CourtListener 10652413

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THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Zachary Leland Moody and Kristina L. Moody,
Appellants,

Gabriela B. Lopez a/k/a Gabriela Baltazar Lopez-
Gutierrez, and individual, Leopoldo Vera Hernandez, an
individual, Santa Fe Construction, LLC, Juan Carlos
Maldonado, an individual, ServPro of Pickens County
d/b/a Blue Moon Enterprises, Inc., Scott D. Caulfield, an
individual, Keller Williams Western Upstate, The Haro
Group of Keller Williams, Creasy Construction, LLC,
Harry James Creasy, an individual, and John Allen Drew,
an individual, Defendants,

Of Which ServPro of Pickens County d/b/a Blue Moon
Enterprises, Inc. and TCT1, LLC d/b/a Keller Williams
Western Upstate, are the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001529

Appeal From Greenville County
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge
G. D. Morgan, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-284
Heard April 17, 2025 – Filed August 6, 2025

AFFIRMED
Townes Boyd Johnson, III and Christian Hill Thorndike,
both of Townes B. Johnson III, LLC, of Greenville, for
Appellants.

Robert T. Lyles, Jr. and Allen Leland DuPre, both of
Lyles & Associates, LLC, of Sullivan's Island, for
Respondent ServPro of Pickens County.

Daniel L. Draisen, of The Injury Law Firm, PC, of
Anderson, and John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Thompson
Sullivan LLC, of Columbia, both for Respondent TCT1,
LLC.

PER CURIAM: Appellants Zachary Leland Moody and Kristina L. Moody appeal
the trial court's grant of Respondents' motions for summary judgment. 1 As to
Respondent ServPro of Pickens County, d/b/a Blue Moon Enterprises, Inc. (Blue
Moon), Appellants argue the trial court erred by finding (1) Blue Moon gave no
implied warranty as a matter of law, (2) Blue Moon violated no legal duty, (3) Blue
Moon was not negligent in its supervision of a former employee, (4) Blue Moon was
not vicariously liable for a former employee's torts, (5) the former employee was
acting outside the scope of his employment, and (6) the South Carolina Notice and
Opportunity to Cure Construction Dwelling Defects Act 2 barred Appellants' claim
for completed repairs. As to Respondent TCT1, LLC d/b/a Keller Williams Western
Upstate (TCT1), Appellants claim the trial court erred by finding TCT1 neither owed
a legal duty to ensure a seller's disclosure statement was complete nor breached said
duty if it existed. We affirm.
FACTS

On April 12, 2017, Appellants purchased a newly constructed residential
home from Gabriela B. Lopez for $288,000 on Foxhound Road in Simpsonville,
South Carolina (the Foxhound Road home). Nate Emery, a real estate licensee
employed by TCT1, served as Appellants' buyers' agent. As required by the
Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act 3 (RPCDA), Lopez provided a State

1
The summary judgment motions were granted by separate judges.
2
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-59-810 to -860 (2011).
3
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-50-10 to -110 (2007 & Supp. 2024).
of South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Statement (disclosure
statement) to Emery. Emery shared the form with Appellants, who signed it on
January 20, 2017. Lopez did not complete disclosure 7 on the disclosure statement,
which refers to the "foundation, slab, fireplaces, chimneys, wood stoves, floors,
basement, windows, driveway, storm windows/screens, doors, ceilings, interior
walls, exterior walls, sheds, attached garage, carport, patio, deck, walkways, fencing,
or other structural components including modifications."

Just over a year after purchasing the Foxhound Road home, issues arose with
water penetration and the home's foundation. When routine maintenance did not
remedy the issues, Appellants hired a contractor to investigate and repair the
problems. The contractor discovered the original builders failed to properly
waterproof the foundation and front entryway of the home, failed to install a proper
drainage system in front of the home, used incorrect grout, and back-filled the lot
with uncompacted dirt full of stumps, construction debris, and other organic matter.

In preparation for this lawsuit, Appellants obtained the permit application for
the home, which listed Blue Moon as the contractor and Scott Caufield as the contact
person. Caufield had been Blue Moon's production manager and license qualifier
until 2016, when he was terminated for making personal charges on his company
credit card. As Blue Moon's primary qualifying party, Caufield was authorized to
pull permits using Blue Moon's general contractor's license.

