Folly East Indian Co. LLC v. City of Folly Beach

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Folly East Indian Co. LLC, Appellant,

v.

City of Folly Beach, Respondent,

and

Save Folly's Future, Intervenor.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000814

Appeal From Charleston County
Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-075
Submitted February 2, 2026 – Filed February 18, 2026

AFFIRMED

Alice F. Paylor, of Saxton & Stump, LLC, of Mt.
Pleasant; and Bijan Khaladj-Ghom, of Saxton & Stump,
LLC, of Charleston, both for Appellant.

Joseph C. Wilson, IV, of Joseph C. Wilson Law Firm
LLC, of Folly Beach, for Respondent.
Robert Marc Turkewitz, of Law Ofc. of Robert M.
Turkewitz, LLC, of Charleston, for Intervenor.

PER CURIAM: Folly East Indian Co. LLC (Folly East Indian Co.) appeals the
circuit court's order granting City of Folly Beach's (City's) and Save Folly's
Future's motions for summary judgment, and denying Folly East Indian Co.'s
motion for summary judgment on its cause of action for a declaratory judgment as
to City's adoption of an ordinance pursuant to the initiative and referendum process
creating a cap on short-term rental business licenses. On appeal, Folly East Indian
Co. argues the circuit court erred in finding (1) the ordinance was validly enacted
pursuant to the initiative and referendum process and (2) there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether City deprived Folly East Indian Co. of a vested
right by adopting the amendment to the ordinance. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the circuit court did not err in granting City's motion for summary
judgment. See Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002)
("When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the appellate court applies the
same standard applied by the [circuit] court pursuant to Rule 56(c) [of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure]."); Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440
S.C. 456, 459, 892 S.E.2d 297, 299 (2023) ("[T]he moving party is entitled to
summary judgment 'if the [evidence before the court] show[s] that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
Rule 56(c), SCRCP)). Although the ordinance may have had an impact on land
use, I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mount Pleasant1 did not mandate that all ordinances
touching upon land use be enacted pursuant to the South Carolina Local
Government Comprehensive Planning Enabling Act of 1944, 2 and the ordinance at
issue only amended City's business regulations to impose a cap on the number of
issued short-term rental business licenses, did not amend City's zoning ordinance,
did not rezone any properties, applied to the entire city, and did not determine
where any specific activities may occur. See I'On, 338 S.C. at 423, 526 S.E.2d at
725 ("[Z]oning by initiative and referendum is not allowed in South Carolina
pursuant to [s]ections 5-17-10 and [5-17]-30." (emphasis added)); id. at 416-17,
526 S.E.2d at 721 ("Such a system ultimately could nullify a carefully established
zoning system or master plan developed after debate among many interested

1
338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000).
2
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 6-29-310 to -1640 (2004 & Supp. 2025).
persons and entities, resulting in arbitrary decisions and patchwork zoning with
little rhyme or reason."); Greenville County v. Kenwood Enters., 353 S.C. 157,
165, 577 S.E.2d 428, 432 (2003) ("[W]hile the Comprehensive Planning Act
governs zoning, it simply does not evince a legislative intent to completely prohibit
any other local enactments from touching upon zoning or land use."), overruled on
other grounds by Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 365 S.C. 650, 660 n.11, 620 S.E.2d 76,
81 n.11 (2005); id. at 167, 577 S.E.2d at 433 ("I'On does not stand for the
proposition that any ordinance affecting land use must be part of the
comprehensive plan and enacted pursuant to the Comprehensive Planning Act.
Instead, I'On simply held that land use regulation cannot be effected via the
referendum and initiative process . . . . To accept [this] expansive reading of I'On
would necessarily eviscerate a [c]ounty's ability to exercise its police power if that
exercise in any way impacted land use.").

2. We hold the circuit court did not err in granting City's motion for summary
judgment because the ordinance did not infringe upon any of Folly East Indian
Co.'s vested rights and the Vested Rights Act 3 was inapplicable because Folly East
Indian Co. was not developing any properties, nor were they doing so pursuant to
any approved site-specific development plan. See Fleming, 350 S.C. at 493, 567
S.E.2d at 860 ("When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the appellate
court applies the same standard applied by the [circuit] court pursuant to Rule
56(c) [of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure]."); Kitchen Planners, LLC,
440 S.C. at 459, 892 S.E.2d at 299 ("[T]he moving party is entitled to summary
judgment 'if the [evidence before the court] show[s] that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Rule 56(c),
SCRCP)); § 6-29-1520(10) ("'Vested right' means the right to undertake and
complete the development of property under the terms and conditions of a
site[-]specific development plan or a phased development plan as provided in this
article and in the local land development ordinances or regulations adopted
pursuant to this chapter."); § 6-29-1520(9) ("'Site[-]specific development plan'
means a development plan submitted to a local governing body by a landowner
describing with reasonable certainty the types and density or intensity of uses for a
specific property or properties. The plan may be in the form of, but is not limited
to, the following plans or approvals: planned unit development; subdivision plat;
preliminary or general development plan; variance; conditional use or special use
permit plan; conditional or special use district zoning plan; or other land-use
approval designations as are used by a county or municipality."). Additionally, a

3
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 6-29-1510 to -1560 (Supp. 2025).
person cannot acquire a vested right to continue, when once licensed, in a business.
See Dantzler v. Callison, 230 S.C. 75, 94, 94 S.E.2d 177, 188 (1956) ("No person
can acquire a vested right to continue, when once licensed, in a business, trade or
profession which is subject to legislative control and regulation under the police
power . . . .").

AFFIRMED.4

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.