds that I am just disagreeing with the facts
found by the District Court. Not so. I do not disagree with any
of the relevant historical facts that the District Court found and
that the dissent highlights. The dissent, for example, calls atten-
tion to the District Court's fnding that nearly two million Wiscon-
sin voters in this election are likely to request mail ballots. I
agree. Indeed, the Wisconsin Elections Commission has already
sent nearly that number of absentee ballots to voters who have
requested them. The dissent notes that the infux of ballots has
imposed a serious burden on some local election offces. I agree.
The dissent points out that the District Court found that ballots
can sometimes take two weeks to be sent and returned in light
of Postal Service delays. I agree. The dissent highlights that
the pandemic has gotten worse, not better, in Wisconsin over
the last few weeks. I agree. And the dissent notes that the
in-person voting option can pose a health risk to elderly and
ill voters. I agree; I am fully aware of and sensitive to that
reality.
Contrary to the dissent's attempt to characterize our disagree-
ment as factual, the facts in this case are largely undisputed. I
have zero disagreement w ith the dissent on the questi on of
whether COVID–19 is a serious problem. It is. Instead, I dis-
agree with some of the District Court's and the dissent's specula-
tive predictions about how the voting process might unfold with
an election-day deadline for receipt of absentee ballots. And I
disagree with the District Court's and the dissent's legal analysis
of whether, given the agreed-upon facts, the State has done
enough to protect the right to vote under the Constitution and

ORDERS 1055
1039
Ka
vanaugh, J., concurring
this Court's precedents, given the necessity of having election
deadl
ines.
In short, I agree with the dissent that COVID–19 is a serious
problem. But you need deadlines to hold elections—there is just
no wishing away or getting around that fundamental point. And
Wisconsin's deadline is the same as that in 30 other States and is
a reasonable deadline given all the circumstances.
To be clear, in every election a voter who requests an absentee
ballot, particularly a voter who waits until the last moments to
request an absentee ballot, might not receive a ballot in time to
mail it back in, or in some cases may not receive a ballot until
after election day. Or in some cases, a voter may mail a com-
pleted ballot, but it may get delayed and arrive too late to be
counted.
2
Indeed, in 2012 and 2016, the States rejected more
than 70,000 ballots in each election because the ballots missed the
deadlines. U. S. Election Assistance Commission, 2012 Election
Administration and Voting Survey 42 (2013); U. S. Election Assist-
ance Commission, 2016 Election Administration and Voting Sur-
vey 11, 25 (2017). But moving a deadline would not prevent
ballots from arriving after the newly minted deadline any more
than moving frst base would mean no more close plays. And
more to the point, the fact that some ballots will be late in any
system with deadlines does not make Wisconsin's widely used
deadline facially unconstitutional. See Crawford, 553 U. S., at
202–203.
Put another way, the relevant question is not whether any voter
would ever miss the deadlines. After all, in every deadline case,
the answer would always be yes, and no election deadline would
ever be permissible. The proper question under the Constitution
is whether the deadline is reasonable under the circumstances.
See Rosario, 410 U. S., at 760. Again, Wisconsin's deadline is the
same as that in about 30 other States for the November election
and is reasonable, for the reasons I have explained.
2
In Wisconsin, a voter can track his or her ballot online. MyVote Wiscon-
sin, Track My Ballot, https://myvote.wi.gov/en-us/TrackMyBallot. If a voter
is concerned that the ballot may not be received in time, the voter can
cancel the absentee ballot and request a new one or vote in person, as
long as the voter meets the deadlines set by the municipality for doing
so, which typically fall a few days before election day. Memorandum from
M. Wolfe, Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, to Wis-
consi n County Clerks et a l. (Oc t. 19, 2020) (onl i ne source arch ived at
www.supremecourt.gov).

1056 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Kagan, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
In any event, if a Wisconsin voter does not receive an absentee
ba
llot in time to cast it, the voter still has the option of voting
in person. And Wisconsin, like many other States, demonstrated
in the April and August primary elections that it can run an in-
person election in a way that is reasonably safe for Wisconsin
voters, with socially distanced lines, mask requirements, and sani-
tizing protocols. The District Court acknowledged that in-person
voting can be done “safely” again in November “if the majority
of votes are cast in advance, suffcient poll workers, polling places,
and PPE are available, and social distancing and masking proto-
cols are followed.” 488 F. Supp. 3d, at 792. If a voter requests
a ballot at the last minute—long after the State has told voters
that they should request ballots—and if that voter does not re-
ceive a ballot by election day, the voter still has the option of
voting in person. That said, the better option, as Wisconsin has
repeatedly announced, is for voters who wish to vote absentee to
request and submit their ballots well ahead of time. That is what
tens of millions of voters across America—including more than
one million voters in Wisconsin—have already done.
***
For those reasons, I concur in the denial of the applications to
vacate the stay.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Justice So-
tomayor join, dissenting.
In April, residents of Wisconsin voted in presidential primaries.
That election was one of the frst during the COVID–19 pandemic,
which has turned in-person voting (with its often-long lines, touch
screens, and enclosed booths) into a health risk, especially for
older and less healthy Americans. Given these emergency condi-
tions, a district judge directed the State to accept mail ballots
received in the six days after the polls closed. That extension of
Wisconsin's ballot-receipt deadline ensured that COVID-related
delays in the delivery and processing of mail ballots would not
disenfranchise citizens fearful of voting in person. Because of
the court's ruling, state offcials counted 80,000 ballots—about fve
percent of the total cast—that were postmarked by Election Day
but would have been discarded for arriving a few days later.
Today, millions of Wisconsin citizens are preparing to vote in
the November election. But COVID is not over. In Wisconsin,

ORDERS 1057
1039
Kagan
, J., dissenting
the pandemic is much worse—more than 20 times worse, by one
measure
—than it was in the spring: The State's health depart-
ment now reports a weekly average of 3,879 cases per day, com-
pared to 175 per day when the April election took place. See
Wisconsin Department of Health Services, COVID–19: Wisconsin
Cases (Oct. 26, 2020), www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/cases.htm.
Indeed, Wisconsin is one of the hottest of all COVID hotspots in
the Nation. So rather than vote in person, many Wisconsinites
will again choose to vote by mail. State election offcials report
that 1.7 million people—about 50 percent of Wisconsin's voters—
have already asked for mail ballots. And more are expected to
do so, because state law gives voters until October 29, fve days
before Election Day, to make that request.
To ensure that these mail ballots are counted, the district court
ordered in September the same relief afforded in April: a six-
day extension of the receipt deadline for mail ballots postmarked
by Election Day. The court supported that order with specifc
facts and fgures about how COVID would affect the electoral
process in Wisconsin. See Democratic National Committee
v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 789–790, 792–795, 807–808
(WD Wis. 2020). The court found that the surge in requests for
mail ballots would overwhelm state offcials in the weeks leading
up to the October 29 ballot-application deadline. And it discov-
ered unusual delays in the United States Postal Service's delivery
of mail in the State. The combination of those factors meant, as
a high-ranking elections offcial testifed, that a typical ballot
would take a full two weeks “to make its way through the mail
from a clerk's offce to a voter and back again”—even when the
voter instantly turns the ballot around. Id., at 788, n. 10. Based
on the April election experience, the court determined that many
voters would not even receive mail ballots by Election Day, mak-
ing it impossible to vote in that way. And as many as 100,000
citizens would not have their votes counted—even though timely
requested and postmarked—without the six-day extension. (To
put that number in perspective, a grand total of 284 Wiscon-
sin mail ballots were not counted in the 2016 election.
1
) In the
court's view, the discarding of so many properly cast ballots would
1
See U. S. Election Assistance Commission, 2016 Election Administration
and Voting Survey 25.

1058 OCTOBER
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Kagan, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
severely burden the constitutional right to vote. The ft remedy
was
to create a six-day grace period, to allow those ballots a little
extra time to arrive in the face of unprecedented administrative
and delivery delays.
But a court of appeals halted the district court's order, and
today this Court leaves that stay in place. I respectfully dissent
because the Court's decision will disenfranchise large numbers of
responsible voters in the midst of hazardous pandemic conditions.
I
Start with this fact: The court of appeals did not dispute
any of the district court's careful fndings about the effect of
COVID on voting in Wisconsin. The appellate court did not
question the health risks—now increasing daily—of in-person vot-
ing in the State, especially to senior citizens and those with some
pre-existing conditions.
2
It did not deny that, because of those
dangers, state election offces will be swamped until the end of
October by timely mail-ballot applications. It did not contest
that backlogs in those offces, combined with unusual delays in
mail delivery, will prevent tens of thousands of Wisconsinites—
through no fault of their own—from successfully casting a mail
ballot. Nor did the appellate court express doubt that disenfran-
chisement of that kind, and on that scale, imposes a severe burden
on the right to vote. See generally Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S.
428, 434 (1992). In fact, the court never even addressed the con-
stitutional issue.
How could that be? In the appellate court's view, this Court's
decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam),
prohibited the district court from modifying Wisconsin's election
rules so close to (i. e., six weeks before) Election Day. See Demo-
cratic National Committee v. Bostelmann, 977 F. 3d 639, 641–643
(CA7 2020) (per curiam); see also ante, at 1043–1045 (Kava-
naugh, J., concurring). But that is a misunderstanding of Pur-
cell's message. In fxating on timing alone, the court of appeals
went astray.
2
See C. Cotti, B. Engelhardt, J. Foster, E. Nesson, & P. Niakamp, The
Relationship Between In-Person Voting and COVID–19: Evidence From the
Wisconsin Primary, NBER Working Paper No. 27187, p. 11 (rev. Oct. 2020)
(“Across all models, we fnd an increase in the positive share of COVID–19
cases in the weeks following the election in counties that had more in-person
votes per voting location, all else equal”).

ORDERS 1059
1039
Kagan
, J., dissenting
The Court in Purcell considered an appellate decision reversing
a
district court's refusal to enjoin a voter identifcation law shortly
before an election. We vacated the decision because the court of
appeals—much like the one here—failed to “give deference to [a
district court's] discretion” in assessing the propriety of injunctive
relief. 549 U. S., at 5. In doing so, we briefy addressed how to
“weigh” whether an injunction of an election rule should issue.
Id., at 4. A court, we counseled, must balance the “harms attend-
ant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction,” together with
“considerations specifc to election cases” that may affect “the
integrity of our electoral processes.” Ibid. Among those elec-
tion-specifc factors, we continued, was the potential for a court
order, especially close to Election Day, to “result in voter confu-
sion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.”
Id., at 4–5.
That statement, as the dissent below saw, “articulated not a
rule but a caution.” 977 F. 3d, at 644 (opinion of Rovner, J.).
Last-minute changes to election processes may baffe and discour-
age voters; and when that is likely, a court has strong reason to
stay its hand. But not every such change poses that danger.
And a court must also take account of other matters—among
them, the presence of extraordinary circumstances (like a pan-
demic), the clarity of a constitutional injury, and the extent of
voter disenfranchisement threatened. At its core, Purcell tells
courts to apply, not depart from, the usual rules of equity. See,
e. g., Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S.
7, 24 (2008) (“In each case, courts must balance the competing
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the
granting or withholding of the requested relief ” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). And that means courts must consider all
relevant factors, not just the calendar. Yes, there is a danger
that an autumn injunction may confuse voters and suppress vot-
ing. But no, there is not a moratorium on the Constitution as
the cold weather approaches. Remediable incursions on the right
to vote can occur in September or October as well as in April
or May.
And so the district court rightly held here. It is hard to see
how the extension of a ballot-receipt deadline could confuse citi-
zens about how to vote: At worst, a voter not informed of the
new deadline would (if she could) put her ballot in the mail a few
days earlier than needed. Nor would that measure discourage

1060 OCTOBER
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Kagan, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
Wisconsin citizens from exercising their right to the franchise.
T
o the contrary, it would prevent the State from throwing away
the votes of people actively participating in the democratic proc-
ess. And what will undermine the “integrity” of that process is
not the counting but instead the discarding of timely cast ballots
that, because of pandemic conditions, arrive a bit after Election
Day. Purcell, 549 U. S., at 4.
3
On the scales of both constitutional
justice and electoral accuracy, protecting the right to vote in a health
crisis outweighs conforming to a deadline created in safer days.
Indeed, I see no more apt time for the district court to have
issued its injunction than when it did. The court of appeals in-
sisted that the injunction would better have come in May, a half-
year before Election Day; then, the court said, the order “could
not be called untimely.” 977 F. 3d, at 642. But “untimely” can
mean too early as well as too late. And a May order could have
been premature, perhaps even foolishly so. At that time, the
district court could not have known the course COVID would
take. Cf. FDA v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, 592 U. S. 990 (2020) (instructing a district court to con-
sider whether pandemic conditions have changed enough to war-
rant modifying an injunction). Nor could the court have known
about the current ability of Wisconsin election offces or the Postal
Service to handle increased demand for mail ballots. (Doubts
about the Postal Service's delivery performance, for example, did
not arise until August.) In waiting until late September, the
district court resolved to base its ruling on concrete evidence—
not on unfounded speculation.
And without Purcell, not much is left in the appellate court's
opinion to justify its stay. That court separately argued that
“ the desig n of elec tora l procedures” is a solely “ leg islative
t ask. ” 977 F. 3d, at 642; see a lso an te, at 1045 –1046
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). But that is not so when those pro-
cedures infringe the constitutionally enshrined right to vote.
See, e. g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 786 (1983) (invali-
3
Justice Kavanaugh alleges that “suspicions of impropriety” will result
if “absentee ballots fow in after election day and potentially fip the results
of an election.” Ante, at 1047. But there are no results to “fip” until all
valid votes are counted. And nothing could be more “suspicio[us]” or “im-
prop[er]” than refusing to tally votes once the clock strikes 12 on election
night. To suggest otherwise, especially in these fractious times, is to dis-
serve the electoral process.

ORDERS 1061
1039
Kagan
, J., dissenting
dating a state fling deadline); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
t
ions, 383 U. S. 663, 666 (1966) (invalidating a state poll tax);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 568 (1964) (invalidating state
districting maps). To be sure, deference is usually due to a legis-
lature's decisions about how best to manage the COVID pandemic.
See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S.
965, 967 (2020) (Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial of application
for injunctive relief ). But the Wisconsin legislature has not for
a moment considered whether recent COVID conditions demand
changes to the State's election rules; that body has not even met
since April. Compare Litke, Fact Check: Wisconsin Legislators
Have Gone About 6 Months Without Passing a Bill, USA Today,
Oct. 7, 2020 (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov)
(“Wisconsin lawmakers have been among the least active in the
country, according to a database of all COVID-related legislation
across the country maintained by the National Conference of
State Legislatures”), with Andino v. Middleton, 592 U. S. 906 (2020)
(staying an order enjoining South Carolina's witness requirement
for mail ballots when that rule was part of a legislative package to
adjust voting procedures in response to COVID). And if there
is one area where deference to legislators should not shade into
acquiescence, it is election law. For in that feld politicians' incen-
tives often confict with voters' interests—that is, whenever sup-
pressing votes benefts the lawmakers who make the rules.
II
Justice Kavanaugh's concurring opinion goes further than the
court of appeals. Rather than relying on Purcell and deference
alone, he also concludes that Wisconsin's election rules, as applied
during the COVID pandemic, do not violate the right to vote.
See ante, at 1047–1048. That follows, in his view, because voting
by mail is “easy” in Wisconsin and because in-person voting is
“reasonably safe.” Ante, at 1050, 1051, 1056.
4
(In another con-
currence, Justice Gorsuch agrees. Ante, at 1040.)
4
Oddly, the concurrence suggests that no change in the State's ballot-re-
ceipt deadline is needed because Wisconsin has “incorporated the lessons”
from April's primary “into its extensive planning for the November elec-
tion.” Ante, at 1048. But the April election was conducted under the same
extended deadline that the Court today precludes. See supra, at 1056.
One might have thought the April election's principal lesson is that a slightly
altered ballot-receipt deadline can save thousands of timely cast mail ballots
from the garbage bin.

1062 OCTOBER
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Kagan, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
The frst problem with that reasoning is that the district court
found
to the contrary. As this Court constantly states, a district
court has the greatest familiarity with the facts in a case, because
it oversees the development and presentation of evidence. See,
e. g., Purcell, 549 U. S., at 5; see also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a).
That is why the court of appeals rightly did not question any of
the lower court's fndings. See supra, at 1052. And why the
concurrence is wrong to take a different tack.
Recall that the district court's fndings include the following.
See supra, at 1057–1058. The COVID pandemic has been getting
worse and worse in Wisconsin. And as the State has “broken
numerous new case records,” in-person voting—according to cred-
ible expert testimony—creates a “signifcant [health] risk,” espe-
cially for older and sicker citizens. 488 F. Supp. 3d, at 792, 794.
For that reason, Wisconsinites have turned to the mails. Accord-
ing to the state elections commission, close to 2 million people
are likely to request mail ballots. See id., at 792. (That is about
double the number of already-returned ballots that the concur-
rence chooses to emphasize. See ante, at 1048, 1050, 1056.)
State election offces have not received the resources they need
to deal with that infux of applications, and severe administrative
backlogs have therefore developed. See 488 F. Supp. 3d, at 792.
Postal Service delays, detailed by both state and federal offcials,
compound the risk that voters will be unable to return timely
requested mail ballots by Election Day. See id., at 792–793.
And if a voter discovers on Election Day that her mail ballot has
not yet arrived, Wisconsin law prevents her from voting in per-
son—even assuming she would undertake the risk. See Wis.
Stat. § 6.86(6) (2017–2018). All these facts would mean, as the
chair of the Wisconsin Elections Commission testifed, that many
thousands of timely requested and postmarked votes—potentially
into the six-fgure range—would not be counted without a short
extension of the ballot-receipt deadline. See 488 F. Supp. 3d, at
807; Electronic Case Filing in No. 3–20–cv–459, Doc. 299 (WD
Wis.), p. 9.
The concurrence fails to give those fndings the respect they
are due. Of course, the concurrence says it is not committing
that elementary error; according to Justice Kavanaugh, he dis-
putes only the district court's “speculative predictions,” not its
statement of “historical facts.” Ante, at 1054. But the concur-

ORDERS 1063
1039
Kagan
, J., dissenting
rence alternately rejects, ignores, or accepts only pro forma the
distr
ict court's account of the facts ( just the facts). In respond-
ing to this dissent, the concurring opinion acknowledges that in-
person voting in Wisconsin “can pose a health risk.” Ibid. Yet
in condemning the injunction, it continues to insist—how else
could it reach the decision it does?—that going to the polls is
“reasonably safe” for Wisconsin's citizens, contrary to the expert
testimony the district court relied on. Ante, at 1056. Similarly,
the concurrence nods glancingly to increased ballot applications,
see ante, at 1054, but it fails to recount (as the district court did
in detail) how that infux has created heavy backlogs and pre-
vented ballots from issuing in timely fashion. And it does not
discuss the evidence of unusual, even unprecedented, delays in
postal delivery service in Wisconsin. In short, the concurrence
refuses to engage with the core of the analysis supporting the
district court's injunction: that a veritable tsunami (in the form
of a pandemic) has hit Wisconsin's election machinery, and dis-
rupted all its usual mail ballot operations. And as to the suppos-
edly “speculative prediction” that without the ballot-receipt ex-
tension as many as 100,000 timely cast mail votes would go
uncounted? That estimate itself derived from the factual fndings
just listed, along with the credible testimony of the elections com-
mission's chair—all matters indisputably entitled to deference
from an appellate tribunal. Those fndings, and not the concur-
rence's substitute facts purporting to show that voting in Wiscon-
sin is safe and easy, should properly ground today's decision.
5
A related faw in the concurring opinion is how much it reasons
from normal, pre-pandemic conditions. Cf. Republican National
Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 589 U. S. 423, 429
(2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court's suggestion that the
current situation is not substantially different from an ordinary
election boggles the mind”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A “reasonable election deadline,” the concurrence says, “does not
5
Note as well that nothing rides on the exactness of the district court's
estimate. Suppose that without the ballot-receipt extension, only (only?)
half as many votes would be discarded as the district court thought. The
court's decision would have remained the same, and so too everything I say
here. But as for the concurrence? Who can know? Justice Kavanaugh
does not reveal how many uncounted votes he thinks would violate the Con-
stitution. Nor does he suggest how many votes short of that level will be
discarded because of the Court's decision today.

1064 OCTOBER
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Kagan, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
disenfranchise voters.” Ante, at 1050. I have no argument with
that
statement, even though some voters may overlook the dead-
line. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 757–758 (1973).
But what is “reasonable” in one set of circumstances may become
unreasonable in another. And when that switch occurs, a consti-
tutional problem arises. So it matters not that Wisconsin could
apply its ballot-receipt deadline when ballots moved rapidly
through the mails and people could safely vote in person. At
this time, neither condition holds—again, according to the district
court's eminently believable fndings. Today, mail ballots often
travel at a snail's pace, and the elderly and ill put themselves in
peril if they go to the polls. So citizens—thousands and thou-
sands of them—who have followed all the State's rules still cannot
cast a successful vote. And because that is true, the ballot-
receipt deadline that once survived constitutional review no
longer does.
6
That deadline, contrary to Justice Kavanaugh's view, now
disenfranchises Wisconsin citizens—however much he objects to
applying that term here. Far from using the word “rhetori-
c[ally],” ante, at 1054, I mean it precisely. During COVID, the
State's ballot-receipt deadline and the Court's decision upholding
it disenfranchise citizens by depriving them of their constitution-
ally guaranteed right to vote. Because the Court refuses to rein-
state the district court's injunction, Wisconsin will throw out
thousands of timely requested and timely cast mail ballots. And
today's decision does not stand alone. In other recent cases as well,
the Court has halted injunctions necessary for people to cast ballots
safely. See Merrill v. People First of Ala., 592 U. S. 1035 (2020);
Merrill v. People First of Ala., 591 U. S. 1024 (2020); Republican
6
The concurrence is wrong to view that conclusion as casting doubt on all
similar deadlines in all other States. See ante, at 1050. The district court
rested its constitutional judgment, as I would too, on a confuence of factors:
COVID conditions in Wisconsin, the scarce time between the State's ballot-
application and ballot-receipt deadlines, evidence about in-state mail delivery
and the administrative capacity of state election offces. See supra, at 1056–
1058, 1062. In another State with all the same facts, the same result should
obtain. But in another State with different facts—say, a less intense out-
break of COVID, an earlier ballot-application deadline, faster mail delivery,
and better staffed and funded election offces—the constitutional analysis
should come out a different way.

ORDERS 1065
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 26, 28, 2020
National Committee, 589 U. S. 423.
7
As
the COVID pandemic
rages, the Court has failed to adequately protect the Nation's
voters.
***
For all these reasons, I would vacate the court of appeals' stay.
The facts, as found by the district court, are clear: Tens of thou-
sands of Wisconsinites, through no fault of their own, may receive
their mail ballots too late to return them by Election Day. Without
the district court's order, they must opt between “brav[ing] the
polls,” with all the risk that entails, and “los[ing] their right to vote.”
Republican National Committee, 589 U. S., at 432 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). The voters of Wisconsin deserve a better choice.
No. 20–18. Lange v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 5. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1024.] Amanda K.
Rice, Esq., of Ann Arbor, Mich., is invited to brief and argue as
amicus curiae in support of the judgment below.
October 28, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A71. Wise et al. v. Circosta, Chair, State Board
of Elections, et al. D. C. M. D. N. C. Application for injunc-
tive relief, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred
to the Court, denied. Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Jus-
tice Gorsuch would grant the application on the issue of the
ballot-receipt deadline. Justice Barrett took no part in the
consideration or decision of this application.
No. 20A72. Moore et al. v. Circosta, Chair, State Board
of Elections, et al. D. C. E. D. N. C. Application for injunc-
7
At the same time that Justice Kavanaugh defends this stance by de-
crying a “federal-judges-know-best vision of election administration,” ante,
at 1050, he calls for more federal court involvement in “reviewing state-
court decisions about state [election] law,” ante, at 1049, n. 1. It is hard to
know how to reconcile those two views about the federal judiciary's role in
voting-rights cases. Contrary to Justice Kavanaugh's attempted explana-
tion, neither the text of the Elections Clause nor our precedent interpreting
it leads to his inconstant approach. See Arizona State Legislature v. Ari-
zona Independent Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U. S. 787, 817–818 (2015); Smi-
ley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 372 (1932).

1066 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 28, 2020 592 U. S.
tive relief, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred
to
the Court, denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the
consideration or decision of this application. Justice Thomas
would grant the application.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Alito joins, dissenting.
This summer, the General Assembly of North Carolina adopted
new election laws expressly designed to address the challenges
COVID posed to a fast-approaching election. Among other
things, the General Assembly reduced the witness requirement
for absentee ballots from two witnesses to one, 2019 N. C. Sess.
Laws 2020–17, § 1.(a); freed up more individuals to staff polling
centers, § 1.(b); created a mechanism to allow voters to track their
ballots, § 3.(a); enabled voters to request absentee ballots online,
§ 7.(a); and increased funding to ensure the State's in-person and
absentee voting infrastructure could withstand “the coronavirus
pandemic,” §§ 11.1(a)–(f ). At the same time, the General Assem-
bly judged it appropriate to retain certain other existing election
rules, like the State's deadline for the receipt of absentee ballots.
Accordingly, under state law, absentee ballots must be post-
marked on or before election day, and they must be received “not
later than three days after” election day. N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 163–231(b)(2)b (2019).
Despite the General Assembly's considered judgment about the
appropriate response to COVID, other state actors—including the
State Board of Elections—recently chose to issue their own addi-
tional and supplemental set of amendments to state election laws.
Relevant here, they purported to extend the absentee ballot
receipt deadline by six days, up to November 12.
That last part should sound familiar. Just days ago, this Court
rejected a similar effort to rewrite a state legislature's election
deadlines. Wisconsin (like North Carolina) has a ballot receipt
deadline enshrined in statute. All the same, a federal district
court decided to order Wisconsin to extend its deadline by six
days. The Seventh Circuit stayed that ruling, and we agreed
with its disposition. For many of the same reasons I believe that
decision was correct, I believe we should stay the Board's action
here. See Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State
Legislature, 592 U. S. 1039, 1040 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
In some respects, this case may be even more egregious, given
that a state court and the Board worked together to override

ORDERS 1067
1065
Gorsuch,
J., dissenting
a carefully tailored legislative response to COVID. Indeed, the
president
pro tempore of the North Carolina Senate and the
speaker of its House of Representatives have intervened on behalf
of the General Assembly to oppose revisions to its work.
The parties before us all acknowledge that, under the Federal
Constitution, only the state “Legislature” and “Congress” may
prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections.”
Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Everyone agrees, too, that the North Carolina
Constitution expressly vests all legislative power in the General
Assembly, not the Board or anyone else. N. C. Const., Art. II,
§ 1; cf. N. C. Const., Art. I, § 6. So we need not go rifing through
state law to understand the Board's permissible role in (re)writing
election laws. All we need to know about its authority to over-
ride state election laws is plain from the Federal and State
Constitutions.
Besides, even assuming the North Carolina General Assembly
could delegate its Elections Clause authority to other offcials, its
representatives contend before us that it has not authorized the
deadline extension here, and understandably so. State law pro-
vides the Board with supervisory authority over elections. N. C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163–22(a). But that authority permits the
Board to prescribe regulations only if “they do not confict” with
state statutory law. Ibid. State law also furnishes the Board
with power to fashion interim rules. § 163–22.2. But that power
too is circumscribed, triggered when a state statute has been (or
likely would be) invalidated by a court. That doesn't sound like
a blank check to the Board allowing it to rewrite the election
code in any and all consent decrees it may wish to enter. Finally,
state law confers upon the Board certain emergency powers.
§ 163–27.1. But, relevant for our purposes, the Board may exer-
cise those powers only when three conditions are met: (1) “the
normal schedule for the election is disrupted” (2) by a “natural
disaster” and (3) provided that the Board's actions do not “unnec-
essar[ily] confict” with statutory law. Ibid. There is no ground
for thinking that the election “schedule” has been “disrupted”:
North Carolina stands fully equipped to conduct its election on
November 3. Nor is COVID like the “natural disasters” the
Board has pointed to in the past (e. g., hurricanes or power out-
ages) that can disrupt the mechanics of running an election, espe-
cially given that the General Assembly has long known about the
pandemic's challenges and expressly prepared for them. Finally,

1068 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
October 28, 2020 592 U. S.
the change the Board adopted was deemed “unnecessary” by the
Genera
l Assembly when it retained the statutory ballot receipt
deadline after considering COVID's impact on election processes.
Any single one of these three problems is enough to sink the
Board's action.
In the Fourth Circuit, Judges Wilkinson, Agee, and Niemeyer
thoughtfully explained the Board's constitutional overreach and
the broader problems with last-minute election-law-writing-by-
lawsuit. As they observed, efforts like these not only offend the
Elections Clause's textual commitment of responsibility for elec-
tion lawmaking to state and federal legislators, they do damage
to faith in the written Constitution as law, to the power of the
people to oversee their own government, and to the authority of
legislatures. Such last-minute changes by largely unaccountable
bodies, too, invite confusion, risk altering election outcomes, and
in the process threaten voter confdence in the results. Wise v.
Circosta, 978 F. 3d 93, 104 (CA4 2020) (en banc) (Wilkinson and
Agee, JJ., joined by Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Respectfully, for
a l l these reasons I wou ld grant the appl icati on to st ay the
Board's action.
No. 20–542. Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boock-
var, Secretary of Pennsylvania, et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Mo-
tion to expedite consideration of petition for writ of certiorari
denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or
decision of this motion.
Additional opinions may follow.
Statement of Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas and
Justice Gorsuch join.
The Court's handling of the important constitutional issue
raised by this matter has needlessly created conditions that could
lead to serious post-election problems. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has issued a decree that squarely alters an impor-
tant statutory provision enacted by the Pennsylvania Legislature
pursuant to its authority under the Constitution of the United
States to make rules governing the conduct of elections for fed-
eral offce. See Art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Art. II, § 1, cl. 2; Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U. S. 70, 76 (2000) (per cu-
riam). In a law called Act 77, the legislature permitted all voters
to cast their ballots by mail but unambiguously required that all
mailed ballots be received by 8 p.m. on election day. 2019 Pa.

ORDERS 1069
1068
St
atement of Alito, J.
Leg. Serv. Act 2019–77; see Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, §§ 3146.6(c),
3150.16(
c) (Purdon 2020). It also specifed that if this provision
was declared invalid, much of the rest of Act 77, including its
liberalization of mail-in voting, would be void. Act 77, § 11. The
legislature subsequently made it clear that, in its judgment, the
COVID–19 pandemic did not call for any change in the election-
day deadline. In a law enacted in March 2020, the legislature
addressed election-related issues caused by the pandemic, but it
chose not to amend the deadline for the receipt of mailed ballots.
See Pa. Leg. Serv. Act 2020–12.
In the face of Act 77's deadline, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
by a vote of four to three, decreed that mailed ballots need not be
received by election day. Pennsylvania Democratic Party v.
Boockvar, 662 Pa. 39, 106, 238 A. 3d 345, 386 (2020). Instead, it im-
posed a different rule: Ballots are to be treated as timely if they are
postmarked on or before election day and are received within three
days thereafter. Id., at 82, 238 A. 3d, at 371. In addition, the court
ordered that a ballot with no postmark or an illegible postmark must
be regarded as timely if it is received by that same date. Ibid., n. 26.
The court expressly acknowledged that the statutory provision
mandating receipt by election day was unambiguous and that its
abrogation of that rule was not based on an interpretation of the
statute. Id., at 78, 238 A. 3d, at 369. It further conceded that
the statutory deadline was constitutional on its face, but it claimed
broad power to do what it thought was needed to respond to a
“natural disaster,” and it justifed its decree as necessary to pro-
tect voters' rights under the Free and Equal Elections Clause of
the State Constitution. Id., at 79–81, 238 A. 3d, at 369–371.
A month ago, the Republican Party of Pennsylvania and the
Pennsylvania Senate leaders asked this Court to stay the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's decision pending the fling and disposition
of a petition for certiorari. See Republican Party of Pennsylva-
nia v. Boockvar, No. 20A54; Scarnati v. Boockvar, No. 20A53.
They argued that the state court decision violated the previously
cited constitutional provisions, as well as the federal statute set-
ting a uniform date for federal elections. Application for Stay
in No. 20A54, p. 2; Application for Stay in No. 20A53, pp. 2–3.
Respondent, Democratic Party of Pennsylvania (DPP), agreed
that the constitutionality of the State Supreme Court's decision
was a matter of national importance and urged us to grant review
and to decide the issue before the election. DPP Response to
Application for Stay in No. 20A53 etc., p. 9. Instead of doing

1070 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Statement of Alito, J. 592 U. S.
what either party sought, the Court simply denied the stay. Al-
though
there were four votes to enter a stay, the application failed
by an equally divided vote. Now, in a last ditch attempt to pre-
vent the election in Pennsylvania from being conducted under a
cloud, we have been asked to grant a petition for a writ of certio-
rari, to expedite review, and to decide the constitutional question
prior to the election.
It would be highly desirable to issue a ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the State Supreme Court's decision before the elec-
tion. That question has national importance, and there is a
strong likelihood that the State Supreme Court decision violates
the Federal Constitution. The provisions of the Federal Consti-
tution conferring on state legislatures, not state courts, the au-
thority to make rules governing federal elections would be mean-
ingless if a state court could override the rules adopted by the
legislature simply by claiming that a state constitutional provision
gave the courts the authority to make whatever rules it thought
appropriate for the conduct of a fair election. See Art. I, § 4,
cl. 1; Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
For these reasons, the question presented by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision calls out for review by this Court—as
both the State Republican and Democratic Parties agreed when
the former applied for a stay. But I reluctantly conclude that
there is simply not enough time at this late date to decide the
question before the election.
That does not mean, however, that the state court decision must
escape our review. Although the Court denies the motion to expe-
dite, the petition for certiorari remains before us, and if it is granted,
the case can then be decided under a shortened schedule. In addi-
tion, the Court's denial of the motion to expedite is not a denial of a
request for this Court to order that ballots received after election
day be segregated so that if the State Supreme Court's decision is
ultimately overturned, a targeted remedy will be available. Peti-
tioner represents that it will apply to this Court to obtain that
modest relief, Reply in Support of Motion for Expedited Review
3, and respondent DPP agrees that such relief is appropriate,
Opp. to Motion for Expedited Review 7. Although the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court rejected petitioner's request for that relief,
we have been informed by the Pennsylvania Attorney General
that the Secretary of the Commonwealth issued guidance today
directing county boards of elections to segregate ballots received

ORDERS 1071
592 U. S.
Oc
tober 28, 29, November 2, 2020
between 8 p.m. on November 3, 2020, and 5 p.m. on November 6,
2020.
Nothing in the Court's order today precludes petitioner
from applying to this Court for relief if, for some reason, it is not
satisfed with the Secretary's guidance.
October 29, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A74. Berger et al. v. North Carolina State Board
of Elections et al. Super. Ct. N. C., Wake County. Applica-
tion for stay, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him re-
ferred to the Court, denied. Justice Thomas, Justice Alito,
and Justice Gorsuch would grant the application on the issue
of the ballot-receipt deadline. Justice Barrett took no part in
the consideration or decision of this application.
November 2, 2020*
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded. (See Mckesson v.
Doe, 592 U. S. 1 (2020); and Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U. S. 7
(2020).)
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–5559. Sundy v. Friendship Pavilion Acquisition
Co., LLC, et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–5566. Wilson v. Florida et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
4th Dist. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauper is denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's
Rule 39.8.
No. 20–5682. Ranteesi v. Arnold, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20M33. Cirota v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. Motion to direct the Clerk to fle peti-
tion for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
*Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the
orders announced on this date.

1072 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 2, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Conditional motion of
T
exas for review of the River Master's 2020 fnal determination
granted. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 589 U. S. 1273.]
No. 19–416. Nestle
́
USA, Inc. v. Doe et al.; and
No. 19–453. Cargill, Inc. v. Doe et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 591 U. S. 1025.] Motion of the Acting Solici-
tor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus
curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 20 – 219. Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller,
P. L. L. C. C. A. 5th Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited
to fle a brief in this case expressing the views of the United
States.
No. 20–5531. Holmes v. Becker et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.
Petitioner is allowed until November 23, 2020, within which to
pay the docketing fee required by this Court's Rule 38(a).
No. 20–5896. In re Weissert;
No. 20–5932. In re Johnson; and
No. 20–5944. In re Calmese. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 20–5515. In re Merrill. Petition for writ of manda-
mus denied.
No. 20–269. In re Stone. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1436. DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, Flor-
ida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 942
F. 3d 1277.
No. 19–1445. Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. v.
Federal Trade Commission et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 947.
No. 19–1447. Manzano v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 616.
No. 19–8332. Rhoades v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 8 Cal. 5th 393, 453 P. 3d 89.

ORDERS 1073
592 U. S.
N
ovember 2, 2020
No. 19–8375. Robinson v. Horton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 337.
No. 19–8594. Darrell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 929.
No. 19–8598. Pizzuto v. Yordy, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d 510.
No. 19–8821. Santiago-Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 34.
No. 19–8900. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 499.
No. 19–8921. Floyd v. Gittere, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 1128.
No. 19–8929. Preston v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 769 Fed. Appx. 707.
No. 20–50. Voss v. Goode. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 954 F. 3d 234.
No. 20–53. Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 887.
No. 20–58. Smith v. Vestavia Hills Board of Education.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed.
Appx. 127.
No. 20–88. HZNP Finance Ltd. et al. v. Actavis Labora-
tories UT, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 940 F. 3d 680.
No. 20–188. Zhiheng Sheng v. Snyder. Ct. App. Ga. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–195. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Tulalip Tribes
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944
F. 3d 1179.
No. 20–199. Clark v. Inco Champion National Security,
Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952
F. 3d 570.
No. 20–200. McCoy v. Bullock et al. Ct. App. Ohio, 9th
App. Dist., Summit County. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
2019-Ohio-3169.

1074 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 2, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–204. Ming Wei v. Pennsylvania et al. C. A. 3d
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 143.
No. 20–207. Bush-Pensy v. Pieger. Ct. App. Wis. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 WI App 58, 389 Wis. 2d
104, 936 N. W. 2d 404.
No. 20–210. Jing Shu Zheng v. Ellis et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 551.
No. 20–213. Dey v. Li-Huei Tsai et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–218. Abascal-Montalvo v. City of New York, New
York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 179 App. Div. 3d 620, 114 N. Y. S. 3d 879.
No. 20 – 225. Muenster v. Disciplinary Board of the
Washington State Bar Assn. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 195 Wash. 2d 276, 457 P. 3d 1139.
No. 20–229. Woolen v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–235. Mierzwa v. Dudek et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 105.
No. 20–236. Wells v. Nelson et al. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–242. Cave v. Delta Dental of California et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed.
Appx. 430.
No. 20–243. Robison v. Citibank, N. A., et al. Sup. Ct. Fla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–246. Pence et al. v. VNB New York, LLC, as Suc-
cessor by Merger to VNB New York Corp., as Successor
in Interest to the Park Avenue Bank. Ct. App. Ky. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–247. Belanus v. Dutton et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 1014.
No. 20–248. Rounds v. Koch et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

ORDERS 1075
592 U. S.
N
ovember 2, 2020
No. 20–262. Alex et al. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., et al.
C
. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed.
Appx. 290.
No. 20–264. Bona v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (2d) 160581, 118 N. E.
3d 1272.
No. 20–270. Rosas v. R. K. Kenzie Corp. et al. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 933.
No. 20–275. Boyd v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 254.
No. 20–284. Barone v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–290. Meyers et al. v. City of New York, New
York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
812 Fed. Appx. 11.
No. 20–323. Barth v. City of Peabody, Massachusetts.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–328. Wilson, as Executor of the Estate of Wil-
son v. Dallas County Hospital District, dba Parkland
Health and Hospital System. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–329. Sowell et al. v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost,
LLP, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
807 Fed. Appx. 115.
No. 20–339. Winer v. Negron et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 660.
No. 20–341. McDaniel v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–342. Kyko Global Inc. et al. v. Bhongir. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 148.
No. 20–358. Henry v. Johnson et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 1005.
No. 20–372. Phillips v. Chappell, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 778 Fed. Appx. 521.

1076 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 2, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–373. Abrams v. Newsom, Governor of California.
C
. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed.
Appx. 305.
No. 20–383. PAR, Inc., et al. v. Richards. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 965.
No. 20–384. Corn et al. v. Mississippi Department of
Public Safety et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 954 F. 3d 268.
No. 20–390. Mack v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 296 So. 3d 906.
No. 20–411. Wash v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 12th App. Dist.,
Preble County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020-Ohio-
152.
No. 20–415. Aleman v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 469 Md. 397, 230 A. 3d 97.
No. 20–420. Jordan v. Department of Labor. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 557.
No. 20–5217. Sparre v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 289 So. 3d 839.
No. 20–5395. Shefeld v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
800 Fed. Appx. 281.
No. 20–5452. Thorpe v. Swidler et al. Super. Ct. N. J.,
App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5454. Shields v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 786.
No. 20–5455. Sepehry-Fard v. Aurora Bank, FSB, et al.
Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5459. Earl v. Virginia. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 201.
No. 20–5461. Camilo v. New Jersey State Parole Board.
Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1077
592 U. S.
N
ovember 2, 2020
No. 20–5462. Ellison v. Neuschmid, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir
. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5466. Cone v. Dowling, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 523.
No. 20–5467. Lopez v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 595 S. W. 3d 897.
No. 20–5468. Manning v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5471. Daniels v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5483. Black v. Robinson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5484. Abdulrazzak v. Smith et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 48.
No. 20–5492. Johnston v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 619.
No. 20–5493. Reed v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5495. Sanchez v. United States et al. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 936.
No. 20–5500. Spataru v. Antonio Suarez et al. Sup. Ct.
Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5501. Hersh v. Garman, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5502. Kirk v. Richardson et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5505. Johnson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 285 So. 3d 940.
No. 20–5509. Pugh v. Deloach, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

1078 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 2, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5511. Pittman v. Pittman. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st) 161316–U.
No. 20–5512. Miller v. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court of
the United States, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5516. Garbarini v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5518. Vance v. Buchanan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5521. Williams v. Kelly, Assistant Warden, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed.
Appx. 353.
No. 20–5522. Blount v. Beecher. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5526. Blanco v. Asuncion, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5529. Bernard v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5538. Boone v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5541. Sachs v. Bank of America, N. A. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5545. Klebba-Shulga v. Shulga. App. Ct. Ill., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st)
182028, 144 N. E. 3d 574.
No. 20–5547. Baker v. Magistrate Court of Georgia, Tal-
bot County. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5550. Lindbloom v. Manatee County, Florida,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808
Fed. Appx. 745.
No. 20–5551. Ohio ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex et al. Sup. Ct.
Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 Ohio St. 3d 317,
2020-Ohio-411, 150 N. E. 3d 907.

ORDERS 1079
592 U. S.
N
ovember 2, 2020
No. 20–5556. Espinosa Dorantes v. Genovese, Warden.
C
. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5567. Ames v. HSBC Bank, USA, N. A. Ct. App.
Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 Wash. App. 2d
1013.
No. 20–5570. Moore v. Stirling, Director, South Caro-
lina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 174.
No. 20–5591. Edwards v. Frakes, Director, Nebraska
Department of Correctional Services. Ct. App. Neb.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 Neb. App. xx.
No. 20–5592. Lipsey v. Goree et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5593. Earp v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 778 Fed. Appx. 246.
No. 20–5594. Lucy v. Estate of Fox. Ct. Civ. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5618. Riley v. Noeth, Superintendent, Attica
Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 7.
No. 20–5629. Waller v. Laughlin, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5651. Gish v. Hepp, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 597.
No. 20–5671. Ward v. Michigan Attorney Grievance Com-
mission. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5679. Tanamor-Steffan v. Barr, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5694. Endsley v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5698. Hernandez v. Shinn, Director, Arizona De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

1080 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 2, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5699. Muhammad v. Nebraska. Ct. App. Neb. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 28 Neb. App. xxiv.
No. 20–5700. Moss v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 3d 887.
No. 20–5708. Miranda v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 484 Mass. 799, 146
N. E. 3d 435.
No. 20–5716. Ziegenfuss v. Mackey et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5729. Westmoreland v. Johnson, Warden, et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5754. Karupaiyan v. New York City Department
of Education. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5758. Woodard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5769. Beauchamp v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5771. Nixon v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5772. Portanova v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 252.
No. 20–5779. Woods v. South Carolina Department of
Health and Human Services et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 199.
No. 20–5781. AbMuhammad v. Nebraska. Dist. Ct. Neb.,
Lancaster County. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5787. Godard v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 209.
No. 20–5792. Pierce v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 111.
No. 20–5798. Velasquez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 655.
No. 20–5799. Davis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 389.