Appellants allege Caufield devised a plan with Lopez, Lopez's husband
Leopoldo Hernandez, who worked for Santa Fe Construction, and another Santa Fe
employee to construct and sell shoddy homes using Blue Moon's license. 4
Appellants claim Blue Moon either knew about the plan or should have known
because its employee, contractor's license, and funds were used to construct homes.5

Blue Moon filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1)
Appellants had no evidence that Blue Moon participated in civil conspiracy; (2) Blue
Moon did not build or sell the Foxhound Road home, which is required for any
implied warranty to arise; (3) Appellants had no evidence that Blue Moon violated
a legal duty owed to them to support a negligence claim; (4) Appellants were not
subjected to a claim by a third-party and as such had no claim for indemnity; and (5)
Appellants' claims were barred by the South Carolina Notice and Opportunity to
Cure Construction Dwelling Defects Act (Right to Cure Act). The trial court granted
the motion and also denied Appellants' motion to alter or amend the judgment.

TCT1 filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) TCT1
owed no duty to independently investigate the condition of the property; (2)
Appellants acknowledged they read the disclosure statement provided by Lopez and
could clearly see that disclosure 7 was left blank; (3) the practical effect of disclosure
7 being left blank was merely that the seller made no representation regarding the
relevant conditions; and (4) Appellants made no request for additional information
from their agent, and the agent was under no legal obligation to provide any
additional information. Appellants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
based upon S.C. Code Ann. § 40-57-5 to -240 (2011 & Supp. 2024), which defines
the duties of real estate brokers. The trial court granted TCT1's motion and denied
Appellants' motion, finding "there is no legal duty on the buyer's agent to ensure the
seller has fully completed the seller's disclosure [statement], and even if there was
such a duty, that duty was not breached." Appellants filed a motion to alter or amend
the judgment, which the trial court denied.

Appellants filed separate notices of appeal from the circuit court's respective
orders denying their respective motions to alter or amend, which this court
consolidated into this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court applies the
same standard used by the trial court." Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston,
378 S.C. 107, 109, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008). "A grant of summary judgment is
proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 109–10, 662 S.E.2d at 41 (citing
Rule 56(c), SCRCP). "In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the
court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Madison ex rel.
Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 134, 638 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2006).
However, "it is not sufficient for a party to create an inference that is not reasonable
or an issue of fact that is not genuine." Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440
S.C. 456, 463, 892 S.E.2d 297, 301 (2023) (quoting Town of Hollywood v. Floyd,
403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2013)). "When the [trial] court grants
summary judgment on a question of law, we review the ruling de novo." Stoneledge
at Lake Keowee Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Builders FirstSource-Se. Grp., 413 S.C. 630,
634–35, 776 S.E.2d 434, 437 (Ct. App. 2015).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Blue Moon's Motion for Summary Judgment

Blue Moon primarily provides repair and mitigation services to customers
whose homes have suffered fire or water damage and has never performed original
construction of new residential homes. In an affidavit filed with its motion for
summary judgment, Blue Moon's owner, Jeff Smith, stated he was unaware that
Caufield used Blue Moon's license to construct the Foxhound Road home. This
affidavit further states that Blue Moon did not contract to build the home, did not
build the home, did not receive payment for construction of the home, did not sell
the home, and did not receive any compensation for the construction or sale of the
home. Appellants did not provide any evidence or testimony to refute this affidavit.
Thus, the undisputed evidence in the record is that a Blue Moon employee used Blue
Moon's general contractor's license to pull a building permit for construction of the
Foxhound Road home without Blue Moon's knowledge. As explained below, this is
not sufficient to impose any liability on Blue Moon, and the trial court did not err by
granting Blue Moon's motion for summary judgment.

