Mark Basham v. Sabrina Leigh Maxwell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Mark Basham and Sara Basham, Appellants,

v.

Sabrina Leigh Maxwell and T.G.B., a minor under the
age of 14 years, Defendants,

Of whom Sabrina Leigh Maxwell is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001539

Appeal From Beaufort County
Douglas L. Novak, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-420
Submitted November 26, 2025 – Filed December 9, 2025

AFFIRMED

Kindle Kay Johnson, of K. Johnson Law Firm, LLC, of
Rock Hill, for Appellants.

Sabrina Leigh Maxwell, of Herculaneum, Missouri, pro
se.

Stephen Schaeffer Meyer, of Vaux Marscher Berglind,
P.A., of Bluffton, as the Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: Mark and Sara Basham (Father and Stepmother; collectively,
Appellants) appeal the family court's order refusing to terminate Sabrina Leigh
Maxwell's (Mother's) parental rights to her and Father's minor child (Child) and to
allow Stepmother to adopt Child. On appeal, Appellants argue the family court
erred in (1) finding preservation of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best
interest, (2) failing to terminate Mother's parental rights when she willfully failed
to visit Child, and (3) making factual findings that were contradicted and
unsupported by the facts. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

"Appellate courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of
evidentiary and procedural rulings." Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833
S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019). Although this court reviews the family court's findings de
novo, we are not required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and
heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign
comparative weight to their testimony. Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 385, 709
S.E.2d 650, 651-52 (2011). De novo review does not relieve an appellant of the
burden of showing that the preponderance of the evidence is against the family
court's findings. Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018).

We hold the family court did not err in denying Appellants' request to terminate
Mother's parental rights. 1 We acknowledge testimony indicated Mother's
inconsistent contact with Child and failure to visit for a period of time had
detrimental effects on Child's mental health. However, Child—who was thirteen
years old at the time of the early 2023 TPR hearing—desired a relationship with
Mother and did not wish to be adopted, especially if adoption could sever her
relationship with Mother and Mother's extended family. Further, the guardian ad
litem (GAL) expressed concern about how terminating Mother's parental rights
would affect Child's mental health, and Mother testified she wanted to visit and
call Child more. Thus, although we are concerned about Mother's previous
inconsistent contact with Child and the detrimental effects such contact had on
Child's mental health, we hold preserving Mother's parental rights is in Child's best
interest, especially in light of Child's age, access to her own cellphone, and desire

1
The family court found at least one statutory ground for termination of parental
rights (TPR) existed, and Mother did not appeal that finding; thus, we consider
only whether TPR and adoption were in Child's best interest. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2025) (stating the family court may order TPR upon finding
clear and convincing evidence supports at least one statutory ground and TPR is in
the child's best interest).
to have a relationship with Mother. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C.
129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In a [TPR] case, the best interests
of the children are the paramount consideration."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620
(2010) ("The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the
parental rights conflict."); cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-30 (2010) ("In determining
the best interests of the child, the court must consider the child's reasonable
preference for custody."); id. ("The court shall place weight upon the preference
based upon the child's age, experience, maturity, judgment, and ability to express a
preference."); Brown v. Brown, 362 S.C. 85, 96, 606 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Ct. App.
2004) ("[T]he preference of any child is merely a factor in the analysis—it is not
determinative."); id. at 95, 606 S.E.2d at 790 ("[A] determination of the best
interests of the child is paramount to the child's preference.").

As to Appellants' remaining arguments, we hold the family court did not base its
decision solely on Child's desire for continued contact with Mother or place undue
weight on Child's wishes. Rather, the court considered Child's desires as it is
permitted to do, in combination with the GAL's testimony, to determine whether
TPR and adoption were in Child's best interest. Cf. § 63-15-30 ("In determining
the best interests of the child, the court must consider the child's reasonable
preference for custody."); id. ("The court shall place weight upon the preference
based upon the child's age, experience, maturity, judgment, and ability to express a
preference."); Brown, 362 S.C. at 96, 606 S.E.2d at 791 ("[T]he preference of any
child is merely a factor in the analysis—it is not determinative."); id. at 95, 606
S.E.2d at 790 ("[A] determination of the best interests of the child is paramount to
the child's preference."). We also hold the family court did not fail to consider the
testimony of Child's former therapist, Patricia Owings-Alley, about Mother's
interaction with Child and opinion that TPR was in Child's best interest or that
TPR and adoption would provide stability to Child. Rather, the family court
considered the evidence at trial and ultimately concluded Child's interest was best
served by preserving Mother's parental rights, and we note Owings-Alley had not
seen Child since June 2021—almost two years prior to trial.

Further, as to Appellants' arguments that the family court failed to (1) consider the
various issues the GAL discussed at trial, (2) address the GAL's recommendations
in its order, and (3) address at the hearing whether the GAL followed up with
Child's counselor's recommendation that Mother undergo an evaluation, we hold
the family court considered the GAL's testimony and report, and we note the GAL
testified he contacted two individuals to see if they would conduct the evaluation
but the parties disputed who would pay for it and the evaluation did not occur.
Additionally, as to Appellants' argument about the impact Child's behavior had on
her immediate family, the family court heard testimony from Appellants and
Owings-Alley regarding how Child's mental health suffered after inconsistent
contact with Mother and how that resulted in adverse effects on her immediate
family, including her younger brothers. Thus, we hold the family court did not fail
to consider how Mother's behavior affected Child's mental health, which adversely
affected her immediate family. Moreover, although the family court found Mother
willfully failed to visit Child for over six months, this is not dispositive, and the
family court considered Mother's failure to visit and how Child's health was
adversely affected by her lack of contact before ultimately concluding TPR and
adoption were not in Child's best interest. Finally, as to the family court's finding
that Mother had "expressed a sincere desire to re-engage with [Child] on a more
meaningful basis and be an integral part of her maturation process," we hold the
family court was within its authority to make this finding because Mother testified
she wanted to be involved in Child's life, and the GAL reported Mother indicated
she wanted to call Child more often and visit with Child during the summer and
holidays, she would do anything to prove she belonged in Child's life, and she fully
intended to be more involved with Child's life. Accordingly, we hold the family
court determined what would most likely ensure Child's physical and mental
well-being was cared for; thus, we hold it did not err in its findings. Based on the
foregoing, we affirm the family court's order.

AFFIRMED.2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.