Jennifer Everhart Edwards v. Gregory Mack Edwards

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jennifer Everhart Edwards, Respondent,

v.

Gregory Mack Edwards, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001232

Appeal From Sumter County
Thomas M. Bultman, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-340
Submitted September 1, 2025 – Filed October 8, 2025

AFFIRMED

Wendy Pauling Levine, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Marian Dawn Nettles, of Nettles Turbeville & Reddeck,
of Lake City; and William Andrew Wallace Buxton, of
The Law Office of William A.W. Buxton, LLC, of
Sumter, both for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Gregory Edwards (Husband) appeals the family court's divorce
decree, which in part divided the marital estate and awarded Jennifer Everhart
Edwards (Wife) permanent periodic alimony. On appeal, Husband argues the
family court erred in its apportionment of marital property and debt and awarding
Wife permanent periodic alimony instead of rehabilitative alimony for a period of
five years. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the family court did not err in its apportionment of the marital estate. See
Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833 S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019) ("Appellate
courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and
procedural rulings."); Weller v. Weller, 434 S.C. 530, 538, 863 S.E.2d 835, 838
(Ct. App. 2021) ("The appellant maintains the burden of convincing the appellate
court that the family court's findings were made in error or were unsubstantiated by
the evidence."); Browder v. Browder, 382 S.C. 512, 522, 675 S.E.2d 820, 825 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("In making an equitable distribution of marital property, the court
must: (1) identify the marital property to be divided between the parties . . . (3)
apportion the marital estate according to the contributions, both direct and indirect,
of each party to the acquisition of the property during the marriage, their respective
assets and incomes . . . and (4) provide for an equitable division of the marital
estate, including the manner in which the distribution is to take place."). We also
hold the court properly identified the marital estate, considered the appropriate
statutory factors, and apportioned the estate according to the parties' marital fault,
contributions, assets, and incomes. Further, we hold the family court did not err
when it failed to identify marital property to be apportioned because the refunds
had been spent at the time of the hearing and were spent on marital expenses, and
Husband failed to meet his burden of showing that the credit card debt apportioned
to Wife was nonmarital. See McDavid v. McDavid, 333 S.C. 490, 494-95, 511
S.E.2d 365, 367 (1999) (finding the husband's usage of marital funds to pay for his
failing business and to pay for "household/family expenses" was not an improper
usage of marital funds); Hardy v. Hardy, 311 S.C. 433, 436-37, 429 S.E.2d 811,
813 (Ct. App. 1993) ("For purposes of equitable distribution, 'marital debt' is debt
incurred for the joint benefit of the parties regardless of whether the parties are
legally jointly liable for the debt or whether one party is legally individually
liable."); Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 547, 615 S.E.2d 98, 105 (2005) ("When
the debt is incurred before marital litigation begins, the burden of proving a debt is
nonmarital rests upon the party who makes such an assertion."); id. ("When a debt
is incurred after the commencement of litigation but before the final divorce
decree, the family court may equitably apportion it as a marital debt when it is
shown the debt was incurred for marital purposes, i.e., for the joint benefit of both
parties during the marriage."); Sanders v. Sanders, 396 S.C. 410, 418, 722 S.E.2d
15, 18 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The ultimate goal of apportionment is to divide the
marital estate, as a whole, in a manner that fairly reflects each spouse's contribution
to the economic partnership and also the effect on each of the parties of ending that
partnership."); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620(B) (2014) (listing the factors a court
must weigh when apportioning the marital estate). Additionally, to the extent
Husband argues the family court erred by failing to apportion Wife's jewelry and
personal property, we hold this argument is without merit. Although Husband
testified he was not asking for possession of any of the items Wife had insured that
were valued at $15,000, Wife explained she and Husband had agreed to divide
their personal belongings themselves, and the family court found Wife's testimony
regarding the agreement was credible. See Downing v. Downing, 440 S.C. 322,
340-41, 891 S.E.2d 375, 384 (Ct. App. 2023) ("Although this court reviews the
family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the fact that the
family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to
evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony.").

Finally, we hold the court did not err by awarding Wife permanent periodic
alimony because Husband failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting
a departure from permanent periodic alimony. See Stone, at 91, 833 S.E.2d at 272
("Appellate courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of
evidentiary and procedural rulings."); Toler v. Toler, 292 S.C. 374, 377, 356
S.E.2d 429, 431 (Ct. App. 1987) ("If a spouse has been out of the job market
performing spousal duties over the course of a lengthy marriage, permanent
periodic alimony ordinarily will be required and rehabilitative alimony should be
approved only in exceptional circumstances."); Allen v. Allen, 347 S.C. 177, 184,
554 S.E.2d 421, 424 (Ct. App. 2001) ("It is the duty of the family court to make an
alimony award that is fit, equitable, and just if the claim is well founded.");
Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451, 759 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2014) ("Alimony
is a substitute for the support normally incidental to the marital relationship.");
Craig v. Craig, 365 S.C. 285, 292, 617 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2005) ("Generally,
alimony should place the supported spouse, as nearly as practical, in the same
position as enjoyed during the marriage.").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.