A. Implied Warranty

Under the implied warranty of workmanlike service, "a builder who contracts
to construct a dwelling impliedly warrants that the work undertaken will be
performed in a careful, diligent, workmanlike manner." Kennedy v. Columbia
Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 344, 384 S.E.2d 730, 736 (1989). "[T]he rationale
supporting the imposition of liability for breach of an implied warranty of
workmanlike service is that the purchaser is forced to rely on the skill of the
professional builder." Smith v. Breedlove, 377 S.C. 415, 423–24, 661 S.E.2d 67, 72
(2008) (holding the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of a
builder on a breach of an implied warranty claim because the builder "was not in the
business of constructing homes" and "never held himself out" as a "licensed general
contractor with expertise in construction"). "Although the warranty of workmanlike
service arises out of the construction contract to which the builder is a party, a
subsequent purchaser may sue a professional builder on the implied warranty of
workmanlike service despite the lack of contractual privity." Id. at 422, 661 S.E.2d
at 71.

Here, Blue Moon has never been in the business of constructing new homes
and has never held itself out as a general contractor with expertise in the construction
of new homes. See id. Additionally, while the record suggests Caufield used Blue
Moon's license to pull the building permit, Appellants put forth no evidence that
Blue Moon or Caufield actually participated in construction of the home. 6 Because
Blue Moon did not construct or contract to construct the home, has never been in the
business of constructing new homes, and has never held itself out as an expert in the
construction of new homes, Blue Moon is not liable to Appellants for breach of the
implied warranty of workmanlike service.

B. Negligence and Negligent Supervision

The trial court correctly determined that Blue Moon did not owe Appellants
any legal duty, which defeats their negligence claim as a matter of law. Additionally,
if a duty did exist, the trial court correctly found Blue Moon was neither vicariously
liable for Caufield's torts nor negligent in its supervision of Caufield.

To prove negligence, "a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant owes a duty of care
to the plaintiff; (2) defendant breached the duty by a negligent act or omission; (3)
defendant's breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and
(4) plaintiff suffered an injury or damages." Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 400, 645
S.E.2d 245, 250 (2007). "The absence of any one of these elements renders the cause
of action insufficient." S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Booz–Allen & Hamilton, 289 S.C.
373, 376, 346 S.E.2d 324, 325 (1986). "An essential element in a cause of action
for negligence is the existence of a legal duty of care owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff. Without a duty, there is no actionable negligence." Moore v. Weinberg,
373 S.C. 209, 221, 644 S.E.2d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2007), aff'd, 383 S.C. 583, 681
S.E.2d 875 (2009) (quoting Bishop v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 331 S.C. 79, 86,

"[T]he undertaking or agreement to construct a dwelling for another is what
creates the duty to exercise and use due care in the construction of that dwelling."
Breedlove, 377 S.C. at 424, 661 S.E.2d at 72 (adopting the circuit court's holding).
"The key inquiry is foreseeability, not privity. . . . By placing [a] product into the
stream of commerce, the builder owes a duty of care to those who will use his
product, so as to render him accountable for negligent workmanship." Id. at 424–
25, 661 S.E.2d at 72 (quoting Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 399, 271 S.E.2d 768,
770 (1980)).

An employer is vicariously liable for injuries caused by an employee's torts
committed within the scope of employment. Froneberger v. Smith, 406 S.C. 37, 52,
748 S.E.2d 625, 633 (Ct. App. 2013). "An act falls within the scope of the
[employee]'s employment if it was reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose
of the [employee]'s employment, and it was done in furtherance of the [employer]'s
business." Id. (quoting Wade v. Berkeley Cnty., 330 S.C. 311, 319, 498 S.E.2d 684,
688 (Ct. App. 1998)). "On the other hand, if the [employee] acts for some
independent purpose of his own, wholly disconnected with the furtherance of his
[employer]'s business, his conduct falls outside the scope of his employment." Kase
v. Ebert, 392 S.C. 57, 61, 707 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Crittenden
v. Thompson-Walker Co., 288 S.C. 112, 116, 341 S.E.2d 385, 387 (Ct. App. 1986)).

"Under certain circumstances, an employer is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to control an employee acting outside the scope of his employment."
Degenhart v. Knights of Columbus, 309 S.C. 114, 116, 420 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1992).
A claim for negligent supervision arises when: (1) the employee intentionally harms
another while on the employer's premises or while using the employer's chattel, (2)
the employer knows or has reason to know of the employer's ability to control the
employee, and (3) the employer "knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control." See id. at 116–17, 420 S.E.2d at 496.

