State v. John A. Webb

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

John Alexander Webb, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001578

Appeal From Horry County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-293
Heard June 4, 2025 – Filed August 13, 2025

AFFIRMED

Lacey Marie Thompson, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of
Conway, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: John A. Webb appeals his convictions for three counts of
"violation[s] of drug distribution law" arising out of his failure to keep or produce
sufficient records of prescriptions he had written. On appeal, Webb argues the trial
court erred by (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict; (2) denying his motion
for a new trial because the State failed to reference any state or federal statute or
regulation setting forth recordkeeping requirements; (3) failing to charge the jury
on the relevant laws and regulations setting forth the requirements for
recordkeeping; and (4) failing to grant a new trial or directed verdict instead of a
"motion in arrest of judgment." He further argues (1) the State violated his right to
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by asserting he was not
permitted to recreate the records in question and (2) the State violated Rule 403,
SCRCP, and Rule 404(b), SCRCP, by making repeated references to uncharged
conduct or prior bad acts after the trial court denied the State's motion in limine to
raise the uncharged conduct. We affirm.

1. We hold the State presented sufficient evidence regarding the requirements for
recordkeeping such that the trial court properly denied the directed verdict motion.
See State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009) (explaining
that in criminal cases, this court sits to review errors of law only and is bound by
the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous); State v. Zeigler,
364 S.C. 94, 102, 610 S.E.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) ("When a motion for a
directed verdict is made in a criminal case in which the State relies exclusively on
circumstantial evidence, the trial [court] is required to submit the case to the jury if
there is any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the
accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced."). At trial,
Investigator Derek Strickland, of the Department of Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC), testified that to prescribe a controlled substance, "a valid
patient/prescriber relationship is required[,]" and, in order to establish this
relationship, certain documentation must be kept by the person who prescribes the
substance. Strickland clearly stated that DHEC did not have specific requirements
for the form of the documentation, just that it must be done. He explained it "can
be in a memorandum of such as long as the document is readily available and upon
request provided to [an] inspector." He further explained, "[b]y regulation with
DHEC, the records must be readily available" and "maintained by the [provider]." 1

1
Section 44-53-340 of the South Carolina Code (2016) states that "[p]ersons
registered to . . . dispense controlled substances under this article shall keep
records and maintain inventories in conformance with the record-keeping and
inventory requirements of [f]ederal law and with any additional rules [DHEC]
issues." Additionally, section 44-53-390(a)(4) of the South Carolina Code (2016)
states that "[i]t is unlawful for a person knowingly or intentionally to . . . furnish
false or fraudulent material information in, or omit any material information from,
any application, report or other document required to be kept or filed under this
article, or any record required to be kept by this article." DHEC Regulation 602
Strickland stated a physician "is required to keep records . . . as far as a
patient/practitioner relationship in where they see the patient, how they see the
patient, what this history is with the patient, and going forward what the
prescribing of that patient should be." Additionally, Strickland testified that "[i]f a
person who is issuing a prescription . . . omits the information from his
documentation or even fails to document it at all" or if the prescriber fails to keep
or maintain the required information, that is a violation of the law. Strickland
further testified that the records must be "readily available" or "readily retrievable,"
which he defined as accessible within one hour or less. We find Strickland's
testimony, while not referencing any regulations or statutes by number or citation,
nevertheless presented a sufficient summary of the substance of the applicable
requirements. Webb has not cited any rule or case law that requires the State to
refer to or publish the exact text of the statute or regulation at issue in a case, nor
have we been able to locate any. Viewing the testimony discussed above in the
light most favorable to the State, we hold the trial court properly submitted the case
to the jury, and we affirm the denial of the motion for a directed verdict. See State
v. James, 362 S.C. 557, 561, 608 S.E.2d 455, 457 (Ct. App. 2004) ("In ruling on a
motion for directed verdict in a criminal case, a trial court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State.").2