ORDERS 1081
592 U. S.
N
ovember 2, 2020
No. 20–5805. Resnick v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 196.
No. 20–5806. Griego v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5809. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 421.
No. 20–5812. Dunlap v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 593.
No. 20–5818. Johnston v. Ransom, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5825. Nance v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 204.
No. 20–5829. Fruit v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 264.
No. 20–5832. Graham v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5860. Antonio Wooten v. Montgomery, Warden.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed.
Appx. 124.
No. 20–5884. Giese v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 6. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5895. Lowe v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5902. Sexton v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1098. National Football League et al. v. Ninth
Inning, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 933 F. 3d 1136.
Statement of Justice Kavanaugh respecting the denial of
certiorari.
In this antitrust case, the plaintiffs challenged the National
Football League's contract with DirecTV for the television rights
to out-of-market games. That contract has been in place for 26

1082 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 2, 2020 592 U. S.
years. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. But the
Cour
t of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs' complaint
suffciently alleged that the contract may be illegal under the
antitrust laws. Ordinarily, a decision of such legal and economic
signifcance might warrant this Court's review. But the case
comes to us at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and the interlocutory
posture is a factor counseling against this Court's review at this
time. See Abbott v. Veasey, 580 U. S. 1104, 1105 (2017) (Roberts,
C. J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
I write separately simply to explain that the denial of certiorari
should not necessarily be viewed as agreement with the legal
analysis of the Court of Appeals.
Under the existing contract, the 32 NFL teams have authorized
the NFL to sell the television rights for out-of-market games to
a single buyer, DirecTV. The plaintiffs argue, and the Court of
Appeals agreed, that antitrust law may require each team to ne-
gotiate an individualized contract for televising only its own
games. But that conclusion appears to be in substantial tension
with antitrust principles and precedents. The NFL and its mem-
ber teams operate as a joint venture. See Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc., 593 F. 2d 1173, 1179 (CADC 1978). And antitrust law likely
does not require that the NFL and its member teams compete
against each other with respect to television rights. Cf. Ameri-
can Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U. S. 183, 202
(2010) (“NFL teams . . . must cooperate in the production and
scheduling of games”); R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 278 (1978).
Moreover, the plaintiffs may not have antitrust standing to sue
the NFL and the individual teams. This Court's case law “au-
thorizes suits by direct purchasers but bars suits by indirect pur-
chasers.” Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 587 U. S. 273, 279 (2019). The
plaintiffs here did not purchase a product from the NFL or any team,
and may therefore be barred from bringing suit against the NFL
and its teams under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977).
In sum, the defendants—the NFL, its teams, and DirecTV—
have substantial arguments on the law. If the defendants do not
prevail at summary judgment or at trial, they may raise those
legal arguments again in a new petition for certiorari, as
appropriate.
No. 19–1412. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the con-

ORDERS 1083
592 U. S.
N
ovember 2, 9, 2020
sideration or decision of this petition.* Reported below: 945
F
. 3d 606.
No. 19–7309. Dailey v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motions of
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. and Conserva-
tives Concerned About the Death Penalty for leave to fle briefs
as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
279 So. 3d 1208.
No. 20–5557. Crownhart v. STRiVE. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition.*
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–8227. Carrier v. Colorado, 590 U. S. 982. Motion
for leave to fle petition for rehearing denied.
November 9, 2020
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20 – 5624. Francisco Vega v. Poppell, Secretary,
Florida Department of Children and Families. C. A. 11th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 20–5638. Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 721.
No. 20 – 5971. Crosby v. True, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Jus-
tice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this
motion and this petition. Reported below: 826 Fed. Appx. 699.
*See also note, 592 U. S. 1071.

1084 OCTOBER
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November 9, 2020 592 U. S.
Miscellaneous Orders
N
o. 20A56. Timbes v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
Application for stay, addressed to justice Sotomayor and re-
ferred to the Court, denied.
No. 20M34. Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas; and
No. 20M35. Kitchen v. BASF. Motions to direct the Clerk
to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 20M36. Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee. Mo-
tion for leave to fle petition for writ of certiorari under seal with
redacted copies for the public record granted.
No. 18–1447. Republic of Hungary et al. v. Simon et al.
C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 591 U. S. 1025.] Motion of
the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu-
ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 19–351. Federal Republic of Germany et al. v. Phil-
ipp et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 591 U. S. 1025.]
Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in
oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted.]
No. 19–422. Collins et al. v. Mnuchin, Secretary of the
Treasury, et al.; and
No. 19–563. Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.
v. Collins et al. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 591 U. S.
1028.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for enlargement of
time for oral argument and for divided argument granted, and
the time is allotted as follows: 35 minutes for the Acting Solicitor
General, 15 minutes for the Court-appointed amicus curiae, and
40 minutes for Patrick Collins et al.
No. 19–508. AMG Capital Management, LLC, et al. v.
Federal Trade Commission. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 591 U. S. 1028.] Case no longer consolidated with No.
19–825, Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC.
No. 19–511. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 591 U. S. 1028.] Motion of petitioner for di-
vided argument granted.
No. 19–825. Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau
Center, LLC, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 591

ORDERS 1085
592 U. S.
N
ovember 9, 2020
U. S. 1028.] Case no longer consolidated with No. 19–508, AMG
C
apital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission. The
July 9, 2020, order granting the petition for writ of certiorari
in this case is vacated. Justice Barrett took no part in the
consideration of this order.
No. 19–1434. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., et al.;
No. 19–1452. Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al. v. Arthrex,
Inc., et al.; and
No. 19–1458. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1000.]
Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to dispense with printing
joint appendix granted.
No. 19–8860. In re Arunachalam. Motion of petitioner for
reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris [592 U. S. 911] denied. The Chief Justice took no part
in the consideration or decision of this motion.
No. 20–5118. Donahue v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 904] denied.
No. 20–6079. In re McKenzie. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 19–8766. In re Wright. Petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 20–354. In re Kilroy. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
No. 19–8767. In re Wright. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition.
No. 20–5855. In re Benitez. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
No. 20–5889. In re Anaya. Petition for writ of prohibition
denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 19–1442. Carr et al. v. Saul, Commissioner of Social
Security. C. A. 10th Cir.; and

1086 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 9, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–105. Davis et al. v. Saul, Commissioner of Social
Security
; and Hilliard v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated,
and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument. Reported
below: No. 19–1442, 961 F. 3d 1267; No. 20–105, 963 F. 3d 790 (frst
judgment) and 964 F. 3d 759 (second judgment).
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1398. Lieu, United States Congressman, et al. v.
Federal Election Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–1475. Duke University v. Biomarin Pharmaceuti-
cal Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
779 Fed. Appx. 750.
No. 19–8641. Hanna v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–8889. Guagua-Alarcon v. United States; and
No. 19–8910. Cabezas-Montano v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 567.
No. 20–112. Hernandez v. PNMAC Mortgage Opportu-
nity Fund Investors, LLC, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–187. Chukwuani v. Solon City School District.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–260. Personal Audio, LLC v. CBS Corp. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 1348.
No. 20–263. Blanchard-Daigle, Representative of the
Estate of Blanchard v. Geers et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 113.
No. 20–267. Braunstein v. Braunstein. Sup. Ct. N. H.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 173 N. H. 38, 236 A. 3d 870.
No. 20–277. Adams et al. v. Parker et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–281. Daker v. Perry, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 648.

ORDERS 1087
592 U. S.
N
ovember 9, 2020
No. 20–288. ALCR, LLC v. Swain et al. Ct. App. Ariz.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 247 Ariz. 405, 450 P. 3d 270.
No. 20–289. Retirement Plans Committee of IBM et al.
v. Jander et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 962 F. 3d 85.
No. 20–336. Kelly et al. v. Motiaytis. App. Ct. Ill., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–340. Perrier-Bilbo v. United States et al. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 413.
No. 20–343. Estate of Maurice et al. v. Life Insurance
Company of North America. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 499.
No. 20–348. Mercer v. Vega. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 119.
No. 20–369. Vana v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 156.
No. 20–417. Bhardwaj v. State Bar of California. Sup.
Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–421. Progressive Lawn Managers, Inc. v. Lawn
Managers, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 959 F. 3d 903.
No. 20–430. Henning v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 430.
No. 20–436. Haugabook v. Bery, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–446. Richards v. Barrett, Secretary of the Air
Force, et al. C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–455. Carpenter v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 20–460. Boggs v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 223.
No. 20–462. Kaiser v. Mortt, Assistant United States
Attorney. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

1088 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 9, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–487. Ho Wong Jeong v. Cabrera et al. C. A. 4th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 185.
No. 20–501. Shaffer, as Executrix of the Estate of
Chuckrow v. Snyder, Commissioner, Massachusetts De-
partment of Revenue. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 485 Mass. 198, 148 N. E. 3d 1197.
No. 20–5600. Harris v. Arizona et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5602. Farrington v. U. S. Bank Trust N. A., as
Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed.
Appx. 490.
No. 20–5608. Besoyan v. Yee et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20 – 5616. Knot ts v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5626. Whitehead v. New Mexico. Dist. Ct. N. M.,
Eddy County. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5627. Woodard v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 179
App. Div. 3d 1504, 119 N. Y. S. 3d 334.
No. 20–5631. Valley v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5632. Shawn v. Eighth Judicial District Court
of Nevada, Clark County. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 136 Nev. 876, 457 P. 3d 968.
No. 20 – 5633. Rowe v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 182.
No. 20–5634. Snow v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5641. Turbi v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 773.

ORDERS 1089
592 U. S.
N
ovember 9, 2020
No. 20–5642. Wooten v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
p
artment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
808 Fed. Appx. 255.
No. 20–5675. Trevino v. Dotson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 145.
No. 20–5678. Logan v. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
802 Fed. Appx. 838.
No. 20–5712. Coleman v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 429.
No. 20–5722. Carter v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas De-
partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5732. Seadin v. Williams, Director, Colorado De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 673.
No. 20–5736. Moran v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5765. Borden v. Swarthout, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5790. Nguedi v. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813
Fed. Appx. 616.
No. 20–5803. Brown v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 225 A. 3d 1167.
No. 20–5833. Fortier v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 563.
No. 20–5836. Diggles v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 551.
No. 20–5841. Nguedi v. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813
Fed. Appx. 616.
No. 20–5842. Yang Mei v. Mayor and City Council of Bal-
timore. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City, Md. Certiorari denied.

1090 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 9, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5844. Santamaria v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 266.
No. 20–5850. Avery v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 279.
No. 20–5851. Badgett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 536.
No. 20–5853. Acosta-Leyva v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 855.
No. 20–5854. Muller v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 701.
No. 20–5857. Barrie v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 124.
No. 20–5861. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5862. Goldston v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5864. Noe v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5865. Doe v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 655.
No. 20–5868. Acosta-Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 854.
No. 20–5871. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 590.
No. 20–5872. Sanchez-Chacon v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 785.
No. 20–5873. Stamps v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 871.
No. 20–5877. Morancy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 432.
No. 20–5879. Phillips v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 144.
No. 20–5880. Deshpande v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 834.

ORDERS 1091
592 U. S.
N
ovember 9, 2020
No. 20– 5881. Lira-Ramirez v. United States (Reported
below:
951 F. 3d 1258); Fernandez-Casas v. United States (806
Fed. Appx. 673); Martinez v. United States (804 Fed. Appx.
1010); Hernandez-Mendez v. United States (806 Fed. Appx.
674); and Rochel-Cervantes v. United States (806 Fed. Appx.
674). C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5882. Nino-Guerrero v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 861.
No. 20–5885. Perez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 315.
No. 20–5890. Benton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 696.
No. 20–5891. Alvarez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 562.
No. 20–5894. Nava v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 581.
No. 20–5900. Sellers et al. v. Wyoming et al. Sup. Ct.
Wyo. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5903. Younger v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 789.
No. 20–5905. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5909. Conerly v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 95.
No. 20–5910. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 167.
No. 20–5912. Henry v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 107.
No. 20–5913. Cox v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5918. Locke v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5925. Mendoza-Sanchez v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 158.

1092 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 9, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5926. Candia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 20 – 5928. Archer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5929. Jones v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 870.
No. 20–5930. Palacios-Villalon v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 868.
No. 20–5933. Grifn v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 683.
No. 20–5936. Carter v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 1007.
No. 20–5937. Pazos Cingari v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 1301.
No. 20–5940. Weightman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 896.
No. 20–5942. Tran v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5946. Darden v. von Blanckensee, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 820.
No. 20–5947. Shults v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 296.
No. 20–5948. Sevier v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5953. McCoy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 223.
No. 20–5956. Cope v. Lee, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 370.
No. 20–5957. Caldwell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 1067.
No. 20–5960. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 345.
No. 20–5961. Gant v. Williams et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 754.

ORDERS 1093
592 U. S.
N
ovember 9, 2020
No. 20–5962. Diaz-Colon v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5967. Mayville v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 825.
No. 20–5969. Dinkins v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5980. Brawner, aka Barber v. United States. Ct.
App. D. C. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5983. Folk v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 597.
No. 20–5988. Yaghi v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 193.
No. 20–5995. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 287.
No. 20 – 5999. Porter v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 A. 3d 846.
No. 20–6003. Andre v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 409.
No. 20–6006. Washington v. Willett, Superintendent,
Meherrin River Regional Jail. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 202.
No. 20–6007. Wright v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 676.
No. 20–6009. Thornton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 397.
No. 20–86. Daniels, Director, Nevada Department of
Corrections, et al. v. Ross. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of re-
spondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 1160.
No. 20–285. Clark v. Braggs, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 782 Fed.
Appx. 741.
No. 20–307. Mireskandari v. Mayne et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of Society of Black Lawyers for leave to fle brief as

1094 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 9, 10, 13, 2020 592 U. S.
amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800
F
ed. Appx. 519.
No. 20–309. Reardon v. New Jersey et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition.
No. 20–5878. Murray v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 386.
Justice Sotomayor, respecting the denial of certiorari.
I concur for the reasons set out in St. Hubert v. United States,
590 U. S. 914 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting denial
of certiorari).
Rehearing Denied
No. 19 –1289. Benavides v. Barr, At torney General,
et al., 592 U. S. 921;
No. 19–1422. Jackson v. Brun, Judge, et al., 592 U. S.
921;
No. 19–5497. McGill v. United States, 590 U. S. 945;
No. 19–7542. Pelmear et al. v. O’Connor et al., 589 U. S.
1307; and
No. 20–32. Morsa v. Iancu, Director, United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Ofce, 592 U. S. 95. Petitions for rehear-
ing denied.
No. 19–7266. Stone v. Centene Corp., 589 U. S. 1225. Mo-
tion for leave to fle petition for rehearing denied.
November 10, 2020
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20–355. Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational
Products Inc. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari dismissed
under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 860.
November 13, 2020
Certiorari Granted
No. 20–107. Cedar Point Nursery et al. v. Hassid et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 923 F. 3d
524.

ORDERS 1095
592
U. S.
November 16, 2020
C
ertiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 20–140. Heidari v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re-
manded for further consideration in light of Nasrallah v. Barr,
590 U. S. 573 (2020). Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 444.
No. 20–5216. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re-
manded for further consideration in light of Davis v. United
States, 589 U. S. 345 (2020) (per curiam). Reported below: 795
Fed. Appx. 267.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20– 5662. Sayed v. Williams, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections. Ct. App. Colo. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–6062. Akers v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Justice
Kagan and Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this motion and this petition. Reported below: 807
Fed. Appx. 861.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A70. Valentine et al. v. Collier, Executive Direc-
tor, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Application to vacate stay, presented to Justice Alito,
and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Justice Sotomayor, w ith whom Justice Kagan joi ns,
dissenting.
I write again about the Wallace Pack Unit (Pack Unit), a geriat-
ric prison in southeast Texas that has been ravaged by COVID–
19. See Valentine v. Collier, 590 U. S. 935 (2020) (statement
respecting denial of application to vacate stay). The Pack Unit
is a “ `tinderbox' ” for COVID–19, not only because it is a dormitory-
style facility, “making social distancing in the living quarters

1096 OCTOBER
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
impossible,” but also because the vast majority of its inmates are
at
least 65 years old, and many suffer from chronic health condi-
tions and disabilities. Valentine v. Collier, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308,
322, 325 (SD Tex. 2020). These inmates are some of the most
vulnerable in the country to the current pandemic.
COVID–19 was frst detected in the Pack Unit in April 2020,
after one inmate, Leonard Clerkly, contracted the virus and died.
Id., at 312. Since then, over 500 inmates have tested positive
(more than 40% of the inmate population), and 19 more have died.
See 490 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1135, 1164 (SD Tex. 2020). The Pack
Unit's 20 deaths account for 12% of all confrmed and presumed
deaths from COVID–19 in the entire Texas Department of Crimi-
nal Justice (TDCJ) prison system. See Tex. Dept. of Criminal
Justice, COVID–19 Dashboard, https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/covid-
19/mac_dashboard.html.
In July, the District Court held a weeks-long trial that revealed
rampant fai lures by the pr ison to protec t its i nmates from
COVID–19. In September, the District Court entered a perma-
nent injunction requiring prison offcials to implement basic safety
procedures. The Fifth Circuit, however, stayed the injunction
pending appeal. Now, two inmates, Laddy Valentine and Richard
King, ask this Court to vacate the stay. Because they have met
their burden to justify such relief, I would grant the application.
I
Valentine and King are 69 and 73 years old, respectively. 490
F. Supp. 3d, at 1128. Already in a high-risk category due to their
ages, both suffer from multiple health conditions that increase the
likelihood of serious illness and death from COVID–19, including
diabetes, hypertension, and kidney disease. Ibid. Earlier this
year, Valentine and King sued the senior warden of the Pack
Unit (Robert Herrera), the executive director of the TDCJ (Bryan
Collier), and the TDCJ on behalf of a class of fellow inmates,
alleging that prison offcials were violating the inmates' Eighth
Amendment rights by failing to protect them adequately from
COVID–19.
1
Following an 18-day trial, the District Court made detailed
fndings of fact about the offcials' “consistent non-compliance with
1
The inmates also raised claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). Because the Eighth Amendment claims provide a suffcient basis to
grant the requested relief, I do not address the ADA claims.

ORDERS 1097
1095
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
basic public health protocols” and failure “to take obvious precau-
ti
onary public health measures upon which all medical profession-
als would agree.” Id., at 1167, 1168. The District Court's fnd-
ings covered the gamut of essential precautions, including social
distancing, mask wearing, proper cleaning and sanitization, test-
ing, quarantining, and contact tracing. Prison staff, for example,
regularly failed to wear masks, as documented in the prison's
own educational video about COVID–19. Id., at 1147–1148. The
prison's communal showers were not cleaned between uses by
different dorms, and disabled inmates had to sit shoulder to shoul-
der on benches while waiting for a disability-accessible shower to
become available. Id., at 1139, 1146. Inmates were responsible
for cleaning the dorms during the outbreak, with no additional
staffng, training, or cleaning supplies. Id., at 1143. This require-
ment was especially diffcult for Harold Dove, who is wheelchair-
bound, legally blind, and paralyzed on the right side of his body.
Id., at 1145. He and others repeatedly notifed the prison that
he was physically unable to clean his assigned dorm, but offcials
continued to assign him cleaning duties for months, at the height
of the outbreak. Ibid. One of the wardens later testifed that
he was not concerned about assigning cleaning duties to disabled
inmates because a disabled inmate “ `could put a broom against
his neck and push it with a wheelchair.' ” Id., at 1144–1145.
Based on the extensive trial record, the District Court entered
a permanent injunction requiring the prison to establish and im-
plement minimum safety protocols. These include “regular clean-
ing of common surfaces,” “unrestricted access to hand soap,”
“wearing of [personal protective equipment (PPE)] among TDCJ
staff,” weekly testing, contact tracing, and quarantining inmates
who are awaiting test results. Id., at 1175. Some of these proce-
dures are already required by statewide policy. See Electronic
Case Filing in No. 4:20–cv–1115, Doc. 94–4 (SD Tex., May 13,
2020) (ECF).
The Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal, conclud-
ing that respondents were likely to prevail because the inmates
failed, before fling suit, to seek relief through the prison's internal
grievance process, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Ac t (PLRA). See 978 F. 3d 154, 162 (2020). In the Fi f th
Circuit's view, it was “irrelevant” if that grievance process was
“ineffective” or “ `operated too slowly' ” in light of the ongoing
outbreak. Ibid. The court also concluded, notwithstanding the

1098 OCTOBER
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
District Court's fnding of systematic “shortcomings” at the Pack
U
nit, that the inmates' claims would likely fail on the merits
because the prison's “actions were reasonable.” Id., at 163–164.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit determined that, absent a stay, the in-
junction would irreparably harm prison offcials by interfering
with their ability to manage the Pack Unit, and that the public
interest favored a stay. Id., at 165–166. This application
followed.
II
The bar for vacating a stay is high. Among other things, the
decision at issue must be “demonstrably wrong.” Western Air-
lines, Inc. v. Teamsters, 480 U. S. 1301, 1305 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
in chambers). When this Court ruled on the prior application in
this case, challenging the Fifth Circuit's stay of the preliminary
injunction, the limited evidentiary record made it diffcult to con-
clude that this stringent standard was met. Now, with the bene-
ft of the District Court's detailed factfnding, no such diffculty
remains. The Fifth Circuit demonstrably erred with respect to
both the threshold issue of exhaustion under the PLRA and the
merits of the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims.
A
Under the PLRA, inmates seeking to bring federal claims con-
cerning prison conditions must frst exhaust “available” adminis-
trative remedies. 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a). In Ross v. Blake, 578
U. S. 632 (2016), this Court held that remedies are not available,
and thus exhaustion is not required, when “an administrative pro-
cedure . . . operates as a simple dead end—with offcers unable
or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved in-
mates.” Id., at 643. In other words, even if an internal process
is “offcially on the books,” it is not “ `available' ” if, as a practical
matter, it “is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Ibid.
That was the case here, as the District Court found. 490 F. Supp.
3d, at 1162–1163. The prison's grievance process is lengthy, begin-
ning with mandatory informal dispute resolution and followed by up
to 160 days of formal review. Id., at 1154–1155. Remarkably,
when this suit was fled, “COVID-related grievances were not
treated differently from other types of grievances,” despite inmates'
attempts to designate them as emergencies. Id., at 1155. Both
Valentine and King fled grievances that remained pending for over
two months during the outbreak. Id., at 1162. By respondent Col-

ORDERS 1099
1095
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
lier's own admission, the prison's policy “ `did not give adequate
attenti
on to the COVID–19 issue.' ” 2020 WL 3491999, *6 (SD
Tex., June 27, 2020).
Given the speed at which the contagion spread, the 160-day
grievance process offered no realistic prospect of relief. In just
116 days, nearly 500 inmates contracted COVID–19, leading to 74
hospitalizations and 19 deaths. 490 F. Supp. 3d, at 1135. At
least one inmate, Alvin Norris, died before the prison took any
steps in response to his grievance. Id., at 1162–1163. Both Val-
entine and another inmate, Gary Butaud, contracted COVID–19
while their grievances remained pending. Id., at 1156.
The Fifth Circuit erred as a matter of law when it disregarded
these fndings by the District Court. The Fifth Circuit seized
on language in Ross rejecting a judicially created exception to
exhaustion for “ `special circumstances,' ” and concluded that “spe-
cial circumstances—even threats posed by global pandemics—do
not matter.” 978 F. 3d, at 161 (citing 578 U. S., at 639). But
the special-circumstances exception rejected in Ross applied when
inmates failed to exhaust available remedies. See 578 U. S., at
637. In rejecting such an exception, this Court nonetheless rec-
ognized that the PLRA “contains its own, textual exception to
mandatory exhaustion” that applies when remedies are not “avail-
able.” Id., at 642. Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's analysis,
consideration of “the real-world workings of prison grievance
systems” is central to assessing whether a process makes adminis-
trative remedies available. Id., at 643. When this suit was fled,
the Pack Unit's process plainly did not. As the District Court
put it, the PLRA “cannot be understood as prohibiting judicial
relief while inmates are dying.” 490 F. Supp. 3d, at 1174, n. 13.
B
The Fifth Circuit's evaluation of the merits of the inmates'
clai ms was a lso demonstrably wrong. To prove an Eighth
Amendment claim for unconstitutional prison conditions, an in-
mate must show that he was exposed to an objective risk of
serious harm and that prison offcials subjectively acted with de-
liberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Bren-
nan, 511 U. S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference is a “state
of mind” equivalent to “recklessly disregarding ” a known and
substantial risk. Id., at 835–836. Prison offcials thus may not
“ignore a condition of confnement that is sure or very likely to

1100 OCTOBER
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
cause serious illness and needless suffering.” Helling v. McKin-
ney
, 509 U. S. 25, 33 (1993).
Here, the dangers of COVID–19 to these especially vulnerable
inmates were undisputed and, indeed, “indisputable.” 490 F.
Supp. 3d, at 1164. The District Court frst found that respond-
ents were subjectively aware of those risks because they were
obvious. Id., at 1165 (citing Farmer, 511 U. S., at 842). Then,
weighing the evidence and “competing narratives” presented by
the parties at trial, the court concluded that the offcials' conduct,
communications, and omissions refected deliberate indifference.
490 F. Supp. 3d, at 1165, 1166.
Each of these factual fndings must be reviewed deferentially
under the clear-error standard. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S.
863, 881 (2015); Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F. 3d 584, 592 (CA5 2015).
“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-
fnder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” An-
derson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 574 (1985). “If the district
court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even
though convinced that . . . it would have weighed the evidence
differently.” Id., at 573–574.
Here, the District Court's assessment of the evidence was not
only permissible, but fully supported. The District Court cited
specifc evidence that respondents knew not only of the dangers
of COVID–19, but also of the dangers specifcally created by their
inadequate response to the outbreak. For example, respondent
Collier received a text message on April 26, 2020, informing him
of the dangers of the prison's policy of removing infected inmates
from quarantine after 14 days, without confrming a negative test
frst: “FYI One of our frst positives is still testing positive and
shedding virus at 21 days. The state['s] 14 day isolation with no
retesting is questionable at best.” 490 F. Supp. 3d, at 1152. Yet
inmates who had contracted COVID–19 testifed that, following
the 14-day period, they were “neither medically examined by a
doctor [n]or retested for COVID–19 before returning to negative
dorms.” Ibid. One inmate, Roger Beal, informed medical and
security staff that he should not be transferred after his 14-day
period ended because he was still symptomatic; he even fled a
formal grievance warning that he posed a risk to other inmates.
Ibid. Nonetheless, Beal was transferred to a dorm for uninfected

ORDERS 1101
1095
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
inmates after the minimum quarantine period ended, despite his
conti
nuing symptoms. Ibid.
Rather than contending with these facts, the Fifth Circuit side-
stepped the clear-error standard by claiming that its review was
not “fact-specifc.” 978 F. 3d, at 165. But the Fifth Circuit's
analysis makes clear that it substituted its own view of the facts
for that of the District Court. For instance, in highlighting the
prison's policy requiring masks and social distancing, the Fifth
Circuit chose to ignore the District Court's express fnding that
“staff non-compliance with regard to wearing PPE and social dis-
tancing were regular, daily features of life in the Pack Unit.”
490 F. Supp. 3d, at 1167. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit gave special
weight to the prison's testing efforts, while disregarding the criti-
cal faws identifed by the District Court. To start, no mass test-
ing occurred until about a month after the prison's frst casualty.
Id., at 1168. Even then, inmates had to wait one to two weeks
to get their results, which, according to the prison's own experts,
was “simply too long to effectively contain the spread of the
virus.” Ibid. Respondents knew of tests with shorter turn-
around times but never explored the possibility of using them.
Ibid. Perhaps most troublingly, the prison continued to house
inmates diagnosed with COVID–19 together with inmates who
tested negative—a failure that respondents obscured by “misrep-
resent[ing] certain facts” to the District Court. Id., at 1134, 1152.
In short, far from “dispell[ing]” an inference of deliberate indiffer-
ence, the prison's actions highlighted by the Fifth Circuit only
confrm it. See 978 F. 3d, at 164.
At bottom, the Fifth Circuit rejected the District Court's care-
ful analysis of subjective deliberate indifference based on the
Fifth Circuit's view that respondents took reasonable “affrmative
steps” to respond to the virus. Ibid. But merely taking affrm-
ative steps is not suffcient when offcials know that those steps
are sorely inadequate and leave inmates exposed to substantial
risks. That was the case here: The District Court found that
respondents “were well aware of the shortcomings” in their re-
sponse “and nevertheless chose to stay the course, even after a
number of inmates died.” 490 F. Supp. 3d, at 1167. Respondent
Collier even admitted that prison offcials “ `were not doing every-
thing [they] should have been . . . . Thin[g]s like restricting, isolat-
ing, PPE access, cleaning supplies.' ” Id., at 1154. To be sure,

1102 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
the “Eighth Amendment does not mandate perfect implementa-
ti
on,” 978 F. 3d, at 165, but it also does not set a bar so low that
any response by offcials will satisfy it. Given the evidence in
the record, there is no basis to overturn the District Court's
fnding of deliberate indifference.
III
The Fifth Circuit's decision creates a risk of serious and irrepa-
rable harm to the inmates that far outweighs any risk of harm to
respondents. See Western Airlines, 480 U. S., at 1305. The
Fifth Circuit concluded that “a stay will not substantially harm”
the inmates because the number of positive cases in the Pack
Unit “has been drastically reduced.” 978 F. 3d, at 166. It is
true that, after a months-long outbreak that claimed 20 lives and
infected over 40% of the Pack Unit's inmate population, the num-
ber of active positive cases has fallen. But the threat of a second
outbreak is “ongoing.” 490 F. Supp. 3d, at 1172. On the same
day that respondents represented to this Court that active cases
had reached zero, the prison reported three active cases among
prison employees and one among inmates. See Reply Brief 2.
As the last outbreak demonstrated, COVID–19 can overtake a
prison in a matter of weeks. On May 9, the Pack Unit reported
8 positive cases; in less than three weeks, there were over 200
cases, 5 deaths, and 12 hospitalizations. See 490 F. Supp. 3d, at
1134–1135. Oral argument before the Fifth Circuit is weeks
away, with a decision on the merits even further. If the injunc-
tion's safety measures are not implemented and maintained, this
“relentless pandemic” may again engulf the Pack Unit. Id., at 1172.
On the other hand, respondents make only a generalized claim
that the injunction interferes with their ability to manage the
Pack Unit. They fail to explain how any particular measure does
so. See Brief in Opposition 27–29.
2
The permanent injunction
2
In addressing the merits of the inmates' ADA claims, respondents argue
that they cannot comply with the permanent injunction's requirement that
mobility-impaired inmates be given access to hand sanitizer. See 490 F.
Supp. 3d, at 1175. Hand sanitizer is an essential alternative to handwashing
for these inmates because “[i]n traveling to and from the sink to wash their
hands with soap and water, wheelchair-bound inmates must touch the tires
of their wheelchairs, which may track dirt, urine, fecal matter, or germs
from the foor.” Id., at 1142. Respondents claim that hand sanitizer cannot
be safely provided to these inmates because of the risk of “ `misuse.' ” Brief

ORDERS 1103
1095
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
imposes only basic safety measures using reasonable, fexible
ter
ms, such as the “regular cleaning of common surfaces with
bleach-based cleaning agents,” the “wearing of PPE among TDCJ
staff,” “weekly testing,” and “contact tracing.” 490 F. Supp. 3d,
at 1142. Respondents have admitted that some of these measures
are “medically necessary” and required by statewide policy, and
they claim that they have voluntarily implemented nearly all of
them.
3
Id., at 1147, 1151, 1174; Brief in Opposition 28. Respond-
ents also presented no evidence of “budgetary or fnancial con-
cerns” with the measures required by the injunction. 490 F.
Supp. 3d, at 1173–1174. They therefore fail to demonstrate that
they will suffer any harm from the injunction. If circumstances
change and respondents are able to show that a modifcation of
the injunction is warranted, the District Court has offered to hear
any such motion on 24 hours' notice. See ECF Doc. 422, p. 2.
***
The people incarcerated in the Pack Unit are some of our most
vulnerable citizens. They face severe risks of serious illness and
death from COVID–19, but are unable to take even the most basic
precautions against the virus on their own. If the prison fails to
enforce social distancing and mask wearing, perform regular test-
ing, and take other essential steps, the inmates can do nothing
but wait for the virus to take its toll. Twenty lives have been
in Opposition 26. But “TDCJ did not perform an analysis to determine
whether hand sanitizer could be provided to wheelchair-bound inmates at
Pack Unit.” 490 F. Supp. 3d, at 1142. At least one other TDCJ facility has
found a safe way for inmates to handle hand sanitizer, even requiring them
to rebottle it for use by TDCJ staff. Id., at 1143. Respondent Collier him-
self stated, “[I]f we need to [provide hand sanitizer to inmates] we know we
can fgure it out.” Ibid. Respondents simply chose not to.
3
Respondents' claim of compliance with the injunction underscores how
feasible and modest its measures are. Their claim does not, however, make
the injunction unnecessary. See Brief in Opposition 28. Like the District
Court, I do “not have confdence that, without an injunction in place, TDCJ
will continue to carry out policies that are appropriate to safeguard inmates'
health and safety.” 490 F. Supp. 3d, at 1172. They previously claimed that
they had substantially complied with the terms of the preliminary injunc-
tion, only for the truth to be exposed at trial. See 960 F. 3d 707 (CA5 2020)
(per curiam). If respondents truly intend to remain in compliance with the
permanent injunction, it is unclear why they are fghting so hard to over-
turn it.

1104 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 16, 2020 592 U. S.
lost a lready. I fear the st ay w i l l lead to fur ther, needless
suffer
ing.
Importantly, nothing in the Court's decision today prevents Val-
entine and King from returning to this Court if it becomes clear
that the risks they face as a result of respondents' conduct are
even graver than they already appear. Because I would not force
them to wait until it may be too late, I respectfully dissent.
No. 20M37. Cone v. Florida. Motion to direct the Clerk to
fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 19–8480. Caterbone v. National Security Agency.
C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order
denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 902]
denied.
No. 20–5308. Horton v. Methodist University, Inc. C. A.
4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris denied. Petitioner is allowed until December 7, 2020,
within which to pay the docketing fee required by this Court's
Rule 38(a).
No. 20–5693. In re Dizzley;
No. 20–5702. In re Osornio; and
No. 20–5808. In re Liverman. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus denied.
No. 20–5705. In re Sattereld. Motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ
of mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–5677. In re Wren; and
No. 20–5815. In re Wilcox. Petitions for writs of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1437. Vetcher v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 361.
No. 20–11. Alexis v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 722.
No. 20–126. Andalusian Global Designated Activity Co.
et al. v. Financial Oversight and Management Board for

ORDERS 1105
592 U. S.
N
ovember 16, 2020
Puerto Rico et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
por
ted below: 948 F. 3d 457.
No. 20–128. Big Port Service DMCC v. China Shipping
Container Lines Co. Ltd. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 481.
No. 20–134. Hernandez et al. v. Boles et al. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 251.
No. 20–300. Clark v. Clark. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 11 Wash. App. 2d 1070.
No. 20 – 310. Keach, Estate Representative of Post-
Effective Date Estate of Montreal, Maine, and Atlantic
Railway, Ltd. v. New Brunswick Southern Railway Co.,
Ltd., et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
953 F. 3d 29.
No. 20 – 312. Texas Brine Co., LLC, et al. v. Naquin,
Clerk, Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit. Sup.
Ct. La. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–324. Barclay v. Oregon Department of Justice
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–325. Whitserve LLC v. Donuts Inc. et al. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx.
929.
No. 20–337. Lynn v. Brown et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 156.
No. 20–344. Myers v. Myers et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 96 Mass. App. 1106, 137 N. E. 3d
1086.
No. 20–349. Pardes v. Wienick et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–352. Paine College v. Southern Association of
Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges, Inc. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx.
852.
No. 20–353. J. H., by Conservator, Harris v. Williamson
County, Tennessee, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 951 F. 3d 709.

1106 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 16, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–359. Pisztora et al. v. City of Pittsburgh, Penn-
syl
vania, et al. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 220 A. 3d 1207.
No. 20– 395. Rote v. Zweizig. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 645.
No. 20– 406. Marroquin-Perez v. Barr, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–416. Caldara et al. v. City of Boulder, Colorado,
et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 955
F. 3d 1175.
No. 20–424. IYM Technologies LLC v. RPX Corp. et al.
(two judgments). C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 796 Fed. Appx. 752 (frst judgment); 798 Fed. Appx. 642
(second judgment).
No. 20 – 431. Corrigan v. Grant County, Washington,
et al. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11
Wash. App. 2d 1034.
No. 20–469. Lindauer et al. v. Elna Sefcovic, LLC, et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d
660.
No. 20–484. Woods v. Storms et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 542.
No. 20–492. Gonzalez et al. v. Elna Sefcovic, LLC, et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed.
Appx. 752.
No. 20–497. Azeez v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–500. Madden v. Brennan, Postmaster General.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–513. Fuechtener v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–514. Sadjadi et al. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
816 Fed. Appx. 997.

ORDERS 1107
592 U. S.
N
ovember 16, 2020
No. 20–5296. A. I. v. M. A. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 20–5303. Dibble v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 159 Ohio St. 3d 322, 2020-Ohio-546, 150
N. E. 3d 912.
No. 20–5621. Simmons-Bey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 172.
No. 20–5657. Scott v. United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5663. Buonaiuto v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 A. 3d 849.
No. 20–5664. Hanserd v. Trierweiler, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5665. Gann v. Allison, Secretary, California De-
partment of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 283.
No. 20 – 5667. Tenaglia-Evans v. Evans. Sup. Ct. Del.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 225 A. 3d 1266.
No. 20–5680. Steele v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5683. Smith v. Hall, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5684. Schwindler v. Hatcher, Warden. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5696. Grandberry v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institu-
tions Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5697. Harris v. Smith. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5701. Narayan v. Prasad. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5703. Miller v. Phillips et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

1108 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 16, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5713. Baptichon v. United States et al. C. A.
D
. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 2.
No. 20–5723. Calhoun v. Florida Department of Correc-
tions. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5724. Johnson v. Gibson, Judge, et al. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5725. Lott v. Oseguera et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 883.
No. 20–5734. Flores v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 5th 371, 462 P. 3d 919.
No. 20 – 5735. Perry v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20– 5750. Staples v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5760. Frederickson v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 Cal. 5th 963, 457 P. 3d 1.
No. 20–5763. Akassy v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 75.
No. 20–5782. Warren v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 146 N. E. 3d 972.
No. 20–5797. Murray v. Rhode Island. Sup. Ct. R. I. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 216 A. 3d 1234.
No. 20–5800. Rose v. Guyer, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 1238.
No. 20–5802. Saunders v. Raybon, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 343.
No. 20–5822. Spears v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 429 S. C. 422, 839 S. E. 2d
450.
No. 20–5847. Hartz v. Washington Department of Cor-
rections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1109
592 U. S.
N
ovember 16, 2020
No. 20–5848. Gustafson v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certio-
rar
i denied. Reported below: 300 Ore. App. 438, 452 P. 3d 962.
No. 20–5866. Dicken v. Brewer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5869. Everett v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 164 So. 3d 747.
No. 20–5914. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 21.
No. 20–5951. Richards v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 961.
No. 20–5952. Muraca v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 545.
No. 20–5958. Fields v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 251.
No. 20–5976. Reynolds v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 185.
No. 20–5977. Atkins v. Brown et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5991. Reyes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 482.
No. 20–5992. Hicks v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6004. Alonso-Tobar v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 288.
No. 20–6005. Brancaccio v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 300 So. 3d 1185.
No. 20–6022. Bruten v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 486.
No. 20–6029. Tiempo-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 158.
No. 20–6030. Wyatt v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 908.
No. 20–6034. Thieme v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

1110 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 16, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–6041. Perry v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 20–6042. Bailey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 298.
No. 20–6044. Benjamin v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed. Appx. 30.
No. 20–6047. Shabazz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 919.
No. 20–6051. Ortiz-Torres v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6052. Conway v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6055. Weatherspoon v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 231.
No. 20–6057. Emmert v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 6058. Moore, aka Kit trell v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6067. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6070. Gilmore v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 997.
No. 20–6087. Lawrence v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1362. Laut v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 790 Fed.
Appx. 45.
No. 20–166. Anglesey et al. v. Allied Professionals In-
surance Co., A Risk Retention Group, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of National Risk Retention Association for leave to fle
brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 952 F. 3d 1131.
No. 20–316. Pappas, Cook County Treasurer, et al. v.
A. F. Moore & Associates, Inc., et al.; and

ORDERS 1111
592 U. S.
N
ovember 16, 19, 2020
No. 20–357. Kaegi v. A. F. Moore & Associates, Inc., et al.
C
. A. 7th Cir. Motions of Illinois Association of School Boards
et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or
decision of these motions and these petitions. Reported below:
948 F. 3d 889.
No. 20–5830. Christian v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari before judgment denied.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–1326. Scarborough v. Court of Common Pleas of
Pennsylvania, Northampton County, et al., 592 U. S. 916;
No. 19–1335. Dummer v. California Contractors State
License Board et al., 592 U. S. 917;
No. 19–8476. Yerton v. Oklahoma, 592 U. S. 928;
No. 19–8607. Thompson v. Grifn, Superintendent, Sul-
livan Correctional Facility, 592 U. S. 932; and
No. 20–5135. Bowell v. State Bar of California, 592 U. S.
964. Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 19–7736. Woods v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority et al., 590 U. S. 910. Motion for leave to
fle petition for rehearing denied.
November 19, 2020
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A99. Hall et al. v. Barr, At torney General,
et al. Application for stay of execution of sentences of death
for Orlando Hall and Brandon Bernard, presented to The Chief
Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
No. 20A102. Barr, Attorney General, et al. v. Hall.
Application to vacate stay of execution, presented to The Chief
Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted, and the
injunction entered by the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia on November 19, 2020, is vacated. Justice Breyer, Justice
Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan would deny the application.
Certiorari Denied
No. 20–688 (20A100). Hall v. Barr, Attorney General,
et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Application for stay of execution of

1112 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 19, 20, 23, 2020 592 U. S.
sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him
referred
to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 830 Fed. Appx. 8.
No. 20–697 (20A101). Hall v. Watson, Warden. C. A. 7th
Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre-
sented to Justice Kavanaugh, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 721.
November 20, 2020
Miscellaneous Orders*
No. 19–1328. Department of Justice v. House Committee
on the Judiciary. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 591
U. S. 1025.] Motion of respondent to remove the case from the
December 2020 argument calendar granted.
No. 20–366. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. New York et al. S. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction
postponed, 592 U. S. 1022.] Joint motion of appellees for enlarge-
ment of time for oral argument and for divided argument granted,
and the time is allotted as follows: 40 minutes for the Acting
Solicitor General, 20 minutes for government appellees, and 20
minutes for private appellees.
Certiorari Granted
No. 20–157. Caniglia v. Strom et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari granted. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 112.
No. 19–1414. United States v. Cooley. C. A. 9th Cir. Mo-
tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 919 F. 3d 1135.
November 23, 2020
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20M38. Lancaster v. City of Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to fle petition for writs
of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 20M39. Treantos v. United States. Motion for leave
to fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal granted.
*For the Court's order making allotment of Justices, see 592 U. S. iv.