Appellants' attempt to derive a legal duty based on the appearance of Blue
Moon's name on the building permit must fail because Blue Moon never agreed to
construct a dwelling for Appellants. See Breedlove, 377 S.C. at 424, 661 S.E.2d at
72 ("[T]he undertaking or agreement to construct a dwelling for another is what
creates the duty to exercise and use due care in the construction of that dwelling.").
Undisputed evidence in the record indicates that Blue Moon did not know Caufield
used its license to apply for the building permit, and Appellants have offered no
evidence that Blue Moon agreed to build the home for Appellants or for anyone else.
Further, Caufield's use of Blue Moon's license to apply for a permit to construct a
new home when Blue Moon was not in the business of constructing new homes was
"not reasonably foreseeable so as to create a duty" on behalf of Blue Moon. Id. at
425, 661 S.E.2d at 73. Therefore, the trial court properly found Blue Moon neither
owed nor breached any legal duty, which defeated Appellants' negligence claim.

However, even if a duty existed, the trial court correctly determined Blue
Moon is not vicariously liable for any torts committed by Caufield related to the
construction of the Foxhound Road home because Caufield did not act within the
scope of his employment when he applied for the building permit. Blue Moon does
not and has never constructed new homes. Thus, applying for a permit to construct
a new residential home was not "reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of"
Caufield's employment, nor was it "done in furtherance" of Blue Moon's business.
Froneberger, 406 S.C. at 52, 748 S.E.2d at 633 (quoting Wade, 330 S.C. at 319, 498
S.E.2d at 688). Similarly, Blue Moon was not negligent in its supervision of
Caufield because Blue Moon did not know and had no reason to know that Caufield
misused its license: it is not foreseeable that an employee responsible for directing
and reviewing the work performed under his employer's license would go behind the
employer's back to use that license for a project wholly removed from the employer's
business. 7

For the above-stated reasons, the trial court properly granted Blue Moon's
motion for summary judgment.

C. Right to Cure Act

Because we affirm the trial court's order, we need not address this issue. See
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591,
598 (1999) (appellate court need not address remaining issues when the disposition
of another issue is dispositive).

II. TCT1's Motion for Summary Judgment

7
Evidence in the record confirms that a building permit can be pulled using a
builder's license without the license holder's knowledge.
for a cause of action against real estate licensees for violation of the Act. Isaac v.
Onions, Op. No. 28274 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 23, 2025) (Howard Adv. Sh. No.
16 at 7, 16). Thus, regardless of whether TCT1 violated the RPCDA in this case,
Appellants may not bring a claim under this statute.

Beyond the RPCDA, any remaining duty related to the disclosure statement
is limited to an agent's general duty of disclosure. "A real estate brokerage firm that
provides services through an agency agreement for a client is bound by the duties of
loyalty, obedience, disclosure, confidentiality, reasonable care, diligence, and
accounting . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 40-57-350(A) (Supp. 2024). A buyer's agent
must "[disclose] to the buyer all material adverse facts concerning the transaction
which are actually known to the licensee." § 40-57-350(E)(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. 2024).

Appellants admit they read, examined, and electronically signed the
disclosure statement. They do not argue that their agent had knowledge about the
property beyond the disclosure statement itself. Instead, Appellants argue that their
buyer's agent "failed to inform [them] that the [d]isclosure [s]tatement was
incomplete and the potential ramifications thereof" and that "[the owner's] omission
in answering [disclosure 7] was a material fact that [the agent] failed to [disclose]."
We disagree.

Appellants' agent had no duty to inform Appellants of facts they could have
discovered by simply reading the disclosure statement. See Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank
of S.C. v. Lanford, 313 S.C. 540, 545, 443 S.E.2d 549, 551 (1994) ("The law does
not impose a duty . . . to explain to an individual what he could learn from simply
reading the document."). Appellants cannot blame their agent for their own failure
to examine the statement they signed. See Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354 S.C. 648,
663, 582 S.E.2d 432, 440 (Ct. App. 2003) ("A person signing a document is
responsible for reading the document and making sure of its contents."). Real estate
licensees must disclose what they know or have reason to suspect, but the duty of
disclosure does not require an agent to investigate beyond a disclosure statement to
learn if the information presented is misleading, false, or incomplete.8 Moreover, an

