State v. Rodney D. Riggins

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Rodney David Riggins, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000892

Appeal From Pickens County
Perry H. Gravely, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-372
Submitted October 23, 2025 – Filed November 5, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Jessica M. Saxon, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Andrew Douglas Powell, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Cynthia Smith Crick, of
Greenville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Rodney David Riggins appeals his convictions for trafficking
methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute heroin and concurrent
sentences of five years' imprisonment. On appeal, Riggins argued the circuit court
erred in denying his directed verdict motion because the State failed to present
evidence he had dominion and control over the borrowed van in which the drugs
were found or that he knew the drugs were in the van; rather, he asserts the
evidence at trial only raised a suspicion of his guilt. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold the circuit
court did not err in denying Riggins's directed verdict motion because the evidence
showed Riggins had constructive possession of the drugs found in the van. See
State v. Fennell, 340 S.C. 266, 270, 531 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2000) ("In considering a
motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or
non-existence of evidence, not with its weight."); State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279,
292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); Fennell, 340
S.C. at 270, 531 S.E.2d at 514 ("The case should be submitted to the jury if there is
any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends
to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly or logically
deduced."); Weston, 367 S.C. at 292, 625 S.E.2d at 648 ("When reviewing a denial
of a directed verdict, [an appellate court] views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 44-53-375(C) (2018) (stating a person is guilty of trafficking in
methamphetamine if a person "knowingly sells, manufactures, delivers, purchases,
or brings into this State, or . . . provides financial assistance or otherwise aids,
abets, attempts, or conspires to sell, manufacture, deliver, purchase, or bring into
this State, or . . . is knowingly in actual or constructive possession or who
knowingly attempts to become in actual or constructive possession of ten grams or
more of methamphetamine or cocaine base, as defined and otherwise limited in"
certain statutes); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(b)(1) (Supp. 2025) (stating a "person
who violates subsection (a) with respect to . . . a controlled substance classified in
Schedule I (B) and (C) which is a narcotic drug or lysergic acid diethylamide
(LSD) and in Schedule II which is a narcotic drug is guilty of a felony"); State v.
Stewart, 433 S.C. 382, 387, 858 S.E.2d 808, 810 (2021) (stating that in order "to
prove trafficking (when based on possession) . . . , the State must prove two
elements": the defendant (1) "had either actual physical custody of the drugs, or the
right or power to exercise control over the drugs" and (2) "must have knowledge of
the drugs and the intent to control their disposition or use"); id. at 389, 858 S.E.2d
at 811 ("[I]f the State presents evidence the defendant had control over the property
on which the drugs were located, then the trial court should deny a directed verdict
motion. But, the existence of evidence the defendant had control over the property
does not equate to a finding of constructive possession. It remains the burden of
the State to convince the jury the defendant had the requisite knowledge and
intent.").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and VINSON and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.