ORDERS 1113
592 U. S.
N
ovember 23, 2020
No. 20M40. Johnson v. Wilson, Warden. Motion for leave
to
fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal granted. Justice Kagan took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this motion.
No. 20M41. Hooker v. Illinois. Motion for leave to proceed
as a veteran denied.
No. 20M42. Smith, aka Smith-Weeks v. United States Pa-
role Commission. Motion to direct the Clerk to fle petition for
writ of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the River
Master for fees and expenses granted, and the River Master is
awarded a total of $6,411.02, for the period July 1, 2019, through
June 30, 2020, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier
order herein, see, e. g., 592 U. S. 1072.]
No. 19–8383. Soro v. Lopez. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 901] denied.
No. 20–18. Lange v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 5. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1024.] Motion of
petitioner to dispense with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 20–6173. In re Telfair. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Justice Kagan took no part in the
consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.
No. 20–5820. In re Mathis. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1273. Assassination Archives and Research Cen-
ter v. Central Intelligence Agency. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 11.

1114 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 23, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–1293. Ludwikowski v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 123.
No. 19–1315. Nevada et al. v. Walden et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 1088.
No. 19–1365. Hueso v. Barnhart, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 324.
No. 19–1368. Walmart Stores, Inc., et al. v. Texas Alco-
holic Beverage Commission et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 206.
No. 19–1453. Michigan v. Fuller. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8657. Jha v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–8733. Gaspar-Miguel v. United States. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d 632.
No. 19–8807. Cean v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 771 Fed. Appx. 81.
No. 20–19. Jackson v. Braithwaite, Secretary of the
Navy. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 949
F. 3d 763.
No. 20–190. Sohn et ux. v. Mariposa County, California,
et al. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–193. McMillan v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 290 So. 3d 17.
No. 20–278. Smith v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Af-
fairs, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 808 Fed. Appx. 852.
No. 20–364. Wilkins v. United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 1020.
No. 20–367. Baran v. ASRC Federal Mission Solutions
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815
Fed. Appx. 633.

ORDERS 1115
592 U. S.
N
ovember 23, 2020
No. 20–385. Doe v. Parson, Governor of Missouri, et al.
C
. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d
1115.
No. 20–386. Gilberti v. Federal Reserve System, Board
of Governors, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–399. Jung Hyun Cho et al. v. Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 230.
No. 20–425. Nastase v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 313.
No. 20–432. S. O. et al. v. District of Columbia. Ct. App.
D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 221 A. 3d 108.
No. 20–434. Heinrich v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 38.
No. 20–453. Consumer 2.0, Inc., dba Rently v. Tenant
Turner, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 796 Fed. Appx. 752.
No. 20–466. Williams v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 164.
No. 20–558. Adams v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811
Fed. Appx. 276.
No. 20–573. Kerven v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 900.
No. 20–5180. Frawley v. Frawley. Ct. App. Mo., Western
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 597 S. W. 3d 742.
No. 20–5366. Smith v. Davis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 582.
No. 20–5563. Bays v. Shoop, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 481.
No. 20–5617. Rundle v. Davis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 581.
No. 20–5777. Banks v. Terry et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

1116 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 23, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5780. D. W. v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.
D
ist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5788. Wilkins v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Wash. App. 2d 1045.
No. 20–5789. Nguedi v. Cauleld et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 20–5804. Burghart v. Beyer. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 787.
No. 20–5807. Graham v. Perry, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct.
Ga. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5814. Webb v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811
Fed. Appx. 915.
No. 20–5819. Jones v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 600 S. W. 3d 94.
No. 20–5834. Garcia-Chicol v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 Ark. 148, 597 S. W. 3d
631.
No. 20–5835. Garcia v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5839. McCall v. Hillis. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 602 S. W. 3d 436.
No. 20–5843. Brown v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2020 WI 63, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945
N. W. 2d 584.
No. 20–5870. Clark v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5875. Marsh v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 739.
No. 20–5915. Cortese v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 780.
No. 20–5927. Diulio v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

ORDERS 1117
592 U. S.
N
ovember 23, 2020
No. 20–5943. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 806.
No. 20 – 5970. Lit tle v. District of Columbia Public
Schools et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5978. Blalock v. Alaska. Ct. App. Alaska. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 452 P. 3d 675.
No. 20–5984. Woods v. Cook, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 295.
No. 20–5985. Crumpton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 964.
No. 20–6018. Win Min Htut v. Capozza, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Fayette, et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6020. Bazzi v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 505 Mich. 1066, 943 N. W. 2d 90.
No. 20–6033. Barnes v. Fedele et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 696.
No. 20–6037. Williard v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st) 152651–U.
No. 20–6065. Reinheimer v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 826 Fed. Appx. 815.
No. 20–6112. Pena Trujillo v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6117. Wasanyi v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 6118. Wall v. Hainsworth, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Laurel Highlands,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1225. Hunt v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of New Mexico et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Motions of Speech
First, Southeastern Legal Foundation, First Amendment Schol-
ars, and Joseph L. Brechner Center for Freedom of Information
et al. for leave to fle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 595.

1118 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
November 23, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 19–8741. Ankeny v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx.
990.
No. 20–14. Congregation Rabbinical College of Tarti-
kov, Inc., et al. v. Village of Pomona, New York, et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of National Jewish Commission on Law and
Public Affairs et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–254. Kuang-Bao Ou-Young v. Roberts, Chief Jus-
tice, Supreme Court of the United States, et al. C. A.
4th Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. The Chief Justice, Justice
Breyer, and Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 112.
No. 20–435. Campbell v. McCarthy, Secretary of the
Army. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of National Security Legal Aca-
demics for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 193.
No. 20–5155. Coughlin v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–1319. Morabito et ux. v. New York et al., 592
U. S. 916;
No. 19–1354. Tan Phan v. Minh Van Truong et al., 592
U. S. 918;
No. 19–1355. Jernigan v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, 592 U. S. 918;
No. 19–1426. Pecina v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, 592 U. S. 921;
No. 19–8652. Sanchez v. Real, Judge, United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California,
et al., 592 U. S. 935;
No. 19 – 8685. In re Fairchild-Lit tlefield, 592 U. S.
910;
No. 19–8687. Ghazavi v. Virginia, 592 U. S. 937;
No. 20–110. Kannry et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 592 U. S. 954; and

ORDERS 1119
592 U. S.
N
ovember 23, 25, 2020
No. 20–173. Hefin et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
, 592 U. S. 956. Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 20–5094. Laux v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, 592 U. S.
986. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Alito took no part
in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 20–5295. Atkins v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity, 592 U. S. 1005. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice
Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
November 25, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A90. Agudath Israel of America et al. v. Cuomo,
Governor of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Application for injunc-
tive relief, presented to Justice Breyer, and by him referred to
the Court, granted in part. Respondent enjoined from enforcing
Executive Order 202.68's 10- and 25-person occupancy limits on
applicants, including Agudath Israel of America's current New
York-based affliates, pending disposition of the appeal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and dispo-
sition of the petition for writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely
sought. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this
order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for
writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the
sending down of the judgment of this Court.
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14 (2020) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting
from grant of application for injunctive relief ).
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Sotomayor and Justice
Kagan join, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from grant of application for injunctive relief ).
Justice Sotomayor, w ith whom Justice Kagan joi ns,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from grant of application for injunctive relief ).

1120 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 2, 3, 2020 592 U. S.
December 2, 2020
D
ismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20 – 8. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
et al. v. Robert R. McCormick Foundation et al. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari dismissed as to respondents AQR Absolute Re-
turn Master Account, LP; AQR Global Stock Selection HV Master
Account Ltd.; AQR Global Stock Selection Master Account, LP;
Columbia Management Group, [nka Bofa Global Capital Manage-
ment Group, LLC]; Conservative Balanced Portfolio a Series of
Prudential Series Fnd Inc.; Loomis Sayles Credit Alpha Fund;
Prudential Bache Securities, LLC [Jefferies Bache Securities,
LLC, fka Prudential Bache Securities, LLC]; Prudential Insur-
ance Co. of America (PDI); Prudential Insurance Co. of America
(PMFIM) [PICA––Pr udentia l Insurance Company Separate
Account]; Prudential Insurance Company of America; Prudential
Investment Management Inc.; Prudential Investment Portfolio
3––Prudential Strategic Value Fund; Prudential Investment Port-
folios 8––Prudential Stock Index Fund; Prudential Investments,
Inc.; Prudential Non-Qualifed Benefts Funding (TOLI); Pruden-
tial Retirement Insurance and Annuity Co.; Prudential Retire-
ment SA LV5; Stock Index Portfolio, a Series of the Prudential
Series Fund, Inc.; and T. Rowe Price Group, Inc., under this
Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 66.
December 3, 2020
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20–273. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Rovi
Guides, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari dismissed under
this Court's Rule 46.
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A94. Harvest Rock Church, Inc., et al. v. Newsom,
Governor of California. Application for injunctive relief,
presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court,
treated as a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment, and
the petition is granted. The September 2 order of the United
States District Court for the Central District of California is
vacated, and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit with instructions to remand to the District Court
for further consideration in light of Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14 (2020).

ORDERS 1121
592 U. S.
D
ecember 4, 7, 2020
December 4, 2020
C
ertiorari Granted
No. 20–37. Azar, Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices, et al. v. Gresham et al.; and Azar, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, et al. v. Philbrick et al.; and
No. 20–38. Arkansas v. Gresham et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour
is allotted for oral argument. Reported below: No. 20–37 (frst
judgment) and No. 20–38, 950 F. 3d 93.
December 7, 2020
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20– 5968. Driessen v. Miami-Dade County, Florida,
et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dis-
missed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeat-
edly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to
accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from peti-
tioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Mar-
tin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992)
(per curiam). Reported below: 290 So. 3d 978.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A79. Dubin v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
Sup. Ct. Haw. Appl icati on for st ay, addressed to Justice
Thomas and referred to the Court, denied.
No. 20M43. Debera P. v. Maine Department of Health
and Human Services. Motion for leave to fle petition for writ
of certiorari under seal granted.
No. 143, Orig. Mississippi v. Tennessee et al. Report of
the Special Master received and ordered fled. Exceptions to the
Report, with supporting briefs, may be fled within 45 days. Re-
plies, if any, with supporting briefs, may be fled within 30 days.
Surreplies, if any, with supporting briefs, may be fled within 30
days. [For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 577 U. S. 981.]
No. 19 – 968. Uzuegbunam et al. v. Preczewski et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 591 U. S. 1028.] Motion of

1122 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 7, 2020 592 U. S.
the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu-
ment
as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 19–8501. Livingston v. Nebraska. Ct. App. Neb. Mo-
tion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 909] denied.
No. 19–8585. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in for ma pauper is [591 U. S. 1014] denied. Justice
Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this
motion.
No. 20–107. Cedar Point Nursery et al. v. Hassid et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1094.] Motion of
petitioners to dispense with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 20–319. Comcast Corp. et al. v. Viamedia, Inc. C. A.
7th Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited to fle a brief in
this case expressing the views of the United States. Justice
Barrett took no part in the consideration of this petition.
No. 20–5045. In re Jones. Motion of petitioner for reconsid-
eration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [592
U. S. 911] denied.
No. 20–5046. In re Jones. Motion of petitioner for reconsid-
eration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [592
U. S. 912] denied.
No. 20–5047. In re Jones. Motion of petitioner for reconsid-
eration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [592
U. S. 912] denied.
No. 20– 5229. Lopez v. Costa Mesa Police Department
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of
order denying leave to proceed in for ma pauper is [592 U. S.
905] denied.
No. 20–5230. Lopez v. Newport Beach Police Department
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration
of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S.
905] denied.
No. 20–5581. Drevaleva v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 994] denied.

ORDERS 1123
592 U. S.
D
ecember 7, 2020
No. 20–5876. In re Keller; and
N
o. 20–5886. Smith v. Dobin. C. A. 3d Cir. Motions of peti-
tioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petition-
ers are allowed until December 28, 2020, within which to pay the
docketing fees required by this Court's Rule 38 (a).
No. 20–629. In re Beggs et ux.; and
No. 20–6267. In re Schiff. Petitions for writs of habeas cor-
pus denied.
No. 20–375. In re Zimmermann. Petition for writ of manda-
mus and/or prohibition denied.
No. 20–404. In re Masiz. Petition for writ of prohibition
denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1477. Man v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940 F. 3d 1354.
No. 19 – 8461. Paz-Tejeda v. Barr, At torney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed.
Appx. 601.
No. 19–8635. Brown v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–27. Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., dba
Auto Smart of Spirit Lake, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 535.
No. 20–62. Parents for Privacy et al. v. Barr, Attorney
General, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 949 F. 3d 1210.
No. 20–111. Strand v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 1347.
No. 20–237. Old Republic Home Protection Co., Inc. v.
Sparks et al. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 2020 OK 42, 467 P. 3d 680.
No. 20–240. Kentucky v. White. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 600 S. W. 3d 176.
No. 20–253. Castagna et al. v. Jean et al. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 211.
No. 20–296. Le v. Braithwaite, Secretary of the Navy.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

1124 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 7, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–320. Doe et al., Individually and as the Natural
P
arents and Next of Kin of Minor Doe v. Jackson Local
School District Board of Education et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 925.
No. 20–377. Ackerman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust
Co. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 222 A.
3d 846.
No. 20–379. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v.
Brighton Collectibles, LLC. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 144.
No. 20–381. Hamilton County Job and Family Services
et al. v. Siefert et ux. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 951 F. 3d 753.
No. 20–389. Schaffer et al. v. Long. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 400.
No. 20–392. Kamara v. New Jersey, Department of Law
and Public Safety, Division of State Police. Super. Ct.
N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–393. Rahmi v. Pill & Pill, PLLC. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–394. Schum v. Fortress Value Recovery Fund I,
L. L. C., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 805 Fed. Appx. 319.
No. 20–396. Speer v. Tieger et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–398. Strong v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812
Fed. Appx. 728.
No. 20–403. Valentin et al. v. California. App. Div.,
Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–412. Katzman v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 330 Mich. App. 128, 946 N. W. 2d
807.
No. 20–413. Thomas v. Blevins. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1125
592 U. S.
D
ecember 7, 2020
No. 20–419. Deck v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
D
ist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–428. Sequeira v. Republic of Nicaragua et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed.
Appx. 345.
No. 20–438. Reiter et al. v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J.,
App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–439. Mantissa Corp. v. Ondot Systems, Inc., et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–445. Anderson v. Bonnewell et al. Sup. Ct. Del.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 228 A. 3d 139.
No. 20–447. Rodriguez-Castro v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx.
835.
No. 20–451. Doe, Individually and as Parent and Guard-
ian of Baby Doe, et al. v. Merck & Co., Inc., et al. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 559.
No. 20–458. Brown v. Department of Labor. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 940.
No. 20–461. United States ex rel. Houpt v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N. A. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
800 Fed. Appx. 533.
No. 20–463. Heghmann v. Democratic National Commit-
tee et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
805 Fed. Appx. 209.
No. 20 – 465. Young County, Texas, et al. v. Sanchez
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956
F. 3d 785.
No. 20–467. Talbot et al. v. U. S. Bank N. A. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 20–494. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College v.
Gruver et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 959 F. 3d 178.

1126 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 7, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–525. Rutila v. Department of Transportation.
C
. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed.
Appx. 745.
No. 20–526. Blackburn v. United States. C. A. Armed
Forces. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–528. Baas v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–529. Boggs v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 174.
No. 20–531. Hutter v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–533. Boudreau, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Boudreau v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d
225.
No. 20–537. Walker et al. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Management and Budget. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–547. Cruz Vazquez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–548. Shelton v. Tanner, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–550. Heon Jong Yoo v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 949.
No. 20–552. Rice v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (3d) 170134, 125 N. E.
3d 546.
No. 20–555. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 251.
No. 20–563. Harris County, Texas v. PRSI Trading, LLC.
Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 599 S. W. 3d
303.
No. 20–566. United States ex rel. Juan v. Hauser et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed.
Appx. 596.

ORDERS 1127
592 U. S.
D
ecember 7, 2020
No. 20–568. Geoffroy v. Town of Winchendon, Massachu-
set
ts, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 959 F. 3d 1.
No. 20–570. Cvijanovich v. United States Secret Serv-
ice. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807
Fed. Appx. 590.
No. 20–572. Young v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–576. Lopez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 46 Cal. App. 5th 317,
260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18.
No. 20–577. Ibrahim v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 694.
No. 20–581. United States ex rel. Integra Med Analyt-
ics, L. L. C. v. Baylor Scott & White Health et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 892.
No. 20–584. Wood et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 833.
No. 20–586. Gersky v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 772.
No. 20–613. Coultas v. Tichenor, Individually and in His
Ofcial Capacity as Yamhill County Prosecutor, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed.
Appx. 554.
No. 20–628. Anstey v. Terry, Superintendent, Mount
Olive Correctional Complex, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 280.
No. 20–642. Mendoza v. Uber Technologies Inc. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–643. D&G, Inc., dba Gary’s Foods, et al. v. C&S
Wholesale Grocers, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 957 F. 3d 879.
No. 20–5132. Cray v. Warden, Federal Correctional In-
stitution Coleman-Medium. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.

1128 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 7, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5172. Williams v. Coakley, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 170.
No. 20–5264. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 494.
No. 20–5360. Dennes v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
797 Fed. Appx. 835.
No. 20–5379. Davis v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 195 Wash. 2d 571, 461 P. 3d 1204.
No. 20–5532. Golden v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 981.
No. 20–5562. Hessler v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 305 Neb. 451, 940 N. W. 2d 836.
No. 20–5588. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 386.
No. 20–5619. Minyard v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 374 N. C. 261, 839 S. E. 2d
848.
No. 20–5768. Barber v. Wasmer, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5786. Sweet v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 293 So. 3d 448.
No. 20–5810. Torres v. Diaz et al. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5811. Torres v. Dallas/Fort Worth Interna-
tional Airport et al. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–5817. Lewis v. Decker et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5821. Simpson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5823. Spengler v. Los Angeles County District
Attorney. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1129
592 U. S.
D
ecember 7, 2020
No. 20–5826. George v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 681.
No. 20–5827. Spengler v. Villanueva. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5831. Danam v. Arizona Board of Education. Ct.
App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5838. Nelson v. Brown, Acting Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5845. Scott v. Burl, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 449.
No. 20–5846. Green v. Lake, Sheriff, Carlton County,
Minnesota, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 467.
No. 20–5849. Igbonwa v. Facebook, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 104.
No. 20–5856. Barrie v. Robinson. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 121.
No. 20–5858. Briscoe v. Chambers-Smith, Director, Ohio
Rehabilitation and Correction, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5859. Blanke v. Utah Board of Pardons and Pa-
role. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020
UT 39, 467 P. 3d 850.
No. 20–5863. Newson v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5867. Alverto v. Cline. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 329.
No. 20–5883. Comrie v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5887. Lewis v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 505 Mich. 1039, 942 N. W. 2d 23.
No. 20–5888. Smith v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jer-
sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

1130 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 7, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5892. Stoddard v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
D
ist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 286 So. 3d 774.
No. 20–5893. Ravon v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 302 So. 3d 865.
No. 20–5897. Williams v. McCain, Warden, et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5898. Ussery v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 596 S. W. 3d 277.
No. 20–5899. Skandha v. Bates. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 144 Mass. App. 329, 97 N. E. 3d 1113.
No. 20 – 5901. Scot t v. City of Hamtramck, Michigan,
Treasurer, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5906. Barber v. Burke et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5907. Peterson v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018–1045 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1/8/20), 289 So. 3d 93.
No. 20–5911. Albritton v. Brnovich, Attorney General
of Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5916. Delph v. University of Arkansas for Medi-
cal Sciences et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 342.
No. 20–5920. Cortez v. Iowa. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 948 N. W. 2d 535.
No. 20–5921. Craig v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 311 Kan. 456, 462 P. 3d 173.
No. 20–5924. Wynn v. Butler, Commissioner, Georgia De-
partment of Labor, et al. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5931. Petrano et ux. v. Baylor. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
1st Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5934. Holden v. Burt, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5935. Holland v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 505 Mich. 975, 937 N. W. 2d 649.

ORDERS 1131
592 U. S.
D
ecember 7, 2020
No. 20–5938. Wister v. White et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 20–5945. Clarmont v. Chapman, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5950. Riley v. Indiana Department of Correction
et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5964. McDonald v. Titus, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20– 5965. Pelino v. Zaken, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Greene, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5981. Garza v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 1152041–U.
No. 20 – 5986. Wilson v. Gabites et al. Ct. App. Mich.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5990. Moreno-Ruiz v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed.
Appx. 970.
No. 20–5994. Leekomon v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 351 Ga. App. 836, 832 S. E. 2d 437.
No. 20–5997. Franco v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 973 F. 3d 465.
No. 20–5998. Prentice v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 295.
No. 20–6001. Canady v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 891.
No. 20–6002. Dale v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6024. Parnell v. Frakes, Director, Nebraska De-
partment of Correctional Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6032. Nolan v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari
denied.

1132 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 7, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–6048. Godine v. Montgomery, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir
. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6059. Duran v. Allison, Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6061. Buchanan v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st
App. Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 Cal.
App. 5th 385, 251 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803.
No. 20–6064. Smith v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20 – 6068. Gross v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6069. Howell v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6073. Littlejohn v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 760.
No. 20–6075. McCarter v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 327.
No. 20–6076. Pena v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 976.
No. 20–6083. Wooten v. Warren, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 50.
No. 20–6084. Wainwright v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 601.
No. 20–6085. Yanez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6086. Kettles v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 970 F. 3d 637.
No. 20–6088. Baez-Castillo v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 332.
No. 20–6089. Hill v. Bauman, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6091. Hollie v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
810 Fed. Appx. 888.

ORDERS 1133
592 U. S.
D
ecember 7, 2020
No. 20 – 6092. Hill v. Warden of Lee County, United
St
ates Penitentiary. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 894.
No. 20–6095. Chaney v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 278.
No. 20–6100. Meza-Cruz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 324.
No. 20–6101. Skidmore v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 333.
No. 20–6102. Cameron v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 1020.
No. 20–6103. Dale v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6105. Oliver v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 305.
No. 20–6106. Cruz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6108. Washington v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 309.
No. 20–6110. Hogans v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 881.
No. 20–6116. Wernicke v. Court of Appeal of California,
Third Appellate District, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6121. Lizarraga v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6122. Capelton v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 1.
No. 20–6124. Loaiza-Gaspar v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 365.
No. 20–6133. Newcomb v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 47.
No. 20–6134. Alfredo Flores v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 360.

1134 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 7, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–6135. Barber v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
m
ent of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 20–6137. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 774 Fed. Appx. 608.
No. 20–6140. Almanzar v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6141. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 755.
No. 20–6143. Mangual-Corchado v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6146. Stewart v. Stoddard, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 534.
No. 20–6147. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6148. Merinord v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 134.
No. 20–6149. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 669.
No. 20–6150. Roman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 972.
No. 20–6151. Costanzo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 1088.
No. 20–6153. Jeffries v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 517.
No. 20–6154. Perez-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 53.
No. 20–6155. Sandoval v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 1243.
No. 20–6156. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 295.
No. 20–6157. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 621 Fed. Appx. 776.

ORDERS 1135
592 U. S.
D
ecember 7, 2020
No. 20–6163. Bankston v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6167. Sepehry-Fard v. United States. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6169. Garner v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 264.
No. 20 – 6170. Brown v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 240.
No. 20–6172. Manuel Villavicencio, aka Rodriguez v.
United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 825 Fed. Appx. 88.
No. 20–6178. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 80.
No. 20–6179. Hai Duong v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6180. Reyes v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 41.
No. 20–6185. Brown v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 218.
No. 20–6186. Kayarath v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 786.
No. 20–6188. Ezeka v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 946 N. W. 2d 393.
No. 20–6189. Javier Nunez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 29.
No. 20–6191. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 485.
No. 20–6193. Harrell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6195. Torres Zuniga v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 260.
No. 20–6196. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 218.

1136 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 7, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–6198. Chavez v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
D
ist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 3d 896.
No. 20–6204. Curry v. Roberson. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6213. Mondragon-Benitez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 401.
No. 20–6214. Powers v. Warden, United States Peniten-
tiary, Allenwood. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Re-
ported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 95.
No. 20–6215. Garcia-Morales v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 942 F. 3d 474.
No. 20–6216. Torres v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 618.
No. 20–6220. McClurg v. United States (Reported below:
811 Fed. Appx. 945); Booker v. United States (810 Fed. Appx.
443); Morgan v. United States (806 Fed. Appx. 465); O’Dell
v. United States (813 Fed. Appx. 180); Plemons v. United
States (818 Fed. Appx. 407); Schumaker v. United States (820
Fed. Appx. 378); and Tigue v. United States (811 Fed. Appx.
970). C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6230. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 414.
No. 20–6236. Ndibalema v. Levine. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6237. Parker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 231.
No. 20–6238. Parker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 892.
No. 20–6243. Sadio v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20 – 6244. Ha v. Popoff, Superintendent, Oregon
State Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6246. Bogema v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 484.

ORDERS 1137
592 U. S.
D
ecember 7, 2020
No. 20–6248. Brooks v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 291.
No. 20–6249. Kuzma v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 959.
No. 20–6255. Dubor v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 327.
No. 20 – 6259. de Jesus-Concepcion v. United States.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–388. Lingfei Sun v. City of New York, New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re-
ported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 469.
No. 20–5919. Davis v. Wilson, Judge, Superior Court of
California, Marin County, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
before judgment denied.
No. 20–5922. Hook v. United States et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 807 Fed.
Appx. 893.
No. 20–6012. Young v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 608.
No. 20 – 6182. Rainey v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 227 A. 3d 423.
No. 20–6201. Thomas v. Calloway, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition.
No. 20–6221. Nunez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 465.
No. 20–6231. Zavala v. Holland, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 809
Fed. Appx. 370.

1138 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 7, 2020 592 U. S.
Rehearing Denied
N
o. 19–1290. Bennett v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,
592 U. S. 915;
No. 19–1341. Van Auken, as Trustee and Beneciary v.
Catron et al., 592 U. S. 915;
No. 19–1371. Waldner v. Hartke et al., 592 U. S. 918;
No. 19–1374. Gutierrez v. California, 592 U. S. 919;
No. 19–1408. Coppedge et al v. Charlton, 592 U. S. 920;
No. 19–1421. LaFlamme v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 592 U. S. 921;
No. 19–1430. Polidi v. Lee et al., 592 U. S. 922;
No. 19–1463. Oliver v. Oliver et al., 592 U. S. 923;
No. 19 – 8317. Taebel v. Ducey, Governor of Arizona,
et al., 591 U. S. 1019;
No. 19–8420. Wilson v. Wisconsin, 592 U. S. 926;
No. 19–8425. Anderson v. Colorado, 592 U. S. 926;
No. 19–8435. Williams v. Duffy et al., 592 U. S. 927;
No. 19–8457. Allen v. Mine et al., 592 U. S. 928;
No. 19 – 8538. Smiles v. Berks County, Pennsylvania,
et al., 592 U. S. 930;
No. 19–8609. Sameer v. Khera et al., 592 U. S. 932;
No. 19–8634. Bey, fka Brown v. Doughtery County State
Court, 592 U. S. 934;
No. 19–8739. Womack v. Finkelstein, Assistant Clerk,
Superior Court of North Carolina, Buncombe County, 592
U. S. 939;
No. 19–8749. Crayton v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 592 U. S. 940;
No. 19–8796. Rodgers v. McIntyre et al., 592 U. S. 943;
No. 19–8798. Salahuddin v. Shinn, Director, Arizona De-
partment of Corrections, 592 U. S. 943;
No. 19–8852. Sameer v. Khera, 592 U. S. 946;
No. 19–8862. Allen v. Total Visa et al., 592 U. S. 946;
No. 19–8930. Dunahue v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas De-
partment of Correction, et al., 592 U. S. 950;
No. 20–17. Robertson v. Honn et al., 592 U. S. 951;
No. 20–44. In re Golden, 592 U. S. 911;
No. 20–59. Campbell v. Bennett et al., 592 U. S. 952;

ORDERS 1139
592 U. S.
D
ecember 7, 8, 10, 2020
No. 20–142. Skidmore, as Trustee for the Randy Craig
W
olfe Trust v. Zeppelin et al., 592 U. S. 986;
No. 20–184. Ellerbee v. Annett Holdings, Inc., dba TMC
Transportation, et al., 592 U. S. 1025;
No. 20–5069. Rosado-Sanchez v. Banco Santander Puerto
Rico, 592 U. S. 961;
No. 20–5232. Anderson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al., 592 U. S. 969;
No. 20 – 5314. Stubblefield v. Brown, Clerk, Circuit
Court of Illinois, Cook County, et al., 592 U. S. 1005;
No. 20–5324. In re Ybarra, 592 U. S. 910;
No. 20–5449. Dawson v. Pakenham, 592 U. S. 1027;
No. 20–5520. Williamson v. May, Warden, 592 U. S. 1007;
No. 20–5523. Jury v. Gray, Warden, 592 U. S. 1007; and
No. 20–5609. In re Barnes, 592 U. S. 910. Petitions for re-
hearing denied.
No. 19–140. Rheinstein v. Attorney Grievance Commis-
sion of Maryland, 589 U. S. 974. Motion for leave to fle peti-
tion for rehearing denied.
No. 20–311. Walton v. First Merchant’s Bank, 592 U. S.
1026. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Barrett took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
December 8, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A98. Kelly, United States Congressman, et al. v.
Pennsylvania et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Application for injunctive
relief, presented to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the
Court, denied.
December 10, 2020
Certiorari Denied
No. 20–6570 (20A110). Bernard v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Cer ti orar i denied. Justice Breyer and Justice
Kagan would grant the application and the petition for writ of
certiorari.

1140 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
T
oday, the Court allows the Federal Government to execute
Brandon Bernard, despite Bernard's troubling allegations that the
Government secured his death sentence by withholding exculpa-
tory evidence and knowingly eliciting false testimony against him.
Bernard has never had the opportunity to test the merits of those
claims in court. Now he never will. I would grant Bernard's
petition for a writ of certiorari and application for a stay to ensure
his claims are given proper consideration before he is put to death.
The prosecution sought the death penalty for Bernard partly
on the theory that he was “likely to commit criminal acts of
violence in the future.” Electronic Case Filing in No. 2:20–cv–
00616, Doc. 3 (SD Ind., Nov. 24, 2020) (App. Vol. I), p. 46 (ECF).
To prove Bernard's future dangerousness, the prosecution repeat-
edly invoked his gang affliations, see id., at 389–422, in particular
emphasizing that all members of his gang were supposedly
“equal.” See, e. g., id., at 379 (“Q: . . . And did you ever have a
conversation . . . regarding everyone being equal in the gang?
A: Yes, sir”). By claiming that all gang members were equal,
the prosecution in turn argued that Bernard was as dangerous as
any other member of the gang and was destined for a life of
violence in prison. See, e. g., id., at 414 (“Q: [What happens] when
. . . a new . . . gang member comes onboard to the federal prison
system[?] A: Well, for one, he would have to, what they call,
`make your bones. ' You have to earn being a gang member,
which means you have to commit a crime, or what we consider a
Bureau of Prisons violation”). The strategy worked: The jury
found that Bernard posed an ongoing risk to the safety of others
and, ultimately, recommended the death penalty.
1
Nearly two decades later, in a resentencing proceeding for one
of Bernard's codefendants, the prosecution called Sergeant San-
dra Hunt, the former head of the Gang Unit in the Police Depart-
ment for Killeen, Texas. Sergeant Hunt testifed that she had
told the prosecution before Bernard's trial that the gang Bernard
had been associated with was not composed of equal members.
Instead, it was a thirteen-tier hierarchy with Bernard at the very
bottom. Sergeant Hunt also produced a pyramidal diagram, de-
1
We now know the prosecution's predictions about Bernard's future dan-
gerousness were entirely inaccurate. Bernard has not committed a single
disciplinary infraction in his two decades in prison.

ORDERS 1141
1139
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
veloped in consultation with a government informant, to illustrate
the
gang 's structure. Both Sergeant Hunt's testimony and this
diagram conficted heavily with the prosecution's characterization
during Bernard's sentencing of the gang 's fat structure and Ber-
nard's position within it. Hunt's testimony also made clear that
the prosecution had known about this diagram when it tried Ber-
nard. See ECF Doc. 3, at 226 (“Q: Did you at that time, at our
request, go back to see if any of the identities of any of the other
people who were involved in that were on this chart? A: Yes, I
did”); ibid. (“Q: And did you locate the individual known as Bran-
don Bernard on this chart? A: I did”).
Soon after Sergeant Hunt's testimony, Bernard moved for relief
from his death sentence in Federal District Court. According to
Bernard, the Government never disclosed Sergeant Hunt's opinion
that he was on the periphery of the gang or the existence of the
diagram illustrating his subordinate role.
2
With this information,
Bernard argued, he could have undermined the prosecution's case
that he was an equal participant in gang activity and posed the
same risk of future dangerousness as other gang members. Thus,
Bernard claimed, the Government had violated its obligation to
turn over exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U. S. 83 (1963), and had elicited knowingly false testimony con-
cerning his role in the gang in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360
U. S. 264 (1959).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Bernard's
motion without considering his Brady and Napue claims on the
merits. 820 Fed. Appx. 309 (2020) (per curiam). According to
the Fifth Circuit, because Bernard had already petitioned for re-
lief from his death sentence in the past, his current motion was
subject to the strict rules that apply to second or successive
2
The Government argues that, because it chose not to call Sergeant Hunt
until years after Bernard's trial, it could not have improperly suppressed an
expert opinion “that had not yet been expressed.” Brief in Opposition 23.
But Sergeant Hunt's testimony confrms that she offered her opinion on the
gang 's structure and the status of members within it (including Bernard) to
the prosecution at the time of Bernard's trial. The Government also argues
that, before trial, it disclosed to Bernard's defense the existence of a hand-
written version of the same diagram as a possible exhibit. Whether that
constitutes proper disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963),
and mitigates Bernard's claim is the type of issue best resolved by the Dis-
trict Court in the course of evaluating Bernard's claims on the merits.

1142 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
petitions. Those rules, which are designed to encourage inmates
to
raise promptly all objections to their conviction, require a peti-
tioner fling a second-in-time petition to produce “newly discov-
ered evidence . . . suffcient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfnder would have found the mov-
ant guilty of the offense.” 28 U. S. C. § 2255(h)(1). This standard
is far more stringent than the “ `reasonable probability of a differ-
ent result' ” standard that typica lly applies to Brady claims.
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U. S. 668, 699 (2004) (quoting Kyles v. Whit-
ley, 514 U. S. 419, 434 (1995)).
The Fifth Circuit got it wrong. Its illogical rule conficts with
this Court's precedent, and it rewards prosecutors who success-
fully conceal their Brady and Napue violations until after an
inmate has sought relief from his convictions on other grounds.
This Court held in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930 (2007),
that the restrictions on second-or-successive petitions do not
apply to a claim that was not ripe when the inmate fled his
frst-in-time petition. Id., at 945.
3
Any other rule would have
troubling consequences, as Panetti explained. Through no fault
of their own, inmates would “ `run the risk' . . . of `forever losing
their opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted
claims.' ” Id., at 945–946 (quoting Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269,
275 (2005)). Consequently, “conscientious defense attorneys
would be obliged to fle unripe (and, in many cases, meritless) . . .
claims in each and every” case to preserve claims in case they
later became ripe. 551 U. S., at 943.
Panetti's reasoning applies with full force to Brady claims. As
in Panetti, applying the bar on second-or-successive habeas peti-
tions to Brady claims “would produce troublesome results, create
procedural anomalies, and close [the courthouse] doors to a class
of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication
that such was Congress' intent.” 551 U. S., at 946 (quoting Castro
v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 380–381 (2003); internal quotation
marks omitted). Take the present case. How exactly was Ber-
nard supposed to have raised a Brady claim more than a decade
3
In other words, as Justice Breyer explained in Magwood v. Patterson,
561 U. S. 320 (2010), “Panetti's holding [is] that an application containing a
claim that the petitioner had no fair opportunity to raise in his frst habeas
petition is not a second or successive application.” Id., at 343 (opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

ORDERS 1143
1139
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
ago when he brought his frst habeas petition, given that he was
unaware
of the evidence the Government concealed from him?
Yet that is what the Fifth Circuit's rule demands.
4
That rule
perversely rewards the Government for keeping exculpatory in-
formation secret until after an inmate's frst habeas petition has
been resolved. Prosecutors who successfully conceal their viola-
tions avoid accountability so long as they can show that the with-
held evidence would not “be suffcient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfnder would have
found the movant guilty of the offense.” 28 U. S. C. § 2255(h)(1).
Under this rule, prosecutors can run out the clock and escape any
responsibility for all but the most extreme violations.
If the prosecution had not committed the Brady and Napue
violations Bernard alleges, there is a reasonable probability Ber-
nard would have been spared a death sentence. By all indica-
tions, the jury's decision to sentence him to death was anything
but easy. See, e. g., In re Bernard, Petition for Clemency Seeking
Commutation of Death Sentence, Exh. E–1 (Nov. 10, 2020) (Decl.
of Juror Gary McClung, Jr.) (“The penalty phase was not as easy
for me. I was uncomfortable giving Mr. Bernard the death pen-
alty and have been bothered with my decision since trial”). The
jury rejected the death penalty on two of Bernard's three death-
eligible convictions. Five of the nine jurors at Bernard's trial
now either support or do not oppose a clemency petition to com-
mute his death sentence to life in prison. See id., Exhs. A–
I. Against that backdrop, there is a reasonable probability that
evidence casting doubt on a centerpiece of the Government's the-
4
The Fifth Circuit's ruling follows that of several other Circuits. See,
e. g., Tompkins v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 557 F. 3d 1257, 1260
(CA11 2009). Those decisions suffer from the same fatal faws, as recog-
nized by judges across the Courts of Appeals. See Long v. Hooks, 972 F. 3d
442, 486 (CA4 2020) (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[T]o subject Brady claims to
the heightened standard of § 2244(b)(2) is to reward investigators or prosecu-
tors who engage in the unconstitutional suppression of evidence with a
`win' ”); Scott v. United States, 890 F. 3d 1239, 1258 (CA11 2018) (arguing
that the Eleventh Circuit's decision adopting the same rule as the Fifth
Circuit's should be reconsidered en banc because it “is fatally fawed” and
fails “to adhere to—or even to attempt to apply—the Panetti factors”); Gage
v. Chappell, 793 F. 3d 1159, 1165 (CA9 2015) (“Under our precedents as they
currently stand, prosecutors may have an incentive to refrain from disclosing
Brady violations related to prisoners who have not yet sought collateral
review”).

1144 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 10, 11, 2020 592 U. S.
ory that Bernard posed a risk of future dangerousness would have
been
enough to persuade just one juror to reject the death
penalty.
That is all that is required for relief under Brady and Napue.
Yet because of the Fifth Circuit's rule, Bernard's claim was re-
jected without fair consideration of its merits. Bernard should
not be executed before his claims have been tested under the
correct standard. Nor should others like him fnd themselves
procedurally barred by similarly perverse and illogical rules.
For those reasons, I would grant Bernard's petition and applica-
tion for a stay.
December 11, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 155, Orig. Texas v. Pennsylvania et al. The State of
Texas' motion for leave to fle bill of complaint denied for lack of
standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not
demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in
which another State conducts its elections. All other pending
motions dismissed as moot.
Statement of Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas
joins.
In my view, we do not have discretion to deny the fling of a
bill of complaint in a case that falls within our original jurisdic-
tion. See Arizona v. California, 589 U. S. 1199 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). I would therefore grant the motion to fle the bill of
complaint but would not grant other relief, and I express no view
on any other issue.
Certiorari Granted
No. 20–222. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al. v. Arkan-
sas Teacher Retirement System et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari granted. Reported below: 955 F. 3d 254.
Certiorari Denied
No. 20 – 6500 (20A104). Bourgeois v. Watson, Warden,
et al. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Barrett, and by her referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1145
592 U. S.
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
Justice Sotomayor, w ith whom Justice Kagan joi ns,
dissenti
ng.
The Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) provides that “a sen-
tence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is
mentally retarded.” 18 U. S. C. § 3596(c). The Court today
allows the execution of Alfred Bourgeois to proceed even though
Bourgeois, who has an IQ between 70 and 75, argues that he is
intellectually disabled under current clinical standards. I would
grant his petition to address whether the FDPA prohibits his
execution.
The District Court in this case applied currently prevailing
diagnostic standards to fnd that Bourgeois had made a “strong
showing ” that he is intellectually disabled. See Bourgeois v.
Warden, 2020 WL 1154575, *4 (SD Ind., Mar. 10, 2020). The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 977 F. 3d
620, 638 (2020). It did not do so because Bourgeois is ft to be
executed under the FDPA, but rather because, nearly a decade
ago, a different Federal District Court found that Bourgeois was
not intellectually disabled under the standards in place at that
time. See United States v. Bourgeois, 2011 WL 1930684 (SD
Tex., May 19, 2011). That court, however, relied heavily on its
own lay observations and assumptions about how people with
intellectual disabilities act and what they are capable of doing.
See, e. g., id., at *29 (“Bourgeois graduated from high school”); id.,
at *43 (“[H]e can engage in the give-and-take of normal conversa-
tion”). Both this Court and the medical community have since
squarely rejected that type of inexpert analysis. See, e. g., Moore
v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1, 18 (2017) (holding it error to rely on “lay
perceptions of intellectual disability”); Moore v. Texas, 586 U. S.
133, 140 (2019) (per curiam) (fnding the state court erred in
relying on the defendant's ability to provide “ `coherent' testi-
mony”); Pet. for Cert. 17–18 (citing expert groups debunking
these stereotypes).
In the Seventh Circuit's view, even if Bourgeois is intellectually
disabled under today's standards, he is nonetheless procedurally
barred from raising that claim anew due to the federal habeas
statute's general prohibition on second or successive petitions.
28 U. S. C. § 2255(h). As Bourgeois notes, however, that statute
permits successive habeas petitions if the frst was “inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of [an inmate's] detention.”
§ 2255(e). Bourgeois contends that his frst petition was inade-

1146 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
quate to determine whether he “is” an intellectually disabled per-
son
against whom “a sentence of death shall not be carried out,”
§ 3596(c), because his 2011 intellectual disability claim could not
be assessed under the materially different standards now prevail-
ing at the time of his execution.
The FDPA's text and structure lend signifcant support to Bour-
geois' argument that the FDPA directs courts to look to current
standards. Most limitations in the FDPA apply to imposing a
death sentence, not implementing it. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3591
(“[N]o person may be sentenced to death who was less than 18
years of age at the time of the offense”); § 3591(a)(2) (crimes must
be committed “intentionally” for a person to be “sentenced to
death”); § 3592(a) (listing mitigating factors to be considered “in
determining whether a sentence of death is to be imposed”); § 3593
(listing procedural requirements for sentencing hearings). By
contrast, the FDPA separately forbids the execution of certain,
limited categories of people: the pregnant, the mentally incapaci-
tated, and the intellectually disabled. These prohibitions appear
in a section titled “Implementation of a sentence of death,” and
are phrased in the present tense: “A sentence of death shall not
be carried out upon” a woman “while she is pregnant,” “a person
who, as a result of a mental disability, lacks the mental capacity
to understand the death penalty,” and “a person who is mentally
retarded.” §§ 3596(b), (c).
The Government counters that, because intellectual disability,
unlike pregnancy and capacity, is a permanent condition evidently
present by the time a person reaches the age of majority, a federal
prisoner raising an intellectual disability claim needs only one
opportunity to prove his case. But while a prisoner's intellectual
disability may not change, the medical standards used to assess
that disability constantly evolve as the scientifc community's un-
derstanding grows. See Moore, 581 U. S., at 20, (“Refecting im-
proved understanding over time, . . . current [clinical] manuals
offer the best available description of how mental disorders are
expressed and can be recognized by trained clinicians” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U. S. 701,
712–714 (2014).
Bourgeois thus puts forth a strong argument that federal
prisoners sentenced to death should be able to fle new habeas
petitions if they can show a potentially dispositive change in the
diagnostic landscape following their frst petition. The Seventh

ORDERS 1147
592 U. S.
D
ecember 11, 14, 2020
Circuit's position, on the other hand, seemingly allows the United
St
ates to “carr[y] out” a death sentence upon a person who
“is” indisputably intellectually disabled under current diagnostic
standards, contrary to the FDPA's express terms. 18 U. S. C.
§ 3596(c).
Without the beneft of full briefng and argument, I cannot say
for certain whether Bourgeois is correct. But that is not the
test for whether this Court should grant certiorari. Bourgeois
presents a serious question that is likely to recur. Waiting to
grant certiorari may mean permitting the illegal execution of peo-
ple with intellectual disabilities. I would therefore resolve this
open legal issue before sanctioning Bourgeois' execution. I re-
spectfully dissent from the denial of certiorari.
December 14, 2020
Affrmed for Absence of Quorum
No. 20–524. Yi Tai Shao v. Roberts, Chief Justice, Su-
preme Court of the United States, et al. C. A. D. C. Be-
cause the Court lacks a quorum, 28 U. S. C. § 1, and since the
qualifed Justices are of the opinion that the case cannot be heard
and determined at the next Term of the Court, the judgment is
affrmed under 28 U. S. C. § 2109, which provides that under these
circumstances “the court shall enter its order affrming the judg-
ment of the court from which the case was brought for review
with the same effect as upon affrmance by an equally divided
cour t. ” The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, Justice
Breyer, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded. (See Shinn v.
Kayer, 592 U. S. 111 (2020).)
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–5972. Smith v. Hayes, Superintendent, Stafford
Creek Correctional Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of peti-
tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certio-
rari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has
repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not
to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from peti-
tioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and

1148 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 14, 2020 592 U. S.
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Mar-
t
in v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992)
(per curiam).
No. 20–5974. Sanders v. Foster, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Justice Barrett took no part in
the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.
No. 20–6008. Evans v. Kahele. Sup. Ct. Haw. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–6016. Christian v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–6302. Nguyen Vu v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Re-
ported below: 225 A. 3d 1144.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A37. Kelly-Leppert v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Application to recall and stay mandate, addressed to Jus-
tice Sotomayor and referred to the Court, denied.
No. 20M44. Carrasco v. United States. Motion for leave
to fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal granted.
No. 20M45. Rynn v. McKay et al. Motion to direct the
Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 20–5475. Cabello, aka Palumbo v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order
denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 906]
denied.