8
This would shift the burden to inspect or investigate from the buyer to the agent,
contrary to the statutory scheme. See, e.g., § 27-50-80 ("This article does not limit
the obligation of the purchaser to inspect the physical condition of the
property . . . . The real estate licensee, whether acting as listing agent or selling
agent, has no duty to inspect . . . ."); § 40-57-350(E)(1)(b)(iii) ("Nothing in this
chapter may limit a buyer's obligation to inspect the physical condition of the
property which the buyer may purchase[.]"); § 40-57-350(G)(l) (Supp. 2024) ("A
owner's failure to fully complete the disclosure statement—i.e., the fact that
disclosure 7 was left blank in this case—is not itself a materially adverse fact. To
the extent that the disclosure statement hinted there were underlying issues with the
home, it was Appellants' duty, alone, to discover these defects. Hiltabidle, 381 S.C.
at 519, 673 S.E.2d at 832 ("[T]he Legislature places the duty of performing such an
inspection or investigation squarely on the shoulders of the buyer.").

In sum, Appellants cannot place the blame on their real estate agent because
they "shut their eyes and contract[ed] for the purchase of a house" despite reviewing
and signing a disclosure statement with missing disclosures. See Watts v. Monarch
Builders, Inc., 272 S.C. 517, 519, 252 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1979). TCT1's agent had no
duty to inform Appellants of the content of the disclosure statement they signed, and
for this reason, the trial court properly granted TCT1's summary judgment motion.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the trial court's grant of Respondents' motions for summary
judgement is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

licensee is not obligated to discover latent defects . . . ."); Chastain v. Hiltabidle, 381
S.C. 508, 519, 673 S.E.2d 826, 832 (Ct. App. 2009) (discussing statutes concerning
real estate licensees and stating that they do "not have a duty to inspect or investigate
the physical condition of a piece of property for the purpose of confirming or
denying statements made by a seller in a disclosure statement"); id. ("Rather, the
Legislature places the duty of performing such an inspection or investigation
squarely on the shoulders of the buyer.").

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Zachary Leland Moody and Kristina L. Moody,
Appellants,

Of Which ServPro of Pickens County d/b/a Blue Moon
Enterprises, Inc. and TCT1, LLC d/b/a Keller Williams
Western Upstate, are the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001529

Appeal From Greenville County
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-284
Heard April 17, 2025 – Filed August 6, 2025

AFFIRMED
Townes Boyd Johnson, III and Christian Hill Thorndike,
both of Townes B. Johnson III, LLC, of Greenville, for
Appellants.

Robert T. Lyles, Jr. and Allen Leland DuPre, both of
Lyles & Associates, LLC, of Sullivan's Island, for
Respondent ServPro of Pickens County.

Daniel L. Draisen, of The Injury Law Firm, PC, of
Anderson, and John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Thompson
Sullivan LLC, of Columbia, both for Respondent TCT1,
LLC.

1
The summary judgment motions were granted by separate judges.
2
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-59-810 to -860 (2011).
3
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-50-10 to -110 (2007 & Supp. 2024).
statement) to Emery. Emery shared the form with Appellants, who signed it on
January 20, 2017. Lopez did complete disclosure 7 on the disclosure statement,
which refers to the "foundation, slab, fireplaces, chimneys, wood stoves, floors,
basement, windows, driveway, storm windows/screens, doors, ceilings, interior
walls, exterior walls, sheds, attached garage, carport, patio, deck, walkways, fencing,
or other structural components including modifications."

Appellants allege Caufield devised a plan with Lopez, Lopez's husband
Leopoldo Hernandez, who worked for Santa Fe Construction, and another Santa Fe
employee to construct and sell shoddy homes using Blue Moon's license.4
Appellants claim Blue Moon either knew about the plan or should have known
because its employee, contractor's license, and funds were used to construct homes.5

On April 28, 2020, Appellants filed this lawsuit against Blue Moon and TCT1,
amongst others. Appellants brought causes of action against Blue Moon for
conspiracy, breach of implied warranty, negligence, negligent supervision, and
equitable indemnity. Appellants brought causes of action against TCT1 for
negligence in discharging agency duties and breach of fiduciary duty.