states, "A registered individual practitioner is required to maintain a readily
retrievable record, separate from patient charts, of all controlled substances . . .
dispensed . . . or otherwise disposed of by the practitioner, his or her employees or
agents . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-4.602(c) (Supp. 2016).
2
Webb also argues he was "convicted of violating the terms of his contract" and
"the [original] trial court attempted to direct a verdict post-trial." We find these
arguments are not preserved. Webb did not contemporaneously object to any
testimony regarding the content of his contract, nor to the State's closing argument.
See State v. Sheppard, 391 S.C. 415, 420-21, 706 S.E.2d 16, 19 (2011) ("Our law
is clear that a party must make a contemporaneous objection that is ruled upon by
the trial [court] to preserve an issue for appellate review."); State v. Franks, 432
S.C. 58, 79, 849 S.E.2d 580, 591-92 (Ct. App. 2020) ("Generally, this [c]ourt will
not consider issues not raised to or ruled upon by the trial [court]." (alterations in
original) (quoting State v. Williams, 303 S.C. 410, 411, 401 S.E.2d 168, 169
(1991))). Further, the order granting the motion in arrest of judgment was
appealed; that appeal was adjudicated on the merits, and Webb did not file a
cross-appeal to raise this argument. See State v. Webb, Op. No. 2023-UP-059
(S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 15, 2023); Johnson v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Police Ins. &
Annuity Fund of State, 221 S.C. 23, 32, 68 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1952) ("An order not
2. For the same reasons discussed above, we hold the trial court properly denied
Webb's motion for a new trial. See Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508, 682 S.E.2d at 822
(explaining that in criminal cases, this court sits to review errors of law only and is
bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous); State
v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11, 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007) ("A trial [court] has the
discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, and [its] decision will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion."); State v. Prince, 316 S.C. 57, 63, 447
S.E.2d 177, 181 (1993) ("[W]here there is competent evidence to sustain the jury's
verdict, the [trial court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury.").
We agree with the reasoning of the trial court in denying the motion; it explained,

[T]he State doesn't have to introduce regulations for
them to follow. The State doesn't have to introduce
the law on burglary first-degree. The State
prosecutes facts and then the judge says: "Alright,
jury, you find the facts. Did the State prove this
beyond a reasonable doubt? Here is the law. You
take the facts as you find the facts to be. You apply
them to the law as I tell you what the law is." The
State doesn't tell the jury what the law is . . . the
judge tells the jury what the law is.

Moreover, Webb conceded he had not objected to the jury charge or informed the
court that he believed it had not sufficiently informed the jury of the law because
the regulation was not included in the charge. 3 Accordingly, we affirm as to this
issue. See Winters v. Fiddie, 394 S.C. 629, 639, 716 S.E.2d 316, 321-22 (Ct. App.
2011) ("South Carolina jurisprudence indicates that a moving party must raise the
objectionable issue at the appropriate time during trial; thus, unobjected to trial
error cannot be advanced as grounds for a new trial."); id. at 642, 716 S.E.2d at
323 (reversing the trial court's grant of a new trial because the "failure to object to
the omitted portion of the jury instruction precluded the trial court from granting a
new trial on that ground"); State v. Dicapua, 383 S.C. 394, 398-99, 680 S.E.2d
292, 294 (2009) (finding the trial court erred in granting a motion for a new trial
on a ground not raised by a party—specifically, the admission of an unobjected-to
videotape).

appealed from is binding on all parties before the [c]ourt, constitutes the law of the
case, and, when questioned, is res judicata . . . .").
3
We note the trial court did, however, specifically quote section 44-53-340 and
section 44-53-390(a)(4) in its jury instructions.
3. Webb concedes his remaining issues are not preserved for this court's review;
thus, we decline to address them. See Rule 20(b), SCRCrimP ("[T]he parties shall
be given the opportunity to object to the giving or failure to give an instruction
before the jury retires . . . . Failure to object in accordance with this rule shall
constitute a waiver of objection."); State v. Todd, 264 S.C. 136, 139, 213 S.E.2d
99, 100 (1975) ("[T]he failure of a defendant to object to the charge as made or to
request additional instructions, when the opportunity to do so is afforded,
constitutes a waiver of any right to complain of errors in the charge."); State v.
Sheppard, 391 S.C. 415, 420-21, 706 S.E.2d 16, 19 (2011) ("Our law is clear that
a party must make a contemporaneous objection that is ruled upon by the trial
[court] to preserve an issue for appellate review."); McHam v. State, 404 S.C. 465,
475, 746 S.E.2d 41, 47 (2013) ("[A]n issue that was raised on direct appeal but
found to be unpreserved may be raised in the context of a PCR claim alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel."), abrogated on other grounds by Smalls v.
State, 422 S.C. 174, 181 n.2, 810 S.E.2d 836, 839 n.2 (2018).4

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

4
Webb argues the unpreserved issues present "flagrant errors" such that "prejudice
clearly appears" and should operate as an exception to South Carolina's refusal to
apply the plain error doctrine. We disagree; as noted above, Webb still has an
avenue to seek relief for these alleged errors through the post-conviction relief
process.