Parrish N.F. Lanier v. Dustin R. Watts

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Parrish Nicole Ford Lanier, Appellant,

v.

Dustin Ray Watts, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2024-002080

Appeal From Florence County
FitzLee H. McEachin, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-327
Submitted September 23, 2025 – Filed September 26, 2025

AFFIRMED

Melinda Inman Butler, of The Butler Law Firm, of
Union, for Appellant.

Marian Dawn Nettles, of Nettles Turbeville & Reddeck,
of Lake City; and Brooke Chapman Evans, of Evans &
Turnblad, LLC, of Florence, both for Respondent.

Almand James Barron, of Shea and Barron, of Columbia,
as the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Parrish Nicole Ford Lanier (Mother) appeals the family court's
order terminating her parental rights to her minor child (Child). On appeal, Mother
argues the family court erred when it (1) allowed Father to file an amended answer
and counterclaim, (2) failed to dismiss Father's termination of parental rights
(TPR) claim, and (3) terminated her parental rights on two statutory grounds. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

"On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal
issues de novo." Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App.
2019). Under the de novo standard of review, this court may make its own
findings of fact; however, we continue to recognize the superior position of the
family court to assess witness credibility. Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813
S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018). Moreover, de novo review does not relieve the appellant
of the burden of showing that the preponderance of the evidence is against the
family court's findings. Id.

1. We hold the family court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Father to
amend his pleadings. See Stoney, 422 S.C. at 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 486 n.2
(explaining appellate courts review the family court's procedural and evidentiary
rulings for an abuse of discretion); Patton v. Miller, 420 S.C. 471, 489, 804 S.E.2d
252, 261 (2017) ("Rule 15(a) [of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure]
provides that when a party asks to amend his pleading, 'leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires and does not prejudice any other party.'" (quoting Rule
15(a), SCRCP)); Parker v. Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer Dist., 362 S.C. 276, 286,
607 S.E.2d 711, 717 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[Rule 15(a)] strongly favors amendments
and the court is encouraged to freely grant leave to amend."). Father filed the
motion to amend his answer and counterclaim—which included the addition of the
claims for TPR—in September 2023, the family court granted the motion in
December 2023, and the TPR hearing occurred in November 2024. Thus, Mother
had nearly a year to prepare to refute Father's claims and properly defend herself at
the TPR hearing. We also find Mother was not prejudiced by Father's second
amended answer and counterclaim because it was filed on May 20, 2024—six
months prior to the TPR hearing—and did not allege any additional causes of
action but merely corrected minor deficiencies. See Lee v. Bunch, 373 S.C. 654,
661, 647 S.E.2d 197, 201 (2007) ("The prejudice that would warrant denial of a
motion to amend the pleadings is a lack of notice that a new issue is to be tried and
a lack of opportunity to refute it.").

2. We hold the family court did not err in denying Mother's motion to dismiss for
failing to strictly adhere to the TPR statute regarding the contents of Father's
answer and counterclaims and for failing to hold the TPR hearing within 120 days.
See Klein, 427 S.C. at 79, 828 S.E.2d at 776 ("On appeal from the family court, the
appellate court reviews factual and legal issues de novo."). First, Father's second
amendment of his answer cured the purported defects Mother alleged, and
Mother's argument that the TPR statute requires strict compliance is without merit.
See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010) ("[The TPR statutes] must be liberally
construed in order to ensure prompt judicial procedures for freeing minor children
from the custody and control of their parents by terminating the parent-child
relationship. The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the
parental rights conflict."). Second, although the February 6, 2024 status
conference order did not properly continue the case because the court did not
schedule the hearing for a certain date and time pursuant to the 120-day timeframe,
Mother failed to show she was prejudiced by the extension of time. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-7-2530(C) (Supp. 2024) ("The hearing on the petition to terminate
parental rights must be held within [120] days of the date the [TPR] petition is
filed."); id. ("A party may request a continuance that would result in the hearing
being held more than [120] days after the petition was filed . . . ."); id. ("[T]he
court may grant a continuance in its discretion. If a continuance is granted, the
court must issue a written order scheduling the case for trial on a date and time
certain."). In fact, the extension of time worked in Mother's favor, as she had more
time to prepare her defenses for the TPR hearing and to seek out additional
individual and reunification therapy to demonstrate her progress to the court.
Moreover, neither at the time of the continuance nor at the time of the TPR hearing
had Mother fulfilled the requirements to have visitation with Child. See Davis v.
Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 87, 641 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An error not shown
to be prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal." (quoting Brown v.
Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 417, 483 S.E.2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1997))).
3. We hold the family court did not err in finding Mother willfully failed to visit
Child. See § 63-7-2570(3) (Supp. 2024) (providing a statutory ground for TPR is
met when a child has lived outside the parent's home for a six-month period during
which "the parent has willfully failed to visit the child"). Mother testified she had
not visited Child in person for nearly six years and last saw Child through a virtual
counseling session two years prior to the TPR hearing. Moreover, her failure to
visit Child was willful. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Broome, 307 S.C. 48, 52,
413 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1992) ("Whether a parent's failure to visit or support a child
is 'willful' within the meaning of the statute is a question of intent to be determined
in each case from all the facts and circumstances."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 256, 519 S.E.2d 351, 355 (Ct. App. 1999) ("A parent's
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego parental duties may fairly be
characterized as 'willful' because it manifests a conscious indifference to the rights
of the child to receive support and consortium from the parent."). Although
Mother's in-person visitation was suspended by court order, the order provided an
avenue to resume visitation if she attended individual and reunification therapy and
cooperated with the recommendations of her counselors. Her failure to adhere to
those conditions to resume seeing Child demonstrates her failure to visit was
willful. See In re M., 312 S.C. 248, 249-50, 439 S.E.2d 857, 858-89 (Ct. App.
1993) (holding a court order requiring psychotherapy did not prevent the father
from visiting the child, but rather, outlined a mechanism through which visitation
could resume); id. at 250, 439 S.E.2d at 859 (holding a father's refusal to meet the
reasonable conditions placed on his visitation was tantamount to willful failure to
visit child); See Broom v. Jennifer J., 403 S.C. 96, 114, 742 S.E.2d 382, 391 (2013)
("Willfulness does not mean that the parent must have some ill-intent towards the
child or a conscious desire not to visit; it only means that the parent must not have
visited due to her own decisions, rather than being prevented from doing so by
someone else.").

We also find TPR is in Child's best interest. 1 See S.C. Dep't. of Soc. Servs. v.
Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In a [TPR] case,
the best interests of the children are the paramount consideration."); § 63-7-2620
("The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights
conflict."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324, 343, 741 S.E.2d
739, 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate courts must consider the child's perspective, and
not the parent's, as the primary concern when determining whether TPR is
appropriate."). Child has been involved in the litigation between Mother and
Father for more than a decade. Mother's refusal to comply with the recommended
therapeutic activities resulted in the termination of her reunification and individual
therapy and thus termination of her virtual visitation with Child. Father testified
Child's stepmother planned to adopt Child, and that Child was happy, excelling in
school, and engaging in extracurriculars while in his care. Based on Child's need
for permanency, and Mother's failure to demonstrate she could provide an
emotionally safe and stable environment for Child, we find TPR is in Child's best
interest.

AFFIRMED. 2

1
Though Mother did not raise this issue on appeal, we consider it pursuant to Ex
parte Roper, 254 S.C. 558, 563, 176 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1970) ("[W]here the rights
and best interests of a minor child are concerned, the court may appropriately
raise . . . issues not raised by the parties.").
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.