Charles Ives v. Charles E. Campbell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Charles Ives, Appellant,

v.

Charles E. Campbell, Vivian C. Gardner, T. Clayter
Campbell, Thomas Clayter Campbell, and Eddie Harold
Goff, Trustees of the Colbert H. Campbell United Trust,
Sonja C. Parker, Barry Campbell, and Randy Bowers,
Defendants,

Of whom, Charles E. Campbell, Vivian C. Gardner,
Thomas Clayter Campbell, Jr., as Personal
Representative and Trustee for the Estate and
Testamentary Trust of Thomas Clayter Campbell, Sr.,
Thomas Clayter Campbell and Eddie Harold Goff,
Trustees of the Colbert H. Campbell United Trust, Sonja
C. Parker, and Barry Campbell are the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001193

Appeal From Kershaw County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-286
Submitted May 1, 2026 – Filed June 10, 2026

AFFIRMED
Desa Ballard, Harvey M. Watson, III, and Haley Alyse
Hubbard, all of Ballard & Watson, Attorneys at Law, of
West Columbia, for Appellant.

Elizabeth Marie Bowen, J. Paul Porter, and Harper Lee
Hutson, all Cromer Babb & Porter, LLC, of Columbia,
for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Charles Ives appeals the circuit court's order dismissing his
claims against Charles E. Campbell; Vivian C. Gardner; Thomas Clayter
Campbell, Jr., as Personal Representative and Trustee for the Estate and
Testamentary Trust of Thomas Clayter Campbell, Sr.; Thomas Clayter Campbell
and Eddie Harold Goff, Trustees of the Colbert H. Campbell United Trust; Sonja
C. Parker; and Barry Campbell (collectively, Respondents) pursuant to Rule 41(b)
of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, Ives argues the circuit
court erred in (1) dismissing his causes of action for equitable lien, unjust
enrichment, and promissory estoppel; (2) excluding witness testimony pursuant to
the Dead Man's statute;1 and (3) finding his claim was barred by laches. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

Initially, as to issue two, we hold Ives's argument that the circuit court erred by
misapplying the Dead Man's Statute is without merit because the record reflects
that the court excluded the testimony on hearsay grounds. Because Ives does not
challenge the court's rulings that the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay,
those rulings are the law of the case. See Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of
Union, 403 S.C. 560, 573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 (2013) ("An unappealed ruling is
the law of the case and requires affirmance."); Dreher v. S.C. Dep't of Health &
Env't Control, 412 S.C. 244, 250, 772 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2015) ("[S]hould the
appealing party fail to raise all of the grounds upon which a lower court's decision
was based, those unappealed findings—whether correct or not—become the law of
the case.").

As to issue one, we hold the circuit court did not err in dismissing Ives's claims for
equitable lien, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel because he failed to
show a right to relief on any claim. See Rule 41(b), SCRCP ("After the plaintiff in
an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the presentation of his

1
S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-20 (2014).
evidence, the defendant . . . may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief."); Horry County v. Ray,
382 S.C. 76, 80, 674 S.E.2d 519, 522 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The appellate court's
standard of review in equitable matters is our own view of the preponderance of
the evidence."). First, we hold Ives failed to establish entitlement to an equitable
lien over the property because he did not allege there was any intent for the
property to serve as security for any debt. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of S.C.
v. Finn, 300 S.C. 228, 231, 387 S.E.2d 253, 254 (1989) ("For an equitable lien to
arise, there must be a debt, specific property to which the debt attaches, and an
expressed or implied intent that the property serve as security for payment of the
debt."); Carolina Attractions, Inc. v. Courtney, 287 S.C. 140, 146, 337 S.E.2d 244,
247 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding no entitlement to an equitable lien when there was no
allegation that it was the parties' intent, expressed or implied, that note proceeds
would serve as security). Second, we hold Ives did not demonstrate Respondents
were unjustly enriched by his improvements to the property because testimony
indicated the improvements did not add value to the property, and Ives failed to
present evidence of the value of any benefit conferred. See Dema v. Tenet
Physician Servs.-Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 115, 123, 678 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2009)
("Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine which permits the recovery of that
amount the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff.");
Barnes v. Johnson, 402 S.C. 458, 467, 742 S.E.2d 6, 10 (Ct. App. 2013) (stating
that in determining the value a defendant was unjustly enriched, recovery is
measured by the difference in the property's value before and after the
improvements), abrogated on other grounds by Cruz v. City of Columbia, 443 S.C.
201, 904 S.E.2d 451 (2024); Stringer Oil Co. v. Bobo, 320 S.C. 369, 374, 465
S.E.2d 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[A]lthough the plaintiff's costs of performance
might represent some evidence of value, they do not represent a recoverable item
of restitution themselves."). Third, we hold the circuit court properly dismissed
Ives's claim for promissory estoppel because there was no evidence presented of
the presence of an unambiguous promise. See Thomerson v. DeVito, 430 S.C. 246,
255-56, 844 S.E.2d 378, 383 (2020) (stating the elements of promissory estoppel
are: "(1) the presence of a promise unambiguous in its terms, (2) reasonable
reliance upon the promise by the party to whom the promise is made, (3) the
reliance is expected and foreseeable by the party who makes the promise, and (4)
the party to whom the promise is made must sustain injury in reliance on the
promise"); Rushing v. McKinney, 370 S.C. 280, 295, 633 S.E.2d 917, 925 (Ct.
App. 2006) (holding the absence of clearly articulated terms between the parties
precludes recovery on a theory of promissory estoppel).
Finally, because issue one is dispositive, we decline to address Ives's remaining
issue, issue three. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C.
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address
remaining issues when the decision of a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED.2

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.