ORDERS 1149
592 U. S.
D
ecember 14, 2020
No. 20–5497. Simpson v. Court of Common Pleas of Ohio,
Hamil
ton County, et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motion of petitioner
for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [592 U. S. 1022] denied.
No. 20–6104. Pidanick v. LaRosa et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.
Petitioner is allowed until January 4, 2021, within which to pay
the docketing fee required by this Court's Rule 38(a).
No. 20–6368. In re Ramsey. Petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus denied.
No. 20–6401. In re Richardson. Motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ
of habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19 –1144. Mc Carron v. DeCarlo & Shanley, P. C.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed.
Appx. 121.
No. 19–1385. Box, Commissioner, Indiana Department of
Health v. Henderson et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 947 F. 3d 482.
No. 19–1402. Zacarias et al. v. Janvey et al.; and
No. 19–1411. Rupert et al. v. Janvey, as Receiver for
Stanford Receivership Estate, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 883.
No. 19–1427. Tedards et al. v. Ducey, Governor of Ari-
zona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 951 F. 3d 1041.
No. 19–8597. McKenzie v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–163. Lillemoe v. United States; and
No. 20–176. Calderon v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 72.
No. 20–326. Stein v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 1313.
No. 20–347. Spivey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 212.

1150 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 14, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–362. Cochlear Corp. et al. v. Alfred E. Mann
Founda
tion for Scientic Research et al. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 643.
No. 20–433. Jenkins v. O’Rourke et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 495.
No. 20–442. Parsons v. Parsons. Ct. App. Tenn. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–448. Strickland v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–452. S. S. v. D. S. et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 225 A. 3d 1188.
No. 20–459. Snyder v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–468. Xpedite Systems, Inc. v. Ficara, Acting Di-
rector, New Jersey Division of Taxation. Super. Ct. N. J.,
App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–470. Mendoza v. Inspira Health Network, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807
Fed. Appx. 197.
No. 20 – 473. Ammar I. v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 Conn. App. 499, 231 A.
3d 1196.
No. 20–474. CMT Hospital HIMA San Pablo Caguas v.
Suero-Algarin. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 957 F. 3d 30.
No. 20–476. Martinez et al. v. Baskin. Sup. Ct. N. J. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–483. Koshkalda v. Seiko Epson Corp. et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 463.
No. 20–485. Torrence v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 603 S. W. 3d 214.
No. 20–505. Ruttkamp v. Bank of New York Mellon, fka
Bank of New York. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–508. LaVergne v. Vaughn et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 869.

ORDERS 1151
592 U. S.
D
ecember 14, 2020
No. 20–521. Citizens for Fair Representation et al. v.
P
adilla, California Secretary of State. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 120.
No. 20–606. Drevaleva v. California Department of In-
dustrial Relations; Drevaleva v. Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia, First Appellate District; and Drevaleva v. Court
of Appeal of California, First Appellate District. Sup.
Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–608. Drevaleva v. California Department of In-
dustrial Relations; and Drevaleva v. Court of Appeal of
California, First Appellate District. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20 – 615. Martinez et al. v. America’s Wholesale
Lender. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
808 Fed. Appx. 519.
No. 20–618. Routten v. Routten. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 374 N. C. 571, 843 S. E. 2d 154.
No. 20–630. Brewer v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–657. Thomas, for the Estate of Dukes v. Craige.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed.
Appx. 874.
No. 20–661. Charles v. Seinfeld et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 550.
No. 20–677. Laettner v. California Commission on Judi-
cial Performance. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–699. Sammons v. United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5030. Franklin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 707.
No. 20–5422. Miller v. Deal, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–5531. Holmes v. Becker et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 183.

1152 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 14, 2020 592 U. S.
No. 20–5579. Torres v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 655.
No. 20–5963. Murray v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5966. Morgan v. United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 148.
No. 20–5973. Santos v. Eckert, Superintendent, Wende
Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5979. Bailey v. Sherman, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5982. Fortenberry v. Texas Board of Pardons
and Parole et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 345.
No. 20–5987. Truesdale v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5989. Karnofel v. Superior Waterproong, Inc.
Ct. App. Ohio, 11th App. Dist., Trumbull County. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20– 6000. Kielly v. New York. County Ct., Broome
County, N. Y. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6011. Williams v. American International Group,
Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
806 Fed. Appx. 223.
No. 20–6013. LaForte v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6015. Martin v. California Department of Cor-
rections and Rehabilitation. Sup. Ct. Ca l. Cer ti orar i
denied.
No. 20–6023. Anderson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6071. Dillingham v. Scruggs et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 450.

ORDERS 1153
592 U. S.
D
ecember 14, 2020
No. 20–6082. Yokois v. Shinn, Director, Arizona Depart-
ment
of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6123. Holcombe v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 293 So. 3d 1036.
No. 20–6138. Walker v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas De-
partment of Correction. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 2020 Ark. 183.
No. 20–6142. Spain v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st) 163184, 163
N. E. 3d 768.
No. 20–6168. Rahaim v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 308 So. 3d 594.
No. 20–6184. Fulton v. Brittain, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Frackville, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6209. Sanders v. Williams, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 238.
No. 20–6241. Smith v. Kelly Services, Inc., et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 728.
No. 20–6247. Cox v. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6319. McCullough v. Pennsylvania et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–109. Schwab, Secretary of State of Kansas v.
Fish et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gor-
such took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 957 F. 3d 1105.
No. 20–638. Gonzales v. ConocoPhillips Co. et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 806
Fed. Appx. 289.
No. 20–6010. Wojcik v. Cook County, Illinois, et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no

1154 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 14, 2020 592 U. S.
part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below:
803 Fed. Appx. 25.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–1321. In re Wolf et al., 592 U. S. 910;
No. 19–8410. Pinney v. Payne, Director, Arkansas Divi-
sion of Correction, 591 U. S. 1020;
No. 19–8436. In re Young, 592 U. S. 911;
No. 19–8516. Mrazek v. Illinois, 592 U. S. 929;
No. 19–8518. Newson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al., 592 U. S. 929;
No. 19–8622. McQueary-Layne v. Louisiana State Board
of Nursing et al., 592 U. S. 933;
No. 19–8752. Allen v. Moore et al., 592 U. S. 940;
No. 19–8758. Li Qin et al. v. 99 Cents Only Stores, LLC,
et al., 592 U. S. 940;
No. 20–67. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, California,
et al., 592 U. S. 952;
No. 20–102. Hadsell v. Baskin et al., 592 U. S. 1001;
No. 20–172. Ukpai v. Continental Automotive Systems
US, Inc., 592 U. S. 1002;
No. 20–194. Cox v. Texas Workforce Commission et al.,
592 U. S. 1025;
No. 20–5068. Li Qin v. Kong-Brown et al., 592 U. S. 961;
No. 20–5194. In re Moore, 592 U. S. 910;
No. 20–5368. Oyibo v. Huntington Hospital et al., 592
U. S. 1026;
No. 20–5565. Weidrick v. Trump, President of the United
States, et al., 592 U. S. 1035;
No. 20–5605. In re Koehl, 592 U. S. 910;
No. 20–5671. Ward v. Michigan Attorney Grievance Com-
mission, 592 U. S. 1079;
No. 20– 5707. Reeves v. Esper, Secretary of Defense,
et al., 592 U. S. 1029; and
No. 20–5754. Karupaiyan v. New York City Department
of Education, 592 U. S. 1080. Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 19–8638. Brzowski v. Executive Committee of the
United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, 592 U. S. 934. Petition for rehearing denied. Jus-
tice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition.

ORDERS 1155
592 U. S.
D
ecember 14, 15, 2020
No. 20 –100. Barth v. Bernards Township Planning
Board
et al., 592 U. S. 1020. Petition for rehearing denied.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition.
December 15, 2020
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded. (See Nos. 20A95
and 20A105, 592 U. S. 1155).
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A95. Robinson et al. v. Murphy, Governor of New
Jersey, et al. Application for injunctive relief, presented to
Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court, is treated as
a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment, and the petition
is granted. The October 2 order of the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit with instructions to remand to the District Court for fur-
ther consideration in light of Roman Catholic Diocese of Brook-
lyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14 (2020).
No. 20A105. High Plains Harvest Church et al. v. Polis,
Governor of Colorado, et al. Application for injunctive re-
lief, presented to Justice Gorsuch, and by him referred to the
Court, is treated as a petition for writ of certiorari before judg-
ment, and the petition is granted. The August 10 order of the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado is va-
cated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit with instructions to remand to the
District Court for further consideration in light of Roman Catho-
lic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14 (2020).
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Justice So-
tomayor join, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because this case is moot. High Plains Har-
vest Church has sought to enjoin Colorado's capacity limits on wor-
ship services. But Colorado has lifted all those limits. The State
has explained that it took that action in response to this Court's re-
cent decision in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,
592 U. S. 14 (2020) (per curiam). See Brief in Opposition 15.
Absent our issuing different guidance, there is no reason to think
Colorado will reverse course—and so no reason to think Harvest

1156 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 15, 16, 17, 2020 592 U. S.
Church will again face capacity limits. When “subsequent
e
vents” thus show that a challenged action cannot “reasonably be
expected to recur,” a case is well and truly over. Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528
U. S. 167, 189 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
December 16, 2020
Certiorari Granted
No. 20–297. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the peti-
tion. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 1008.
No. 20–512. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Als-
ton et al.; and
No. 20–520. American Athletic Conference et al. v.
Alston et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consoli-
dated, and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument. Re-
ported below: 958 F. 3d 1239.
December 17, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A96. Danville Christian Academy, Inc., et al. v.
Beshear, Governor of Kentucky. On November 18, the Gov-
ernor of Kentucky issued a temporary school-closing order that
effectively closes K–12 schools for in-person instruction until and
through the upcoming holiday break, which starts Friday, Decem-
ber 18, for many Kentucky schools. All schools in Kentucky may
reopen after the holiday break, on January 4. A religious private
school and the attorney general of Kentucky sought a preliminary
injunction against the school-closing order as applied to religious
schools. The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Kentucky granted a preliminary injunction, but the Sixth
Circuit then stayed that injunction pending appeal.
The Governor's school-closing order effectively expires this
week or shortly thereafter, and there is no indication that it will
be renewed. The order applies equally to secular schools and
religious schools, but the applicants argue that the order treats
schools (including religious schools) worse than restaurants, bars,
and gyms, for example, which remain open. For the latter rea-
son, applicants argue that the order is not neutral and generally
applicable for purposes of Employment Div., Dept. of Human

ORDERS 1157
592 U. S.
D
ecember 17, 2020
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990). Several amici
suppor
ting applicants argue in the alternative that even if the
order is neutral and generally applicable because it treats reli-
gious schools the same as secular schools, Smith still requires
heightened scrutiny when the “application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action” also implicates “the
right of parents” “to direct the education of their children.” Id.,
at 881 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972)). Applicants did not
squarely raise that alternative Smith argument in the District
Court, the Sixth Circuit, or this Court.
Under all of the circumstances, especially the timing and the
impending expiration of the order, we deny the application with-
out prejudice to applicants or other parties seeking a new prelimi-
nary injunction if the Governor issues a school-closing order that
applies in the new year.
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, dissenting.
For the reasons explained in Justice Gorsuch's dissent, post,
p. 1158, I would vacate the Sixth Circuit's stay of the preliminary
injunction issued by the District Court and remand for further
consideration in light of the proper legal standards. While I do
not agree with the Court's denial of the applicants' request for
emergency relief, no one should misinterpret that denial as signi-
fying approval of the Sixth Circuit's decision. As I understand
this Court's order, it is based primarily on timing. At this point,
just a few school days remain before the beginning of many
schools' holiday break, and the executive order in question will
expire before classes would normally begin next year. The Court
is therefore reluctant to grant relief that, at this point, would
have little practical effect.
I understand that reluctance, but in my judgment, it is unfair
to deny relief on this ground since this timing is in no way the
applicants' fault. They fled this action on November 20, 2020,
just two days after the issuance of the Governor's executive order.
And when, on November 29, the Sixth Circuit granted a stay of
the order that would have allowed classes to resume, the appli-
cants sought relief in this Court just two days later, on Decem-
ber 1. It is hard to see how they could have proceeded more
expeditiously.

1158 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Gorsuch, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
As things now stand, this action remains on the docket of the
D
istrict Court. If the Governor does not allow classes to begin
after the turn of the year, the applicants can fle a new request
for a preliminary injunction, and if the lower courts do not pro-
vide relief, the applicants may of course return to this Court.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Alito joins, dissenting.
Four weeks ago, the Governor of Kentucky issued two executive
orders. One (the School EO) closed all elementary, middle, and
high schools—including religious ones—for in-person learning,
while leaving preschools, colleges, and universities untouched.
The other (the Business EO) permitted virtually all other in-
person activities to continue with only capacity restrictions.
Movie theaters, indoor wedding venues, bowling alleys, and gam-
ing halls remained open for business.
Religious schools challenged these decrees as a violation of the
First Amendment, and the district court agreed with them. The
court “wonder[ed] why” people “would be free to attend a lecture,
go to work, or attend a concert, but not attend socially distanced
chapel in school or pray together in a classroom that is following
strict safety procedures and social distancing.” Danville Chris-
tian Academy, Inc. v. Beshear, 503 F. Supp. 3d 516, 524 (ED
Ky. 2020). In the end, the court held that the Governor's EOs
discriminated against the free exercise of religion and enjoined
their enforcement against religious schools, so long as those
schools followed all applicable sanitization and social distancing
protocols.
The Sixth Circuit stayed the district court's injunction. Com-
monwealth of Kentucky, Atty. Gen. Cameron v. Beshear, 981
F. 3d 505 (2020). It did so by considering the School EO in
isolation and ignoring the many activities permitted under the
Business EO. Looking only to the School EO, the court ex-
plained, religious exercises were subject to “neutral” and “gener-
ally applicable” rules. Id., at 510. After all, the School EO treated
religious and secular schools the same. Accordingly, the circuit
concluded, the School EO triggered only rational-basis review and
easily passed muster under the terms of Employment Div., Dept.
of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990).
Whatever the ultimate merits of this case, the Sixth Circuit's
decisional path was fawed in at least two respects. First, the

ORDERS 1159
1156
Gorsuch,
J., dissenting
court had an obligation to address the plaintiffs' argument that
the
two EOs, considered together, resulted in unconstitutional
discr iminati on against relig i on. W hether discr i mi nati on is
spread across two orders or embodied in one makes no difference;
the Constitution cannot be evaded merely by multiplying the de-
crees. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U. S. 520, 539–540 (1993). Second, under this Court's precedents,
even neutral and generally applicable laws are subject to strict
scrutiny where (as here) a plaintiff presents a “hybrid” claim—
meaning a claim involving the violation of the right to free exer-
cise and another right, such as the right of parents “to direct the
education of their children.” Smith, 494 U. S., at 881.
Perhaps the Sixth Circuit's errors are understandable. Smith's
rules about how to determine when laws are “neutral” and “gen-
erally applicable” have long proved perplexing. See, e. g., Lay-
cock & Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise
of Religion, 95 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2016). It is far from clear,
too, why the First Amendment's right to free exercise should be
treated less favorably than other rights, or ought to depend on
the presence of another right before strict scrutiny applies. See,
e. g., Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 586 U. S. 1130, 1133
(2019) (Alito, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari); Mc-
Connell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1121–1122 (1990).
Rather than vacate and remand in light of these problems, to-
day's majority denies relief. On the merits, the majority suggests
the applicants may not have “squarely” advanced the second argu-
ment about “hybrid” rights. But however that may be, no one
doubts the applicants have always pressed the frst argument—
that the Governor's two EOs together discriminate against reli-
gion. The Sixth Circuit's failure to engage that argument is alone
suffcient grounds for vacatur. The majority disputes none of this
but instead turns to an assessment of the equities. Whatever the
problems with the Sixth Circuit's order, it says, we should let this
one go because this case is old news; winter break is coming soon,
and the Governor's decrees will expire in a few weeks, on January 4.
I would assess the equities differently. The EOs remain in
force, the dispute over them remains live, and the decision allow-
ing them to stand is fawed. Nothing prevents us from saying
so; no one attempts to suggest this case is moot; and the appli-
cants are entitled to a fair assessment of their rights under accu-

1160 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
December 17, 28, 2020 592 U. S.
rate legal rules. The plaintiffs proceeded expeditiously in chal-
leng
ing the EOs; they have hardly sat on their rights. Nor
should a Governor be able to evade judicial review by issuing
short-term edicts and then urging us to overlook their problems
only because one edict is about to expire while the next has yet
to arrive. Come January 4, a new school semester will be about
to start, and the Governor has expressly told us that he reserves
the right to issue more decrees like these if and when religious
schools try to resume holding classes. Rather than telling the
parties to renew their fght in a month, asking the Sixth Circuit to
resolve the case now, under accurate legal rules, would be better for
everyone—from the parents who might have to miss work and
stay home should decrees like these be upheld, to the state public
health offcials who might have to plan for school if they are not.
Courts have a broader equity at stake here too. In their strug-
gle to respond to the current pandemic, executive offcials have
sometimes treated constitutional rights with suspicion. In Ken-
tucky, state troopers seeking to enforce gubernatorial orders even
reprimanded and recorded the license plate numbers of worship-
pers who attended an Easter church service, some of whom were
merely sitting in their cars listening to the service over a loud-
speaker. Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 977 F. 3d
561, 563–564 (CA6 2020) (per curiam). Recently, this Court made
clear it would no longer tolerate such departures from the Consti-
tution. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592
U. S. 14, 17–20 (2020) (per curiam). We did so in a case where
the challenged edict had arguably expired, explaining that our
action remained appropriate given the Governor's claim that he
could revive his unconstitutional decree anytime. Id., at 20.
That was the proper course there, as I believe it is here. I would
not leave in place yet another potentially unconstitutional decree,
even for the next few weeks.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would grant the
application, vacate the Sixth Circuit's stay, and remand the matter
for further consideration under the proper legal standards.
December 28, 2020
Vacated and Remanded on Appeal
No. 20 – 561. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. City of San Jose, California, et al. Appeal from
D. C. N. D. Cal. Judgment vacated, and case remanded with

ORDERS 1161
592 U. S.
D
ecember 28, 30, 2020, January 5, 7, 8, 2021
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See Trump v.
N
ew York, 592 U. S. 125 (2020) (per curiam).
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice
Kagan, dissents for the reasons stated in Trump v. New York,
592 U. S. 125, 134 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
No. 20 – 662. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Useche et al. Appeal from D. C. Md. Judgment
vacated, and case remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. See Trump v. New York, 592 U. S. 125 (2020)
(per curiam).
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice
Kagan, dissents for the reasons stated in Trump v. New York,
592 U. S. 125, 134 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
December 30, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A108. Louisiana v. Hill. Sup. Ct. La. Application
for stay, presented to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the
Court, denied.
January 5, 2021
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20–6585. Moore v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.
January 7, 2021
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20–743. DISH Network L. L. C. v. United States
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's
Rule 46.
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A115. Gohmert et al. v. Pence, Vice President of
the United States. Application for interim relief, presented
to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
January 8, 2021
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 19–1189. BP p.l.c. et al. v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 591 U. S.

1162 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 8, 2021 592 U. S.
1080.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to partici-
pate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or
decision of this motion
No. 19–1231. Federal Communications Commission et al.
v. Prometheus Radio Project et al.; and
No. 19 –1241. National Association of Broadcasters
et al. v. Prometheus Radio Project et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 591 U. S. 1080.] Motion of the Acting Solici-
tor General for divided argument granted.
Certiorari Granted
No. 20–255. Mahanoy Area School District v. B. L., a
Minor, By and Through Her Father, Levy, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 170.
No. 20–315. Sanchez et ux. v. Wolf, Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted.
Reported below: 967 F. 3d 242.
No. 20–334. City of San Antonio, Texas, on Behalf of
Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Munici-
palities v. Hotels.com, L. P., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
granted. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 159.
No. 20–382. Territory of Guam v. United States. C. A.
D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 104.
No. 20–440. Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 957 F. 3d
1256.
No. 19–251. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Be-
cerra, Attorney General of California; and
No. 19–255. Thomas More Law Center v. Becerra, Attor-
ney General of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer ti orari
granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour is allotted for
oral argument. Reported below: 903 F. 3d 1000.
No. 19–8709. Greer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 483.

ORDERS 1163
592 U. S.
January
8, 11, 2021
No. 20–437. United States v. Palomar-Santiago. C. A.
9th
Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 813
Fed. Appx. 282.
No. 20–444. United States v. Gary. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion
of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 194.
No. 20– 472. HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC,
et al. v. Renewable Fuels Assn. et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Motions of American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers and
Countrymark Refning and Logistics, LLC, for leave to fle briefs
as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below:
948 F. 3d 1206.
No. 20–543. Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation et al.; and
No. 20–544. Alaska Native Village Corp. Assn., Inc.,
et al. v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reserva-
tion et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of United States Senator
Lisa Murkowski et al. for leave to fle briefs as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of
one hour is allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 976
F. 3d 15.
No. 20–5904. Terry v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 563.
January 11, 2021
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 20 – 234. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
et al. v. Padilla et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted,
judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration
in light of Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U. S. 103 (2020). Reported below: 953 F. 3d 1134.
No. 20–306. Olan et al. v. United States; and
No. 20–5649. Blaszczak v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Motion of petitioner in No. 20–5649 for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and

1164 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
cases remanded for further consideration in light of Kelly v.
U
nited States, 590 U. S. 391 (2020). Reported below: 947 F. 3d 19.
No. 20–5123. Hayes v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir.
Reported below: 2017–0789 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/27/19); and
No. 20–5363. Jones v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir.
Reported below: 2018–0973 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/27/19). Motions
of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded for
further consideration in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S.
83 (2020).
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–6031. Talley v. United States District Court for
the Southern District of Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–6056. Jones v. Capiro. Sup. Ct. Del. Motion of peti-
tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certio-
rari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported below: 238
A. 3d 848.
No. 20– 6114. Shong-Ching Tong v. Superior Court of
California, Los Angeles County, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–6128. Liviz v. Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed.
See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported below: 484 Mass. 1015, 140
N. E. 3d 909.
No. 20–6145. Kelly v. Bishop, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 167.
No. 20–6171. Baptiste v. Koenig, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–6217. Rangel v. Meyer et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,

ORDERS 1165
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported
below:
807 Fed. Appx. 567.
No. 20–6345. DeCarlo v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari before judgment dismissed. See this Court's
Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's proc-
ess, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in
noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee re-
quired by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in
compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 20–6365. Crosby v. True, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Jus-
tice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this
motion and this petition. Reported below: 830 Fed. Appx. 571.
No. 20–6366. Riley v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed
not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from
petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid
and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See
Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1
(1992) (per curiam). Justice Alito took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this motion and this petition. Reported
below: 238 A. 3d 848.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A97. Vinkov v. United States District Court for
the Central District of California. Application for stay,
addressed to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied.
No. 20M46. Stewart v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion, et al. Motion to direct the Clerk to fle petition for writ
of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 19–1434. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., et al.;
No. 19–1452. Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al. v. Arthrex,
Inc., et al.; and

1166 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 19 –1458. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
et
al. C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1000.]
Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for divided argument
granted.
No. 19–1442. Carr et al. v. Saul, Commissioner of Social
Security. C. A. 10th Cir.; and
No. 20–105. Davis et al. v. Saul, Commissioner of Social
Security; and Hilliard v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1085 and
1086.] Motions of petitioners to dispense with printing joint ap-
pendix granted.
No. 20–37. Azar, Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices, et al. v. Gresham et al.; and Azar, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, et al. v. Philbrick et al.; and
No. 20–38. Arkansas v. Gresham et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1121.] Motion of the Acting Solici-
tor General to dispense with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 20–402. Richardson et al., Individually and as Par-
ents and Next Friends of L v. Omaha School District.
C. A. 8th Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited to fle a
brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.
No. 20–512. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Als-
ton et al.; and
No. 20–520. American Athletic Conference et al. v. Al-
ston et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1156.]
Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing joint appendix
granted.
No. 20–639. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak,
Governor of Nevada, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Respondents are
directed to fle a response to the petition on or before noon, Tues-
day, January 19, 2021. Petitioner may fle a reply brief on or
before noon, Thursday, January 21, 2021.
No. 20–799. Wood v. Raffensperger, Georgia Secretary
of State, et al. C. A. 11th Cir.;
No. 20–809. Ward v. Jackson et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz.;
No. 20–810. Kelly, United States Congressman, et al. v.
Pennsylvania et al. Sup. Ct. Pa.;
No. 20–815. King et al. v. Whitmer, Governor of Michi-
gan, et al. C. A. 6th Cir.;

ORDERS 1167
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–845. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boock-
v
ar, Secretary of Pennsylvania, et al.; Donald J. Trump
for President, Inc. v. Philadelphia County Board of Elec-
tions et al.; and Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v.
Elkin et al. Sup. Ct. Pa.;
No. 20–882. Trump et al. v. Biden et al. Sup. Ct. Wis.;
and
No. 20–883. Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Motions of petitioners to expedite consid-
eration of the petitions for writs of certiorari denied.
No. 20–816. In re Pearson et al. Motion of petitioners to
expedite consideration of the petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
No. 20–5566. Wilson v. Florida et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
4th Dist. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order deny-
ing leave to proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 1071] denied.
No. 20 – 5638. Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of
order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S.
1083] denied.
No. 20–5659. Robles v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsidera-
tion of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [592
U. S. 1022] denied.
No. 20–6093. Abutaleb v. Abutaleb. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist.;
No. 20–6152. Luquin-Coronel v. Rosen, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 6th Cir.;
No. 20–6234. Moynihan v. West Chester Area School
District et al. C. A. 3d Cir.; and
No. 20 – 6283. Brownlee v. Capozza, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Fayette. C. A. 3d Cir.
Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied. Petitioners are allowed until February 1, 2021, within
which to pay the docketing fees required by this Court's Rule
38(a).
No. 20–6421. In re Richards;
No. 20–6587. In re Tanamor-Steffan;
No. 20–6616. In re Romain; and

1168 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6634. In re Chades. Petitions for writs of habeas
cor
pus denied.
No. 20–6536. In re Raghubir. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 20–626. In re Heghmann;
No. 20–726. In re Michael;
No. 20–760. In re Demery; and
No. 20–6270. In re Howell. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus denied.
No. 20–6287. In re Akel. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of manda-
mus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Justice Kagan
took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and
this petition.
No. 20–6119. In re Woods. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
No. 20–6164. In re Romain. Petition for writ of prohibition
denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1143. FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 942 Fed.
Appx. 916.
No. 19–1363. Urrutia Robles v. Rosen, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
940 F. 3d 420.
No. 19–1441. City of Austin, Texas v. Paxton, Attorney
General of Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 943 F. 3d 993.
No. 19–1476. Vantage Energy Services, Inc., et al. v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 749.

ORDERS 1169
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 19–8650. Campbell v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 243 Md. App. 507, 221 A.
3d 1022.
No. 19–8661. Santos v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d 711.
No. 19–8668. Whiteside v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 Ark. 349, 588 S. W. 3d 720.
No. 19–8799. Johnman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 612.
No. 19–8838. Medina v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 223.
No. 19–8898. Efthimiatos v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 75.
No. 20–47. Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Whitmer
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956
F. 3d 863.
No. 20–132. Moodsters Co. v. Walt Disney Co. et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 767.
No. 20–139. Iwai v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 930 F. 3d 1141.
No. 20–150. ThermoLife International LLC v. Iancu,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Prop-
erty and Director, United States Patent and Trademark
Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
796 Fed. Appx. 726.
No. 20–202. Massie v. Mena. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 539.
No. 20–216. Bose v. de la Salud Bea et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 F. 3d 983.
No. 20–217. Balter v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 245.
No. 20–239. Solorzano-Guerrero v. Rosen, Acting Attor-
ney General. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–244. Fayed v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 5th 147, 460 P. 3d 1149.

1170 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–250. Poole v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de-
nied.
Reported below: 297 So. 3d 487.
No. 20–256. Jordan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 160.
No. 20–272. Maryland et al. v. Rogers. Ct. App. Md.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 468 Md. 1, 226 A. 3d 261.
No. 20–293. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. et al. v. New Mex-
ico ex rel. Balderas, Attorney General. Ct. App. N. M.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019–NMCA–016, 436 P. 3d
724.
No. 20–301. Hennis v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 79 M. J. 370.
No. 20–304. World Programming Ltd. v. SAS Institute,
Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952
F. 3d 513.
No. 20–332. Hurchalla v. Lake Point Phase I, LLC, et al.
Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 278 So. 3d 58.
No. 20–333. Bozeman Financial LLC v. Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 955 F. 3d 971.
No. 20–351. Carey v. Throwe et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 468.
No. 20–360. Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of
Corrections, et al. v. Jensen et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 443.
No. 20–361. Courtney et al. v. Danner et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 558.
No. 20–365. Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Prod-
ucts LLC. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
953 F. 3d 1170.
No. 20–370. Bugarenko v. Rosen, Acting Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798
Fed. Appx. 741.

ORDERS 1171
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–378. North Cypress Medical Center Operating
Co
., Ltd., et al. v. Cigna Healthcare et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 708.
No. 20–407. Massenburg v. Innovative Talent Solutions,
Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–410. NTCH, Inc. v. Federal Communications Com-
mission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 950 F. 3d 871.
No. 20–423. Garrott v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 905.
No. 20–426. Huntress et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 74.
No. 20–441. Minnesota Sands, LLC v. County of Winona,
Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–456. Elder v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 19.
No. 20–457. MarketGraphics Research Group, Inc. v.
Berge. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953
F. 3d 907.
No. 20–464. Rosemond v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 111.
No. 20–471. Y. W. v. Auero et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–488. Bhargava v. Mortgage Electronic Registra-
tion Systems, Inc. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–490. Freeman v. Wainwright, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 226.
No. 20–491. Perez Hernandez v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex.,
13th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–495. Stanley v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 351.
No. 20–496. Weinberg v. Bort. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 3d 898.

1172 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–498. Garcia et al. v. Blevins et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d 596.
No. 20–502. Mascara, Sheriff of St. Lucie County, Flor-
ida, et al. v. Bryant, as Personal Representative the Es-
tate of Hill. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 800 Fed. Appx. 881.
No. 20–503. Kurbanov v. UMG Recordings, Inc., et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 344.
No. 20–506. Vinkov v. Smith et al. (two judgments). Ct.
App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 509. Monalim et ux. v. HawaiiUSA Federal
Credit Union. Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 147 Haw. 33, 464 P. 3d 821.
No. 20–511. George v. Territory of the Virgin Islands.
Sup. Ct. V. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 69 V. I. 553.
No. 20–515. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v.
Gateway Hospitality Group Inc. et al. Sup. Ct. Mont. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 400 Mont. 80, 464 P. 3d 44.
No. 20–516. McCoy v. Ouedraogo. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–522. Porter v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 800.
No. 20–530. Burbank v. Connecticut Ofce of Chief Dis-
ciplinary Counsel. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 195 Conn. App. 416, 224 A. 3d 1185.
No. 20–532. Xiaohua Huang v. Huawei Technology Co.,
Ltd. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795
Fed. Appx. 848.
No. 20–538. Rentberry, Inc., et al. v. City of Seattle,
Washington. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Repor ted
below: 814 Fed. Appx. 309.
No. 20–540. Hegland et al. v. Hanna. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

ORDERS 1173
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–541. MacDonald v. Kempinsky et al. Ct. App. Cal.,
2d
App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–545. Terrell v. Renner. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–556. Special Services Bureau, Inc., dba Regional
Bonding Co. v. Circuit Court of West Virginia, Berkeley
County. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–557. Aguirre-Chavez v. Rosen, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–560. Sullivan et al. v. Nassau County Interim
Finance Authority et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 959 F. 3d 54.
No. 20–562. Yearwood et al. v. Department of the Inte-
rior et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
960 F. 3d 223.
No. 20–571. Weisshaus v. Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 814 Fed. Appx. 643.
No. 20–582. Kifayatuthelezi, aka Hayes v. South Caro-
lina Department of Corrections et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 229.
No. 20–583. Dailey v. Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–588. Wainwright, Warden v. Sexton. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 968 F. 3d 607.
No. 20–590. Pankoe v. Pankoe. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 222 A. 3d 443.
No. 20–592. Hallmark Care Services, Inc., et al. v. Supe-
rior Court of Washington, Spokane County, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 424.
No. 20–593. Hallmark Care Services, Inc., et al. v. Supe-
rior Court of Washington, Spokane County, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 435.

1174 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–594. Berry v. State Bar of Arizona. Ct. App.
Ar
iz. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–596. Scott v. City of St. Petersburg, Florida,
et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 308 So. 3d 584.
No. 20–597. Jeffery v. Brooks, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 747.
No. 20–598. Kratz v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. Super.
Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–600. Sevy v. Barach. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 58.
No. 20–607. Drevaleva v. Alameda Health System. Ct.
App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–610. Howland v. Kelly et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–611. Doyle v. Vigilante. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 628.
No. 20–614. Kerr v. Kerr. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 400 Mont. 561, 464 P. 3d 1012.
No. 20–616. Durr v. Department of the Army et al.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed.
Appx. 723.
No. 20–617. California Virtual Academies v. California
Public Employment Relations Board. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 6. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–619. R. S. et al., Individually and on Behalf of
Their Son, A. S. v. Board of Education Shenendehowa Cen-
tral School District et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–620. Williams et al. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
801 Fed. Appx. 328.
No. 20–623. Gurvey v. Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P. C.,
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1175
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–624. Golden v. Apple Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certio-
rar
i denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 930.
No. 20–625. Findler v. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–627. E. H. v. Florida Department of Agriculture
and Consumer Services, Division of Licensing. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 300
So. 3d 162.
No. 20–631. Hologic, Inc., et al. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 957 F. 3d
1256.
No. 20–632. Fyk v. Facebook, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 597.
No. 20–635. Soo Line Railroad Co., dba Canadian Pacic
v. Consolidated Rail Corporation et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 965 F. 3d 596.
No. 20–640. Welsh Government v. Pablo Star Ltd. et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 555.
No. 20–644. Pendergrass v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–646. Baggott v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 301 So. 3d 230.
No. 20–647. Azala v. Rosen, Acting Attorney General.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed.
Appx. 51.
No. 20–650. Stadtwerke Frankfurt am Main Holding
GmbH v. RWE Trading Americas Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 6.
No. 20–651. Cook Children’s Medical Center v. T. L., a
Minor, et al. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 607 S. W. 3d 9.
No. 20 – 652. Georgiou v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.

1176 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–653. Hamilton v. City of Hayti, Missouri, et al.
C
. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d
921.
No. 20–654. Ripa v. Stony Brook University. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 50.
No. 20–655. Xiu Jian Sun v. Lawrence, Assistant United
States Attorney, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–656. Kinghorn et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 879.
No. 20–663. Culpepper v. Provectus Biopharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–664. Joukov v. Ofce of the State Attorney for
the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 296 So. 3d 902.
No. 20–670. Dillard et al. v. O’Kelley et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 1048.
No. 20–673. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge
No. 7 v. City of Chicago, Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 IL 124831, 181 N. E. 3d 18.
No. 20–675. Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Iancu,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Prop-
erty and Director, United States Patent and Trademark
Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
809 Fed. Appx. 773.
No. 20–680. Loder v. Icemakers, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 698.
No. 20–681. Larkin et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20– 682. Kolodziejczyk v. Rosen, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
804 Fed. Appx. 14.
No. 20–684. Tagger v. Strauss Group Ltd. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 124.
No. 20–686. Shock v. Arkansas. Ct. App. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 Ark. App. 165, 596 S. W. 3d 580.

ORDERS 1177
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20– 687. Allen v. United States (three judg ments).
C
. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed.
Appx. 1013 (frst judgment).
No. 20–689. Foster v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–692. Webster et al. v. Fresenius Medical Care
Holdings, Inc., aka Fresenius Medical Care North
America. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–693. Fridman et al. v. Orbis Business Intelli-
gence Ltd. et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 229 A. 3d 494.
No. 20–698. Headman v. Hansen et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 315.
No. 20–703. Kinney et al. v. Urban Housing Develop-
ment, LLC. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–705. Jaye v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 994.
No. 20–710. Grove v. Groome et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 551.
No. 20 –713. Ventura de Paulino v. New York City
Department of Education et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 519.
No. 20–715. Hersi v. Sheldon, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–721. Garding v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 400 Mont. 296, 466 P. 3d 501.
No. 20–729. Coderch Mitjans v. EGI–VSR, LLC. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 1112.
No. 20–731. Wineld v. United States Probation and
Pretrial Services et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 343.
No. 20–736. Frasch v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 279 So. 3d 844.
No. 20–741. Anderson, on Behalf of Minor Child M. A
v. Vazquez. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Repor ted
below: 813 Fed. Appx. 358.

1178 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–747. Gary et al. v. JTC Holdings, LLC. Ct. App.
Colo
. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–751. Krapacs v. Florida Bar. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–754. Von Weingarten v. Chester. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 110.
No. 20–761. Campbell v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Western
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 600 S. W. 3d 780.
No. 20–774. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Association Certied
Grievance Committee et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 159 Ohio St. 3d 211, 2019-Ohio-5157, 150
N. E. 3d 43.
No. 20–778. Grose v. Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treas-
ury. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–780. Aguillard v. Louisiana College. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 248.
No. 20–788. Veasy et al. v. Fraternal Order of Police
Jim Fogleman Lodge #50, Inc. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 298 So. 3d 619.
No. 20–5064. Brown v. United States; and
No. 20–5074. Banks v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 455.
No. 20–5090. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 346.
No. 20–5184. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 328.
No. 20–5202. Collins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 131.
No. 20–5278. Whitehead v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 649.
No. 20–5285. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 153.
No. 20–5308. Horton v. Methodist University, Inc. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 209.

ORDERS 1179
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–5341. Becerra v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 958 F. 3d 725.
No. 20–5342. Avila v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–5355. Cox v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 322.
No. 20–5416. Cure v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 3d 311.
No. 20–5417. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5485. Moss v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 292 So. 3d 791.
No. 20–5486. Miles v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 292 So. 3d 1178.
No. 20–5517. Gardner v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2020 Ark. 147, 598 S. W. 3d 10.
No. 20–5537. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 234.
No. 20–5539. Rumzis v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 790
Fed. Appx. 842.
No. 20–5578. Walker v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 577.
No. 20–5639. Cain v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 672.
No. 20–5746. Finnesy v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 675.
No. 20–5775. Angeles v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 971 F. 3d 535.
No. 20–5784. Jeffries v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 160 Ohio St. 3d 300, 2020-Ohio-1539,
156 N. E. 3d 859.
No. 20–5801. Rogers v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 299 So. 3d 386.

1180 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–5828. Carter v. CPC Logistics, Inc., et al. C. A.
4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 196.
No. 20–5840. Miller v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 1095.
No. 20–5874. Lard v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 Ark. 110, 595 S. W. 3d 355.
No. 20–5954. McDonald v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 296 So. 3d 382.
No. 20– 5996. Howard v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
959 F. 3d 168.
No. 20–6014. Vick v. Bernard et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6017. Godfrey v. Guyer, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6019. Givens v. Yates et al. Ct. App. Ohio, 7th
App. Dist., Belmont County. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6021. Allen v. Batts et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 437.
No. 20–6025. McManus v. Vann, Superintendent, Altona
Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6026. Newkirk v. Kiser, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 159.
No. 20–6028. Maria Pedro v. City Fitness, LLC, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx.
647.
No. 20–6035. Williams v. South Carolina Workers’ Com-
pensation Commission et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 244.
No. 20–6036. Washington v. Clarke, Director, Virginia
Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 897.
No. 20–6039. McBride v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1181
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–6040. Bullock v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
p
artment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 248.
No. 20–6053. Riechmann v. Florida Department of Cor-
rections et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 940 F. 3d 559.
No. 20–6060. Smiley v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 295 So. 3d 156.
No. 20–6063. Sameer v. Right Move 4 U et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 473.
No. 20 – 6072. Maraglino v. Espinosa, Warden, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed.
Appx. 451.
No. 20–6077. Pinney v. Illinois et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6080. Posey v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6081. Albert-Sheridan v. State Bar of Califor-
nia et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
960 F. 3d 1188.
No. 20–6096. Brown v. Nicklaus, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6097. Martinez v. Gonzalez. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 417.
No. 20–6099. Moore v. United States; and
No. 20 – 6427. Wil son v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 136.
No. 20–6107. Maples v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806
Fed. Appx. 314.
No. 20–6111. Moore v. Board of Review, New Jersey De-
partment of Labor, et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certio-
rari denied.

1182 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6113. Wogenstahl v. Shoop, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6115. Taylor v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6120. Tippins v. NWI–1, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6125. Jones v. Traylor et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6126. Jones v. Edward et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6127. Tart v. Vigus et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 181.
No. 20–6131. Smith v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 WI App 1, 389 Wis. 2d 624, 937
N. W. 2d 297.
No. 20–6132. Coffee v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2020 WI 53, 391 Wis. 2d 831, 943
N. W. 2d 845.
No. 20–6136. Barnaby v. Witkowski et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6139. Alvarado v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6144. Kuntz v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6158. Brockington v. South Carolina Department
of Social Services et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 122.
No. 20–6159. Bruce v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed.
Appx. 248.
No. 20–6160. Blankumsee v. West, Warden, et al. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 893.
No. 20– 6166. Sigmon v. Stirling, Commissioner, South
Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 183.

