NASSCO, Inc. v. Byunghwan Chay

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

NASSCO, Inc., Respondent,

v.

Byunghwan Chay a/k/a Bjorn Chay and Michelle
Mihyang Chay, Defendants,

Of whom Byungwhan Chay is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001489

Appeal From Greenville County
Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-057
Submitted January 29, 2026 – Filed February 11, 2026

AFFIRMED

Adam Sinclair Ruffin, of Ruffin Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Aaron J. Angell, of Angell Molony, LLC, of Greenville;
and Jonathan D. Waller, of Hawk Law Group, of Aiken,
both for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Byungwhan Chay (Byungwhan) appeals the master-in-equity's
order voiding a deed in which Byungwhan conveyed his half-interest in a property
to Michelle Chay (Michelle).1 On appeal, Byungwhan argues the master-in-equity
erred in finding the conveyance was fraudulent under the Statute of Elizabeth 2
because the deed was supported by consideration and made without intent to
defraud NASSCO, Inc. (NASSCO), his creditor. Additionally, he contends that
even if the deed was not supported by consideration, NASSCO failed to prove
Byungwhan lacked sufficient funds to pay his debt. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

We hold Byungwhan lacks standing to appeal from the master-in-equity's order
because he does not qualify as an "aggrieved party." See Rule 201(b), SCACR
("Only a party aggrieved by an order, judgment, sentence or decision may
appeal."); Ralph v. McLaughlin, 432 S.C. 640, 649, 856 S.E.2d 154, 158 (2021)
(explaining a party is "aggrieved by the judgment or decree when it operates on his
rights of property or bears directly upon his interest, the word aggrieved referring
to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal or property right or the
imposition on a party of a burden or obligation" (emphasis added) (quoting Cisson
v. McWhorter, 255 S.C. 174, 178, 177 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1970))). At the time
NASSCO commenced the present litigation, Byungwhan had relinquished his
interest in the residence, and the family court had entered a final order divorcing
Byungwhan and Michelle; therefore, Byungwhan was not aggrieved by the
master-in-equity's order because it did not affect his rights or interest. See Powell
v. Green, 281 S.C. 358, 360-61, 315 S.E.2d 183, 184 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding the
grantor in an alleged fraudulent conveyance was not a necessary party in an action
to set aside the transfer when, at the time the action was filed, the grantor had no
present possessory interest or reversionary interest in the property at issue); cf.
Brown v. Butler, 347 S.C. 259, 264, 554 S.E.2d 431, 433 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding
an estranged wife—who had not yet filed for divorce—had a "sufficient interest in
property titled in her husband's name to set aside a conveyance" of the property
that "could" have prejudiced her claims for separate support and maintenance,
alimony, or equitable division of marital property).

AFFIRMED.3

1
Michelle is Byungwhan's ex-wife; the residence on the property was their marital
home. Byungwhan conveyed his half-interest in the property to Michelle prior to
their divorce.
2
S.C. Code Ann. § 27-23-10(A) (2007).
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
THOMAS, MCDONALD, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.