4
Appellants obtained a judgment against Caufield for $297,809.41 in 2020.
5
Before filing the present lawsuit, Appellants filed a complaint against Blue Moon
with the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (SCLLR).
Blue Moon cooperated with the investigation and informed SCLLR that Caufield
used its license to construct the Foxhound Road home without its knowledge. After
investigating, SCLLR dismissed the complaint against Blue Moon.
Blue Moon filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1)
Appellants had no evidence that Blue Moon participated in civil conspiracy; (2) Blue
Moon did not build or sell the Foxhound Road home, which is required for any
implied warranty to arise; (3) Appellants had no evidence that Blue Moon violated
a legal duty owed to them to support a negligence claim; (4) Appellants were not
subjected to a claim by a third-party and as such had no claim for indemnity; and (5)
Appellants' claims were barred by the South Carolina Notice and Opportunity to
Cure Construction Dwelling Defects Act (Right to Cure Act). The trial court granted
the motion and also denied Appellants' motion to alter or amend the judgment.

Appellants filed separate notices of appeal from the circuit court's respective
orders denying their respective motions to alter or amend, which this court
consolidated into this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Blue Moon's Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Implied Warranty

B. Negligence and Negligent Supervision

6
Appellants admit they did not know who participated in the construction of the
home when they bought it, nor did they take any steps to ensure it was constructed
by a licensed builder.
"[T]he undertaking or agreement to construct a dwelling for another is what
creates the duty to exercise and use due care in the construction of that dwelling."
Breedlove, 377 S.C. at 424, 661 S.E.2d at 72 (adopting the circuit court's holding).
"The key inquiry is foreseeability, not privity. . . . By placing [a] product into the
stream of commerce, the builder owes a duty of care to those who will use his
product, so as to render him accountable for negligent workmanship." Id. at 424–
25, 661 S.E.2d at 72 (quoting Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 399, 271 S.E.2d 768,
770 (1980)).

For the above-stated reasons, the trial court properly granted Blue Moon's
motion for summary judgment.

C. Right to Cure Act

II. TCT1's Motion for Summary Judgment

The trial court correctly granted TCT1's motion for summary judgment
because TCT1 did not owe Appellants a legal duty to ensure the disclosure statement
was complete. First, our supreme court recently held the RPCDA does not provide
for a cause of action against real estate licensees for violation of the Act. Isaac v.
Onions, Op. No. 28274 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 23, 2025) (Howard Adv. Sh. No.

7
Evidence in the record confirms that a building permit can be pulled using a
builder's license without the license holder's knowledge.
16 at 7, 16). Thus, regardless of whether TCT1 violated the RPCDA in this case,
Appellants may not bring a claim under this statute.

8
This would shift the burden to inspect or investigate from the buyer to the agent,
contrary to the statutory scheme. See, e.g., § 27-50-80 ("This article does not limit
the obligation of the purchaser to inspect the physical condition of the
property . . . . The real estate licensee, whether acting as listing agent or selling
agent, has no duty to inspect . . . ."); § 40-57-350(E)(1)(b)(iii) ("Nothing in this
chapter may limit a buyer's obligation to inspect the physical condition of the
property which the buyer may purchase[.]"); § 40-57-350(G)(l) (Supp. 2024) ("A
licensee is not obligated to discover latent defects . . . ."); Chastain v. Hiltabidle, 381
S.C. 508, 519, 673 S.E.2d 826, 832 (Ct. App. 2009) (discussing statutes concerning
owner's failure to fully complete the disclosure statement—i.e., the fact that
disclosure 7 was left blank in this case—is not itself a materially adverse fact. To
the extent that the disclosure statement hinted there were underlying issues with the
home, it was Appellants' duty, alone, to discover these defects. Hiltabidle, 381 S.C.
at 519, 673 S.E.2d at 832 ("[T]he Legislature places the duty of performing such an
inspection or investigation squarely on the shoulders of the buyer.").

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the trial court's grant of Respondents' motions for summary
judgement is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

real estate licensees and stating that they do "not have a duty to inspect or investigate
the physical condition of a piece of property for the purpose of confirming or
denying statements made by a seller in a disclosure statement"); id. ("Rather, the
Legislature places the duty of performing such an inspection or investigation
squarely on the shoulders of the buyer.").

Zachary Moody v. ServPro of Pickens County

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