Emanuel Stikas v. Georgetown County

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Emanuel Stikas, Trustee of the Stikas Revocable Living
Trust, dated February 1, 2023, d/b/a The Village Shops;
Donald W. Reid and Katheryn W. Reid; Elizabeth
Gattshall Hawkins Martin; and Tall House Farm, L.P.,
Appellants,

v.

Georgetown County; David E. Tanner; RCB Land
Holdings, LLC; and Magic Oaks, LLC, Respondents,

AND

Magic Oaks, LLC, Third Party Plaintiff,

v.

Keep It Green, Inc., Third Party Defendant.

Appellate Case No. 2025-000066

Appeal From Georgetown County
David P. Caraker, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-279
Submitted February 24, 2026 – Filed June 10, 2026

DISMISSED
F. Patrick Hubbard, of Columbia, and Cynthia Ranck
Person, of Pawleys Island, for Appellants.

David B. Miller and Zachary James Crowl, both of
Bellamy, Rutenberg, Copeland, Epps, Gravely &
Bowers, P.A., of Myrtle Beach, for Respondents RCB
Land Holdings, LLC, and Magic Oaks, LLC; H. Thomas
Morgan, Jr., of Smith Robinson Holler DuBose Morgan,
LLC, of Camden, and Sydney Jean Douglas, of Smith
Robinson Holler DuBose Morgan, LLC, of Columbia, for
Respondent Georgetown County; and Daniel W. Stacy,
Jr., of Pawleys Island, for Respondent David E. Tanner.

PER CURIAM: Emanuel Stikas, Trustee of the Stikas Revocable Living Trust,
dated February 1, 2023, d/b/a The Village Shops, Donald W. Reid and Katheryn
W. Reid, Elizabeth Gattshall Hawkins Martin, and Tall House Farm, L.P.
(Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order striking factual allegations regarding a
public kayak launch from their complaint. Respondents RBC Land Holdings,
LLC, and Magic Oaks, LLC (collectively, Magic Oaks) moved to dismiss the
appeal, arguing the circuit court's order was interlocutory and unappealable.
Appellants maintain the order involves the merits of the case and has the effect of
striking out one of their causes of action in which they allege the passing of two
ordinances, Georgetown County Ordinances 24-05 and -06, was invalid because it
did not comply with section 6-29-760(A) of the South Carolina Local Government
Comprehensive Planning and Enabling Act of 1994.1 They maintain this renders
the order immediately appealable. We disagree and dismiss the appeal.2

1
S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-110 to -1640 et seq. (2004 & Supp. 2025).
2
Magic Oaks' motion to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory was initially denied
without prejudice by the order of one judge of this court. As provided in that
order, Magic Oaks renewed the motion to dismiss in its appellate brief. Magic
Oaks filed a second motion to dismiss with this court in which they argue the
passage of recent ordinances nullify Ordinances 24-05 and -06, rendering this
matter moot. Because our disposition of the renewed motion to dismiss is
dispositive of this appeal, we decline to address the arguments raised by Magic
Oaks' second motion to dismiss. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (explaining the "appellate
"An appeal ordinarily may be pursued only after a party has obtained a final
judgment." Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 194, 607 S.E.2d 707, 708
(2005). "Any judgment or decree, leaving some further act to be done by the court
before the rights of the parties are determined, is interlocutory and not final." Ex
parte Wilson, 367 S.C. 7, 12, 625 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2005). In some instances, an
otherwise interlocutory order may be immediately appealable. An appellate court
may review an intermediate order "involving the merits" of the case or "[a]n order
affecting a substantial right" when the order "in effect determines the action . . .
[or] strikes out an answer or any part thereof or any pleading . . . ." S.C. Code
Ann. § 14-3-330(1) and (2)(a)&(c). "[T]he question of whether an order is
immediately appealable is determined on a case-by-case basis." Stone v.
Thompson, 426 S.C. 291, 295, 826 S.E.2d 868, 870 (2019). "Whether an order
granting a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is appealable . . . depends on the effect of the
individual order under the facts and circumstances of the case." Thornton v. S.C.
Elec. & Gas Corp., 391 S.C. 297, 304, 705 S.E.2d 475, 479 (Ct. App. 2011).

Section 6-29-760(A) provides in part: "No change in or departure from the text or
maps as recommended by the local planning commission may be made pursuant to
the hearing unless the change or departure be first submitted to the planning
commission for review and recommendation." In their complaint, Appellants
allege that after the initial approval of Magic Oaks' development plan by the
Georgetown County Planning Commission (the Planning Commission), Magic
Oaks altered the development plan by changing a proposed kayak launch from
private to public and by modifying sidewalks and drainage easements. They
contend the failure to resubmit the development plan to the Planning Commission
violated section 6-29-670(A), rendering Georgetown County Council's (County
Council's) passage of the subject ordinances invalid and ultra vires. Respondents
moved to strike the factual allegations regarding the kayak launch from Appellants'
complaint based on subsequent events they claim eliminated the amendment to the
kayak launch and returned it to the original private status.

Striking the factual allegations regarding the kayak launch does not affect the
merits of Appellants' claims and does not have the effect of striking Appellants'
pleading that passage of the ordinances violated section 6-29-670(A). Other
factual claims regarding modifications between the time of the Planning
Commission's approval of the development plan and County Council's approval of

court need not address remaining issue when disposition or prior issue is
dispositive").
Ordinances 24-05 and -06 are still alleged. Therefore, the circuit court's order is
interlocutory and unappealable.

Accordingly, Appellants' appeal is

DISMISSED.3

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.