Matthew Williams, 215077 v. SCDPPPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Matthew Williams, #215077, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and
Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001585

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-243
Heard May 6, 2025 – Filed July 16, 2025

AFFIRMED

Axton Dylan Crolley and Charles Harold West, Jr., both
of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP; Stuart M.
Andrews, Jr., of Burnette, Shutt & McDaniel, PA, all of
Columbia; and Shirene Carole Hansotia, of Mount
Pleasant, for Appellant.

General Counsel Matthew C. Buchanan and Legal
Counsel Jessica Elizabeth Kinard, both of S.C.
Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Services, of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Matthew Williams appeals from an Administrative Law Court
(ALC) decision denying Williams's motion for a new parole hearing following a
denial by the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services
(SCDPPPS). The key issue is whether members of the parole board (Board) were
required to deliberate his case on the record when they subsequently issued a written
notice of rejection detailing their reasons for the denial in conformity with case law
and statutory requirements. We hold that on-the-record deliberations are not
required by the law, and we affirm the ALC's ruling.

BACKGROUND

In 1996, Williams was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with
the possibility of parole. In 2021, Williams appeared with his attorney for a parole
hearing. Williams's attorney submitted a packet of materials to the Board on his
behalf prior to the hearing. During the hearing, the Board heard a presentation from
Williams's attorney and heard testimony from Williams.

The Board unanimously voted to deny parole. The members did not engage in any
deliberations following the presentation but instead moved directly to a vote.
Thereafter, the Board issued a written notice of rejection. The notice recites that the
Board considered: (1) the characteristics of Williams's current offense, his criminal
history, and his disciplinary record; (2) the factors outlined in sections 24-21-640
and 24-21-10(F)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2025); and (3) the factors contained
in Department Form 1212 (Criteria for Parole Consideration). The Board cited the
nature and seriousness of the offense as grounds for denial.

Williams appealed the Board's decision to the ALC. The ALC ordered SCDPPPS
to produce a supplemented record with all documents considered by the Board,
including risk assessment results, a full case summary, notes from the pre-hearing
interview, and any recommendations by the parole agent. Williams argued that the
supplemental record showed the Board did not consider his risk assessment as
required, and his case should therefore be remanded to the Board for them to
consider his risk assessment as required. He further argued that the transcript of the
Board's deliberations was devoid of any mention of the other prescribed criteria, and
the Board's decision was therefore not supported by substantial evidence.
The ALC found "no indication in the record" that the Board gave Williams's record
careful consideration as required by section 24-21-60. However, the ALC denied
Williams's motion to remand, stating that, under Compton v. South Carolina
Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Services, 385 S.C. 476, 685 S.E.2d 175
(2009), the ALC lacked the authority to review the Board's decision because the
decision included the required "boilerplate language" endorsed in Compton. The
ALC further determined that "a careful review of [Williams's] record [was] not
necessary to constitute a routine denial of parole." This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from an ALC decision, the appellate court may only reverse if the
decision is "(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of
the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) affected
by other error of law; (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record; or (f) arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2024). To determine the ALC's decision was
supported by substantial evidence, this court must determine there is evidence in the
record from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the ALC.
Hill v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 389 S.C. 1, 9-10, 698 S.E.2d 612, 617
(2010).

DISCUSSION

Williams appeals the ALC's decision, arguing the Board's failure to engage in
deliberations following the parole hearing shows it did not consider the required
factors, and therefore violated his due process rights. We disagree.
"Parole is a privilege, not a right." Cooper v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon
Servs., 377 S.C. 489, 496, 661 S.E.2d 106, 110 (2008), abrogated on other grounds
by Allen v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 439 S.C. 164, 886 S.E.2d 671 (2023). The parole
board has the sole authority to determine parole eligibility. Id. Under the
Administrative Procedures Act, an administrative law judge "shall not hear an appeal
… involving the denial of parole to a potentially eligible inmate by the Department
of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services." S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-600(D) (Supp.
2024). "The ALC has appellate jurisdiction over any matter where the procedural
requirements for perfecting an appeal have been met." Allen, 439 S.C. at 168, 886
S.E.2d at 672. However, an administrative decision by SCDPPPS is only reviewed
for a denial of the inmate's due process rights. Id. at 168, 886 S.E.2d at 673. An
inmate must allege the denial of a state-created liberty interest to be entitled to relief
for the denial of his due process rights. Id. at 169, 886 S.E.2d at 673. The ALC
may summarily dismiss an appeal if it determines the claim does not implicate a
state-created liberty interest. Id.
In Cooper, our supreme court found the parole board's decision denying parole was
arbitrary and capricious because the parole board "neither offered an explanation nor
indicated that it had considered the statutory criteria of section 24-21-640 and the
fifteen criteria listed on the parole form." 377 S.C. at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112. The
court explained, "[i]f a Parole Board deviates from or renders its decision without
consideration of the appropriate criteria, we believe it essentially abrogates an
inmate's right to parole eligibility and, thus, infringes on a state-created liberty
interest." Id. at 499, 661 S.E.2d at 111. In such a case, the court held the parole
board's decision was not a routine denial of parole, even though the board did not
permanently deny the inmate parole. The court therefore remanded the case for the
parole board to consider the appropriate criteria. Id. at 502, 661 S.E.2d at 113. The
court in Cooper clarified that if, in the future, the parole board "clearly states in its
order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640 and
the fifteen factors published in its parole form, the decision will constitute a routine
denial of parole and the ALC would have limited authority to review the decision
and could summarily dismiss the inmate's appeal." Id. at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112.
In Compton, our supreme court again reiterated the standard set forth in Cooper and
reversed the ALC's decision remanding the matter back to the parole board for more
detailed findings. 385 S.C. at 479, 685 S.E.2d at 177. The court held that the parole
board clearly stated in its notice of rejection that it considered both the statutory
criteria and the criteria set forth in Form 1212, which the court found sufficient to
satisfy the criteria set forth by the court in Cooper. Id.

In this case, SCDPPPS complied with the requirements set forth in Cooper and
Compton by issuing a notice of rejection that adequately stated the grounds for the
denial. We find neither the case law nor the statutory scheme contains any additional
requirement that the Board deliberate on the record. The Board here was given a
copy of all of Williams's materials in advance of the hearing for review, it afforded
Williams and his attorney a full hearing, and it issued a notice of rejection in
conformity with the law. We therefore affirm the ALC's decision. 1

1
The ALC did seem to conflate the issues of jurisdiction and scope of review. The
order states, "This Court's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived from
… Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000) … This Court's duty
and jurisdiction is limited from reviewing the Board's decision to determine if any
evidence in the record supports its statement that the proper factors were
considered." As the court clarified in Allen, the ALC had subject matter jurisdiction
to hear this properly perfected appeal, but a limited scope of review where the inmate
AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

did not allege a state-created liberty interest. In any event, we find the ALC's
decision to affirm the denial of parole was correct where SCDPPPS's notice of
rejection complied with this court's instructions in Cooper and Compton.