SCDSS v. Jennifer Hale

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Jennifer Hale and Timothy Williamson, Defendants,

of whom Jennifer Hale is the Appellant

and

Timothy Williamson is a Respondent.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2025-000503

Appeal From Anderson County
M. Scott McElhannon, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-053
Submitted January 29, 2026 – Filed February 3, 2026

AFFIRMED

Kindle Kay Johnson, of K. Johnson Law Firm, LLC, of
Rock Hill, for Appellant.
Nima Fiuzat, of Easley, for Respondent Timothy
Williamson.

Andrew Troy Potter, of Anderson, for Respondent South
Carolina Department of Social Services.

John Marshall Swails, Jr., of Greenville, for the Guardian
ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Jennifer Hale (Mother) appeals a family court order terminating
her parental rights to her four minor children (collectively, Children). On appeal,
Mother argues the family court erred in finding termination of parental rights
(TPR) was in Children's best interests.1 We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

We hold the family court did not err in finding TPR was in Children's best
interests. See Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App.
2019) ("On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and
legal issues de novo."); Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487
(2018) ("[D]e novo review allows an appellate court to make its own findings of
fact; however, this standard does not abrogate two long-standing principles still
recognized by our courts during the de novo review process: (1) a trial [court] is in
a superior position to assess witness credibility, and (2) an appellant has the burden
of showing the appellate court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the
finding of the trial [court]."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133,
538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In a [TPR] case, the best interests of the
children are the paramount consideration."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W.,
402 S.C. 324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate courts must
consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when
determining whether TPR is appropriate."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010)
("The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights
conflict."). One of the children, Child 2, was removed from the care of Mother and

1
The family court found clear and convincing evidence of four statutory grounds
for TPR. Mother acknowledges in her appellate brief "that at least one statutory
ground for [TPR] has been proven." See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp.
2025) (explaining that "[t]he family court may order [TPR] upon a finding of one
or more of [twelve statutory] grounds and a finding that termination is in the best
interest of the child").
Timothy Williamson (Father; collectively, Parents) in September 2022 due to
medical neglect, and the other three children were removed from the hotel in which
Parents resided one year later, in September 2023, after the children tested positive
for drugs. At the time of the December 2024 TPR hearing, Parents continued to
reside together in the same hotel—a hotel to which Father attributed the children's
positive drug screens. Moreover, Mother acknowledged Father had not completed
any of his court-ordered placement plan, despite having had two years to do so,
and could not have unsupervised contact with Children until he had completed it.
Father also admitted he was arrested for possession of marijuana in mid-2024—
almost one year after the three children were removed—and testified the charge
had been dismissed. He was unsure why the public record reflected that a trial was
held in his absence and resulted in a guilty finding. We acknowledge the evidence
showed Mother completed court-ordered substance abuse treatment, remained
employed throughout the case, visited Children regularly, and shared a bond with
them; however, we are unable to overlook the fact that over two years after this
case began, Mother continued to reside with Father in housing that was not safe or
appropriate for Children.

Further, the Department of Social Services (DSS) caseworker and the guardian ad
litem (GAL) testified to the improvements each child had made since entering
foster care. The evidence showed Child 2 was almost six years old at her 2022
removal and had difficulty walking, was nonverbal, and required a feeding tube; at
the time of the hearing, she no longer required the feeding tube, could express
emotions other than frustration, and was able to keep up with her siblings during
visits. The youngest child, Child 4, was diagnosed with autism and was also
nonverbal when he was removed. He was also not potty trained when he was
removed despite being almost six years old. According to the GAL, at the time of
the TPR hearing, Child 4 was potty trained, able to speak several words, and
"thriving" in his therapeutic foster home. The GAL also testified that although
Child 1 and Child 3 previously had not regularly attended school, they "loved"
school at the time of the hearing. She confirmed Child 1 and Child 3 were closely
bonded and placed in the same foster home, where they were doing well.

The caseworker and GAL confirmed that Child 2 resided in a pre-adoptive foster
home. Although the three other children were not in pre-adoptive placements at
the time of the TPR hearing, the caseworker confirmed DSS was looking for
adoptive resources for them. The GAL testified to her understanding that a
potential foster family had been identified to adopt the three children together and
would make a decision following the hearing. Further, the GAL, who saw
Children monthly and had attended fifteen to twenty visitations between Parents
and Children, believed TPR was in Children's best interests. Accordingly, based
on Mother's failure to provide a safe, stable home for Children, their need for
permanency, and the likelihood they can be adopted, we hold TPR is in their best
interests. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2510 (2010) (describing the purpose of the
TPR statute as "to establish procedures for the reasonable and compassionate
termination of parental rights where children are abused, neglected, or abandoned
in order to protect the health and welfare of these children and make them eligible
for adoption by persons who will provide a suitable home environment and the
love and care necessary for a happy, healthful, and productive life"); cf. S.C. Dep't
of Soc. Servs. v. Janice C., 383 S.C. 221, 229-31, 678 S.E.2d 463, 467-68 (Ct. App.
2009) (finding TPR was not in Children's best interests despite the unlikelihood
Mother would ever be able to successfully parent them because the evidence
showed Mother was making progress on her placement plan, Children enjoyed
visits, the GAL did not observe Mother's interactions with Children, and Children
were unlikely to be adopted); Charleston Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Jackson, 368
S.C. 87, 102-04, 627 S.E.2d 765, 774-75 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding DSS failed to
present any evidence that TPR was in Child's best interest when Father undertook
"extraordinary" measures to establish a relationship with Child, the GAL
recommended TPR without speaking to Father, and Child's foster parents had not
indicated an interest in adoption).

AFFIRMED.2

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.