Tamera Middleton v. Stephen Middleton

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Tamera Toogood Middleton, Respondent,

v.

Stephen Arthur Middleton, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-002001

Appeal From Aiken County
Angela W. Abstance, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-145
Submitted March 2, 2026 – Filed March 25, 2026

AFFIRMED

Sarah Floyd Blake, of Sarah Floyd Blake, PC, of Evans,
Georgia, for Appellant.

Jordan Christopher Calloway, of McGowan Hood Felder
& Phillips, of Rock Hill; and Amanda Medlin Bellotti, of
Law Office of Amanda M. Bellotti, LLC, of Evans,
Georgia, both for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Stephen Middleton (Husband) appeals the family court's order
arising from Tamera Middleton's (Wife's) rule to show cause and motion for
contempt arising from Husband's failure to sign the Veteran Affair's (VA's)
Certification of Eligibility (the Waiver), despite the language of the parties'
separation agreement (the Agreement) requiring that Husband "shall cooperate to
allow Wife to assume the mortgage," including "execut[ing] and deliver[ing] to the
other party any documents that may be reasonably required to accomplish the
intention" of the Agreement. On appeal, Husband argues the family court erred in
finding the Agreement unambiguously required him to waive a portion of his VA
mortgage eligibility (Entitlement) and finding that it was reasonable to require him
to waive a portion of his Entitlement in order for Wife to assume the mortgage on
the marital home. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the family court did not err by finding the Agreement required
Husband to sign the Waiver because the Agreement's language was unambiguous
as to Husband's duties under the Agreement. See Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593,
596, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) (clarifying the standard of review in family court
matters is de novo); Fennell v. Fennell, Op. No. 6141 (S.C. Ct. App. filed March
18, 2026) (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 11 at 58) (recognizing the appellate courts review
contempt orders arising out of the family court using a de novo standard of
review); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 384-85, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651 (2011)
(explaining the appellate court has the authority to find the facts in accordance with
its own view of the preponderance of the evidence in appeals from the family
court); Stoney, 422 S.C. at 595, 813 S.E.2d at 487 ("[D]e novo review allows an
appellate court to make its own findings of fact; however, this standard does not
abrogate two long-standing principles still recognized by our courts during the de
novo review process: (1) a trial [court] is in a superior position to assess witness
credibility, and (2) an appellant has the burden of showing the appellate court that
the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the trial [court]."). The
parties' final order awarded Wife the martial home and made her responsible for
the associated "indebtedness, taxes, and expenses." The Agreement's language
specifically stated: "Husband shall cooperate to allow Wife to assume the
mortgage, if that is an option"; "Each of the parties shall . . . execute and deliver to
the other party any documents that may be reasonably required to accomplish the
intention of . . . [the] Agreement"; and "[E]ach party shall do all other things
necessary to accomplish the spirit and the purpose of . . . [the] Agreement."
Husband argued that the terms "cooperate," "reasonable," "spirit," and "purpose"
are inexact terms that by their very definition require some judgment interpreting
and applying the terms and that if Wife wanted absolute compliance, the
Agreement would have included "comply with all requests." However, we find
that these terms should be given their ordinary and plain meaning, as the
Agreement did not contain contractual definitions to the contrary, and the terms
were not ambiguous. Thus, the family court did not err in finding the Agreement
required Husband to help Wife assume the mortgage and take any additional
actions to accomplish such, including signing the Waiver. See Gibson v. Epting,
426 S.C 346, 351, 827 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Ct. App. 2019) ("Ambiguity of a contract
is a question of law, which [an appellate court] review[s] de novo."); Nicholson v.
Nicholson, 378 S.C. 523, 532, 663 S.E.2d 74, 79 (Ct. App. 2008) ("In South
Carolina, the construction of a separation agreement is a matter of contract law."
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 75, 641 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ct. App. 2006)));
id. ("The court's only function with an agreement that is clear and capable of legal
construction is to interpret its lawful meaning and the intention of the parties as
found within the agreement and to give them effect."); id. ("In the enforcement of
an agreement, the court does not have the authority to modify terms that are clear
and unambiguous on their face." (quoting Messer v. Messer, 359 S.C. 614, 621,
598 S.E.2d 310, 314 (Ct. App. 2004))); Bardsley v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 405 S.C.
68, 76, 747 S.E.2d 436, 440 (2013) ("[A] provision . . . is not ambiguous merely
because its terms are undefined . . . . It is a well-settled principle of contract
interpretation that absent a contractual definition to the contrary, contract language
is given its ordinary and plain meaning.").

2. We hold Husband's issue regarding the reasonableness of the family court
requiring Husband to sign the Waiver is not preserved for appellate review because
Husband conceded the family court never ruled on the matter and Husband failed
to file a motion to alter or amend the family court's judgment under Rule 59(e) of
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See Nicholson, 378 S.C. at 537, 663
S.E.2d at 82 ("The imposition of the preservation requirement upon an appellant is
designed to enable the [family] court to rule properly after consideration of all
relevant facts, law[,] and arguments."); id. ("An issue is not preserved where the
[family] court does not explicitly rule on an argument and the appellant does not
make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment." (quoting Doe v. Roe,
369 S.C. 351, 376, 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006))).

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.