ORDERS 1183
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20– 6174. Childs v. Western Tidewater Community
Services
Board. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 797 Fed. Appx. 116.
No. 20–6175. Walker v. Laughlin, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6176. Weathers v. Frakes, Director, Nebraska
Department of Correctional Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6177. Davis v. Goodyear Police Department et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed.
Appx. 449.
No. 20–6181. Shareef v. Moore et al. (three judgments).
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6187. Jackson v. County of Sacramento Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 587.
No. 20–6194. Vodicka v. Tobolowsky, Executor of the Es-
tate of Tobolowsky, et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6202. Wooten v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2020 Ark. 305, 608 S. W. 3d 565.
No. 20–6203. Rachel O. v. Alaska Department of Health
and Social Services. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 467 P. 3d 1076.
No. 20–6205. Caraffa v. United States District Court
for the District of Arizona. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 20–6206. Johnson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 IL App (1st) 172094–U.
No. 20–6207. Cooper v. Bay County, Florida, et al. Dist.
Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 295
So. 3d 218.
No. 20–6208. Jackson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

1184 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6219. Lynch v. Chao et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
D
ist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6222. White v. Yang Acupuncture et al. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6223. White v. Tavel. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6224. White v. Elite Beverages. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6228. Le v. Dwyer et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6229. Johnson v. McReynolds. Ct. App. Nev. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 136 Nev. 833, 470 P. 3d 280.
No. 20–6232. Peterson v. Rewerts, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6233. Mote v. Murtin et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 635.
No. 20–6235. Montano v. Court of Appeals of Michigan.
Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 506 Mich.
888, 946 N. W. 2d 781.
No. 20–6239. Mohammed v. Prairie State Legal Services
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6240. Richards v. Taskila, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6245. Davis v. Chapman, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6250. Box v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 App.
Div. 3d 1238, 119 N. Y. S. 3d 650.
No. 20–6251. Byers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 801 Fed. Appx. 889.
No. 20–6252. Boyle v. Shoop, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

ORDERS 1185
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20 – 6253. Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee.
C
. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed.
Appx. 138.
No. 20–6254. Yoquigua Lopez v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 654.
No. 20 – 6256. Valentine v. PNC Financial Services
Group, Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 722.
No. 20–6257. Davis v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807
Fed. Appx. 337.
No. 20–6258. Campbell v. Gause et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6261. Desjardins-Racine v. United States. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 219.
No. 20–6262. Brown v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jer-
sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 6263. Abdulrazzak v. Fluke, Warden, et al.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6264. Abdelsalam, aka Abdelsalim, aka Al Sayed
v. Rosen, Acting Attorney General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6265. Aguilar v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 973 F. 3d 445.
No. 20–6266. Salas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 218.
No. 20–6268. Roberts v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6269. Gardner v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 245 Md. App. 740.
No. 20–6271. Betton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 297.

1186 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6273. Barrett v. Parris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6274. Juarez, aka Perez-Juarez v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed.
Appx. 313.
No. 20–6276. Fressadi v. Arizona et al. Ct. App. Ariz.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6277. Stucks v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 306 So. 3d 373.
No. 20–6281. Ratliff v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed. Appx. 937.
No. 20–6282. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 969 F. 3d 583.
No. 20–6285. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 274.
No. 20–6286. Aragon v. Williams, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 610.
No. 20–6288. Snyder v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6290. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6292. Richey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 280.
No. 20–6293. Grifn v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 815.
No. 20–6298. Butler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6299. Leyva-Peraza v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 417.
No. 20–6301. Wall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 844.
No. 20–6304. Al-Farekh v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 99.

ORDERS 1187
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–6306. Gilliam v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 834 Fed. Appx. 387.
No. 20–6309. Urena-Villa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 584.
No. 20–6311. Davis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 970 F. 3d 650.
No. 20–6313. Merritt v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 243.
No. 20–6314. McClures v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 814.
No. 20–6316. Pubien v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 727.
No. 20–6317. Petty v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 152 N. E. 3d 1075.
No. 20–6320. Carter v. Pellicane et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 243.
No. 20–6324. Laird v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 497.
No. 20–6326. Bennett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 236.
No. 20–6327. Carroll v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 264.
No. 20–6328. Mayhall v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 282.
No. 20–6330. Macias v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 1000.
No. 20–6332. Salyers v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6335. Sikes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 805.
No. 20–6338. Smith v. Cook, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 377.
No. 20–6340. Farrace v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 470.

1188 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6341. Harriman v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 970 F. 3d 1048.
No. 20–6342. Gutierrez v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 320.
No. 20–6343. Fernandes v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 485 Mass. 172, 148
N. E. 3d 361.
No. 20–6346. Morris v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 156.
No. 20–6348. O’Brien v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6350. Dozier v. Neven, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20– 6360. Wilkins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6362. Avalos-Rivera v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 110.
No. 20–6363. Cabezas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 415.
No. 20–6364. Davis v. United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6370. Merritt v. May, Warden, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6372. Ashe v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 229 A. 3d 1228.
No. 20–6375. Nweme v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6376. Harstine v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 852.
No. 20–6378. White v. Wishard Hospital. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6380. Hester v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1189
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–6381. Anastasio v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 972 F. 3d 63.
No. 20–6382. Eplion v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20 – 6389. Martinez-Rodriguez v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed.
Appx. 261.
No. 20–6390. Cabrera v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6392. Gakuba v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 12.
No. 20–6394. Hagar v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 361.
No. 20–6397. Cornejo v. Pfeiffer, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6402. Treantos v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 6403. Mat tingly v. Duval County Jail et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed.
Appx. 971.
No. 20–6405. Cato v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed. Appx. 398.
No. 20–6406. Cuddington v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 241.
No. 20–6408. Fernandez-Vargas v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 355.
No. 20–6412. St. Hilaire v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 61.
No. 20–6415. Burleigh v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 214.
No. 20–6418. Harris v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6420. Urias Espinoza v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 328.

1190 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6423. Lee v. AT&T Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 372.
No. 20–6426. Farias-Valdovinos v. United States. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 441.
No. 20–6434. Madero-Diaz, aka Ramon Castillo v. United
States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817
Fed. Appx. 489.
No. 20–6435. Jones v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 100.
No. 20–6437. Pena v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 1016.
No. 20–6438. Molina v. Fox, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 469.
No. 20–6439. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 333.
No. 20–6440. Toscano v. Adam et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 687.
No. 20–6442. Moore v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 725.
No. 20–6446. Cotto-Flores v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 970 F. 3d 17.
No. 20–6449. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 394.
No. 20–6450. Yerkes v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 334.
No. 20–6451. White v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 557.
No. 20–6455. Wade v. Trustees of Indiana University
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804
Fed. Appx. 410.
No. 20–6461. Morris v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 341.

ORDERS 1191
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–6463. Murillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 372.
No. 20–6464. Moreno-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 364.
No. 20–6465. Tillery v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 157.
No. 20–6467. Howard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 383.
No. 20–6470. Wilson v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6482. Mofte v. Mississippi. Ct. App. Miss. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 309 So. 3d 529.
No. 20–6485. Collins v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 694.
No. 20–6508. Harris v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 64.
No. 20–6523. Brooks v. Jordan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6581. Hanzlik v. Joseph, Superintendent, Bed-
ford Hills Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–1184. Bruni et al. v. City of Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-
vania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 941 F. 3d 73.
St atement of Justice Thomas respec ti ng the denia l of
certiorari.
The city of Pittsburgh, like many jurisdictions, has created
“buffer zones” around abortion clinics. These zones often impose
serious limits on free speech. Many even prohibit certain one-
on-one conversations. In 2000, we upheld one such law, determin-
ing that it survived under the First Amendment because it satis-
fed intermediate scrutiny. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703 (2000).
Our use of intermediate scrutiny there, however, “is incompatible

1192 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
with current First Amendment doctrine as explained in Reed
[
v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155 (2015)] and McCullen
[v. Coakley, 573 U. S. 464 (2014)].” Price v. Chicago, 915 F. 3d
1107, 1117 (CA7 2019). For example, these more recent decisions
establish that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review
when a law targets a “specifc subject matter . . . even if it does
not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.”
Reed, 576 U. S., at 169.
I agree with the Court's decision not to take up this case be-
cause it involves unclear, preliminary questions about the proper
interpretation of state law. But the Court should take up this
issue in an appropriate case to resolve the glaring tension in
our precedents.
No. 19–1389. Texas Democratic Party et al. v. Abbott,
Governor of Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari before
judgment denied.
No. 20–136. Dozier v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 949 F. 3d 322.
No. 20–276. Gibson v. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of Pacifc Legal Foundation
for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 753.
No. 20–405. City of Miami Gardens, Florida v. Wells
Fargo & Co. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of International
Municipal Lawyers Association for leave to fle brief as amicus
curiae granted. Reported below: 931 F. 3d 1274.
No. 20–427. Polk County, Wisconsin v. J. K. J. et al. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
960 F. 3d 367.
No. 20–510. IQVIA Inc. v. Mussat. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 441.
No. 20–519. State Bar of California et al. v. Albert-
Sheridan. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 960 F. 3d 1188.

ORDERS 1193
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–523. Otworth v. PNC Bank. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rar
i denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition.
No. 20–527. Guskiewicz et al. v. DTH Media Corp. et al.
Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion of Victim Advocacy Groups for leave to
fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 374 N. C. 292, 841 S. E. 2d 251.
No. 20–553. Pennsylvania Voters Alliance et al. v. Cen-
tre County, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
before judgment denied.
No. 20–589. McDonald v. Eagle County, Colorado, et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 807 Fed. Appx. 786.
No. 20–707. Johnson v. Wilson, Warden. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 648.
No. 20–712. Burlaka et al. v. Contract Transport Serv-
ices, LLC. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Bar-
rett took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 971 F. 3d 718.
No. 20–714. Saccoccia v. United States et al. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 955 F. 3d
171.
No. 20–722. Williamson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 802 Fed.
Appx. 795.
No. 20–737. B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. C&D Zodiac, Inc. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer and Justice
Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this peti-
tion. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 1373.
No. 20–767. O’Brien v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 953 F. 3d 449.

1194 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6078. Vreeland v. Zupan, Warden, et al. C. A.
10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
801 Fed. Appx. 629.
No. 20– 6183. Hatton v. Sevier, Superintendent, New
Castle Correctional Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition.
No. 20–6377. Martin v. Fowler et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 804 Fed.
Appx. 414.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–1277. Thorpe v. Dumas et al., 592 U. S. 914;
No. 19–1342. Mulcahy v. Aspen Pitkin County Housing
Authority, 592 U. S. 917;
No. 19–1419. Henry-Bey v. Castro et al., 592 U. S. 921;
No. 19–5267. St. Hubert v. United States, 590 U. S. 984;
No. 19–6594. Ingraham v. Florida, 589 U. S. 1150;
No. 19– 8446. Twitty v. Smith, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Houtzdale, et al., 592 U. S.
927;
No. 19–8458. Allen v. Jordan et al., 592 U. S. 928;
No. 19–8648. McNeal v. Fleming et al., 592 U. S. 935;
No. 19–8684. Hill v. United States District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina, 592 U. S. 937;
No. 19–8690. Wheeler v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, 592 U. S. 937;
No. 19–8701. Raymond v. United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota, 592 U. S. 938;
No. 19–8716. Pepke v. United States, 592 U. S. 938;
No. 19–8724. Garry v. Trane Co., 592 U. S. 939;
No. 19–8728. Harrell v. California, 592 U. S. 939;
No. 19–8769. Shumake v. Virginia, 592 U. S. 941;
No. 19–8793. R. W. v. Dauphin County Social Services
for Children and Youth, 592 U. S. 943;
No. 19–8801. Jones et al. v. Lamar Co., LLC, 592 U. S. 943;
No. 19–8834. Dutta-Roy v. Jysk Bed’n Linen, dba By De-
sign Furniture, as Successor to Quick Ship Holding, Inc.,
dba By Design Furniture, 592 U. S. 945;

ORDERS 1195
592 U. S.
January
11, 2021
No. 20–13. Lavergne v. Cain, Warden, et al., 592 U. S.
951;
N
o. 20–112. Hernandez v. PNMAC Mortgage Opportu-
nity Fund Investors, LLC, et al., 592 U. S. 1086;
No. 20–187. Chukwuani v. Solon City School District, 592
U. S. 1086;
No. 20–242. Cave v. Delta Dental of California et al.,
592 U. S. 1074;
No. 20–247. Belanus v. Dutton et al., 592 U. S. 1074;
No. 20–248. Rounds v. Koch et al., 592 U. S. 1074;
No. 20–329. Sowell et al. v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost,
LLP, et al., 592 U. S. 1075;
No. 20–344. Myers v. Myers et al., 592 U. S. 1105;
No. 20–348. Mercer v. Vega, 592 U. S. 1087;
No. 20–364. Wilkins v. United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California, 592 U. S. 1114;
No. 20–484. Woods v. Storms et al., 592 U. S. 1106;
No. 20 – 5020. Allen v. Tri-Lift North Carolina, Inc.,
et al., 592 U. S. 958;
No. 20–5025. Amos v. Bowen, 592 U. S. 959;
No. 20–5043. Rizk v. Defense Finance and Accounting
Service, 592 U. S. 960;
No. 20–5048.
No. 20–5084.
No. 20–5188.
No. 20–5211.
No. 20–5236.
No. 20–5247.
No. 20–5289.
No. 20–5291.
No. 20–5329.
No. 20–5509.
No. 20–5518.
No. 20–5519.
No. 20–5525.
No. 20–5541.
1078;
No. 20–5567.
1079;
No. 20–5572.
No. 20–5623.
Bowman v. Boyd, Warden, 592 U. S. 960;
Ellis v. United States, 592 U. S. 962;
Barnes v. Dowling, Warden, 592 U. S. 967;
Dobson v. Stolle et al., 592 U. S. 968;
In re Rope, 592 U. S. 1000;
Burnside v. Rewerts, Warden, 592 U. S. 970;
Sanderson v. Foley, Warden, 592 U. S. 1005;
Johnson v. Marlar, 592 U. S. 971;
Scyphers v. Washington, 592 U. S. 972;
Pugh v. Deloach, Warden, 592 U. S. 1077;
Vance v. Buchanan, Warden, 592 U. S. 1078;
Wanke v. Illinois, 592 U. S. 1007;
Bailey v. United States et al., 592 U. S. 1028;
Sachs v. Bank of America, N. A., 592 U. S.
Ames v. HSBC Bank, USA, N. A., 592 U. S.
Witkin v. Lotersztain et al., 592 U. S. 1008;
Stefanyuk v. United States, 592 U. S. 1010;

1196 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 11, 12, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–5693.
N
o. 20–5731.
No. 20–5750.
In re Dizzley, 592 U. S. 1104;
In re Alford, 592 U. S. 1000;
Staples v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 592 U. S. 1108; and
No. 20–5765. Borden v. Swarthout, Warden, 592 U. S. 1089.
Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 19–1343. In re Starling, 592 U. S. 911. Motion for leave
to fle petition for rehearing denied. Justice Kavanaugh took
no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
No. 19–1470. Gurrola v. Walgreen Co., 592 U. S. 924. Mo-
tion for leave to fle petition for rehearing denied.
No. 19–8630. Lussy v. Lussy et al., 592 U. S. 934;
No. 20–5028. Lussy v. Dahood, 592 U. S. 986; and
No. 20–5029. Lussy v. Lussy, 592 U. S. 986. Petitions for
rehearing denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of these petitions.
January 12, 2021
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A34. Food and Drug Administration et al. v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
et al. D. C. Md. Application for stay, presented to The Chief
Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted, and the
District Court's July 13, 2020, order granting preliminary injunc-
tion is stayed pending disposition of the appeal in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and disposition of
the petition for writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.
Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall
terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of
certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending
down of the judgment of this Court. Justice Breyer would
deny the application.
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring.
The question before us is not whether the requirements for
dispensing mifepristone impose an undue burden on a woman's
right to an abortion as a general matter. The question is instead
whether the District Court properly ordered the Food and Drug

ORDERS 1197
1196
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
Administration to lift those established requirements because of
the
court's own evaluation of the impact of the COVID–19 pan-
demic. Here as in related contexts concerning government re-
sponses to the pandemic, my view is that courts owe signifcant
deference to the politically accountable entities with the “back-
ground, competence, and exper tise to assess publ ic hea lth. ”
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S.
965, 967 (2020) (Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial of application
for injunctive relief ). In light of those considerations, I do not
see a suffcient basis here for the District Court to compel the
FDA to alter the regimen for medical abortion.
Justice Sotomayor, w ith whom Justice Kagan joi ns,
dissenting.
The majority of American women seeking abortion care during
the first 10 weeks of preg nancy rely on medication abortion.
Medication abortion involves taking two prescription drugs, mife-
pristone and misoprostol, which together induce the equivalent of
an early miscarriage. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
allows patients to receive all physician consultations for a medica-
tion abortion virtually and to take both prescriptions at home
without medical supervision. To obtain mifepristone, however,
the FDA requires patients to go to a hospital, clinic, or medical
offce to pick up the drug in person and sign a disclosure form.
1
Of the over 20,000 FDA-approved drugs, mifepristone is the only
one that the FDA requires to be picked up in person for patients
to take at home.
The FDA's unique treatment of mifepristone has become even
more pronounced during the COVID–19 pandemic. After the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) declared the
COVID–19 pandemic a public health emergency, the FDA and
HHS waived in-person requirements for several other drugs, in-
cluding certain controlled substances, but not for mifepristone.
As a result, Government policy now permits patients to receive
prescriptions for powerful opioids without leaving home, yet still
requires women to travel to a doctor's offce to pick up mifepri-
stone, only to turn around, go home, and ingest it without
supervision.
1
Misoprostol, meanwhile, can be obtained through a retail or mail-order
pharmacy.

1198 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
In July, a District Court enjoined the FDA's in-person dispens-
i
ng and signature requirements for mifepristone for the duration
of the COVID–19 pandemic. Today, the Court grants extraordi-
nary relief to reinstate them. Because the FDA's policy imposes
an unnecessary, unjustifable, irrational, and undue burden on
women seeking an abortion during the current pandemic, and
because the Government has not demonstrated irreparable harm
from the injunction, I dissent.
I
A
As of early January, the United States has endured over 20
million reported COVID–19 cases and over 350,000 deaths from
the disease.
2
COVID–19 spreads easily from person to person
and many individuals infected by COVID–19 display no symp-
toms. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
have therefore advised people to avoid close contact with others,
especially in indoor spaces, to the greatest extent possible.
3
The
COVID–19 pandemic has thus made many typica l ac tivities
more diffcult and dangerous. A trip to the doctor's offce is no
exception.
As a result, the Federal Government has urged healthcare pro-
viders and patients to take advantage of telemedicine. For exam-
ple, the CDC has advised medical providers to use telemedicine
“whenever possible” because it is “the best way to protect pa-
tients and staff from COVID–19.”
4
The CDC has likewise in-
formed patients that they should use telemedicine “to reduce the
risk of COVID–19 and keep you and your family healthy.”
5
As
mentioned above, the FDA and HHS have waived many in-person
drug distribution requirements because they could “put patients
2
See CDC, United States COVID–19 Cases and Deaths by State (updated
Jan. 5, 2021), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesper100k.
3
See CDC, Things To Know About the COVID–19 Pandemic (updated
Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/need-
to-know.html.
4
See CDC, Prepare Your Practice for COVID–19 (updated June 12, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/preparedness-resources.html.
5
See CDC, Telemedici ne: W hat Does It Mean and W hy Shou ld You
Care? (updated Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/
downloads/global-covid-19/Telemedicine-Factsheet-MIT.pdf.

ORDERS 1199
1196
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
and others at risk for transmission of the coronavirus.”
6
F
or
instance, the FDA no longer requires patients to undergo in-
person procedures, such as laboratory tests or MRIs, before being
prescribed certain drugs. Similarly, HHS now permits physi-
cians to use telemedicine, rather than in-person evaluations, be-
fore prescribing certain controlled substances, including opioids.
The Government has thus recognized that in-person healthcare
during the COVID–19 pandemic poses a signifcant risk to pa-
tients' health, and it has acted to help patients “ `access health-
care they need from their home, without worrying about putting
themselves or others at risk during the COVID–19 outbreak.' ”
7
Yet the Government has refused to extend that same grace to
women seeking medication abortions. Women must still go to a
clinic in person to pick up their mifepristone prescriptions, even
though physicians may provide all counseling virtually, women
may ingest the drug unsupervised at home, and any complications
will occur long after the patient has left the clinic.
B
This summer, representatives of the Nation's healthcare provid-
ers, including the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists (ACOG) and the Council of University Chairs of Obstetrics
and Gynecology (CUCOG), along with SisterSong Women of Color
Reproductive Justice Collective, fled suit to enjoin the Federal
Government from enforcing mifepristone's in-person requirements
during the COVID–19 pandemic. In a thorough opinion, the Dis-
trict Court concluded that the in-person requirements likely
placed a “substantial obstacle” in the path of women seeking abor-
tions during the pandemic. 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 217 (Md. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court preliminarily en-
joined the Government from enforcing mifepristone's in-person
requirements during the pandemic. Id., at 233. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the Government's request
6
FDA, Policy for Certain REMS Requirements During the COVID–19
Public Health Emergency: Guidance for Industry and Health Care Profes-
sionals 7 (Mar. 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media /136317/download.
7
Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Secretary Azar Announces Historic
Expansion of Telehealth Access To Combat COVID–19 (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/03/17/secretary-azar-announces-historic-
expansion-of-telehealth-access-to-combat-covid-19.html.

1200 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
for a stay of that injunction. The Government then applied for
a
stay from this Court.
In early October, this Court issued an order holding the Gov-
ernment's application in abeyance so the District Court could con-
sider a yet-to-be-fled motion from the Government to dissolve,
stay, or modify the injunction, “including on the ground that rele-
vant circumstances have changed.” 592 U. S. 990, 991 (2020).
The Government fled such a motion, but the District Court con-
cluded that no changed circumstances justifed a stay or dissolu-
tion of the injunction. 506 F. Supp. 3d 328, 349 (Md. 2020). In-
deed, the District Court found that the pandemic had gotten only
worse since the summer. Id., at 339. The number of COVID–
19 cases in the United States had increased four-fold, the number
of deaths had more than doubled, and the pandemic was expected
to intensify in the coming winter months. Ibid. The District
Court therefore denied the motion.
The Government has now returned to this Court, asking again
for a stay of the District Court's injunction. Although the
COVID–19 pandemic has only worsened since October, the Court
now grants the Government's request.
A stay of a district court's injunction is “ `extraordinary' ” relief.
See Williams v. Zbaraz, 442 U. S. 1309, 1311 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
in chambers). “An applicant for a stay must meet a heavy burden
of showing not only that the judgment of the lower court was
erroneous on the merits, but also that the applicant will suffer
irreparable injury if the judgment is not stayed pending his ap-
peal.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 463 U. S. 1315, 1316 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., in chambers) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1302 (2012) (Roberts,
C. J., in chambers). The District Court was correct to conclude
that the FDA's unique regulation of mifepristone during the
COVID–19 pandemic “plac[es] a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion.” Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion);
see also June Medical Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S.
299, 304–305 (2020) (plurality opinion) (“ ` “[H]ealth regulations
that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obsta-
cle to a woman seeking an abortion” ' . . . are . . . `constitutionally
invalid' ” (quoting Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S.
582, 589–590 (2016)); June Medical, 591 U. S., at 353–354 (Roberts,
C. J., concurring in judgment) (“In this case, Casey's requirement

ORDERS 1201
1196
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
of fnding a substantial obstacle before invalidating an abortion
reg
ulation is . . . a suffcient basis for the decision”); id., at 379
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under our precedent, the critical question
. . . is whether [a] challenged . . . law places a `substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus' ”
(quoting Casey, 505 U. S., at 877 (plurality opinion))). The Gov-
ernment has moreover failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.
For these reasons, I would deny the Government's request.
II
A
Due to particularly severe health risks, vastly limited clinic
options, and the 10-week window for obtaining a medication abor-
tion, the FDA's requirement that women obtain mifepristone in
person during the COVID–19 pandemic places an unnecessary and
undue burden on their right to abortion. Pregnancy itself puts
a woman at increased risk for severe consequences from COVID–
19. In addition, more than half of women who have abortions
are women of color, and COVID–19's mortality rate is three times
higher for Black and Hispanic individuals than non-Hispanic
White individuals. On top of that, three-quarters of abortion pa-
tients have low incomes, making them more likely to rely on
public transportation to get to a clinic to pick up their medication.
Such patients must bear further risk of exposure while they
travel, sometimes for several hours each way, to clinics often
located far from their homes.
8
Finally, minority and low-income
populations are more likely to live in intergenerational housing,
so patients risk infecting not just themselves, but also elderly
parents and grandparents. These risks alone are signifcant de-
terrents for women seeking a medication abortion that requires
in-person pickup.
8
For instance, according to the most recently available data, Arkansas has
just three abortion clinics, and 77% of women of childbearing age live in a
county without any clinic. Mississippi has just one abortion clinic, and 91%
of women of childbearing age live in a county without any clinic. Missouri
has just three abortion clinics, and 78% of women of childbearing age live in
a county without a clinic. North Dakota has just one abortion clinic, and
72% of women of childbearing age live in a county without any clinic. See
Guttmacher Institute, R. Jones, E. Witwer, & J. Jerman, Abortion Incidence
and Service Availability in the United States, 2017, pp. 17–18 (2019).

1202 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
The obstacles are even greater, however, because medical offces
have
dramatically reduced availability during the pandemic. The
District Court received unrebutted evidence that some healthcare
facilities that normally provide medication abortion services have
closed at various times during the pandemic, making it impossible
for women to pick up their mifepristone. Even those practices
that remain open may operate at decreased capacity to maintain
social distancing, sometimes seeing just 10% to 25% of their typi-
cal patient load. One doctor described how the pandemic caused
her hospital system to stop in-person visits to all but three pri-
mary care clinics. Abortion patients were referred to distantly
located family planning clinics that were open only a half day
per week.
9
The District Court found that these obstacles can cause women
to miss the 10-week window for a medication abortion altogether.
The average American woman does not discover that she is preg-
nant until 5.5 weeks, and nearly a quarter of women do not dis-
cover their pregnancies until 7 weeks or later.
10
A woman seek-
ing a medication abortion may therefore be left with fewer than
three weeks to fnd an accessible clinic that will provide mifepri-
stone, schedule and receive the required counseling,
11
and make
an appointment to collect the medication in person, all while try-
ing to determine the safest way to travel to the clinic and perhaps
wondering whether she will bring COVID–19 back home with her.
What rejoinder does the Government have to the possibility
that refusing to suspend the FDA's in-person requirements for
mifepristone during the COVID–19 pandemic will cause some
women to miss the 10-week window altogether? No cause for
9
Data has begun to bear out the diffculties women have faced in ac-
cessing reproductive care. In a June 2020 survey, one in three women
reported that they had delayed or canceled a visit for sexual or reproduc-
tive care or had trouble accessing birth control during the pandemic. See
L. Lindberg, A. VandeVusse, J. Mueller, & M. Kirstein, Early Impacts of
the COVID–19 Pandemic: Findings From the 2020 Guttmacher Survey of
Reproductive Health Experiences, p. 4 (June 2020), https://www.guttmacher.
org/report/early-impacts-covid-19-pandemic-fndings-2020-guttmacher-survey-
reproductive-health. Such delays were higher among Black, Hispanic, and
low-income women. Ibid.
10
See Branum & Ahrens, Trends in Ti mi ng of Preg nancy Awareness
Among US Women, 21 Maternal & Child Health J. 715, 719, 721–722 (2017).
11
The required counseling can take place in person or via telemedicine,
although the patient must then sign a disclosure form in person.

ORDERS 1203
1196
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
concern, the Government assures this Court, because even if the
FD
A's in-person requirements cause women to lose the opportu-
nity for a medication abortion, they can still seek out a surgical
abortion. What a callous response.
As the Government acknowledges, surgical abortions are far
more invasive than medication abortions. Medication abortion in-
volves taking two pills and the equivalent of an early miscarriage.
When a woman undergoes surgical abortion, she requires local
anesthesia and sometimes sedation, her cervix is stretched with
dilating rods, a tube is inserted through her cervix into her
uterus, and, depending on the particular procedure, various medi-
cal tools are used to remove fetal tissue from her uterus. On top
of this, surgical abortions carry all the same (and likely greater)
risks of exposure to COVID–19 as do medication abortion's in-
person requirements.
The Government insists that requiring women to undergo a far
more invasive abortion procedure does not impose an undue bur-
den on women's right to abortion. In support, the Government
points to Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124 (2007), in which this
Court held that a ban on a rare, second-trimester abortion proce-
dure was not unconstitutional, in part because “the vast majority”
of second-trimester abortions remained available. Id., at 156.
This Court has never held that the Government can ban one of
the most common and safest early abortion procedures without
running into constitutional problems. Indeed, in Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U. S. 914 (2000), this Court concluded that a state
ban on dilation and evacuation abortion, “the most commonly used
method for performing previability second trimester abortions,”
imposed an undue burden on the right to choose abortion itself.
Id., at 945–946. The same reasoning extends to a regulation that,
when applied in the context of a deadly pandemic, prevents
women from accessing the most commonly used and safest method
for early abortions.
The Government also argues that the pandemic has not caused
the FDA's regulation to impose a meaningful burden on women
seeking medication abortions because in two States that inde-
pendently require in-person visits for medication abortions (Indi-
ana and Nebraska), there were more abortions in 2020 than in
2019. This comparison, however, provides little insight. For
one, the Government does not compare Indiana and Nebraska to
States where the in-person requirements for medication abortion

1204 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
have been suspended, which may have seen even larger increases
over
2019. Second, the Government provides data for just two
years, so it is impossible to know whether the two States simply
saw an unusually low number of abortions in 2019. Finally, the
data does not distinguish between medication and surgical abor-
tions. For all anyone can tell, then, Indiana and Nebraska may
have seen a large increase in surgical abortions and a reduction
in medication abortions. For the reasons discussed above, these
procedures are not equivalent. Reading the Government's statis-
tically insignifcant, cherry-picked data is no more informative
than reading tea leaves.
Together, patients' health vulnerabilities, public transportation
risks, susceptible older family members at home, and clinic
closures and reduced services pose substantial, sometimes insur-
mountable, obstacles for women seeking medication abortions
during the COVID–19 pandemic. See June Medical, 591 U. S.,
at 336–339 (plurality opinion); id., at 354–358 (Roberts, C. J.,
concurring in judgment); Hellerstedt, 579 U. S., at 622–624.
Under these conditions, the in-person requirements for mifepri-
stone impose an unjustifable and undue burden on a woman's
constitutional right to an abortion.
B
The District Court was therefore correct on the merits. But
even if it were not, the Government has not shown that it will
suffer any irreparable harm absent a stay of that court's injunc-
tion. The Government argues that all injunctions against a gov-
ernment inherently cause irreparable harm, especially for agen-
cies charged with protecting public health, and that courts should
look no further. This Court's precedent does not support such
a sweeping rule. See, e. g., Williams, 442 U. S., at 1312–1314
(considering whether a state public health agency had shown ir-
reparable harm from an injunction requiring the State to fund
medically necessary abortions).
The Government points to no meaningful concrete harms. It
argues only that the in-person requirements mitigate health risks
from mifepristone “by allowing patients to receive in-person coun-
seling about possible complications and by avoiding potential de-
lays associated with patients trying to obtain the drug from a
pharmacy on their own.” Application for Stay of Injunction 33.
The former concern is undermined by the fact that patients may

ORDERS 1205
1196
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
receive physician counseling remotely. The latter concern makes
no
sense: The Government proposes to avoid delays by limiting
women's options to obtain care quickly. Indeed, the evidence be-
fore the District Court shows that the in-person requirements are
causing, not preventing, delays in obtaining critical healthcare.
Signifcantly, the FDA's in-person requirements for mifepristone
have now been suspended for six months, yet the Government
has not identifed a single harm experienced by women who have
obtained mifepristone by mail or delivery.
C
The concurrence argues that courts should nonetheless defer to
the FDA's decision not to lift mifepristone's in-person require-
ments during the pandemic. I agree that deference is due to
reasoned decisions of public health offcials grappling with a
deadly pandemic. See South Bay Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,
590 U. S. 965, 967 (2020) (Roberts, C. J., concurring in denial of
application for injunctive relief ); see also Roman Catholic Diocese
of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14, 40 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (citing medical expert declarations supporting chal-
lenged responses to the current pandemic). But the record here
is bereft of any reasoning. The Government has not submitted
a single declaration from an FDA or HHS offcial explaining why
the Government believes women must continue to pick up mifepri-
stone in person, even though it has exempted many other drugs
from such a requirement given the health risks of COVID–19.
There simply is no reasoned decision here to which this Court can
defer. Cf. Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State
Legislature, 592 U. S. 1039, 1061 (2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting in
denial of application to vacate stay) (deference not due where the
government “has not for a moment considered whether recent
COVID conditions demand changes”).
***
This country's laws have long singled out abortions for more
onerous treatment than other medical procedures that carry simi-
lar or greater risks. See Greenhouse & Siegel, Casey and the
Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125
Yale L. J. 1428, 1430 (2016). Like many of those laws, maintain-
ing the FDA's in-person requirements for mifepristone during the
pandemic not only treats abortion exceptionally, it imposes an

1206 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 12, 14, 2021 592 U. S.
unnecessary, irrational, and unjustifable undue burden on women
seek
ing to exercise their right to choose. One can only hope that
the Government will reconsider and exhibit greater care and
empathy for women seeking some measure of control over their
health and reproductive lives in these unsettling times. See Gon-
zales, 550 U. S., at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[Women's] abil-
ity to realize their full potential . . . is intimately connected to
their ability to control their reproductive lives” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). For now, I respectfully dissent.
No. 20A122. Rosen, Acting Attorney General, et al. v.
Montgomery. Application for stay or vacatur, presented to The
Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted. The
January 11, 2021, order of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit granting a stay is vacated. Jus-
tice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan would
deny the application.
No. 20A124. Montgomery v. Watson, Warden, et al. Ap-
plication for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to
Justice Barrett, and by her referred to the Court, denied.
Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan
would grant the application.
No. 20A125. United States v. Montgomery. Application
for stay or vacatur, presented to Justice Kavanaugh, and by
him referred to the Court, granted. The January 12, 2021, order
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
granting a stay is vacated.
Certiorari Denied
No. 20–922 (20A121). Montgomery v. Rosen, Acting Attor-
ney General, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Application for stay of
execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief Justice,
and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.
January 14, 2021
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A130. Johnson v. United States. Application for
stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The Chief
Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Kagan would grant the application.

ORDERS 1207
592 U. S.
January
14, 15, 2021
No. 20A131. Johnson et al. v. Rosen, Acting Attorney
General,
et al. Application for stay of execution of sentences
of death for Corey Johnson and Dustin Higgs, presented to The
Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Jus-
tice Breer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan would
grant the application.
January 15, 2021
Certiorari Granted—Reversed and Remanded
No. 20–927 (20A134). United States v. Higgs. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted. The December 29, 2020,
order of the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals
with instructions to remand to the District Court for the prompt
designation of Indiana under 18 U. S. C. § 3596(a). Application to
vacate stay, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him re-
ferred to the Court, granted. The January 13, 2021, order of the
Court of Appeals granting a stay is vacated. Justice Kagan
would deny the petition for writ of certiorari before judgment
and the application.
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
Last July the Federal Government executed Daniel Lee. Lee's
execution was the frst federal execution in seventeen years. The
Government's execution of Dustin Higgs tonight will be its thir-
teenth in six months. I wrote in July that “the resumption of
federal executions promises to provide examples that illustrate
the diffculties of administering the death penalty consistent with
the Constitution.” Barr v. Lee, 591 U. S. 979, 983 (2020) (dissent-
ing opinion). The cases that have come before us provide several
of those examples.
I agree with much of what Justice Sotomayor says in greater
detail about many of these cases. The present case concerns
an inmate infected with COVID–19 at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Terre Haute, Indiana. He argues, and the District
Court agreed, that COVID–19 caused him signifcant lung damage
and that, as a result, executing him by injection of pentobarbital
will “subject [him] to a sensation of drowning akin to waterboard-
ing.” In re Federal Bureau of Prisons' Execution Protocol
Cases, No. 1:19–mc–145, Doc. 394, p. 3 (D DC, Jan. 12, 2021). He

1208 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Breyer, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
also argues that (for complex legal reasons) it is now too late for
the
Federal Government to obtain an order changing the state
law designated to govern his execution from that of Maryland
(which is where he was sentenced but which has since abolished
the death penalty) to that of Indiana (which maintains the death
penalty).
Consider some of the other questions that the federal death
penalty cases have raised. To what extent does the Govern-
ment's use of pentobarbital for executions risk extreme pain and
needless suffering? See Lee, supra, at 983 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). Has an inmate demonstrated a suffcient likelihood that she
is mentally incompetent—to the point where she will not under-
stand the fact, meaning, or signifcance of her execution? See
Montgomery v. Watson, 592 U. S. 1206 (2021); Barr v. Purkey,
591 U. S. 1034, 1037 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from grant
of vacatur). Should a court apply contemporary diagnostic stand-
ards to determine whether an inmate is intellectually disabled at
the time of his execution, such that the execution is unlawful?
See Bourgeois v. Watson, 592 U. S. 1144 (2020). Is a defendant's
second habeas challenge to his death sentence subject to the de-
manding standard for successive challenges, even though Govern-
ment conduct prevented him from being able to bring those claims
in his frst habeas petition? See Bernard v. United States, 592
U. S. 1139 (2020). Can a defendant's second habeas challenge in-
clude a claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate
where the defendant failed to raise that claim in his frst habeas
proceeding only because his frst habeas counsel was also constitu-
tionally inadequate? See Purkey, supra, at 1036 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from grant of vacatur). Does the Federal Government
have to follow state requirements for how much advance notice
an inmate receives for her execution? See Rosen v. Montgomery,
592 U. S. 1206 (2021). These are but a few of the many death-
penalty-related questions (some technical, some not) that courts
must consider, even though the result of this consideration is
often delay—perhaps for many years. See Glossip v. Gross, 576
U. S. 863, 926–929 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
None of these legal questions is frivolous. What are courts to
do when faced with legal questions of this kind? Are they simply
to ignore them? Or are they, as in this case, to “hurry up, hurry
up”? That is no solution. Higgs' case illustrates this dilemma.
The District Court ruled against the Government and the Govern-

ORDERS 1209
1207
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
ment appealed. The Fourth Circuit denied the Government's re-
quest
to dispense with oral argument “in light of the novel legal
issues presented” and set oral argument for January 27. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 29a. The Circuit then stayed the execution pending
further order. Order in No. 20–18 (Jan. 13, 2021). The Govern-
ment now seeks certiorari before judgment, an extraordinary
remedy that is to be granted only upon a showing that “the case
is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation
from normal appellate practice.” This Court's Rule 11. Given
the fnality and severity of a death sentence, it is particularly
important that judges consider and resolve challenges to an in-
mate's conviction and sentence. How just is a legal system that
would execute an individual without consideration of a novel or
signifcant legal question that he has raised?
Yet, to consider these questions, some of which (such as mental
competency) may not arise until a few weeks before an execution,
takes time. That time means delay. The recent federal execu-
tions are again illustrative. The Federal Government executed
Lee 21 years after his conviction; Brandon Bernard 20 years after
his conviction; Alfred Bourgeois 16 years after his conviction;
Wesley Purkey 16 years after his conviction; and Lisa Montgom-
ery 12 years after her conviction. Today, the Government exe-
cutes Higgs 20 years after his conviction. The longer the delay,
the weaker the basic penological justifcations for imposing the
death penalty in the frst place become, and the greater the psy-
chological suffering inficted on the death row inmate. I remain
convinced that this dilemma arises out of efforts to impose the
death penalty. Together with other problems that I have pre-
viously described, it calls into question the constitutionality of the
death penalty itself. See Glossip, supra, at 945–946 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
But this case involves a procedural issue. The Fourth Circuit
issued a stay of the execution and has not yet resolved the Gov-
ernment's appeal. It is rare for us to consider a question before
the Circuit has decided it. And I would not depart from ordinary
practice here. Consequently, I dissent.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
After seventeen years without a single federal execution, the
Government has executed twelve people since July. They are
Daniel Lee, Wesley Purkey, Dustin Honken, Lezmond Mitchell,

1210 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
Keith Nelson, William LeCroy Jr., Christopher Vialva, Orlando
H
all, Brandon Bernard, Alfred Bourgeois, Lisa Montgomery, and,
just last night, Corey Johnson. Today, Dustin Higgs will become
the thirteenth. To put that in historical context, the Federal
Government will have executed more than three times as many
people in the last six months than it had in the previous six
decades.
This unprecedented rush of federal executions has predictably
given rise to many diffcult legal disputes. One source of confu-
sion has been the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), which Con-
gress enacted in 1994 to guide the imposition and implementation
of federal death sentences. Section 60002(a), 108 Stat. 1959, codi-
fed as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 3591 et seq. Prior to last July, the
Federal Government had executed just three people since the
enactment of the FDPA, two in 2001 and one in 2003. Many
questions about the FDPA remain unanswered.
Another source of uncertainty has been the Department of Jus-
tice's (DOJ) announcement of a new execution protocol (the 2019
Protocol). Whereas the previous protocol prescribed a three-
drug cocktail for use in executions, the 2019 Protocol calls for a
single drug: pentobarbital. Diffculty in obtaining the required
drugs had contributed to the Government's nearly two-decade
hiatus in carrying out executions. The Government surely knew
the 2019 Protocol would face further litigation.
Against this backdrop of deep legal uncertainty, the DOJ did
not tread carefully. Simultaneous with the announcement of the
2019 Protocol, it scheduled fve executions; eight would follow in
the months to come. This rapid pace required those facing execu-
tion to fast-track challenges to their sentences. Rather than per-
mit an orderly resolution of these suits, the Government consist-
ently refused to postpone executions and sought emergency relief
to proceed before courts had meaningful opportunities to deter-
mine if the executions were legal.
Throughout this expedited spree of executions, this Court has
consistently rejected inmates' credible claims for relief. The Court
has even intervened to lift stays of execution that lower courts
put in place, thereby ensuring those prisoners' challenges would
never receive a meani ng fu l air i ng. The Cour t made these
weighty decisions in response to emergency applications, with
little opportunity for proper briefng and consideration, often in

ORDERS 1211
1207
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
just a few short days or even hours. Very few of these decisions
offered
any public explanation for their rationale.
This is not justice. After waiting almost two decades to re-
sume federal executions, the Government should have proceeded
with some measure of restraint to ensure it did so lawfully.
When it did not, this Court should have. It has not. Because
the Court continues this pattern today, I dissent.
I
The Government will execute Dustin Higgs tonight. In 2001,
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
sentenced Higgs to death for his involvement in the kidnapping
and killing of three people. The FDPA requires that a federal
death sentence be “implemented” “in the manner prescribed by
the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed.” 18 U. S. C.
§ 3596(a). If that State does not allow the death penalty, the
FDPA directs courts to designate an alternate State that does.
Executions were legal in Maryland in 2001, so the District Court's
Judgment and Order did not designate an alternate State. See
App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a–21a. Maryland has since abolished the
death penalty, however, so the Government cannot implement the
death sentence in accordance with Maryland law as the FDPA
requires.
In August 2020, the Government asked the District Court to
amend its Judgment and Order to designate Indiana, where Higgs
and all other federal death-row prisoners are imprisoned, as the
alternate State. Consistent with its current practice, the Govern-
ment set an execution date before the District Court could rule.
The District Court denied the Government's motion, holding that
the court had no authority to modify its original judgment. See
2020 WL 7707165, *4 (D Md., Dec. 29, 2020) (“The Government's
initial, extraordinary request that the Court amend its original
judgment and sentence is something that the Court plainly cannot
do”). The Government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, which scheduled oral argument for January 27,
2021. Unwilling to wait, the Government asks this Court to
grant certiorari and summarily reverse the District Court without
normal briefng or argument, and direct the District Court to
designate Indiana as the Government requested.
Ordinarily, this Court grants petitions for certiorari before
judgment only “upon a showing that the case is of such imperative

1212 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate
prac
tice and to require immediate determination in this Court.”
This Court's Rule 11. The Government falls far short of meeting
this strict standard. Whether district courts can amend fnal or-
ders and judgments in this situation is an open and novel question
on which none of the courts of appeals have spoken. After failing
to act since Higgs' sentence was imposed in 2001, the Government
gives no compelling reason why it suddenly cannot wait a few
weeks while courts give his claim the consideration it deserves.
Certainly, there is no “imperative public importance” behind the
Government's request. I would deny the Government's petition.
II
Sadly, it is not surprising that the Court grants this extraordi-
nary request. Over the past six months, this Court has repeat-
edly sidestepped its usual deliberative processes, often at the
Government's request, allowing it to push forward with an un-
precedented, breakneck timetable of executions. With due judi-
cial consideration, some of the Government's arguments may have
prevailed and some or even many of these executions may have
ultimately been allowed to proceed. Others may not have been.
Either way, the Court should not have sanctioned these execu-
tions without resolving these critical issues. The stakes were
simply too high.
A
Even af ter 13 federa l executi ons i n six months, basic,
recurring questions about the FDPA and the 2019 Protocol remain
unanswered. For example, what does it mean to “implemen[t]”
a federal death sentence “in the manner prescribed by the law
of the State”? 18 U. S. C. § 3596(a). Answers run the gamut.
Some judges believe the FDPA merely requires following the
State's “top-line choice among execution methods such as hanging,
electrocution, or lethal injection.” In re Fed. Bureau of Prisons'
Execution Protocol Cases, 955 F. 3d 106, 113 (CADC 2020) (Exe-
cution Protocol Cases I) (Katsas, J., concurring). Others read
the FDPA to incorporate nearly all state execution protocols, in-
cluding those details that precede the execution itself. See Order
in In re Fed. Bureau of Prisons' Execution Protocol Cases,
No. 20–5361 (CADC, Dec. 10, 2020), pp. 4–5 (per curiam) (en banc)
(Execution Protocol Cases II) (Wilkins, J., dissenting); see also
Execution Protocol Cases I, 955 F. 3d, at 149, 151 (Tatel, J.,

ORDERS 1213
1207
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
dissenting).
1
Th
is Court has yet to say which interpretation is
correct. See Mitchell v. United States, 591 U. S. 1077, 1078 (2020)
(Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of application for stay) (calling
for the Court to “address this issue in an appropriate case”).
Worse, the Court has actively prevented lower courts from pro-
viding defnitive answers themselves. Just four days ago, the
D. C. Circuit granted Lisa Montgomery a stay of her execution
so it could decide this issue en banc. See Order in Montgomery
v. Rosen, No. 21–5001 (Jan. 11, 2021) (per curiam). This Court
vacated that stay without explanation. Montgomery was exe-
cuted hours later.
Another outstanding question concerns the FDPA's provision
that “[a] sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person
who is [intellectually disabled].” 18 U. S. C. § 3596(c). Alfred
Bourgeois and Corey Johnson presented substantial evidence that
they were intellectually disabled under modern diagnostic stand-
ards. Lower courts, however, held that these inmates were
barred from challenging their executions on this ground because
they had previously been denied relief under outdated diagnostic
standards. See 28 U. S. C. § 2255(h). Yet there are compelling
reasons to believe that the FDPA directs courts to evaluate intel-
lectual disability based on the standards prevailing at the time of
the execution. See Bourgeois v. Watson, 592 U. S. 1144, 1146–1147
(2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari and
application for stay); Order in United States v. Johnson, No. 20–
15 (CA4, Jan. 14, 2021), pp. 4–5 (Wynn, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc); Order in United States v. Johnson, No. 20–
15 (CA4, Jan. 12, 2021), p. 7 (Motz, J., concurring in part in denial
of stay). On that view, prior proceedings relying on obsolete
medical standards do not preclude consideration of whether an
individual “is” intellectually disabled at the time of his execution.
18 U. S. C. § 3596(c). This Court should have answered this con-
1
Other judges and courts have taken different positions along this spec-
trum. See Execution Protocol Cases I, 955 F. 3d, at 134 (Rao, J., concur-
ring); Order in Montgomery v. Rosen, No. 21–5001 (CADC, Jan. 11, 2021),
pp. 7–8 (Millett, J., dissenting); United States v. Vialva, 976 F. 3d 458, 462
(CA5 2020) (per curiam); LeCroy v. United States, 975 F. 3d 1192, 1198
(CA11 2020) (“Whatever that phrase means, we are confdent that it does
not extend to ensuring a lawyer's presence at execution”); United States v.
Mitchell, 971 F. 3d 993, 996–997 (CA9 2020) (per curiam); Peterson v. Barr,
965 F. 3d 549, 554 (CA7 2020).

