Harlan D. Melton v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Harlan D. Melton, #364742, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2025-001699

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
S. Phillip Lenski, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-155
Submitted March 2, 2026 – Filed April 1, 2026

AFFIRMED

Harlan D. Melton, pro se.

Christina Catoe Bigelow, of the South Carolina
Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Harlan D. Melton, pro se, appeals an order of the Administrative
Law Court (ALC) granting the South Carolina Department of Corrections'
(SCDC's) motion to dismiss Melton's appeal of his conviction of possession of any
communication device. On appeal, he argues (1) his due process and equal
protection rights were violated when SCDC employees failed to follow established
written policy and caused Melton to face an administrative tribunal without
evidence he requested, (2) the ALC erred because he is still a citizen of the United
States and South Carolina with the same rights to due process and equal protection
of the law in spite of being an incarcerated man, (3) the ALC erred because South
Carolina is bound to uphold the rights to due process and equal protection of the
law as all other states and federal jurisdictions are bound to uphold these same
laws, and (4) the ALC erred because SCDC is bound to follow the country's and
state's laws and ethical guidelines while upholding its own guidelines and written
policy concerning internal agency affairs.1 We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

We hold the ALC did not err when it summarily dismissed Melton's appeal of
SCDC's final decision because the policies Melton alleges the SCDC officials
violated did not incorporate language that required SCDC officials to reach a
particular outcome; thus, they did not implicate a state-created liberty interest. See
Major v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 384 S.C. 457, 464, 682
S.E.2d 795, 799 (2009) ("The ALC's order should be affirmed if supported by
substantial evidence in the record."); id. ("The decision of the ALC should not be
overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by some
error of law."); Tennant v. Beaufort Cnty. Sch. Dist., 381 S.C. 617, 620, 674 S.E.2d
488, 490 (2009) ("Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, but
evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds
to reach the conclusion the agency reached."); Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989) ("[T]he most common manner in which a
State creates a liberty interest is by establishing 'substantive predicates' to govern
official decision-making, and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached
upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met." (citation omitted)); Allen v.
S.C. Dep't of Corr., 439 S.C. 164, 171, 886 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2023) ("[T]he ALC
. . . may summarily dismiss an inmate's grievance if it does not implicate a
state-created liberty or property interest sufficient to trigger procedural due process
guarantees."); Allen v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 434 S.C. 114, 118-19, 862 S.E.2d 268,
270 (Ct. App. 2021) ("An inmate 'claiming a protected interest must have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Protected liberty interests "may arise from
two sources[:] the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States."'"
(alteration in original) (quoting Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460)), aff'd as modified,
439 S.C. at 167, 886 S.E.2d at 672 (2023); id. at 119, 862 S.E.2d at 270 ("In order
to establish a state-created liberty interest, a regulation must 'contain "explicitly
mandatory language," i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the
regulations' substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow.'"

1
We address Melton's four issues on appeal together.
(quoting Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463)); id. ("This language means if the regulation
explicitly mandates an outcome based on the existence of relevant criteria then the
State has created a liberty interest."). Additionally, Melton's appeal to the ALC did
not include allegations that his freedom from restraint had been limited. See id. at
119, 862 S.E.2d at 271 ("States may also create liberty interests protected by the
Due Process Clause by limiting an inmate's freedom from restraint in such a way
that 'imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.'" (quoting Sullivan v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 355 S.C.
437, 442, 586 S.E.2d 124, 126 (2003))). Melton also argues that good-time credits
are a state-created liberty interest and that SCDC exceeded its authority under
section 24-13-210(B) of the South Carolina Code (2025) when it "took [thirty]
days of good-time," which would accrue over ten months, and changed his
projected release date from August 18, 2033, to September 17, 2033. We hold
these arguments are without merit because the loss of the opportunity to earn
good-time credits does not implicate a state-created liberty interest. See Howard v.
S.C. Dep't of Corr., 399 S.C. 618, 629, 733 S.E.2d 211, 217 (2012) ("[A]n inmate's
loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits does not implicate a state-
created liberty interest.").

Finally, because a state-created liberty interest was not implicated in the loss of the
opportunity to receive good-time credit, Melton was not deprived of procedural
due process. See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 369-70, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750
(2000) ("The statutory right to sentence-related credits is a protected 'liberty'
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, entitling an inmate to minimal due
process to ensure the state-created right was not arbitrarily abrogated."); id. at 369,
527 S.E.2d at 750 ("The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
liberty and property." (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
569 (1972))).2

2
Any argument that Melton was deprived of equal protection of the laws is not
properly before this court because, other than asserting that the ability to earn good
time was protected by the Equal Protection Clause, he never cited authority to
support his contention. See Rule 208(b)(1)(E), SCACR (stating the "particular
issue to be addressed" in an appellant's brief shall be "followed by discussion and
citations of authority"); Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81,
557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[S]hort, conclusory statements made
without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not
presented for review.").
AFFIRMED.3

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.