1214 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
sequential question before allowing the Government to execute
Bourgeois
and Johnson. Their executions may well have been
illegal.
The Court has also allowed executions to proceed in the face
of signifcant challenges to the 2019 Protocol's method of execu-
tion. A Federal District Court found that Daniel Lee, Wesley
Purkey, and Keith Nelson were likely to succeed in showing that
the 2019 Protocol violates the Eighth Amendment because pento-
barbital causes fuid to rapidly accumulate in the lungs, resulting
in “ `extreme pain, terror and panic.' ” In re Federal Bureau of
Prisons' Execution Protocol Cases, 471 F. Supp. 3d 209, 218–219
(DC 2020). Accordingly, the District Court preliminarily en-
joined executions under the 2019 Protocol. Id., at 225. This
Court vacated the injunction and allowed the executions to move
forward, concluding that the Government's “competing expert tes-
timony” rendered a “last-minute” stay inappropriate. Barr v.
Lee, 591 U. S. 979, 981 (2020) (per curiam). Lee and Purkey,
however, did not fle their claims at the last minute. They did
so shortly after the DOJ announced the new protocol and sched-
uled their executions. Nelson raised his claim before his execu-
tion was even announced. It was the Government, not the in-
mates, who charged ahead with conducting executions under the
challenged protocol, creating an “artifcial claim of urgency to
truncate ordinary procedures of judicial review.” Id., at 983 (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting). The Court condoned the Government's
tactics and granted a stay.
This Court repeated this error just this week. On December
16, 2020, both Corey Johnson and Dustin Higgs tested positive
for COVID–19. They quickly moved to enjoin their executions,
arguing that lung damage caused by the virus substantially in-
creased the likelihood they would suffer torturous effects if exe-
cuted with pentobarbital. The District Court held an evidentiary
proceeding and agreed. In re Federal Bureau of Prisons' Execu-
tion Protocol Cases, 514 F. Supp. 3d 136, 146–151 (DC 2021).
This time, the Court of Appeals stayed the injunction, relying on
this Court's fawed decision in Lee. Order in Roane v. Rosen, No.
21–5004 (CADC, Jan. 13, 2021), p. 4 (Katsas, J., concurring). This
Court left that ruling in place, again allowing these executions to
proceed despite the District Court's careful factfnding and the
risk of needless and signifcant pain.

ORDERS 1215
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Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
B
The
issues left unresolved during this saga do not end with
the FDPA and 2019 Protocol. Many other challenges deserved
this Court's review. None were granted. While I cannot cata-
logue all these claims here, some particularly troubling ones
bear mention.
Consider again Corey Johnson. In addition to the claim al-
ready discussed, Johnson sought a reduction of his death sentence
under the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. The Dist-
rict Court denied Johnson's motion, concluding that his death
sentence was for a crime that was not a “covered offense.”
See United States v. Johnson, No. 3:92–cr–68 (ED Va., Nov.
19, 2020). The Fourth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal.
See Order in United States v. Johnson, No. 20–15, etc. (Jan. 12,
2021). Judge Motz dissented from the denial of stay based on
Johnson's First Step Act claim, explaining that the application of
the defnition of “covered offense” “present[s] diffcult and impor-
tant issues necessitating adequate consideration by this court.”
Id., at 9.
Judge Motz was right. In fact, the courts of appeals have di-
vided on the proper way to interpret the statute's “covered of-
fense” defnition.
2
When Johnson sought a stay, this Court had
already granted certiorari to resolve a split implicating this ques-
tion. See Pet. for Cert. in No. 20–5904. Rather than granting
Johnson a stay and holding his case for reconsideration in light
of this, the Court allowed the Government to execute Johnson
without any appellate court ruling on the merits of his claims.
Consider next Brandon Bernard. Bernard, who was only 18
when he committed the crimes for which he was executed, raised
credible allegations that the Government secured his death sen-
tence by withholding exculpatory evidence and eliciting know-
ingly false testimony in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S.
83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959). But Bernard
never received consideration of those claims on the merits. In-
stead, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, even
2
Compare United States v. Smith, 954 F. 3d 446, 449–450 (CA1 2020) (the
Fair Sentencing Act must modify any penalty in the statute of conviction,
such as 21 U. S. C. § 841), with United States v. Jones, 962 F. 3d 1290, 1298
(CA11 2020) (the Act must modify the penalty for the defendant's actual
violation).

1216 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
though Bernard could not have known about the suppressed evi-
dence
when he fled his frst habeas petition, those claims were
subject to the general bar on second-or-successive habeas peti-
tions. United States v. Bernard, 820 Fed. Appx. 309 (2020) (per
curiam); see also 28 U. S. C. § 2255(h)(1).
As Bernard correctly argued, the Fifth Circuit's ruling cannot
be reconciled with this Court's decision in Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U. S. 930 (2007), which held that the bar on second-or-
successive petitions does not apply to claims that were not ripe
when an inmate fled his frst-in-time petition. Bernard v. United
States, 592 U. S. 1139, 1142 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit's rule makes no sense, as it “perversely
rewards the Government for keeping exculpatory information se-
cret until after an inmate's frst habeas petition has been re-
solved.” Id., at 1143. Unmoved, this Court denied Bernard's
petition for a writ of certiorari and application for a stay, leaving
this dangerous precedent in place and, again, condoning the Gov-
ernment's tactics.
Finally, consider Wesley Purkey and Lisa Montgomery, whose
executions this Court allowed even though the District Courts
concluded they were likely to succeed in showing that they had
no “ `rational understanding ' of why the State want[ed] to execute
[them].” Madison v. Alabama, 586 U. S. 265, 283 (2019) (quoting
Panetti, 551 U. S., at 958). Wesley Purkey suffered from Alzhei-
mer's disease. Thousands of pages of evidence suggested that he
earnestly and steadfastly believed that the Government planned
to execute him in retaliation for his “protracted jailhouse lawyer-
ing ” to expose prison abuses. Electronic Case Filing in No. 1:19–
cv–3570, Doc. 1–18 (DDC), p. 12; see also Barr v. Purkey, 591 U. S.
1034, 1039–1040 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The District
Court therefore preliminarily enjoined Purkey's execution. Skip-
ping over the Court of Appeals, the Government sought immedi-
ate relief from this Court, which vacated the injunction without
comment.
Lisa Montgomery likewise made a “substantial threshold show-
ing ” to the District Court that she was incompetent to be exe-
cuted. See Electronic Case Filing in No. 2:21–cv–20, Doc. 17 (SD
Ind.), p. 15. Based on expert evidence that Montgomery was
experiencing a dissociative psychotic state, the District Court con-
cluded that her “current mental state is so divorced from reality
that she cannot rationally understand the government's rationale

ORDERS 1217
592 U. S.
January
15, 19, 2021
for her execution.” Id., at 18. These fndings with respect to
Purkey
and Montgomery raised signifcant questions as to
whether their executions comported with the Constitution. We
will never have defnitive answers to those questions because this
Court sanctioned their executions anyway.
III
There is no matter as “grave as the determination of whether
a human life should be taken or spared.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U. S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
That decision is not something to be rushed or taken lightly; there
can be no “justice on the fy” in matters of life and death. See
Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 427 (2009). Yet the Court has
allowed the United States to execute 13 people in six months
under a statutory scheme and regulatory protocol that have re-
ceived inadequate scrutiny, without resolving the serious claims
the condemned individuals raised. Those whom the Government
executed during this endeavor deserved more from this Court.
I respectfully dissent.
January 19, 2021
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–6321. Cameron v. Walrath, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Re-
ported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 895.
No. 20–6322. Christian v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–6502. Reilly v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari
dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeat-
edly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to
accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from peti-
tioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Mar-
tin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992)
(per curiam).

1218 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 19, 2021 592 U. S.
Miscellaneous Orders
N
o. 19–1155. Rosen, Acting Attorney General v. Ming
Dai; and
No. 19–1156. Rosen, Acting Attorney General v. Alcaraz-
Enriquez. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. in No.
19–1155, Barr v. Ming Dai; in No. 19–1156, Barr v. Alcaraz-
Enriquez, 591 U. S. 1080.] Motion of respondents for divided ar-
gument granted.
No. 19 –1414. United States v. Cooley. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1112.] Motion of the Acting Attor-
ney General to dispense with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 20–177. Ally Financial Inc. v. Haskins et al. Sup. Ct.
Mo. Joint motion to defer consideration of petition for writ of
certiorari granted.
No. 20–6104. Pidanick v. Larosa et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 1149] denied.
No. 20–6295. Raively v. Whelihan. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div.;
No. 20–6334. Singhderewa v. Superior Court of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.,
Div. 3; and
No. 20–6413. Shepard v. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed
until February 9, 2021, within which to pay the docketing fees
required by this Court's Rule 38(a).
No. 20–671. In re Shah. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1063. Denby-Peterson v. NU2U Auto World et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 941 F. 3d 115.
No. 19–8873. Diaz et al. v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 599 S. W. 3d 409.
No. 20–350. Flores v. Pfeiffer, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 153.

ORDERS 1219
592 U. S.
January
19, 2021
No. 20–380. Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC et al. v. Gilead
Sciences,
Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 941 F. 3d 1149.
No. 20–400. Avery v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 749.
No. 20–518. Mastin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 972 F. 3d 1230.
No. 20–648. Bonham v. Sutto et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–665. Cook v. Galaza, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–667. Bush v. City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813
Fed. Appx. 767.
No. 20–668. Allison v. Liou et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–672. Gilewicz v. Brylin Hospital et al. Ct. App.
N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 N. Y. 3d 1037, 138
N. E. 3d 1105.
No. 20– 694. Eagle Cove Camp & Conference Center,
Inc., et al. v. Town of Woodboro, Wisconsin, et al. Ct. App.
Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 WI App 1, 389
Wis. 2d 624, 937 N. W. 2d 293.
No. 20–716. Flores-Moreno v. Rosen, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
971 F. 3d 541.
No. 20–720. Gordon v. Rosen, Acting Attorney General.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d
1344.
No. 20–776. Williams v. Jackson, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 621.
No. 20–786. United States ex rel. Porter v. Magnolia
Health Plan, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 237.

1220 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 19, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20 –790. Sprowl v. Mercedes-Benz U. S. Interna-
t
ional, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Repor ted
below: 815 Fed. Appx. 473.
No. 20–5643. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 252.
No. 20–5689. Bell v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 7.
No. 20–5975. Ruth v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 642.
No. 20–6275. Ford v. Parris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6278. Skandha v. Moroney. App. Ct. Mass. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6279. Skandha v. Superior Court of Massachu-
setts, Middlesex County, et al. App. Ct. Mass. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 97 Mass. App. 1113, 144 N. E. 3d 329.
No. 20–6280. Scott v. Cook. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 36.
No. 20–6289. Randolph v. United States District Court
for the District of Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 234.
No. 20–6297. Barker v. Robinson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6300. Lietzau v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 248 Ariz. 576, 463 P. 3d 200.
No. 20–6303. Whatley v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 IL App (1st) 163179–U.
No. 20–6308. Wallace v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6312. Mohammed v. Alonso, District Judge, et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6315. Newsome v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 180.

ORDERS 1221
592 U. S.
January
19, 2021
No. 20–6318. Mohammed v. Anderson et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 833 Fed. Appx. 651.
No. 20–6325. Delima v. Walmart Stores Arkansas, LLC.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed.
Appx. 411.
No. 20–6329. Acedo v. United States District Court for
the Southern District of California et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6331. Sam v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6333. Sanchez v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6337. Standberry v. United States; and
No. 20–6540. Wright v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 119.
No. 20–6344. Knight v. Chatelain et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 971.
No. 20–6349. Odum v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6352. G. N. W. v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6353. Williams v. Lewis et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 214.
No. 20–6354. Poplawski v. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsyl-
vania Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6355. McArty v. Hutchinson, Governor of Arkan-
sas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020
Ark. 190, 600 S. W. 3d 549.
No. 20–6357. Cook v. Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of California, Los Angeles. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6358. Dawson v. Valdez et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 321.

1222 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 19, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6361. Davis v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6369. Samuels v. Brnovich, Attorney General of
Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6393. Hughes v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6395. Grifth v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 3d 1109, 157 N. E. 3d
678.
No. 20–6417. Almonte-Nunez v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 58.
No. 20–6422. Kmet v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 109.
No. 20–6424. Jones v. United States; and
No. 20–6433. Jones v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 333.
No. 20–6441. Keel v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Af-
fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 830
Fed. Appx. 315.
No. 20–6445. Gallegos-Espinal v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 970 F. 3d 586.
No. 20–6452. Homer v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 339.
No. 20–6453. Gonzalez Flores v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 427.
No. 20–6456. Trammel v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas De-
partment of Correction. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 2020 Ark. 342, 610 S. W. 3d 158.
No. 20–6457. Watkins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 22.
No. 20–6458. Waagner v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 971 F. 3d 647.

ORDERS 1223
592 U. S.
January
19, 2021
No. 20–6462. Castruita-Escobedo v. United States. C. A.
5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 362.
No. 20–6468. Shaw v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 965 F. 3d 921.
No. 20–6469. Valentine v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 156.
No. 20–6471. Washington v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 148.
No. 20–6472. Cortez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 965 F. 3d 827.
No. 20–6473. Arnold v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 337.
No. 20–6474. Fermin Barajas v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 356.
No. 20–6475. Abdalla v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 972 F. 3d 838.
No. 20–6476. Allen v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 237.
No. 20–6478. Gray v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 540.
No. 20–6480. Freeman v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 774.
No. 20–6481. Murillo Morn v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 759.
No. 20 – 6483. Matuck v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6494. Vera-Gutierrez v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 733.
No. 20–6495. Alford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805 Fed. Appx. 924.
No. 20–6496. Alford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 375.

1224 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 19, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6509. Grant v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 407.
No. 20–6511. Lugo-Guerrero, aka Moraima, aka Rivera-
Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6513. Coston v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 289.
No. 20–6516. McGadney v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 963.
No. 20–6517. Basic v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 965 F. 3d 921.
No. 20–6519. Mondragon-Hernandez, aka Rojas, et al. v.
United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 819 Fed. Appx. 548.
No. 20–6521. Valdez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 117.
No. 20–6526. May v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 142.
No. 20–6527. Brown v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 973 F. 3d 667.
No. 20–6529. Wakeford v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 813.
No. 20–6530. Mobley v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 651.
No. 20–6535. Rufn v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 219 A. 3d 997.
No. 20–6543. Moody v. Harris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6545. Meadows v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 434.
No. 20 – 6548. Guzman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 6555. Manamela v. Warden, Federal Correc-
tional Institution Fort Dix. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 81.

ORDERS 1225
592 U. S.
January
19, 2021
No. 20–6556. Bass v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 538.
No. 20–6557. Cruz v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 826 Fed. Appx. 97.
No. 20–6567. Summerville v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 175.
No. 20–6568. Javier Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 888.
No. 20–6571. Smith v. Brecken, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 245.
No. 20–6613. Pickle v. Mississippi. Ct. App. Miss. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 306 So. 3d 771.
No. 20–6635. Williams v. Wilhelm, Warden, et al. Ct.
App. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 28 Neb. App.
xxvii.
No. 20 – 6665. Peters v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20 – 231. Aladdin Manufacturing Corp. et al. v.
Water Works and Sewer Board of the Town Centre et al.
Sup. Ct. Ala. Motion of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6487. Johnston v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 814 Fed.
Appx. 142.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–8807. Cean v. United States, 592 U. S. 1114;
No. 19–8886. Erickson v. Collins, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Cochise County, et al., 592 U. S. 948;
No. 19–8897. Smith v. North Carolina, 592 U. S. 948;
No. 20–399. Jung Hyun Cho et al. v. Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc., et al., 592 U. S. 1115;
No. 20–5723. Calhoun v. Florida Department of Correc-
tions, 592 U. S. 1108; and

1226 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 19, 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–5735. Perry v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion, 592 U. S. 1108. Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 20–254. Kuang-Bao Ou-Young v. Roberts, Chief Jus-
tice, Supreme Court of the United States, et al., 592 U. S.
1118. Petition for rehearing denied. The Chief Justice, Jus-
tice Breyer, and Justice Alito took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition.
January 22, 2021
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A111. Francois v. Wilkinson, Acting At torney
General. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of removal, pre-
sented to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court,
denied.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
Alex Francois is a 61-year-old Haitian national who came to the
United States unlawfully when he was 19 and has lived here
ever since. Francois suffers from severe mental illness, including
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and psychosis. He presents com-
pelling evidence that, if he is removed to Haiti, he will be targeted
for cruel and dehumanizing mistreatment because of his mental
illness. An Immigration Judge (IJ) therefore granted Francois
withholding of removal in 2019, guaranteeing that he would not
be sent to Haiti. That should have been the end of this case.
Instead, Francois now faces i mmi nent remova l to Haiti.
Rather than deferring to the IJ's factual fndings, as the law
requires, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ignored them
and remanded the case back to the IJ for further factfnding. On
remand, the IJ reviewed the very same evidentiary record on
which it had previously relied to grant Francois relief. This time,
however, the IJ denied Francois withholding of removal, contra-
dicting not only its prior decision but also key evidence that the
IJ claimed to be crediting. The BIA dismissed Francois' appeal.
Francois is currently seeking review of the BIA's decision be-
fore the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Govern-
ment, however, plans to remove Francois before he can even sub-
mit his opening brief. This is exactly the kind of circumstance

ORDERS 1227
1226
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
that calls for a temporary stay of removal. Francois is likely to
pre
vail on appeal; he will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay;
and the public interest strongly favors protecting Francois from
wrongful removal and the terrible suffering awaiting him in Haiti.
Yet, without explanation, the Fifth Circuit denied a stay. Today,
this Court does the same. I dissent.
I
Francois came to the United States in 1979 to reunite with his
father, a Haitian exile who became an American citizen. Francois
spent much of his life in New York City, where he worked in
construction and raised a family, including six children. Two of
his children went on to serve in the U. S. Army, including one
who deployed to Afghanistan.
According to his father, Francois' struggles with mental illness
began in his midforties. He experienced delusions, irritability,
and aggression, and as his condition deteriorated, he engaged in
unusual behavior such as eating grass and drinking his own urine.
Francois also developed a lengthy criminal history, which appears
to stem from the effects of his illnesses. He has been hospitalized
numerous times, and he is currently being treated with psycho-
tropic medication.
In 2018, the Government sought to have Francois declared re-
movable from the United States because he was not lawfully ad-
mitted. The IJ sustained the charge of removability. But the
IJ also deemed Francois mentally incompetent and allowed his
attorney to apply for withholding of removal on his behalf. With-
holding of removal prevents the Government from removing a
noncitizen to a country where it is more likely than not that the
noncitizen's “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of
a protected ground. 8 U. S. C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). There is no dis-
pute in this case that Francois' mental illness is one such pro-
tected ground. See App. A to Application for Stay (IJ Decision,
p. 5, n. 2).
To prove a likelihood of persecution, Francois submitted an
expert declaration explaining that mental illness is poorly under-
stood and stigmatized in Haiti. “[B]izarre, erratic and non-
compliant behavior is often responded to with extreme physical
punishment, torture, and isolation,” including locking the mentally
ill in “crawlspaces or other tiny spaces.” App. K to Application
for Stay 10. The IJ placed “great evidentiary weight” on the

1228 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
expert's assessment, concluding that Francois more likely than
not
will be persecuted on account of his mental illness if removed
to Haiti. App. A to Application for Stay (IJ Decision, at 5, n. 3).
Specifcally, as a deportee with a criminal record, Francois will
face detention in an “overcrowded, disease-infested” prison “lack-
ing in basic necessities such as plumbing and electricity.” Id., at
5. Because of his mental illness, Francois' suffering will be
“made worse” “due to lack of access to medication or treatment
and extreme repressive measures such as physical punishment,
torture and isolation.” Ibid. Even if Francois is not detained,
his symptoms will more likely than not “attract the attention of
Haitian authorities or private actors” whom the Haitian Govern-
ment is unwilling or unable to control, “who will persecute him
on account of ” his mental illness. Id., at 6. Accordingly, the IJ
granted Francois withholding of removal.
The Government appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ
“erred in fnding ” that Francois will likely be persecuted on ac-
count of his mental illness. App. B to Application for Stay 3.
The BIA may not, however, “engage in de novo review of fndings
of fact determined by an immigration judge.” 8 CFR
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2020). Instead, the BIA may review such fnd-
ings “only to determine whether the fndings of the immigration
judge are clearly erroneous.” Ibid. Under that standard, even
if the BIA would interpret the evidentiary record differently, the
BIA was required to defer to the IJ's view of the evidence as
long as it was “plausible.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S.
564, 574 (1985).
Rather than attempting to fnd clear error, the BIA sidestepped
the standard of review by implausibly concluding that the IJ had
failed entirely to make certain critical factual fndings. The BIA
remanded with instructions for the IJ to determine “whether
[Francois] will be singled out individually for persecution,” what
“harm [Francois] is likely to suffer in Haiti,” and “whether such
harm would be on account of his membership in his proposed
particular social group” (i. e., the severely mentally ill). App. B
to Application for Stay 2.
In reality, the IJ had already repeatedly concluded that Fran-
cois “will more likely than not be persecuted on account of ” his
mental illness, including through “physical punishment, torture
and isolation.” App. A to Application for Stay (IJ Decision, at
5–6, and n. 3). The IJ thus recognized the BIA's order for what

ORDERS 1229
1226
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
it was: an instruction to change those fndings. “Reviewing the
e
videntiary record again, in light of the Board's decision,” the IJ
concluded that Francois would not likely be persecuted on account
of his mental illness. App. C to Application for Stay (IJ Decision
on Remand, at 4). The IJ admitted no additional evidence to
justify its 180-degree turn; it simply recharacterized the old evi-
dence. To take just one example, the IJ claimed on remand that
Francois' expert “opine[d] that future persecution on account of
[Francois'] mental health issue is possible, while stopping short
of saying that it is probable.” Id., at 6. In fact, as the IJ recog-
nized in its frst decision, the expert clearly found that “it is very
likely that Mr. Francois will suffer serious and irreparable harm
amounting to torture if deported to Haiti,” and that “both his
criminal deportee status and mental illness are likely to result in
violence.” App. K to Application for Stay 30–31.
Francois appealed to the BIA. The BIA acknowledged “exten-
sive evidence in the record of the mistreatment of the mentally
ill [in Haiti,] particularly when detained or hospitalized.” App.
D to Application for Stay 4. It also noted the expert's use of
phrases like “ `often,' ” “ `routinely,' ” and “ `more likely' ” to de-
scribe the probability of harm to the mentally ill. Id., at 2–3.
But this time, the BIA concluded that it was bound by the clear-
error standard to respect the IJ's fndings and dismissed Fran-
cois' appeal.
On December 1, 2020, Francois fled a petition for review with
the Fifth Circuit. On December 16, the Government notifed
Francois that he would be removed to Haiti on December 22, just
six days later. Francois requested a stay of removal from the
Fifth Circuit so that he could complete his appeal. Without ex-
planation, the Fifth Circuit denied a stay. App. I to Application
for Stay. It then set a briefng schedule beginning in February
2021.
Francois now seeks a stay of removal from this Court.
II
“It takes time to decide a case on appeal,” and “if a court takes
the time it needs, the court's decision may in some cases come
too late for the party seeking review.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S.
418, 421 (2009). This is such a case. If Francois is removed to
Haiti as the Government intends, he will suffer extreme harm

1230 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
before any federal court has had an opportunity to address his
clai
ms for relief.
Courts have an important tool for addressing such a situation:
the power to issue a temporary stay. A stay “allows an appellate
court to act responsibly,” preventing the need for “justice on the
fy” or, worse, the denial of justice altogether. Id., at 427. The
decision to issue a stay is guided by four factors: “ `(1) whether
the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irrepara-
bly injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding;
and (4) where the public interest lies.' ” Id., at 434. The frst
two factors “are the most critical.” Ibid.
Under this standard, Francois is plainly entitled to a stay.
Most importantly, he has shown a strong likelihood that his appeal
will succeed on the merits. As the IJ originally recognized, the
record clearly proves that Francois more likely than not will be
persecuted on account of his mental illness if removed to Haiti.
In its frst decision remanding the case, the BIA abused its discre-
tion by ignoring the IJ's fndings. See, e. g., Vitug v. Holder, 723
F. 3d 1056, 1064 (CA9 2013) (fnding an abuse of discretion where
“the BIA ignored factual fndings of the IJ that were key to the
IJ's holding ”). Exacerbating the BIA's error, the IJ on remand
issued a decision that is entirely unsupported by the record. The
expert, whom the IJ credited, was clear: Francois “will be specif-
cally targeted for violence by prison and police offcials, over and
above the usual harsh treatment of Haitian criminal deportees,
when—as his psychiatric records show—he exhibits symptoms of
his mental conditions that will be disturbing and disruptive.”
App. K to Application for Stay 31.
For the same reasons, Francois has shown that he will suffer
irreparable harm absent a stay. As the BIA acknowledged, if
removed to Haiti, Francois “will not receive the treatment he
needs for his mental illness,” and he “will be detained” in “deplor-
able” conditions where “extreme repressive measures are used
against detainees.” App. D to Application for Stay 1. As his
mental condition deteriorates, he will fall prey to the very perse-
cution that entitles him to relief on appeal.
Finally, the public interest weighs heavily in Francois' favor.
The public has a strong interest in preventing noncitizens from
being wrongfully removed, “particularly to countries where they

ORDERS 1231
1226
Sotoma
yor, J., dissenting
are likely to face substantial harm.” Nken, 556 U. S., at 436; see
a
lso Yusupov v. Attorney Gen. of U. S., 650 F. 3d 968, 977 (CA3
2011) (explaining that withholding of removal effectuates the
United States' treaty commitment to protect refugees). That in-
terest is heightened because Francois is currently receiving medi-
cal treatment and is supported here by his family. The Govern-
ment has offered no compelling reason that Francois should be
robbed of these critical lifelines before he has had a chance to be
heard in court.
In light of the foregoing, the Fifth Circuit's decision to deny a
stay was an abuse of its discretion. See Dada v. Mukasey, 554
U. S. 1, 21 (2008) (noting that it “may constitute an abuse of discre-
tion” to deny a stay where a noncitizen “states nonfrivolous
grounds” for relief ). Today, this Court compounds the Fifth Cir-
cuit's error by refusing to provide the temporary relief necessary
to allow Francois' appeal to be heard.*
That leaves only the Government itself to avert this unneces-
sary tragedy. The Government has long exercised its discretion
to halt removal temporarily, either through an administrative stay
or deferred action. See 8 CFR § 241.6(a); Department of Home-
land Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. 1, 10 (2020).
That discretion is warranted here. As his father wrote in a letter
to the IJ, Francois is “at his weakest and at his lowest” point.
*One difference between the factors in Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418
(2009), and this Court's traditional stay criteria is this Court's consideration
of whether a case raises signifcant issues that merit plenary review (some-
times called “cert-worthiness”). See Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1302
(2012) (Roberts, C. J., in chambers). This inquiry is complicated in cases
such as this one where there is not yet a decision by the court of appeals,
which often informs whether a case presents substantial questions of
law. Even in limited emergency briefng, Francois identifes several issues
that the Fifth Circuit may address, including the adequacy of proce-
dural safeguards for mentally incompetent noncitizens in removal proceed-
ings and the due process concerns created by the BIA's remand. In addi-
tion, this Court does, on occasion, intervene in cases to correct obvious
errors made below. See, e. g., Salazar-Limon v. Houston, 581 U. S. 946, 954
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing cases).
This Court has stepped in, for instance, when it believed important factual
fndings were “overlooked.” See Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U. S. 520, 524
(2012) (per curiam). A stay is not a conclusive determination that this
Court will grant certiorari. It simply gives this Court time to consider
these issues.

1232 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 22, 25, 2021 592 U. S.
App. N to Application for Stay 20. For now, all he asks is the
sma
ll grace, to which he is legally entitled, of being allowed to
remain in the country while he pursues his substantial claims for
relief. Because I would grant him that opportunity, I dissent.
January 25, 2021
Appointment of Reporter of Decisions
It is ordered that Rebecca Anne Womeldorf be appointed Re-
porter of Decisions of this Court to succeed Christine Luchok
Fallon, effective January 25, 2021, and she is charged with the
duty of reporting the decisions of the present Term which have
not been reported prior to January 25, 2021.
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 19–8695. Gutierrez v. Saenz et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted. The June 12, 2020, order of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granting the
motion to vacate the stay of execution previously issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
is vacated. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with
instructions to remand the case to the District Court for further
and prompt consideration of the merits of petitioner's underlying
claims regarding the presence of a spiritual adviser in the execu-
tion chamber in light of the District Court's November 24, 2020,
fndings of fact. Although this Court's stay of execution shall
terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court,
disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari is without preju-
dice to a renewed application regarding stay of execution should
petitioner's execution be rescheduled before resolution of his
claims regarding the presence of a spiritual adviser in the execu-
tion chamber.
No. 20–305. Planned Parenthood Center for Choice
et al. v. Abbott, Governor of Texas, et al. (two judgments).
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and case
remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. See
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). Re-
ported below: 954 F. 3d 772 (frst judgment); 956 F. 3d 696 (sec-
ond judgment).

ORDERS 1233
592 U. S.
January
25, 2021
No. 20–330. Trump, President of the United States v.
C
itizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motions of Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman
et al. and Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh for leave to fle
briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded with instructions to dismiss the case
as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36
(1950). Reported below: 953 F. 3d 178.
No. 20–331. Trump, President of the United States v.
District of Columbia et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of Scholar
Seth Barrett Tillman et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re-
manded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. See
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). Re-
ported below: 958 F. 3d 274.
No. 20–482. Slatery, Attorney General of Tennessee,
et al. v. Adams & Boyle, P. C., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded with instruc-
tions to direct the District Court to vacate as moot its April 17,
2020, order granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).
Reported below: 956 F. 3d 913.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–6410. Sepehry-Fard v. Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia, Sixth Appellate District, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20M47. Linsangan v. Taijeron et al. Motion for leave
to proceed as a veteran denied.
No. 20M48. Matthews v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division; and
No. 20M49. Jenkins v. Florida Department of Correc-
tions. Motions to direct the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of
certiorari out of time denied.

1234 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 25, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 154, Orig. New Hampshire v. Massachusetts. The
A
cting Solicitor General is invited to fle a brief in this case
expressing the views of the United States.
No. 19–1257. Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona,
et al. v. Democratic National Committee et al.; and
No. 19–1258. Arizona Republican Party et al. v. Demo-
cratic National Committee et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 591 U. S. 1081.] Motion of petitioners for divided argu-
ment granted. Motion of respondents for divided argument
granted.
No. 20–18. Lange v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 5. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1234.] Motion of
petitioner for divided argument granted. Motion of the Acting
Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami-
cus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 20 –138. Biden, President of the United States,
et al. v. Sierra Club et al.; and Biden, President of the
United States, et al. v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted sub nom. Trump v. Sierra Club; Trump v.
California, 592 U. S. 1024.] Motion of respondents for divided
argument granted.
No. 20–865. In re Britton-Harr. Petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus denied.
No. 20–6677.
denied.
In re Wright. Petition for writ of mandamus
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–1130. Danielson et al. v. Inslee, Governor of
Washington, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 945 F. 3d 1096.
No. 20–183. Stair v. Jackson. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 704.
No. 20–208. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Vo-
lungis et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 808 Fed. Appx. 414.
No. 20–245. Nelson v. Rivera. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 983.

ORDERS 1235
592 U. S.
January
25, 2021
No. 20–422. Lee v. Ohio Education Assn. et al. C. A. 6th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 386.
No. 20–486. Ogle v. Ohio Civil Service Employees Asso-
ciation, AFSCME Local 11, AFL–CIO. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 794.
No. 20–580. Mallatere v. Town of Boone, North Caro-
lina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808
Fed. Appx. 213.
No. 20–591. Greer et al. v. Mirlis. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 36.
No. 20–604. InfoBionic, Inc. v. Cardionet, LLC, et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 955 F. 3d
1358.
No. 20–621. Hua Cai v. Huntsman Corp. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 639.
No. 20–691. Lih Bin Shih v. Parnell. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–695. Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 962
F. 3d 842.
No. 20–696. Brownstein v. Lindsay et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 75.
No. 20–700. Smith v. Syhadley, LLC. Ct. App. Wash. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–702. Stiles v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 596 S. W. 3d 361.
No. 20–704. Santana v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–706. Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design,
Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808
Fed. Appx. 459.
No. 20–732. Wyche v. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–735. Koshkalda v. Seiko Epson Corp. et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 837.

1236 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 25, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–738. Grochowski, as Administrator of the Estate
of
Grochowski, Deceased, et al. v. Clayton County, Geor-
gia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
961 F. 3d 1311.
No. 20–739. Levin v. Frank, Individually and as Corpo-
ration Counsel for the City of Binghamton, New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803
Fed. Appx. 562.
No. 20–742. Bruce v. Azar, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 826 Fed. Appx. 643.
No. 20–744. Wigginton v. University of Mississippi et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 329.
No. 20–750. Murphy v. Stacy, Circuit Court Judge. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx.
677.
No. 20–757. Ashford v. Ofce for Counsel for Disci-
pline et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 805 Fed. Appx. 446.
No. 20–765. Willman v. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 972
F. 3d 819.
No. 20–793. Khoury v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–848. D. A. S. v. Madison County Department of
Human Resources. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5133. Baxter v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 128.
No. 20–5748. Holliday v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio-
rar i denied. Repor ted below: 2017– 01921 (La. 1 /29/20), 340
So. 3d 648.
No. 20–5762. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 151.
No. 20–5917. Malmstrom v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 1.

ORDERS 1237
592 U. S.
January
25, 2021
No. 20–5923. Flores v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rar
i denied.
No. 20–6094. Bush v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 295 So. 3d 179.
No. 20–6371. Moseley v. Clarke. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6379. White v. St. Lawrence Catholic Schools.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6384. McCants v. Silva. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6385. Devers v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 306 Neb. 429, 945 N. W. 2d 470.
No. 20–6391. Hare v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 505 Mich. 1127, 944 N. W. 2d 119.
No. 20–6396. Bever v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 OK CR 13, 467 P. 3d
693.
No. 20–6398. Allen v. Pollard, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6404. Liggins v. Vashaw, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6411. Ramirez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6416. Byrd v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 192.
No. 20–6454. Zimmerman v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6479. Garcia v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 152 N. E. 3d 1082.
No. 20–6503. Raudenbush v. Monroe County, Tennessee,
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6504. Barnes v. United States et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 284.

1238 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 25, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6510. Ford v. Budde. Ct. App. Nev. Certiorari de-
nied.
Reported below: 136 Nev. 827, 461 P. 3d 900.
No. 20–6520. Viriyapanthu v. State Bar of California
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813
Fed. Appx. 312.
No. 20–6553. McGinnis v. Social Security Administra-
tion. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808
Fed. Appx. 127.
No. 20–6554. Pike v. United States; and
No. 20–6589. Portillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 969 F. 3d 144.
No. 20–6559. Villarreal-Ramirez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 892.
No. 20–6562. Salinas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 259.
No. 20–6566. Beltran Del Rio v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 900.
No. 20–6575. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6576. Parker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 377.
No. 20–6577. Mondragon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 56.
No. 20–6580. Peeples v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 677.
No. 20–6584. Olive v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20 – 6588. Gordon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6590. Pike v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 979 F. 3d 364.
No. 20–6591. Vanegas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 257.

ORDERS 1239
592 U. S.
January
25, 2021
No. 20–6594. Hernandez-Zozaya v. United States. C. A.
3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 826 Fed. Appx. 144.
No. 20–6596. Abney v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 185.
No. 20–6597. Aguilar v. Chapman, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6606. Miller v. Von Blankensee. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6609. Moreno Cervantes v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 251.
No. 20–6618. Malachowski v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6619. Carrasco v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 708.
No. 20–6628. Lamb v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6630. Estrada v. Brnovich, Attorney General of
Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6632. Valdez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 975 F. 3d 63.
No. 20–6638. Brennerman, aka Soetan v. United States.
C. A. 2d Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Reported below: 818 Fed.
Appx. 25.
No. 20–6641. Angel Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 253.
No. 20–6647. Knicely v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 821.
No. 20–6655. Sanchez Ochoa v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 977 F. 3d 354.
No. 20–6656. Bazan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 439.
No. 20–6657. Barrientos-Osorio v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 282.

1240 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 25, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6660. Gumbs v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 1340.
No. 20–6671. Cox, aka Cunningham v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 915.
No. 20–6673. Diehl v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 800.
No. 20–6674. Chevallier v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 882.
No. 20–6683. Diaz-Guzman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1104. Janus v. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et al. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
942 F. 3d 352.
No. 19–1126. Mooney v. Illinois Education Assn. et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 942 F. 3d 368.
No. 20–20. Casanova v. International Association of Ma-
chinists, Local 701. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Jus-
tice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition.
No. 20–60. Silver v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 948 F. 3d 538.
Justice Gorsuch, w ith whom Justice Thomas joi ns,
dissenting.
Normally, extortion and bribery are treated as distinct crimes.
In Evans v. United States, 504 U. S. 255 (1992), however, this
Court confated them for purposes of the Hobbs Act when a public
offcial is the defendant. Id., at 260. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer have all questioned
that judgment. See id., at 278 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, J., dissenting); Ocasio v. United States, 578 U. S.
282, 300 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring); id., at 301–302 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). I would have granted this case to reconsider
Evans in light of these thoughtful criticisms.

ORDERS 1241
592 U. S.
January
25, 2021
No. 20–82. Kane County, Utah, et al. v. United States
et
al.; and
No. 20–96. United States v. Kane County, Utah, et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no
part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported
below: 928 F. 3d 877.
No. 20–639. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak,
Governor of Nevada, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari before
judgment denied.
No. 20–678. M&T Bank Corp. et al. v. Jaroslawicz et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of Securities Industry and Financial Mar-
kets Association et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 701.
No. 20–784. Schmidt v. Braithwaite, Secretary of the
Navy. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kava-
naugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this peti-
tion. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 10.
No. 20–800. Barnett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition.
No. 20–5733. Rumley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 538.
No. 20–6637. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 20–6648. Edwards v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this petition.
No. 20–6666. Eccleston v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–8006. Greiner v. Macomb County, Michigan, et al.,
592 U. S. 925;

1242 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
January 25, 28, February 1, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 19 – 8806. Dixon v. Ames, Superintendent, Mount
Olive
Correctional Complex, 592 U. S. 943;
No. 20 – 278. Smith v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, et al., 592 U. S. 1114;
No. 20–497. Azeez v. West Virginia, 592 U. S. 1106;
No. 20 – 5027. Allred v. Ut techt, Warden, 592 U. S.
959;
No. 20–5842. Yang Mei v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 592 U. S. 1089; and
No. 20–6091. Hollie v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, 592 U. S. 1132. Petitions for rehearing denied.
January 28, 2021
Dismissals Under Rule 46
No. 20–6488. Montano v. Oakland County Circuit Court
Judge. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's
Rule 46.
No. 20–6489. Montano v. Wimmer; Montano v. Wimmer; and
Mam v. IAW. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari dismissed under this
Court's Rule 46.
No. 20–6490. Montano v. Oakland County Circuit Court
Judge. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's
Rule 46.
No. 20–6491. In re Montano. Petition for writ of mandamus
dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.
February 1, 2021
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A116 (20–826). Brown, Acting Warden v. Davenport.
Application to recall and stay the mandate, presented to Justice
Kavanaugh, and by him referred to the Court, granted, and the
mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in case No. 17–2267 is recalled and stayed pending disposi-
tion of the petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for
writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automati-
cally. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted,
the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment
of this Court. Justice Sotomayor would deny the application.

ORDERS 1243
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 3, 5, 2021
February 3, 2021
M
iscellaneous Order
No. 19–1212. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity, et al. v. Innovation Law Lab et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted sub nom. Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, 592
U. S. 1243.] Motion to hold further briefng in abeyance and to
remove the case from the February 2021 argument calendar
granted.
No. 20 –138. Biden, President of the United States,
et al. v. Sierra Club et al.; and Biden, President of the
United States, et al. v. California et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted sub nom. Trump v. Sierra Club; Trump v.
California, 592 U. S. 1024.] Motion to hold further briefng in
abeyance and to remove the case from the February 2021 argu-
ment calendar granted.
Certiorari Granted
No. 19–1039. PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC v. New Jersey
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted. In addition to the
question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to
brief and argue the following question: “Did the Court of Appeals
properly exercise jurisdiction over this case?” Case will be set
for argument in the April 2021 argument session. Reported
below: 938 F. 3d 96.
February 5, 2021
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A136 (20 –746). South Bay United Pentecostal
Church et al. v. Newsom, Governor of California, et al.
Application for injunctive relief, presented to Justice Kagan,
and by her referred to the Court, granted in part. Respondents
are enjoined from enforcing the Blueprint's Tier 1 prohibition on
indoor worship services against applicants pending disposition of
the petition for writ of certiorari. The application is denied with
respect to the percentage capacity limitations, and respondents
are not enjoined from imposing 25% capacity limitation on indoor
worship services in Tier 1. The application is denied with re-
spect to the prohibition on singing and chanting during indoor

1244 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 5, 2021 592 U. S.
services. This order is without prejudice to applicants present-
i
ng new evidence to the District Court that the State is not
applying the percentage capacity limitations or the prohibition on
singing and chanting in a generally applicable manner. Should
the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall termi-
nate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certio-
rari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down
of the judgment of this Court.
Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch would grant the appli-
cation in full. Justice Alito would grant the application with
respect to all of the capacity restrictions on indoor worship serv-
ices and the prohibition against indoor singing and chanting, and
would stay for 30 days an injunction against the percentage at-
tendance caps and the prohibition against indoor singing and
chanting. Justice Alito would have the stay lift in 30 days
unless the State demonstrates clearly that nothing short of those
measures will reduce the community spread of COVID–19 at in-
door religious gatherings to the same extent as do the restrictions
the State enforces with respect to other activities it classifes
as essential.
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring.
As I explained the last time the Court considered this evolving
case, federal courts owe signifcant deference to politically ac-
countable offcials with the “background, competence, and exper-
tise to assess public health.” South Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S. 965, 967 (2020) (opinion concurring
in denial of application for injunctive relief ). The State has con-
cluded, for example, that singing indoors poses a heightened risk
of transmitting COVID–19. I see no basis in this record for over-
riding that aspect of the state public health framework. At the
same time, the State's present determination—that the maximum
number of adherents who can safely worship in the most cavern-
ous cathedral is zero—appears to refect not expertise or discre-
tion, but instead insuffcient appreciation or consideration of the
interests at stake.
I adhere to the view that the “Constitution principally entrusts
the safety and the health of the people to the politically account-
able offcials of the States.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). But the Constitution also entrusts the pro-

ORDERS 1245
1243
St
atement of Gorsuch, J.
tection of the people's rights to the Judiciary—not despite judges
bei
ng shielded by life tenure, see post, at 1254 (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing), but because they are. Deference, though broad, has its
limits.
Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Kavanaugh joins,
concurring.
I agree with Justice Gorsuch's statement, save its contention
that the Court should enjoin California's prohibition on singing
and chanting during indoor services. The applicants bore the
burden of establishing their entitlement to relief from the singing
ban. In my view, they did not carry that burden—at least not
on this record. As the case comes to us, it remains unclear
whether the singing ban applies across the board (and thus consti-
tutes a neutral and generally applicable law) or else favors certain
sectors (and thus triggers more searching review). Of course, if
a chorister can sing in a Hollywood studio but not in her church,
California's regulations cannot be viewed as neutral. But the
record is uncertain, and the decisions below unfortunately shed
little light on the issue. As the order notes, however, the appli-
cants remain free to show that the singing ban is not generally
applicable and to advance their claim accordingly.
Statement of Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas
and Justice Alito join.
Often, courts addressing First Amendment free exercise chal-
lenges face diffcult questions about whether a law refects “ `sub-
tle departures from neutrality,' ” “ `religious gerrymander[ing],' ”
or “impermissible targeting ” of religion. Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 534–535 (1993).
But not here. Since the arrival of COVID–19, California has
openly imposed more stringent regulations on religious insti-
tutions than on many businesses. The State's spreadsheet sum-
marizing its pandemic rules even assigns places of worship their
own row. See App. to Emergency Application for Writ of In-
junction, App. G–3. At “Tier 1,” applicable today in most of
the State, California forbids any kind of indoor worship. Mean-
while, the State allows most retail operations to proceed indoors
with 25% occupancy, and other businesses to operate at 50%
occupancy or more. See ibid.; see also 985 F. 3d 1128, App.
A (CA9 2021). Apparently, California is the only State in the

1246 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Statement of Gorsuch, J. 592 U. S.
country that has gone so far as to ban all indoor religious serv-
ices.
See Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus
Curiae 5–6.
When a State so obviously targets religion for differential treat-
ment, our job becomes that much clearer. As the Ninth Circuit
recognized, regulations like these violate the First Amend-
ment unless the State can show they are the least restrictive
means of achieving a compelling government interest. 985 F. 3d,
at 1142.
In cases implicating this form of “strict scrutiny,” courts nearly
always face an individual's claim of constitutional right pitted
against the government's claim of special expertise in a matter of
high importance involving public health or safety. It has never
been enough for the State to insist on deference or demand that
individual rights give way to collective interests. Of course we
are not scientists, but neither may we abandon the feld when
government offcials with experts in tow seek to infringe a consti-
tutionally protected liberty. The whole point of strict scrutiny is
to test the government's assertions, and our precedents make
plain that it has always been a demanding and rarely satisfed
standard. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546. Even in times of cri-
sis—perhaps especially in times of crisis—we have a duty to hold
governments to the Constitution.
Still, California says it can thread the needle. It insists that
religious worship is so different that it demands especially oner-
ous regulation. The State offers essentially four reasons why: It
says that religious exercises involve (1) large numbers of people
mixing from different households; (2) in close physical proximity;
(3) for extended periods; (4) with singing.
No one before us disputes that factors like these may increase
the risk of transmitting COVID–19. And no one need doubt that
the State has a compelling interest in reducing that risk. This
Court certainly is not downplaying the suffering many have expe-
rienced in this pandemic. But California errs to the extent it
suggests its four factors are always present in worship, or always
absent from the other secular activities its regulations allow.
Nor has California sought to explain why it cannot address its
legitimate concerns with rules short of a total ban. Each of the
State's shortcomings are telltale signs this Court has long used
to identify laws that fail strict scrutiny. See, e. g., First Nat.
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 793 (1978) (The State's

ORDERS 1247
1243
St
atement of Gorsuch, J.
proffered “purpose is belied, however, by the provisions of the
st
atute, which are both underinclusive and overinclusive.”).
Consider California's arguments in turn. The State presumes
that worship inherently involves a large number of people.
Never mind that scores might pack into train stations or wait in
long checkout lines in the businesses the State allows to remain
open. Never mind, too, that some worshippers may seek only to
pray in solitude, go to confession, or study in small groups. See
Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, App. to Emergency Appli-
cation for Writ of Injunction, No. 20A137, Exh. A, No. 20–56357,
p. 4, n. 1 (CA9, Jan. 25, 2021) (O'Scannlain, J., specially concur-
ring). Nor does California explain why the less restrictive option
of limiting the number of people who may gather at one time is
insuffcient for houses of worship, even though it has found that
answer adequate for so many stores and businesses.
Next, the State tells us that worshippers are sure to seek close
physical interactions. It touts its mild climate, too, suggesting
that worshippers might enjoy more space outdoors. Yet, Califor-
nia is not as concerned with the close physical proximity of hair-
stylists or manicurists to their customers, whom they touch and
remain near for extended periods. The State does not force them
or retailers to do all their business in parking lots and parks.
And California allows people to sit in relatively close proximity
inside buses too. Nor, again, does California explain why the
narrower options it thinks adequate in many secular settings—
such as social distancing requirements, masks, cleaning, plexiglass
barriers, and the like—cannot suffice here. Especially when
those measures are in routine use in religious services across the
country today.
California worries that worship brings people together for too
much time. Yet, California does not limit its citizens to running
in and out of other establishments; no one is barred from lingering
in shopping malls, salons, or bus terminals. Nor, yet again, has
California explained why more narrowly tailored options, like a
reasonable limit on the length of indoor religious gatherings,
would fail to meet its concerns.
When it comes to each of the frst three factors, California
singles out religion for worse treatment than many secular activi-
ties. At the same time, the State fails to explain why narrower
options it fnds suffcient in secular contexts do not satisfy its
legitimate interests. Recently, this Court made it abundantly

1248 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Statement of Gorsuch, J. 592 U. S.
clear that edicts like California's fail strict scrutiny and violate
the
Constitution. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14 (2020) (per curiam). Today's order should
have been needless; the lower courts in these cases should have
followed the extensive guidance this Court already gave.
1
If I have a quibble with the Court's order, it is with how it
addresses California's fnal factor, singing. While the Court's
order requires California to allow churches to open, it also per-
mits California to enforce, for now, a categorical ban on singing
during services. This much might seem understandable. Cali-
fornia has sensibly expressed concern that singing may be a par-
ticularly potent way to transmit the disease, and it has banned
singing not just at indoor worship services, but at indoor private
gatherings, schools, and restaurants too.
But, on further inspection, the singing ban may not be what it
frst appears. It seems California's powerful entertainment in-
dustry has won an exemption.
2
So, once more, we appear to have
1
While today's case concerns the total ban on indoor worship found in
“Tier 1,” nothing in our order precludes future challenges to the other dis-
parate occupancy caps applicable to places of worship, particularly in “Tiers”
2 through 4. See App. to Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction,
App. G–3.
2
There is some confusion over what rules actually apply to Hollywood but
I would not allow the government offcials who created California's complex
regime to beneft from its confusing nature. The district court did not
address the singing ban, and the Ninth Circuit applied rational-basis review
because it was not convinced that anyone is permitted to sing indoors
in California. 985 F. 3d. 1128, 1152 (CA9 2021). But the record suggests
that music, flm, and television studios are permitted to sing indoors. See
Record in No. 20–56358, Doc. 18–4 (CA9), p. 124 (decl. of Screen Actors
Guild General Counsel) (“Singing in larger groups [inside the studio] is
permitted but only . . . with additional protections.”). California's most
recent edict prohibits singing at “private” “social situations” as well as “ac-
tivities protected by the First Amendment to the extent they are not al-
ready permitted by other guidance.” California Dept. of Public Health,
Guidance for the Prevention of COVID–19 Transmission for Gatherings (up-
dated Nov. 13, 2020). No one seems to know exactly how far this language
stretches, but it seems unlikely to apply to the entertainment industry,
which has its own governing guidance. And California does not squarely
deny as much here. See Brief in Opposition 51–52, and n. 52. As the Court
recognizes, though, nothing in today's order precludes future relief on this
claim either.

ORDERS 1249
1243
St
atement of Gorsuch, J.
a State playing favorites during a pandemic, expending consider-
able
effort to protect lucrative industries (casinos in Nevada;
movie studios in California) while denying similar largesse to its
faithful. See, e. g., Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 591
U. S. 1042, 1050 2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of
application for injunction relief ).
Once more, too, the State has not explained how a total ban on
religious singing is narrowly tailored to its legitimate public
health concerns. Even if a full congregation singing hymns is
too risky, California does not explain why even a single masked
cantor cannot lead worship behind a mask and a plexiglass shield.
Or why even a lone muezzin may not sing the call to prayer from
a remote location inside a mosque as worshippers fle in. The
Ninth Circuit sought to defend California's uneven regime by
observing that the entertainment industry has adopted COVID–
19 testing protocols. See 985 F. 3d at 1146. But, if that's true,
it is unclear why California's religious institutions might be denied
a similar opportunity. Rather than assume such testing is infeasi-
ble, California might have at least offered the option, or sought
to adapt it to churches. In my view, the State must do more to
tailor the requirements of public health to the rights of its people.
The Court's order today at least allows the applicants to press
these points on remand.
No doubt, California will argue on remand, as it has before,
that its prohibitions are merely temporary because vaccinations
are underway. But the State's “temporary” ban on indoor wor-
ship has been in place since August 2020, and applied routinely
since March. California no longer asks its movie studios, malls,
and manicurists to wait. And one could be forgiven for doubting
its asserted timeline. Government actors have been moving the
goalposts on pandemic-related sacrifces for months, adopting new
benchmarks that always seem to put restoration of liberty just
around the corner. As this crisis enters its second year—and
hovers over a second Lent, a second Passover, and a second Ra-
madan—it is too late for the State to defend extreme measures
with claims of temporary exigency, if it ever could. Drafting
narrowly tailored regulations can be diffcult. But if Hollywood
may host a studio audience or flm a singing competition while
not a single soul may enter California's churches, synagogues, and
mosques, something has gone seriously awry.

1250 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Kagan, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Justice So-
toma
yor join, dissenting.
Justices of this Court are not scientists. Nor do we know much
about public health policy. Yet today the Court displaces the
judgments of experts about how to respond to a raging pandemic.
The Court orders California to weaken its restrictions on public
gatherings by making a special exception for worship services.
The majority does so even though the State's policies treat wor-
ship just as favorably as secular activities (including political as-
semblies) that, according to medical evidence, pose the same risk
of COVID transmission. Under the Court's injunction, the State
must instead treat worship services like secular activities that
pose a much lesser danger. That mandate defies our caselaw,
exceeds our judicial role, and risks worsening the pandemic.
Start with the governing law. We have held time and again
that the First Amendment demands “neutrality” in actions affect-
ing religion. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,
508 U. S. 520, 532 (1993). A government cannot put limits on
religious conduct if it “fail[s] to prohibit nonreligious conduct that
endangers” the government's interests “in a similar or greater
degree.” Id., at 543. That principle, though, has a corollary: The
“Constitution does not require things which are different in fact
. . . to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 216 (1982). So “States must treat like cases
alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly.” Vacco v. Quill,
521 U. S. 793, 799 (1997); see Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 542.
1
California's response to the COVID pandemic satisfes that neu-
trality rule by regulating worship services the same as other
activities “where large groups of people [come together] in close
proximity for extended periods of time.” South Bay United Pen-
tecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S. 965, 966 (2020) (Roberts,
C. J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief ).
The restricted activities include attending a worship service or
political meeting; going to a lecture, movie, play, or concert; and
frequenting a restaurant, winery, or bar. So the activities are
both religious and secular—and many of the secular gatherings,
1
Only if a government fails this neutrality test must its policy “be justifed
by a compelling government interest and . . . be narrowly tailored to ad-
vance that interest.” Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 531–532.

ORDERS 1251
1243
Kagan
, J., dissenting
too, are constitutionally protected. In all those communal activi-
ties,
California requires mask wearing and social distancing, and
bars indoor singing and chanting, to reduce the risk of COVID
transmission. In addition, the State has put limits on how many
people can assemble in one indoor space—whether a church, the-
ater, or lecture hall. Depending on COVID case and test-positivity
rates, public gatherings may occur only at specifed occupancy
levels—for example, at 50% or 25% of a facility's capacity. And
when COVID rates are highest, all those capacity limits give way
to a r u le that the gather i ng—agai n, whether rel ig i ous or
secu lar—take place outdoors (w ith no limits on attendance).
Given California's mild climate, that restriction—the one the
Court today lifts for houses of worship alone—does not amount
to a ban on the activity. Worship services, along with other gath-
erings, have taken place outdoors throughout this winter.
California's scheme homes in on these indoor gatherings be-
cause they pose a heightened danger of COVID transmission.
In written testimony in this case, Dr. James Watt, the Chief of
Communicable Diseases at the California Department of Public
Health, explained: “There is broad consensus among epidemiolo-
gists that transmission (and thus spread) of the novel coronavirus
is more likely” at “[i]ndoor public gatherings,” which “bring to-
gether [many] people from different households.” Decl. of Dr.
James Watt in No. 3:20–cv–865 (SD Cal.), Doc. 81–3, ¶¶37, 44
(Watt Decl.). Dr. George Rutherford, a professor of epidemiology
at the University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine,
further elaborated on the point. He described the “increase[ ]”
in risk when gatherings “are of an extended duration, and when
there is a lot of verbal interaction, especially when there is group
singing, chanting, or other loud vocalization” like speeches or ser-
mons. Decl. of Dr. George Rutherford in No. 3:20–cv–865, Doc.
81–4, ¶91 (Rutherford Decl.). That risk, of course, extends not
only to the participants themselves, but to everyone they associ-
ate with in a community. See Watt Decl., ¶42.
The medical experts also testifed about why California imposed
more severe capacity limits on gathering places like churches and
theaters than on other indoor sites. The State's regulation of
retail stores is less stringent, Dr. Rutherford explained, because
shopping “involves less close proximity” with other people—and
for less time—than does an indoor worship service, lecture, or

1252 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Kagan, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
similar event. Rutherford Decl., ¶113; see id., ¶117. For that
reason,
shoppers are “less likely to receive a suffcient viral load
of droplets” to contract COVID. Id., ¶113. Similarly, Dr. Ruth-
erford observed, workplaces can have higher capacity limits be-
cause employers (and, by extension, their employees) must comply
with “detailed, workplace-specifc COVID prevention plans sub-
ject to enforcement by State labor authorities.” Id., ¶121. Film
production studios in California, for example, must test their em-
ployees as many as three times a week—a requirement that
“could not feasibly be applied to the congregation of a house of
worship.” Ibid., and n. 8.
Given all that evidence, California's choices make good sense.
The State is desperately trying to slow the spread of a deadly
disease. It has concluded, based on essentially undisputed epide-
miological fndings, that congregating together indoors poses a
special threat of contagion. So it has devised regulations to curb
attendance at those assemblies and—in the worst times—to force
them outdoors. Crucially, California has applied each of those
rules equivalently to religious activities and to secular activities,
including some with First Amendment protection of their own.
Where the State has regulated religious conduct, it has as well
regulated “nonreligious conduct that endangers [its] interests in
a similar” way. Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 543. The only secular
conduct the State treats better is the kind that its experts have
found does not so imperil its interests—the kind that poses less
risk of COVID transmission. Nothing in that policy violates the
First Amendment.
Yet the Court will not let California fght COVID as it thinks
appropriate. The Court has decided that the State must exempt
worship services from the strictest aspect of its regulation of
public gatherings. No one can know, from the Court's 19-line
order, exactly why: Is it that the Court does not believe the
science, or does it think even the best science must give way?
In any event, the result is clear: The State may not treat worship
services like activities found to pose a comparable COVID risk,
such as political meetings or lectures. Instead, the State must
treat this one communal gathering like activities thought to pose
a much lesser COVID risk, such as running in and out of a hard-
ware store. In thus ordering the State to change its public
health policy, the Court forgets what a neutrality rule demands.

ORDERS 1253
1243
Kagan
, J., dissenting
The Cour t i nsists on treati ng unl ike cases, not l ike ones,
equiva
lently.
2
This is no garden-variety legal error: In forcing California to
ignore its experts' scientifc fndings, the Court impairs the State's
effort to address a public health emergency. There are good rea-
sons why the Constitution “principally entrusts the safety and
the health of the people” to state offcials, not federal courts.
South Bay, 590 U. S., at 967 (Roberts, C. J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). First among them is
that judges “lack[ ] the background, competence, and expertise to
assess public health.” Ibid. To state the obvious, judges do not
know what scientists and public health experts do. I am sure
that, in deciding this case, every Justice carefully examined the
briefs and read the decisions below. But I cannot imagine that
any of us delved into the scientifc research on how COVID
spreads, or studied the strategies for containing it. So it is
alarming that the Court second-guesses the judgments of expert
offcials, and displaces their conclusions with its own. See Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14, 40 (2020) (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting). In the worst public health crisis in a
century, this foray into armchair epidemiology cannot end well.
And who knows what today's decision will mean for other re-
strictions challenged in other cases? The Court's order exempts
churches only from California's indoor ban, leaving its capacity
restrictions in place (at least for now). That is all to the good:
The injunction stops short of giving the churches all their re-
quested relief. But the scope of the order raises questions.
2
For much this reason, the Court's decision in Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. 14 (2020) (per curiam), does not require to-
day's injunction. There, the Court found that New York had “single[d] out
houses of worship for especially harsh treatment.” Id., at 17. But here,
according to the epidemiological evidence in the record, California has
treated houses of worship identically to other facilities with the same risk.
It is the Court, not the State, that “single[s] out” religious activity—separat-
ing it from other equally risky public gatherings. What is more, Roman
Catholic Diocese held, at a time when New York was lifting restrictions to
refect declining case rates, that the policy at issue was “far more severe
than has been shown to be required to prevent the spread of the virus.”
Id., at 18. No court—or, at any rate, no court with any sense of modesty—
can make that claim here. California's hospitals are near maximum capacity,
and over 3,500 state residents perished from the virus just last week.

1254 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 5, 2021 592 U. S.
When are such capacity limits permissible, and when are they
not?
And is an indoor ban never allowed, or just not in this
case? Most important—do the answers to those questions or
similar ones turn on record evidence about epidemiology, or on
naked judicial instinct? The Court's decision leaves state policy-
makers adrift, in California and elsewhere. It is diffcult enough
in a predictable legal environment to craft COVID policies that
keep communities safe. That task becomes harder still when of-
fcials must guess which restrictions this Court will choose to
strike down. The Court injects uncertainty into an area where
uncertainty has human costs.
All this from unelected actors, “not accountable to the people.”
South Bay, 590 U. S., at 967 (Roberts, C. J., concurring). I fer-
vently hope that the Court's intervention will not worsen the
Nation's COVID crisis. But if this decision causes suffering, we
will not pay. Our marble halls are now closed to the public, and
our life tenure forever insulates us from responsibility for our
errors. That would seem good reason to avoid disrupting a
State's pandemic response. But the Court forges ahead regard-
less, insisting that science-based policy yield to judicial edict. I
respectfully dissent.
No. 20A137. Harvest Rock Church, Inc., et al. v. New-
som, Governor of California. Application for injunctive re-
lief, presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the
Court, granted in part. Respondent is enjoined from enforcing
the Blueprint's Tier 1 prohibition on indoor worship services
against applicants pending disposition of the appeal in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of
the petition for writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.
The application is denied with respect to the percentage capacity
limitations, and respondent is not enjoined from imposing a 25%
capacity limitation on indoor worship services in Tier 1. The
application is denied with respect to the prohibition on singing
and chanting during indoor services. This order is without preju-
dice to applicants presenting new evidence to the District Court
that the State is not applying the percentage capacity limitations
or the prohibition on singing and chanting in a generally applica-
ble manner. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied,
this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate
upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

ORDERS 1255
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 5, 8, 11, 2021
Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch would grant the appli-
cati
on in full. See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. New-
som, 592 U. S. 1243, 1245 (2021) (statement of Gorsuch, J.). Jus-
tice Alito would grant the application with respect to all of the
capacity restrictions on indoor worship services and the prohibi-
tion against indoor singing and chanting, and would stay for 30
days an injunction against the percentage attendance caps and the
prohibition against indoor singing and chanting. Justice Alito
would have the stay lift in 30 days unless the State demonstrates
clearly that nothing short of those measures will reduce the com-
munity spread of COVID–19 at indoor religious gatherings to the
same extent as do the restrictions the State enforces with respect
to other activities it classifes as essential.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Justice So-
tomayor join, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in South Bay United Pentecos-
tal Church v. Newsom, 592 U. S. 1243, 1250 (2021) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting from partial grant of application for injunctive relief ).
February 8, 2021
Miscellaneous Order
No. 20A120. Gish et al. v. Newsom, Governor of Califor-
nia, et al. Application for injunctive relief, presented to Jus-
tice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court, is treated as a
petition for writ of certiorari before judgment, and the petition
is granted. The December 11, 2020, order of the United States
District Court for the Central District of California is vacated,
and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit with instructions to remand to the District
Court for further consideration in light of South Bay United Pen-
tecostal Church v. Newsom, 592 U. S. 1243 (2021).
February 11, 2021
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 20–816. In re Pearson et al. Petition for writ of man-
damus dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 20A128. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department
of Corrections v. Smith. C. A. 11th Cir. Application to va-

1256 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 11, 2021 592 U. S.
cate the injunction, presented to Justice Thomas, and by him
referred
to the Court, denied. Justice Thomas would grant
the application.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer, Justice Soto-
mayor, and Justice Barrett join, concurring.
Willie Smith is sentenced to death, and his last wish is to have
his pastor with him as he dies. The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, applying a statute designed to protect prisoners'
religious rights, required Alabama to honor that request. I concur
in the Court's decision to leave that order in place, and I write to ex-
plain why. Alabama has not carried its burden of showing that
the exclusion of all clergy members from the execution chamber is
necessary to ensure prison security. So the State cannot now
execute Smith without his pastor present, to ease what Smith calls
the “transition between the worlds of the living and the dead.”
Complaint in No. 2:20–cv–1026, Doc. 1, ¶65 (MD Ala.) (Complaint).
The governing law sets a high bar for Alabama to clear. The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
provides “expansive protection” for prisoners' religious liberty.
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U. S. 352, 358 (2015). Under that statute, a
prison may not “impose a substantial burden” on a prisoner's
“religious exercise” unless doing so satisfes our strict-scrutiny
test: The challenged policy must be “the least restrictive means
of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000cc–1(a). That standard, we have often explained, is “excep-
tionally demanding.” Holt, 574 U. S., at 364. If any “less re-
strictive means is available for the Government to achieve its
goals, then the Government must use it.” Id., at 365.
Alabama's policy substantially burdens Smith's exercise of reli-
gion. The State bars all clergy members from the execution
chamber, leaving inmates to die without spiritual attendance.
But Smith understands his minister's presence as “integral to
[his] faith” and “essential to [his] spiritual search for redemption.”
Complaint ¶64; Decl. of Spencer Hahn in No. 2:20–cv–1026, Doc.
4–1, ¶14. His pastor, Smith says, will not only “relieve his strug-
gle as he passes,” but also help him “properly express to God
his repentance.” Complaint ¶¶65–66. The sincerity of those
religious beliefs is not in doubt: Alabama acknowledges that

ORDERS 1257
1255
Kagan
, J., concurring
Smith's request is “based on a religious belief and not some other
motivanti
on.” Brief for Defendant-Appellee in No. 21–10348
(CA11), p. 24. So Alabama's pol icy must w ithst and str ic t
scrutiny.
And it cannot. Prison security is, of course, a compelling state
interest. But past practice, in Alabama and elsewhere, shows
that a prison may ensure security without barring all clergy mem-
bers from the execution chamber. Until two years ago, Alabama
required the presence of a prison chaplain at an inmate's side.
(It gave up the practice only when this Court barred States from
providing spiritual advisors of just one faith.) Still more rele-
vant, other jurisdictions have allowed clergy members with no
connection to the government to attend an inmate's execution.
In the last year, the Federal Government has conducted more
than 10 executions attended by the prisoner's clergy of choice—
exactly what Smith requests. And some States have chosen to
follow the same practice. See also post, at 1258 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from denial of application to vacate injunction). No-
where, as far as I can tell, has the presence of a clergy member
(whether state-appointed or independent) disturbed an execution.
That record “suggests that [Alabama] could satisfy its security
concerns through a means less restrictive” than its current prohi-
bition. Holt, 574 U. S., at 368–369.
The State's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Ala-
bama mainly asserts the need to close the execution chamber to
all but those whom the warden has found “trustworthy.” Appli-
cation 30. But that does not justify the State's categorical bar.
Alabama can take any number of measures to ensure that a clergy
member will act responsibly during an execution. The State can
do a background check on the minister; it can interview him and
his associates; it can seek a penalty-backed pledge that he will
obey all rules. See Dunn v. Ray, 586 U. S. 1138 (2019) (Kagan,
J., dissenting). What the State cannot do, consistent with strict
scrutiny, is simply presume that every clergy member will be
untrustworthy—or otherwise said, that only the harshest restric-
tion can work. See Holt, 574 U. S., at 369. Relatedly, Alabama
identifes “disturbances [that] have arisen around executions in
the past.” Application 22. But its two examples concern close
family members of inmates. The State cannot jump from those
(dissimilar) incidents to a conclusion that even well-vetted clergy

1258 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 11, 2021 592 U. S.
members risk disrupting an execution. Again, the State fails to
recog
nize that RLUIPA places a heightened duty on prison off-
cials: to demonstrate, not just “assume[,] that a plausible, less
restrictive alternative would be ineffective” when their preferred
approach burdens religion. Holt, 574 U. S., at 369.
For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit was right to bar Alabama
from executing Smith without his pastor by his side. The law guar-
antees Smith the right to practice his faith free from unnecessary
interference, including at the moment the State puts him to death.
Justice Kavanaugh, with whom The Chief Justice joins,
dissenting.
In 1991, Willie Smith murdered Sharma Ruth Johnson. Smith's
execution was scheduled for tonight. Smith asked to have his
spiritual advisor in the execution room. Alabama said no under
its policy of excluding all spiritual advisors from the execution
room, as distinct from the viewing room. The Eleventh Circuit
enjoined the execution, stating that the State's policy likely vio-
lates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
Because the State's policy is non-discriminatory and, in my view,
serves the State's compelling interests in ensuring the safety,
security, and solemnity of the execution room, I would have
granted the State's application to vacate the injunction. See
Murphy v. Collier, 587 U. S. 901, 913 (2019) (statement of Kava-
naugh, J., joined by Roberts, C. J., respecting grant of applica-
tion of stay). But the Court has a different view and denies
the State's application. Given the stays of execution here and in
Gutierrez v. Saenz, 590 U. S. 1016 (2020), it seems apparent that
States that want to avoid months or years of litigation delays
because of this RLUIPA issue should fgure out a way to allow
spiritual advisors into the execution room, as other States and
the Federal Government have done. Doing so not only would
satisfy inmates' requests, but also would avoid still further delays
and bring long overdue closure for victims' families.
No. 20A129. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department
of Corrections, et al. v. Smith. Application to vacate stay of
execution entered by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit on February 10, 2021, presented to Justice
Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, granted.

ORDERS 1259
592
U. S.
February 22, 2021
C
ertiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 20 – 31. Mc Coy v. Alamu. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer ti orari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consid-
eration in light of Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U. S. 7 (2020). Reported
below: 950 F. 3d 226.
No. 20–683. Wilke, Interim State Health Ofcer of
North Dakota, et al. v. Pharmaceutical Care Management
Assn. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and
case remanded for further consideration in light of Rutledge v.
Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn., 592 U. S. 80 (2020).
Reported below: 968 F. 3d 901.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 20–6506. Buxton v. Dougherty et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Re-
ported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 70.
No. 20–6578. White v. Lumpkin, Presiding Judge, Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals, et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx.
886.
No. 20–6642. Dunigan v. California Department of Cor-
rections and Rehabilitation et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 20–6651. Sepehry-Fard v. Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia, Sixth Appellate District, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.

1260 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
Miscellaneous Orders
N
o. 20A63. Trump v. Vance, District Attorney of the
County of New York, et al. S. D. N. Y. Application for stay,
presented to Justice Breyer and referred to the Court, denied.
No. 20M50. Seidman v. Weiler et al.;
No. 20M52. Martinez v. United States;
No. 20M53. Markovic v. Rahaman; and Markovic v.
Fishman;
No. 20M55. Mitchell, Individually and on Behalf of His
Children X. M. et al., et al. v. Dakota County Social Serv-
ices et al.; and
No. 20M58. Yazdchi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. Motions
to direct the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of
time denied.
No. 20M51. Thomas v. United States. Motion for leave to
fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal granted.
No. 20M54. Polites v. City of Philadelphia Law Depart-
ment. Motion for leave to proceed as a veteran denied.
No. 20M56. Robinson v. Kandulski et al. Motion to direct
the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time under
this Court's Rule 14.5 denied.
No. 20M57. Doe Co. v. United States. Motion for leave to
fle petition for writ of certiorari under seal with redacted copies
for the public record granted. Justice Breyer took no part in
the consideration or decision of this motion.
No. 20–437. United States v. Palomar-Santiago. C. A.
9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1163.] Motion of respond-
ent for appointment of counsel granted, and Bradley N. Garcia,
Esq., of Washington, D. C., is appointed to serve as counsel for
respondent in this case. Motion of petitioner to dispense with
printing joint appendix granted.
No. 20–444. United States v. Gary. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certio-
rari granted, 592 U. S. 1163.] Motion of respondent for appoint-
ment of counsel granted, and Jeffrey L. Fisher, Esq., of Stanford,
Cal., is appointed to serve as counsel for respondent.

ORDERS 1261
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–493. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo et al. v. Texas. C. A.
5th
Cir. The Acting Solicitor General is invited to fle a brief in
this case expressing the views of the United States.
No. 20 – 5904. Terry v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 592 U. S. 1163.] Motion of petitioner to dis-
pense with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 20–5974. Sanders v. Foster, Warden. C. A 7th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave
to proceed in forma pauperis [592 U. S. 1148] denied. Justice
Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this
motion.
No. 20–6507. Berry et ux. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir.;
No. 20–6602. Boucher v. Lyons. Sup. Ct. N. H.;
No. 20–6604. Grant v. City of Roanoke, Virginia. C. A.
4th Cir.;
No. 20–6735. McClung et ux. v. Estevez. Cir. Ct. Miami-
Dade County, Fla.; and
No. 20–6899. Hudson v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until
March 15, 2021, within which to pay the docketing fees required
by this Court's Rule 38(a).
No. 20–6897. In re Bradford;
No. 20–6952. In re Pelletier; and
No. 20–6994. In re Smith. Petitions for writs of habeas cor-
pus denied.
No. 20–777. In re Heyman;
No. 20–798. In re Patti;
No. 20–5876. In re Keller;
No. 20–6617. In re Romain; and
No. 20–6750. In re Marvin. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus denied.
No. 20–6603. In re Akel. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of manda-
mus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Justice Kagan

1262 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and
th
is petition.
Certiorari Granted
No. 20–449. Department of Homeland Security et al. v.
New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported
below: 969 F. 3d 42.
No. 20–429. American Medical Assn. et al. v. Cochran,
Acting Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.;
No. 20–454. Cochran, Acting Secretary of Health and
Human Services, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Bal-
timore; and
No. 20–539. Oregon et al. v. Cochran, Acting Secretary
of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour is
allotted for oral argument. Reported below: Nos. 20–429 and 20–
539, 950 F. 3d 1067; No. 20–454, 973 F. 3d 258.
No. 20–5279. Wooden v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted limited to Question 2 presented by
the petition. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 498.
Certiorari Denied
No. 20–48. Johnson v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019 Ark. 391, 591 S. W. 3d 265.
No. 20–120. Juarez v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 457 P. 3d 560.
No. 20–186. Villegas Rendon v. Wilkinson, Acting Attor-
ney General. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–261. Schulz et al. v. Presbytery of Seattle
et al. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10
Wash. App. 2d 696, 449 P. 3d 1077.
No. 20–294. Gaines v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 709.
No. 20–321. Barnette v. HBI, L. L. C., et al. Sup. Ct. Neb.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 305 Neb. 457, 941 N. W. 2d
158.

ORDERS 1263
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–371. Care Alternatives v. United States et al.
C
. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 952 F. 3d 89.
No. 20–401. Pierson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–475. Campbell v. Eagle Force Holdings, LLC,
et al. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 235
A. 3d 727.
No. 20–478. CBX Resources, L. L. C. v. ACE American
Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 959 F. 3d 175.
No. 20–499. Hull v. Rockwell. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 968 F. 3d 12.
No. 20–534. All Saints’ Episcopal Church (Fort Worth)
v. Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth et al.; and
No. 20–536. Episcopal Church et al. v. Episcopal Diocese
of Fort Worth et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 602 S. W. 3d 417.
No. 20–549. Farrow et al. v. Contra Costa County, Cali-
fornia. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799
Fed. Appx. 520.
No. 20–564. Carlisle v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 601 S. W. 3d 168.
No. 20–595. Lemma, Sheriff, Seminole County, Florida v.
Barnett. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
956 F. 3d 1291.
No. 20–599. Singh v. Murphy, Governor of New Jersey.
Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 244 N. J. 329,
240 A. 3d 384.
No. 20–602. Clifford, aka Daniels v. Trump. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 746.
No. 20–612. De La Fuente et al. v. Simon, Minnesota Sec-
retary of State. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–622. Amazon.com, Inc., et al. v. Rittmann et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 971 F. 3d 904.

1264 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–658. Cohen v. Equifax Information Services, LLC,
et
al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827
Fed. Appx. 14.
No. 20–660. Employer Solutions Stafng Group, LLC,
et al. v. Scalia, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 1097.
No. 20–719. Webster v. United States District Court for
the District of Alaska. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–724. Middleton et al. v. Complete Nutrition
Franchising, LLC, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 482.
No. 20–725. Ramon Ochoa v. Levine. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 660 Pa. 234, 234 A. 3d 402.
No. 20–728. adidas AG v. Nike, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 1355.
No. 20–734. Lloyd v. Gerhard et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 302.
No. 20–749. Roux v. Pharris et al. Ct. App. Tex., 10th
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–752. Davis v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–755. Biberovic v. City of Culver City, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 805
Fed. Appx. 531.
No. 20–756. Baylor v. Eto, fka Baylor. Ct. App. Minn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–758. Reynolds v. U. S. Bank N. A. Ct. App. Ariz.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–759. Bing v. Brivo Systems, LLC. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 959 F. 3d 605.
No. 20–766. Archer v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., et al.
Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–769. GS Cleantech Corp. et al. v. Adkins Energy
LLC et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 951 F. 3d 1310.

ORDERS 1265
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–770. Nypl v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. et al. C. A.
9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 135.
No. 20–771. Debera P. v. Maine Department of Health
and Human Services. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–775. Williams v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2019–00490 (La. 4/3/20), 340
So. 3d 761.
No. 20–781. United States ex rel. Concilio de Salud In-
tegral de Loiza, Inc., et al. v. J. C. Remodeling, Inc., et al.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 34.
No. 20–785. Baldwin v. Dorsey. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 320.
No. 20–787. Preserve Responsible Shoreline Manage-
ment et al. v. City of Bainbridge Island, Washington,
et al. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11
Wash. App. 2d 1040.
No. 20–789. Dikes, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Dikes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 472.
No. 20–792. Pearson v. City of Augusta, Georgia, et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed.
Appx. 940.
No. 20–797. Patti v. Peck. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 168.
No. 20–799. Wood v. Raffensperger, Georgia Secretary
of State, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 981 F. 3d 1307.
No. 20–801. DeLucia v. Greenbuild, LLC, et al. App.
Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 182 App. Div. 3d 874, 122 N. Y. S. 3d 181.
No. 20–802. Kurschinske v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 224 A. 3d 810.
No. 20–803. Langan v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 982.

1266 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–805. RollinsNelson LTC Corp. et al. v. United
St
ates ex rel. Winters. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 953 F. 3d 1108.
No. 20–806. Swartzlander v. United States. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 616.
No. 20–809. Ward v. Jackson et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–811. Contreras, on Behalf of Her Minor Child
A. L. v. Dona Ana County Board of County Commissioners,
dba Dona Ana County Detention Center, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 965 F. 3d 1114.
No. 20 – 813. Simmons v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 972 F. 3d 664.
No. 20–814. Nalder et al. v. United Automobile Insur-
ance Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
817 Fed. Appx. 347.
No. 20–817. Ogden v. Tice, Superintendent, State Cor-
rectional Institution at Somerset, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–818. Norvell v. Yellen, Secretary of the Treas-
ury, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
821 Fed. Appx. 853.
No. 20–820. Jackson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed.
Appx. 27.
No. 20–821. Mountainlands Conservancy, LLC, et al. v.
California Coastal Commission et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 8. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 47 Cal. App.
5th 214, 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683.
No. 20–822. Phillips v. Maryland Board of Law Examin-
ers et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
812 Fed. Appx. 165.
No. 20–823. Crider v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 607 S. W. 3d 305.
No. 20–824. Taupier v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 197 Conn. App. 784, 234 A. 3d 29.

ORDERS 1267
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–825. Brewer v. Hooks et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 923.
No. 20–829. WasteCare Corp. v. Harmony Enterprises,
Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822
Fed. Appx. 892.
No. 20–833. Coontz v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 201.
No. 20–834. Widtfeldt v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 444.
No. 20–835. Rosenfeld v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–838. Blandino v. Nevada et al. Ct. App. Nev.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 Nev. 785, 472 P. 3d 702.
No. 20–841. Martinez Lopez v. Wilkinson, Acting Attor-
ney General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 804 Fed. Appx. 815.
No. 20–847. Powers v. Bank of New York Mellon, fka
Bank of New York, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 730.
No. 20–852. Gray, Co-Administratrix of the Estate of
Miller, et al. v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 212.
No. 20–862. Hui Feng et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Repor ted
below: 935 F. 3d 721.
No. 20–863. Akeva L. L. C. v. Nike, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 1005.
No. 20–867. Ahmed v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–868. Foxeld Villa Associates, LLC, et al. v.
Robben et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 967 F. 3d 1082.
No. 20–870. Orem et ux. v. Gillmore et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 90.

1268 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–876. Liberti et al. v. City of Scottsdale, Arizona,
et
al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816
Fed. Appx. 89.
No. 20–878. Edwards v. Indiana University. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 441.
No. 20–882. Trump et al. v. Biden et al. Sup. Ct. Wis.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 WI 91, 394 Wis. 2d 629,
951 N. W. 2d 568.
No. 20–890. Stanford Vina Ranch Irrigation Co. v. Cali-
fornia et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 50 Cal. App. 5th 976, 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509.
No. 20–893. Belanus v. Guyer, Warden. Sup. Ct. Mont.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–897. Kopitke v. Bell, Executive Director, North
Carolina State Board of Elections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 252.
No. 20–898. Sherrod v. United Way Worldwide. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 311.
No. 20–899. Sorum et al. v. North Dakota et al. Sup. Ct.
N. D. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 ND 175, 947
N. W. 2d 382.
No. 20–901. Spring Branch Independent School District
v. O. W., by Next Friend Hannah W. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 781.
No. 20–903. First Choice Chiropractic, LLC, et al. v. De-
Wine, Governor of Ohio, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 969 F. 3d 675.
No. 20–906. Horne et al. v. Polk. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 810 Fed. Appx. 591.
No. 20–912. Ladd et al. v. Marchbanks. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 971 F. 3d 574.
No. 20–917. 800 Services, Inc. v. AT&T Corp. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 98.
No. 20–921. Castillo v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.

ORDERS 1269
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–924. Bowser v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 26.
No. 20–926. Belanus v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–930. Geppert v. Maryland Motor Vehicle Admin-
istration. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
470 Md. 28, 233 A. 3d 102.
No. 20–934. Samaranayake et al. v. Iancu, Under Secre-
tary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Direc-
tor, United States Patent and Trademark Ofce. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx.
925.
No. 20–946. Dierlam v. Biden, President of the United
States, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 977 F. 3d 471.
No. 20–947. Idaho State Tax Commission v. Noell Indus-
tries, Inc. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Cer ti orar i denied. Repor ted
below: 167 Idaho 367, 470 P. 3d 1176.
No. 20–957. Vazirabadi v. Denver Public Schools et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed.
Appx. 805.
No. 20–958. Scott v. Arnold, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 1128.
No. 20–961. Ryskamp v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816
Fed. Appx. 207.
No. 20–964. Tulp v. Educational Commission for Foreign
Medical Graduates et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 134.
No. 20–967. Rodriguez-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 283.
No. 20– 970. Gonzalez v. Wilkinson, Acting At torney
General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
817 Fed. Appx. 476.
No. 20–978. Metaxas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

1270 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–981. Agbapuruonwu v. NBC Subsidiary (WRC–TV),
LLC,
dba NBC4 Washington, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 234.
No. 20–986. Hubbard v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–1003. Christy, Inc. v. United States. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 971 F. 3d 1332.
No. 20–1028. Blixseth v. Credit Suisse. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 1074.
No. 20–1032. Petrobras America Inc. et al. v. Vantage
Deepwater Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 966 F. 3d 361.
No. 20–1045. Liebenguth v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 Conn. 685, 250 A. 3d 1.
No. 20–5085. Johnson v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 8 Cal. 5th 475, 453 P. 3d 38.
No. 20–5304. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5589. Ross v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 1034.
No. 20–5598. Richardson v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 CO 46.
No. 20–5610. Brown v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19–370 (La. App. 5 Cir.
1/15/20), 289 So. 3d 1179.
No. 20–5672. Turpin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 800 Fed. Appx. 194.
No. 20–5718. Trice v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 506.
No. 20–5764. Berryman v. Wong, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–5774. Manzanares v. United States. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 1220.

ORDERS 1271
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–5776. Augard v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 954 F. 3d 1090.
No. 20–5993. James v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 950 F. 3d 289.
No. 20–6038. Whitaker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 209.
No. 20–6043. Archer v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 293 So. 3d 455.
No. 20–6046. McGinnis v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 956 F. 3d 747.
No. 20–6093. Abutaleb v. Abutaleb. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 IL App (3d) 190572–U.
No. 20–6161. Brunson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 968 F. 3d 325.
No. 20–6218. Valentine v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 296 So. 3d 375.
No. 20–6272. Usher v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 202.
No. 20 – 6283. Brownlee v. Capozza, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Fayette. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 73.
No. 20–6310. Carter v. Broomeld, Acting Warden.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 489.
No. 20–6323. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 891.
No. 20–6351. Tippins v. Caruso et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6383. McFadden v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 619 S. W. 3d 434.
No. 20 – 6429. Howell v. Gordon, Arata, Mc Collam,
Duplantis & Eagan, L. L. C., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20 – 6430. Howell v. Gordon, Arata, Mc Collam,
Duplantis & Eagan, L. L. C., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

1272 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No.
N
o.
20–6431.
20–6432.
Howell v. Adler et al.;
LaMartina v. Adler et
and
al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 271.
No. 20–6443. Myers v. Rowell et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6444. Fuston v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2020 OK CR 4, 470 P. 3d 306.
No. 20–6477. Ardaneh v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 486 Mass. 1005, 155
N. E. 3d 717.
No. 20–6493. Uppal v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. Sup.
Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6497. Bridges v. Gray, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6499. Sigler v. Thornton et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 124.
No. 20–6501. Riley v. Meehan. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6505. Bigbee v. Fitz, Warden. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6512. Lewis v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6514. Weatherholt v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 298 Va. 438, 839 S. E. 2d 492.
No. 20–6518. Milam v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6522. Pendleton v. Hamrick et al. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6524. Myers v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6525. Aranoff v. Aranoff. Ct. App. N. Y. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 3d 1077, 154 N. E. 3d 10.
No. 20–6528. Washington v. Brooke et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 402.

ORDERS 1273
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–6532. Sanchez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.
D
ist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6534. Scott v. Grifn et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 403.
No. 20–6537. Rouhi v. CVS Pharmacy et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 879.
No. 20–6538. Schmitt v. Baker, Governor of Massachu-
setts. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6542. Pew v. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 660 Pa. 309, 234 A. 3d 444.
No. 20–6544. Overton v. Macauley, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 341.
No. 20–6546. Nimmer v. Heavican, Chief Justice, Supreme
Court of Nebraska, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 803 Fed. Appx. 61.
No. 20–6547. McNees v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6549. Moss v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6550. Newkirk v. Kiser, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6558. Bamberg v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 308 Ga. 340, 839 S. E. 2d 640.
No. 20–6561. Rodriguez v. Moody, Attorney General of
Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 813 Fed. Appx. 426.
No. 20–6564. Scott v. Singleton, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6565. Quinn v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019–00647 (La. 9/9/20), 340 So. 3d 829.
No. 20–6573. Keyes v. Wilson et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

1274 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6579. O’Neil v. Weld County, Colorado. C. A. 10th
Cir
. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6592. Gomez v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807 Fed. Appx. 709.
No. 20–6593. MacLeod v. Moritz et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6595. Brockington v. Salem United Methodist
Church et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 797 Fed. Appx. 115.
No. 20–6598. Baker v. Capozza, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Fayette, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6605. Mayo v. Russell et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 799 Fed. Appx. 531.
No. 20–6607. Miles, aka Miles-El v. Ionia Correctional
Facility et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6608. Patten v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6611. Mullaney v. University of St. Thomas. Ct.
App. Minn. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6612. Patterson v. Saul, Commissioner of Social
Security. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
805 Fed. Appx. 208.
No. 20–6614. Jarvis v. Leggett et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6615. McHenry v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 826 Fed. Appx. 352.
No. 20–6620. Spengler v. Los Angeles County District
Attorney. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6621. Smith v. Benton, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6623. Pin v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 922.

ORDERS 1275
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–6624. Aguilera v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th
App
. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6625. Whipple v. Johnson et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6627. Jenkins v. South Carolina Department of
Employment Workforce et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 795.
No. 20–6629. Doe v. Carson, Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6631. Redmond v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 965 F. 3d 416.
No. 20–6633. Vargas v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 9 Cal. 5th 793, 468 P. 3d 1121.
No. 20–6636. Lan Tu Trinh v. Citizen Business Banking
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 807
Fed. Appx. 196.
No. 20–6639. Aurit v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 20–6643. McCray v. Lewis, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 288.
No. 20–6644. Santiago Renteria v. Lumpkin, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional In-
stitutions Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 827.
No. 20–6645. Cervantes v. Shinn, Director, Arizona De-
partment of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6646. Croce v. Croce. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 221 A. 3d 286.
No. 20–6649. El Mujaddid v. Brewer et al. (Reported
below: 808 Fed. Appx. 73); and El Mujaddid v. New Jersey
(802 Fed. Appx. 674). C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6650. Sumner v. Carter et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 309.

1276 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6652. Stephenson v. Kelly, Superintendent, Ore-
gon
State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6653. Roeder v. Kansas. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 57 Kan. App. 2d xlii, 444 P. 3d 379.
No. 20–6654. Romero v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6658. Brown v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6659. Ashley v. California et al. Ct. App. Cal.,
2d App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6661. Figge v. Frauenheim, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 570.
No. 20–6663. Brownlee v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181
App. Div. 3d 1265, 120 N. Y. S. 3d 673.
No. 20–6667. Douglas v. Schmitt, Attorney General of
Missouri, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6669. Zellner v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 353 Ga. App. 527, 838 S. E. 2d 613.
No. 20–6670. Taylor v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 1021.
No. 20–6672. Coleman v. Ephraim McDowell Regional
Medical Center. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6675. Cavitte v. Nebraska. Ct. App. Neb. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 28 Neb. App. 601, 945 N. W. 2d 228.
No. 20–6676. Daniels v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 304 So. 3d 1218.
No. 20–6678. Davis v. Payne, Director, Arkansas Division
of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6680. Taylor v. Buchanan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6681. Wright v. Georgia Department of Correc-
tions et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 820 Fed. Appx. 841.

ORDERS 1277
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–6682. Vurimindi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.
Super
. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6685. Redditt v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 965 F. 3d 654.
No. 20–6686. Stewart v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6687. Jonas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 224.
No. 20–6689. Kwong v. Cheswold (TL), LLC, et al. App.
Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 Conn. App.
279, 229 A. 3d 1145.
No. 20–6691. Armenta Lopez v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 821.
No. 20–6692. Lopez-Canales v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 299.
No. 20–6694. Flores-Riojas v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 166.
No. 20–6695. Massey v. MultiCare Health System et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6697. O’Neil v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 764.
No. 20–6698. Morrison v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6699. Pineda-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 17.
No. 20–6700. Calabrese v. California et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6701. Pedraza v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 9th App. Dist.,
Medina County. Cer ti orar i denied. Repor ted below: 2020-
Ohio-2661.
No. 20 – 6702. Moreno-Turrubiates v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed.
Appx. 161.

1278 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6703. Darden v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 434.
No. 20–6704. Calderon v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6706. Degollado v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6707. Peterson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 138.
No. 20–6708. Decloues v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6709. Hundley v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 162 Ohio St. 3d 509, 2020-Ohio-3775,
166 N. E. 3d 1066.
No. 20–6710. Iron Crow v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 970 F. 3d 1003.
No. 20–6712. Leake v. Social Security Administration.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed.
Appx. 789.
No. 20–6713. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 869.
No. 20–6715. Mankin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 162.
No. 20–6716. Martin v. Shinn, Director, Arizona Depart-
ment of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6720. Harper v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6721. Booth v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 820 Fed. Appx. 590.
No. 20–6722. Poindexter v. Payne, Director, Arkansas
Division of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6723. Ducksworth v. MacMurdo et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 809 Fed. Appx. 249.

ORDERS 1279
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–6725. Durant v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 430 S. C. 98, 844 S. E. 2d 49.
No. 20–6726. Betances v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6727. Avalos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 601.
No. 20–6728. Adams v. Georgia Ofce of the Governor
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818
Fed. Appx. 887.
No. 20–6730. Corrall v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 147.
No. 20–6732. Forty-Febres v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 982 F. 3d 802.
No. 20–6733. Ferguson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 380.
No. 20–6734. Mobasseri v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 278.
No. 20–6736. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 107.
No. 20–6737. Alejandro Perez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6738. Coffman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 969 F. 3d 186.
No. 20–6739. Miller v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6740. Peak v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 230 A. 3d 1220.
No. 20–6741. McDaniels v. Preito et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 697.
No. 20–6744. Ellis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 117.
No. 20–6747. Clinton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 185.

1280 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6748. David v. Ituarte et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 436.
No. 20–6752. Tinoco-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 183.
No. 20–6753. Winn v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 811 Fed. Appx. 1011.
No. 20–6755. Tovar-Regalado v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 974.
No. 20–6757. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 813 Fed. Appx. 918.
No. 20–6759. Weiters v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 247.
No. 20–6761. Wells v. Wallace, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 856.
No. 20–6763. Mathis v. Vizcarrondo. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 746.
No. 20–6766. Villalona v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6768. Watson v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6770. Treminio-Tobar v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 752.
No. 20–6771. Soto-Peguero v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 978 F. 3d 13.
No. 20–6774. Snoddy v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 976 F. 3d 630.
No. 20–6776. Becton v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed. Appx. 105.
No. 20–6777. Baxton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 320.
No. 20–6778. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 804 Fed. Appx. 8.
No. 20–6782. Guadron-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 752.

ORDERS 1281
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–6783. Harris v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 272.
No. 20–6784. Hussein v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 968 F. 3d 922.
No. 20–6787. Pryor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 824 Fed. Appx. 652.
No. 20–6789. Olmedo-Perez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 827 Fed. Appx. 447.
No. 20–6792. Mier-Garces v. United States. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 1003.
No. 20–6795. Richards v. Richards. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6796. Sanchez v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 675.
No. 20–6801. Palacio v. Sullivan. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 774.
No. 20–6803. Lindsey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 969 F. 3d 136.
No. 20–6804. Cometa v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 966 F. 3d 1285.
No. 20–6809. Wood v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 430.
No. 20–6813. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 814 Fed. Appx. 891.
No. 20–6816. Rodriguez v. Filson, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6817. Quinn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 826 Fed. Appx. 337.
No. 20–6820. Lawson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 Cal. App. 5th 1121,
267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183.
No. 20–6823. Buttery v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 162 Ohio St. 3d 10, 2020-Ohio-2998, 164
N. E. 3d 294.

1282 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6827. Majid v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 1014.
No. 20 – 6829. But tercase v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 306 Neb. a.
No. 20–6831. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 834 Fed. Appx. 134.
No. 20– 6838. Nsinano v. Wilkinson, Acting At torney
General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
808 Fed. Appx. 554.
No. 20–6839. Townsend v. Taylor, Superintendent, East-
ern Oregon Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6842. D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 964 F. 3d 1014.
No. 20–6844. Angel Torres v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 808 Fed. Appx. 270.
No. 20–6850. Weems v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6854. Bazan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 822 Fed. Appx. 263.
No. 20–6856. Oden v. Turner, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6857. Pina v. United States (Reported below: 818
Fed. Appx. 384); and Zamora De Anda v. United States (826
Fed. Appx. 406). C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6859. Swan v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 829 Fed. Appx. 304.
No. 20–6861. Sanders v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6863. Findley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 806 Fed. Appx. 966.
No. 20–6864. Hill v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 831 Fed. Appx. 69.

ORDERS 1283
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–6867. Romero-Espinal v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 812 Fed. Appx. 151.
No. 20–6869. Radford v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2020 IL 123975, 181 N. E. 3d 78.
No. 20–6870. Harris v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 960 F. 3d 1103.
No. 20–6873. Harrell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st
App. Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6878. Curran v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 812.
No. 20–6880. Esquivel v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6883. Garner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 969 F. 3d 550.
No. 20–6884. Andrade-Salas v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 7.
No. 20–6885. Vogel v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6888. Pandey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 800.
No. 20–6889. Bartunek v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 969 F. 3d 860.
No. 20–6895. Brennerman v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 583.
No. 20–6903. Villa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 133.
No. 20–6909. Gale v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 802 Fed. Appx. 787.
No. 20–6911. Alfaro-Granados v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6915. Peterson v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Cal. 5th 409, 472 P. 3d 382.
No. 20–6916. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 828 Fed. Appx. 311.

1284 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–6917. McAfee v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6918. Moseley v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 980 F. 3d 9.
No. 20–6920. Moftt v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6921. Marquez-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 25.
No. 20–6925. Iraheta et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 962 F. 3d 420.
No. 20–6926. Alegria Hernandez v. California. Ct. App.
Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6927. Freeney v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 815 Fed. Appx. 802.
No. 20–6928. Ivey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 30.
No. 20–6930. Lopez-Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 375.
No. 20–6931. Landreneau v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 F. 3d 443.
No. 20–6932. Jamaica-Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 817 Fed. Appx. 16.
No. 20–6933. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 816 Fed. Appx. 846.
No. 20–6936. Tucker v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 961 F. 3d 105.
No. 20–6941. Dodge v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 963 F. 3d 379.
No. 20–6942. Camarena v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 478.
No. 20–6943. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1285
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–6944. Zavala-Marti v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir
. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6954. Gamez-Castaneda v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 819 Fed. Appx. 279.
No. 20–6958. Paulino v. Grifn, Superintendent, Green
Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 20–6960. McMichaels v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (1st)
163053, 166 N. E. 3d 775.
No. 20–6961. Pfoff v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6962. Herrera-Fuentes v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–6969. Usry v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6971. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 371.
No. 20–6973. Fannin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 821 Fed. Appx. 358.
No. 20–6976. Doctor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 838 Fed. Appx. 484.
No. 20–6977. Dorman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 378.
No. 20–6978. Castro v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 823 Fed. Appx. 375.
No. 20–6979. Webb v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 818 Fed. Appx. 376.
No. 20–6980. West v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 20–6989. Sims v. Seibel, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

1286 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–54. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Hawaii Land Use
C
ommission. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Repor ted
below: 950 F. 3d 610.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
I recently explained that “it would be desirable for us to take
a fresh look at our regulatory takings jurisprudence, to see
whether it can be grounded in the original public meaning of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Murr v.
Wisconsin, 582 U. S. 383, 419 (2017) (dissenting opinion).
Our current regulatory takings jurisprudence leaves much to be
desired. A regulation effects a taking, we have said, whenever
it “goes too far.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S.
393, 415 (1922). This occurs categorically whenever a regulation
requires a physical intrusion, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982), or leaves land “without econom-
ically benefcial or productive options for its use,” Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1018 (1992). But such
cases are exceedingly rare. See, e. g., Brown & Merriam, On the
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking the Tak-
ings Claim, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1847, 1849–1850 (2017) (noting that
in more than 1,700 cases over a 25-year period, there were only
27 successful takings claims under Lucas—a success rate of just
1.6%). For all other regulatory takings claims, the Court has
“generally eschewed any set formula for determining how far is
too far,” requiring lower courts instead “to engage in essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 326 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Factors might include (1)
“[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” (2)
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the character of the
governmental action.” Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A.
Inc., 544 U. S. 528, 538 – 539 (2005). But cour ts must a lso
“ `weig[h] all the relevant circumstances.' ” Tahoe-Sierra Preser-
vation Council, 535 U. S., at 322. As one might imagine, no-
body—not States, not property owners, not courts, nor juries—
has any idea how to apply this standardless standard.
This case illustrates the point. After an 8-day trial and with
the beneft of jury instructions endorsed by both parties, the jury

ORDERS 1287
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
found a taking. The District Court, in turn, concluded that there
was
an adequate factual basis for this verdict. But the Ninth
Circuit on appeal reweighed and reevaluated the same facts under
the same legal tests to conclude that no reasonable jury could
have found a taking. These starkly different outcomes based on
the application of the same law indicate that we have still not
provided courts with a “workable standard.” Pomeroy, Penn
Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing Test or One
Strike Rule? 22 Fed. Cir. B. J. 677, 678 (2013). The current doc-
trine is “so vague and indeterminate that it invites unprincipled,
subjective decision making ” dependent upon the decisionmaker.
Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for
History's Dustbin? 52 Land Use L. & Zoning Dig. 3, 7 (2000); see
also Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings
Test, 118 Pa. St. L. Rev. 601, 602 (2014) (“[T]he doctrine has
become a compilation of moving parts that are neither individu-
ally coherent nor collectively compatible”). A know-it-when-you-
see-it test is no good if one court sees it and another does not.
Next year will mark a “century since Mahon,” during which
this “Court for the most part has refrained from” providing “de-
fnitive rules.” Murr, 582 U. S., at 393. It is time to give more
than just “some, but not too specifc, guidance.” Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 617 (2001). If there is no such thing
as a regulatory taking, we should say so. And if there is, we
should make clear when one occurs.
I respectfully dissent.
No. 20–477. Day et al. v. Wooten et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 947 F. 3d
453.
No. 20–542. Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. De-
graffenreid, Acting Secretary of Pennsylvania, et al.; and
No. 20–574. Corman et al. v. Pennsylvania Democratic
Party et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Motions of Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc., for leave to intervene as petitioner dismissed as
moot. Motions of Thomas J. Randolph et al. for leave to inter-
vene as respondents dismissed as moot. Motion of Honest Elec-
tions Project for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae in No. 20–
542 granted. Motion of White House Watch Fund et al. for leave
to fle brief as amici curiae in No. 20–574 granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 662 Pa. 39, 238 A. 3d 345.

1288 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Thomas, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
The
Constitution gives to each state legislature authority to
determine the “Manner” of federal elections. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1;
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Yet both before and after the 2020 election,
nonlegislative offcials in various States took it upon themselves
to set the rules instead. As a result, we received an unusually
high number of petitions and emergency applications contesting
those changes. The petitions here present a clear example. The
Pennsylvania Legislature established an unambiguous deadline for
receiving mail-in ballots: 8 p.m. on election day. Dissatisfed, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended that deadline by three
days. The court also ordered offcials to count ballots received
by the new deadline even if there was no evidence—such as a
postmark—that the ballots were mailed by election day. That
decision to rewrite the rules seems to have affected too few bal-
lots to change the outcome of any federal election. But that may
not be the case in the future. These cases provide us with an
ideal opportunity to address just what authority nonlegislative
offcials have to set election rules, and to do so well before the
next election cycle. The refusal to do so is inexplicable.
I
Like most States, Pennsylvania has a long history of limiting
the use of mail-in ballots. But in October 2019, the Pennsylvania
Legislature overhauled its election laws. Relevant here, it gave
all voters the option of voting by mail, and it extended the dead-
line for offcials to receive mail ballots by several days to 8 p.m.
on election day. 2019 Pa. Leg. Serv. Act 2019–77. Then, in re-
sponse to COVID–19, the legislature again amended the law but
decided not to extend the receipt deadline further. See 2020 Pa.
Leg. Serv. Act 2020–12.
Displeased with that decision, the Pennsylvania Democratic
Party sued in state court. It argued that the court could extend
the deadline through a vague clause in the State Constitution
providing, in relevant part, that “[e]lections shall be free and
equal.” Art. I, § 5. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed.
On September 17, it held that this “free and equal” provision
enabled the court to extend the deadline three days to accommo-
date concerns about postal delays.
Petitioners promptly moved for emergency relief, fling an ap-
plication for a stay on September 28. That application easily met
our criteria for granting relief. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558

ORDERS 1289
1287
Thomas,
J., dissenting
U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). Not only did parties on both
sides
agree that the issue warranted certiorari, but there also
was no question that petitioners faced irreparable harm. See
Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C. J.,
in chambers) (“ `[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from
effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it
suffers a form of irreparable injury' ”). Petitioners further estab-
lished a fair prospect of certiorari and reversal. For more than
a century, this Court has recognized that the Constitution “oper-
at[es] as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to
circumscribe the legislative power” to regulate federal elections.
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 25 (1892). Because the Fed-
eral Constitution, not state constitutions, gives state legislatures
authority to regulate federal elections, petitioners presented a
strong argument that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
violated the Constitution by overriding “the clearly expressed
intent of the legislature.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S. 98, 120 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). Despite petitioners' strong show-
ing that they were entitled to relief, we divided 4–4 and thus
failed to act. Scarnati v. Boockvar, 592 U. S. 1022 (2020).
Four days later, petitioners fled the frst of these petitions and
moved to expedite consideration so the Court could decide the
merits before election day. But by that time, election day was
just over a week away. So we denied the motion to expedite
even though the question was of “national importance” and there
was a “strong likelihood that the State Supreme Court decision
violates the Federal Constitution.” Republican Party of Pa. v.
Boockvar, 592 U. S. 1068, 1070 (2020) (statement of Alito, J.).
II
Now that the petitions are before us under the normal brief-
ing schedule, I see no reason to avoid them. Indeed, the day
after we denied petitioner's motion to expedite in No. 20–542, the
case became even more worthy of review. The Eighth Circuit
split from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, granting a pre-
liminary injunction against an attempt by the Minnesota Secre-
tary of State to extend the legislature's deadline to receive ballots
by seven days. Carson v. Simon, 978 F. 3d 1051, 1059–1060,
1062 (2020). This divide on an issue of undisputed importance
would justify certiorari in almost any case. That these cases
concern federal elections only further heightens the need for
review.

1290 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Thomas, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
A
Elec
tions are “of the most fundamental signifcance under our
constitutional structure.” Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 184 (1979). Through them, we exer-
cise self-government. But elections enable self-governance only
when they include processes that “giv[e] citizens (including the
losing candidates and their supporters) confdence in the fairness
of the election.” See Democratic National Committee v. Wiscon-
sin State Legislature, 592 U. S. 1039, 1044 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in denial of application to vacate stay); accord, Purcell
v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam) (“Confdence in the
integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning
of our participatory democracy”).
Unclear rules threaten to undermine this system. They sow
confusion and ultimately dampen confdence in the integrity
and fairness of elections. To prevent confusion, we have thus
repeatedly—although not as consistently as we should—blocked
rule changes made by courts close to an election. See Purcell,
supra.
1
An election system lacks clear rules when, as here, different
offcials dispute who has authority to set or change those rules.
This kind of dispute brews confusion because voters may not
know which rules to follow. Even worse, with more than one
system of rules in place, competing candidates might each declare
victory under different sets of rules.
We are fortunate that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's deci-
sion to change the receipt deadline for mail-in ballots does not
appear to have changed the outcome in any federal election. Jus-
tice Alito ordered the county boards to segregate ballots re-
ceived later than the deadline set by the legislature. Order in
Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, No. 20A84 (Nov. 6, 2020).
And none of the parties contend that those ballots made an out-
come-determinative difference in any relevant federal election.
1
See also Merrill v. People First of Ala., 592 U. S. 1035 (2020) (Merrill
II); Andino v. Middleton, 592 U. S. 906 (2020); Merrill v. People First of
Ala., 591 U. S. 1024 (2020) (Merrill I); Republican National Committee v.
Democratic National Committee, 589 U. S. 423 (2020) (per curiam); Veasey
v. Perry, 574 U. S. 951 (2014); North Carolina v. League of Women Voters,
574 U. S. 927 (2014) (allowing enjoined provisions to remain in effect for the
upcoming election).

ORDERS 1291
1287
Thomas,
J., dissenting
But we may not be so lucky in the future. Indeed, a separate
decisi
on by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have already
altered an election result. A different petition argues that after
election day the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nullifed the legisla-
tive requirement that voters write the date on mail-in ballots.
See Pet. for Cert., O. T. 2020, No. 20–845. According to public
reports, one candidate for a state senate seat claimed victory
under what she contended was the legislative rule that dates
must be included on the ballots. A federal court noted that this
candidate would win by 93 votes under that rule. Ziccarelli v.
Allegheny Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2021 WL 101683, *1 (WD Pa.,
Jan. 12, 2021). A second candidate claimed victory under the
contrary rule announced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
He was seated.
That is not a prescription for confdence. Changing the rules
in the middle of the game is bad enough. Such rule changes by
offcials who may lack authority to do so is even worse. When
those changes alter election results, they can severely damage the
electoral system on which our self-governance so heavily depends.
If state offcials have the authority they have claimed, we need
to make it clear. If not, we need to put an end to this practice
now before the consequences become catastrophic.
B
At frst blush, it may seem reasonable to address this question
when it next arises. After all, the 2020 election is now over,
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision was not outcome
determinative for any federal election.
But whatever force that argument has in other contexts, it fails
in the context of elections. For at least three reasons, the Judi-
ciary is ill equipped to address problems—including those caused
by improper rule changes—through postelection litigation.
First, postelection litigation is truncated by frm timelines.
That is especially true for Presidential elections, which are gov-
erned by the Electoral Count Act, passed in 1887. That Act sets
federal elections for the day after the frst Monday in November—
last year, November 3. See 3 U. S. C. § 1. Under a statutory
safe-harbor provision, a State has about fve weeks to address all
disputes and make a “fnal determination” of electors if it wants
that decision to “be conclusive.” § 5. Last year's deadline fell
on December 8, and the Electoral College voted just six days

1292 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Thomas, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
later. § 7. Five to six weeks for judicial testing is diffcult
enough
for straightforward cases. For factually complex cases,
compressing discovery, testimony, and appeals into this timeline
is virtually impossible.
Second, this timeframe imposes especially daunting constraints
when combined with the expanded use of mail-in ballots. Voting
by mail was traditionally limited to voters who had defned, well-
documented reasons to be absent. See, e. g., Moreton, Note, Vot-
ing by Mail, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1261–1264 (1985). In recent
years, however, many States have become more permissive, a
trend greatly accelerated by COVID–19. In Pennsylvania, for
example, mail-in ballots composed just 4% of ballots cast in 2018.
But the legislature dramatically expanded the process in 2019,
thereby increasing the mail-in ballots cast in 2020 to 38%.
This expansion impedes postelection judicial review because liti-
gation about mail-in ballots is substantially more complicated.
For one thing, as election administrators have long agreed, the
risk of fraud is “vastly more prevalent” for mail-in ballots. Lip-
tak, Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises, N. Y.
Times, Oct. 6, 2012. The reason is simple: “[A]bsentee voting
replaces the oversight that exists at polling places with something
akin to an honor system.” Ibid. Heather Gerken, now dean of
Yale Law School, explained in the same New York Times article
that absentee voting allows for “simpler and more effective alter-
natives to commit fraud” on a larger scale, such as stealing absen-
tee ballots or stuffng a ballot box, which explains “ `why all the
evidence of stolen elections involves absentee ballots and the
like.' ” Ibid. The same article states that “[v]oting by mail is
now common enough and problematic enough that election experts
say there have been multiple elections in which no one can say
with confdence which candidate was the deserved winner.” Ibid.
Pennsylvania knows this well. Even before widespread absen-
tee voting, a federal court had reversed the result of a state
senate election in Philadelphia after fnding that the supposedly
prevailing candidate “conducted an illegal absentee ballot conspir-
acy and that the [election offcials] covertly facilitated the scheme
with the specifc purpose of ensuring a victory for” that candidate.
Marks v. Stinson, 1994 WL 146113, *29, *36 (ED Pa., Apr. 26,
1994). This problem is not unique to Pennsylvania, and it has
not gone away. Two years ago, a congressional election in North
Carolina was thrown out in the face of evidence of tampering with

ORDERS 1293
1287
Thomas,
J., dissenting
absentee ballots. Because fraud is more prevalent with mail-in
ba
llots, increased use of those ballots raises the likelihood that
courts will be asked to adjudicate questions that go to the heart
of election confdence.
2
Fraud is not the only aspect of mail-in ballots that complicates
postelection judicial review. Also relevant are the corresponding
safeguards that States put in place to ameliorate that heightened
risk of fraud. To balance the “strong interest” of ballot access
with the “ `compelling interest in preserving the integrity of [the]
election process,' ” Purcell, 549 U. S., at 4, many States have ex-
panded mail-in ballots but sought to deter fraud—and create
mechanisms to detect it—by requiring voters to return ballots in
signed, dated secrecy envelopes. Some States also require wit-
ness or notary signatures. Tallying these ballots tends to be
more labor intensive, involves a high degree of subjective judg-
ment (e. g., verifying signatures), and typically leads to a far
higher rate of ballot challenges and rejections. Litigation over
these ballots can require substantial discovery and labor-intensive
fact review. In some cases, it might require sifting through hun-
dreds of thousands or millions of ballots. It also may require
subjective judgment calls about the validity of thousands of bal-
lots. Judicial review in this situation is diffcult enough even
when the rules are clear and the number of challenged ballots
small. Adding a dispute about who can set or change the rules
greatly exacerbates the problem.
Third, and perhaps most signifcant, postelection litigation
sometimes forces courts to make policy decisions that they have
no business making. For example, when an offcial has improp-
erly changed the rules, but voters have already relied on that
change, courts must choose between potentially disenfranchising
a subset of voters and enforcing the election provisions—such as
receipt deadlines—that the legislature believes are necessary for
elec ti on i ntegr ity. That occurred last year. Af ter a cour t
wrongly altered South Carolina's witness requirement for absen-
tee ballots, this Court largely reinstated the original rule, but
2
We are fortunate that many of the cases we have seen alleged only im-
proper rule changes, not fraud. But that observation provides only small
comfort. An election free from strong evidence of systemic fraud is not
alone suffcient for election confdence. Also important is the assurance that
fraud will not go undetected. Cf. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm'n,
572 U. S. 185, 191, 206–207 (2014) (plurality opinion).

1294 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Thomas, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
declined to apply it to ballots already cast. Andino v. Middleton,
592
U. S. 906 (2020). Settling rules well in advance of an election
rather than relying on postelection litigation ensures that courts
are not put in that untenable position.
In short, the postelection system of judicial review is at most
suitable for garden-variety disputes. It generally cannot restore
the state of affairs before an election. And it is often incapable
of testing allegations of systemic maladministration, voter sup-
pression, or fraud that go to the heart of public confdence in
election results. That is obviously problematic for allegations
backed by substantial evidence. But the same is true where alle-
gations are incorrect. After all, “[c]onfdence in the integrity of
our electoral process is essential to the functioning of our partici-
patory democracy.” Purcell, supra, at 4; cf. McCutcheon v. Fed-
eral Election Comm'n, 572 U. S. 185, 191, 206–207 (2014) (plural-
ity opinion) (identifying a compelling interest in rooting out the
mere “appearance of corruption” in the political process). An
incorrect allegation, left to fester without a robust mechanism to
test and disprove it, “drives honest citizens out of the democratic
process and breeds distrust of our government.” Purcell, supra,
at 4.
III
Because the judicial system is not well suited to address these
kinds of questions in the short time period available immediately
after an election, we ought to use available cases outside that
truncated context to address these admittedly important ques-
tions. Here, we have the opportunity to do so almost two years
before the next federal election cycle. Our refusal to do so by
hearing these cases is befuddling. There is a clear split on an
issue of such great importance that both sides previously asked
us to grant certiorari. And there is no dispute that the claim is
suffciently meritorious to warrant review. By voting to grant
emergency relief in October, four Justices made clear that they
think petitioners are likely to prevail. Despite pressing for re-
view in October, respondents now ask us not to grant certiorari
because they think the cases are moot. That argument fails.
The issue presented is capable of repetition, yet evades review.
This exception to mootness, which the Court routinely invokes in
election cases, “applies where (1) the challenged action is in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expira-
tion, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same com-

ORDERS 1295
1287
Alito,
J., dissenting
plaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Davis
v
. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U. S. 724, 735 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (resolving a dispute from the 2006 elec-
tion); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 784, and n. 3
(1983) (resolving a dispute from the 1980 election). Here, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its decision about six weeks
before the election, leaving little time for review in this Court.
And there is a reasonable expectation that these petitioners—
the State Republican Party and legislators—will again confront
nonlegislative offcials altering election rules. In fact, various
petitions claim that no fewer than four other decisions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court implicate the same issue.
3
Future
cases will arise as lower state courts apply those precedents to
justify intervening in elections and changing the rules.
***
One wonders what this Court waits for. We failed to settle
this dispute before the election, and thus provide clear rules.
Now we again fail to provide clear rules for future elections. The
decision to leave election law hidden beneath a shroud of doubt
is baffing. By doing nothing, we invite further confusion and
erosion of voter confdence. Our fellow citizens deserve better
and expect more of us. I respectfully dissent.
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, dissenting.
I agree with Justice Thomas that we should grant review in
these cases. They present an important and recurring constitu-
tional question: whether the Elections or Electors Clauses of the
United States Constitution, Art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, are
violated when a state court holds that a state constitutional provi-
sion overrides a state statute governing the manner in which a
federal election is to be conducted. That question has divided
the lower courts,* and our review at this time would be greatly
benefcial.
3
Pet. for Cert., O. T. 2020, No. 20–845 (challenging three decisions); Pet.
for Cert., O. T. 2020, No. 20–810 (challenging one decision).
*See Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 662 Pa. 39, 79–83, 238
A. 3d 345, 369–372 (2020); Carson v. Simon, 978 F. 3d 1051, 1059–1060 (CA8
2020).

1296 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Alito, J., dissenting 592 U. S.
In the cases now before us, a statute enacted by the Pennsylva-
nia
Legislature unequivocally requires that mailed ballots be re-
ceived by 8 p.m. on election day. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25,
§§ 3146.6(c), 3150.16(c) (Purdon 2020). Nevertheless, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, citing a provision of the State Constitution
mandating that elections “be free and equal,” Art. I, § 5, altered
that deadline and ordered that mailed ballots be counted if re-
ceived up to three days after the election, Pennsylvania Demo-
cratic Party v. Boockvar, 662 Pa. 39, 81–83, 238 A. 3d 345, 362,
371–372 (2020). Both the state Republican and Democratic par-
ties urged us to grant review and decide this question before the
2020 election. See Application for Stay in Republican Party of
Pa. v. Boockvar, No. 20A54, pp. 2–3; Democratic Party of Pennsyl-
vania Response to Application for Stay in No. 20A54, pp. 8–9.
But the Court, by an evenly divided vote, refused to do so. Nos.
20A53 and 20A54, 592 U. S. 1022 and 1023 (2020) (Thomas, Alito,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., noting dissents). That unfortu-
nate decision virtually ensured that this important question could
not be decided before the election. See Republican Party of Pa.
v. Boockvar, 592 U. S. 1068 (2020) (statement of Alito, J., joined
by Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ.).
Now, the election is over, and there is no reason for refusing
to decide the important question that these cases pose. “The
provisions of the Federal Constitution conferring on state legisla-
tures, not state courts, the authority to make rules governing
federal elections would be meaningless if a state court could over-
ride the rules adopted by the legislature simply by claiming that
a state constitutional provision gave the courts the authority to
make whatever rules it thought appropriate for the conduct of a
fair election.” Id., at 1070; see also Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 531 U. S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam). A decision
in these cases would not have any implications regarding the 2020
election. (Because Pennsylvania election offcials were ordered
to separate mailed ballots received after the statutory deadline,
see Order in Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, No. 20A84 (Nov.
6, 2020), we know that the State Supreme Court's decision had no
effect on the outcome of any election for federal offce in Pennsyl-
vania.) But a decision would provide invaluable guidance for fu-
ture elections.
Some respondents contend that the completion of the 2020 elec-
tion rendered these cases moot and that they do not fall within

ORDERS 1297
1287
Alito,
J., dissenting
the mootness exception for cases that present questions that are
“capable
of repetition” but would otherwise evade review. See,
e. g., Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U. S. 724, 735–736
(2008). They argue that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's deci-
sion “arose from an extraordinary and unprecedented confuence
of circumstances”—specifcally, the COVID–19 pandemic, an in-
crease in mail-in voting, and Postal Service delays—and that such
a perfect storm is not likely to recur. Brief in Opposition for
Boockvar in No. 20–542, pp. 1, 9; see also Brief in Opposition for
Pennsylvania Democratic Party in Nos. 20–542 and 20–574, p. 12.
That argument fails for three reasons. First, it does not ac-
knowledge the breadth of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's deci-
sion. That decision claims that a state constitutional provision
guaranteeing “free and equal” elections gives the Pennsylvania
courts the authority to override even very specifc and unambiguous
rules adopted by the legislature for the conduct of federal elections.
See Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 662 Pa. 39, 81, 238
A. 3d 345, 371 (2020) (relying on the court's “broad authority to craft
meaningful remedies when required” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). That issue is surely capable of repetition in future elec-
tions. Indeed, it would be surprising if parties who are unhappy
with the legislature's rules do not invoke this decision and ask the
state courts to substitute rules that they fnd more advantageous.
Second, the suggestion that we are unlikely to see a recurrence
of the exact circumstances we saw this fall misunderstands the
applicable legal standard. In order for a question to be capable
of repetition, it is not necessary to predict that history will repeat
itself at a very high level of specifcity. See Federal Election
Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 463 (2007).
Third, it is highly speculative to forecast that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court will not fnd that conditions at the time of a future
federal election are materially similar to those last fall. The pri-
mary election for Pennsylvania congressional candidates is sched-
uled to occur in 15 months, and the rules for the conduct of
elections should be established well in advance of the day of an
election. We may hope that by next spring the pandemic will no
longer affect daily life, but that is uncertain. In addition, the
state court's decision was not based solely on the pandemic but
was also grounded in part on broader concerns about the operation
of the Postal Service, 662 Pa., at 72, 81, 238 A. 3d, at 365, 371
and concerns of this nature may persist or resurface. As voting

1298 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
by mail becomes more common and more popular, the volume of
mai
led ballots may continue to increase and thus pose delivery
problems similar to those anticipated in 2020.
For these reasons, the cases now before us are not moot.
There is a “reasonable expectation” that the parties will face the
same question in the future, see Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,
551 U. S., at 463, and that the question will evade future pre-
election review, just as it did in these cases.
These cases call out for review, and I respectfully dissent from
the Court's decision to deny certiorari.
No. 20–565. Matthews et ux. v. Becker et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Motion of respondents for damages and costs pursuant to
this Court's Rule 42.2 denied. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 817 Fed. Appx. 731.
No. 20– 634. Robinson v. Webster County, Mississippi,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Network for Victim Recovery
of DC for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 825 Fed. Appx. 192.
No. 20–810. Kelly, United States Congressman, et al. v.
Pennsylvania et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of 28 Current Mem-
bers of the House of Representatives for leave to fle brief as
amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 663
Pa. 114, 240 A. 3d 1255.
No. 20–815. King et al. v. Whitmer, Governor of Michi-
gan, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.
No. 20–845. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. De-
graffenreid, Acting Secretary of Pennsylvania, et al.
(Reported below: 662 Pa. 718, 240 A. 3d 591); Donald J. Trump
for President, Inc. v. Philadelphia County Board of Elec-
tions et al. (663 Pa. 145, 241 A. 3d 339); and Donald J. Trump
for President, Inc. v. Elkin et al. (663 Pa. 283, 241 A. 3d
1058). Sup. Ct. Pa. Motions of Constitutional Attorneys and Re-
publican Party of Pennsylvania for leave to fle briefs as amici
curiae granted. Certiorari denied.
No. 20–913. Wilborn v. Jones, Acting Warden. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 964
F. 3d 618.

ORDERS 1299
592 U. S.
F
ebruary 22, 2021
No. 20–6531. May Ruiz v. Baughman, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 812
Fed. Appx. 447.
No. 20–6560. Ferebee v. Stapleton et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari before judgment denied.
No. 20–6574. Martin v. Ledford. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition.
No. 20–6800. Miller v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 822 Fed.
Appx. 484.
No. 20–6893. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–8498. Diggs v. Gallucci, Chief of Police, City of
Carlsbad, California; and Diggs v. Shiomoto, Director, Cal-
ifornia Department of Motor Vehicles, 592 U. S. 929.
No. 19– 8771. Risenhoover v. Muniz, Warden, 592 U. S.
941;
No. 20–267. Braunstein v. Braunstein, 592 U. S. 1086;
No. 20–337. Lynn v. Brown et al., 592 U. S. 1105;
No. 20 – 458. Brown v. Department of Labor, 592 U. S.
1125;
No. 20–505. Ruttkamp v. Bank of New York Mellon, fka
Bank of New York, 592 U. S. 1150;
No. 20–606. Drevaleva v. California Department of In-
dustrial Relations; Drevaleva v. Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia, First Appellate District; and Drevaleva v. Court
of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, 592
U. S. 1151;
No. 20–608. Drevaleva v. California Department of In-
dustrial Relations; and Drevaleva v. Court of Appeal of
California, First Appellate District, 592 U. S. 1151;
No. 20–613. Coultas v. Tichenor, Individually and in His
Ofcial Capacity as Yamhill County Prosecutor, et al.,
592 U. S. 1127;

1300 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
February 22, 2021 592 U. S.
No. 20–618.
N
o. 20–629.
Routten v. Routten, 592 U. S. 1151;
In re Beggs et ux., 592 U. S. 1123;
No. 20–5193. McWhorter v. United States, 592 U. S. 967;
No. 20–5316. Smith v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al., 592 U. S. 1005;
No. 20–5399. Latimer, aka Smith v. Jones et al., 592
U. S. 1027;
No. 20–5422. Miller v. Deal, Warden, 592 U. S. 1151;
No. 20–5502. Kirk v. Richardson et al., 592 U. S. 1077;
No. 20–5632. Shawn v. Eighth Judicial District Court of
Nevada, Clark County, 592 U. S. 1088;
No. 20–5635. Smith v. Warden, Federal Correctional In-
stitution Beaumont, 592 U. S. 1010;
No. 20–5701. Narayan v. Prasad, 592 U. S. 1107;
No. 20–5703. Miller v. Phillips et al., 592 U. S. 1107;
No. 20–5724. Johnson v. Gibson, Judge, et al., 592 U. S.
1108;
No. 20–5732. Seadin v. Williams, Director, Colorado De-
partment of Corrections, 592 U. S. 1089;
No. 20–5931. Petrano et ux. v. Baylor, 592 U. S. 1130;
No. 20–6059. Duran v. Allison, Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 592 U. S.
1132;
No. 20–6241. Smith v. Kelly Services, Inc., et al., 592 U. S.
1153; and
No. 20–6259. de Jesus-Concepcion v. United States, 592
U. S. 1137. Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 20–388. Lingfei Sun v. City of New York, New York,
et al., 592 U. S. 1137. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice
Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
No. 20–5680. Steele v. Lumpkin, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion, 592 U. S. 1107. Motion for leave to fle petition for rehear-
ing denied.